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CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, ET.AL., vs. CA & FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO

Facts:

Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad
Provido Elevencionado ("decedent"). Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. The
Regional Trial Court allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.

More than four (4) months later, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings.  Likewise, they
filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. 

The RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition 13 with an
application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC’s Decision. They claimed that they learnt
of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit
their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and
set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.

The CA declared as baseless petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud.

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent’s deliberate omission or
concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will,
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s
offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for
probate.

Issue: Whether there was extrinsic fraud committed against the Petitioners as to justify the petition

Ruling:

There was no extrinsic fraud committed against the Petitioners.

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.
Even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A
perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of
the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the
same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of
the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do
not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the
proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

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ADALIA B. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA FRANCISCO, ESTER FRANCISCO, ADELUISA FRANCISCO and ELIZABETH
FRANCISCO vs. HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena
City and JOSEFINA D. LAGAR

Facts:

Private respondent filed with respondent judge a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land and damages alleging inter
alia that respondent's father caused the land in question titled in his name alone as "widower", after her mother's death, in spite
of the property being conjugal, and then sold it to the predecessor in interest of petitioners from whom they bought the same.

Thereafter, the petitioners failed to appear at the pre-trial. Taking advantage of such absence, private respondent's counsel
move that they be declared in default and that private respondent be allowed to present their evidence. The motion was
granted and after presenting her evidence, counsel rested her case. Respondent judge rendered judgment finding the
evidence insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged and therefore dismissing the complaint.

Private respondent filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging that the insufficiency of her evidence was due to
the fault of her counsel who presented the same without her being fully prepared. Acting on the said motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, respondent judge denied the same for having been filed out of time. Persisting in her effort to pursue her
claim, private respondent filed, thru another new counsel, Atty. Ricardo Rosales, Jr., a petition for relief,

Issue: Whether the petition for relief will prosper

Ruling:

No. The petition for relief will not prosper. Where another remedy is available, as, in fact, private respondent had filed a motion
for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging practically the same main ground of the petition for relief under discussion, which
was denied, what respondent should have done was to take to a higher court such denial. A party who has filed a timely motion
for new trial cannot file a petition for relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies are exclusive of each other. It
is only in appropriate cases where a party aggrieved by a judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial that a
petition for relief can be filed.

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO vs. Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br.
124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and
AVELINO BANAAG

FACTS:

Private respondent Avelino Banaag alleged that he is the registered owner of the disputed property Caloocan City as
evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title. He averred that petitioners Mangahas and Verdejo constructed houses on the
property without his knowledge and consent and that several demands were made, but the same fell on deaf ears as
petitioners refused to vacate the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the matter to the Lupon Tagapayapa for
conciliation. The recourse proved futile since the parties were not able to settle amicably. Banaag then filed an action for
ejectment against Mangahas and Verdejo in MeTC Caloocan City.

Mangahas and Verdejo deny having unlawfully deprived private respondent possession of the contested property. They
claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan
Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by PIADECO’s president
in their favor.

Mangahas and Verdejo also filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property
is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated enjoining the MeTCs of
Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that
the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the
National Capital Region.

The MeTC denied said manifestation and motion, and ratiocinated that the injunction issued by the QC RTC has binding effect
only within the territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the
injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

MeTC ruled in favor of Banaag, stating that Banaag's TCT affords a better right over the property than Mangahas and
Verdejo's Certificate of Occupancy. It ordered Mangahas and Verdejo to : 1) Vacate the premises of the subject prop by
removing the houses they built; 2) pay rentals and; 3) pay for cost of suit. RTC affirmed. CA affirmed. Judgment now final and
executory after lapse of reglementary period of appeal to SC.

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However, during the pendency of the appeal from RTC to CA, Banaag filed a motion to execute the RTC judgment pending
appeal. RTC granted. Mangahas then filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC. Said motion was denied. Sheriff
implemented and enforced the writ of execution. Hence this petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer
For Provisional Remedy.

ISSUE: Jurisdiction of the RTC over the execution. (Where application for execution made)

HELD:

RTC order for execution affirmed. The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated November 10, 1997
which emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should have prompted the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
to suspend the ejectment proceedings then pending before it. It was the petitioners’ contention that the injunction writ issued in
Quezon City is enforceable also in Caloocan City inasmuch as both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in
scope but under Sec. 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits.

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a
branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over
which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Xxx"

Therefore, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied
the petitioners’ Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the
Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate presides.

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC became the law of the
case between the parties. Once an appellate court has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in
subsequent appeal. The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite
time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Mangahas et al are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has no binding
effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at
some point; otherwise there would be no end to litigation.

Instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners’ motion to suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private
respondent of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is
the ministerial duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent
events would render execution of judgment unjust. Petitioners did not allege nor proffer any evidence that this case falls
within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the RTC. Petition is DENIED.

CAGAYAN DE ORO COLISEUM, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO MABANAG, JR. and RICHARD GO KING

FACTS:

Petitioner Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc., obtained a loan executed a promissory note and a mortgage over all its assets and
properties, including a parcel of land.

The loan, together with the promissory note and the mortgage, were later assigned by Maceren to the Commercial Credit
Corporation of Cagayan de Oro (Commercial Credit). Petitioner failed to pay the loan when it became due, hence, the
Commercial Credit commenced foreclosure proceedings on the said parcel of land.

Stockholders of CDO Corp. instituted before CFI Misamis Oriental a petition for injunction against Commercial Credit, the City
Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro and herein petitioner corporation seeking to enjoin the public sale of the corporate property alleging
that the loan was contracted by the president of the corporation, without authority from the stockholders; and that the creditor,
Santiago Maceren, was corporate treasurer and a member of the Board of Directors of petitioner corporation at the time the
loan was obtained.

Parties entered into a compromise agreement which became the basis of a judgment rendered by TC. Commercial Credit filed
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with RTC – CDO, an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. Commercial Credit alleged that petitioner failed to
pay several installments on its loan and left an outstanding balance. TC granted the motion and the Branch Clerk of Court
issued the writ of execution on the personal and real properties of petitioner corporation. 

Petitioner forthwith filed an MR of the Order of Execution alleging that the issuance of the order of execution ex-parte violated
petitioners right to due process; that a hearing should have been conducted on the motion for execution because petitioner had
already made payments with in an overpayment.

TC denied MR, however, reduced petitioners principal obligation. Branch Clerk of issued the writ of execution, prompting
Deputy Provincial Sheriff to publish the notice of auction sale. However, sale did not proceed on said date, however, due to
some internal problems in the office of the sheriff.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the CA an action for annulment of judgment of the TC seeking to set aside the compromise
judgment on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation which it discovered only later. Upon consideration of such total
payments made by petitioner, CA equitably reduced the penalty on the overdue and unpaid installments, and additional
attorneys fees.

Respondent Sheriff Mabanag issued an amended notice of sale setting the sale of the property at public auction on the same
day the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision. At the Auction Sale the property was sold to the highest bidder, herein
respondent Richard Go King.

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Petitioner argued that: (1) the penalty or past due charges on the obligation be applied only after the payment of the principal
and interest, and that the reduced penalty be applied from the time it was to be imposed, instead of from the date the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration; (2) that Commercial Credit, to its advantage, concealed from petitioner the promulgation
of C.B. Circular No. 721 before rendition of the compromise judgment, and as a result of the non-application of said Circular,
petitioners obligation ballooned to P170,000.00; (3) that the auction sale was conducted the day of promulgation of the Court of
Appeals decision substantially amending the amount of judgment debt.

Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion. It, however, granted the motion for reconsideration with respect to the public
auction sale conducted during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals declared the writ of execution, the sheriffs
notice of sale, the public auction sale and the certificate of sale null and void insofar as they were in excess of the judgment as
modified by its decision.  Commercial Credit filed MR, denied.

Both parties filed separate petitions for review. Petitioner’s was denied while the petition of Commercial Credit in G.R. No.
78315 was granted setting aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the compromise judgment of
the trial court.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Consider and Resolve En Banc Herein Motion for Reconsideration in view of the Resolution, the
motion was denied. Meanwhile, during the pendency of these cases respondent Sheriff issued to respondent Go King a Final
Deed of Conveyance over the subject property.

After finality of the decision of the SC decision, petitioner filed before RTC CDO against herein respondents Sheriff Mabanag
and Richard Go King for Remedies from Falsification and Damages. Petitioner alleged that (1) the execution proceedings were
null and void for failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court; (2) the cancellation of petitioners title and the
issuance of another in the name of respondent Go King was made in violation of the Court of Appeals Resolution; and (3)
assuming that the auction sale was valid, petitioner was exercising his right of redemption by consigning with the court the
purchase with the purchase price plus interest in accordance with the Rules of Court. 

Petitioner also filed before the same Branch where a Special Civil Action was instituted in 1979, an Omnibus Motion to Declare
the Judgment Satisfied, Reimburse Bidder or Pay as in Redemption, Etc., praying that the auction sale of the subject property
be declared null and void and that the title over the property in the name of Richard Go King be cancelled and petitioners title
fully restored. In the same pleading, petitioner manifested that on the assumption that the execution proceedings were valid, it
was exercising its right to redeem the property by consigning redemption money in court. It was denied in view of the pendency
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 89-098 before Branch 24. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

The order of denial was lifted and the Omnibus Motion was instituted. The court declared that the resolution of the said motion
shall await the outcome of Civil Case before CDO RTC unless the parties shall have decided to consolidate the two cases.
These were eventually ordered consolidated by the court.

Respondent Go King filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession and a Petition for the Appointment of a
Receiver. Both were opposed by petitioner.

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TC rendered a decision declaring the deed of sale, the final deed of conveyance, and TCT No. T-51704 in the name of
respondent Go King as null and void, and denying respondent Go King’s motion for writ of possession and petition for receiver,
after finding that the property subject of execution was not levied upon, that notices of sale were not posted and that there was
no return of the writ of execution.

On appeal by respondents, CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the civil case. The appellate court found that the case
was a relitigation of the issues already raised and that the notice requirements for the execution sale were validly complied
with. Petitioner’s MR. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Validity of Execution

RULING:

It was found that the execution order was filed with the Register of Deeds only after the execution sale. What was filed with the
Register of Deeds before the execution sale was not the correct order of execution but the earlier order rendered ex-parte.

Since this order was not filed with the Register of Deeds prior to the execution sale, it follows that the levy was not effected and
the execution sale proceeded without a levy.

A lawful levy on execution is indispensable to a valid sale on execution. In other words, a sale, unless preceded by a valid levy,
is void, and the purchaser acquires no title to the property sold. Without a proper levy, the property is not placed under the
authority of the court. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the property subject of execution, hence, it could not transmit
title thereto at the time of the sale. Where in the instant case no jurisdiction was acquired over the subject property, the
execution sale was void and of no legal effect. And the trial court did not err in so ruling.

It appears that petitioner has consigned redemption money to the court a quo  as an alternative cause of action. Private
respondent argues that redemption is inconsistent with the claim of invalidity of the levy and sale. In the case at bar, however,
petitioner has expressly averred that the redemption was made purely on the assumption, not admission, of the validity of the
execution proceedings. Petitioner has consistently questioned the validity of the execution proceedings. It would be unjust to
deprive it of the opportunity to recover its one and only real property by the simple expedient of estoppel despite the express
condition attached to its redemption. After all, the Rules of Court provide that a party may in one pleading set forth two or more
statements of a claim alternatively or hypothetically, either in one or in separate cause of action.

The nullity of the execution proceedings does not discharge petitioners indebtedness to Commercial Credit. The execution
order of November 26, 1986 subsists. Unless petitioner corporation pays the amount determined under said order, execution
proceedings may issue accordingly. Petition is GRANTED.

GREEN ACRES HOLDINGS, INC. vs. VICTORIA P. CABRAL

FACTS:

Cabral filed a case before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking the cancellation of the Emancipation
Patents issued in favor of Spouses Moraga over a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Pending resolution of such
case, Sps. Moraga subdivided the land into 3 small lots and sold them to Filcon. Subsequently, Green Acres purchased 5 lots
from Filcon including the disputed property. A warehouse building complex was constructed therein.

The DARAB issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the titles issued to Sps. Moraga. Thereafter, Green Acres filed a
Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction and Writ of Preliminary Attachment before
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against Cabral, the Spouses Moraga, Filcon, the DARAB and the Registry of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Green Acres sought to quiet its title and alleged that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value, claiming that it had no notice
or knowledge of any adverse claim, lien, or encumbrance on the properties. Neither was it a party to the DARAB proceedings
nor did it have notice of the said proceedings where the DARAB Decision was issued.

After Green Acres presented its evidence, Cabral filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence arguing that the former failed to prove
that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value. She likewise insisted that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject
property since the same is still within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and thus under the jurisdiction
of the DARAB. The trial court granted the demurrer and ordered the case dismissed. Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Green Acres filed with the CA an appeal.

In the meantime, the DARAB decision became final and executory as no further recourse was sought by the Spouses Moraga

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from the denial of their motion for reconsideration. Cabral filed with the PARAD a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of
the DARAB decision, but the same was denied for lack of merit. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Cabral filed
with PARAD a notice of appeal.

Meanwhile, the CA rendered a decision dismissing Green Acres’ appeal. Subsequently, PARAD issued an order denying due
course to Cabral’s notice of appeal and held that the resolution denying the motion for execution is an interlocutory order
against which the remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not an appeal to the DARAB. The PARAD further ruled
that Cabral’s act of impleading Green Acres as additional defendant only in the execution stage is highly irregular and that to
enforce the decision against Green Acres would violate the latter’s right to due process. When Cabral went to the CA on
appeal, the appellate court denied the same. Hence the filing of the present petitions by both Cabral and Green Acres before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON a writ of execution including petitioner Green Acres may be issued considering that the dispositive portion of the DARAB
decision does not include the former as one of the parties in the judgement issued.

RULING:

NO. In the instant case, Cabral seeks the execution of a final and executory DARAB decision that directs the cancellation of the
titles issued in favor of Spouses Moraga and Filcon. Nowhere in the said decision is Green Acres or its titles mentioned.
Nonetheless, in her Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Cabral alleged that Green Acres, like Filcon, “also never acquired
valid title to the subject land” and “[h]ence, its present TCTs thereto should likewise be cancelled (together with the respective
[Emancipation Patents] and TCTs of Sps. Moraga and Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. mentioned in the DARAB Decision) and
reverted back to [her] TCT.” She prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Spouses Moraga and “their
subsequent assigns/successors in interest Filcon Ready Mixed, Inc. and Green Acres Holdings, Inc.”

As correctly ruled by the PARAD and upheld by the appellate court, only the decision of the DARAB as embodied in the
dispositive portion of the decision can be implemented by a writ of execution.

As held in Ingles v. Cantos, 481 SCRA 140 (2006): A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision
to be executed, and the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a settled
general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly with every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It
may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed. Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro
tanto no validity.

ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO

FACTS:

Herein petitioner was substituted in place of her husband in an ejectment case he filed against several defendants,
respondents herein included, with the MTCC in Bacolod City. The defendants were divided into two groups. The defendants in
the 1st group relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land, while the defense of the 2 nd group was
that the plaintiff’s title was not valid because their respective portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras
Strait, and thus their respective areas were subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Upon the parties’ appeal, the RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the
decision of the MTCC. Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA.
Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTC’s decision became final and executory as to them. After CA’s denial of
both the respondents’ appeal and MR, they elevated the case to the SC, but the Court rejected the same.

In the meantime, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties involved.
None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. Subsequently, it issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s
motion. The respondents motion to quash the writ of execution, and a motion to stay the execution of the judgement. They
anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land
belonging to the State. To support their contention, they presented administrative issuances from the DENR. The MTCC
denied both motions and the respondent’s MR.

More than a year after the writ of execution was served, the respondents, led by Tortogo, file a petition for certiorai and
prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the RTC of Negros
Occidental, praying for the annulment of the MTCC decisions. The lower court granted the prayer for a TRO and subsequently
issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her socalled “petition

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for review on certiorari,” seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already
final and executory decision of the MTCC.

RULING:

NO. Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally
applied against the respondents. They could not anymore be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment
through their interposition of new petitions or pleadings. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully
respected, their commencing a new petition in the hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already
fully and finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment, the fruit
and the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the
correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and satisfaction
of the judgment, which would be the life of the law.

To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts,
which thereby increases the costs of litigation. The interest of justice undeniably demanded that we should immediately write
finis to the litigation, for all courts are by oath bound to guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of
the winning party’s right, and to stop any attempt to prolong controversies already resolved with finality.

FRANCISCO LU, vs.  JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, MTC-URDANETA, PANGASINAN, DOMINGO S. LOPEZ,
SHERIFF IV, RTC-URDANETA, PANGASINAN, BRANCH 45 and PRIVATE PROSECUTOR JOSELINO A. VIRAY

FACTS:

Francisco Lu is the defendant in a civil case for ejectment raffled to respondent Judge Orlando Ana F. Siapno of the Municipal
Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. In his administrative complaint, Francisco Lu alleges that he filed an Answer with
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint for ejectment which was later amended. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Dismiss  the
ejectment case on the ground that plaintiffs therein were no longer the owners of the land in question, the same having been
sold to the Shahanis on February 7, 1995 and later transferred in the names of the latter. On September 7, 1995, respondent
Judge Siapno rendered judgment against Lu which decision was allegedly received by Lu's counsel on September 13, 1995. A
notice of appeal was filed on the same day. On September 11, 1995, MTC-Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz issued a Writ of
Execution which was allegedly implemented by the Sheriff who forcibly ejected Lu from the premises.

While on appeal, the Regional Trial Court issued a preliminary mandatory injunction and declared the writ of execution earlier
issued by the MTC to be null and void. The RTC rendered judgment modifying the MTC-judgment by deleting the paragraph
"(I)n accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issue.” Hence, Lu filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, plaintiff's counsel filed on February 19, 1996 a Motion for Execution with MTC which was granted by
respondent Judge Siapno allegedly without notice and hearing. The writ of execution was issued by Clerk of Court Corpuz on
the same day.

Atty. Joselino Viray, plaintiff's counsel, filed an Ex-parte Motion to Withdraw deposit praying that the amount deposited in the
municipal treasurer be withdrawn in order to satisfy the judgment. Said motion was granted. Atty. Viray filed a Motion for
Special Demolition which was likewise granted by respondent Judge Siapno, allegedly without notice and hearing.

Hence, this complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, abdication of official function and gross misconduct.
The case was referred to the RTC for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a Memorandum, the Court Administrator opined that the respondent Judge erred in including in the dispositive portion of his
decision the directive that "(I)n accordance with the Rules, let the Writ of Execution be issued" and by doing so, respondent
Judge had no other intention but to see to it that the decision is "immediately executed" without any further action on the part of
the plaintiffs therein.

ISSUE:

W/N the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law in providing in the dispositive portion the immediate execution
of the judgment

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RULING:

The Court agreed with the Court Administrator that respondent Judge Siapno is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he
rendered judgment providing, in the dispositive portion, for its immediate execution. It should be noted that the Regional Trial
Court, while affirming the judgment of the respondent Judge, nevertheless deleted that portion of the decision providing for
immediate execution. Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of judgment in the decision itself. Section 21 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure likewise provides that the decision of the regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if
immediately executory, there must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for that purpose. In an ejectment case,
the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution can be ordered in disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence,
respondent Judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of malicious intent, however,
cannot completely free respondent Judge from liability. When the law is elementary, so elementary not to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.

BACHRACH CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
FACTS:
Bachrach Corporation entered into two lease contracts with the Philippine government covering two specified areas, Block 180
and Block 185, located at the Manila Port Area, then under the control and management of the Director of Lands, for a term of
ninety-nine years each, the first lease to expire on 19 June 2017 and the other on 14 February 2018. During her tenure,
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 321 transferring the management and administration of the entire Port
Area to herein respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Shortly after its take-over, PPA issued a Memorandum increasing
the rental rates of Bachrach by 1,500%. Bachrach refused to pay the substantial increased rates demanded by PPA.
PPA initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against Bachrach for non-payment of rent. On MeTC rendered a decision ordering
the eviction of Bachrach from the leased premises. Bachrach appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila which,
affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.
Bachrach elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the decision of
the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bachrach; however, the resolution of the motion was put on hold pending
submission of a compromise agreement. When the parties failed to submit the promised compromise agreement, the Court of
Appeals, denied Bachrachs motion for reconsideration. The decision of the appellate court in the ejectment suit became final
and executory.
Meanwhile, while the motion for reconsideration was yet pending with the appellate court, Bachrach filed a complaint against
PPA with the Manila RTC for refusing to honor a compromise agreement said to have been perfected between Bachrach and
PPA during conference that superseded the ejectment case. In its complaint, Bachrach prayed for specific performance.
PPA filed in the RTC a motion for a writ of execution/garnishment in the ejectment case. The next day, Bachrach filed an
application in the specific performance case for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the MeTC from issuing the writ of execution/garnishment. PPA countered by filing a motion for preliminary
hearing on its affirmative defenses which was denied. However, the RTC granted the application of Bachrach for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision nullifying and setting aside the orders of the RTC and ordering
the latter to dismiss the specific performance case.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent judge acted without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against the final and executory resolution of the CA
RULING:
No, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is proper. The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after
a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should
interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence,
when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a
competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant
an injunctive relief.
Evidently, the trial court in the case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its disposition of the specific performance
case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an early implementation of the ejectment writ. As such, the injunction
issued by the RTC is proper and the CA erred in nullifying such decision by the RTC

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Douglas F. Anama vs Court of Appeals, Philippine Savings Bank, Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co and the
Register of Deeds, Metro Manila, District II

FACTS:

Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), entered
into a Contract to Buy, on installment basis, the real property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
301276 in the latters name. However, Anama defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB rescinded the said
contract and title to the property remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses
Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of the same
in their names.

Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, cancellation of
transfer certificate of title, and specific performance with damages against PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila, District II. The Respondent Court dismissed Anamas complaint and upheld the validity of the
sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Undaunted, Anama appealed, at first, to this Court, and after failing to obtain
a favorable decision, to the Supreme Court.

On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anamas petition and sustaining the validity of
the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its decision became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Pursuant
thereto, the Co Spouses moved for execution, which was granted by the Respondent Court per its Order, dated
November 25, 2005.

Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the Respondent Courts November 25, 2005 Order arguing that the Co
Spouses motion for execution is fatally defective. He averred that the Spouses motion was pro forma because it
lacked the required affidavit of service and has a defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap of paper. The
Respondent Court, however, denied Anamas motion(s) for reconsideration.

The petitioner questioned the RTC Order before the CA for taking judicial cognizance of the motion for execution filed
by Spouses Co, which was without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties and its lack of the mandatory affidavit
of service.

The CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It reasoned out that the issue on the validity of the deed of sale
between respondents, PSB and the Spouses Co, had long been laid to rest considering that the January 29, 2004
Decision of this Court became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of right on
the part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing a final and
executory decision. The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a motion are
mandatory requirements, the Spouses Cos motion for execution of a final and executory judgment could be acted
upon by the RTC ex parte, and therefore, excused from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing when they filed their motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC.

RULING:

No. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless
piece of paper, which should not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon
by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement
of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the judgment sought to be
executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a
writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty
on the part of the RTC are based on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. The records clearly
show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by, petitioners counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta
Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a signed stamped received mark appearing on said pleading. The records are
bereft of proof showing any written denial from petitioners counsel of its valid receipt on behalf of its client. Neither is there
proof that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally withdrawn its appearance as petitioners counsel-of-

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record. Thus, there was compliance with the rules. It is undisputed that the August 21, 1991 RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
44940 is already final and executory. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are
deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing
party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.

MARIA G. BALUYUT, BEATRIZ G. DAVID, CONSOLACION G. ZAMORA, PURITA G. TONGOL, LUZ G. VIRAY, JOSE S.
GUIAO & JESUS GUIAO vs. RODOLFO GUIAO, TRINIDAD G. MANDAL, SPOUSES NICOLAS TUBIL & ILUMINADA
CANLAS

FACTS:

On July 7, 1988, plaintiffs (herein petitioners) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, a complaint against
defendants (herein respondents) seeking to declare null and void the donation of a 245.42 square meter portion of the property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4528, executed by plaintiff Rosario S. Vda. De Guiao in favor of defendants Rodolfo
Guiao and Trinidad G. Mandal, as well as the separate sale of said portion by the defendants in favor of their co-defendants
spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas likewise, as null and void.

The Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga declared the Donation of Real Property Inter vivos executed by plaintiff
Rosario S. Vda. De Guiao in favor of respondents Trinidad Mandal and Rodolfo Guiao as null and void. In effect, it also
cancelled the sale of the subject property by respondents Mandal and Guiao in favor of respondents Spouses Nicolas Tubil
and Iluminada Canlas. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint.
Subsequently, spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession. On the other
hand, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash. Petitioners then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court also dismissed the petition on the ground that the
trial court did not commit an error in issuing the writ of possession in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession issued conforms to the essence of the judgment of ownership.

RULING:

Yes. As discussed above, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in denying the notice of appeal on the
premise that the Supreme Court has allowed an exception to the rule that only final judgments or orders shall be subject to
appeal when in the afore-cited case of Paulino vs. Court of Appeals, it ruled that when in the opinion of the defeated party, the
order of execution varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, he may appeal the order.

However, a perusal of the records will show that the instant case does not fall under the above-stated exception. In this case,
the writ of possession clearly does not vary the terms of the judgment which affirmed the validity of the donation as well as the
subsequent sale. As the appellate court correctly observed, by virtue of a valid donation in favor of respondents Rodolfo Guiao
and Trinidad Mandal, ownership over the subject property had been transferred to the latter. In the same vein, by virtue of the
valid sale made by the aforenamed respondents in favor of respondent spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas, the latter
became the owners of the same. One of the attributes of ownership is possession; it follows, that respondent spouses, being
the owners of the subject property, are entitled to possession of the same.

Clearly, the writ of possession issued by the trial court does not vary the terms of the judgment attributing ownership of the
subject property to respondent spouses. On the contrary, said writ of possession conforms to the essence of the judgment of
ownership.

Judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto; and, where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land
should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on
his claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party
has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership, which was rejected. In such a case, a writ
of execution would be required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the property. Here, there is no
allegation, much less proof, that petitioners have any right to possess the land independent of their claim of ownership. This is
in conformity with Section 47 (c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (c) In any other
litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in
a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been adjudged, or which was actually and

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necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCECOMPANY, LTD., vs. TOYOTA BEL-AIR, INC.

FACTS:

Toyota entered into a Contract of Lease over a 3,700-square meter lot and building owned by Insular Life in Pasong
Tamo Street, Makati City, for a 5-year period, from April 16, 1992 to April 15, 1997. Upon expiration of the
lease, Toyota remained in possession of the property. Despite repeated demands, Toyota refused to vacate the
property. Thus, Insular Life filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against Toyota in the MeTC. MeTC rendered in favor of
Insular Life.

Insular Life filed a Motion for Execution of the decision. Toyota filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision however, both parties
later filed separate motions to withdraw their respective appeals. MeTC approved the withdrawal of notice of appeal of both
parties and issued a Writ of Execution.

Deputy Sheriff of the MeTC executed the writ by levying on Toyota's personal and real properties, and garnishing its bank
accounts. Toyota filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief in the RTC and charged the MeTC with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution since the writ amended the dispositive portion of the decision it sought to
execute by giving retroactive effect to the payment of reasonable compensation of P585,640.00 by the inclusion of the phrase
from April 15, 1997.

MeTC issued an Order, clarifying paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 3, 1998 to read as: 2. to pay
reasonable compensation in the amount of P585,640.00 as of April 15, 1997 until possession of the subject premises is
surrendered to plaintiff.

Five days later, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, holding that the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Writ of Execution dated August 12, 1998 by giving retroactive effect to the reasonable compensation judgment of
P585,640.00 by inserting the date April 15, 1997 which was not provided for in the dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision;
that the clarificatory order issued by the MeTC did not cure the ambiguity in the decision since it omitted the phrase a month as
originally stated in the Decision; that considering the Writ of Execution is void, the levy effected by the Sheriff is also void; and
that consignation of rentals is proper since Toyota has been in possession of the property since July 3, 1998.

MeTC issued its second clarificatory order to correct paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated July 3, 1998 to
read as: 2. [t]o pay reasonable compensation at the rate of P585,640.00 a month as of April 15, 1997 until possession of
the subject premises is surrendered to the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction when it declared
void the writ of execution issued by the MeTC.

RULING:

Yes. RTC erred in giving due course to Toyota's petition for certiorari.  The rule is that before a petition for certiorari can be
brought against an order of the lower court, all remedies available in that court must first be exhausted. Thus, for the special
civil action for certiorari to prosper, there must be no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The court must be given sufficient opportunity to correct the error it may have committed. The reason for this rule is that
issues, which courts of first instance are bound to decide, should not be taken summarily from them and submitted to an
appellate court, without first giving the lower courts an opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation.

Second, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a).where there is ambiguity or uncertainty,
the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision
must find support from the decisions ratio  decidendi; and (b).where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the
issue is found in the body of the decision.
The Court finds that the exception applies to the instant case. The RTC should have referred to the body of the decision for
purposes of construing the reasonable compensation judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support
from the decisions ratio  decidendi. In the present case the omission of the award of payment of rental from April 15, 1997 was
obviously through mere inadvertence. The pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law of the MeTC bear out that upon
the termination of the lease on April 15, 1997, Toyota's possession of the property became unlawful; thus, from that date,
payment of rents must be reckoned. The importance of April 15, 1997 as termination date of the lease was emphasized by
the MeTC in the body of its Decision.
Finally, the Court cannot help but call the RTCs attention to the prejudice it has wittingly or unwittingly caused Insular Life by
voiding the entire writ of execution when what was assailed was simply the inclusion of the phrase from April 15, 1997 in the
reasonable compensation judgment of the MeTC. The order for Toyota to vacate the lease properties and return possession
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thereof to Insular Life, and pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses was not assailed and should have been enforced.
Toyota misused all known technicalities and remedies to prolong the proceedings in a simple ejectment case. The equitable
remedy provided by the summary nature of ejectment proceedings has been frustrated by Toyota to the great prejudice of
Insular Life and the time of this Court.
The action of the RTC in giving due course to Toyota's petition for certiorari prolonged the litigation and unnecessarily delayed
the case, in the process causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Petition is GRANTED. The Writ of Execution is
valid.

BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED vs. THELMA U. LEE, MAYBELLE L. LIM, DANIEL U. LEE, SAMUEL U.
LEE and MIDAS DIVERSIFIED EXPORT CORPORATION,

FACTS:

Petitioner is a foreign corporation engaged in the banking business in the Philippines while respondent Midas is a corporation
organized under Philippine laws. Individual respondents are the owners, directors, and managers of Midas.

Petitioner provided Midas a credit line of about $2,000,000. When Midas refused to pay its outstanding obligation, petitioner,
filed with the RTC of Makati City, an Amended Complaint for Sum of Money with an Urgent Application for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against respondents. The trial court found that a partial judgment can be rendered. The only remaining
factual issues would be: (1) petitioners entitlement to the writ of preliminary attachment; and (2) the parties claim for damages
against each other. In a Partial Decision, the trial court ruled ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of
US$1,998,554.60 plus legal rate of interest at 12% per annum effective upon the filing of the complaint on 12 March 1998 until
fully paid and ordering the same individual defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the sum of US$800,000.00
representing the account of MHI plus legal rate of interest at 12% per annum effective upon the filing of the amended complaint
on 7 May 1998 until fully paid.

Trial court, however amended the fallo and the appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court but it ruled that a partial
decision cannot be the subject of execution until after judgment is rendered on the entire case. Trial court upheld the validity of
the writ of preliminary attachment and dismissing defendants claim for damages for lack of evidence and then issued the
assailed Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.

However, respondents filed anew before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining
Order impugning the February 12, 2003 Order of the trial court. It was granted and held that the assailed Order failed to state
good reasons to justify immediate execution.

ISSUE:

Assuming that the Partial Decision is not final and executory, whether or not there are nonetheless good reasons justifying its
execution pending appeal.

RULING:

No merit in the petition. When the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, judgment had already been rendered on the
remaining factual issues such that the partial judgment had become a complete judgment. Thus, a writ of execution could
already issue. However, since appeal had been duly perfected, though not yet finally resolved, execution was not a matter of
right, but of discretion provided good reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ must be
stated in a special order after due hearing.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case
and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before
the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

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The assailed Order of the trial court failed to state good reasons for the issuance of the writ. The trial court deemed that
execution should issue as a matter of right because it mistakenly held that the partial decision had become final and executory.
The assailed Order of the trial court, which granted the motion for execution pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of
Section 2, Rule 39. Where the order of execution is not in conformity with the rules, the same is null and void. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals did not err in declaring the said Order nullified. The assailed decision which nullified the order of RTC is
affirmed.

Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation

Facts:

Philex contracted a manpower audit which revealed that 214 of its employees are redundant. Thus Philex undertook a
retrenchment that resulted from the termination of the petitioners employment. Consequently petitioner file a case for illegal
dismissal against the respondent which was submitted for arbitration upon the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in
CAR, Baguio City.

Voluntary Arbitrator Juan Valdez rendered his decision in favor of the petitioners for reinstatement with backwages in 1994.
Philex Appealed to the CA which was denied for lack of merit. Philex elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari, which we denied in a resolution dated January 14, 1998. Entry of judgment was made on April 27, 1998.

On august 14 1998, Philex filed a manifestation and motion for leave to offer separation pay to petitioners, in lieu of
reinstatement, before the Office of Voluntary Arbitrator Juan Valdez. Philex alleged that petitioners positions no longer existed
and that there arose strained relations between the parties that effectively barred reinstatement.

Arbitrator Juan Valdez granted Philexs motion in his order dated December 11, 1998 for separation pay and backwages.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground that Arbitrator Juan Valdez acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction. On July 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of
Arbitrator Valdez. It likewise denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Philex aver that the CA committed and error of
law in affirming the December 11, 1998 order of voluntary arbitrator Juan Valdez altering his March 5, 1994 decision which
had already become final and executory on April 27, 1998.

Issue:

Whether or not CA committed an error of law when it affirms VA Juan Valdez's decision dated December 11, 1998 which
altered and modified the decision dated March 5, 1994 which had become final and executory on April 27, 1998.

Ruling:

A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land.

One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events
present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law,
the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.

Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by
justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of
the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable
grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain
circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision
has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its
execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.

Considering the circumstances in the present case, we find that the only issue to be resolved is whether the supervening
events are grave enough to warrant a modification in the execution of the judgment. Both the voluntary arbitrator and the Court
of Appeals found that reinstatement is no longer possible due to the fact that respondent has been continuously suffering
business losses and reducing the number of its employees pending litigation, and so the positions held by petitioners were
abolished as a cost-cutting measure. Petitioners argue, however, that to excuse the respondent from reinstating the petitioners
would be to allow it to do indirectly what it was not allowed to do directly the retrenchment of the petitioners. They add that what
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is so scheming about this ploy is that respondent now tries to justify its refusal to reinstate the petitioners by its very own act of
abolishing their positions.

Despite our sympathy for the workers plight, however, we find no legal support for their opposition to the conclusion and
findings of the voluntary arbitrator and the Court of Appeals. On record, there is no showing that the abolition of the petitioners’
positions was capricious or whimsical. The appellate court, as well as the voluntary arbitrator, based their decisions on
applicable law and the evidence. As confirmed by the appellate court, the voluntary arbitrator also found that petitioners’
reinstatement had become not only inappropriate but also impossible.

David vs. CA

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, with Judge Ricardo Diaz, then presiding, issued a writ of attachment over real
properties covered by TCT Nos. 80718 and 10289 of private respondents. In his Decision dated October 31, 1979, Judge Diaz
ordered private respondent Afable to pay petitioner P66,500.00 plus interest from July 24, 1974, until fully paid, plus P5,000.00
as attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

On June 20, 1980, however, Judge Diaz issued an Order amending said Decision, so that the legal rate of interest should be
computed from January 4, 1966, instead of from July 24, 1974. The amended Decision in the decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendant, Valentin Afable Jr., ordering him to pay to the plaintiff the
sum of P66,500.00 plus the legal rate of interest thereon from January 4, 1966 up to the time the same is fully paid plus the
amount of P5,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the costs of the suit. ordering the private respondent Afable to pay
the petitioner the sum of P66,500.00 plus the legal rate of interest thereon from July 24, 1974, plus the amount of P5,000.00 as
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit.

Respondent Afable appealed to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. In both instances, the decision of the
lower court was affirmed. Entries of judgment were made and the record of the case was remanded to Branch 27, presided at
that time by respondent Judge Edgardo P. Cruz, for the final execution of the Decision dated October 31, 1979, as amended by
the Order dated June 20, 1980.

Upon petitioners motion, respondent Judge issued an Alias Writ of Execution by virtue of which respondent Sheriff Melchor P.
Pea conducted a public auction. Sheriff Pea informed the petitioner that the total amount of the judgment is P270,940.52. The
amount included a computation of simple interest. Petitioner, however, claimed that the judgment award should be
P3,027,238.50, because the amount due ought to be based on compounded interest.

Although the auctioned properties were sold to the petitioner, Sheriff Pea did not issue the Certificate of Sale because there
was an excess in the bid price in the amount of P2,941,524.47, which the petitioner failed to pay despite notice. This excess
was computed by the Sheriff on the basis of petitioners bid price of P3,027,238.50 minus the amount of P270,940.52 computed
in the judgment award.

Petitioner filed a Motion praying that respondent Judge Cruz issue an order directing respondent Sheriff Pea to prepare and
execute a certificate of sale in favor of the petitioner, placing therein the amount of the judgment as P3,027,238.50, the amount
he bid during the auction which he won and that compounding interest should apply.

Judge Cruz denied petitioners motion stating that Considering that plaintiffs P3,027,238.50 bid exceeds the amount of his
judgment, then he is not entitled to a certificate of sale without paying the excess in the sum of P2,756,198.66

Issue:

W/N when the case was remanded to the trial court, respondent Judge, abused his discretion when he modified the Decision
and amended its dispositive portion

Ruling:

When a decision has become final and executory, the court may no longer amend, revoke, nor alter the dispositive portion, and
the only power of the court is to order its execution. But the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the courts to order its execution is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions. One exception is that where
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facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or
reason which renders the final and executory decision of the court no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify
or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.

In the present case, after the case was remanded to the lower court, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias Writ of
Execution. The motion was only finally resolved on July 5, 1993. When Central Bank Circular No. 416 took effect on July 29,
1974, the suit was still pending. Hence, when respondent Judge ordered the computation of legal interest for the execution of
the amended October 31,1979 order, he correctly took judicial notice of the Courts pronouncement in Reformina vs. Tomol, Jr.,
139 SCRA 260.

In Reformina, the Court applied Central Bank Circular No. 416 which took effect on July 29,1974, pursuant to P.D. 116,
amending Act. 2655 (Usury Law) and raising the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per annum. Respondent Judge followed
Reformina and did not err in modifying the Order of October 31, 1979. The passage of the Central Bank Circular No. 416 was a
supervening event which happened after the decision had become executory. Had respondent Judge failed to order the
assailed amendment, the result would have been iniquitous. Hence, here, no error nor grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed to respondent Judges order dated June 30, 1980. Likewise, respondent appellate court could not be faulted for
affirming said order of respondent Judge.

GENEROSO SALIGUMBA,  ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALERIA SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO
SALIGUMBA, SR., vs. MONICA PALANOG

Facts:

Spouses Palanogs filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, Spouses Saligumbas with the RTC.
In the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as
owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly
prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question.

Eliseo Saligumba Sr. died in 1984, while Valeria Saligumba also passed away the following year. However, Atty. Miralles, failed
to inform the court of the said events. Further, he was appointed as an MCTC judge and told the court that he would withdraw
as counsel for the spouses Saligumbas because of it. But, on the date of the presentation of evidence of the spouses
Saligumbas, only spouses Palanogs and their counsel appeared. Thus, upon motion of the spouses Palanogs, the spouses
Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their evidence.

After a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision. RTC declared
spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordered spouses Saligumbas, their agents, representatives and all
persons acting in privity with them to vacate the premises and restore possession to spouses Palanogs.

Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court ruled that since more
than five years had elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. 
Thus, Monica Palanog, now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the RTC decision on 1987 which she
claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and
Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the revival of the 1987 judgment. The trial court ruled that the
non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject was the exclusive property of
defendant Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased parents. The death of her husband, Eliseo Saligumba,
Sr., did not change the complexion of the ownership of the property that would require his substitution. The
spouses Saligumbas children, who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while Valeria Saligumba was still
alive. The trial court further found that when defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not inform the
court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to
the negligence of counsel. Petitioners elevated the matter directly to the Supreme Court. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the revival of judgment in this case was proper considering that the defendants in the action for revival were not
the original contending party in the original case.

Ruling:

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Yes. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment
which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is
not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the first
judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property
case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.

In the instant case, the 1987 judgment of the RTC had been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time with no motion
for reconsideration nor was an appeal having been filed. Furthermore, there was no formal withdrawal received and approved
by the court from Atty. Miralles as the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas at that time, thus, since there was no such formal
withdrawal, he remained the counsel for the spouses Saligumbas until the RTC rendered judgment. His acts bind his clients
and the latter’s successors-in-interest. Additionally, it was shown on record that Eliseo Saligumba Jr.was also furnished copies
of the  trial court’s orders and notices. It is also clear that in the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have
not shown much interest in the case

It is also important to take note that the complaint filed at that time was an action for quieting of title with damages which is an
action involving real property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the
death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
for the procedure, thus:

Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved
in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order
the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court,
after receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal
representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal representative or heir to appear, nor did
any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure
the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever asked to be substituted.

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