Zimmerman 1

Andrew Zimmerman

Professor Black

Hist-52b

24 November 2003

Napoleon: Leader of the Revolutionary Army

Napoleon once said “You engage and then you wait and see.”1 This statement

summed up much of his military ideology. Napoleon did not envision the entire battle in his

mind in advance and then execute it; rather he went on to the field with a large mass of soldiers

and used his instinct and control over his army when the action began.2 Utilizing this strategy

required a large number of loyal soldiers and competent Marshals who could control and

command those soldiers. It was Napoleon’s belief in the ideals of the French revolution and

meritocracy that enabled him to raise a citizen army that was strong and loyal, and had one of the

greatest officer cores of his time. Both of these factors contributed greatly to his military success.

Napoleon’s military strategy was to act based upon the situation at hand, and to be able to

change strategies in mid-battle. His strategy was largely based upon taking risks and guesses that

were sometimes wrong.3 For example at Ulm, Napoleon “blitzkreiged into thin air”4 based on his

miscalculation of the location of the Austrian army. Without a carefully planned strategy,

Napoleon required well trained marshals and a great number of soldiers to fix the blunder. What

saved him in this battle, besides his amazing ability to scramble, was his strength in numbers and

his commanders who carried out his orders swiftly. In this entire move against the Austrians,

Napoleon merely laid out the general scheme with objectives for the corps, the rest was up to the

1
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1987), 1.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., 2.
4
Ibid., 80.
 Zimmerman 2

marshals.5 Furthermore as a result of his greater numbers, he was able to send enough troops

under Murat, Ney, and Lannes to re-cross the Danube and engage the Austrians at Ulm.6 It was

at Ulm, the Austrians surrendered and Napoleon emerged victorious.

After the French revolution and the destruction of the aristocracy, class distinctions

became increasingly less significant. When Napoleon came into power many of his meritocratic

ideas became the law. These ideas were greatly reflected in the consulate reforms. The consulate

reforms allowed citizens to rise in all parts of government services based upon their abilities and

to receive money to serve in their positions.7 This became know as the doctrine of “careers open

to talent”. The doctrine of careers open to talent allowed men to rise up in government or the

military regardless of their origins. Furthermore, they could now afford to hold these positions,

because they were receiving money to work. In all of Napoleon’s dependant states a plan of

reform similar to that of France was initiated.8 Thus, with each victory came the ideals of the

French revolution.

The ideals of the revolution that Napoleon secured into law gave French soldiers

something to fight for. The French army was an army of liberty. It was an army free from

privilege and class distinction. The soldiers who fought in the army did so to spread the

revolution to other parts of Europe. Napoleon’s ideals were viewed by them as a representations

and affirmations of the revolution. This bred loyalty and commitment. This placed the French

army at an advantage over the other armies during that time period. The armies of other

European countries “reflect[ed] the feudal politics they served-their officer corps were composed

largely if not exclusively, of aristocrats and gentry, while the rank and file tended to come from

5
Thomas E. Griess, The Wars of Napoleon (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1985), 44.
6
Ibid.
7
R.R. Palmer et al, “The French Revolution,” in A History of the Modern World (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002),
385.
8
R.R. Palmer et al, “Napoleonic Europe,” in A History of the Modern World (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 401.
 Zimmerman 3

the dregs of society.”9 In these armies the ideology was that “soldiers should be more afraid of

their officers than of the enemy.”10 In other words these soldiers fought less because of their

ideologies than fear of reprimand. In Napoleon’s army, where discipline was relaxed, the soldiers

fought because of their dedication to “La Patrie”, the nation.11 The officers and the soldiers were

citizens whose origins came from every level of society, and were fighting together for the

liberty they believed in. As a result, French soldiers had a greater willingness to fight the enemy

and there were fewer deserters.12 Napoleon could risk sending his troops on prolonged pursuits,

because he was confident that a majority of them would continue fighting to the end.13 One of the

French army’s greatest pursuits was the one that occurred after they defeated the Prussians at

Jena. The Prussians were in full retreat led by their general Hohenlohe. A large group of soldiers

led by Muret, chased after them. “Nipping at Prussian heels all the way,” the French soldiers ran

down the last of the Prussians twenty five miles from the Oder River.14 Hohenlohe, having no

time to find safe haven, was forced to surrender to the French forces.15 The French soldier’s

loyalty and belief in the ideals of the revolution contributed greatly to Napoleons military

success.

In eighteenth century Europe, warfare had been conducted by the aristocrats.16 The

doctrine of “careers open to talent” revolutionized the way the French fought wars. Before the

revolution one could rise up the ranks in the army based upon pedigree. Now pedigree was

simply not enough. Napoleons used Generals that for the first time came from the regular masses

and not from the aristocracy. Only twenty seven percent of Napoleon’s marshals were from

9
David Gates, Warfare in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 48.
10
Ibid., 49
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 50
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Thomas E. Griess, The Wars of Napoleon (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1985), 70.
16
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1987), 4.
 Zimmerman 4

aristocratic families.17 The French revolution had allowed these men to move up the ranks of the

regular army into leadership positions. Massena and Lefebvre are examples of marshals that

came from the regular ranks. Massena was the son of a shopkeeper who was orphaned when he

was six years old.18 When he was seventeen he joined the French army in 1789 and after a series

of promotions became a marshal in 1804.19 Massena contributed to many of Napoleon’s

victories. In 1796, he defeated the Austrians at Montenotte, Deggo and Mondovi.20 In 1797 he

defeated the Archduke of Austria at the Tarvisio pass.21 In 1800, he defeated Suvorov at the

battle of Zurich.22 In 1810, he invaded Portugal and captured Almeida. Massena was known for

his ability to maneuver his regiment better than any of its officers.23 Lefebvre was the son of a

former soldier who became a miller and town constable.24 Following his fathers death in 1763, he

was raised by his uncle.25 In 1773, he enlisted in the French guards. After slowly rising through

the ranks, he became a marshal in 1804.26 He served with distinction at the Battle of Fleurus and

at the battle of Altenkirchen.27 In 1808, he defeated General Blake at the Battle of Durango.28 In

1809, he defeated the Tyrolean rebels at Mount Worgl.29 Lefebvre was known to be an excellent

tactician and an outstanding combat leader.30 The policy of careers open to talent allowed these

men of talent to rise in the ranks. They helped lead the French to victory, despite their humble

origins.
17
David Chandler, Napoleon’s Marshals (New York: Macmillan, 1987), XXXIX.
18
Ibid., 272.
19
Ibid., 272, 270.
20
Ibid., 270.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Kevin Kiley, The Eagle’s Talons: Generalship in La Grande Armée.
<http://www.napoleonseries.org/articles/military/talons.cfm>
24
David Chandler, Napoleon’s Marshals (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 218.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 216.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Kevin Kiley, The Eagle’s Talons: Generalship in La Grande Armée.
<http://www.napoleonseries.org/articles/military/talons.cfm>
 Zimmerman 5

The skill of his officers as well as their devotion aided Napoleon greatly. At the battle of

Austerlitz, for example, General Marshal Davout, was “the anvil on which Napoleon could

hammer the Russian army at will.”31 In this battle Davout marched all night to sure up

Napoleon’s right wing. Without the suring up of Napoleon’s right wing, the battle could not

have been won. This battle was the most decisive of all the previous battles with Austria. In the

Peace of Pressburg which followed this battle Napoleon gained many concessions from Austria.
32
It was victories like these that enabled Napoleon to dominate the continent.

The devotion of Napoleon’s officers was also outstanding. Le Febvre charged at the head

of his battalion at the siege of Danzig in 1807. Massena fought among his men in 1805, at

Essling.33 They were hardened by the wars. Marshall Lannes took ten wounds, including one in

the neck at Acre. Rapp was wounded so often that he was referred to as a piece of fine lace.

General Pajol and Emmanuel de Grouchy were so crippled by wounds at various times during

their careers they had to be sent home.34 This devotion and skill made them extremely effective

officers

It was, however, Napoleon’s management skills that allowed his marshal’s to keep

focused on the war and out of politics. Napoleon kept his Marshall’s under his control. He

managed them by keeping them in a constant rivalry for his favors.35 Following the coup d’etat

of Brunaire, the coup that brought Napoleon into power, some generals had shown hostility

toward Napoleon.36 They felt he had too much power and distrusted his regime. Napoleon knew

that a determined group of generals could perform a coup and overthrow him. Napoleon

31
Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1987), 88.
32
Ibid., 93.
33
David Chandler, Napoleon’s Marshals (New York: Macmillan, 1987), XLVI.
34
Kevin Kiley, The Eagle’s Talons: Generalship in La Grande Armée.
<http://www.napoleonseries.org/articles/military/talons.cfm>
35
Felix Markham, Napoleon (New York: The New American Library, 1963), 143.
36
David Chandler, Napoleon’s Marshals (New York: Macmillan, 1987), XLVIII.
 Zimmerman 6

therefore limited the Marshall’s to twenty and made sure they knew their place.37 R.P. Dunn-

Pattison writes that Napoleon “…had it in his power to reward twenty hungry aspirants, while he

robbed the individuals of their glory, since each marshal shared his dignity with nineteen

others.”38 Napoleon used to tell his marshal’s:

“Recollect, that you are soldiers only when with the army. The title of Marshall is merely

a civil distinction…but carries with it no authority. On the battlefield you are general, at

court you are nobles, belonging to the state by the civil position I created for you when I

bestowed your titles on you.” 39

Napoleon knew how to keep them loyal and not seek the throne as many generals do. This

allowed for stability in the French state.

Napoleon’s downfall began when he no longer had his great generals and his strength in

numbers. Without them he could not win. An example of how lack of numbers and great

marshals resulted in Napoleon’s defeat was the Battle of Waterloo. At the Battle of Waterloo

Napoleon was outnumbered 800,000 to 280,000.40 Furthermore, by the time the battle of

Waterloo came around Napoleon had lost many of his generals and they could not be replaced.

After Lannes death at Essling, Napoleon promoted three Marshals after Wagram: Marmont,

Oudinot, and MacDonald. The army referred to them as 'Lannes small change.' Bessieres was

killed in 1813, before the campaign was well begun. St. Hilaire was mortally wounded at

Essling, as was d'Espagne. Montbrun, probably the most skillful of Napoleon's cavalry

commanders, was knocked out of the saddle by a Russian roundshot at Borodino; his

replacement, was killed leading his troopers against the Great Redoubt. Senarmont died at the

siege of Cadiz and Eble died of exhaustion, after building the bridges that enabled the Grande
37
R.P. Dunn-Pattison, Napoleon’s Marshals (London: Empericius, 2001), vii.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., viii.
40
Thomas E. Griess, The Wars of Napoleon (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1985), 162.
 Zimmerman 7

Armée to escape from Russian in 1812.41 As a result of the army’s lack of skilled marshals, many

tactical mistakes were made. Without great military subordinates Napoleon could not take on the

allies. For example, Napoleon was deprived of one third of his army because of Grouchy’s

incompetence. Grouchy was supposed to keep the Prussian army preoccupied, but because he

started marching too late several Russian regiments slipped by him. He refused to pursue these

Prussian regiments. This resulted in an even decreased amount of soldiers with which to fight the

already numerically superior allies.42 Had one of Napoleon’s other generals been alive the

situation may have been drastically different.

Napoleon’s armies marched through Europe and proudly spread the ideals of the French

revolution. Napoleon’s soldiers and Marshals were products of the French revolution. As a result

of Napoleon’s meritocratic ideals only the best could be marshals for the French army. These

men performed their duties bravely and skillfully. Napoleon’s soldiers were made up of citizens

who saw themselves as fighting to spread liberty to all of Europe. They fought passionately and

fiercely for their cause. Their great number and their loyalty combined with the skill and bravery

of their marshals contributed greatly to Napoleon’s military success.

41
Kevin Kiley, The Eagle’s Talons: Generalship in La Grande Armée.
<http://www.napoleonseries.org/articles/military/talons.cfm>
42
Thomas E. Griess, The Wars of Napoleon (New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1985), 44.