XXIII.
EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan
A. Ex Post Facto Laws
1. Katigbak v. Solicitor General
Facts:
Involved in this case is the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any
Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. "
The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The first was instituted by the
Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak. In their
complaint they prayed, among other things, that said statute be
declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of
properties acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new
preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against Alejandro
Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered. The second action was
commenced by petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son,
Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the
properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in
accordance with R.A. No. 1379.
The trial court held that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its
objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the
recovery of property held under an implied trust.
Issue:
WON RA 1379 is an ex post facto law.
Held:
YES. The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No.
1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a
law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty
of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to
acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the
Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder. But this is precisely what has been done in the case of
the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions
in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although
made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon
"in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a
disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.
2. SALVADOR v. MAPA
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. The subject
administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come
within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not
mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
FACTS:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Several loan accounts were
referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now
Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP).
1 of 4
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the
characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum
Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was
under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the
loan was granted. Consequently, Atty. Salvador, Consultant of the
Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, against the respondents.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. It dismissed the
complaint holding that the offenses charged had already
prescribed. It bears mention that the acts complained of were
committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence,
the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as
provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions
between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when there was yet
no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or
categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans. The
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on
October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently,
Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued
defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses
committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by
the Constitution. The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but it was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed.
2. Whether or not A.O. 13 and M.O. 61 are ex-post facto laws.
RULING:
1. The crime charged had not yet prescribed. The issue of
prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, thus:
It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party,
to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time
the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or
conspired with the "beneficiaries of the... loans." Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period
for the offenses with which the respondents in
OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from
the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the
day of such commission.
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the
discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have been
made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee
was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the
respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed
on October 4, 1996.
2. Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 are not ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an
action done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which... changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order... to convict the
defendant.[22] This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely:
(e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall
not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is
clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in
favor of constitutionality.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. The subject
administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come
within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No.
13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference
for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore,
no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject
administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.
3. GONZALES v. CA
The new law, Republic Act No. 8294 which has lowered the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms finds application in instant
case to favor the accused so as to immediately release him from
jail where he has already served 9 years, 9 months and 23 days,
which is well beyond the maximum penalty now imposed for his
offense. Whereas prior to the passage of this law, the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearms was penalized with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, after its
enactment, the penalty has been reduced to prision correccional
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
Thousand Pesos P15,000.00.
Being favorable to the accused, this newly-enacted law
constitutes an exception to the fundamental doctrine that laws
should be applied prospectively. Petitioner, therefore, holds the
"distinction" of being the first beneficiary of this reduced penalty to
favor him with its retroactive application.
FACTS:
Two separate informations were filed against petitioner Reynaldo
Gonzales y Rivera involving the crimes of attempted homicide
and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866. In the instant
petition, there is no doubt that the petitioner is indeed guilty of
having intentionally possessed an unlicensed firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Gonzales can be released on the ground that
he has already served beyond the sentence which the new law
provides.
2 of 4
RULING:
YES. In view of the passage of R.A. No. 8294 wherein the penalty
for simple illegal possession of firearms has been lowered, the SC
reduces Gonzales’ penalty. Since it is an elementary rule in criminal
jurisprudence that penal laws shall be given retroactive effect
when favorable to the accused, we are now mandated to apply
the new law in determining the proper penalty to be imposed on
the petitioner.
While prior to the passage of R.A. No. 8294, the crime of simple
illegal possession of firearm was penalized with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, after its
enactment, the penalty was reduced to prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00).
Since the petitioner has already served nine (9) years, nine (9)
months and twenty-three (23) days, which is well beyond the
maximum principal penalty imposed for his offense, as well as the
subsidiary penalty for the unpaid fine, he is hereby ordered
RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.
4. VALEROSO v. PEOPLE
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto
law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.
FACTS:
Jerry Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under P.D. 1866 in which he pleaded not guilty. The
trial court found Valeroso guilty sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay
the fine in the amount of P15,000. The CA affirmed with
modification the RTC’s decision stating that “Verily, the penalty
imposed by the trial court upon the accused- appellant is modified
to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed.
RULING:
YES. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the
time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However,
R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now
states that the of prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low- powered firearm, such
as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law.
An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. Although an additional fine of
P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment
is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional
maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will
form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The
minimum term shall be one degree lower, which isprision
correccionalin its medium period (two[2]years, four[4]months and
one[1]day to four [4] years and two [2] months). Hence, the
penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum,
as maximum term.
5. PCGG v. CARPIO MORALES
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (Ad Hoc Committee). A few months later, President Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to be
used by the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide in investigating and
studying loans granted by government financing institutions that
amount to behest loans. One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad
Hoc Committee for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel
Corporation (RHC). To secure the loans totaling ₱86.9 million,
RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these
loans which included the Baguio Pines Hotel, Taal Vista Lodge, Hotel
Mindanao and the luxury buses. In 1980, 40% of the amount
were converted into DBP’s common shareholding in RHC, and
the balance of ₱58.4 million was restructured. The properties were
foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of ₱11.97 million. On the basis
of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP’s total
exposure as of 1986 amounted to ₱99.1 million. Agreeing that the
said loans bear the characteristics of a behest loan on the basis of
the said Committee Report, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent directors and officers
of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and
3 (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. This was dismissed by the Ombudsman stating: “In
as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint was
filed with this office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten (10)
years from the time the crimes were discovered on 4 January
1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed. This
office, therefore has no other recourse but to DISMISS the instant
complaint.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint on the ground
of prescription.
RULING:
NO. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable
under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was
later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982.
This does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period
shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. Following Our
pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,6 the rule is that "in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is
more favorable to the accused is to be adopted." As such, the
longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195
cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of
3 of 4
the said amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the
crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977,
the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period
set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for
Our determination is the reckoning point for the 10- year period.
Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription
shall begin to run. This void, however, is remedied by Act No.
3326, Section 2. There are two reckoning points for the counting
of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the commission of
the violation of the law; and 2) if the day when the violation was
committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the
discovery of said violation and the institution of judicial
proceedings for investigation and punishment.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans
which We have recognized as a violation that, by their nature,
could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient
of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies.
We, therefore, count the running of the prescriptive period from
the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the
President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This
being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint
before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6,2003, a little
over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is
clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of
prescription.
Simply put, and as correctly held by the Ombudsman,
prescription has already set in when petitioner PCGG filed the
Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003.
6. PEOPLE v. JABINAL
FACTS:
Jabinal was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition. The accused admitted that on
September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite
license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had
an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.
RTC found accused criminally liable for illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were
reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the
accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the
time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition
without license or permit, he had an appointment from the
Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to
hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held
that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as
Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance
of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the
firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the
lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of
a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in
Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained
the judgment of conviction on the ground that “No provision is
made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.”
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent
by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang
(1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v.
Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant should be acquitted on the basis of SC rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view
of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine
in Mapa.
RULING:
Jabinal should be acquitted. Decisions of this Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.”
The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way,
a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid
down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the
Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is
especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant
must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an
act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
4 of 4
B. Bills of Attainder
7. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(BOCEA) v. TEVES
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder.
It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A.
No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a
BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee
are amply protected.
FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005. It was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue. Performance
Evaluation Board. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of the Act was approved and became effective in 2006. The
Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an
association of rank-and-file employees of the BOC, assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR alleging that it is in
violation of the fundamental rights of its members. BOCEA aver,
among others, that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it
inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials
and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the
law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of
removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the
removal from service is immediately executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
RULING:
NO. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional. A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. R.A.
No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It
does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of
a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the
consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee
are amply protected. It must be noted that this is not the first time
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being
challenged. The Court already settled the majority of the same
issues raised by BOCEA in its decision in Abakada Guro Party
List v. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008), which
attained finality on September 17, 2008.