Santiago Paera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011.

FACTS: As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his
constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong.
Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water
distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access. The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of
water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of
water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio
arrived. According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio,
shouting I will kill you!. Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea). Upon seeing
petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted “I don’t spare anyone, even if you are
a woman, I will kill you!”. Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue
Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Indalecio’s father (Vicente),
and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!”.
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed
his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting
Indalecio to scamper

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found petitioner guilty three counts of Grave Threats, The RTC affirmed the MCTC,
sustaining the latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive. Hence, this appeal. The petitioner claims, among others, that he is innocent
of the charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty

ISSUE: Whether or not the justifying circumstances of defense of stranger and lawful performance of duty should be
appreciated.

HELD: NO. The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives
such as revenge and resentment.24 None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression
against third parties’ rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing
ordinary, peaceful acts. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner
used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing
him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies
upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
office.25 Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to “ensure delivery of basic services”26 when he barred the
Darongs’ access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively
chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options
constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before petitioner27 and his resort to any of them would have spared him
from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner
ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats
of violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 39.