Ichong vs Hernandez
45685, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937
G.R. No. L-7995 , 101 Phil. 115
May 31, 1957
[Petitioner: Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180
Respondents: Jamie Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City
Treasurer of Manila]
Facts:
Petitioner Lao H. Ichong brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
Republic Act 1180 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of
their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines. In answer, the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid
exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 1180 violates the equal protection of laws.
Held/Ruling:
No. According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also
then provided that police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a
treaty or a contract. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged
in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The petition is hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE VS. VERA (1937) | EQUAL PROTECTION  CLAUSE
G.R. No.
Doctrine: Requites for a valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
Facts:
1. Private respondent (Cu-Unjieng) was convicted of a criminal charge by trial
court of Manila.
2. He filed several motions for reconsideration or new trial but was denied. On
1936, the SC remanded the case to the original court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
3. While waiting for the new trial, he appealed to Insular Probation Office (IPO)
for probation but was denied.
4. However, Judge Vera, upon another request by petitioner, allowed the petition
to be set for hearing for probation.
5. Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for the latter has no power to place
the petitioner under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221
(i.e., the grant to the provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation
to convicted person.)
Petitioner’s contentions:
1. Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner under probation because it is
in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 because nowhere it states that it is to be
made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
2. Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal protection clause for being an
invalid classification because its applicability is not uniform throughout the country
for each provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to provide a
probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion
of each provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc.
Issue: WON the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause.
Held:
 YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause.
 Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class.
 In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power. Each provincial board
has its own discretion to provide or not to provide a probation system, allocate
funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each provincial
boards as regards their own locality, etc. What if the other province decides not
to adopt probation system, or it decides not to have salary for the probation officer?
 it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in
which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of
Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance
making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in
any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation
within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila and for other purposes. 
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said
ordinance.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process
andequal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos
to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the
purpose of regulation. 
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment
in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the
second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory
but a revenue measure. 
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of
the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means
of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit
aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it
does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of
an alien employmentpermit fee. 
P E O P L E V. C AYAT ( 1 9 3 9 ) | E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N   C L A U S E
G.R. No. L-45987, 68 Phil 12, May 5, 1939
DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.                

FACTS:
1. Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-
Christian tribe was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for
possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.
2. Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a
member of the non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating
liquor other than their so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof
provides for its punishment.
3. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due
process and it is an improper exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?
RULING:
  No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
 Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of
the same class.
 Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the
classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes
refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly
to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No.
1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The
experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and
crimes, which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life
and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the
conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and
security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.
B I R A O G O V. T R U T H C O M M I S S I O N ( 2 0 1 0 ) | E Q U A L
PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. 192935, 637 SCRA 78, December 7, 2010
Doctrines:
1. For a classification to be valid, it should be applicable to future conditions
as well.
2. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary
lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Facts:
1. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC).
2. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President, which is
tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
3. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
4. Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it
violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption
is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members of the
same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its
sole object makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.
5. They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and
corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of
former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the “same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have been committed
against the Filipino people.
6. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall
under the recognized exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction
between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and
second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive
Order No. 1 to end corruption.”
Issue:
WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:
 Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause.
 The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration” The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.
 the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution.
 While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary
lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
O R M O C S U G A R C O . V. T R E A S U R E R O F O R M O C C I T Y ( 1 9 6 8 ) |
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
G.R. No. L-23794, 22 SCRA 603, February 17, 1968
Doctrine: For a classification to be valid, it should be applicable to future conditions
as well.
Facts:
1. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passedOrdinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per export
sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.”
2. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total
of P12,087.50.
3. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complain tagainst the City of Ormoc as
well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
4. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within
defendant city’s power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same
did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause. 
Held:
 Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal
protection clause.
 The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable
classification.
 The ordinace taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar
central in the city of Ormoc.
 To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.