A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J               September 23, 2014 Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement  before the National Bureau of
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into
certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing
indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the
Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary. 1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government
funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the
money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members
of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind,
Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities
identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles'
parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of
double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous
transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly
tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but
instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
2
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties
and other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our
office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla,
Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza,
Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas
Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene
Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that
that case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang
ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya
na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim
Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her,
that we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko,
susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the
NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim
Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin
ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera."  (Emphasis supplied.)
3
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo
entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph
of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in
the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the
photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator
Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the
ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he
insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one
advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases
where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the
Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay
"  wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement,
5
alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang
29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa
inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET
NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking
pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad
ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-
alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang
mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa
2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET
NAPOLES sa conference room.
xxxx 6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013,
Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)
7
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision
rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator
Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier.
He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been
rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the
party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or
social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our
court, or while she already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I
have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been
advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs.
Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in
the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were
decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not
even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of
the Chief Justice such that even without being required to submit an explanation, he
voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan
as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the
testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the
malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny
Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through
the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba? knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her.
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs.
Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the
Sandiganbayan consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman
and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula
and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their
backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made
xxxx misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do
so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya them would be "fixed."
"Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles
sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs.
Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent
xxxx said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph
was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po. miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was
mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong. Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon.
Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing
MS. SULA. Opo. treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape
the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan? a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this
day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of
such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank
MS. SULA. Opo. her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her
supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at
Xxxx8
the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no
alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division
with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his
[NGOs] involved in the scam). 9
Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as
sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to
submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of
affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution
Comment.  Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases
10
was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-
DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within
a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C.
Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with
the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original
records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there
is no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and
other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case
Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her
report with the following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case
No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for
Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of
Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles
(Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo
Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same -
the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the
amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the
payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are
mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an
Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser
crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to
pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in
question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited,
this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins.
After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed
in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he
was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was
also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily
business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him
the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that
court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning
the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is
respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote,
"Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory,
Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then
going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo
alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam
ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang
matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee
that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you
were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases,
kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya
si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy
Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each other
(nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms.
Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na
po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po
yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator
Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the
Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar
case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of
the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million
pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was
involved in the Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various
amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten
years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to
respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam
ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You
stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam
ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni
Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles,
parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So
nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na
nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si
madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si
Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero
she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam. ₱282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest.
Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement? the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
Witness Luy
xxx
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms.
Justice Gutierrez Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office
namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang
Continue counsel. madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa
kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet
Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So
Witness Luy
tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would
like to deposit money?
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya.
Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na
A Opo.
PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q So he could get 13% interest?
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it
spent?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang
opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang
po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms.
staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng
Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po
ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check
Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
na inissue ...
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On
the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest
ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so
natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-
much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings
iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa
and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles
nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas
called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO
₱282,000.00 or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa
check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just
₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang
deposit respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she
prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako
would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin.
x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Ms. Sula
Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms.
Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam
2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, The Chairman
hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Gregory Ong?
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the
bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay
Ms. Sula
Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the
arrangement? Do you understand me?
Opo.
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account
ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e. The Chairman

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. Sa Sandiganbayan?
She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's)
favorite. Ms. Sula

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did Opo.
not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the
Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each The Chairman
of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his
lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent. Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation.
Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying
for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice
sometime in 2012.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by
the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against
her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to
worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the
hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas
yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so
hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na
tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO
billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam,
paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa
Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron
naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit
ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she
would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as
follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix
(aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her
acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi
masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the
photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is
shielded by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members
of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that
picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I
immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be
going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under
his Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his
office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his
side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him.
Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the
parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the
woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the
Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when
a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,
respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of
the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J.
Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or
influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent
deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles
considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March
2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and
narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles
approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and
thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank
her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her,
she would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting
Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese
Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she
mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black
Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the
robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then
respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment
(prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his
family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to
drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also
received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his
body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office
and thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on
declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang
kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest
consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued
to her his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed
that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he
does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO
check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks
representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that
in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or
Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per
annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula
testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a
case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent
fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four
things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar
case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual
basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be
pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial
body and that he never interceded on her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified
that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the
Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The
witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult
questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the
subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under
investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it
is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against
respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their
testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they
did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible
witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and
trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula
were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar
case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation.
Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides,
respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists
remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and
Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion
that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept
a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles
for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten
years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay,
inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according
to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements
were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it
possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to
clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's
suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula.
Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He
should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim
regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan,
resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute
gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to
respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It
is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed
and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it
possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true,
nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent could have transacted
business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of
₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his
judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably
disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of
the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing
in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm
the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her
office considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in
violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it
possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her,
respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he
visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely
frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without
doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he
"fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly
perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted
position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for
reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the
same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not
present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must
have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not
have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been
charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada,
Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of
PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of
collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting
as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a
different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles.
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that
Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar
helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that
there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at
such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up
the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the
helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets
were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-
000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a
hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the
Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
 The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating
Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the
charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case
while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the
Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar
case resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure
("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where
she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total
of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she
deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator
Estrada and Napoles. 11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery
during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent
failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had
actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied
with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."  We agree with Justice
12
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and
after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence,
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. 13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles'
trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and
personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the
case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan
who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees.
Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted
even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced
she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by
Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to
respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt
Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her
association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010
and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by
Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have
no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to
them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that
Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan;
hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the
Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her
(Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even
supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a
public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official
duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received.  Ajudge who
14
extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.
Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law
and the courts.15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant
must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what
is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of
proof required should be more than substantial.  Concededly, the evidence in this case
16
is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both
Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged
bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we
find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly
indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office
on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a
collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public
disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with
Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath
by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of
the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself
acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations
are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government
corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of
their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with
government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly
observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the
Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle
blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this case,
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid,
straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous,
clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are
consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or
faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great
weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of
the witnesses as they testified.  The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality,
17
to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases
applies a fortiori to administrative cases.  In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
18
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with
Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles
talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar
as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to
respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent,
and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that
Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other
employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on
direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the
problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran
niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi
na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang
Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami.
Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po
dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya
at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot
din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will
answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that
right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga
officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang
probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si
Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)
19
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of
public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure
a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the
merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative
liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that
fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.  Public confidence in the Judiciary is
20
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. 21
In Caneda v. Alaan,  we held that:
22
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance
is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free
from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association
or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites
the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.  where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was
23
charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they
were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines
Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the
latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to
lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding
their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency
and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to
his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his
children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently
seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point
was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions
where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or
thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and
litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could
see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is
fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend
whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any
manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that
they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at
the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion
that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining
his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because
Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from
malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may
raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized
in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still
on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles'
office because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending
and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.  Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
24
states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with
the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel
appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or
partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion
from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue,
time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile
endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims
and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act
and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their
counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny,
the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion
on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association
with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy
which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-
flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our
special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence
and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its
serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation
Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be
possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or
assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the
image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper
request. Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are
a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there
and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that
conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there
is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should
have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in
public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could have
thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings that
you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have
worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of
going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San
Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the
public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that.
"That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former
respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned
you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even
before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson,
isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator
Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.  (Emphasis supplied.)
26
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his
counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version.
Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed
by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI.
Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously
testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded
upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed
advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent
as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.  Such finding is consistent
1âwphi1
with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said
case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles
office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at
her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to
support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance
interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles
extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in
the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse
public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts
of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative
investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he
vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed
to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain
omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to
Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as
the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one
instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in
her supplemental affidavit x x x." ).
27
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a
violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."  Dishonesty, being a
28
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the Judiciary.
29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a
serious charge may be penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering

that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct
and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a
magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S.

Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he
is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency
or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. R-351-RTJ September 26, 1986 PER CURIAM:

ABRAHAM L. RAMIREZ, petitioner, Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
vs. Branch CXX, stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent. misconduct in the performance of her official duties. The details are as follows:

A.M. No. R-359-RTJ September 26, 1986 I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ. —

LIWAYWAY B. SAMSON, complainant, This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on
vs. June 29, 1985 by Deputy Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent. Caloocan City to secure his release from the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was
ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for direct contempt of
A.M. No. R-621-RTJ September 26, 1986 court consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction
dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from
VICTORIA TORRES, complainant, demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said case.
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent. Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-
Liwag of Branch CXXIII of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to
A.M. No. R-684-RTJ September 26, 1986 demolish the improvements of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C-7361,
C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said defendants are the
intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued the
ESPERANZA LAZARO, complainant,
preliminary injunction.
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten
note of respondent judge addressed to then superintendent of the Northern Police
A.M. No. R-687-RTJ September 26, 1986
District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of this Court, however, Deputy Sheriff
Ramirez was released from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter, the court resolved to
JESUS ALBA, complainant, treat the petition as an administrative case   and to require respondent judge to
1

vs. comment thereon.  2

HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.

A.M. No. 86-4-9987-RTC September 26, 1986
DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING JUDGE IN BRANCH CXXI, RTC, CALOOCAN CITY.
Bognot, Toledano & Associates counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 359-RTJ.
Romulo T. Santos counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. R-684-RTJ.
Conrado A. Leaño counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 687-RTC.
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of
Ramirez. She justified the arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and academic and
as a curative measure to preserve the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten
note, on the other hand, was explained as a means to preserve the integrity of courts of
justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added that the writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original jurisdiction, while
the Order of January 11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, which the latter should not have done as she should have remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution.

II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ. —

On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of
Caloocan City a complaint for damages against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro
Iwata and Remigio Pasion docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to
respondent judge. The summonses were served on the defendants on October 3, 1984.
On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel and Exequiel filed their answer with cross-claim
against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a motion for leave to file
a third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on October 22,
1984. On November 12, 1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata
filed his answer with compulsory counter-claim and cross-claim and answer to cross-
claim against defendants Urgel, Exequiel and Pasion. The latter did not file any answer.
Thus, on November 29, 1984, complainant thru counsel moved to declare Pasion in
default and to set the case for pre-trial On January 29, 1985, counsel for complainant
filed an ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of the motion of November 29, 1984.
When no action was forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on March 26, 1985,
reiterating his prayer in the motion of November 29, 1984. For alleged failure of
respondent judge to act on the motions, the instant complaint was filed on June 6, 1985.
Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984
was noted for study on December 18, 1984 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985,
"well within the period even for the court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the
receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July 2, 1985; " and that the case could not yet be set
for pre-trial on account of the existence of the third-party complaint. In conclusion,
respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but was intended to
malign the undersigned Presiding Judge   and should therefore be dismissed.
3
Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent
judge's allegation that the motion dated November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1,
1985. She averred that if this were true, why is it that notice thereof was received by her
counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the instant complaint had been filed; and why is it
that respondent judge failed to resolve the other motions? She concluded that the only
reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to show some color of
performance of duties. She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order the service
of summons and copy of the third-party complaint on the third-party defendant.
It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-
complaint is not only malicious but was intended to malign the undersigned Presiding
Judge complainant moved for respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559 and its
re-raffling to another sala. This motion was denied.
Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from
hearing Civil Case No. 11559, which has since been assigned to another judge and has
been set for pre-trial In said rejoinder, respondent judge characterized complainant's so-
called implication respecting the order of March 1, 1985 as being founded on
conjectures, assumptions and suppositions. Furthermore, she said that after the third
party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to order service of the summons
on the third-party defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the cause of the
client.
III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ. —
In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent
judge with ignorance of the law, graft or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary
motives. She alleged that respondent judge had indiscriminately issued restraining
orders without conducting hearings on the applications for the issuance of preliminary
injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the lapse of the mandatory twenty
[20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement of the writs of
execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which are
of co-equal jurisdiction; that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other
branches whom she fancies to have offended her, as in the case of Deputy Sheriff
Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ] who was merely complying with the order of
Judge Liwag and that she has been issuing restraining orders in ejectment cases
involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for undoubtedly suspicious considerations.
By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent
submitted her comment on the letter-complaint on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations
found therein as false accusations as it failed to state specific facts on the matters
complained of. She stated that she issued a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No.
10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al. v. Alexander Development Corp., et al." but
denied having issued an extension thereof. She claimed having issued a preliminary
prohibitory injunction after due hearing.
With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the
restraining orders as a method of maintaining the status quo so that the cases pending
before her involving the issue of ownership may not be rendered moot and academic by
the execution of the decisions in the ejectment cases relating to the same properties.
Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with
the Ramirez arrest-incident and asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate
cases objectively on the basis of the law involved and the evidence on hand.
It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court,
complainant Victoria Torres, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of Alexander
Development Co. caused the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC
of Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case No. 10645, entitled "Alexander Development
Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution was enforced thru the demolition of a shanty
being claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10526. Because
of this, Torres was ordered arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an
order dated May 15, 1986. To challenge said arrest order Torres instituted before the
IAC a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as AC-G.R. S.P. No.
09162-SP, wherein respondent judge was likewise required to comment. On June 5,
1986, respondent judge issued an order recalling the arrest order for being moot and
academic. This was manifested in the comment submitted in AC-G.R. No. 09162-S.P.
IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ. —
The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged
failure of respondent judge to decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v.
Esperanza Lazaro," despite the case having been submitted for decision for more than
18 months. Complainant who is the defendant in Civil Case No. C-9831, claims that the
case was submitted for decision on October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's
memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent judge had been drawing her salary
during the entire time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge is likewise
guilty of falsification in view of the certification required of judges before they could draw
their salaries to the effect that they have decided all cases assigned to them on or before
the end of three months counted from the time a case is submitted for decision.
On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and
motion to withdraw the complaint on the ground that "certain facts and conditions which
heretofore were unknown to the complainant and undersigned counsel have come to
[their] knowledge ... which affect their resolution to prosecute the complaint.4
Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required
respondent judge to answer the complaint.
In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the
record shows that the case has been submitted for decision; that defendant in said case
[herein complainant] never appeared in court during the hearing of the case nor during
the series of conferences called by her for the purpose of effecting an amicable
settlement between the parties, as per manifestation of her counsel, complainant and her
husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court interpreter that she did
not want to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after she
received a telephone call from an alleged close relative of an associate of a national
official saying " If you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro you will be removed,
but if you decide in her favor then you will stay," that she looked into the records of the
case where she found the motion of Mrs. Lazaro, received by the court on March 12,
1986, praying for the early resolution of the case; that because of the telephone calls and
with the point in mind that "this is a revolutionary government," she had no recourse but
to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a decision dated July 18,
1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7, 1986, the instant
complaint is already moot and academic.
V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ. —
Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly
rendering an unjust decision. Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-
23527 [84] entitled "People v. Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned to respondent's
court. The decision acquitting the accused was promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly
in the absence of complainant and his counsel, so that complainant learned about the
decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant challenged the decision as erroneous for the
reasons that the testimony of the accused on the alleged self-defense was not
convincing, respondent judge erred in her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution as well as in her pronouncement that Cabel had no motive for
stabbing complainant when lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she
did not give credence to the version of the prosecution. She ended with the conclusion
that the decision in said criminal case is just and in consonance with the evidence
presented by the parties. She views the complaint as a means to harass her in the wake
of the judiciary reorganization.
VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC. —
Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano
and Adelina Quijano," an appealed case for an unlawful detainer was pending before
Branch CXXI of the RTC of Caloocan City when presiding judge thereof, Judge Salvador
J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC of Quezon City on November 15,1985. Said judge
had previously required the parties to file their memorandum with. in 30 days from notice
of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff had done so at the time of his
transfer.
On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of
Civil Case No. 12172 with Civil Case No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff
versus Manchie Sabile Brozo, Defendant" pending before Branch CXXX of the same
court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No. C-12172 to another judge to avoid delay in its
disposition; or if re-raffle is not proper, to effect the transfer of said case to the pairing
judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant opposed the motion.
On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge
Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of Branch CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.
On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees.
However, on March 13, 1986, she issued another order recalling, rescinding and setting
aside the order of February 19, 1986 and considering the case submitted for decision to
her as pairing judge. Counsel for plaintiff-appellant, Atty. Jose V. Marcella moved for a
reconsideration of the order dated March 13, 1986 with a request that the matter be
referred to the Court Administrator for determination or ruling as to which judge-Judge
Baylen or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M.
Angeles, RTC, Branch CXXIX, Caloocan City as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the
same court "in addition to his regular duties without additional compensation, effective
immediately and to continue until a regular incumbent is appointed or until further orders
from this Court." 
5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172
dismissing plaintiff's appeal Copies of the decision and the order denying his motion for
referral were received by counsel for plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed a
motion for reconsideration of both the decision and the order. Pending resolution thereof,
he wrote the Court Administrator a letter on June 9, 1985, requesting for a ruling on who,
among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has authority to decide the case
and who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the pending motion
for reconsideration.
Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge
Salvador J. Baylen Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case
No. C-12172, considering that before his transfer to another court of equal jurisdiction
said case was already submitted before him for decision and as such all proceedings
were totally heard and tried by him and the greater interest of justice will be better served
if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge Antonia C. Macandog to EXPLAIN within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why she should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for taking cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and deciding the same
against the vigorous objection of the plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE and declare null and
void the decision rendered by Judge Macandog for lack of authority and the pending
motion for reconsideration and to set aside the decision and the order denying plaintiff's
motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court be recalled and withdrawn."  6
In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 12172 by virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar
Herrera appearing on the face of the "Motion to Consolidate and/or to transfer case to
the Pairing Judge dated January 7, 1986; which note reads: "Refer to Pairing Judge, Br.
120" and signed, "Oscar M. Herrera 1/9/86;" that as the thirty-day period granted to the
parties within which to file their memorandum under the order dated November 4, 1985
expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the case would be
deemed submitted for decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same not
having been submitted to him for decision at the time of his transfer on November 15,
1985; that she has been authorized by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take
cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch XIV [now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City]
and that the resolution dated April 24, 1986 in A.M. No. 86-499-87, which impliedly
revoked this authority came to her knowledge only during the first week of June, 1986
when Judge Angeles started taking cognizance of and began hearing cases in Branch
CXXI.
Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed
outright for lack of merit, the other charges brought against respondent are indeed
serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on respondent's moral, intellectual
and attitudinal competence to remain a member of the Bench.
The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on
respondent having given credence to the exempting circumstance of self-defense offered
by the accused in Criminal Case No. C-23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277, where
the complainant placed in issue the wisdom of the respondent judge's decision in a civil
case for having believed the testimony of the plaintiff, an alleged operator and maintainer
of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said circumstance was not an indubitable
ground for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as previously stated in the
case of Dizon vs. de Borja, 37 SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.
Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the
occasion to pronounce that 11 mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so
gross and patent as to produce an influence of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge
knowingly rendered an unjust decision [which circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar], are irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. We
further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the evidence for the defense was entitled
to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to account administratively for the result
of ratiocination." 
7
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of
the promulgation of the decision in said criminal case. While it may be the better practice
to notify the offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do not require a
judge to do so.
The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-
621-RTJ are, however, administratively censurable. In both cases, she issued
preliminary injunctions to stay the implementation of writs of execution issued by courts
of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and issued arrest orders against a deputy sheriff
and an attorney-in-fact of a party who proceeded to enforce the writs of execution
despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the order of arrest against
deputy sheriff Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim
requesting his assistance on the matter.
To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should
have been aware that forcible entry and detainer cases do not interfere with a
proceeding where ownership is at issue. Thus, in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was
held that "the determination of the respective right of rival claimants to public land is
different from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation
with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A
judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the
actual occupant, who has been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in
any illegal manner, can never be 'prejudicial interference' with the disposition or
alienation of public land." Besides, in the case of deputy sheriff Ramirez respondent
judge should have taken into consideration that his duty to enforce court orders and
processes is ministerial in character and that he has no authority to determine the validity
of the order placed in his hands to implement. Thus, whether Judge Liwag can, in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, legally issue the writ of execution is of no moment
insofar as deputy sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not have been punished
by incarceration for performing his official duty.
Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least,
highly irregular and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest
creates the impression that she has taken an interest far and beyond that ordinarily
expected of judicial officers with respect to cases pending before them; which, in turn,
puts her impartiality in question.
Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall
of the order of arrest against Victoria Torres had rendered the administrative cases
against her moot and academic. Rather than exonerate her, these facts instead serve to
strengthen the charges against her. For one, the release order issued by this Court only
proves the impropriety of her act, while on the other, the recall order demonstrates the
impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first place.
The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative
Matter No. R-684-RTC which she wants this court to consider moot and academic for the
reasons that she has rendered a decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the
complainant had moved for the withdrawal of said complaint.
We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or
dismiss the complaint by complainant, does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the
administrative case against respondent judge, because "to condition administrative
actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone
a detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring
members of the Judiciary."
And seriously blunder, respondent did.
While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it
was not indubitably established that the case had been submitted for decision as alleged
in the complaint, and dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of course,
the case had taken an unexpected twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to
have succumbed to pressure in deciding the case in favor of herein complainant, Mrs.
Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so nobody would call me again
by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent, then decided the case with the
point in mind that this [sic] a revolutionary government and she had nor [sic] recourse but
to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro, [Decision dated July 18, 1986,
see attached.]" 8
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice
removed from the national official mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to
this pressure on the telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust reposed on
respondent as an arbiter of the law and a revelation of her weak moral character. By her
appointment to the office, the public has laid on respondent their confidence that she is
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong
enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably, respondent has
dismally failed to exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.
In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable
dispatch required of judicial officers. There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date
shown on the order resolving the motion of complainant to declare therein defendant
Pasion in default. If it were true that the motion was resolved as early as March 1, 1985,
We do not think that service of the order upon counsel for complainant at this office in
Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and most conveniently after the
present complaint has been filed.
Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge
should endeavor to avoid it. It is thus incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a
view to the prompt and convenient disposition of its business and he should not tolerate
abuses, indifference or neglect by clerks, sheriffs and other officers of the court. Hence,
upon failure of her clerk to serve summons on the third party defendant, it became
incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.
The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC
is unsatisfactory. Par. VIII, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court
provides:
VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:
 A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
considered as paired with another branch. In the event of vacancy in any instrumentalities.
branch, or of the absence or disability of the judge thereof, all incidental
or interlocutory matters pertaining to it may be acted upon by that judge This Decision is immediately executory.
of the other branch paired with it. The latter may likewise conduct trials or
hearings on the merits in criminal cases with detention prisoners SO ORDERED.
assigned to the other branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject
to the conformity of the parties. [Emphasis supplied.]

Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172
to judge Macandog was solely for the purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate
and/or transfer case to the pairing judge. Such referral did not in any manner empower or
authorize her to decide the case on the merits, particularly in the light of the vigorous
objection interposed by therein plaintiff. The power and authority of one acting as a
pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said paragraph and one acting
beyond its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.

Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties.   They
9

are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially
those which relate to the scope of their authority. They are dutybound to observe and
abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the
orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with a serious challenge to one's
authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the
wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court.
The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding
Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her authority and the
reasonable request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in
office warranting disciplinary sanction.

Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September
16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the
same was revoked, not by our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier, by the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act on January 17, 1983.

Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to
remain in her office. Her removal must perforce be effected.

In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was
rendered under undue pressure and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take
such remedial steps as may be warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered

dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1266 August 21, 1996
ARMANDO CONTRERAS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CESAR M. SOLIS, respondent.
 
MELO, J.:p
The instant administrative case against respondent Judge Cesar M. Solis stemmed from his orders releasing the
accused on bail in a habeas corpus proceeding and his subsequent order directing the re-arrest of the said
accused.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On November 8, 1992, prior to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus before the
sala of herein respondent Judge Solis, an information was filed against Rufino
Mamangon, a PNP member, for the murder of Gener Contreras. The case was
raffled to Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region
stationed in Malolos, Bulacan, presided over the Judge Demetrio Macapagal Sr.
On May 31, 1994, Judge Macapagal dismissed the criminal case for lack of
jurisdiction and accordingly directed the branch clerk of court to forward the
complete record of the case to the Sandiganbayan. Mamangon was not,
however, released from detention despite the dismissal of the criminal case,
prompting him on July 20, 1994, to file a petition for habeas corpus. The petition
was raffled to the branch (No. 21) presided over by of herein respondent Judge
Cesar M. Solis. Respondent, in an order dated July 27, 1994, dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. On August 4, 1994, acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Mamangon, respondent issued an order authorizing the
release of Mamangon from the provincial jail upon the posting of a cash bond in
the amount of P25,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
provincial prosecutor which prompted respondent judge to cancel the cash bond
posted by Mamangon and to order his re-arrest. Thereupon, Armando Contreras,
brother of the victim Gener Contreras, filed the instant complaint.
Complainant alleged that on the morning of August 1, 1994, when he went to the
office of respondent he was told by the latter that Mamangon is willing to give
P25,000.00 for his release. It appears, according to complainant, that if he would
give the same amount of money, respondent would no longer release
Mamangon.
According to complainant, respondent also gravely abused his discretion and
authority when he ordered the release of the accused upon the posting of the
cash bond; that it is not within the authority of respondent to release the accused
considering that his authority in a habeas corpus proceeding is to determine
whether or not the detention of the accused is legal or illegal. Moreover, it was
contended, respondent has no authority to order the re-arrest of the accused in
the same proceeding.
On July 3, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepano submitted her
report with the following evaluation:
A. On the Charge of Dishonesty/Extortion
Respondent insists he never asked money from complainant. He merely instructed one
of his staff to advise Armando Contreras about the habeas corpus proceeding so that he
can participate in it. It was quite late in the afternoon of that day and the "clerks were no
longer available to type the notice or order." He also explains that complainant
misconstrued his mentioning an amount, i.e., P20,000.00 to be extortion when all he
meant was that this would be how much he will spend to hire a lawyer to represent his
cause in the proceedings.
The protestations of respondent Judge are not exactly persuasive. At once certain
questions beg to be asked. For instance, if his sole interest in asking Contreras to see
him in his office was to afford the former the opportunity to "participate" in the habeas
corpus case, why express such interest at a very late stage, i.e., after he had issued a
decision thereon and after petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision?
Noteworthy is that the petition was filed on 20 July 1994, set for hearing six (6) days later
or on 26 July, and the decision rendered the following day. Judge Solis could have very
well notified complainant about the proceeding as soon as the petition was filed by
simply furnishing him copy of his Order setting the case for hearing on 26th July. But he
did not. Strangely enough, he waited until after the last working hour of Friday, 29th July,
to "notify" Contreras of his desire to meet him at the very early hour of 7 o'clock in the
morning of 1 August. Why then did the judge schedule the meeting at an early hour that
morning even before court employees arrived for work? Was it only for the purpose of
telling complainant that he can participate in the proceeding, or more specifically, in
the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, and that he should engage the services of
a good lawyer for P20,000.00? If it was, then in my view, the meeting was absolutely
unnecessary. The judge denies that he propositioned complainant, and complainant
informs the Court that he did not pay the amount "proposed". At any rate on 8 August
1994 Judge Solis motu proprio issued two Orders for the posting of a cash bond for
P25,000.00 by accused Mamangon and his release from jail, and the transmittal of the
records of the case to Sandiganbayan.
While no proof has been submitted to the Court by complainant as to the attempted
extortion by respondent judge other than his verified letter-complaint, still, the actuations
of respondent leave much to be desired since these easily lend[s] to suspicions of
dishonesty. On this score alone, respondent should be properly advised to avoid
occasions where his acts may arouse suspicions of irregularity.
B. On the Grant and Subsequent Cancellation of Bail Constituting Grave Abuse
of Authority, Grave Misconduct and Incompetence
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that all persons in custody shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except when charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Criminal Case No. 2406-M-92 for MURDER was filed on 5 November 1992 when the
penalty imposable at the time for the crime of murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Significantly, the records do not show that an
application for bail was filed with the court trying the criminal case. Neither do they show
that such an application was filed with respondent Judge in the habeas
corpus proceedings. Complainant has pointed this out in his complaint because it
appears that the grant of bail to the accused by respondent Judge Cesar M. Solis and
the corresponding approval of his cash bond in the amount of P25,000.00 as shown in
the Orders dated 4 August 1994 (p. 27) and 8 August 1994 (p. 28), respectively, was in
the thinking of the judge, a matter of right for the accused.
An analysis of the submissions of respondent Judge on this point shows that in issuing
the aforesaid Orders, he relied on the provisions of Sec. 14 of Rule 102 which state:
Sec. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned, recommitted, and when let to
bail. — If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is
plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an
offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or
bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having
committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to
imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If
he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the
court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the
prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his
appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to
abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the
proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such
bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
In the Order dated 24 August 1994 (p. 16, Rollo) respondent Judge justified his reliance
on the aforequoted provision pointing to Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court which
provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall, as far as practicable, be applicable in special proceedings. A habeas
corpus belongs to the category of special proceedings.
In the same Order, Judge Solis further argued that because of Sec. 14 of Rule 102, he
took into consideration the fact that since the penalty for the crime at that time was
only reclusion perpetua and not death, he did not find it necessary to apply the provisions
of criminal procedure on bail.
I am not convinced of the reasons proffered by respondent Judge.
The accused never applied for bail. Consequently, it was improper for and erroneous of
respondent judge to advocate for the accused and motu proprio grant him
bail sans application. Compounding this was that despite the fact that the penalty for the
crime for which the accused was detained was reclusion perpetua, no hearing was
ordered by the judge to give prosecution a chance to show that the evidence against the
accused was strong as to preclude bail. It is my position that the grant of bail under Sec.
14 of Rule 102 of the Rules does not do away with the basic requirements set forth in
Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on Bail since the former merely prescribes
supplemental rules on bail for habeas corpus proceedings. The argument of respondent
that he merely interpreted Sec. 14 of Rule 102 "to the best interest of justice and fair
play" considering that the murder case had been dismissed by Branch 18, the accused
had been detained for a long period and that he had a family to support are specious,
being irrelevant, in the face of the express requirements of the Rules. More importantly,
the application of Sec. 14 of Rule 102 of the Rules is erroneous because while Sec. 14
speaks of a prisoner lawfully restrained, Mamangon in this case was being unlawfully
restrained despite the dismissal of the case against him on the ground of lack jurisdiction
(sic). Respondent therefore should have forthwith ordered Mamangon's release from jail.
Instead, he granted bail which was not even necessary. This however cannot be
construed as malicious, it appearing merely to be an error of judgment.
Respondent's misapplication of the law was further aggravated when upon motion by
prosecution and complainant herein, he cancelled the cash bond posted by Mamangon
and ordered his re-arrest for the reason that such is allowed by the self-same provision
upon which he based his Order granting bail to Mamangon, and considering further that
[the] Mamangon's release would endanger the life of complainant and that of his family
and relatives.
A close reading of the rule alluded to shows that while discretion is
afforded the judge to grant bail, no discretion is authorized in the
 cancellation thereof, for the rules limit the instances under which bail may
be cancelled. Thus, Sec. 22 of the Rule 114 applies, quoted hereunder:
Cancellation of bail bond. — Upon application filed with
the court and after due notice to the prosecutor, the bail
bond may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.
The bail bond shall be deemed automatically cancelled
upon acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case or
execution of the final judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice
to any liability of the bond.
The grounds cited by respondent in cancelling Mamangon's bail find no
support in the abovequoted provision. Thus grave misconduct was
committed by respondent when her arbitrarily cancelled Mamangon's bail
and ordered the latter's re-arrest. For this reason, respondent must be
sanctioned.
On the basis of the above, the imposition of an unspecified fine was
recommended.
We partly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
On the Charge of Extortion and Dishonesty
Our minds can not sit easy with regard to the charge of extortion. Respondent
admitted having met complainant in the early morning of August 1, 1994, for the
purpose of informing complainant that he could participate in the habeas
corpus proceeding. During said meeting, respondent also admitted having told
complainant of the "potency" of Mamangon's motion for reconsideration and the
amount of money which complainant would spend to hire a good lawyer to
represent him in the proceeding. Respondent's seemingly benign conduct of
advising complainant on matters pending before respondent puzzle our minds
since we are not told of any special circumstance which would justify
respondent's special interest over complainant's concern. Respondent, however,
gives no other reason for meeting and advising complainant that could dispel ill
thoughts in reference to respondent's motives. Any person with a reasonable
mind would deduce that respondent's actuation meant something much more
than what he explicitly suggested, for what could be respondent's reason, in
mentioning the "potency" of Mamangon's motion for reconsideration and the
amount of money which complainant might spend in resisting the same, than to
insinuate that complainant could save on expenses and be certain of the result
by spending the same amount for the judge. Certainly, it is simply naive to say
that a proposal to that effect could be done only through the use of direct words
expressing respondent's intention to be willing and able to decide the case in
complainant's favor for a consideration. Respondent's pretended innocence over
the perceived meaning of his insinuation is unpersuasive considering his long
years in the practice of law. Thus, the intention of respondent in meeting with
complainant and in giving him advice is, to say the least, far from the behavior of
a member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest of hint of
anomaly and corruption.
Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct
himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the
avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system. Thus, the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
A judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of his duties
should be free from appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach
(Alazar vs. Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453). Any act which would give the
appearance of impropriety is in itself reprehensible, calling for disciplinary action.
This is the price which must be paid by one who joins the Judiciary. Whatever
may have been respondent judge's motive in meeting with complainant, such
action certainly could but be said as giving rise to questions on his honesty.
Respondent judge is thus guilty of committing act of impropriety prejudicial to the
integrity of the judiciary.
On Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct and Incompetence
At the outset, let it be said that respondent judge correctly rules that the granting
of the petition for habeas corpus would unduly intervene with the functions of a
co-equal branch of the court, considering that the period within which to file a
notice of appeal or a motion for reconsideration against the order of Judge
Macapagal declaring his court to be without jurisdiction had then not yet lapsed.
However, respondent, upon Mamangon filing a motion for reconsideration,
released Mamangon on bail. Maliciously made it is suggested, for it was made
several days after an alleged extortion attempt by respondent judge upon herein
complainant Armando Contreras. The order, nonetheless, according to
respondent is not devoid of any legal basis. Respondent judge cites, in this
regard, Section 14 of Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court as his legal ground
for such an order, to wit:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. — If
it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and
specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense
punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he
is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an
offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or
admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to
bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge
deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the
nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the
court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or
judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together
with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed,
the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
Clear as the basis may be, its application is, however, erroneous. Even assuming
that Mamangon was lawfully imprisoned at the outset, at the time he filed his
motion for reconsideration, the decision of Judge Macapagal declaring his court
to be without jurisdiction had already become final and considering that no
information had been re-filed, the detention of Mamangon was untenable and
illegal. An accused against whom the information has been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction may no longer be detained; the information under which the accused
is being held for trial loses its force and effect. There is simply nothing to told the
accused answerable for. Section 14 of Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court
speaks of a person lawfully imprisoned. The accused Mamangon was no longer
lawfully imprisoned at the time the motion for reconsideration was filed. Thus,
respondent should not have applied Section 12 of Rule 114 but instead reversed
his former decision by granting the petition and ordering the release of the
accused without requiring him to post bail. When the court where the criminal
case was filed is without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to hold the accused
in confinement pending trial is a valid subject of a petition for habeas corpus.
Where the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ will lie where the order
is void because the court issuing it had no jurisdiction over the crime charged or
over the person accused where the latter had challenged on time, the jurisdiction
of the court over his person (Francisco, p. 665, Rules of Court in the Philippines
Vol. V-B; citing the case of Banayo vs. President of San Pablo, 2 Phil. 413;
Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534; Malinao et al. vs. Peterson, No. L-16464 July 26,
1960). But this remedy should not be secured before a court of equal rank in
order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless
the former court has declared itself to be without jurisdiction, as in the instant
case.
Considering that the petition for habeas corpus should have been granted, and
the accused released from jail without bail, respondent judge acted erroneously
when he ordered the re-arrest of the accused. Apparently, the order of
respondent to re-arrest the accused was prompted by the filing of the motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution alleging that respondent committed error
when he ordered the release of the accused charged with a capital offense.
Believing that an error has been committed, respondent ordered the cancellation
of the cash bond and the re-arrest of the accused by invoking the inherent power
of the court to protect and preserve the rights of the parties and for the safety of
the victim's family. Unfortunately, in trying to correct his error, respondent fell into
another error by ordering the re-arrest of the accused.
The erroneous application of the rule by respondent nevertheless cannot be the
sole basis for disciplining him. As we have ruled in the past, in order to discipline
a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being
contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent
to do injustice (Re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107). Judges cannot be subjected to
liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of their official acts, no matter
how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act
fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or
administratively responsible (Valdez vs. Valera, 81 SCRA 246). Considering the
circumstances of the case at bar, we cannot hold respondent liable for his
erroneous action. An erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been
issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary. Complainant herein
alleged that the order of respondent judge releasing the accused on bail was
maliciously motivated for having been issued several days after the attempted
extortion. We find the decision of respondent erroneous but its malicious intent,
however, may not be presumed in the absence of any evidence to prove the
same. It might be suggested that, respondent's ill motives may be presumed
considering his actuation prior to the issuance of the questioned erroneous order.
We are, however, unable to find a clear and definite connection between an
attempt at extortion and the subsequent erroneous orders. It would be unjust to
presume wrong intentions considering that respondent's questioned orders are
not totally unjustifiable.

Withal, respondent judge cannot be held liable for releasing Mamangon on bail
and for ordering the cancellation of his cash bond and his re-arrest.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent judge guilty of committing acts of impropriety

prejudicial to the integrity of the Judiciary, for which infraction he is hereby
ordered to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00), with the warning that a
repetition of a similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. R-192-RTJ January 9, 1987 and shortly, said respondent returned to the Court; that after some
remarks by respondent judge, complainant moved that the Honorable
ATTY. ARTURO A. ROMERO, complainant, respondent voluntarily inhibit himself from further trying the case in the
vs. light of the antecedents, but denied it and ordered the resetting of the
HON. JUDGE GABRIEL O. VALLE, JR., respondent. case; 1

RESOLUTION Required to comment on the complaint, respondent judge denied the charges and
branded the same as "exaggerated, sensationalized, fabricated and inherently
improbable and contrary to human experience and one-sided.   Respondent judge
2

likewise explained that he has been issued by the provincial commander the necessary
permit to carry his licensed pistol outside his residence on account of a threat on his life
PER CURIAM:
from the New People's Army. By way of prayer, he asked that complainant be suspended
from the practice of law for a certain period of time. 
3

In a verified complaint dated November 28, 1984, Atty. Arturo A. Romero charged Judge
Gabriel O. Valle, Jr;. of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch XII with grave
On January 31, 1985, the Court en banc resolved to refer the case to Associate Justice
misconduct and oppression. In the words of complainant himself, the acts complained of
of the then Intermediate Appeallate Court, Abdulwahid Bidin, for investigation, report and
consisted in:
recommendation. From the evidence adduced at the hearings, Associate Justice Bidin
made the following findings of facts and conclusions:
5. That instead of directing complainant to proceed with the marking of
exhibits and to continue the direct examination, respondent continued to
Complainant is one of the two counsels for plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6821
utter embarrassing remarks which hurt complainant and, therefore, the
entitled "Iglesia Filipina Independiente versus Rafael Albano, et. al.," for
latter tried to make further explanations on said exhibits and to defend his
"Quieting of Title with Preliminary Injunction," pending before the
integrity in a controlled and respectful manner, but his honor, the
Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte-Laoag City, branch XII, presided by
respondent judge suddenly banged his gavel producing such a deafening
Respondent Judge.
noise that several persons from the adjoining branches of the Court
came: that without declaring a recess, said respondent judge
unceremoniously REMOVED his coat and told, angrily, herein During the trial of said case on November 19, 1984, complainant
complainant: "You step out and we will finish the matter"; immediately requested that an inventory book of plaintiff be marked as Exhibit F.
thereafter, respondent judge stepped down from the rostrum and left; Respondent Judge interrupted the complainant with a remark that the
said inventory book should be marked Exh. G since there is already an
Exh. F of the plaintiff which was marked during the last hearing of the
6. That, shaken and stunned by such sudden aggressive behaviour of
case when complainant was absent. The fact that there was already an
respondent, complainant then stood by his seat, and as some people in
Exh. F for the plaintiff was confirmed by the manifestation of Atty. Rafael
the Courtroom rushed out of the Courtroom, complainant looked around
Ruiz, counsel for the defendant after verifying his notes as requested by
and then saw respondent judge outside the courtroom holding a gun with
respondent judge. Nevertheless, the complainant in a loud voice insisted
his right hand, in front of him, facing towards complainant, in an angry
that his proposed marking of the Exhibit is the correct one as the Exhibit
and menacing manner, and waited for complainant to go outside;
F referred to by respondent judge and Atty. Ruiz was not initialed by the
confronted by such alarming and threatening stance of respondent,
Clerk of Court. This remark of complainant irritated the respondent judge
complainant could not move for a moment, as complainant was totally
who retorted that complainant is not prepared for trial and admonished
unarmed, surprised and shocked; and when complainant saw respondent
the latter to be prepared with his trial brief before coming to court so that
Judge briskly walked to and fro still holding a gun, complainant then
he will not bangle (sic) the marking of his exhibit. As the complainant
asked the Court stenographer: "Please put in the record that the Judge is
continued insisting in a loud voice that his proposed marking of the
holding a gun"; that luckily thereafter, Atty. Isidro Madamba, member of
inventory book as Exhibit F is correct, despite the fact that respondent
the Sangunian Panlalawigan, succeeded in pacifying respondent judge
judge had admonished him [complainant] not to bring his "passion" to the
court and if complainant does not respect the Judge, he should respect
the court, the respondent banged his gavel left the rostrum and went to
his chamber. According to the complainant and his witness, [Atty. Andres
Tunac, co-counsel of complainant in the case], the respondent, before
leaving the rostrum made this remark to complainant "You step out. We
finish the matter." Respondent denied having made the challenge to
complainant and alleged that what he said or declared before leaving the
rostrum was "five minutes recess." This call for a recess by respondent is
confirmed and/or corroborated by Atty. Rafael Ruiz, defendant's counsel
in the case on trial and respondent's witness in this investigation. From
his chamber, respondent judge went to the stairs passing the corridor
holding his coat with his left hand while on his right hand he was holding
a hand gun [revolver] which was inside its holster. As respondent walked
on the corridor towards the stairs, he looked at the courtroom where the
lawyers were. Upon reaching the stairs, respondent was informed by his
clerk that there are still cases in the calendar ready for trial. Respondent
returned to his chamber and placed his gun inside his table. Later,
respondent came out to resume his court session.
At the resumption of the trial, the complainant stood up and asked the
respondent to inhibit himself from hearing the case. The respondent
required the complainant to put his request in writing and dictated an
order resetting the case to another date. The case [Civil Case No. 6821],
is now transferred to another judge who presides over Branch XIII.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to carry his licensed pistol
outside of his residence as evidenced by the Certification issued by the
Provincial Commander of Ilocos Norte [Exh. 7] and that he had been
carrying the said gun from his house to office and back ever since he
received a letter threat dated March 22, 1984 [Exh. 1 ] from the NPA.
According to Atty. Leandro Rafales [complainant's own witness] and who
appears with [sic] the most impartial among the witnesses, the
respondent stood up, bang [sic] his gavel and left the rostrum because
the complainant did not stop making remarks and insisted in a loud voice
in marking the inventory book as Exhibit F despite the fact that it has
been established that there was already an Exhibit F of the plaintiff and
that before banging the gavel respondent judge told the complainant not
to bring his passion to court and if complainant does not respect the
Judge, he should respect the court. Atty. Rafales also testified that
respondent judge did not remove his coat when he left the rostrum and
while respondent was holding his gun which was inside its holster with his
right hand when he came out of his chamber on his way towards the
stairs, the gun was not pointed at anyone, although the respondent
turned his face towards the people inside the courtroom as he walked
towards the stairs.
As regards the charge that respondent challenged the complainant to
step out and we settle the matter the evidence is inconclusive. While the
complainant and his co-counsel, Atty. Tunac testified that the respondent
Judge uttered those statements, the latter and Atty. Rafael Ruiz
[defendant's counsel and witness for respondent] denied that such
statement was made by respondent. Both respondent and Atty. Ruiz
allege that what respondent said or declared before leaving the rostrum
was "five minute recess." On the other hand, Atty. Rafales testified that
what he heard from respondent-judge was "step out" only. The transcript
of the proceedings that took place before respondent judge on that fateful
day had not been presented as evidenced [sic] by the parties at this
investigation. In view of this conflicting testimony of the witnesses, the
undersigned cannot conclude that respondent judge challenged the
complainant as alleged in the complaint.  4
It is evident from the foregoing that complainant and respondent judge are equally to
blame for the incident under consideration. We have enunciated in the case of Lugue vs.
Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165, that:
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the
high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other
that tends to undermine the people's respect for, and confidence in, the
administration of justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have
to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be
expected then of petitioner and respondent is a sense of shared
responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice. ...
The relations between counsel and judge should be based on-mutual respect and on a
deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other.   Thus, counsel is expected to
5
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial of
officers.   Although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of
6
causes he upholds,   his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
7
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another.   Certainly, and most especially in our culture, raising one's voice
8
is a sign of disrespect, improper to one whose "investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative
than that of respectful behavior towards the courts."  9
Complainant is an active law practitioner in the province of Ilocos Norte. He was director
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Ilocos Norte-Laoag City Chapter in 1982,
Chairman of the Legal Aid Committee of said chapter, president of PHILCONSA, Ilocos
Norte-Laoag City Chapter from 1981-83 and president of the Ilocos Norte Lions Club in
1983. 10 As a recognized community leader, complainant should provide an example in proper court decorum to his
brothers in the profession, and not to foment discord in the courtroom. Considering complainant's obvious high standing in
the legal profession and the community, he should have observed humility to accept mistakes graciously and to treat the
same as the proverbial learning experience.

On the other hand, respondent judge exhibited shortness of temper and impatience,
contrary to the duties and restrictions imposed upon him by reason of his
office. 11 In Calalang vs. Fernandez, Adm. Case No. 175-J, June 10, 1971, We stated that a judge should show no
shortness of temper for it merely detracts from the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant marks of a
dispenser of justice. In the case at bar, respondent judge, in losing his temper and engaging complainant in a heated
discussion, not only failed to observe the proper decorum expected of judicial officers, but as a consequence thereof likewise
failed to preserve and enforce order in his court. Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without
being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the
court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by
banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

Respondent judge appears to have a valid explanation for gun, but such explanation
cannot be taken as carrying a satisfactory. for his having chosen to carry the same in
plain view of the complainant and other lawyers inside the courtroom when he came out
of his chambers on his way to the stairs. Taken in the light of what had just transpired,
the actuation of respondent judge was not an innocent gesture, but one calculated to
instill fear in or intimidate complainant. We cannot let this pass unnoticed. Respondent
judge's behavior constitutes grave misconduct. It is a serious violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which require that a "judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond
reproach." 12 Moreover, it reveals an attitude diametrically opposed to our pronouncement in De la Paz v. Inutan, 64
SCRA 540. that "the judge is the visible representation of law, and more importantly, of justice." Certainly, one who lives by
the uncivilized precept of "might is right," is unworthy of an office entrusted with the duty to uphold the rule of law.

WHEREFORE, Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. is found guilty of grave misconduct and is
hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service, without forfeiture of retirement benefits but
with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. Complainant Atty. Arturo A. Romero is required to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for conduct unbecoming of an officer of
the court, within fifteen (15) days from notice.

The decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS,
O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, *
ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K.
MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE
B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP,
ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS,
VICENTE JAYME, **, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran,
Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members),
JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ.
GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO
G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT.
LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO,
SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ,
SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN,
SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO
MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A.
BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO,
AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, *** , respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
RESOLUTION
 
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the
third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former
Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the
imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses
alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose
jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but
mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the
General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the
President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971
when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ."   This 1
followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates
for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates headed by
Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the
truth has never been known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to
undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's
refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine national
reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort
away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on
that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was)
technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon."   The military investigators reported within a span
2
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days
later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his
house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The
military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV
channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a
nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce
disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free
world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning
and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral
reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board   to investigate "the 3
treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all
Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early distortions and exaggerations in both
foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and
dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on
October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8
hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts,
until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark
another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the
chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the report as if it were the majority
report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the
legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four
other members was submitted on the following day to the then President who coldly received them and could scarcely
conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what
you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando
Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary]
that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the
military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers
who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service
stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn,
of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference between the two reports is that the
majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the
case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who
were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther
Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented
without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to
our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the
President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member majority report (also
prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and
intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our
traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They
wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only
to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the
late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility
of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice,
rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was
indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore our
country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the free world
where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing
of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills
pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that
has been haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the
breakdown of peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft
and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what
are otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military and law
enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large,
the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have
remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the
service of our country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst
fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority
can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity
and indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is
bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that
public officials should regard public service as a reflection of human
Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly
required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis
that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of
the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest
esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public
officials transcend all other considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and
statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings
and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this
view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he
told David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September
9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I
would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know
how they think. I know what they are thinking of."   He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his
7
Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that
seems to contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent
evidence seems to indicate that some of the guards may
have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have
been reading are the newspapers and the newspaper
reports have been biased. The evidence still proves that
Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that
there were intelligence reports connecting the communist
party to the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave
of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that
"(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has
chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of
opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended
"My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case,"   even as
he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an
interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as
saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and
Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five
incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present
action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present
vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that
the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused,
and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find
out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan
from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had
scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial
and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before
an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.  -a 10
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes   to issue the restraining order prayed for.
11
The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent
Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio
in reverse,   resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining
12
the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period
counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on
them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a
consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining
the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set
for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the
respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due
process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence
9
is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be
restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. This marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect
convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of
Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In
opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer
and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration
was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial
a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to
whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict
of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon.  15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April
11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he
was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in
his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any
alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully
resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary
investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases
below against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure.
That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied."  -a He
submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged
attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the
reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been caused may
be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and
reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection
to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could
take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of
April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and
decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that
"if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the
Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably
alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to
the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent
Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that
he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he
had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any
lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by
this Court to settle the note passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that
the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino
and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous
end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared
resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the
undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution
charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the
Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the
former President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo
Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran
15
(the Presiding Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the
Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and
left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed
resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in
advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman
shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against
the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the
former President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about
Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the
Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: "It
will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious
and poor Johnny does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with
Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming
ambitious "the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be
charged in court, and wig be detained at city jail."
 From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic
approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political
and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court,
Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public
demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not
IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was
ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo
and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their
respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to
commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never
mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished
in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the
New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been
tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na
lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned
manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or
even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always
been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and
efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be
conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in
accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of
a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the
Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the media;
the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war
room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution;
the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the
"scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and
partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not
decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for
Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds
all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they
incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the
undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only
occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated
himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would
require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body
of commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners'
claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a
double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its
denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to file
a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its
evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked
that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2,
1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing
that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct
action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish
by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of
June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired Supreme
Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate Court
Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and
relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court
for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June
16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents announced in
open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former
President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of
respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it
submitted its extensive 64-page Report   wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a
16
recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the
Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge
before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having
already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members of
the Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel
and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman
who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of
the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view
of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be
denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with
capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be
"categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as
accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to
the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific
instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the
Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of
some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses
who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of
defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in
the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted
the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted
sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same
in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice
Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into
line by the omnipresent influence of an authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that
the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also
predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the
considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment
of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in the said case have been
vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that
the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et
al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the
Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the
parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis
thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly
supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter,
that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of
the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case
and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of
the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused of all criminal and
civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public
record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of
141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and
judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff
from the grain,   the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public
17
respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case
disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite
understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred
unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not
invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate
Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President Marcos
came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino
was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want
the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory
thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this
purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them.
From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six
(26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted
that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the findings of the
Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could stand in court.
He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in
the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the
charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly
prevent further street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such
a procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are
charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit
of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution
if some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer
in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of
dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as
accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody of
the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution, President
Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how long it
would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran
'point blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice
Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the
entire course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that
such order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain
then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases
therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice
thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received
such presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light
of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned
to the division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at
once dispelled by the circumstance that he was the only one from the
Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference wherein the said
directive was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from
his admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame
when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after
an agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting
the accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na
lamang kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President Marcos
expressed his thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to
reciprocate," did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part
of justice Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the
conference was presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier
manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal
Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without
any reason having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In
the mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn
therefrom is that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to
bear on both the court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition
of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is readily
deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and
official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were directed,
the motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the
government prevailing at that time which enabled, the then head of state
to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or
stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the
public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those
directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take
the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to
see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made of this
conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15)
months later when the former president was no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he
wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to
do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of
will or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice
Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their realization of its
unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated murder
case may be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto.
No effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most valid reason
to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or
"out of respect to the Office of the President," or that it would be
'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of
mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of
capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to
Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized
and exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos may likewise
be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given
seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not
that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the
talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be
said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential
pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is
on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to
such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective
handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos
in the conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the
Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and
instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure
and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six
accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals,
Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and
recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be
completely justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no
sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The majority
of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of the
accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may
hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard practice of
the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the
highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence
presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and
practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera
panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily
opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacañang
instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization
came only after the then President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel,
Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November,
1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang
conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special
Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the
crime of double murder."   As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice
19
Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been
the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go
to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that
a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent
efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and
thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable
evidences were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being
ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to
refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21
 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had
to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the
Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to
stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as
"palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August
20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on
the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in
accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as
prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he
gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon
his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a
soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya
was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let
him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the
Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed
testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the
efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than
those in the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in
constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed men; that their
house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the
foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and
ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk
with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Fariñas
offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Fariñas of
Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to warn her not
to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered her two million
pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the
punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she
would refrain from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and
harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually
testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice
Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's
going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to
honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May
1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The
insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not end
with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several
notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who
cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be asked more
questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having coached
her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which lasted
for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and
making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to
pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the
courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the building
housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City
Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the main
switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside
the room occupied by Malacañang people who were keeping track of the
proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that
the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4,
1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn
(also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them away, also
disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman,
the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a neighbor
named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then, despite his attempts to find
any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because they
said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of National Defense to
locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new
leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S.
airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to
divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not necessarily
contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was
killed at the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that
such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,'
it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to accomplish the same
purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece
of evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that it was prudent
or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence.
Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the
cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as
averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have
been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the
Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the
testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a
motion for the reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so
and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least,
indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon
as possible, if not of something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-
forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such
directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos
to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are
assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The evidence
before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran
evinces a strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular
raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an
announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify on
the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given
why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the
officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were
present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed
by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle
Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of the two
Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized
as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in
the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such
preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited time available therefor,
the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring
with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any
one of the two other members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in
the City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by
the Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail.
The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that
point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding Officers.
Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the
Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito
Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after
sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the
Court had been monitored by Malacañang presumably for it to know what was
happening and to take remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had
candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the
President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There was
a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and
Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings." the close monitoring by
Malacañang showed its results on several occasions specified in the
Report. Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's
presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his
testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at
once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at
the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was
brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody of her.
"It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel
pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in
the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It
is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the
case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be
complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of
the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to
accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable
both to then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the
foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in
the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard
ground that their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most
logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total
absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had
to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations,
and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to
see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by
Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the
accused should be convicted he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them;
however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and
Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six
accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he
would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the
Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-
93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or
more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne
out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur ) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro,
22
his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable
(it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution
panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference,
would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and
the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how
to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings
to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and
precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14,
1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus,   "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
25
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority
with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the
boys' " acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that
he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four
majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the
legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four
majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the
indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser
seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he
totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted
that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought
futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security
for Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and
searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who
wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and
pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on
the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version
of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy
with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the
authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges
against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have
been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the
preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal
laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any avowal of
independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very
moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men  -a) made it possible to refer the cases to
26
the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too
easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion as to the
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after
fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and
impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to
be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the
world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In
life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a
civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the
aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment
of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,  27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37
SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78;
Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian
president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an the respondents-accused.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end
"deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was
already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the
overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's
difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to
appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the
proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months
time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained
of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the
subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing
witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be
able to produce their witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation
of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were
pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not
maintained by the court.   Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law
28
with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such
as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society
and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds
contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends
the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being put in double jeopardy
was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully
applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights are
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under
it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales must
balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society,
which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean
injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is
due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors
had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the
Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising
from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had
been passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion
and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that
respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first
making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between
him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed with the
trial and then deal later on with that. After all, the most
important thing here is, shall we say, the decision of the
case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your
Honor, is the capacity of the justices to sit in
judgment. That is more important than anything else.(p.
13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by
Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in
the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the
facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the
contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution
neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a
similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it
now is not alone out of season but is also a confession of official
insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969
case of Paredes vs. Gopengco   since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of
33
acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the
overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged
failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition
and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering
its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order
was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This
is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan , Wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that
35
"prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge
acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents' counsels
must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and
that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment,
instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to
enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment
for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by
the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the
beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the
public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict
of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of
the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the
judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are
not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and
jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied
by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was
suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now
exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc.   is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one
36
Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once more,
since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for
reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month
since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of
the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being
resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the
Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was
not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang
conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per
adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated
and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of
authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the
imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress
and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the
new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy
attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers
both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In
the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and
naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith
and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword
nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and
moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity
and impartiallity integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the
rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The
lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment
today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new
trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as
vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should
not become simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents
accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied
the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to
the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of
knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their
primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not
to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing
authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus
given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and
the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the
sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges
must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided
only, the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros
German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service
in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and
submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period and greatly
easing the Court's burden.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The

resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan
and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to
an

This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988
MERCEDITA G. LORENZO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PRIMO L. MARQUEZ, respondent.
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-88-141 June 27, 1988
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PRIMO L. MARQUEZ, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn statement dated October 11, 1987 executed by Mercedita G. Lorenzo and in
an indorsement of December 2, 1987 of the Chief State Prosecutor transmitting the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation dated November 5, 1987, the herein
respondent Judge Primo L. Marquez of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya,
Quezon is charged on three counts, namely: (1) harassment in failing to indorse the
reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo as Municipal Trial Court Aide; (2) for
violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in deciding Civil Case No. 1202
entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya vs. Gilda Balid, et al., when he was
the former counsel of the plaintiff; and (3) for issuing a subpoena for the appearance of
Jose D. Obosa, a prison inmate of the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) to appear before
him when said person has no case pending before him nor is he a witness in any
pending case therein.
The respondent was required to file an answer to said complaint and after his answer
was filed a formal investigation was conducted by the Deputy Court Administrator,
Meynardo A. Tiro, by authority of the Court, wherein evidence was adduced by the
complainant and respondent. On May 27, 1988, said official submitted his report and
recommendation to the Court.
On the first charge of harassment, the respondent explained that he did not recommend
the reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo because she was inefficient.
Such reluctance of the respondent must be because she was a protegee of the
respondent's predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly exposed the
illegal issuance of the subpoena to Obosa by the respondent. Nevertheless, it is the
privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee
with whom he will work. If he did not choose to have said complainant reappointed, he
cannot thereby be held administratively liable.
Under the second charge, there is no question that the respondent was the counsel for
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1202 entitled "Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya
(KBPS) vs. Gilda Balid, et al." filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon. The
complaint was filed by Crisostomo L. Luna, president and board chairman of the plaintiff,
who is his uncle.   The respondent was then a member of the board of directors of the
1
plaintiff.   In an order of November 28, 1986, Judge Parentela declared defendants in
2
default for failure to file their answer. When the respondent assumed office he issued an
order on February 10, 1987 requiring plaintiff to secure the services of another counsel in
his place and he set the case for hearing. On March 9, 1987, he issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision. on April 2, 1987, he rendered a decision
favorable to the plaintiff, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the above-named plaintiff and
against the above-named defendants, whereby defendants are hereby
directed to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the following, to wit:
1. Principal amount of P4,676.00 plus one (1%) percent interest on the
unpaid balance and the two (2%) percent penalty interest per month until
the entire obligation is fully paid
2. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent the total amount due
and collectible, plus litigation expenses in the amount of P460.00 and
cost of suit,
An appeal therefrom was interposed by the defendants to the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily. interested
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
 A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.
From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was
a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from
any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear
violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the
parties, not a mere verbal consent much. less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said
written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record.
The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct betrays his
unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to
administer the law impartially and without any fear or favor.
The third charge is even more serious. The record of Criminal Case No. 8924, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat" for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, shows that on
July 24, 1987, the respondent issued a subpoena, addressed to prison inmate Jose
Obosa, who was then a convict in the NBP at Muntinlupa, Rizal, requiring him to appear
before his court on July 27, 28 and 29, 1987 at 8:30 A.M. and then and there to testify in
the above entitled case. There is a notation at the top thereof "For Conference.  3
On August 18, 1987, the respondent issued an order and on the basis thereof issued
another subpoena for Obosa to appear for a conference on August 28, 1987 at 8:30
A.M.   There was no reason for respondent to subpoena Obosa to testify in said case as
4
the accused had not yet been arrested and thus the case could not be set for hearing.
Respondent, however, explained that the reason he subpoenaed Obosa was due to his
interest in having the accused Salamat arrested as he was still at large. He stated that
during one of his speaking engagements in San Narciso, Quezon, he met a certain
Rivera who told him that Obosa was a friend of Salamat who may be able to tell the
respondent about the whereabouts of Salamat. Respondent added that it was the
complainant Maximino Torres who requested the issuance of said subpoena for Obosa.
Torres, however, testified that he did not know Obosa and that it was the respondent
who drafted a letter dated August 14, 1987 and caused him to sign the same by going to
his house, nine kilometers away from the courtroom. The said letter-request was made
long after the first subpoena was issued by respondent on July 24, 1987. This
discrepancy reveals the questionable motive of the respondent.
Because of the subpoena issued by the respondent, Obosa appeared at past 12:00 noon
on July 28, 1987 in the house of the respondent at Sariaya, Quezon, not in the
courtroom, with two prison escorts and yet the respondent did not ask him about the
whereabouts of Salamat. Respondent stated Obosa was to appear before him in court
but there was no court hearing as yet as the accused had not been apprehended.
Again, on July 29, 1987, Obosa appeared in his house at past noon but likewise
respondent did not inquire about the whereabouts of Salamat. The excuse of the
respondent is that was the time he had to bring his sick daughter to the hospital.
Atty. Salvador Ranin, the agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who
investigated the case, testified that from July 28, 1987, up to August 2, 1987, Obosa did
not return to his quarters at the NBP although there was an entry in the logbook of the
NBP that Obosa returned to his quarters allegedly on August 2, 1987 at 2:10 in the
afternoon. The well publicized murder of Local Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer
occurred at 6:45 P.M. of the same day. Ranin stated that during the incident, three (3)
school children saw a man with a gun running towards La Huerta, Paranaque.
Incidentally, the residence of Obosa is in Paranaque.
Ranin went to Muntinlupa and he photographed Obosa while taking a bath. He blew up
the picture and showed it to the witnesses and the children and they positively Identified
Obosa as the man running away from the scene of the crime. Later fifteen (15) persons
were lined up at the NBI headquarters in Manila together with Obosa and the witnesses
pointed to Obosa as the one fleeing after the commission of the offense. Ranin
emphasized that in their opinion the marginal entry in the logbook of the NBP as to the
alleged return of Obosa to his quarters on August 2, 1987 at 2:1 0 P.M. is a false entry.
There are now two criminal cases pending before the RTC, Makati, Metro Manila,
namely: Criminal Case No. 011, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Nieves Constancio,
Ruel Villahermosa y Fernandez, Jose Obosa y Tutaan and Victoriano Tutaan, prison
superintendent, for the murder of Secretary Ferrer; and Criminal Case No. 012 against
the same accused for the murder of Jesus T. Calderon, driver of Secretary Ferrer. The
respondent is not accused in the said criminal cases.
No doubt the respondent is guilty of the charge against him. There was no reason for him
to require the appearance of Obosa in his court, even for a conference. The criminal
case pending before him was not yet ready for trial as the accused was at large. If truly
respondent was impelled with the desire to locate the whereabouts of accused Salamat
so that he could be arrested, all that he could have done was to have a policeman or
court employee go to Muntinlupa for the purpose, or he himself could have done so.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena shall be signed by the clerk
of court or by the judge, if the court has no clerk, under the seal of the court. The
respondent had a clerk of court, Miss Gloria Lorenzo, and yet he himself issued and
signed the subpoena. His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement
allegedly to appear before him is obvious.

Respondent did not even consider that Circular No. 6 dated December 5, 1987 of this
Court specifically directs that no maximum security prisoner could be taken out of the
NBP to serve as witness in a case and testify therein without the permission of this Court
and unless the same is absolutely necessary. The respondent failed to secure such
authority from this Court before issuing a subpoena for Obosa. His lame excuse is that
he has not read said circular.

In causing Jose Obosa to get out of the NBP allegedly to appear before him, the
respondent wittingly or unwittingly, furnished Obosa the opportunity to participate in the
commission of a crime or crimes. In fact, Obosa is now being held to account as a
principal in the murder of Secretary Ferrer and his driver.

The respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty.
He demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as in fact by his behavior he has placed the
judiciary in disrepute.   He abused the great powers of his office so that he should not
5

stay a moment longer as a member of the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, while respondent is cleared of the charge of harassment filed by

Mercedita G. Lorenzo, he is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct for
deciding Civil Case No. 1202, entitled Kilusang Bayan Pampananalapi ng Sariaya
(KBPS) vs. Gilda Balid, et al., wherein he was a former counsel for plaintiff in violation of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and for having illegally issued a subpoena for
the appearance of prison inmate Jose T. Obosa of the NBP before him in Criminal Case
No. 8924, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Salamat;" and as penalty thereof,
the respondent it is hereby DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement
in the government and forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if any, but without prejudice to
the payment of his accrued leave or salaries already earned.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1594. June 20, 2003.]
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-650-RTJ)
PASTOR SALUD, Complainant, v. JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas
City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative case filed by Pastor Salud 1 against the Hon.
Florentino M. Alumbres, then presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City, Metro Manila, Branch 255, for undue delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. LP-96-300, entitled Sps. Eduardo and Josefina
Laurito v. Sps. Pastor and Marcosa Salud.
As found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), 2 the instant matter
originated from the double sale of a parcel of land. It appears that a certain
Ricardo Forneza, Jr., and Cynthia S. Forneza were the original owners of a
house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (106597) T-
5251-A. In a brief span of four (4) days, the Fornezas managed to sell the
same property twice. The first sale took place on February 8, 1990 to one
Ferdinand Jimenez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Then on February 12,
1990, the Fornezas executed in favor of Maria Belen Salud and Laurina Salud,
a Contract to Sell 3 over the same house and lot. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The first buyer (Jimenez) successfully caused the transfer of the title of the
subject property in his name, as a result of which TCT No. (106597) T-5251-
A was cancelled and TCT No. T-14065 issued in his name. On June 27, 1991,
Jimenez sold the property to the spouses Eduardo and Josefina Laurito. The
Laurito spouses then secured a new title, TCT No. T-24778, in their names. 4
When the Laurito spouses visited the subject property, they discovered that
the spouses Pastor and Marcosa Salud were occupying the house and lot.
Notwithstanding the demand made by the Lauritos, the Salud couple refused
to vacate the property. Hence, the Lauritos filed a suit for unlawful detainer
against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City. 5
Despite the defense of the Salud spouses that they were buyers in good faith,
the MeTC rendered a Decision, 6 dated December 9, 1996, against them. The
MeTC held that the Saluds failed to present any document to show that they
were the owners of the property.
On April 17, 1997, the Salud spouses appealed and filed a memorandum
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 40 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-96-300, was raffled to Branch 255 of the
RTC of Las Piñas City, presided over by herein Respondent. Notwithstanding
the pendency of said appeal, on April 1, 1997, 8 Judge Alumbres issued an
Alias Writ of Execution, stating that "judgment [is] now final and executory."
9 Thus, the Salud spouses filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals on April 23, 1997, with a prayer to temporarily restrain the RTC from
implementing, enforcing or otherwise executing its orders dated February 17,
1997 and April 1, 1997, or otherwise disturbing the status quo. 10
The Laurito spouses then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Declare
Temporary Restraining Order Vacated and for the early resolution of the case.
On October 8, 1998, they also filed a Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal. 11
On October 19, 1998, 12 Pastor Salud filed a Letter Complaint 13 with the
OCA praying that the respondent judge be found administratively liable for
delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. The Salud spouses
claimed that the RTC had the period from May 1997 to August 1997 to decide
Civil Case No. LP-96-300, but had not resolved the matter. They likewise
pointed to another case pending before the respondent, where the litigants
had been waiting at least six (6) months for the court’s judgment. The
complainants herein asked the OCA, to look closely at the docket of
respondent judge’s sala, as they were of the belief that several cases ripe for
decision remained unacted upon. 14
On October 19, 1998, despite Salud’s opposition, the respondent judge issued
an Alias Writ of Execution. Salud questioned the issuance of the alias writ on
the ground that said order was contrary to the respondent judge’s earlier
statement that he would not act upon or issue any writ out of respect for the
order of the Court of Appeals to maintain the status quo. The respondent
judge made the statement, according to Salud despite the prayer of the
Saluds that a decision be rendered on their unlawful detainer case. 15
On November 20, 1998, or after more than fifteen (15) months from
submission, the RTC handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. LP-96300. It
affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC, which found the Saluds have failed
to present a better title to the subject property. 16
In his Comment 17 on the instant Complaint, respondent judge does not
deny that there was a delay in the rendition of judgment. However, he sought
to put the blame for the delay squarely on the complainant herein. According
to respondent, after he decreed the issuance of a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal, complainant herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC
but also with the Court of Appeals, which sought to thwart the
implementation of the writ issued and, obviously, to harass him. Complainant
likewise sought to inhibit him from proceeding with the hearing of Civil Case
No. LP-96-300. Respondent avers that complainant even went to the extent
of charging him with contempt of court before the Court of Appeals. As a
result, respondent said his time was virtually used up by answering baseless
and unwarranted pleadings filed by the complainant. 18
Respondent points out that despite the pendency of the administrative case
against him, he was nevertheless able to render a decision, albeit delayed by
16 months. He now submits that given this development, he should be
exempted from and relieved of any liability. In addition, Judge Alumbres
submits that more than one (1) year has lapsed since the case was decided
and he no longer has any jurisdiction over Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Hence,
he should not be ordered to explain matters no longer within his jurisdiction
and competence. 19 Lastly, Judge Alumbres attributes the filing of the
administrative case against him to the unfavorable decision he rendered
against complainant in the unlawful detainer case. He cites complainant as "a
classic example" of a disgruntled litigant. 20
On August 29, 2000, the Court Administrator recommended that the
respondent judge be suspended without pay and benefits for a period of two
(2) months 21 for delay in the disposition of a case. 22 Said recommendation
took into consideration the fact that respondent had previously been
admonished for having decided a case beyond the reglementary period. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is not disputed that it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his
decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision. The
Constitution 23 mandates lower court judges to decide a case within ninety
(90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct 24
mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge
to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by
the law and the rules. We have emphasized strict observance of this duty in
order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion
and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim that
justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration
of justice, no matter how brief, may result in depriving the litigant of his right
to a speedy disposition of his case. Delay ultimately affects the image of the
judiciary. 25 Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of
the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is
detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a
case despite the ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross
inefficiency, 26 and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting judge.
27
Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in our
judicial system, 28 and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. 29
In the event that judges cannot comply with the deadlines prescribed by law,
they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions. 30
The Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them
reasonable extensions of time to resolve cases upon proper application by the
judges concerned and on meritorious grounds. 31 At the very least,
respondent judge should have requested for an extension of time to render
judgment once he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-day
period to render a judgment. In so doing, he would have been able to apprise
litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for the delay, if any. It
would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.
Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under
Section 4, Rule 140 32 of the Rules of Court, as amended. If found guilty
thereof, the judge shall be suspended from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months; or
imposed a fine of more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant
to Section 10, 33 Rule 140. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In this instance, however, we also have to recognize certain contributing
factors for the delay. Among them are the observed tendencies of the
litigants to resort to harassment tactics against the judge, as well as to
overburden the court with multiple but unnecessary motions and related
paperwork. These negative tactics are to be deplored. Although they do not
excuse undue delay, they certainly should mitigate the imposable penalty on
the erring judge.
Except for the mitigating circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA
recommendations in this case. The record shows that this is not the first
time, that respondent has been called to account by this Court. In 1992, he
was fined for gross partiality to a party. In 1996, he was admonished for
delay in the disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded. Although
respondent has retired on June 3, 2001, the recommendation of the OCA that
a fine be imposed on him is still in order.

Worth stressing, even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still
be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed
during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or
suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his retirement
benefits. 34

ACCORDINGLY, considering all the circumstances in this case, Hon. Florentino

M. Alumbres, former presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas,
Branch 255, is FINED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) for undue delay in
rendering a decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300. Said amount is hereby
ORDERED deducted from retirement benefits of Respondent.

SO ORDERED
ADM. MATTER No. RTJ-90-447             July 12, 1991
EMMA J. CASTILLO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint dated January 17, 1990, docketed as Adm. Matter No. RTJ-90-447,
Emma J. Castillo charged Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a public official. The sworn complaint is copied in full:
January 17, 1990
The Honorable Justice
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Padre Faura, Manila
Attn: Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan
        Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Your Honors:
I would like to register this letter-complaint against the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 who is likewise the incumbent President of the
Philippine Judges Association, Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., for immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a public official.
Sometime in 1987, when I intervened in the case for (sic) intestate estate of my late
common-law husband which was then pending before the RTC, Branch 94, Quezon City,
where incidentally Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. was temporarily holding office at that
time, the latter was referred to me by an acquaintance of mine as a person who could
assist me and help facilitate for (sic) the early termination of the case in my favor.
Subsequently, I personally met Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. in his office located at the
11th floor of the Quezon City Hall where he transferred. At the said meeting, he advised
me to see him at his law office located in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila which I did. When I
met him at noon, he invited me to eat in a restaurant and even asked me to ride with him
in his car but instead, to my surprise, he took me to a motel where he made sexual
advances on me. As he did not succeed in his evil design, he asked me if I will (sic)
agree to the proposition that he be my sub-husband (sic) and promised to give me his
condominium unit located at Pag-asa Bliss Condominium, Quezon City, as well as to
provide financial support for my two (2) minor children and place them in an exclusive
school for girls. Due to confusion because of the untimely death of my common-law
husband coupled with the persistent pleadings of Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., he was
able to convince me. Upon giving my consent, he immediately gave his condominium
unit No. 19-22 at Pag-asa Bliss Condominium, Quezon City, where I and my two (2)
minor daughters reside up to the present. On May 27, 1989, as a result of our
relationship, I gave birth to a baby boy which (sic) we named Jerome Christopher
Calanog.
Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. is very well-known to my two (2) minor daughters as they
fondly called him as "Tito Nonong".
From the time I gave birth to our son Jerome Christopher Calanog, said Judge Manuel
M. Calanog, Jr. has refused to provide us financial support nor placed my two (2) minor
daughters to an exclusive school as he had promised. Worst, to the present, he fails and
refuses to pay the monthly installments of the condominium unit he gave to me despite
being informed by the National Housing Authority that we will be evicted from the said
place for failure to pay the same. Despite my repeated verbal demands for him to give
us, or at least his son Jerome Christopher Calanog, financial support, Judge Manuel M.
Calanog Jr. just ignored my pleas.
May I then ask and pray that justice be given to me and my children or at least for my
son Jerome Christopher Calanog? May I further request that the proper sanction be
meted against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. for his conduct unbecoming of a public
official and immorality?
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EMMA J. CASTILLO
Bldg. 19-22 Bliss Pag-asa, Q.C.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jan. 25, 1990, at Quezon City, Metro
Manila, affiant exhibited to me her Res. Cert. No. 500827K issued at Quezon City, Metro
Manila, on January 19, 1990.
 (Sgd.) JOSE L. MA SANTOS
Notary Public
Comm. until Dec. 31, 1991
PTR No. 8016341-Q.C.
Jan. 2, 1990
TAN: 1525-203-4
Doc. No. 89;
Page No. 19;
Book No. 238;
Series of 1990.
Copy furnished:
All SC Justices
Ombudsman
NBI, Manila1
Acting on the complaint filed by Castillo, the Court required the respondent to answer.
The respondent took time in answering the complaint. It was only after two motions for
extension of time to file answer did he file on April 10, 1990 his two-paragraph Answer
dated April 5, 1990 followed by another two-paragraph pleading entitled "Supplemental
Answer" dated May 30, 1990. In both answers he simply averred that the complainant
"has expressly stated that she is no longer interested in pursuing the same (complaint)
and therefore, pray that the said complaint be considered withdrawn." The respondent
prayed "that the instant case be considered withdrawn and/or Dismissed. In his
Supplemental Answer he vehemently denies for being untrue the material allegations of
complainant in her letter-complaint dated January 17, 1990." He reiterated his prayer
"that the instant case be dismissed." Later, on February 5, 1990, the complainant filed a
sworn letter-request dated February 1, 1990, praying that her complaint be considered
withdrawn "because I (she) am no longer interested in pursuing it."  Just like that.
2 named JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG and also on February 1990
Notwithstanding the turn of events, the Court, as a matter of procedure in cases of this
serious nature, on September 6, 1990, issued a Resolution referring the case to
Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In her investigation, Justice Paras heard the testimonies of Ernesto Bustamante and
Jose Javier, both employees in the sala of the respondent.
On October 19, 1990, the complainant submitted a formal "Affidavit of Desistance" in
which she denied totally the allegations of her complaint:
2. That after I have filed the above-complaint, I began to be bothered by my own
conscience inasmuch as what I have narrated therein are not true, especially the
fact that I had an amorous relationship with him and that my child namely Jerome
Christopher is his son and also the fact that I was given by him a condominium
unit located at my above address;
3. That after filing, however, the above-mentioned letter-complaint with the
Supreme Court, I have come to my right senses and realized the injustice I have
committed against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., so that as an evidence of
repentance and desire on my part to straighten everything I executed that letter
addressed to the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court which I filed with the
Office of the Chief Justice on January 26, 1990 manifesting therein that I am
considering my subject complaint against Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. as
withdrawn and that I am no longer interested in further pursuing it and that
recently I asked the forgiveness of Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. for the dishonor
I have done to him as a consequence of the subject complaint and I was forgiven
by him; 3
The other witnesses, namely Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier, however, stood firm
on their testimonies.
Jose Javier, who had worked as court interpreter in the sala of the respondent for almost
ten years, testified on the circumstances mentioned in the following affidavit:
1. During my stay with Branch 76, Quezon City, my extra work given to me by
Honorable Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. is to bring the weekly allowance of Ms. Emma
J. Castillo and to pay the monthly electric and water bills of the said Bliss located
at Blg. 19-22 Apartment, Pag-asa, Quezon City where Ms. Emma J. Castillo is
residing and also instructed me last May 25, 1989 to bring Ms. Emma J. Castillo
to the Chinese General Hospital to give birth and further instructed me to fetch
from the hospital Ms. Emma J. Castillo after having given birth to a Baby Boy
instructed me to secure education plan for JEROME CHRISTOPHER CALANOG
in the amount of P534.00 for first payment only.
2. In view of being a lay minister of Mary Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church
at Pasig, Metro Manila who distributes Holy Communion during Holy Mass on
Sundays, I considered to (sic) revolting to my conscience to be an errand boy by
doing every now and then. 4
x x x           x x x          x x x
In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Service, upon the instruction
of this Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts raised in the testimonies and
furnished the following information:
x x x           x x x          x x x
On June 29, 1990 initial discreet verification disclosed that indeed EMMA J.
CASTILLO resides at #19-22 Bliss Condominium, Pag-asa, Q.C.,
x x x           x x x          x x x
It was further discreetly gathered at that time that EMMA J. CASTILLO is the
mistress of a Judge of a Quezon City Court; about 50 plus years old; always
wearing long sleeve shirt.
Further initial discreet verification also revealed that EMMA J. CASTILLO has
three children and that the youngest is still a baby. 1âwphi1
On June 30, 1990, it was discreetly gathered from Judge CALANOG's staff at
Branch 76, RTC, Q.C., that subject CALANOG is scheduled to leave the country
for China on a vacation.
On same day, from another source who is familiar with EMMA J. CASTILLO, it
was discreetly gathered that EMMA J. CASTILLO is the mistress of a Judge of a
Quezon City Court and has three children. Accordingly, this Judge has been
frequently seen at EMMA J. CASTILLO's unit, especially during the afternoon
and that when they go out, they walk separately, pretending not to know each
other.
x x x           x x x          x x x
On the same day, it was discreetly verified from the National Housing Authority
(NHA) that a Bliss Condominium #19-22 was originally awarded to one
EVANGELINE JACINTO, who is an employee of NHA. JACINTO sold her rights
to the said condominium unit to one Atty. CAMAYA who happens to be a close
friend of subject CALANOG. Atty. CAMAYA's wife, MELY CAMAYA is also
familiar with Subject CALANOG because she used to work at the RTC where
Subject CALANOG is the judge. Atty. CAMAYA sold his Bliss Condominium unit
#19-22 to Subject CALANOG. However, monthly amortization payments were
made still under the name of EVANGELINE JACINTO. About a month ago,
EMMA J. CASTILLO approached EVANGELINE JACINTO and requested the
latter to sign an Absolute Deed of Sale for the said condominium unit #19-22 in
her (Emma J. Castillo) favor. All the copies of said Absolute Deed of Sale are
with EMMA J. CASTILLO. Per NHA records, Emma J. Castillo has not yet
presented the said absolute deed of sale with NHA.
On 2 July 1990, a Barangay Census record (attached) was discreetly obtained
where EMMA J. CASTILLO, in her own handwriting, listed the names of all her
co-occupants in the said condominium unit. At the bottom of said list, Emma
listed the names of her children, including JEROME CHRISTOPHER, born 27
May 1989. An opportunity arose where the child JEROME CHRISTOPHER was
personally seen inside the said condominium unit.
On 2 July 1990, a Certified True Copy of the BIRTH CERTIFICATE of the child
JEROME CHRISTOPHER was discreetly obtained from the National Statistics
Office (attached). In this Birth Certificate, the surname of the child JEROME
CHRISTOPHER is listed as CALANOG. Furthermore, in this Birth Certificate, the
listed parents of the child JEROME CHRISTOPHER are EMMA J. CASTILLO as
mother, and MANUEL M. CALANOG as father. EMMA J. CASTILLO gave birth at
the Chinese General Hospital. 5
x x x           x x x          x x x
Among the issues raised for our determination are:
1) Whether or not the "Affidavit of Desistance" has any effect on the continuation of the
administrative case; and
2) Whether or not the circumstances shown are sufficient to convict the respondent judge
for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official.
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially
when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar.  As held in People v. Obina:
6
It would be dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on
changed their mind for one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn
trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witness. 7
Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her "Affidavit of Desistance," we would not have
been swayed solely by her allegations, and we find from the testimony of Jose Javier that
the former's charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds.
As alleged by the complainant, verified by Justice Gloria C. Paras, and confirmed by
Jose Javier and agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, Judge Calanog did
establish an intimate, albeit immoral, relationship with complainant Emma Castillo
although he, Judge Calanog, is a married man. Out of that liaison Emma Castillo gave
birth to Judge Calanog's child, Jerome Christopher, whom he housed in a condominium
unit together with his (Jerome's) mother and her two older children.
Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes and as a model of
rectitude, betrayed the people's high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which
they hold the judiciary in general.
It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a
criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter that invokes the power of
supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.
The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the
respondent judge by failing to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing
immorality and worse, having that suspicion confirmed.
Canon I states:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Rule 1.01 — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, probity
and independence.
The Court's Commentary on this Rule states:
The integrity and independence of the judiciary can be reduced to one common
denominator: the judge — the individual who dispenses justice, and upon whose
attributes depend the public perception of the judiciary.
Independence of the judiciary requires that the judge should be independent-
minded, imbued with a sense of mission, a person of honor, integrity, courage
and conviction. 8
Under Rule 140, Immorality is classified under "Serious Charges". This means that the
following sanction may be imposed:
Dismiss from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a
government- owned or controlled corporations; 9
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a
judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.
The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion. 10
Justice Gloria C. Paras of the Court of Appeals, the assigned investigator of this case,
submitted on November 19, 1990 her report and recommendation, the ultimate portions
of which state:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The statements of the aforesaid witnesses, Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier
confirm the amorous relationship between the respondent and the complainant.
The Investigator is of the view that the respondent who is a married man, and a
member of the judiciary and the incumbent President of the Philippine Judges
Association, had committed immorality.
Exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and
laid down by the Highest Court of the land in regard to those in the service of the
judiciary and more specifically so when the malefactor is a judge (Sicat vs.
Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). It need not be stated that the personal and
official actuations of every member of the bench must be beyond reproach and
above suspicion for the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of
justice can not be maintained if a Judge who dispenses it is not equipped with
the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to
commit an affront to public decency. The Supreme Court, in the case of Leynes
vs. Veloso, 82 SCRA (1978), has also said: "A Judge suffers from moral
obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors
under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress
in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. The absence of
 criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action by reason of his highly
unconventional and censurable behaviour."
Concluding, the undersigned Investigator respectfully recommends that:
(1) The "Motion to Strike Out Testimony From The Records", filed by counsel for
the complainant be DENIED; and
(2) respondent Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. be found guilty of immorality and
be meted out the severest disciplinary action of Dismissal from the service with
prejudice to appointment to any government position and forfeiture of retirement
benefits, if any.
We have examined the entire record of the case vis-a-vis this report and
recommendation and we are in full accord with them.
It is worth noting here that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial precept, has also
committed a grave injustice upon the complainant, who had sought his assistance in
expediting the intestate estate proceedings of her deceased common-law husband. The
judge, who was in the first place, prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct  from
11
intervening in a case in any court, took advantage of the complainant's helplessness and
state of material deprivation and persuaded her to become his mistress. The exploitation
of women becomes even more reprehensible when the offender commits the injustice by
the brute force of his position of power and authority, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge, the Hon. Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., is found guilty
of IMMORALITY and is hereby DISMISSED from the roll of judges, with prejudice to his
reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or
controlled corporation, and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any. Let a copy of this
resolution be included in his record and be served on all courts throughout the land.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Davide, Jr., Paras, JJ., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I must state at the outset that this dissent is not a brief for immorality. It is a plea for
fairness and compassion. Respondent Judge Manuel M. Calanog, Jr. has been found
guilty of the charges filed against him. I believe that there is enough basis for the
administrative finding that, being a married man, he had sexual liaisons with the
complainant.
The respondent has erred. He has sinned. His conduct in this instance has fallen short of
the highest standards of morality and virtue expected of all who serve in the judiciary.
However, the penalty of virtually capital punishment meted upon him is too severe
considering the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.
No infraction should go unpunished but the punishment should also fit the offense. I
believe that the Court should also take into account the fact that fault should not
automatically and entirely be attributed solely to the respondent. Judge Calanog's record
of excellent public service, his dedication to the welfare of the members of the bench, his
involvement in civic and national affairs, the leadership traits acknowledged by his peers,
and the respect and unstinted cooperation he has always given to this Court should also
be considered.
I am aware of the cases brought before this Court where immorality is cited as a reason
for the dismissal, suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar or Bench. (Rule 138,
Section 27) It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral
character that is required for the continued practice of law. (Cordova v. Cordova, Adm.
Case No. 3249, Nov. 29, 1982) If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more
reason is the requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is
expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency.
(Leynes v. Veloso, 82 SCRA 325 [1978]) Members of the judiciary are admonished to so
conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their
official duties but also in their everyday life. (Association of Court Employees of Panabo
v. Tupas, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-87-141, July 12, 1989; Sicat v. Judge Alcantara, Adm.
Matter No. R-006-RTJ, May 11, 1988). In cases where the charges of immorality have
been sufficiently established and where public decency has been outraged, the Court
has not hesitated to impose the penalty of removal from office.
The penalty in the instant case, however, deserves to be treated in a different light. As
aptly stated by former Chief Justice Fernando in Garcia v. Comelec (105 SCRA 250
[1981]), "There can be a diversity of result in the decision-making process in cases which
apparently are not dissimilar. This perspective allows for individualization of justice."
Thus, I believe that justice would be better served if we were to view the present
controversy with equity and compassion.
It should be emphasized that all the evidence against the respondent has been taken
from the allegations of the complaint, an ex-parte "discreet" investigation by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and statements from two subordinate personnel of the
respondent's court. But while the silence of the respondent may be taken as proof that
indeed there was a sexual relationship with the complainant, it does not necessarily
follow that the various details in the Investigator's Report must be taken as unvarnished
truth and that the implications may not be negated or minimized by contrary
considerations.
The present case arose from a complaint filed by a woman who sought help from the
respondent regarding the settlement of the intestate estate of her common-law husband.
It was alleged, although the allegation was later withdrawn, that the complainant initially
refused the respondent's amorous advances during their first meetings but she later
agreed to be the respondent's mistress after promises of financial stability were given to
her; i.e. the purchase of a condominium unit, schooling for the complainant's two minor
daughters at an exclusive girl's school and because of the "confusion" arising from the
death of her common-law-husband.
The case may be considered peculiar in the sense that the complainant is not the
offended, abandoned or neglected wife nor is she a person with only the best of
intentions in mind. It would have been easy for us to give total credence to a complaint
filed by one who has no ill-motive or cause to complain against the respondent.
(See Dela Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 [1975]) But here, the other party is a liberated
woman who appears to have no compunctions about living in illicit relations with men.
There is, of course, no proof that Judge Calanog was the one seduced but I will not also
swallow hook, line, and sinker the picture of an aggressive middle-aged man importuning
a reluctant woman, whose common-law-husband had just died, and practically forcing or
inducing her to submit to his advances.
What I see from the scanty records of this administrative case is a woman who was
willing, if she did not actually inveigle, to enter into a sexual relationship. When the
financial expectations were not forthcoming and a life of relative ease and comfort could
not be assured, she struck out with the administrative complaint. Realizing perhaps that
he had sinned and should sin no more, the respondent had assumed what to the other
party was a sudden, cold, and security-threatening attitude. The complainant's intentions
are indeed suspect, if not motivated by revenge and bad faith. (See Lim v. Antonio, 125
SCRA 273 [1983]) The case, especially the punishment imposed, deserves to be
examined more carefully.
The complainant is obviously a woman of experience, wise in the ways of the world, with
two (2) children from an earlier common-law relationship. She appears to be sufficiently
mature and intelligent, enough to know what she was entering into. She certainly was
aware of the consequences of an illicit arrangement with the respondent. Her consent to
the illicit relationship with the respondent is without question. From all indications, this
was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two (2) consenting adults who were fully
aware of the consequences of their deed and for which only they should ordinarily be
held responsible. (Abaigar v. Paz, 93 SCRA 91 [1979])
The liaison was a most discreet affair. If the other party had only remained quiet, it would
not have been discovered. In other words, the affair was not characterized by
scandalous behavior or a public flaunting of decency and morals. It was wrong to be sure
but not outrageously so.
The majority considers the promise of a dwelling place and education for the children as
financial helplessness taken advantage of by the respondent. I have a different view.
Instead of concluding that the complainant is a helpless woman wronged by a predatory
profligate, I prefer to think that the complainant and the respondent alike are both
offenders and victims.
I can not, therefore, agree that the respondent should be made to suffer the most severe
penalty we can impose when the immorality committed by him was made possible by the
rather equivocal conduct of the complainant herself. The ruling in Viojan v. Duran, (4
SCRA 390 [1962]) could very well apply to this case before us:
The respondent has committed an act of immorality. The flesh is weak. But man
should possess that consciousness to do the right and avoid the wrong. And one
who has taken the oath of public service to dispense with justice, should be more
possessed of the courage and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh.
Since the dispensation of justice has to originate from sound moral
consciousness, one who lacks it, or has shown to be wanting of it, cannot offer
the guaranty required for the performance of a just dispensation. A magistrate
has to live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others
when his own needs judgment. It should not be "do as I say and not what I do."
For then the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one
devoid of respect. Hence, the necessity for the magistrate to possess enough
fortitude to subdue his passion for wrong.
There is, therefore, no question that for the immorality he committed within the
territory of his jurisdiction as a Justice of the Peace, the respondent should be
punished. But, considering the tempting circumstances which surrounded him for
that length of time, which circumstances, were indirect invitations, his falling to
sin should not be dealt with severity. Few men and very few indeed, could have
 resisted that temptation; could have the moral strength, the spiritual energy to
impose on his weaker self the will to ignore such enticement. Although we want
to count the respondent among these few, yet it would be too much wishing to
expect him to be among them before he learns the hard lesson brought about by
repentance. This misstep, the first that he committed, should not be taken as the
measure of his whole conduct. He should be given the chance after now to
benefit himself out of his stumble. For after all, it was rightly said that "without an
element of the obscene, there can be no true and deep aesthetic or moral
conception to life." (at p. 392; Emphasis supplied)
True, the respondent is a Judge. But he is also human. Regrettably, yielding to the
cravings of the flesh is a most common human failing. There is ample literature to show
that Presidents, Prime Ministers, Generals, high ranking members of the clergy, and
other representatives of the powerful and famous all over the world have unfortunately
engaged in sexual escapades As so succinctly stated by Henry Kissinger "Power is the
greatest aphrodisiac." If such publications like the Kinsey Report are to be trusted, the
incidence of infidelity and immorality in polite society is unbelievably if not shockingly
high. A Judge who falls into the trap of this altogether human and common failing should
be disciplined. The Court cannot be indulgently permissive. At the same time, the above
nature of the offense requires that we should take into account all relevant circumstances
and, where warranted, mitigate the severity of the punishment for a few who somehow
failed to summon the moral fiber needed to resist this all too human failing.
If a public officer, on his or her own initiative or through the enticements of the other
party, is involved in an illicit relationship, he or she should be allowed and encouraged to
get out of that situation. However, if instant and automatic dismissal is always the
punishment, a scheming paramour would have a weapon to keep the erring officer going
deeper and deeper into the mess instead of rectifying the unfortunate error. It would be a
sword of Damocles keeping a Judge who has stumbled from rising up, correcting the
error, and terminating the unfortunate relationship.
Judge Calanog has positive accomplishments in his favor. We are not aware of any other
shortcoming or offense committed by him. As a member of the judiciary Planning
Development and Implementation Office (JPDIO), he has with talent and resourcefulness
represented Judges all over the country, bringing their problems to the JPDIO and the
Court's attention. Judicial reforms are more readily implemented because of close
coordination between the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine Judges
Association (PJA) which the respondent headed until recently. The respondent initiated
the College Assurance Plan for children of Judges and a modest insurance plan which
gives death benefits to qualified members. He has tried his best these past few years to
push through a housing development for members of the bench and apparently his
efforts are about to bear fruit. He and the other officers of the PJA have shown unfailing
respect for and cooperation with this Court. Respondent Calanog has rallied all Judges
to stand behind the Court when we were unfairly charged or subjected to senseless
vituperation. The respect which members of the bench and bar have accorded to the
respondent is shown by the warm receptions extended to him in Cebu, Bacolod, Davao,
and other parts of the country when the PJA officers visit their fellow Judges or attend
judicial conferences and conventions.
Ours is not only a court of law but also a court of equity. Mindful of the circumstances
surrounding a case, this Court has shown compassion and exercised prudent restraint in
dealing with errant members of the Bar or Bench especially when the offenses
committed is the subject's first offense. To illustrate a few:
1) In re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge
Baltazar R. Dizon (173 SCRA 719 [1989]) — This is a case where reinstatement
was ordered after Judge Baltazar Dizon had, in our view, sincerely evinced
humble repentance. He admitted that he committed an error in interpreting the
law but we considered the mistake as not so grave as to warrant the penalty of
"virtually capital punishment." The Court also considered Judge Dizon's long
years of dedicated and devoted service to the government.
2) In Tolentino v. Mangapit (124 SCRA 741 [1983]) — Examining the lawyer's
failure to give notice of an adverse decision to her client, the court found that
such error may be traced to the lawyer's inexperience. Considering that this was
the first error committed by the respondent, the court resolved to merely
admonish her instead of suspending her for one month as recommended by the
Solicitor General, the same being too harsh and severe.
3) Munar v. Flores (122 SCRA 448 [1983]) — Respondent, through his
malpractice and gross misconduct in office committed a most serious breach of
public trust which under other circumstances could well result in the forfeiture of
his privilege and license as a member of the Philippine Bar. Taking into
consideration, however, the respondent's submission in effect to the report and
recommendation of the Solicitor General and his manifestations of remorse and
finally, considering that this happened to be his first offense, the Court was
inclined to extend to the respondent a measure of liberality and approved the
Solicitor General's recommendation for only six (6) months suspension.
There are likewise instances such as those involving Judges entitled to full retirement
benefits, where the Court has acted with compassion for the sake of the wife or widow
and the children of the respondent.
I submit that we should apply the reformative and not the punitive principle in the instant
case. For the sake of the respondent's obviously bright future, the fair name and honor of
his family and the prospective service that he could render to the judiciary and the nation,
the Court should help the respondent redeem himself.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I vote to impose a penalty of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00) fine and a most severe warning that a repetition of the same
offense shall be accorded the highest penalty with an the Court's power to impose.
VICENTE SOTTO             January 21, 1949
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.
Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto,
who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection
with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which
statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality,
reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now
has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake
of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need
be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally
given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the
period of time given him the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered
a judgment for contempt after considering his answer, because he does not deny the
authenticity of the statement as it has been published. But, in order to give the
respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the publication of such libelous
statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4, the hearing being
later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date set for
hearing, the case was submitted for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat,
and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court.
But he therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon
the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by
virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the
honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the
Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of
any one.' The other arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no
consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court
an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the
court to punish for contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a
mere reproduction of section 231 and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No.
190, amended, in connection with the doctrine laid down by this Court on the inherent
power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several cases, among them In
re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of
superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of
last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence
is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may
be regarded as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a
part of the judicial authority granted to courts created by the Constitution of the
United States or by the Constitutions of the several states. It is a power said to be
inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether they are State or Federal; such
power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of any special express
grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals to
punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory
authorization is unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are
concerned, and in general adds nothing statutory authority may be necessary as
concerns the inferior courts statutory authority may be necessary to empower
them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American
Jurisprudence, this Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has
a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free
from outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting
upon the upon court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is
contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all court. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt
tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in
courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of
their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness
of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated;
because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an
error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way,
influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the
present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our
construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he,
as proponent of the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in
that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the
Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the
respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court
finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State" was added or
inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member
thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be
determined by this Court in applying said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of
this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by
this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of
justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is
to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one
of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions,
will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is
now the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and
not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade
the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under
the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the
law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the
utmost good faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for
contempt of court; but it is belied by his acts and statements during the pendency of this
proceeding. The respondent in his petition of December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio
Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for contempt, conveying thereby the
idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr. Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be
protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen
should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of
an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance
of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge Holmes very appropriately said U.
S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The administration of justice and the know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent misrepresents
freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the
should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the
duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere
which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid against this Supreme Court. So ordered.
impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial
business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and
verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to Reyes, JJ., concur.
exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to
proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as
vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-
defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."

It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed
from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).

In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt
of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to
pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of
P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show
cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law
in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements
made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of
Court.

In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December
9, 1948, the respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close
my mouth; " and in his other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same
paper, he stated among others: "It is not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the
cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech at the Abellana High School in
Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the respondent said
that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal than
now when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in
placing him behind bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would
consider imprisonment a precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me
because the cause is noble and lofty." And the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published
the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect that this Court "acted with malice"
in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the members of this Court
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J               April 12, 2011
ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by
respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated 1 September) dated
September 15, 2010 of the complainant.
Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010,
albeit on different grounds.
Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for
simple misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), as follows:
1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of
₱15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;
and
3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more
cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court. 1
A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given.
The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong,
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases
as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao
City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having
unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b)
falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the
hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them
had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth
they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of
judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez’s making the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the
hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006), to wit:
(a) ‘We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by
that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.’ 2;
(b) ‘You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are
you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor
who is doing nothing.’3;
(c) ‘Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you
are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their
(sic) mother’4; and
(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated,
and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had
studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ong’s)
own alma mater.
and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that
Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the
criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the
dismissal order being signed by all three respondents).
In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows:
A.
 Respondents’ Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
x x x           x x x          x x x
We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings
was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure
arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the
integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.
Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.
They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices’ adoption of the irregular
procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in
judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be
distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The
respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct – defined as the transgression
of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-
known legal rules – considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the
complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by
holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither
were they liable for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable
evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an
intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the
contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices
have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention
to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been
seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.
Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their
proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that
they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a
sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated
their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed,
and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by
precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew
as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the chief
objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v.
Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it
should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and
deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to
end the trial. A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration
before ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the just administration of
law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge, which are more important than a
reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
x x x           x x x          x x x
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not
mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both
implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include
accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure.
He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life."
Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices’ signing of the orders issued
during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby
made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was different.
Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a
separate offense.
B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrator’s finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainant’s charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
had uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the
offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the
complainant’s charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must
accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they
bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared
them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging
during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They
thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite
humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit.
We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which
no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance of
judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each
other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease
tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with
dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary clearly enjoins that:
broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice
or logical procedure or prescribed method."
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already
mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No.
171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such
dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction."

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and clear that they:
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the Honorable Court’s
direction or control.
finding that the proceedings they had adopted in their provincial hearings fell short of
what the provisions of the law and rules require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and Hernandez can only express their regret and apology.
and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against
Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that
some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of
they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges
simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they "have not been ill-motivated or
avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous
favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases
profession who practice regularly in their courts.
in the provinces;" their actions were not willful in character or motivated by a
"premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose;" or even if their actions might be
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their "irregular, wrongful, or improper," such could not be characterized as simple misconduct
judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any necessitating administrative sanction.
person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the
high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be
Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard,
unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
origin of the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per se,
mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
did not justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they thereby
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues,
never derided any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis of their
without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on their alma
such duties.
mater.1avvphi1

In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming
In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal
conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct "applies to a
to that meted on Justice Hernandez. He "implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the
propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due
consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that ‘the Sandiganbayan is a
collegial court,’ and ‘in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or
majority rule.’"
For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all
administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be
increased to be commensurate to their infractions.
Ruling
Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with and
discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by her, we
deny her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated 1
September).
We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration,
considering what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows:
Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division "in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto." The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division
would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings.
This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of
the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at
the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.
Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became
impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that
rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or
hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be
complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the cases
heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents properly and
promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before him.
Moreover, the respondents’ non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose
of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three
Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees
triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division
of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than
those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single
judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader
circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to
the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the
discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court,
which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of
cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately
reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).
In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court delved on the
nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its
head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the
collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon
Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could
alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other
commissioners as members. The Court ruled:
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out
of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any
incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in
this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission.
He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-
man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in
every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC
evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which
organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order
No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was
a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent
Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice
or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As
responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of
collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.
As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Court’s finding of
unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the Decision of
August 24, 2010.

We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon
him be similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez.

The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their Division

compel the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the Chairperson,
was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the
most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision,
direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings of the Division. This
circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to treat Justice Ong differently from
the other respondents.

Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise of his powers as Chairman
of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an

unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and
steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to
guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of
substantive and procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
did not direct and control how the proceedings of the Division were to be conducted.
Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the running of the Division and
their having relied without malice on the Justice Ong’s direction and control should not be
reproved as much as Justice Ong’s misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and liability
as Members of the Division were properly diminished.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Court’s Decision Dated
1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special Prosecutor III
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and Associate Justice Jose R.
Hernandez are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 12. August 8, 1901. ]
In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO AGUAS for
contempt of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA.
Claudio Gabriel, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, representing the Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTEMPT OF COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS. — An attorney may
rightfully protest against personal violence to a witness at the hands of the
court, and such protest, if respectful, is not contempt of court.
2. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT. — A finding that an attorney’s attitude toward the
court was "menacing" is a mere conclusion and will not support a judgment of
contempt.
DECISION
SMITH, J. :
It appears from the record in this matter that on the 29th of August, 1900,
during the progress of a trial then being held before the Court of First
Instance at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the court had occasion to
caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the case, not to look at the attorney for
the defendant but to fix his attention on the judge who was at the time
examining him. It seems that the witness did not give heed to this warning,
and the judge thereupon arose from his seat and approaching the witness,
seized him by the shoulders, and using the expression, "Lingon ang mucha"
("Look at me"), either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the
defendant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others.
Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all events "seizing
him," brought the defendant’s attorney to his feet, who, protesting against
the action of the judge as coercive of the witness, demanded that a record be
made of the occurrence and that the further hearing of the case be
postponed. Two days afterward the clerk entered in his record a recital of the
incident substantially as above, and also a statement that on other and prior
occasions the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been wanting in respect to the
court by making use of "improper phrases," and by interrupting opposing
counsel in their examination of witnesses. The court on this record adjudged
the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended him from the practice
of his profession for a period of twenty days. The attorney appealed, but his
appeal having been disallowed by the lower court, he asked to be heard in
justification, which was granted.
On the hearing in justification evidence was taken touching the contempt
alleged to have been committed by Señor Aguas, from which the court found
that during the trial of the case of Roberto Toledo v. Valeriano Balatbat, the
judge, having had occasion to seize the witness, Alberto Angel, by the
shoulders to turn him around, Señor Aguas, attorney for defendant, had risen
from his seat in a "menacing attitude," and "with a voice and body trembling"
protested that the action of the judge was coercive of the witness; and
further that his attention being called to the fact that he was wanting in
respect to the court and that he should sit down, he waived his right to go on
with the trial and moved a postponement of the hearing. On this finding the
court again adjudged the attorney guilty of contempt of court, and suspended
him from the practice of his profession for a period of twenty days. From this
judgment Señor Aguas appealed to this court.
In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by
the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference
with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is
entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice. Against such conduct the
appellant had the right to protest and to demand that the incident be made a
matter of record. That he did so was not contempt, providing protest and
demand were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the
court. The only question, therefore in this case is, Was the appellant
respectful and regardful of the court’s dignity in presenting his objection and
asking that it be recorded in the proceedings? The witnesses say and the
judge finds that "his attitude was menacing" (bastante amenazadora) in the
moment of making his protest, but beyond that there is nothing in the record
which even tends to show that he was disrespectful to the court or unmindful
of its dignity. In our opinion both testimony and finding state a mere
conclusion which, in the absence of the facts from which it was deduced, is
wholly valueless to support a judgment of contempt. The statement that the
attorney’s attitude was "menacing" tended no more to competently establish
the alleged offense of contempt than if the witnesses had testified and the
court had found that his conduct was "contemptuous or lacking in respect."
The specific act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing
should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and
failing that, the record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the
conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.

The judgment appealed from must therefore be reversed, and it is so

ordered, with costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Torres and Ladd, JJ., concur.

Mapa, J., did not sit in this case.

 G.R. No. Nos. L-36927-28 April 15, 1974
CRESENCIO PAREDES, and VENANCIO
UYAN, Petitioners, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO MEN ABAD of
the Court of First Instance of Ifugao, GUALBERTO
LUMAUIG, and JOHN LANGBAYAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-37715 April 15, 1974
BELINO C. SUNGA, Petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE
LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, and FELINO
CUNANAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-38331 April 15, 1974
VICENTE O. VALLEY, Petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE
FELIX T. CARO, District Judge, Court of First Instance
of Eastern Samar, Branch VIII (Oras, Eastern Samar),
and VICTOR A. AMASA, Respondents.
Alejandro C. Silapan for petitioners Paredes and Uyan.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates and Amelito R. Mutuc for
petitioner Sunga.
Edwin L. Segovia for respondents Lumauig and Langbayan.
Felix M. Hernandez for respondent Cunanan.
Judge Francisco Men Abad for and in his own behalf.
Vicente O. Valley in his own behalf.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
The respondent-Judges committed a clear error when they
dismissed the election protests filed by the herein
petitioners against the private respondents who had been
proclaimed elected and had assumed their respective
positions 1 for a four year term 2 as a result of the November
8, 1971 elections. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The principal ground of the dismissal orders 3 now
challenged before Us on certiorari, is that under Section 9,
Art. XVII 4 of the Transitory Provisions of the New
Constitution, the election protests filed by the petitioners
have become moot and academic, for the reason that the
private respondents are now holding their respective
positions under a new term, indefinite as it is, the original
four-year term to which they have been elected having
expired upon the ratification of the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973. This ruling of the respondent-Judges is
clearly untenable. When Section 9, Art. XVII of the
Transitory Provisions of the New Constitution, upon the
ratification of said Constitution on January 17, 1973, made
indefinite the four-year term of the elective provincial, city
and municipal officials, said four-year term had not yet
expired - it was to expire on December 31, 1975. More than
this, the law under which they were elected to a four-year
term provides for a hold-over. 5 We hold that, as far as
these elective officials are concerned, said constitutional
provision refers only to those who had been duly elected;
they are the ones who should continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent
President.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is a difference between the "term" of office and the
"right" to hold an office. A "term" of office is the period
during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to
hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments. A "right" to hold a public office is the just and
legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities
of the office. 6 In other words, the "term" refers to the
period, duration of length of time during which the occupant
of an office is entitled to stay therein, whether such period
be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Art.
XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the
petitioners indefinite, 7 it did not foreclose any challenge by
the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the "right"
of the private respondents to continue holding their
respective offices. What has been directly affected by said
constitutional provision is the "term", not the "right" to the
office, although the "right" of an incumbent to an office
which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the "term"
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It must be emphasized that the "right" of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only
by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution
but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to
their respective positions as a result of the November 8,
1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were
not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then
certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite
term of office given to them by said constitutional
provision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of
the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
respondents expired, and that they are now holding their
respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion
that they hold their respective offices still under the term to
which they have been elected, although the same is now
indefinite. In the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc 8, We held that
although the term of office of an official or employee holding
a position that is primarily confidential is indefinite, the term
is deemed to have expired only when the appointing power
expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the
incumbent; when this event takes place, his term is then
considered to have expired. Consequently, it is only when
by law or by decree of the incumbent President the services
of an incumbent elective official are put to an end that his
present indefinite term of office will be considered to have
expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as
in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had
been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein
private respondents to the respective offices which they are
now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would
be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could
have been an election victory characterized by fraud,
threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of
irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve
inviolate the sanctity of the ballot. Such a situation would
certainly be against the goals of the New Society, which are
"to reform the social, economic and political institutions in
our country;" "to clean the government of its corrupt and
sterile elements;" and to implement a general program for a
new and better Philippines." 9 chanrobles virtual law library
Section 7 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution provides that
"all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by
the National Assembly." And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of
1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an
election contest against those proclaimed elected.
According to Section 8, Art. XVII of the NEW Constitution,
all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this
Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction
until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this
Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be
heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force."
Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by
the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed
by the herein petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But it has been argued, with respect to the protests for
Governor in G.R. No. L-36927 and G.R. No. L-38331, and
for Vice-Governor in G.R. No. L-36928, that the Courts of
First Instance where they are pending lost jurisdiction over
the same in view of the fact that under the New
Constitution, the Commission on Elections is made the sole
judge of election contests of "members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial  and city officials." 10
We do not share this view. We hold, as already stated
earlier, that with respect to the protests filed by the herein
petitioners, the Court of First Instance presided over by the
respondent Judges shall continue to hear, try and decide the
same by virtue of Section 8, Art. XVII of the New
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Constitution. It must be noted that the New Constitution
was ratified on January 17, 1973, Section 2, par. 2 of Art.
XII-C thereof (which made the Commission on Elections the
sole judge of all election contests of elective provincial
officials) could not have referred and do not refer to election
protests filed as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Under the 1971 Election Code, election protests should be
filed within fifteen days after the proclamation of the
winning candidates. 11 Under ordinary circumstances
election protests arising from said elections should have
been filed in or before January of 1972. 12 When the
Constitutional Convention finally approved the New
Constitution in its plenary session on November 29, 1972,
the present election protests and similar others were
already pending in the different Courts of First Instance of
the Philippines. And it may be assumed that trial had been
under way in many if not all of them. The Constitutional
Convention must be referring, among others, to these
election protests when it decreed that all courts existing at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution shall continue
and exercise jurisdiction, and that all cases pending in said
courts shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws
then in force.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
An additional issue is involved in G.R. No. L-36927-28
pending before the respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad of
the Court of First Instance of Ifugao, and that is the matter
of his disqualification to continue hearing the election
protests for the position of Governor and Vice-Governor filed
by the petitioners Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan
against the private respondents Gualberto Lumauig and
John Langbayan. The reasons adduced by the petitioners
are "said petitioners opposed the confirmation of the
nomination of said respondent to his present position before
the Commission on Appointments; that petitioners filed
criminal charges against said respondent before the
COMELEC for violation of the Election Code of 1971 which
are still pending until this date; and that this respondent
was recommended to his present position by his co-
respondent Gualberto Lumauig, the protestee in Election
Case No. 5, and the latter's brother, Congressman Romulo
Lumauig." 13chanrobles virtual law library
In the memorandum filed by said respondent Judge before
this Honorable Court, he stated the following:
Briefly, the charges against your respondent boil down to
one thing - alleged electioneering during the local elections.
This - we can only say - that, during the time the
respondent was allegedly engaged in partisan political
activities, the Department of Justice reminded him and
similar officials through directives to remain in their places
of assignment to attend to all questions that may likely arise
relating to election matters coming up within this respective
jurisdictions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence of petitioners consisted mainly of affidavits of
alleged witnesses. These evidences were submitted to the
COMELEC as well as to the Commission on Appointments.
During the hearings in both forums, these evidences passed
the close scrutiny of the investigators. If it is necessary to
mention it here, it is observed that Hungduan Ifugao, to
which municipality your respondent was then accredited as
Municipal Judge was never included as one of the protested
municipalities. It becomes evident that the motive of the
protestants is personal, devoid of merits. Hence, the
Commission on Appointments decided our case favorably
and exonerated the undersigned of the charges. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is amusing to observe that petitioners insist to anchor
their rationale on bias and prejudice, still itchy to resuscitate
a long cremated issue. Assuming that petitioners stiffly
opposed the confirmation of your respondent in the
Commission on Appointments, the Honorable Body search
rigidly into the truth of the allegations contained in
petitioners' opposition and found instead falsity in them as a
consequence, the Commission proceeded to confirm the
appointment of the herein respondent, which was "clean bill
of health" to him.
Whatever be the merit of the charge of the petitioners that
the respondent Judge Abad campaigned in support of the
candidacy of the private respondents and their line-up of
candidates; that they filed criminal charges against and
opposed the confirmation of the appointment of the said
respondent Judge; that said respondent Judge was
recommended to his present position by private respondent
Gualberto Lumauig and the latter's brother, Congressman
Romulo Lumauig, the fact is that a strained personal
relationship must have arisen between the petitioners, on
the one hand, and the respondent Judge Abad, on the other.
And not only the petitioners but even their political
supporters as well may not be in a position to have full
faith, trust and confidence on the impartiality of said
respondent Judge. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 14 where the petitioner
sought the disqualification of the respondent Judge from
sitting in four cases wherein he, petitioner, was counsel, on
the ground that he was the complainant in an administrative
case which he himself filed against the respondent Judge
with the Supreme Court, We denied the petition for
disqualification but suggested that he might voluntarily
inhibit himself, holding that:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision,
have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed
to indulge in unjustified assumption, or make a speculative
approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and
feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because
counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him.
As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed
the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not
thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or
conduct or his would show arbitrariness or prejudice,
Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge,
not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before
him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a
charge made before trial that a party "will not be given fair,
impartial and just hearing" is "premature". Prejudice is not
to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal
obligation under his oath to administer justice "without
respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the
rich." To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far
as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of
conscience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good
occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to
appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to
try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the
fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
courts of Justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at
the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of the judge may be generated because
of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or
his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject
to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise
great care and caution before making up his mind to act or
"withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that
case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others
involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not
to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily, desist from sitting
in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously
impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning
and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1. Rule
137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.
But in the case at bar, we would like to go one step further
and hold that for the strict observance of the rule of due
process, the respondent Judge Abad is hereby declared
disqualified to continue hearing the election protests filed by
Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private
respondents Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. For,
as we have already observed above, there must already be
a strained personal relationship between the petitioners, on
the one hand, and the respondent Judge Abad on the other;
and not only the petitioners but even their political
supporters as well may not be in a position to have full
faith, trust and confidence on the impartiality of said
respondent Judge. And "next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of a judge." 15 We should be very zealous in
safeguarding this constitutional guarantee of due process.
We have done so with greater zeal lately in the matter of
the disqualification of Judges in the case of Luque vs.
Kayanan, 16 and Mateo, et al. vs. Villaluz  17.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Luque vs. Kayanan, the petitioner was one of
the defendants and cross-defendants in a civil case pending
before the respondent Judge. We held:
1. This case presents an unedifying picture of animosity,
hostility and bad blood between petitioner a lawyer and
party defendant and cross-defendant, and respondent, a
judge. From the events that occurred in the court below, we
gather the impression that the courtroom had been
converted into an arena of recriminations between the two.
Opprobrious language has been employed by both.
It is the duty of both counsel and judge to maintain, not to
destroy the high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on
the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the
people's respect for, and confidence in, the administration of
justice is to be avoided. And this, even if both may have to
restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To
be expected then of petitioner and respondent is a sense of
shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of
justice. And yet lack thereof is painfully apparent in the
record of this case. It would appear that both petitioner and
respondent were seized by a kind of ennui which
immobilizes the sense of proportion of men trapped in
situations where emotion runs loose. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the
cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested
and impartial tribunal. It has been said that "next
importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion
of the fairness and integrity of the judge." Let it not be said
that the administration of justice in this country suffers from
too many human imperfections. To our mind, respondent
Judge should inhibit himself since it has become apparent
that his further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in
the best interest of justice, which he is bound to serve. 18 chanrobles virtual law library
And in the case of Mateo, et al. vs. Villaluz, petitioners were
among those being tried by the respondent Judge for
robbery in band with homicide. An extrajudicial statement
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
by Reyes, one of the accused, who implicated the
petitioners was subscribed before the respondent Judge.
Reyes, when called upon to testify as a witness for the
prosecution, impugned his written declaration stating that it
was executed as a result of a threat by a government agent. of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge"
We ruled: not being met are more than justified. Hence the conclusion
reached by us. 19chanrobles virtual law library

... Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.

Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what
apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial
statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the
slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later
declaration that there was intimidation by a government
agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to
respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness
under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The
absence of the requisite due process element is thus
noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It
was he who attested to its due execution on October 1,
1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent Judges
dismissing the election protests respectively filed by the
herein petitioners against the private respondents are
hereby set aside, and the different Courts of First Instance
where said protests are pending are hereby ordered to
immediately continue with the trial thereof. The respondent
Judge Francisco Men Abad, having been declared
disqualified, is ordered to desist from continuing with the
hearing of the election protests filed by petitioners
Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private
respondents Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan. Costs
against the private respondents. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that

time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them SO ORDERED.
was pending its resolution was deferred by respondent
Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested
its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and
tried for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding. It
cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect
ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed
freely. With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so
at all, coercion having come into the picture there is
apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a
question that by implication had already been answered by
him. Such a fact became rather obvious. For respondent
Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had
previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in ones
objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on
disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement