A.C. No. 4349 December 22, 1997
00 purportedly to be deposited as a
LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21
November 1994, complainant Lourdes R. Busiños charged respondent Atty. Francisco
Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay with having committed the crime of estafa
under Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the sum of
P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in the
bank account of complainant's husband, while P2,000.00 represented the amount
respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case No. 5814,
when no such bond was required.
In the resolution of 18 January 1995, we required respondent to comment on the
complaint. Despite his receipt of a copy of the resolution, respondent did not comply,
compelling us in the resolution of 17 July 1995 to require him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
Again respondent failed to comply. Hence in the resolution of 25 September 1996, we
ordered him once more to file his comment within ten (10) days from notice, and within
the same period, to pay a fine of P1,000.00 or suffer imprisonment of ten (10) days
should he fail to so pay. In a Compliance and Motion dated 24 October 1996, respondent
transmitted the fine of P1,000.00 by way of postal money order, but asked for five (5)
days from date to file his comment. As respondent still failed to so file, we then declared,
in the resolution of 2 December 1996, that respondent was deemed to have waived his
right to file his comment, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
reception of complainant's evidence and submission of a report and recommendation
thereon.
On 16 October 1997, the Bar Confidant, Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa, submitted her Report
and Recommendation, material portions of which read as follows:
Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort stands charged with having misappropriated
the sum of P30,000.00 intended for his clients as well as having deceived his
clients into giving him the sum of P2,000.
bond in the case he was handling.
Complainant Lourdes R. Businos is one of the heirs of Pedro Rodrigo who are
the defendants in Civil Case No. 1584, apparently a case involving the properties
of the late Pedro Rodrigo, father of herein complainant. Respondent was the
counsel of record for the defendants in the said case. On July 10, 1994,
complainant, representing her co-heirs, executed a special power of attorney,
appointing and constituting respondent and/or Pedro Rodrigo, Jr. to be her true
and lawful attorney-in-fact with the following powers:
1. To attend to and represent me, testify, or otherwise enter into
compromise during the pre-trial stage or other proceedings in
Civil Case No. 1584, entitled "Heirs of Rosario Rodrigo-Reantaso,
vs. Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo Sr., et. al." now pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao, Albay;
2. To demand, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money
that may now be deposited in said court by the defendant Oas
Standard High School or hereafter be deposited by said
defendant, due and owing to me or said Heirs of Pedro Rodrigo,
Sr., representing the rentals of said defendant for the lease of the
property involved in said case; and
3. To sign, authenticate, issue and deliver any and all deeds,
instruments, papers and other records necessary and pertinent to
the above stated transactions.
On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Br. 12 issued an
order, directing the Clerk of Court "to release any and all deposits of rentals
made in connection with this case (Civil Case No. 1584) to the defendants Heirs
of Pedro Rodrigo through Lourdes Rodrigo Businos who were receiving the
rentals from Oas Standard High School prior to the institution of this case."
In a letter dated August 10, 1994, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Ligao informed
herein complainant that respondent had already received the rental deposit of
P25,000.00 on even date (see Annex "C" to the complaint). Respondent also
received from Oas Standard High School on August 17, 1994 the sum of
P5,000.00 as payment for rental of school site for the month of July 1994
(See Annex "D" to the complaint). The said sum was entrusted to respondent
with an obligation on his part to deposit the same in the account of complainant's
husband at PNB, Ligao Branch. Instead, however, of depositing the money,
respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite several
demands, he failed to return the same to complainant. She was thus constrained
to file a criminal case for estafa and an administrative case for disbarment
against him. Thus, on November 21, 1994, complainant filed the instant
administrative case against respondent.
Complainant further accuses respondent for demanding and receiving P2,000.00
from her which he said will be used for the bond in Civil Case No. 1584, but said
amount was never used as intended since no bond was required in the said
case. Thus, respondent merely pocketed the said amount.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant, upon questioning by the undersigned, testified that: She authorized
respondent to withdraw the money amounting P35,000.00 representing the rental
fee paid of Oas Standard High School from the Clerk of Court, with the instruction
to deposit the same in her savings account at the PNB. After she was informed
by the court that respondent had already withdrawn the money, she expected in
vain to receive the money a week later in Tarlac as respondent failed to effect the
deposit of the said sum in her account. She demanded from him to give her the
money, but he informed her that he had already spent the same. He promised,
though, to pay her the said amount. (pp. 7-8, TSN, Reception of Evidence, April
18, 1997). She clarified that respondent withdrew only the sum of P30,000.00
from the Clerk of Court, while the P5,000.00 was withdrawn by respondent from
Oas Standard High School (TSN, p. 8). Despite several demands, both from her
and her lawyer, respondent failed to make good his promise to give her the
money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School (TSN,
pp. 11-13). She was then constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and an
administrative case against respondent sometime in November of 1994 to
recover the money in question (TSN, pp. 14-16). On their third hearing of the
estafa case sometime in 1995, respondent came with the money and paid
complainant inside the courtroom (TSN, pp. 15, 19-20). Because of this
development, she did not anymore pursue the estafa case against respondent
(TSN, p. 17). She has no intention, however, of withdrawing the instant complaint
(TSN, p. 18).
She further testified that respondent demanded from her the sum of P2,000.00
for the bond required in the civil case. (TSN, p. 18). Respondent did not give her
a receipt for the said amount. (TSN, p. 19). Respondent gave back the P2,000.00
to complainant. He paid complainant a total of P60,000.00 representing the
money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard High School, the
P2,000.00 he got from complainant and attorney's fees, which he undertook to
foot as a way of settlement. (TSN, p. 19).
Although complainant failed to submit the original or certified true copies of the
documents in support of her complaint against respondent, respondent's
repeated failure to comply with several resolutions of the Court requiring him to
comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations of the complainant.
It manifests his tacit admission thereto. We have no other alternative, therefore,
but to accept the said documents at their [sic] face value.
There is no doubt that respondent is guilty of having used the money of his
clients without their consent. As the evidentiary value of the documents should be
given more weight than the oral testimony of complainant, we place the amount
illegally used by respondent at P30,000.00 and not P35,000.00 as claimed by
complainant. Respondent's illegal use of his client's money is made more
manifest [by] his letters to complainant, all promising the latter to make good his
promise to pay the money he withdrew from the Clerk of Court and Oas Standard
High School (See Annex "E" to the complaint).
It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any
man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has
come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or
use it for his personal purposes without his client's [sic] consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Daroy vs. Legaspi,
65 SCRA 304).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is
held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57
Phil. 8).
Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use
without their consent, and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the
amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required is,
undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. By so doing, he
betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has he degraded
himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an
honorable profession.
His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do
not relieve him from any liability if only to impress upon him that the relation
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and
good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly
account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct (Daroy vs. Legaspi, supra).
 Moreover, his repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court,
requiring him to comment on the complaint indicate the high degree of
irresponsibility of respondent.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Francisco Ricafort be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE
(1) YEAR.
While the findings are in order, the penalty recommended is not commensurate to
respondent's infractions.
Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have
a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct
and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to
the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar
betrays their trust and confidence.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. In Marcelo v. Javier (A.C. No. 3248, 18 September
1992, 214 SCRA 1, 12-13), reiterated in Fernandez v. Grecia, (A.C. No. 3694, 17 June
1993, 223 SCRA 425, 434), this Court declared:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a
high standard and appreciation of his duty to his client, his profession, the courts
and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as
well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of
the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
Here, respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a
guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair an
impartial administration of justice — a vital function of democracy a failure of which is
disastrous to society.
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of
his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is
specially so, as here, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the
Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain
the respect due the courts.
WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable
disregard of Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to
maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to
preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court
Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of
law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
This resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record; the National Office
and the Albay Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Philippine Judges
Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989 Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio
Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit "24",
CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR Robinol), who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the
ALARCON and LUIS AGAWAN, complainant, land to them.
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent. But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo
Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other
A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989 Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15
per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant, in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that Father
vs. Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property.
ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent. On the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in
his name alone.
RESOLUTION
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433,
Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera,
 
et al., Defendants." with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the
  corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.
PER CURIAM:
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as
Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as
land of approximately 50 square meters each on which their respective homes were built. attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the
To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would
the benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its property at pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was
a giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the landless squatters. confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2").

The antecedent facts follow: On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:

The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel (1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-
of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land
Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the payment of
the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the
possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of refusal or failure
on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT
Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and ordering the
training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said
squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or certificate and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name
selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters of plaintiffs-appellants, upon presentation of the deed of
to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. conveyance to be executed in favor of appellants and (2)
 ordering appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants
the sum of P 2,000.00 as attomey's fees, plus costs." (p.
30, Report and Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses
for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation,
transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P 2,500.00
from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts
prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned over to
Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00
respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to
Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil
case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been
dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses,
which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their
counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached
Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the
document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to
change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent
Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to
terminate his services and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him
(Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the
same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty.
Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No.
Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of
the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the
five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion
for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the
appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980,
another document labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21
plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that
they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this
Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and
praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy
to practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit
executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty.
Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their
case to the Court of appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement
as to attomey's fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court
Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject matter of the litigation equal
to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that
he did not receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00;
that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P
70,000.00 only to save complainants from embarrassment and shame should their co-
plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have
not; that the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would really be P
75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P
2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the
right to hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of his attomey's
fees of get a portion of the property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his
portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743
square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff,
multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P 50,000.00 is even
less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a
million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount
of P 12,470.00, representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P
62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make this Court a collection
agency and that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over members of
the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that
the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be
ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to
appropriate the money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it
until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because
of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of
his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal
withdrawal and conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against
Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his Robinols formal
withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the
plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs
and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's
fees were payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the
receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as
attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty.
Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil
Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex
"2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the
agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex
"3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he
agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most
members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal
Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433
(Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his
discharge and substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his
appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution
as shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal
actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do
not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint
against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No.
2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 15 December 1988, the Solicitor General
submitted his compliance and recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three
months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in
his possession, with the warning that a more severe
penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or
similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the
plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No.
2134, the sum of P 75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor,
Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not
committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty.
Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the
recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that
make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of
Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's
funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his
fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00,
which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no
right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for
him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an
existence They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family
with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having
seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he
had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable
ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had
obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was
duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any
legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land.
He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed
upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his
services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express
contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum
meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of
P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not
yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the
more credible and that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of
the share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian For, in the pleadings filed
by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for Execution on 5
June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to Set
Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7)
persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which
list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to
continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for
money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the
profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the
fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is
hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money,
broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to
continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount
of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the
aforementioned Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of Attys.
Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor.
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor
General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in This Resolution is immediately executory.
the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433. SO ORDERED.

Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first
consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much
as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment
of their shares, only twenty five (25) of them should be considered in determining the
majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the
said consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority.

Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge
as counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination
of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the
same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and during the
proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no
objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did
enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that
Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He had in no way encroached
upon the professional employment of a colleague.

There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at
any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer
who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below
decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act
was well within their prerogative.

In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor
is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit.
Dongga v atty cruz
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit [1] filed on February 11, 2005 by
complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty.
Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles (Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler),
and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty. Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles,
Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm), charging them of various violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter alia, refusing to return the
money given by complainant in exchange for legal services which respondents failed
to perform.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of
respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya Filipinas
Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler,
complainant was told that: (a) the case would cost him P300,000.00, with the first
P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable after the
final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the case upon receipt
of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and filing fees;
and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four
(4) months from filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00
which was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.[2]
From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler. However, despite his constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
could not present any petition and instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that:
(a) they still had to look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still
looking for a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were still
deliberating where to file the case.[3] They promised that the petition would be filed
on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed without any petition being
filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed since they
have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's
petition.[4]
Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler asked for an
additional payment of P250,000.00 in order for them to continue working on the
case. Hoping that his petition would soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the
said amount on July 23, 2004, which was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.
[5]
 However, to complainant's dismay, no appreciable progress took place. When
complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty. Cruz-Angeles
attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft petition was already submitted
to the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized. [6]
In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text message from Atty.
Cruz-Angeles informing him that the National Statistics Office bore no record of his
marriage. The latter explained then that this development was favorable to
complainant's case because, instead of the proposed petition for annulment of
marriage, they would just need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
She also informed complainant that they would send someone to verify the records of
his marriage at the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil Registrar)
where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon complainant's independent
verification through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in the
Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records of his marriage
was a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the petition. [7]
Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment,
complainant went to respondents' law office to terminate their engagement and to
demand for a refund of the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them.
However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler refused to return the said amount, and to
complainant's surprise, sent him two (2) billing statements dated October 5,
2004[8] and October 10, 2004[9] in the amounts of P258,000.00 and P324,000.00,
respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing statement included a fee for
"consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.[10] In view of the foregoing,
complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as
CBD Case No. 05-1426.
In her defense,[11] Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total of
P350,000.00 from complainant,[12] but denied that she was remiss in her duties,
explaining that the delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage was
due to complainant's failure to give the current address of Mutya and provide
sufficient evidence to support the petition. [13] Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that
it was Atty. Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the petition. [14] For his part,
[15]
 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action,
arguing too that complainant filed the present administrative complaint only to avoid
payment of attorney's fees.[16]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[17] dated July 10, 2012, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for four (4) months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any
liability as his participation in the charges has not been discussed, much less proven.
[18]
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged the services
of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya.
Despite receiving the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as evidenced by
their failure to just even draft complainant's petition for annulment despite being
engaged for already five (5) long months.[19] Moreover, as pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, despite their preliminary assessment that
complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler still
proceeded to collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they even
billed him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00.[20] Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that the amounts respondents had already collected and would
still want to further collect from complainant can hardly be spent for research in
connection with the annulment case that was not filed at all. Neither can they cover
just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler who did nothing to serve complainant's
cause.[21]
In a Resolution[22] dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification
increasing the recommended penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of
law. Atty. Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration, [23] which was, however, denied in
a Resolution[24] dated June 7, 2015.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004, complainant
secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for the purpose of annulling his
marriage with Mutya, and in connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler the aggregate sum of P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite
the passage of more than five (5) months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case before the proper
court; and worse, could not even show a finished draft of such pleading. Such neglect
of the legal matter entrusted to them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-
bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable,"[25] as in this case.
In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when they failed to return to complainant the amount of
P350,000.00 representing their legal fees, viz. :
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand, x x x.
It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this
case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality, as well as of professional ethics."[26]
Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to complainant that the
delay in the filing of his petition for annulment was due to the fact that they were still
looking for a "friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much
of a hindrance in achieving success in the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2)
billing statements dated October 5, 2004[27] and October 10, 2004,[28] Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went to various locations to look for a
suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even paid various amounts to
prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of Investigation to act as their
"consultants." Such misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are
bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."[29] Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell
short of such standard when they committed the afore-described acts of
misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts are not only
unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they also reveal
basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law. [30]
As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not perform acts that
would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as
insinuating that they can find a "friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable
ruling in complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers
of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without this guarantee, the
institution would be resting on very shaky foundations. [31] This is the very thrust of
Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the
aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized
accordingly, as in this case.[32]
Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for the strength of the legal profession
lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain
the high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions
beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice; as
acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial
edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the
good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and
reputation of the judiciary.[33] In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
compromised the integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national
prosecutorial service, by insinuating that they can influence a court, judge, and
prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the annulment of complainant's
marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Canon 7 of the
CPR, and hence, they should be held administratively liable therefor.
Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, jurisprudence provides
that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client's affairs, failed to return the
latter's money and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed acts
of misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
In Jinon v. Jiz [34] the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his
failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never
performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera,  [35] the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of
two (2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to
return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b) misrepresentation that he was
an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v.
Limos, [36] the Court suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to
file a petition for adoption on behalf of complainants, return the money she received
as legal fees, and for her commission of deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had
already filed such petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue
prejudice to therein complainants. In this case, not only did Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler fail to file complainant's petition for annulment of marriage and return what
the latter paid them as legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a
court, judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a favorable
resolution of such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary and the national
prosecutorial service. Under these circumstances, the Court individually imposes
upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler to return the amount of P350,000.00 they received from complainant as
legal fees. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."[37] Hence, since Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid
amount as part of their legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M.
Paler are found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule
18.03, Canon 18, and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, each of them is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler
are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as the legal fees they
received from the latter in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive
will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea is DISMISSED for lack

of merit.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance and be attached to respondents' personal records as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. 5925. March 11, 2003
RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDWIN T.
QUIOCHO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 3, 2002, Ruby Mae Barnachea filed a verified complaint for
breach of lawyer-client relations against respondent Atty. Edwin T.
Quiocho.
It appears that respondent had not been in the private practice of the law
for quite some time. However, in September 2001, he decided to revive
his legal practice with some associates. Complainant engaged the legal
services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under her name
of the title over a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
334411 previously owned by her sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The
latter sold said property to complainant under an unnotarized deed of
absolute sale. Complainant drew and issued BPI Family Bank Check No.
0052304 in the amount of P11,280.00 and BPI Family Bank Check No.
0052305 in the amount of P30,000.00, both dated September 5, 2001, or
the total amount of P41,280.00 for the expenses for said transfer and in
payment for respondents legal services. Respondent enchased the checks.
However, despite the lapse of almost two months, respondent failed to
secure title over the property in favor of complainant. The latter
demanded that respondent refund to her the amount of P41,280.00 and
return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. However,
respondent failed to comply with said demands. On November 1, 2001,
complainant received a letter from respondent informing her that he had
failed to cause the transfer of the property under her name and that he
was returning the documents and title she had entrusted to him and
refunding to her the amount of P41,280.00 through his personal check
No. DIL 0317787. Said check was drawn against his account with the
Bank of Commerce (Diliman Branch) in the amount of P41,280.00 and
was postdated December 1, 2001. Respondent told complainant that he
needed more time to fund the check.  However, respondent failed to fund
the check despite the demands of complainant.
In his Answer to the complaint, respondent denied that complainant
contracted his legal services. Although respondent admitted having
received the two checks from complainant, he claimed that said checks
were intended to cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation,
communication, representation, necessary services, taxes and fees for the
cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the name of
complainant and not for legal services. He asserted that he acted in good
faith as shown by the fact of his return of complainants documents with
an explanatory letter and his issuance of a personal check for P41,280.00
dated December 1, 2001. He insisted that he would not compromise for
such meager amount his personal standing as well as his membership in
the legal profession. His failure to transfer the title of the property under
the name of the complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good
the claimed amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes and the
consequent loss of sight of his right eye.
Respondent further alleged that he was a licensed real estate and
insurance broker and had been a freelance business management
consultant. At the same time he engaged in real estate brokering, pre-
need products marketing for Prudential Life, and life insurance
underwriting for Insular Life. In 1999, he gave up the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and subsequently managed to put up a business
center with fellow insurance underwriters for their common insurance
underwriting practice. He further claimed that sometime in August, 2001,
an insurance client introduced complainant as an insurance prospect to
him. In the course of their dealing, complainant intimated to respondent
her willingness to consider respondents insurance proposal provided the
latter would help her facilitate the cancellation and eventual transfer to
her name the property covered by TCT No. 334411 in the name of
complainants sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent agreed to
help complainant in the transfer of the title to her name, with the
condition that no diligent study or verification of complainants documents,
nor preparation of any additional document or any application or petition
whatsoever, will be made by respondent. He explained to complainant
that his task was merely to go through the regular process of presenting
the available documents, paying the taxes and fees, and following up the
processing for the cancellation and issuance of the certificate of title. In
other words, respondent offered to complainant services which a non-
lawyer familiar with the procedure and the related offices can perform and
provide to the complainant with respect to the transfer of the title of the
property in her name.
Respondent asserted that in the latter part of September 2001, he
discovered and became aware for the first time that the original copy of
TCT No. 334411 with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was destroyed
in a fire in Quezon City Hall several years earlier and that complainants
copy of the title needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and
transferred. At about the same time, the working relations of respondent
in the business center with his non-lawyer associates had become difficult
and strained, impelling him to sever his business relations with them and
cease from to going to the business center. Consequently, telephone
communications between respondent and complainant at the business
center was cut. Communications became much more limited when, apart
from the fact that respondent did not have a landline at his residence,
respondents mobile phone was stolen sometime in October 2001.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) designated Atty. Dennis B.
Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint.
Despite several settings, respondent failed to appear and adduce
evidence.
On April 26, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa submitted
his report and recommendation stating in part that:
1. Respondent is not able to meet his financial obligations due to financial
difficulties, and that respondent is in good faith in his failure to meet this
obligation.
2. It is recommended that respondent be ORDERED TO REPAY HIS
CLIENT within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision. The principal
amount being P41,280.00. Failure to comply with the Order shall be
considered as proof of evident bad faith, and shall be considered in the
continuing evaluation of the case in view of the continued failure to repay
his client.
3. Respondent should also be given a WARNING that a repetition shall be
dealt with more severely.1cräläwvirtualibräry
The Investigating Commissioner gave credence to the claim of
complainant that she engaged the legal services of respondent and paid
him for his services and that respondent failed in his undertaking and
refund the amount of P41,280.00 to complainant despite her demands
and that respondent appeared to be evading the complainant.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-550 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners
recommendation with the additional sanction of reprimand for
respondent:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
with  modification. Respondent is hereby reprimanded and ordered to
return the Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P41,280.00) Pesos
to complainant within ninety (90) days from receipt of notice.2
While the Court agrees with the Board of Governors that respondent
should be meted a disciplinary sanction, it finds that the penalty of
reprimand recommended by the Board of Governors is not commensurate
to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. As found by the
Investigating Commissioner, the complainant engaged the legal services
of the respondent. As admitted in his letter to the complainant,
respondent had just resumed his private practice of law two months
before complainant contracted his services for the notarization of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the registration thereof with the Register of Deeds
and the transfer of the title over the property to the complainant:
NOVEMBER 1, 2002
DEAR RUBY,
I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CHANGES.
I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS RIGHT AFTER YOU GAVE ME THE
TWO CHECKS AND COMING WITH THE AMOUNTS WITH PERSONAL
FUNDS.
I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE ONLY FOR TWO MONTHS WHICH
WE MET AND HAD JUST SET UP THE OFFICE WITH TWO ASSOCIATES
WHICH A FEW WEEKS LATER WE HAD DISAGREEMENTS AND DECIDED
TO DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO REFURBISH MY OFFICE. I AM ISSUING MY
PERSONAL CHECK TO GUARANTEE THE AMOUNT I TOOK. I NEED A
LITTLE TIME TO COVER THE AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR
UNDERSTANDING.
(Sgd.) EDWIN.
[3cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his legal services flies
in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no
attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an
attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him.4cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for almost
two months. Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund
the amount of P41,280.00 and to return to complainant the deed of
absolute sale and title over the property. Respondents claim that
complainant could not contact him because he did not have any landline
at his residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is
hard to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his
telephone at the business center was cut or that his mobile phone had
been stolen. Even then, respondent could have easily contacted the
complainant at her residence or could have written her a letter informing
her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the custody of the
Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by
fire and that there was a need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither
did respondent adduce evidence that he was a life insurance underwriter
for Insular Life or that he had been sick with diabetes and had lost his
sight in his right eye. Respondent simply refused to adduce evidence to
prove his allegations in his Answer to the complaint.
The Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause the transfer
of the title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a
financial problem that beset him shortly after he received the checks from
complainant. It can easily be inferred from respondents letter that he
used complainants money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What
compounded respondents unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal
check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in
his bank account to cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his
account with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check
became due.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that
may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and
property.5 He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of
Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real
property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned
immediately to his client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to
return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption
that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed
on him.6 The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client
is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.7cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, respondent intransigeantly refused to return to the
complainant the amount of P41,280.00 which he received for the
expenses for the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his
professional fees. His dishonest conduct was compounded by his
interjection of flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to refund the
amount to complainant.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a
very delicate, exacting and confidential character.8 A lawyer is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients.9 The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an
absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case,
respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard
expected of him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,  Respondent Atty. Edwin T.

Quiocho is found guilty of violation of Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
One (1) Year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to restitute to the
complainant the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from
notice hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court
proof of payment of said amount within ten (10) days from said payment.
If Respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid
period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three (3) months for
every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said
amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to
restitute the said amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve
successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary
penalty. This is without prejudice to the right of the complainant to
institute the appropriate action for the collection of said amount.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35702 May 29, 1973
DOMINGO D. RUBIAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ISAIAS BATILLER, defendant-appellee.
Gregorio M. Rubias for plaintiff-appellant.
Vicente R. Acsay for defendant-appellee.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court as involving purely legal
questions, we affirm the dismissal order rendered by the Iloilo court of first instance after
pre-trial and submittal of the pertinent documentary exhibits.
Such dismissal was proper, plaintiff having no cause of action, since it was duly
established in the record that the application for registration of the land in question filed
by Francisco Militante, plaintiff's vendor and predecessor interest, had been dismissed
by decision of 1952 of the land registration court as affirmed by final judgment in 1958 of
the Court of Appeals and hence, there was no title or right to the land that could be
transmitted by the purported sale to plaintiff.
As late as 1964, the Iloilo court of first instance had in another case of ejectment likewise
upheld by final judgment defendant's "better right to possess the land in question .
having been in the actual possession thereof under a claim of title many years before
Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff."
Furthermore, even assuming that Militante had anything to sell, the deed of sale
executed in 1956 by him in favor of plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was concededly his
counsel of record in the land registration case involving the very land in dispute
(ultimately decided adversely against Militante by the Court of Appeals' 1958 judgment
affirming the lower court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration) was
properly declared inexistent and void by the lower court, as decreed by Article 1409 in
relation to Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
The appellate court, in its resolution of certification of 25 July 1972, gave the following
backgrounder of the appeal at bar:
On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to
recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot under
Psu-99791 located in Barrio General Luna, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he
bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its
present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said
portions of the lot on two occasions — in 1945 and in 1959. Plaintiff
prayed also for damages and attorneys fees. (pp. 1-7, Record on
Appeal). In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims the complaint
of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter
being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in
actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under
claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question and for the
alleged malicious institution of the complaint he claims he has suffered
moral damages in the amount of P 2,000.00, as well as the sum of
P500.00 for attorney's fees. ...
On December 9, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order, after a pre-
trial conference between the parties and their counsel which order reads
as follows..
'When this case was called for a pre-trial conference
today, the plaintiff appeared assisted by himself and Atty.
Gregorio M. Rubias. The defendant also appeared,
assisted by his counsel Atty. Vicente R. Acsay.
A. During the pre-trial conference, the parties have
agreed that the following facts are attendant in this case
and that they will no longer introduced any evidence,
testimonial or documentary to prove them:
1. That Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located
in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of
Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934, whereby he
was issued a plan Psu-99791 (Exhibit "B"). (The land claimed contained
an area of 171:3561 hectares.)
2. Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the
land technically described in psu-99791 (Exh. "B") opposed by the
Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors. However,
during the war with Japan, the record of the case was lost before it was
heard, so after the war Francisco Militante petitioned this court to
reconstitute the record of the case. The record was reconstituted on the
Court of the First Instance of Iloilo and docketed as Land Case No. R-
695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852. The Court of First Instance heard the land
registration case on November 14, 1952, and after the trial this court
dismissed the application for registration. The appellant, Francisco
Militante, appealed from the decision of this Court to the Court of Appeals
where the case was docketed as CA-GR No. 13497-R..
3. Pending the disposal of the appeal in CA-GR No. 13497-R and more
particularly on June 18, 1956, Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff,
Domingo Rubias the land technically described in psu-99791 (Exh. "A").
The sale was duly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
province of Iloilo as Entry No. 13609 on July 11, 1960 (Exh. "A-1").
(NOTE: As per deed of sale, Exh. A, what Militante purportedly sold to
plaintiff-appellant, his son-in-law, for the sum of P2,000.00 was "a parcel
of untitled land having an area Of 144.9072 hectares ... surveyed under
Psu 99791 ... (and) subject to the exclusions made by me, under
(case) CA-i3497, Land Registration Case No. R-695, G.L.R.O. No.
54852, Court of First Instance of the province of Iloilo. These exclusions
referred to portions of the original area of over 171 hectares originally
claimed by Militante as applicant, but which he expressly recognized
during the trial to pertain to some oppositors, such as the Bureau of
Public Works and Bureau of Forestry and several other individual
occupants and accordingly withdrew his application over the same. This
is expressly made of record in Exh. A, which is the Court of Appeals'
decision of 22 September 1958 confirming the land registration
court's dismissal of Militante's application for registration.)
4. On September 22,1958 the Court of appeals in CA-G.R. No. 13497-R
promulgated its judgment confirming the decision of this Court in Land
Case No. R-695, GLRO Rec. No. 54852 which dismissed the application
for Registration filed by Francisco Militante (Exh. "I").
5. Domingo Rubias declared the land described in Exh. 'B' for taxation
purposes under Tax Dec. No. 8585 (Exh. "C") for 1957; Tax Dec. Nos.
9533 (Exh. "C-1") and 10019 (Exh. "C-3")for the year 1961; Tax Dec. No.
9868 (Exh. "C-2") for the year 1964, paying the land taxes under Tax
Dec. No. 8585 and 9533 (Exh. "D", "D-1", "G-6").
6. Francisco Militante immediate predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff,
has also declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No.
5172 in 1940 (Exh. "E") for 1945; under Tax Dec. No. T-86 (Exh. "E-1")
for 1948; under Tax Dec. No. 7122 (Exh. "2"), and paid the land taxes for
1940 (Exhs. "G" and "G-7"), for 1945 46 (Exh. "G-1") for 1947 (Exh. "G-
2"), for 1947 & 1948 (Exh. "G-3"), for 1948 (Exh. "G-4"), and for 1948 and
1949 (Exh. "G-5").
7. Tax Declaration No. 2434 in the name of Liberato Demontaño for the
land described therein (Exh. "F") was cancelled by Tax. Dec. No. 5172 of
Francisco Militante (Exh. "E"). Liberato Demontaño paid the land tax
under Tax Dec. No. 2434 on Dec. 20, 1939 for the years 1938 (50%) and
1959 (Exh. "H").
8. The defendant had declared for taxation purposes Lot No. 2 of the
Psu-155241 under Tax Dec. Not. 8583 for 1957 and a portion of Lot No.
2, Psu-155241, for 1945 under Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A" Tax No.
8583 (Exh. "2") was revised by Tax Dec. No. 9498 in the name of the
defendant (Exh. "2-B") and Tax Dec. No. 8584 (Exh. "2-A") was cancelled
by Tax Dec. No. 9584 also in the name of the defendant (Exh. "2-C").
The defendant paid the land taxes for Lot 2, Psu-155241, on Nov. 9,
1960 for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year 1950, and for the year
1960 as shown by the certificate of the treasurer (Exh. "3"). The
defendant may present to the Court other land taxes receipts for the
payment of taxes for this lot.
9. The land claimed by the defendant as his own was surveyed on June
6 and 7,1956, and a plan approved by Director of Land on November 15,
1956 was issued, identified as Psu 155241 (Exh. "5").
10. On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer
case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac
Viejo Province of Iloilo (Exh. "4") to which the defendant Isaias Batiller
riled his answer on August 29, 1960 (Exh. "4-A"). The Municipal Court of
Barotac Viejo after trial, decided the case on May 10, 1961 in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff (Exh. "4-B"). The
plaintiff appealed from the decision of the Municipal Court of Barotac
Viejo which was docketed in this Court as Civil Case No. 5750 on June 3,
1961, to which the defendant, Isaias Batiller, on June 13, 1961 filed his
answer (Exh. "4-C"). And this Court after the trial. decided the case on
November 26, 1964, in favor of the defendant, Isaias Batiller and against
the plaintiff (Exh. "4-D").
(NOTE: As per Exh. 4-B, which is the Iloilo court of first instance decision
of 26 November 1964 dismissing plaintiff's therein complaint for
ejectment against defendant, the iloilo court expressly found "that
 plaintiff's complaint is unjustified, intended to harass the defendant" and
"that the defendant, Isaias Batiller, has a better right to possess the land
in question described in Psu 155241 (Exh. "3"), Isaias Batiller having
been in the actual physical possession thereof under a claim of title
many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff-hereby
dismissing plaintiff's complaint and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendant attorney's fees ....")
B. During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent evidence
the following:
The appellate court further related the developments of the case, as follows:
1. That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A"
was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato Demontaño but that on
September 6, 1919 the land was sold at public auction by virtue of a
judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato
Demontaño Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of
which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4,
1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of Sale
was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan.
19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10,
1934 (Exh. "1-1").
2. On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco
Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered
in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940 (Exh. "J-1").
3. That plaintiff suffered damages alleged in his complaint.
C. Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the trial of this
case the following facts:
1. That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and
possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller,
on the death of the former in 1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller
succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of
the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land
remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous in the concept of an owner,
exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants.
2. That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never
been in the actual possession of the land and that they never had any
title thereto.
3. That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of
the defendant has been approved.
4. The damages suffered by the defendant, as alleged in his
counterclaim."'1
On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that
before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file
a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging
that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the
property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-
law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in
the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was
the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. Invoking
Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:
'Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited by law.
'ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any
purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of
through the mediation of another: .
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.'
defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the
property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco
Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal).
Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that
defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as
Article 1422 of the same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of
contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly
affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal).
On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming
plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order
of dismissal the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention
that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was
null and void. In due season plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration
(pp. 50-56 Record on Appeal) which was denied by the lower court on
January 14, 1966 (p. 57, Record on Appeal).
Hence, this appeal by plaintiff from the orders of October 18, 1965 and
January 14, 1966.
Plaintiff-appellant imputes to the lower court the following errors:
'1. The lower court erred in holding that the contract of
sale between the plaintiff-appellant and his father-in-law,
Francisco Militante, Sr., now deceased, of the property
covered by Plan Psu-99791, (Exh. "A") was void, not
voidable because it was made when plaintiff-appellant
was the counsel of the latter in the Land Registration
case.
'2. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant-
appellee is an interested person to question the validity of
the contract of sale between plaintiff-appellant and the
deceased, Francisco Militante, Sr.
'3. The lower court erred in entertaining the motion to
dismiss of the defendant-appellee after he had already
filed his answer, and after the termination of the pre-trial,
when the said motion to dismiss raised a collateral
question.
'4. The lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of
the plaintiff-appellant.'
The appellate court concluded that plaintiffs "assignment of errors gives rise to two (2)
legal posers — (1) whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-
in-law, the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void
because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration
case involving the property in dispute; and (2) whether or not the lower court was correct
in entertaining defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss after the latter had already filed his
answer and after he (defendant) and plaintiff-appellant had agreed on some matters in a
pre-trial conference. Hence, its elevation of the appeal to this Court as involving pure
questions of law.
It is at once evident from the foregoing narration that the pre-trial conference held by the
trial court at which the parties with their counsel agreed and stipulated on the material
and relevant facts and submitted their respective documentary exhibits as referred to in
the pre-trial order, supra,  practically amounted to a fulldress trial which placed on record
2
all the facts and exhibits necessary for adjudication of the case.
The three points on which plaintiff reserved the presentation of evidence at the-trial
dealing with the source of the alleged right and title of Francisco Militante's
predecessors, supra,  actually are already made of record in the stipulated
3
facts and admitted exhibits. The chain of Militante's alleged title and right to the land as
supposedly traced back to Liberato Demontaño was actually asserted by Militante (and
his vendee, lawyer and son-in-law, herein plaintiff) in the land registration case
and rejected by the Iloilo land registration court which dismissed Militante's application
for registration of the land. Such dismissal, as already stated, was affirmed by the final
judgment in 1958 of the Court of Appeals. 4
The four points on which defendant on his part reserved the presentation of evidence at
the trial dealing with his and his ancestors' continuous, open, public and peaceful
possession in the concept of owner of the land and the Director of Lands' approval of his
survey plan thereof, supra,  are likewise already duly established facts of record, in the
5
land registration case as well as in the ejectment case wherein the Iloilo court of first
instance recognized the superiority of defendant's right to the land as against plaintiff.
No error was therefore committed by the lower court in dismissing plaintiff's complaint
upon defendant's motion after the pre-trial.
1. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of
cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of
ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof for P2,000.00 made
in 1956 by his father-in- law, Francisco Militante, in his favor, at a time when Militante's
application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land
registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of Militante's
application for registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land
was conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence, there was no right or
title to the land that could be transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in
favor of plaintiff.
Manifestly, then plaintiff's complaint against defendant, to be declared absolute owner of
the land and to be restored to possession thereof with damages was bereft of any factual
or legal basis.
2. No error could be attributed either to the lower court's holding that the purchase by a
lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article
1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra;  and that
6 likewise and so did Sisenando Palarca. In a decision dated June 21,
consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming
that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the
property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by
virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts
"expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts
cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived."
The 1911 case of Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez  relied upon by plaintiff as holding that a
7
sale of property in litigation to the party litigant's lawyer "is not void but voidable at the
election of the vendor" was correctly held by the lower court to have been superseded by
the later 1929 case of Director of Lands vs. Abagat.  In this later case of Abagat, the
8 possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties without
Court expressly cited two antecedent cases involving the same transaction of purchase
of property in litigation by the lawyer which was expressly declared invalid under Article
1459 of the Civil Code of Spain (of which Article 1491 of our Civil Code of the Philippines
is the counterpart) upon challenge thereof not by the vendor-client but by the adverse
parties against whom the lawyer was to enforce his rights as vendee thus acquired.
These two antecedent cases thus cited in Abagat clearly superseded (without so
expressly stating the previous ruling in Wolfson:
The spouses, Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, were the owners of
twelve parcels of land. Vicenta Macaraeg died in November, 1909,
leaving a large number of collateral heirs but no descendants. Litigation
between the surviving husband, Juan Soriano, and the heirs of Vicenta
immediately arose, and the herein appellant Sisenando Palarca acted as
Soriano's lawyer. On May 2, 1918, Soriano executed a deed for the
aforesaid twelve parcels of land in favor of Sisenando Palarca and on the
following day, May 3, 1918, Palarca filed an application for the
registration of the land in the deed. After hearing, the Court of First
Instance declared that the deed was invalid by virtue of the provisions of
article 1459 of the Civil Code, which prohibits lawyers and solicitors from
purchasing property rights involved in any litigation in which they take
part by virtue of their profession. The application for registration was
consequently denied, and upon appeal by Palarca to the Supreme Court,
the judgement of the lower court was affirmed by a decision promulgated
November 16,1925. (G.R. No. 24329, Palarca vs. Director of Lands, not
reported.)
In the meantime cadastral case No. 30 of the Province of Tarlac was
instituted, and on August 21, 1923, Eleuteria Macaraeg, as administratrix
of the estate of Vicente Macaraeg, filed claims for the parcels in question.
Buenaventura Lavitoria administrator of the estate of Juan Soriano, did
1927, the Court of First Instance, Judge Carballo presiding, rendered
judgment in favor of Palarea and ordered the registration of the land in
his name. Upon appeal to this court by the administration of the estates
of Juan Soriano and Vicente Macaraeg, the judgment of the court below
was reversed and the land adjudicated to the two estates as conjugal
property of the deceased spouses. (G.R. No. 28226, Director of Lands
vs. Abagat, promulgated May 21, 1928, not reported.) 9
In the very case of Abagat itself, the Court, again affirming the invalidity and nullity of the
lawyer's purchase of the land in litigation from his client, ordered the issuance of a writ of
reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses, and ruled that "the appellant
Palarca is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the
beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a
possessor in bad faith."
As already stated, Wolfson and Abagat were decided with relation to Article 1459 of the
Civil Code of Spain then adopted here, until it was superseded on August 30, 1950 by
the Civil Code of the Philippines whose counterpart provision is Article 1491.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its
six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control
over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or
indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents;
(3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees,
prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.
In Wolfson which involved the sale and assignment of a money judgment by the client to
the lawyer, Wolfson, whose right to so purchase the judgment was being challenged by
the judgment debtor, the Court, through Justice Moreland, then expressly reserved
decision on "whether or not the judgment in question actually falls within the prohibition
of the article" and held only that the sale's "voidability can not be asserted by one not a
party to the transaction or his representative," citing from Manresa   that "(C)onsidering
10
the question from the point of view of the civil law, the view taken by the code, we must
Citing the same decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Gullon Ballesteros, his "Curso
de Derecho Civil, (Contratos Especiales)" (Madrid, 1968) p. 18, affirms that, with respect
to Article 1459, Spanish Civil Code:.
Que caracter tendra la compra que se realice por estas personas?
Porsupuesto no cabe duda de que el caso (art.) 1459, 40 y 50, la nulidad
esabsoluta porque el motivo de la prohibicion es de orden publico.  14

limit ourselves to classifying as void all acts done contrary to the express prohibition of
the statute. Now then: As the code does not recognize such nullity by the mere operation Perez Gonzales in such view, stating that "Dado el caracter prohibitivo delprecepto, la
of law, the nullity of the acts hereinbefore referred to must be asserted by the person consequencia de la infraccion es la nulidad radical y ex lege." 15

having the necessary legal capacity to do so and decreed by a competent

court." 
11

Castan, quoting Manresa's own observation that.

The reason thus given by Manresa in considering such prohibited acquisitions under
"El fundamento do esta prohibicion es clarisimo. No sa trata con este precepto tan solo
Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code as merely voidable at the instance and option of
de guitar la ocasion al fraude; persiguese, ademasel proposito de rodear a las personas
the vendor and not void — "that the Code does not recognize such nullity de pleno
que intervienen en la administrcionde justicia de todos los retigios que necesitan pora
derecho" — is no longer true and applicable to our own Philippine Civil Code
ejercer su ministerio librandolos de toda suspecha, que aunque fuere in fundada,
which does recognize the absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose
redundura endescredito de la institucion."   arrives at the contrary and now accepted
16

is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are
view that "Puede considerace en nuestro derecho inexistente 'o radicalmente nulo el
"expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent
contrato en los siguentes cases: a) ...; b) cuando el contrato se ha celebrado en
and void from the beginning."  12

violacion de una prescripcion 'o prohibicion legal, fundada sobre motivos de orden

publico (hipotesis del art. 4 del codigo) ..."  17

The Supreme Court of Spain and modern authors have likewise veered from Manresa's
view of the Spanish codal provision itself. In its sentencia of 11 June 1966, the Supreme
It is noteworthy that Caltan's rationale for his conclusion that fundamental consideration
Court of Spain ruled that the prohibition of Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code is
of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by
based on public policy, that violation of the prohibition contract cannot be validated by
public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices,
confirmation or ratification, holding that:
judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled
by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted
... la prohibicion que el articulo 1459 del C.C. establece respecto a los in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as
administradores y apoderados, la cual tiene conforme a la doctrina de "inexistent and void from the beginning." 18

esta Sala, contendia entre otras, en S. de 27-5-1959, un fundamento

de orden moral lugar la violacion de esta a la nulidad de pleno
Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be
derecho del acto o negocio celebrado, ... y prohibicion legal,
cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not
afectante orden publico, no cabe con efecto alguno la
permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of
aludida retification ... 
13

The criterion of nullity of such prohibited contracts under Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil
Code (Article 1491 of our Civil Code) as a matter of public order and policy as applied by
the Supreme Court of Spain to administrators and agents in its above cited decision
should certainly apply with greater reason to judges, judicial officers, fiscals and lawyers
under paragraph 5 of the codal article.
public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first
three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to
whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in
"the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity
which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the
object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful
at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may
have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been
clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its
execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract."  19

As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-
appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the
land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon
were being asserted against defendant-appellant. The principles governing the nullity of
such prohibited contracts and judicial declaration of their nullity have been well restated
by Tolentino in his treatise on our Civil Code, as follows:

Parties Affected. — Any person may invoke the in existence of the

contract whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against
him. Thus, if there has been a void transfer of property, the transferor can
recover it by the accion reinvindicatoria; and any prossessor may refuse
to deliver it to the transferee, who cannot enforce the contract. Creditors
may attach property of the debtor which has been alienated by the latter
under a void contract; a mortgagee can allege the inexistence of a prior
encumbrance; a debtor can assert the nullity of an assignment of credit
as a defense to an action by the assignee.

Action On Contract. — Even when the contract is void or inexistent, an

action is necessary to declare its inexistence, when it has already been
fulfilled. Nobody can take the law into his own hands; hence, the
intervention of the competent court is necessary to declare the absolute
nullity of the contract and to decree the restitution of what has been given
under it. The judgment, however, will retroact to the very day when the
contract was entered into.

If the void contract is still fully executory, no party need bring an action to
declare its nullity; but if any party should bring an action to enforce it, the
other party can simply set up the nullity as a defense.  20

ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs in
all instances against plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,. Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
A.C. No. 9532               October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUSTICO B. GAGATE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by Maria Cristina
Zabaljauregui Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), .
charging him for gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David), 2 a British national
who passed away on June 18, 2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business
in the Philippines and owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting
Edge, Inc.4 (Consulting Edge), a domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her
deceased husband, complainant engaged the services of respondent. 5
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui
Bantegui),6 a major stockholder of Consulting Edge, 7 in order to discuss the settlement of
David’s interest in the company.8 They agreed to another meeting which was, however,
postponed by Bantegui. Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to
hide something, respondent insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled. 9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004.
However, prior to the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent
to put a paper seal on the door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was
legal.10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of
complainant and respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to
settle. She then asked them to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a
duplicate key.11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the
change in the lock of the Consulting Edge office door, 12 which prevented the employees
thereof from entering and carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted
Bantegui to file before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutor’s Office) a
complaint for grave coercion against complainant and respondent. 13 In turn, respondent
advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be initiated against Bantegui for
the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in Consulting Edge. 14 Thus,
on January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of Agreement, 15 whereby
respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which complainant
paid the amount of ₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondent ₱1,000.00 for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution 17 dated October 13,
2004, finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion.
The corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a
matter of course, warrants of arrest were issued against them. 18 Due to the foregoing,
respondent advised complainant to go into hiding until he had filed the necessary
motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent abandoned the grave coercion case
and stopped communicating with complainant. 19 Failing to reach respondent despite
diligent efforts,20 complainant filed the instant administrative case before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint. The case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006, 22 which
was reset twice,23 on January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of
respondent. The last notice sent to respondent, however, was returned unserved for the
reason "moved out."24 In view thereof, Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador
III declared the mandatory conference terminated and required the parties to submit their
position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits. 25
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner
Magpayo) issued a Report and Recommendation,26 observing that respondent failed to
safeguard complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion
case. Commissioner Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor
complainant as subrogee of David because complainant has yet to establish her kinship
with David and, consequently, her interest in Consulting Edge. 27 Hence, the actions taken
by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the door of the company premises
and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced with the counter
legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause. 28 Commissioner
Magpayo found that respondent’s acts evinced a lack of adequate preparation and
mastery of the applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 529 of the Code of
Professional Responsibity (Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for
a period of six months.30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November
19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules.31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s
November 19, 2011 Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation 34 dated
February 6, 2013, concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client
and failed to safeguard the latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties
as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-month suspension from the practice of law as
suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and, in lieu thereof, recommended that
respondent be suspended for three years.36 Likewise, it ordered respondent to return the
₱150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee. 37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his
client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to
expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest
means to attain lawful objectives.39 These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
xxxx
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the
required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her
competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the
proper bounds of law; and, second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave
coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of
her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-
handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the
latter’s interest in Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the change of the office door lock
which thereby prevented the free ingress and egress of the employees of the said
company – was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot take the law into his own hands,
regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent's act of advising
complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be
maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of the
ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty
to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice, 40 in violation of Rule
19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of
action were not only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his
client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same
regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him – in particular, her trust that
respondent would only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests
– thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent
completely abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case
against them; this notwithstanding petitioner’s efforts to reach him as well as his receipt
of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care
or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before
any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing
the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court. 41 Hence,
considering respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally
unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule
18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for
instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that
the fact of respondent’s receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant
remains undisputed,47 the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the
OBC, to be in order.

In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17
complaint despite due notice.  This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but
1âwphi1 Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
also his lack of interest in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
an implied admission of the charges leveled against him. 42 In fine, respondent should be period of three 3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning
held administratively liable for his infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
now proceeds to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed against respondent.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for Pitcher the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90)
infractions similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will
of law for a period of two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,43 a lawyer who neglected his client's case, warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
misappropriated the client's funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his
pleadings and attend the hearings was suspended from the practice of law for two years. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
In Small v. Banares,44 the Court meted a similar penalty against a lawyer who failed to Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant; to return the courts.
money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client on the status of
her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and attend SO ORDERED.
the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales, 45 a lawyer
who neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s
ESTELA M. PER
money and to return the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of
her case and to respond to her requests for information; and failed to submit his answer
and to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP was suspended from the practice
of law for two years. However, the Court observes that, in the present case, complainant
was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for the crime of grave coercion
largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were it not for
respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during
the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to
complainant, the Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three years as recommended by the
OBC.

In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of the
₱150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held
that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, 46 it must be clarified that this
A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989
MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.
Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for complainant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM
Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in
the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs
that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar or
to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the
maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney
towards his client. 1
Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer
and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit,
fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
The essential facts are as follows: 2
Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for
"ejectment" docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case
No. 54117 for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit
being rented by complainant and her sister.
When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case
No. 54117 for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June
8, 1987 while Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Court against her.
On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for
ejectment, complainant and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented
premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on
the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such
introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case.
Forthwith, a petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by
respondent to forestall the execution of the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent
what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed   petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent
3
promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the
judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend).
Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro
Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the
complainant one thousand pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that
same afternoon.
However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge
asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.
On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be
ready with two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will issue
the restraining order in the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her
sister were only able to raise the amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately
gave to respondent.
Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the
judge who would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's
Restaurant where respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food
allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture,
respondent asked for the remaining balance of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00)
which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and
Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to
enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told
complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to
be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and
another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of the suit. Respondent
stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint.
Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some
friends and relatives. On October 26,1987, the money was handed over to the
respondent.
On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or
Spurious Sale with Damages," later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by
respondent with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987,
respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew
his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another
lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained.
As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced
and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need
to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210.
After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on
December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return
of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier
gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never
returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein
respondent.
Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, dismissed Civil
Case No. 55118 for failure to state a cause of action.  On January 20,1988, Civil Case
4
No. 5521 0 was likewise dismissed for being identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5
Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210
was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the
administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only
intended to harrass him. 6
This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be
poorly prepared and written. having represented himself capable of picking up the
cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully
prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little
time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file
the best pleading within his capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in
getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged
about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to
"buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00 as alleged deposit
in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the
complainant dry is obvious.
When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for
its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the
client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics . 7
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's
interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the
presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by
reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to
find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.
Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to
withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing
as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due
to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not
even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead.  8
His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the
interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his
client.   More so in this case, where by reason of his gross negligence complainant
9
thereby suffered by losing all her cases.
The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had
already filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118,
reveals his lack of good faith as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the
complainant in said case. It was all a show to get more money from her. This adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with this evident irregularity, he
lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he nevertheless
prepared and drafted the pleadings.
His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the
ejectment proceeding would be returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who
persuaded complainant that the filing of these two cases simultaneously were the means
by which this objective can be achieved. His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings
but to represent complainant until the termination of the cases. This he failed to do.

His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when
he already knew that he could no longer physically handle the same is an act of
deception of his client.  It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the
10

Philippine bar.

The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him
as fee for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly
disproportionate with the service he actually rendered.   And his failure to return even a
11

portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation
of complainant that respondent does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court.

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal
profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional
ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in
dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business
proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case,
this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time
he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the
practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven
thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is
actually returned.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1311             July 18, 1991
RAMONA L. VDA. DE ALISBO and NORBERTO S. ALISBO, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
A verified complaint for disbarment was filed with then Secretary of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile on January 2, 1974, by Ramona L. Vda. de Alisbo and Norberto S.
Alisbo against their former counsel, Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr., charging him with
deceit, malpractice, and professional infidelity. The complaint was referred to this Court
on February 5, 1974.
After the complainants had submitted the required number of copies of their complaint,
the respondent was ordered to file his answer thereto which he did on June 5, 1974.
On August 20, 1974, the complainants filed a reply.
On August 28, 1974, the Court referred the complaint to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On February 2, 1990, or after sixteen (16)
years, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, together with the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken at the investigation and folders of exhibits
submitted by the parties.
The facts of the case, as found by the Solicitor General, are the following:
On March 16, 1970, Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr.,
as his counsel to commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased
spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him under
the judgment dated April 29, 1961 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in
Civil Case No. 4963, because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of the judgment
in his favor within the reglementary five-year period (Sec. 6, Rule, 39, Rules of Court).
The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between
Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following:
1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of
Ramon Alisbo's share or claim;
2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and
3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid fifty per cent (50%) of the value of
the property recovered.
On April 18, 1970, respondent prepared a complaint for revival of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 4963 but filed it only on September 12, 1970 on five (5) months later. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9559, entitled: "Ramon S. Alisbo, Teotimo S. Alisbo and
Pacifico S. Alisbo vs. Carlito Sales, in his own capacity and as Judicial Administrator of
the deceased Pedro Sales." The complaint was signed by respondent alone. However,
no sooner had he filed the complaint than he withdrew it and filed in its stead (on the
same day and in the same case) a second complaint dated August 31, 1970, with
Ramon S. Alisbo as the lone plaintiff, praying for the same relief. Teotimo S. Alisbo and
Pacifico S. Alisbo were excluded as plaintiffs and were impleaded as defendants instead.
Attorneys Bernardo B. Pablo and Benito Jalandoon, Sr. (herein respondent) signed as
counsel.
On December 8, 1971, an amended complaint was filed wherein the plaintiffs were:
Ramon S. Alisbo, assisted by his judicial guardian, Norberto S. Alisbo, and eight (8)
others, namely: Pacifico S. Alisbo, Ramona Vda. de Alisbo and Ildefonso, Evangeline,
Teotimo, Jr., Reynaldo, Elizabeth and Teresita, all surnamed Alisbo. The amended
complaint was signed by Attorney Bernardo B. Pablo alone as counsel of the plaintiffs.
On August 21, 1973, defendant Carlito Sales filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the action for revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 had already
prescribed (Exh. 21). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Exh. 22).
On October 3, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription as the judgment in Civil Case No. 4963 became
final on May 30, 1961 yet, and, although a complaint for revival of said judgment was
filed by Ramon Alisbo on September 12, 1970, before the ten-year prescriptive period
expired, that complaint was null and void for Ramon Alisbo was insane, hence,
incompetent and without legal capacity to sue when he instituted the action. The
subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint on December 8, 1972, after the statutory
limitation period had expired, was too late to save the plaintiffs right of action. Thereafter,
nothing more was done by any of the parties in the case.
On January 2, 1974, the complainants charged respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon,
Sr. with having deliberately caused the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 and with having
concealed from them the material fact that he had been the former legal counsel of
Carlito Sales, their adversary in the probate proceedings. The respondent filed a general
denial of the charges against him.
When Ramon S. Alisbo engaged the services of Attorney Jalandoon to enforce the
decision in Civil Case No. 4963, that decision was already nine (9) years old, hence, it
could no longer be executed by mere motion (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Complainants had only about a year left within which to enforce the judgment by an
independent action.
Ramon Alisbo was already insane or incompetent when he hired Attorney Jalandoon to
file Civil Case No. 9559 for him. Attorney Jalandoon concealed from Alisbo the fact that
he (Atty. Jalandoon) had been the former counsel of Carlito Sales in the probate
proceedings where Alisbo and Sales had litigated over their shares of the inheritance.
However, according to Attorney Jalandoon, it was only on October 6, 1972, when Civil
Case No. 9559 was called for pre-trial, that he discovered his previous professional
relationship with Sales. At that time, the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of the
judgment in favor of Alisbo had already expired. He thereupon asked Alisbo's permission
to allow him (Jalandoon) to withdraw from the case. He also informed the court about his
untenable position and requested that he be allowed to retire therefrom. His request was
granted.
In his report to the Court, the Solicitor General made the following observations:
Evident from the foregoing is the fact that in handling the case for Ramon S.
Alisbo which eventually led to its dismissal, respondent committed several errors,
among which are:
1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case.
Otherwise, his lack of capacity to sue would not have been at issue.
2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to
a motion to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he
frittered away precious time.
3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as
defendants.  Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in
1âwphi1
part.
Had not respondent committed the above mistakes, Civil Case No. 9559 in all
probability would not have been dismissed on the ground of prescription. (pp. 9-
10, Solicitor General's Report.)
While the Solicitor General does not believe that Attorney Jalandoon's mistakes in
handling Alisbo's case were deliberate or made with malice aforethought because there
is no "proof of collusion or conspiracy between respondent and those who would benefit
from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9559 . . . and that, on the other hand, respondent
stood to gain substantially (50% of the amount recovered) if he had succeeded in having
the judgment revived and executed" (pp. 10-11, Solicitor General's Report), still those
errors are so gross and glaring that they could not have resulted from mere negligence
or lack of due care.
Attorney Jalandoon's pretense that he did not know before the pre-trial that the Sales
defendants had been his clients in the past, is unbelievable because:
1. Before he filed the complaint for revival of judgment, he had had several
interviews with Ramon S. Alisbo and Norberto Alisbo regarding Civil Case No.
4963.
2. He must have done some research on the court records of Civil Case No.
4963, so he could not have overlooked his own participation in that case as
counsel for Carlito Sales, et al.
3. To prepare the complaint for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 9559), he had
to inform himself about the personal circumstances of the defendants-Carlito
Sales, et al. The fact that they had been his clients could not have eluded him.
In view of his former association with the Saleses, Attorney Jalandoon, as a dutiful
lawyer, should have declined the employment proffered by Alisbo on the ground of
conflict of interest. Had he done that soon enough, the Alisbos (herein complainants)
would have had enough time to engage the services of another lawyer and they would
not have lost their case through prescription of the action.
The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics which provide:
6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection
with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.)
The impression we gather from the facts is that Attorney Jalandoon used his position as
Alisbo's counsel precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's
action to revive the judgment in his favor and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his
judgment which Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had vigorously opposed. Thus,
although Atty. Jalandoon prepared Alisbo's complaint for revival of judgment on April 18,
1970, he delayed its filing until September 12, 1970. He postponed filing the action by
asking the Court instead to resolve pending incidents in said Civil Case No. 4963. By
doing that, he frittered away what little time was left before the action would prescribe.
The original complaint which he filed in the names of Ramon Alisbo and his brothers was
only partially defective because of Ramon's incompetence. By dropping the other
plaintiffs, leaving alone the incompetent Ramon to prosecute the action, respondent
made the second complaint wholly defective and ineffectual to stop the running of the
prescriptive period.

After filing the complaint, Attorney Jalandoon sat on the case. While he allegedly found
out about Ramon Alisbo's insanity on July 17, 1971 only, he amended the complaint to
implead Alisbo's legal guardian as plaintiff on December 8, 1971 only, or almost five (5)
months later. By that time the prescriptive period had run out.

The surrounding circumstances leave us with no other conclusion than that Attorney
Jalandoon, betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with
that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer is obligated to give to every
case that he accepts from a client. There is more than simple negligence resulting in the
extinguishment and loss of his client's right of action; there is a hint of duplicity and lack
of candor in his dealings with his client, which call for the exercise of this Court's
disciplinary power.

The Honorable Solicitor General who conducted the investigation of this case found
respondent Attorney Benito Jalandoon, Sr. guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity.
Although the Solicitor General recommended the suspension of respondent Attorney
Benito Jalandoon Sr. from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court, after
due deliberation, decided to suspend him for a period of two (2) years from the finality of
this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2490             February 7, 1991
FULGENCIO A. NGAYAN, TOMASA K. NGAYAN and BELLA AURORA
NGAYAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein complainants
Fulgencio A. Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan in a letter-complaint
dated November 16, 1982 against respondent lawyer for violation of sub-paragraphs (e)
and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
It appears that respondent lawyer was formerly a counsel for complainants either as
defense counsel or private prosecutor in the following cases:
(a) People v. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch Criminal Case
No. 053773-CR for light threat;
(b) People v. Tomasa Ngayan and Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila,
Branch VIII, Criminal Case No. 053594-CR, for unjust vexation;
(c) People v. Bella Aurora Ngayan, City Court of Manila, Branch II, Criminal Case
No. 053599-CR, for grave threats;
(d) People v. Roberto Leonido, City Court of Manila, Branch XIV, Criminal Case
No. 053649-CR, for trespass to dwelling; and People v. Nestor Campo, Branch
XIV, Criminal Case No. 053650-CR, for threats;
(e) Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K. Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano and Robert
Leonido for grave threats and trespass; Fulgencio A. Ngayan and Tomasa K.
Ngayan v. Rowena Soriano, for grave defamation, Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila before Assistant City Fiscal Elmer K. Calledo, I.S. No. 82-8564. (pp. 1-
2, Rollo)
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as
basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a
consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without
thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she
was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not
mention that Robert Leonido was with Rowena Soriano when both suddenly barged into
complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent about his omission and
in front of her, respondent crossed out the paragraph she complained about and
promised to make another affidavit. In the meantime, complainants filed motions to
discharge the respondent as their counsel.
Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging respondent and found that
the name of Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission was
remedied by their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse
parties filed a motion for reinvestigation and attached thereto the first affidavit of
complainants which was crossed out. Complainants averred that the motion was filed by
Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of respondent. They further said that
respondent was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company.
Complainants further alleged that the motion for reinvestigation was set for hearing
before Assistant City Fiscal Milagros F. Garcia-Beza where respondent himself executed
and submitted an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano
controverting the affidavit of complainants notwithstanding the fact that he prepared the
latter's affidavit when he was still their counsel.
They further alleged that before he executed and submitted his affidavit, respondent sent
a personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing
criminal and civil cases against them.
Complainants charged respondent for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20,
Rule 138, Rules of Court, which provide:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged;
Complainants claim that paragraph (e) above was violated by respondent when the
affidavit he prepared for complainants but subsequently crossed-out was submitted as
evidence against complainants in the motion for reinvestigation. As to paragraph (f),
complainants averred that respondent violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying
that his name was being adversely affected by the false affidavits of complainants and
for that reason, respondent was contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for
damages against them.
In a resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated January 19, 1983, respondent
was required to answer the complaint against him but respondent failed. Thus, on May
25, 1983, for failure of the respondent to file an answer, this Court resolved to refer this
case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereupon,
the Solicitor General set the complaint for hearing on September 26, 1983, October 17
and 18,1983 and November 24,1983, all of which dates, respondent was duly notified.
However, respondent never appeared on any date. Accordingly, the Solicitor General
made findings of facts based on the aforesaid claims of complainants and said:
Consistent with respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint herein filed
against him, he also did not appear, despite due notice on the four occasions
when the hearing of the present complaint was set at the Office of the Solicitor
General. Neither has respondent shown concern or interest about the status of
the complaint filed against him. The inaction of respondent to the resolutions of
this Honorable Court requiring him to file his Answer to the Complaint filed
against him and his subsequent failure to attend the hearings on the said
complaint indicate that respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities and he has not conducted himself as a lawyer according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients (Sec. 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Further, lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes. They should stand
foremost in complying with the court's directives or instructions being themselves
officers of the court (p. 75, Legal Ethics, Ruben Agpalo, 2nd Ed.). This lack of
concern shown by respondent regarding the matter that involved the very
foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would show how much
less he would regard the interest of Ms clients. 1
He thus recommended that the respondent lawyer be disbarred and his name dropped
from attorney's roll.  In this report, he averred that the conduct of respondent as above-
1âwphi1
shown constitutes unprofessional conduct and an outright violation of the provisions of
Section 3 and paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof (Santos v. Dichoso, Adm. Case
No. 1825, August 22, 1978, 84 SCRA 622).
In the case at bar, complainants claim that respondent furnished the adverse parties in a
certain criminal case with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it
as evidence against complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust and
confidence of his former clients in violation of paragraph (e), Section 20, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Inasmuch as respondent failed to answer the complaint filed against him
and despite due notice on four occasions, he consistently did not appear on the
scheduled hearing set by the Office of the Solicitor General, this claim remained
uncontroverted. Besides, We tend to believe the said claim of complainants when it is
taken together with their other claim that respondent's actuations from the beginning tend
to show that he was partial to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade
complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido. This partiality could be
explained by the fact that respondent is the former classmate of Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda,
the adverse parties' counsel and the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the brother of
Robert Leonido in an insurance company.
Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido
and Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as
the fact that the crime charged in complainants' affidavit had prescribed and that he was
asked to prepare an affidavit to make the offense more grave so as to prevent the
offense from prescribing demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against
complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rule 138, Rules of
Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory
over the dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias against the
complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was meant
only to titillate the anger of complainants.
Additionally, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to
appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the
court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule
138, Rules of Court.
We have fully scrutinized and evaluated the records of this case and We cannot but find
that strong and unassailable reasons exist to render it Our irremissible duty to impose a
disciplinary sanction on respondent. But We feel that disbarment is too harsh considering
the circumstances of the case. We hold that suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year should be imposed on respondent for the aforestated misconduct.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Faustino F. Tugade is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
[B.M. NO. 793. July 30, 2004]
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY
OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar
for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule
of Court provision covering this cases central issue. Up to this juncture, its
reach and breadth have not undergone the test of an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,1 the District Court of Guam informed this
Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the
practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the Decision rendered
by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case
No. SP0075-94,2 a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar
Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.3 Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where
he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment
or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of
an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda
C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record of
Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam District Court
do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and are
thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or
omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of
his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.4  cralawred
Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,5 the
Bar Confidant sent a letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of
Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case
against Maquera and of the rules violated by him. 6  cralawred
The Court received certified copies of the record of Maqueras case from the
District Court of Guam on December 8, 1997. 7  cralawred
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from the IBPs receipt of the case records. 8  cralawred
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing  requiring him to appear before the
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28, 1998. 9 However, the notice
was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last
known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address. 10  cralawred
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and
Recommendation and its Resolution No. XVI-2003-110,  indefinitely
suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and
unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. 11  cralawred
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February
28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the
territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high
fee for handling his clients case.12  cralawred
In its Decision,  the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987,
Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment
against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case.
Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a
public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however,
retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of
redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt
within the aforesaid period.13 
cralawred
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for Five Hundred
U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay
him.14 
cralawred
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in
the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. 15  cralawred
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by
paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. 16  cralawred
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C.
Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$320,000.00). 17  cralawred
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee)
conducted hearings regarding Maqueras alleged misconduct. 18  than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services rendered to
cralawred
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam
praying that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 19 and
1.8(a)20 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in
Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that
Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule
1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to
a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyers
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully
disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing. 21  member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
cralawred
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two [2] years, however, with all but
thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to
Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs
and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to
pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It
also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has
been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam. 22  cralawred
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property
in his favor as compensation for past legal services and that the transaction,
except for the deed itself, was oral and was not made pursuant to a prior
written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was made
three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship
between them, and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for
his legal services to Castro.23  cralawred
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered
its Decision 24 suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a
period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional
Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that
the attorney-client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet
completely terminated when they entered into the oral agreement to transfer
Castros right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It also held
that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castros
property to him since he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more
Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to take
the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he was
aware of the requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions
between an attorney and his client in a very general sort of way. 25  cralawred
On the basis of the Decision  of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP
concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct,
there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics
in the Philippines.26 However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely
for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,
which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent
Revised Rules of Court.27 
cralawred
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 13, 1992, which states: chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so.The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras acts, namely:
acquiring by assignment Castros right of redemption over the property
subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for him;
exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for
a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for
members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds for his suspension
or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property
by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client
in payment of his legal services.Such transaction falls squarely under Article
1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 149128 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by
assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the litigation
handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, 29 the prohibition extends to sales
in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is
founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may
easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and unduly
enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste 31 illustrates the significance of the aforementioned
prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired his clients property subject of
a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed
by his clients in his favor.He contended that the sale was made at the
instance of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services.
The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the property of his clients
under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable for
malpractice. The Court held: chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the
spouses driven by financial necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at
the latters behest, as contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In
either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate
his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective of the
confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and
client, and of the rights of both.32  cralawred
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros
right of redemption, his subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of
selling the redeemed property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and
bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee
for his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of
redemption to Maquera was in payment for his legal services, and since the
property redeemed by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of
December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was assigned to
him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services
way beyond his actual fees which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2) -year suspension from
the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his
suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative
of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall
be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him; and Rule 1.01 which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal profession. 33  cralawred
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering
Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under
Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever
jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any comes later.
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. 35 Likewise,
the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record in
facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a lawyer.36 More fundamentally, the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an
investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised SO ORDERED.
Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases
be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and
failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled
investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.37  cralawred

The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on
his behalf regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him,
as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by
the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
Maqueras current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice,
this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be
suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership
dues from 1977 up to the present.38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such
payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.39  cralawred

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within

fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be
suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary
proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent
suspension in said jurisdiction.

The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of
Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
 A. C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, Respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the '50s
during their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness
extended to their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and
accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City. 1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which
he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondent's
name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July
8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant
IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates,
handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose's estate. Complainant was appointed as
administratrix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose's estate.
On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages
against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative
case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics
when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged
to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real estate properties" he prepared
for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its
counsel and auditor. 2
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent's offer to serve as
lawyer and auditor to settle her husband's estate. Respondent's law firm then filed a
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran
property in the estate's inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his
corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant
accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did
not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said
property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences  3 with the Baguio City
Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's auditing firm (C. J. Valdes &
Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband's estate, yet
included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00,
which respondent represented as her husband's loans applied "probably for the purchase
of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City."
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law firm (Carlos J. Valdes
and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband's estate in court, while
respondent's auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the
estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting
interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORN, Inc. against her husband's estate which was represented by respondent's law
firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction between respondent's law and
auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are
housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his ANSWER, 4 respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended
on the result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of
ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance
case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute
owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from
him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory
of Nakpil's estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate
which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of
the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list
drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondent's name were
applied "probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City."
Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as
the phrase "probably for the purchase" did not imply a consummated transaction but a
projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit "H")
of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the
Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere
error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the
Moran property for: (1) complainant's February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the
Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting
firms in the settlement of her husband's estate.  5 However, he pointed out that he has
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty.
Percival Cendaña (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the intestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C.J. Valdes
& Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his
thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN,
Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President.
Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the latter's death, became
the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law and
accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged
representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of complainant
as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate and the
claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be
satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as
administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant
has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the
banks' claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate.
Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of
the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim.
Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15,
1974. 6 He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the
SEC's certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of
Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes
& Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the
claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he
committed such "misconduct" not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another
forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.  7 She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her
disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of
the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondent's conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of
Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that
complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C.J.
Valdes & Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court
by C.J. Valdes & Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes
were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran property  but were part of respondent's
scheme to remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of the
professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required.
Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis
of defects in the documents he himself prepared..
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of
claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil's payment of realty tax on the
Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other
documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations
and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9,
1976 to "several years later." She alleged that none of the documents submitted as
evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm.  The documents merely
substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER, 8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his
action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not  per se anomalous for
respondent's accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He
reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer,
but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law
firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims
as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He
emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and
that the failure of respondent's law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution, 9 we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue
of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the
ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her
complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent
as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. 10
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled
that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to
this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report 11 on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the
decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that
respondent was not put on notice of complainant's claim over the property. It opined that
there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the
absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondent's right to transfer title to his family
corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late
Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice
in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The measure of good faith
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at "arms
length." 13 Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on
public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence
or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's favor. 14
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993. 15
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case. 16 It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close
relationship dating as far back as the '50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent
who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent
and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it
in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the
death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the
intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the
trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent's bad faith in transferring the property to
his family corporation is well discussed in this Court's Decision,  17 thus:
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late
Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e repudiated the trust
when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil
submitted to the intestate court in 1973. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties . . . can be
bolstered by Exh. "I-2," an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the
late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes &
Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit "I-2," which is a list of the
application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by
the late Jose Nakpil, . . . contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent.
If ownership of Pulong Maulap  was already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans
should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined
in Exh. "J" was that respondent Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan of P140,000.00
and pay all of the interests due on the notes" while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would
continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for
regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the
five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, . . . Valdes
could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of
respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the
estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself." (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant's documentary evidence
(Exhibits "H", "J" and "L"), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should
estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not
merely in trust for Jose Nakpil. 18
It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from the estate
which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If
respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead
of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and
the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to deprive
his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or
privity in the preparation of the list of the estate's liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion
of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear
that the information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come
from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of
the accounting firm in charging respondent's loans against the estate could not have been
committed without respondent's participation. Respondent wanted to "have his cake and
eat it too" and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an
issue. 19 The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter 20 and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney's
intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. 21 However, representation
of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation,
after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their
informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature
and extent of the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood
by his clients. 22
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of
assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In
fact, at one instance, respondent's law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil
against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm Carlos
J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did
not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the
records of this case and in the reconveyance case, 23 respondent acted as counsel and
accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent's defense that he
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing
of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondent's claim of resignation from his law
firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record 24 only show
respondent's resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these
documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as
of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Jose's estate had not yet been
terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to
his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court.
Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant
of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates
was the legal counsel of the estate 25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs,
was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. 26 The fact, however,
that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against
her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained
the legal situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the
arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the
conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se
adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against
her husband's estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate
proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position
where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondent's law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims
were prepared by respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is
a conflict of interest in the representation is  probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondent's duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the
probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could
not be charged before this Court as his alleged "misconduct" pertains to his accounting
practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions.
He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case
at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common
accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting
firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm
to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a
breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent's and his law firm's
loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent's misconduct refers to his
accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of
the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 27 Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in
a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.  28 In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. 29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6297             July 13, 2004
DOLORES D. PARIÑAS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR P. PAGUINTO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
A lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention and time to every case he accepts.  A
lawyer impliedly warrants that he possesses the necessary diligence, learning and skill to
handle each case.  He should exert his best judgment and exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of his client's cause.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, complainant Dolores Dryden Pariñas ("Pariñas") engaged
the services of respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto ("Paguinto") to annul her marriage to
Danilo Soriano. They agreed that for the legal services, Pariñas would pay Paguinto an
acceptance fee of P25,000, the filing fee of P2,500 and other incidental expenses.
On 2 December 2001, Pariñas paid Paguinto P10,000 in cash as partial payment of the
acceptance fee. An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment. Pariñas gave
1  attend the hearing on 30 July 2003 because he was in Tabuk, Kalinga attending a
Paguinto a diskette containing a narration of what happened between her and her
estranged husband Danilo Soriano.  Pariñas also furnished Paguinto with a copy of her
marriage contract with Soriano. Before the end of December 2001, Pariñas gave
Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee.
Sometime between January and April 2002, Pariñas inquired from Paguinto on the
progress of her annulment case.  Paguinto informed her that the case was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 64 ("RTC-Manila, Branch 64"), before Judge
Ricaforte and that the hearing was scheduled on 25 April 2002.  Before the hearing,
Pariñas requested for a meeting with Paguinto but the secretary informed her that the
hearing was cancelled.  The secretary further informed Pariñas that the judge reset the
succeeding hearings originally scheduled on 29 May 2002 and 26 June 2002 because
the judge was sick or out of town.
On the first week of July 2002, Pariñas went to the trial court to inquire about her case
but the court personnel in RTC-Manila, Branch 64 informed her that there was no such
case filed in their court.  Pariñas asked Paguinto for the case number, date of filing, copy
of the petition and the court where the annulment case was pending.  Paguinto told
Pariñas that the records were at his office and that he was in Malolos, Bulacan attending
to a case.  It turned out that there was no annulment case filed in RTC-Manila, Branch
64.  Paguinto promised to return the money that Pariñas paid as down payment. 
However, Paguinto returned the P10,000 only after Pariñas filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline ("CBD") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") the present
complaint for disbarment.
In the Order dated 14 February 2003, the CBD directed Paguinto to answer the
2 
complaint.  Paguinto asked for an extension of 15 days to file his Answer. The CBD
granted the extension in the Order dated 19 March 2003. However, Paguinto failed to file
3 
his Answer within the extended period and thus the CBD declared him in default in the
Order dated 15 July 2003. After the hearing, Pariñas submitted her Position Paper
4 
praying that the CBD declare Paguinto guilty of violation of Rule 16.01 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 10 September 2003, Pariñas filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of the complaint. Pariñas
5 
stated that Paguinto "personally explained exhaustively the reasons why he failed to
comply with his obligations" and she realized that the complaint arose due to a
"misapprehension of facts, misunderstanding and miscommunication." Pariñas
manifested that she was withdrawing the complaint, as she was no longer interested in
pursuing the case.
On the same date, Paguinto filed a Manifestation and Motion explaining that he failed to
6 
hearing in a criminal case for frustrated homicide. He apologized to Pariñas for his
actuations claiming "himself solely to be blamed." He further declared that he failed to
timely prepare and file the petition for annulment because he spends his time mostly in
Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Cavite where he practices law catering to those "clients who have
less in life."
Commissioner's Report & Recommendation
The IBP designated Atty. Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ("Commissioner") as Commissioner
to conduct a formal investigation of the case. The Commissioner found Paguinto
negligent in performing his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of the court.  The
Commissioner declared that a lawyer has the duty to give adequate attention, care and
time to his cases, accepting only as many cases as he can handle. Paguinto failed to
comply with this duty.  The Commissioner recommended the suspension of Paguinto
from the practice of law for six months.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commissioner.
Pariñas gave Paguinto P10,000 cash as partial payment of the acceptance fee. Pariñas
also gave Paguinto P2,500 for the filing fee.  Paguinto led Pariñas to believe that he had
filed the annulment case.  Paguinto informed Pariñas that the case was filed with the
RTC-Manila, Branch 64, before Judge Ricaforte.  However, Pariñas later found out that
Paguinto never filed the annulment case in court.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("the Code") provides that a lawyer
shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such
7 
as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to
the client on demand. Paguinto returned the money only after Pariñas filed this
8 
administrative case for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When
a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses
the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.  The lawyer has the
duty to exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him
and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or defense of
the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case. Once he agrees to
handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care.   If he fails in this
duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as much
cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his clients' interests will suffer. It is not
9 
enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He must
also give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost learning and ability in handling his
cases.  A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the
licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage their cases. The
10 
legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family.
In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara, we ruled:
11 
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He shall serve his client with competence and
diligence, and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires,
but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is
justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's
cause to succeed. An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests
commences from his retainer until his effective release from the case or the final
disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. During that period, he is
expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's
interests may require.
And failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. 12
Rule 18.01 of the Code is clear. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service that he is
not qualified to render. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle
any legal matter without adequate preparation. He has the duty to prepare for trial with
diligence and deliberate speed. Rule 18.03 of the Code also provides that a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence shall render him liable.
One last point. Pariñas executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of the complaint stating that
13 
she was withdrawing the administrative complaint against Paguinto after realizing that
"said complaint against the respondent arose due to misapprehension of facts,
misunderstanding and miscommunication." Paguinto, on the other hand, submitted a
Manifestation and Motion apologizing to Pariñas for his actuations and admitting that he
was "solely to be blamed."    A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate
an administrative complaint against a lawyer, especially in this case where the lawyer
14 
admitted his misconduct.
Pariñas's affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case does not exonerate Paguinto in
any way. We reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos that – 15 
[A] proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance.  They are undertaken solely for the public welfare. x x x The
attorney is called upon to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.  The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
 interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto GUILTY of violation of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we penalize Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto
with SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law effective upon receipt
of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 5817 : May 27, 2004]
EMMA V. DE JUAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. OSCAR R. BARIA
III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In her Salaysay filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 29, 2002,
complainant, former client of respondent, charged respondent with
negligence in handling her labor case and threats against her person.
The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Oscar R. Baria III, as her
counsel in NLRC NCR CA No. 022654-00/NLRC RAB IV-7-11287-99-R, Emma
De Juan v. Triple AAA Antique/Mr. Yappe and Mr. Godofredo Nadia,
negligently failed to file motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
September 24, 2001 of the NLRC in her behalf. 1  whom was complainant.As a practice, he said he forewarned his clients that
cralawred
The complainant avers that she was hired by Triple AAA on or about
December 15, 1998 as packer on probation status for six months in its
Packing Department.2 Based on a performance evaluation citing her irregular
attendance and inefficiency, the company terminated her services on June
11, 1999,3 after waiting for two weeks for her to report. She claims that she
was terminated without notice nor explanation 4 so she filed a complaint
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the company
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday, rest day, and
13th month pay.She also claimed moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.5  appeal filed by Triple AAA but the NLRC still gave due course to the
cralawred
In search of a lawyer, she asked the assistance of Banahaw Broasting
Corporation (BBC) which assigned respondent to handle her labor
case.Respondent represented complainant on a contingency fee agreement.
On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
complainant.6 Triple AAA appealed to the NLRC.In a decision promulgated on
September 24, 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared there
was no illegal dismissal.7 
cralawred
Complainant blamed respondent for the reversal.She said that she came to
know of the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision when she called
respondent in October 2001.When she asked the respondent what they
should do, respondent answered, Paano iyan ihaehhindi ako marunong
gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration. Sometime in November 2001, her
husband called respondent to ask if he did anything in connection with the
NLRCs Decision and he was advised by respondents secretary that, Sabi
ni Attyhuwag na kayong magpakita sa kanya dahil galit na galit sa inyo si
Attorney at baka kung ano pa ang magawa niya sa inyo.8  cralawred
The Court required respondent to comment and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.9  cralawred
In his Comment, respondent explained that soon after passing the bar in
1999, he was employed as a broaster in DWANs radio program offering free
legal services to the poor.He gave free legal services to indigent clients one of
he was just a new lawyer and that they should not expect too much from him
because of his limited legal experience. According to respondent he tried to
explain to complainant the legal remedies available to her as well as the time
her case may take.It appeared to him that complainant did not fully grasp the
usual delays that may be involved in her case.He recalled that when he told
complainant that the Labor Arbiters decision was in her favor, she was so
jubilant at the money judgment.Later however, the complainant became
furious when he told her that Triple AAA Antique had appealed.Respondent
filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the Labor Arbiters Decision but this
Motion was ruled premature.Respondent then filed an opposition to the
appeal.While Triple AAAs appeal was pending resolution he told complainant
to call him every week so that she could be advised of any developments in
her case.He generously suggested that complainant call collect to lessen her
expenses.He even allowed complainant and her husband to stay in his home
when they came to Manila from the province.He said he even fed them when
they were in Manila.
In October 2001, the NLRC rendered its decision reversing the Labor
Arbiter.By this time, according to respondent, he confronted complainant for
lying to him about her employment with Triple AAA and told her that because
of her lies there was a possibility she could lose the appeal.He advised
complainant to get a more experienced lawyer for her appeal because as a
new lawyer he was not confident he could handle her appeal.Thereafter,
complainant no longer contacted him and at some time, he even had to ask
her whereabouts from her relatives.
On December 2001, respondent received calls from the staff of Raffy Tulfo, a
radio commentator. In one of these calls, his wife talked to one of Tulfos
employees and she was told that complainant told Tulfo that the respondent
received money from Triple AAA Antique.As a result Tulfo lambasted him on
his radio program.Respondent thereafter called Tulfo, explained his side, and
demanded that the latter apologize on air otherwise he would file a libel case
against Tulfo.
Sometime in January 2002, respondents secretary received a call from the
complainants husband.When respondents secretary confronted the husband
regarding the Tulfo incident, complainants husband retorted, Sabihin mo sa
kanya mag ingat siya at baka may mangyari sa kanya. Shortly thereafter,
respondent began receiving death threats over the phone and also noticed
armed men casing his office.He reported these calls and presence of
suspicious armed men to the police.
Respondent surmises that complainant believed Triple AAA paid him off and
he pocketed money supposedly for her.Respondent vehemently denied he
did.He asks that Triple AAA be summoned to bear witness to his
story.Respondent asserts that he has not committed any breach of his oath
and that he has vigorously pursued his clients cause to the end.He avers that
it was his clients own negligence and folly that caused her to lose her case.He
asks that the complaint be dismissed.
In a Resolution dated March 15, 2003, this Court referred the case to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation.In turn, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline required complainant to reply.In her reply written in Filipino,
complainant denied that she accepted money from respondent during the
pendency of her labor case, except on one occasion when she borrowed P100
from respondents secretary for travel fare back to the province.She reiterated
that she filed her Salaysay because of respondents failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.She further insists that she does not believe that respondent
did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration as he claims since she
was aware that even a law student would know how to.
In its Resolution dated August 30, 2003, the IBP approved the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.The IBP Board of
Governors found respondent guilty of negligence in handling the aforecited
labor case and recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing
law for three months.The charge of grave threats was dismissed for
complainants failure to substantiate the same.10  cralawred
The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as
would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainant a
motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer
owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.11 Further, among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory.A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his
services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances.12 Any dereliction of duty by a counsel, affects the client. 13 This
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense.14  cralawred
The records reveal that indeed the respondent did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC such that the said decision eventually had
become final and executory.Respondent does not refute this.His excuse that
he did not know how to file a motion for reconsideration is lame and
unacceptable.After complainant had expressed an interest to file a motion for
reconsideration, it was incumbent upon counsel to diligently return to his
books and re-familiarize himself with the procedural rules for a motion for
reconsideration.Filing a motion for reconsideration is not a complicated legal
task.
We are however, not unaware that respondent had been forthright and
candid with his client when he warned her of his lack of experience as a new
lawyer.We are also not unaware that he had advised complainant to get a
new lawyer.However, his candor cannot absolve him. As already stressed by
this Court:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
A lawyer is expected to be familiar with these rudiments of law and procedure
and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to not just competent service
but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause.It is the duty of a lawyer
to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect within the bounds of law the interest of his client.A lawyer
should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his
negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action. 15 
cralawred

Again, the Court held in the case of Santos v. Lazaro  ,16 that Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility17 explicitly provides that negligence of
lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall
render them liable.

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel,

respondent remains counsel of record and whether or not he has a valid
cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out
in the cold.An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and
hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the
new attorney is recorded in the case. 18 Respondent did not comply with these
obligations.

WHEREFORE, respondent lawyer Oscar R. Baria III is hereby FINEDin the

amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of this or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED
 [Adm. Case No. 5394. December 2, 2002* .]
RIZALINO FERNANDEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for
alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of Civil Case No. 7500 which
complainant Rizalino Fernandez and others had filed against the Bacolod City
Water District before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Bacolod City. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In his letter, 1 dated October 16, 1996, to the Court Administrator,
complainant imputed the following negligent acts to respondent which led to
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 7500: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing on January 11, 1996 nor
seek a postponement thereof, for which reason the trial court considered
respondent to have waived further presentation of his evidence and directed
him to formally offer his exhibits for admission on January 30, 1996;
2. Notwithstanding receipt of the order dated January 11, 1996, respondent
failed to formally offer his exhibits on January 30, 1996, prompting the trial
court to order the dismissal of the case;
3. While respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, he did not file his motion within the reglementary period, as a
result of which the said motion, actually filed on May 7, 1996, was denied by
the trial court on May 14, 1996 for having been filed out of time;
4. When asked for an explanation regarding the dismissal of the case,
respondent informed complainant through a letter, dated July 30, 1996, that
he had filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but the
motion, which had been filed a long time ago, had not yet been resolved by
the trial court;
5. Respondent tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming that the
latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness. The
truth was that complainant’s sister had already testified and there was no
more witness to present; and
6. Respondent only attended one (1) hearing in the civil case.
In his answer, 2 dated September 3, 1997, respondent averred that the
complaint filed against him was baseless and was purely malicious and
speculative considering the fact that it was not made under oath. He alleged
that complainant engaged his legal services after the first counsel had
withdrawn from the case because of a misunderstanding with complainant.
He stated that he had no knowledge of what had happened in the case before
he handled it because complainant did not furnish him the records and
stenographic notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated requests.
Respondent further claimed that he failed to formally offer the exhibits as
evidence because complainant could not be reached when he was needed for
conference and the latter even tried to take over the handling of the case by
insisting on presenting more witnesses who nevertheless failed to appear
during trial despite several postponements.
The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which
submitted a report, 3 dated February 3, 2001, finding respondent guilty of
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month.
Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which in its report and recommendation, dated October 15,
2001, found respondent remiss in observing the standard care, diligence and
competence prescribed for members of the bar in the performance of their
professional duties. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months with warning that the commission of the same or similar offenses will
be dealt with more severely in the future. 4 The report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner was approved on June 29, 2002 by the IBP
Board of Governors. 5
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, dated September 17, 2002,
alleging that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint
because it was not verified. According to him, the complaint was a mere
political ploy to discredit him because he was aspiring for a congressional
seat in the 1998 elections. He denied complainant’s claim that he attended
only one hearing. He explained that he was not able to terminate his
presentation of evidence because complainant insisted on presenting as
witness his sister who was residing in Manila, even though the latter
repeatedly failed to appear in court despite several postponements. He
claimed that complainant had told him that his intention was really to delay
the case as he was using the same as his leverage in a criminal case filed or
to be filed against him by the Bacolod City Water District for his alleged water
tapping. When he refused to go along with the scheme, complainant allegedly
threatened to change counsel. Respondent further alleged that complainant’s
attitude is apparent from the fact that the latter caused to be disseminated
several copies of the IBP Resolution recommending his (respondent’s)
suspension and distributed them to radio stations in Bacolod City. For these
reasons, respondent sought the reversal of the IBP Resolution. 6
After review of the records of this case, the Court finds the report of the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP to be well taken. The records clearly
show that respondent has been negligent in the performance of his duties as
complainant’s counsel. His failure to file his formal offer of exhibits
constitutes inexcusable negligence as it proved fatal to the cause of his client
since it led to the dismissal of the case. To compound his inefficiency,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration outside the reglementary
period, which was thus accordingly denied by the trial court for being filed out
of time. Hence, the order issued by the trial court dismissing the case became
final. Respondent’s acts and omission clearly constitute violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides in pertinent parts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CANON 17. — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
As this Court has held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even
malfeasance or nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a lawyer
owes to the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of
law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to
expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but
also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause. 7
Respondent’s attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on
complainant is apparent. His averment that complainant failed to turn over to
him the records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his
incompetence and inadequacy in handling complainant’s case. Considering
that respondent has been practicing law for almost 15 years, he should have
known that he could easily obtain a copy of the records and stenographic
notes from the court where the case was docketed. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious attitude of complainant
in trying to manipulate the manner in which he was a handling the case as
the main reason for his failure to formally offer his exhibits in contravention
of the order of the court. But respondent should bear in mind that while a
lawyer owes utmost zeal and devotion to the interest of his client, he also has
the responsibility of employing only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and he should not allow the latter to dictate the
procedure in handling the case. 8 As this Court said in another case: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth
and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability
to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in
accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within
the authority of the law in support of his client’s cause, regardless of his own
personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer
should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the
general public. 9
As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken
cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint was not verified, as
required in Rule 139-B, § 1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys, 10 suffice it to say that such constitutes only a formal
defect and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject
matter of the complaint. "The verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct — the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or
act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may be served." 11
However, instead of suspension for six (6) months as recommended by the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, we hold that the suspension of respondent
Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for one (1) month, as recommended by the Office
of the Bar Confidant, would be commensurate considering that this is the first
time Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his client’s case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month effective upon finality
hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in
this complaint will be dealt with even more severely.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED