The Supreme Court ruled that venue was properly laid in Southern Leyte for petitioner Saludo's complaint against American Express. As a Congressman representing Southern Leyte at the time of filing, Saludo was deemed a resident based on both his intention to reside there and his personal presence in the area. While his community tax certificate was from another city, this did not override his qualifications as an elected representative, including residency. The Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing the complaint on venue grounds.
The Supreme Court ruled that venue was properly laid in Southern Leyte for petitioner Saludo's complaint against American Express. As a Congressman representing Southern Leyte at the time of filing, Saludo was deemed a resident based on both his intention to reside there and his personal presence in the area. While his community tax certificate was from another city, this did not override his qualifications as an elected representative, including residency. The Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing the complaint on venue grounds.
The Supreme Court ruled that venue was properly laid in Southern Leyte for petitioner Saludo's complaint against American Express. As a Congressman representing Southern Leyte at the time of filing, Saludo was deemed a resident based on both his intention to reside there and his personal presence in the area. While his community tax certificate was from another city, this did not override his qualifications as an elected representative, including residency. The Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing the complaint on venue grounds.
FACTS: Petitioner Saludo filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. against American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-president and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, head of operations. The complaint alleged that AMEX wrongfully dishonored petitioner’s credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and further stated that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that the venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that petitioner was not a resident as shown by the fact that his community tax certificate was issued in Pasay City. Moreover, the complaint was prepared in Pasay City and was signed by the lawyer in the same city. Thus, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo. Petitioner asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the Congressman of the lone district at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. Petitioner claimed that as a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the constitution. Regarding his community tax certificate, it was issued in that city because he has an office there and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. He claimed that the community tax certificate is not determinative of one’s residence. The Court of quo sided with the petitioners stating that the complaint was sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents as the petitioner is an incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte is enough to dispel any and all doubts about his actual residence. Respondents sought for reconsideration but was denied. Respondents filed with the Court of Appeal and it granted the respondents’ petition for review and ordered to set aside lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals committed error in holding that the venue was improperly laid in the court a quo because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, was a resident of Southern Leyte.
RULING: YES. The Court ruled that the complaint for damages by petitioner before the court of a quo is a personal action and according to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, states that the option of plaintiff in personal actions recognized by the RTC is either the place where the defendant resides or may be found or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff chose the latter, he is limited to that place. In this case, the court found petitioner as a plaintiff has opted to file a complaint with the court a quo on the ground that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency rule. In addition, the respondents cannot rely on the Koh v. Court of Appeals ruling because the facts of the present case are not the same. In this case, petitioner was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that the was a resident therein. Following the definition of “residence” for purposes of election law, petitioner not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein. The latter element was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident of Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. NOTES
Community tax certificate - Indicated in petitioner’s complaint’s verification and certification of non-forum-shopping - It was issued at Pasay City which was where the petitioner’s law firm was located. Court a quo - The court in which the matter was first heard - The court from which an appeal or review is being heard. Koh v. Court of Appeals - The complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. - Plaintiff did not establish that he was a resident of San Nicolas at the time of the filing of the complaint. Definition of Residence 1. For purposes of election o Two elements strictly followed: § Intention to reside in the particular place § Personal and physical presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. o DOMICILE is what the Constitution means when it speaks of residence for this purpose. 2. For purposes of venue (such as this case) o Less technical definition of residence o The personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. o Signifies physical presence in a. Place and actual stay thereat. o This term merely means RESIDENCE
Residence – bodily presence Domicile – bodily presence and intention to remain for an unlimited time.
Dorothy L. Buckingham, in Her Own Right and As Administratrix of The Estate of Elvin E. Buckingham, Deceased v. United States, 394 F.2d 483, 4th Cir. (1968)
United States v. Santos Jesus Martinez-Torres, United States of America v. Luis Alfredo Martinez-Torres, United States of America v. Epifanio Martinez-Torres, 944 F.2d 51, 1st Cir. (1991)
Donald E. Blanchard, JR., Patricia S. Blanchard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, An Illinois Corporation, 931 F.2d 789, 11th Cir. (1991)