G.R. No.

197807               April 16, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
1 

No. 03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2 

18 in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 for Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for
Frustrated Murder.

The Facts

Two Informations charged accused Cecilia Lagman as follows:

3 

Criminal Case No. 02-200106

That on or about February 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Jondel Mari Davantes
Santiago, by then and there stabbing him with a knife with an approximate length of 6 ½ inches
(blade and handle) hitting his neck and trunk, thereby inflicting upon said Jondel Mari Davantes
Santiago stab wounds which are necessarily fatal and mortal, which were the direct cause of his
death immediately thereafter.

Criminal Case No. 02-200107

That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there stabbing her hitting her
buttocks, thereby inflicting upon the said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which were
necessarily fatal, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of her will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula
which prevented her death.

During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna Maniego (Maniego), Violeta
Sicor (Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit (PO3 Alateit), and PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3
Samson).

On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on
Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of
a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused approached her and punched her face several times.
The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small
knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the
barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel
Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiago’s mother. On her way there, she saw the accused
4 

stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between
where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters. Maniego 5 

then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna
Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was
being treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting
the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.6

After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and brought to police
headquarters. 7

On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for almost ten years and
had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused got angry with her when she eloped
with Santiago.8

Sicor, Maniego’s mother, corroborated Maniego’s testimony. She saw the accused punch Maniego
several times while they were inside the sidecar on February 24, 2002. The accused then grabbed
her and stabbed her in her buttocks with a small knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two
sidecar boys came to her aid and brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from
the hospital two hours after receiving treatment.
9

PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his motorcycle on his way home.
While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a
stabbing incident had taken place. He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a
commotion. He then saw a woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was
bloodied. He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone.
At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the woman’s waist. He confiscated the item and
brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the
woman as the accused. 10

Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2 Edison Bertoldo was the
police investigator in the case against the accused and that he prepared the following:

(1) Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit "A";

(2) Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit "C";

(3) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit "E";

(4) Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits "F," "F-1" and "F-2"; and

(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002, Exhibit "F-3." 11

The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date of the incident, he was
assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division. He presented before the court the
sharp object used in stabbing the victim (Exhibit "M") and the Request for Laboratory Examination
(Exhibit "M-1"). 12

For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr. Mario Lato.
Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date of the stabbing
incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that she had been spreading the rumor
that the accused was insane. Maniego answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped
Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead
pipe. Since she needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad. 13

At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing was found on her
body when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that
there were other people in the area where it was found. She added that she had an argument only
with Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.14

Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused, who had a laceration on
the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe. He said that the accused
sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her mid-pectoral area. 15

Ruling of the Trial Court

On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106 and
Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02-200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No.
02-200106. She is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel
Lari Santiago, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No. 02-200107, this court
finds same accused guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries. She is sentenced to suffer six (6)
months of arresto mayor and to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED. 16

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness Maniego. She also averred that the same
witness’ credibility was improperly appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from
the one who rendered the decision.

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the totality of the
prosecution’s evidence showed that accused-appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It added that accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to falsely testify against her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 18, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED. 17

Hence, We have this appeal.

The Issues

I
 Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt

II

Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s witness
despite patent inconsistencies

III

Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery

The defense reiterates previous arguments calling for an acquittal of accused-appellant.  It casts
1âwphi1

doubt on Maniego’s testimony, claiming that it has irreconcilable inconsistencies which affected her
credibility.

The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before Judge Romulo A. Lopez,
while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra Garcia-Fernandez. It is further contended that
18 

Maniego did not actually witness Santiago being stabbed, because she admitted in court that she
found out that Santiago had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to her
injured mother.

Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 5’8" in height and of average built while
accused-appellant is only 4’11". It is, thus, incredible that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on
the victim.

Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of Santiago was
accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accused-appellant did stab the victim, the defense claims
that it was not proved that she deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack. The
encounter was even preceded by a confrontation between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it
was Sicor and Santiago who followed accused-appellant after the confrontation. The stabbing
incident should have been considered as having occurred in the spur of the moment.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal, but modify the CA Decision.

Elements of Murder Established

The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
19

The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was accused-
appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego.
Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Maniego’s testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as follows:

Q What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?

A I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay hall to ask help x x x.

Q And what happened after that?

xxxx

A ‘Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta ko ho doon nasalubong

po ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si
Jondel Mari.’ (When I went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the barangay
chairman was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet [sic] Cecilia Lagman and without
any word Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Mari.)

Q And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly stabbed Jondel Mari
Santiago?

A At Asuncion, Lakandula [in Tondo Manila] x x x.

Q When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far were you?

A (Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).

xxxx

Q What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

A He was lighting a cigarette x x x.

Q And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

A ‘Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh.’ [He was shocked because
he did not know he was going to be stabbed.]

Q What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was stabbed?

A One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x

Q x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will you be able to identify her?

A Yes x x x.

xxxx

x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]

Q x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four times is in court will you
be able to identify him or her?

A ‘Siya rin po." [She is the same person.] 20

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The 21 

essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with
22 

approval the appellate court’s finding on the presence of treachery:

In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him
four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend
himself from appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant’s act of suddenly
stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery. x x x
23 

Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and the victim, We affirm
the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant’s method of inflicting harm
ensured that she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of
the victim in terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in
attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant suddenly
started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.

Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.

Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been
long settled that when the issues raised concern the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s findings
of fact, its calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies’ probative weight,
including its conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is
acknowledged that the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. Furthermore, accused-
24 

appellant failed to show why Maniego and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a
terrible crime. Maniego was the common-law spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to
seek justice for his death as well as the injury sustained by her mother.

An examination of the records shows that there is no truth to the allegation of accused-appellant that
Maniego did not witness the stabbing of Santiago. She clearly testified that accused-appellant first
stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on the side of his neck, then twice on his back. 25

On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of
conviction. That the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to
26 

observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does
not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support
its conclusion. 27

Alibi as a Defense

The defense of alibi is likewise unconvincing. Accused-appellant was positively identified by

eyewitnesses. She herself admitted that she confronted one of the eyewitnesses, Maniego,
moments before she was seen attacking Maniego, Santiago and Sicor. It is well-settled that alibi
cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place of the crime or in
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In accused-appellant’s case, there is no
28 

corroborative evidence of her alibi or proof of physical impossibility of her being at the scene of the
incident to shore up her defense.

Elements of Less Serious Physical Injuries Not Established

We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 02-200107.
Originally charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was convicted of less serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by
Sicor was not on a vital part of the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after
receiving medical treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated
murder as it was not shown that there was intent to kill. However, while the RTC correctly ruled that
29 

the accused-appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records
do not support a conviction for less serious physical injuries.

Art. 265 of the RPC provides, "Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for
ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less
serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor." Nothing in the records,
however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10) days or more or that
she required medical attention for the same period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated,
Sicor was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital. She later returned to the
30 

hospital for the removal of the suture on her wound, according to the RTC, "after a certain period of
time." The Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit "H") does not indicate how many days of medical
31 

treatment her injury would need. Sicor, however, testified that she lost two (2) days of work on
32 

account of the injury she sustained. The testimony of her attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis
33 

Cendeno, on the other hand, was dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties on his
testimony. The prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the injury sustained by Sicor falls
34 

under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement that her injury required medical attention
for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.

The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries. Under par. 1, Art. 266
of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor "when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period." There being no modifying circumstances to be
appreciated, and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64, accused-appellant should be meted a penalty
35 

of imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty
(20) days under Art. 76 of the RPC.

Pecuniary Liability

The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 and
PhP 25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No. 02-200106.

People v. Combate reiterated the rule on civil indemnity and damages:

36 

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. In People
v. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of
damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such as Mendoza
v. People, People v. Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt
this rule in the instant case. Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award
of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and
exemplary damages, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Santiago
37 

is in order. Moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum, are also proper. 38

We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only slight physical
injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was presented during trial.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289 finding
accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari
Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No. 02-200107,
accused-appellant is convicted of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20)
days of arresto menor. The award of temperate damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182522               March 7, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NOEL T. ADALLOM, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a review on appeal of the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1 

CR.-H.C. No. 00365, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated December 15, 2003 by the Regional
2 

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-105875 and Q-01-105877,
finding accused-appellant Noel T. Adallom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder
and attempted murder.

Accused-appellant was originally charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of
attempted murder under the following Informations:

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875

That on or about the 28th day of October 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true names and other personal
circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of DANILO VILLAREAL y ESPIRAS by then and there shooting him with the use of a
firearm hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Danilo Villareal y Espiras. 3

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876

That on or about the 28th day of October 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true names and other personal
circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon
the person of ROMMEL HINA by then and there shooting him with the use of a firearm hitting the
latter on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Rommel Hina. 4

Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877

That on or about the 28th day of October [2001], in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating with two other persons whose true names and identities have not
as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts,
by then and there shooting one BABELITO E. VILLAREAL with the use of a firearm but said accused
were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of murder by
reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is complainant
was able to ran away, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party. 5

When arraigned on January 15, 2002, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.6

At the pre-trial conference on January 29, 2002, the parties stipulated only as to the deaths of Danilo
Villareal (Danilo) and Rommel Hina (Rommel). 7

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Babelito Villareal (Babelito), Danilo’s brother
8 

who survived the shooting; Janita Villareal (Janita), Danilo’s wife; Dr. Joselito Rodrigo (Joselito), the
9  10 

Chief Medico Legal of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who examined Danilo’s
cadaver; and Diorito Coronas, Jr. (Diorito), who was present at the time and place of the shooting.
11 

Below are the testimonies of Babelito and Diorito as summarized by the RTC:

Prosecution witness Babelito Villareal, a construction worker and residing at 120 Senatorial Road,
Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, testified that he was with his brother, Danilo, and Rommel
Hina, a neighbor, towards midnight of October 27, 2001 in front of the store of his sister, Nanieta. His
house was just across the street. They were drinking beer but ran out of it. Danilo asked Rommel
Hina to buy cigarettes from a nearby store because their sister’s store was already closed. When
Hina returned, they stayed in the same place. Babelito had his back against the wall fronting the
road while he was facing his brother’s back. Hina was on his right side. Soon a tricycle with its lights
out and its engine turned off, arrived. It was still moving because the road was on a downward slope.
He saw Noel Adallom alight from the sidecar. Adallom was with Johnwayne Lindawan and a tricycle
driver. After Adallom alighted, he fired his carbine. There was a successive burst of gunfire and
Adallom was saying, "Ano? Ano?" His brother went down and Rommel Hina was moaning. The
tricycle came from his left side. When Adallom fired his gun, Danilo turned his head and tried to run
but he was hit at the back. He himself, when he saw the gunfire just closed his eyes and leaned
against the wall and turned his head to the right and moved his leg downward just waiting for what
would happen next. When his brother and Rommel fell, the firing stopped and when he turned his
head, he noticed that Adallom upon seeing him alive, again fired successive shots and then he
heard, "tak-tak." The gun must have jammed then he heard another burst of gunfire, "rat-tat-tat." He
sought cover beside a vehicle and ran. He showed some pictures and pointed to the place he
testified on (see Exhibit A). There were bullet marks shown in the pictures (Exhibit B). He ran to an
alley and then he went back to Senatorial Road where the incident happened and saw people milling
around. His brother was already dead while Rommel Hina was rushed to the hospital. Noel Adallom,
a long time resident of their place is the cousin of the husband of his sister while Johnwayne
Lindawan is the son of his brother-in-law. During the wake of his brother, he saw Johnwayne with a
new haircut. Adallom also had a new haircut. They used to have long hair prior to the incident. Both
of them were sporting army cut. He tried to watch Adallom’s movements. He saw him fixing the gate
of his house and when he could not take it anymore he told Jeanette, the wife of his brother Danilo
Villareal, that what Adallom was doing was very insulting. He did not give any statement to the police
because there was still the wake and he wanted to consult Jeanette who was very confused. He
knows that it is hard to fight an Ifugao. After the funeral, he told his siblings about the incident. They
decided to have Adallom arrested. His Ate Jeanette went to Station 6 but the police were not
cooperative and he was losing heart. On November 19, 2001, he saw Adallom alight in front of his
house. He asked his siblings to go to the barangay hall while he waited for Adallom because he
might leave. When the barangay people came, they picked him up and informed him about the
complaint against him. Adallom was detained at the barangay hall and taken at Station 6. Babelito
executed a sinumpaang salaysay marked Exhibit C.

On cross examination, among others, he said that Adallom’s house is just near the eskinita. The
following day when he saw Adallom sporting a new haircut, he tried to keep track of his movements.
He did that for several days. He was shown a sketch marked as Exhibit D for the prosecution and
said, the house of his sister was along Senatorial Road at the corner of an alley in Avocado Street.
After Adallom alighted from the tricycle, he positioned himself before he fired the shots. When
Babelito returned to the scene of the incident, he instructed some people to bring Rommel Hina to
the hospital. He saw Agustin Adallom and Anderson Tuguinay that night. He saw Adallom’s wife by
the gate of their house. He did not see Noel Adallom after the incident. The police investigators
came to the scene and he went with them to the Criminal Investigation Unit. The investigator was
Lawa-Lawa. When he was about to give a statement at the Criminal Investigation Unit, Nathaniel
Hina, the father of Rommel appeared and he was telling a different story. Nathaniel was a usual
drinking companion of Noel Adallom. Immediately prior to the incident, Rommel’s father was coming
down from the tricycle with some companions, the barkada of Noel Adallom, he passed by the
eskinita and took a look at them. That was before the tricycle with Adallom as passenger passed by.
At the police precinct Rommel’s father was saying that it was another Ifugao, a certain Hubert who
was responsible for the shooting. Because of this incident with the father of Rommel, he did not give
a statement. He reiterated that he saw his brother hit as he was slowly moving his head and then he
closed his eyes. After the first burst of gunfire it stopped for a while. When the gunman saw him, he
raised his gun again and pointed it at him then he heard, "pak." It did not fire then he heard
successive shots. He saw Adallom with the carbine only that night but he knew that his family has a
carbine. He was shown a photograph marked Exhibit 2 depicting the wall of his sister Nanette’s store
marked as Exhibits A and B. There were no chairs in front of the store even when they were
drinking. He was there first before Danilo and Rommel arrived. There were also two women who
came thirty (30) minutes prior to the incident Danilo and Rommel had been drinking in front of his
house. When they arrived, they gave him a bottle of beer to drink. And then, Danilo asked Rommel
to buy cigarettes at Anderson’s store. The father of Rommel arrived and stared at them, just as
Rommel arrived. He knows that Nathaniel gave a statement at the police station. Although in his
affidavit he also mentioned Johnwayne Lindawan, the police have not arrested him. Lindawan also
alighted from the back of the tricycle driver and he stood by the side of the road. He could not
identify the tricycle driver.

Diorito Coronas, Jr., a billiard player by profession, usually played at the billiard hall near the house
of Noel Adallom in Sarep Street on the right side going up the road. On October 28, 2001, about
midnight, he was at the videoke bar, his usual hang out in Sitio 6 going towards Talanay. While
there, he heard gunfire so he immediately went near a parked vehicle in front of the videoke bar.
When he tried to investigate, he saw three persons fall to the ground (Bumulagta noong
pinagbabaril). Two of them were already down and the third one stood up and ran even as the
gunman continued firing. He identified the man who ran away as Babelito Villareal (Samboy). It was
Noel Adallom whom he saw carrying the firearm which he described as a little less than 2 feet,
shooting the three men. He saw Adallom’s companion and a third one who was manning the tricycle.
The place of the incident was well lighted but from where he was standing, the light came only from
the videoke bar. Then he noticed a yellow tricycle without any plate number moving toward his
direction while the two other guys went to the opposite direction going upward. When he saw that
they left, he immediately approached the two men lying down. He identified one of them as Rommel
who was still moaning. He became apprehensive that someone might see him and his family might
be involved. He ran toward his house. He identified three sets of pictures marked Exhibits A and B.
He pointed to the place where the three guys who were shot at were positioned.

On cross examination, Coronas identified the owner of the videoke bar as Anderson Tuguinay. 12
Janita, when she took the witness stand, detailed the expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of
her husband, Danilo.

Dr. Joselito reported that as a result of his autopsy examination of Danilo’s body, he had determined
that Danilo died from hemorrhagic shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. There were six gunshot
wounds in Danilo’s trunk and lower extremities. All points of entry were at Danilo’s back. There were
five exit wounds at the front portion of Danilo’s body while one slug was recovered in Danilo’s liver.
Dr. Joselito submitted the recovered slug for ballistic examination. Dr. Joselito further elaborated on
his findings during his cross-examination:

On cross examination, among others, he stated that the autopsy was conducted on October 28,
2001 at around 11:30 a.m. The abrasion on the victim’s right acromial region was caused by friction
of the skin on a rough hard surface. Gunshot wound no. 1 was directed anteriorwards, upwards and
lateralwards meaning it came from the back, traveled upwards from the center towards the sides. Its
point of entry was 10 cm. from the posterior midline while the point of exit was 20 cm. from the
posterior midline. The point of entry of gunshot wound No. 2 (depicted as POE No. 1 in Exhibit J) is
4 cm. from the posterior midline and exited 6 cm. from the anterior midline. The bullet traversed from
the rear to the front going to the right side of the cadaver. The third gunshot wound’s point of entry is
at the right infrascapular region end exited also on the right side of the chest but more towards the
outer portion. The fourth gunshot wound’s point of entry is on the left side, back to front, lateralwards
meaning from center or near the center towards the most outer part of the left side of the body. The
entrance and exit wound were on the same level. It is superficial wound meaning it did not enter the
peritonial cavity. The fifth gunshot wound was directed anteriorwards, downwards and medialwards.
Anteriorward means from the back, it is noted downwards towards the foot while medialwards is
towards the center. The sixth and final gunshot wound was sustained at the right buttocks directed
anteriorwards, upwards and lateralwards, meaning from the back upwards going to the head and
lateralwards, meaning from the center to the outer side of the cadaver. Since the entrance wounds
were at the back of the cadaver, assuming the victim was not moving, the assailant or muzzle of the
gun was at the back of the victim. Except for the fourth gunshot wound which entered and exited at
the same level and the fifth gunshot wound which was downwards, all the other gunshot wounds
were directed upwards. If the victim was in a sitting position at the time he sustained the wounds
with an upward trajectory, he would probably be in a ducking position, hence the upward trajectory. If
the victim was stationary at the time he was shot, it is possible the assailant was moving but the
most probable explanation for the differences in the level of the points of entry in relation to the
points of exit of the wounds is that the victim moved as a result of the force of the bullet that entered
his body. The slug that he extracted from the cadaver of the victim was from a .30 caliber firearm
based on the report of the ballistician.
13

The defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant himself; Mila Adallom (Mila), accused-
14  15 

appellant’s wife; Aida Marquez (Aida); Sgt. Anderson Tuguinay (Anderson); Sgt. Agustin Adallom
16  17 

(Agustin); Editha Gutierrez (Editha); and Elizabeth Buyayo (Elizabeth).

18  19  20

Accused-appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi, to wit:

Noel Adallom, a machine operator, testified that on October 27, 2001, he arrived home from work at
about 11:00 o’clock in the evening and he saw his wife working on the screen. He had coffee
because he was not yet sleepy. He told his wife that he was going to the billiard hall at Retota. On
his way, he saw the group of Boying Hina having a drinking spree. They gave him a shot of liquor
but he refused because in that place, riots were rampant. He has known Boying Hina since he
started residing in Batasan Hills in 1988. He went to the billiard hall owned by Ilustre. He is a new
player and he played in with one Zaldy. After that, he transferred to the Retota billiard hall. He
arrived there at about midnight. He played billiard with Danilo and Dominador Baldaba. They were
playing when they heard gunshots. The sound of the gun fire was rat-tat-tat. They continued playing
billiard until his wife arrived to fetch him. They stopped playing and he went with her. His wife asked
him to pass by Senatorial Road where the sounds of gunshots came from. He saw Nanette Villareal
Lindawan and asked her what was happening. Nanette was crying and she said, "Patay na si kuya,"
referring to Danilo Villareal. He has known Nanette from the time she got married. He talked to her in
front of her house in the middle portion of Senatorial Road. He identified a picture marked Exhibit 3
showing the place where he talked to Nanette. When he was about to leave the place, he saw Sgt.
Tuguinay holding a flashlight. When he asked Sgt. Tuguinay what happened, Tuguinay looked at
him and did not say anything. He proceeded to talk with Sgt. Agustin when a police patrol arrived.
The police were asking for someone who witnessed the incident. Babelito Villareal came out
shirtless and boarded a mobile. He and his wife proceeded home. The place as shown in Exhibit 3
was not lighted. It was illuminated by some lights from other houses about ten meters away and you
would not be able to recognize faces. When shown a sketch, Exhibit 1, he pointed the billiard place
of Retota (Exhibit 1-I). The Avocado Road alley was marked Exhibit 3-A. He was passing by that
alley everyday in front of the house of Nanette. For the month of October 1 to 15, he was assigned
to the first shift and went to work in the morning from 6:00 to 3:00 o’clock. From October 16 to the
end of that month, he was on the second shift arriving home at 11:00 o’clock in the evening. There
was no electric bulb in front of the house of Nanette. Across the house of Nanette is the house of
Sgt. Agustin Adallom. There was no bulb in front of his house. In the morning of October 28, 2001,
he was planting pechay at the house of Agustin Adallom at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning. On
succeeding days after the incident, he usually left the house at noontime because his work started at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. He identified his time record from October 1 to 15 marked Exhibit 4;
the time card for October 16-31 marked Exhibit 4-A; the time card for November 1-15 marked Exhibit
4-B; and the time card for November 16-30 marked as Exhibit 4-C. Exhibit number 7 has no
signature because that was the time he was arrested on November 19. When he is not working he
stayed at home. At the time he was arrested he was preparing coffee when he heard someone
calling from outside and found out that they were barangay officials looking for him. He saw one
BSDO jump over the fence with a gun so he became afraid. They told him that he was the one who
killed Danilo Villareal. They were not accompanied by policemen. He was asking them why he was
being apprehended without a warrant of arrest. They told him to give his explanation at the barangay
office. He was handcuffed. They just placed him inside the cell for an hour. Policemen came and
brought him to Station 6. On the 20th of November, he was brought to Camp Karingal and they
asked for his name and occupation. They brought him to a vacant room and asked him, "bakit mo
pinatay si Villareal." He said he did not commit the crime and they brought him back to the cell. On
the 21st of November, he was brought to Quezon City Hall for inquest. He saw the name of Wilfredo
Maynigo on top of his table. Upon investigation the prosecutor placed on top of the paper, "for
further," (see Exhibit 8). He knows Danilo Villareal and his wife Janita because their wives were
doing business of paluwagan. He met his wife in the house of Agustin Adallom and he did not know
that she and Danilo had an affair.

On cross examination, Noel Adallom said that he works as a machine operator since 1988. He
recalled that October 28, 2001 was a Sunday and it was his day-off. He was alone when he went to
Retota billiard hall near Senatorial Road after telling his wife that he would go there. Riots frequently
happen on the upper portion of Senatorial Road. When they heard gunshots they were playing
billiard, and they stopped momentarily. He was married to Mila Adallom in the year 2000 at a mass
wedding but he knew her since 1992. He did not have any knowledge that Danilo and his wife were
having an affair. He does not know of any such relationship nor did he hear any gossip about that.
He knew Babelito Villareal since 1988. There had been no quarrel between them and does not know
why he would point to him as the assassin. Mila fetched him that early morning of October 28, 2001
at Retota. He would have still played billiard with Danilo and Dominador but Mila came and asked
him to go home because there was a shooting at the upper portion of Senatorial Road. After the
incident he talked with Nanette, sister of Danilo Villareal and Babelito Villareal, and asked her what
happened. She told him that [her] kuya was dead. He has known Danilo since 1998 because
Danilo’s wife and his wife were engaged in a paluwagan business. He seldom talked with Danilo
Villareal because both of them were working and they seldom saw each other. He does not know of
any reason to be jealous of Danilo because he does not know anything about the alleged
relationship between him and his wife.21

Mila confirmed on the witness stand that her husband, accused-appellant, went out to play billiards
at around 11:30 p.m. on October 27, 2001. After midnight, she heard a burst of gunfire. Fearing that
accused-appellant might get into trouble, Mila decided to fetch accused-appellant at Retota’s billiard
hall. When she reached the billiard hall, Mila asked accused-appellant, who was then still playing
billiards, to go home with her. To get home, Mila and accused-appellant took the route from Avocado
Street to Senatorial Road. There, at Senatorial Road, Mila saw Danilo and Rommel already
sprawled on the ground. On cross-examination, Mila denied having an affair with the deceased
Danilo.

Aida, an ambulant vendor, testified that in the early morning of October 28, 2001, she was at a
billiard hall watching accused-appellant, together with a certain Paeng and Zaldy, play a game, when
she heard gunshots.

Sgt. Anderson, who resided within the vicinity of the shooting incident, recollected that at around
past midnight of October 28, 2001, he was in a videoke bar with a certain Boying, when he heard
two successive automatic gunshots. He went out of the bar and saw Nanette, Danilo’s sister, who he
asked about what happened. Nanette responded "binaril si manong." Sgt. Anderson went home and
called the authorities. He went back to the scene of the shooting with a flashlight to look for empty
shells. Sgt. Anderson also remembered that accused-appellant approached him and asked him
about what happened.

Sgt. Agustin, who likewise resided within the vicinity of the shooting incident, narrated that he was
awakened by a burst of gunfire in the early morning of October 28, 2001, at around 12:45 a.m. He
then heard someone shouting "wag sarge, wag sarge!" Then he heard another burst of gunfire. He
went out of his house and proceeded to Senatorial Road. There he saw blood in front of the window
of the house of Nanette, Danilo’s sister, and a lot of people already milling around. Among the
people he saw were Nanette, accused-appellant, and Sgt. Anderson. Sgt. Agustin acknowledged
that accused-appellant is his first-degree cousin and that he did not personally witness the shooting
incident.

Editha is another ambulant vendor who recalled that at around 2:00 a.m. on October 28, 2001, she
met a certain Boying (purportedly Rommel’s father) on the road, who told her that his son was shot.
Editha admitted, however, that she had no personal knowledge of the shooting incident.

The last witness for the defense was Elizabeth, accused-appellant’s distant relative, and the
neighbor and close friend of Janita, Danilo’s wife. Elizabeth stated under oath before the RTC that
on October 28, 2001, she opened her gate and saw people gathering at Senatorial Road. From
listening to the stories of the bystanders, she learned that someone was shot at around 1:00 a.m. on
October 28, 2001 by two persons wearing bonnets and riding a motorcycle. According to Elizabeth,
Janita had never confided to her any marital problem with Danilo.

The prosecution presented on rebuttal Nanieta Lindawan (Nanieta), who gave the following account
of the events that transpired in the early morning of October 28, 2001:

Testifying on rebuttal, Nanieta Lindawan denied having met, seen or talk[ed] with Adallom, a
townmate of her husband, in the early morning of October 28, 2001. There was never a time after
the killing of [her] brother Danilo that she saw the accused on Senatorial Road. She belied the
testimony of Agustin Adallom that he talked to her in the morning of October 28, 2001. She knows
that he is a soldier stationed in Camp Capinpin and that he comes home only once a month for a
day, either Saturday or Sunday. She is also sure that witness Sgt. Anderson Tuguinay was not able
to talk to her that morning because after the incident, she was alone in the middle of the road crying.

On cross-examination, among others, she stated that the incident happened right in front of her
house. She was at home with her sisters and they were sleeping when she heard successive
gunfire. She peeped out of the window and she saw two persons lying face down, Danilo and
[Rommel]. She was able to recognize her brother because he was facing the window. She went out
of the house minutes after the last gunshot. She called for her siblings. Except for the neighbor of
her Ate [Janita], none of their neighbors came out because they were afraid. Her brother Babelito
was also there and he told her that he was almost hit. Danilo was already brought to the hospital
before the police arrived in unmarked vehicles. Although Sgt. Tuguinay owns a delivery van, they did
not try to borrow it to bring Danilo to the hospital because Tuguinay does not lend his vehicle to
anyone. She denied having borrowed facilities, like chairs and tables, from her best friend Elizabeth,
who owns a school. Elizabeth told Nanieta’s husband that she was afraid to go to the wake because
it was her gun which was used in the shooting. She admitted she saw Elizabeth at the wake once.
She does not remember the last time when Sgt. Agustin Adallom came home from Camp Capinpin.
Her husband is also stationed in Camp Capinpin and if Sgt. Agustin was really there at the time of
the incident, he would have offered to inform her husband about the incident. 22

The documentary exhibits for the prosecution – consisting of Babelito’s sworn statement, in a
question and answer form, executed before PO3 Leo Tabuena on November 21, 2001; sketch and
photographs of the location of the shooting incident; Danilo’s death certificate; the autopsy report on
Danilo’s body; receipts and list of funeral and burial expenses incurred by Danilo’s heirs; and the
ballistics report which stated that the bullet recovered at the scene came from a .30 caliber firearm –
were all admitted by the RTC in its Order dated September 2, 2002.
23 

The defense submitted its own documentary exhibits, specifically, photographs of several bullet
holes at the store where Danilo, Rommel, and Babelito were shot to show the trajectory of the
bullets; sketch of the location of the shooting incident; accused-appellant’s daily time records from
his work for the months of October and November 2001; and Janita’s letter-complaint dated
November 19, 2001 against accused-appellant. All these exhibits were admitted by the RTC in its
Order dated June 23, 2003.
24 

On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision giving more credence to the positive
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Babelito and Diorito and finding implausible accused-
appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC pronounced accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder of Danilo in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875 and
attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877; but dismissed the charge against
accused-appellant for the murder of Rommel in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876 because of
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused NOEL ADALLOM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder described and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 63
thereof, and there being no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Danilo Villareal, as follows:

1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

 3. ₱57,084.80 as actual damages; and

4. To pay the costs.

With respect to Crim. Case No. Q-01-105817 for the attempted murder of Babelito Villareal after
applying the indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby sentences accused to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor.

For insufficiency of evidence, Criminal Case No. Q-01-105876 is hereby dismissed. 25

Accused-appellant appealed the foregoing RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals. Accused-
appellant filed his Brief on January 13, 2006 while plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the
26 

Solicitor General, filed its Brief on May 29, 2006.

27 

In its Decision dated July 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals agreed with the factual findings of the RTC
and ruled thus:

Verily, we reiterate the jurisprudential doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of
the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses; this can only be
discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked, ignored or
disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have
altered the result. In the course of our review, the records disclose, that the trial court has
considered all the evidences of both parties and, thus, has ruled correctly. Trial courts have the
opportunity to see witnesses as they testify in court, an opportunity not readily available to appellate
courts.

Thus, we find no reason to depart from the above ruling. We have examined the records and we
confirm the trial court’s findings that the testimonies of the witnesses are more trustworthy than the
testimonies of the defense witnesses, particularly the appellant’s.

With the application of prevailing laws and jurisprudence to the evidence presented, We cannot
conclude otherwise but rule for the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. 28

Hence, accused-appellant comes before us on appeal.

In our Resolution dated July 23, 2008, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
29 

briefs. Both plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellant manifested, however, that they had already
exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals and would no longer file any supplemental
brief.
30

Accused-appellant assails his conviction for murder and attempted murder on these grounds:

A. The trial court erred in finding the testimony of Babelito Villareal and Diorito Coronas, Jr.
credible. 31

1.) The trial court misapplied the doctrine that the relationship of the witness to the victim
does not make the former a biased witness, but rather makes his testimony more credible. 32
 2.) The trial court’s findings that Babelito and [Diorito] narrated as they saw the incident in a
clear, simple and direct manner; and, that their testimonies jive on material points are
seriously belied by the evidence extant on the record. 33

3.) The trial court’s finding that Babelito and [Diorito] could not have been mistaken with the
identity of Noel Adallom because he had been a long time resident of the place is highly
speculative.34

4.) The trial court’s finding that the place where the incident occurred was lighted. 35

5.) The trial court’s finding that no motive was shown for the two witnesses to prevaricate
and concoct the story to implicate Adallom with the killing is uncalled for.36

B. The trial court erred in relying on the weakness of the defense rather on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. 37

C. The trial court erred in not finding that the evidence on record raise a reasonable doubt that the
accused was the assailant. 38

Plaintiff-appellee counter-argues that:

The testimony of Babelito Villareal, an eye witness and survivor of the assault, established
with utmost certainty the identity of appellant as the assailant and gunman.

II

The prosecution established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

III

Appellant’s defense of denial is weak and without factual basis. 39

We sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for both crimes.

Jurisprudence dictates that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally binding upon this Court." 40

We find no cogent reason to deviate from the cited case doctrine.

As aptly appreciated by the RTC, prosecution witnesses Babelito and Diorito both positively
identified accused-appellant as the person who treacherously shot Danilo and Babelito, and
ultimately succeeded in killing Danilo. Said witnesses gave a forthright and consistent narration of
what they had actually witnessed the early morning of October 28, 2001 at Senatorial Road.
Babelito had to relive before the RTC the traumatic experience of seeing his brother Danilo killed
and barely escaping with his own life:

Q And can you tell us where were the three of you during that time?

A I was in front of my house which is also in front of the store of my sister Nanieta.

xxxx

Q And what were the three of you doing at that time?

A We were seated in front of the store of my sister drinking beer, sir.

xxxx

Q And you said that you ran out of beer, what happened after you ran out of beer?

A We stopped drinking and then a tricycle arrived with its lights out and its engine turned off.
It was still moving because the road was on a downward slope, sir.

xxxx

Q At the time that you noticed the said tricycle, can you tell us what time was that?

A 12:45 in the morning of October 28, 2001, sir.

Q When you noticed the said tricycle moving downwards because of the sloping road, what
happened next?

A Noel Adallom alighted from the tricycle. He got out of the sidecar.

Q By the way, were you able to count how many persons were inside the tricycle?

A There were three of them: the tricycle driver, Noel Adallom and John Win Lindawan.

Q You said Noel Adallom was inside the tricycle, at the time, where was he seated in the
tricycle?

A Inside the tricycle, sir.

Q Now, what happened next when Noel Adallom alighted?

A He fired his gun, sir.

Q From the place wherein Noel Adallom alighted immediately thereafter fired his gun, how
far was your group from him?

A About 4 meters, sir.

Q Now, you said Mr. Adallom alighted and fired his gun, can you remember what kind of
firearm he used at the time?

A Carbine.

Q Was it a long or short firearm?

A Long firearm, sir.

Q And when he alighted and fired his gun, what happened to your group, if any?

A There were successive shots and I just saw gunbursts and he was saying, "Ano? Ano?"
while he was firing successively at my brother and Rommel Hina who was already moaning.

Q Can you tell us your relative positions at the time Mr. Adallom fired his gun?

A I was at the back by the wall fronting the road and my brother’s back was fronting the
street facing me.

Q How about Mr. Hina, where was he positioned?

A On my right side, sir.

Q Can you tell us from what direction the said tricycle came from?

A From my left side, sir.

Q So, you are telling us that the tricycle which had no lights and with engines not running just
came by the road and 4 meters from you, Mr. Adallom alighted and fired his gun?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what was the relative position of your brother when Noel Adallom fired his gun?

A While the tricycle was coming down the road, my brother turned his head and tried to run
but he was already hit all at the back by the volley of fire.

Q What about Rommel Hina, what happened to him?

A He was also hit.

Q How about you?

A When I saw gunfire, I just closed my eyes and leaned against the wall and turned my head
to the right and slowly, I moved my leg downwards and just waited for what would happen
next.

Q And can you tell us what happened to you after you just left your fate to God?
A When my brother and Rommel fell, the firing stopped. I turned my head and I noticed that
Noel Adallom looked surprised.

Q When Noel Adallom looked surprised upon seeing you still alive, what happened next?

A He again fired a succession of shots and then I heard "tak-tak."

Q And would you know what that sound was that you heard?

A I surmised that the gun must have jammed, sir.

Q What did you do, if any, when you realized that the gun must have jammed?

A I thought of standing up and running and I again heard a burst of gunfire, "rat-tat-tat."

Q What happened when you heard another round of gunfire?

A I sought cover behind a vehicle and I ran towards the corner to escape. (Emphases
41 

supplied.)

Diorito corroborated Babelito’s testimony when he recounted before the RTC the following:

Q Now, you said that you were at the said videoke bar at around 11:30 to 12:00 o’clock;
while you were there at the said videoke, what happened if any?

A When I heard a gunfire, I immediately proceeded near the vehicle to look on what is
happening.

Q Now, you said that you heard a gunfire; when you heard that gunfire, who were with you
during that time?

A I was alone.

Q And you said that after hearing a gunfire you went out near a vehicle that was parked; can
you tell us where is that vehicle that was parked where you went for cover?

A The vehicle is right in front of the videoke bar where we usually hang out and it so
happened that the vehicle is also owned by the owner of that videoke bar.

xxxx

Q You said you went to that vehicle which was parked, what else did you do after going near
the vehicle?

A I was looking who shot who.

Q And what did you see if any?

A I saw three persons who fell (bumulagta noong pinagbabaril).

Q Now, you said that you saw three men who just fell when shots were fired upon, [is] any of
those three men present in today’s courtroom whom you said that fell down, can you identify
them?

A The two persons are already dead but the other, I got surprised when he immediately ran.

Q That person that stood up, can you identify him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you kindly tell us his name if you know it?

A Samboy, sir.

Q Is he present in today’s courtroom? Can you kindly stand up and point to us that person?
Kindly tap the shoulder of that person.

A (Witness tapping the shoulder of a man who when asked answered that his name is
Babelito Villareal.)

Q Aside from seeing those three men whom you said fell down, what else did you see if any?

A I saw one person firing shots and the other one is facing in front of the house of Samboy
and the other person was manning the tricycle.

Q So, all in all, there were three persons that you saw other than those three other persons
whom you said fell down, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that you saw one of those three persons firing a gun, can you kindly describe to
us that gun that was used by the said person?

A The size of the gun that he was using was like this (witness demonstrating), less than two
feet. But I don’t know what kind.

Q That person whom you saw carrying a firearm and was shooting that men, if that person is
present in today’s courtroom, can you identify him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you kindly step down again and tap the shoulder of that person whom you saw?

A (Witness tapping the shoulder of a person who gave his name as Noel Adallom)

Q Now, when this shooting incident took place, can you kindly tell us how far were this group
of men whom you said were shot from the place where you were hiding or covering near the
vehicle?

A Same distance more or less eight meters.

 Q How about the gunman who was shooting these three men, how far were you from him?

A It is farther by half meter.

Q You said that you saw this incident that took place, can you kindly tell us what was the
lighting condition during that time that this incident happened?

A The place where the incident happened, it was well-lighted, however, from where I stand,
the place was not lighted. The light came only from the videoke bar.

xxxx

Q You said that after you saw Mr. Adallom shot these three men, what else did you see if
any?

A When he started firing at these three men, right after, I saw one person immediately stood
up and ran away and right after that, Noel Adallom kept on firing at the guy who was running.

Q When you said that guy stood up you were referring to Babelito Villareal, that one that you
just pointed prior to the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened next after Mr. Adallom was not able to hit Mr. Babelito Villareal?

A I noticed a yellow tricycle without plate number which immediately started its engine and
moved downward towards my direction and the other two guys went on the other direction
going upward.

Q How about you, what did you do next after seeing that incident?

A I immediately approached the two guys who were lying down.

Q And what did you see if any after that?

A I still heard one guy in the person of Rommel who was still moaning.

Q After hearing Rommel still moaning, what did you do, if any?

A I was a bit apprehensive because maybe somebody will see me and my family will be
involved so I immediately ran away from the scene.

Q Where did you go after running away?

A I immediately went to my house. (Emphases supplied.)

42 

Accused-appellant’s attacks on the credibility of Babelito and Diorito are unconvincing, each having
already been soundly rejected by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The accused-appellant is not successful in proving the incredibility and improbability of the
testimonies of the [prosecution’s] two eye witnesses, hence, his arguments on the slight difference in
the location and nature of gunshot wounds as opposed to the position of the assailant as testified by
the witness are not sufficient to overturn the eyewitness accounts of Diorito and Babelito. The
positive identification of the witnesses is more than enough to prove the accused-appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant argues that the delay in charging him raises serious doubts on Babelito’s
testimony. Well settled is the rule that "Delay in making criminal accusations will not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained." It has been established
that the delay in filing a criminal complaint is attributed to his confusion and desire to consult his
sister-in-law who is the wife of deceased Danilo. He also testified that he did not file a complaint
immediately, because he did not want to disturb the wake of his brother. Such explanation is
acceptable. True enough, he filed a complaint with the barangay officials and asked for their
assistance in bringing accused-appellant to Station 6 after the funeral of his brother. 1âwphi1

Accused-appellant tried to attack the reliability of Babelito’s testimony by insisting that the story told
by Babelito does not jive with the story told by the physical evidence consisting of the wounds
sustained by the body of Danilo. We are not convinced. Accused-appellant is capitalizing on the fact
that the location and nature of the gunshot wounds sustained by deceased Danilo is anteriorwards,
lateralwards and going to the right. Simply stated, the direction of the wounds are slightly going
upwards to the right, which according to the accused-appellant is impossible to be sustained by the
deceased, because (as told by Babelito) he is standing up when he shot deceased Danilo, who is
seated on the street. Such argument lacks merit. As explained by Dr. Rodrigo in his testimony, the
body of Danilo could have moved and slumped forward when he was being hit by bullets in rapid
succession and the position of his body has changed. When the bullets hit the body of the deceased,
the body was already on the ground face down and the natural trajectory of bullets is upward, toward
the head of the deceased. It is established that accused-appellant Noel was shooting while he was
standing and the deceased was already on the ground. So when you try to examine the body and let
it stand up, it would naturally create an impression that the bullets’ direction is upward. The
explanation is so simple, the body received the bullets while it is slumped, with face forward on the
ground, and accused-appellant Noel was shooting while he was standing up. Such explanation is
corroborated by Babelito’s account that Danilo tried to turn his shoulders to face his left side, before
he fell furthermore, such testimony is also corroborated by the testimony of Nanette which claimed
that Danilo fell at the spot marked as Exhibit 2-C as told by Babelito. (Emphasis supplied and
43 

citations omitted.)

In contrast, accused-appellant proffered the defenses of denial and alibi, which are the weakest of
defenses in criminal cases. The well-established rule is that denial and alibi are self-serving negative
evidence; they cannot prevail over the spontaneous, positive, and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who pointed to and identified the accused-appellant as the malefactor.
"Indeed, alibi is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove."
44

Although accused-appellant presented other witnesses to supposedly corroborate his alibi, we could
not ascribe much probative weight to said witnesses’ testimonies. None of said witnesses actually
saw the shooting, most only heard the gunshots and arrived at the scene after the shooting took
place and, thus, had no personal knowledge of the said incident. Except for Aida, no other witness
for the defense was physically with accused-appellant at the exact time of the shooting. And even
Aida’s testimony is unreliable given the observation of the RTC that it is in conflict with that of
accused-appellant. Accused-appellant claimed that he first went to the billiard hall owned by Ilustre
where he played with a certain Zaldy and then he transferred to Retota’s billiard hall where he was
playing with Danilo and Dominador Baldaba when he heard the gunshots. Yet, Aida attested that
she was watching accused-appellant playing billiards with a certain Zaldy when she heard the
gunshots.

In sum, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant for the
murder of Danilo in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875 and attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal
Case No. Q-01-105877.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. With the
45 

repeal of the death penalty law, the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder is
reclusion perpetua. The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply, inter alia, to persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment, including reclusion perpetua. Hence,
accused-appellant has been properly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
murder of Danilo in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875.

However, we find it necessary to modify the award of damages to Danilo’s heirs in Criminal Case
No. Q-01-105875. Consistent with prevailing case law, accused-appellant must pay Danilo’s heirs
46 

the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, in addition to the sum of ₱57,084.80 as actual damages.

For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, we sentence accused-appellant to suffer
imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, for the attempted murder of Babelito in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
105877.

We further order accused-appellant to pay Babelito the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱10,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
105877.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Noel T. Adallom is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00365, which
affirmed the Decision dated December 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon
City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-105875 and Q-01-105877, finding Noel T. Adallom guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and attempted murder, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS as to the penalties and awards imposed:

1) For the murder of Danilo Villareal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105875, Noel T. Adallom is
SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Danilo Villareal the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱57,084.80 as actual damages; and

2) For the attempted murder of Babelito Villareal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105877, Noel T.
Adallom is SENTENCED to suffer imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ORDERED
 to pay Babelito Villareal the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱10,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10126           October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by
its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There
were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were
Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of
Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called
Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named
Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same
morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst
and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had
to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they
could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were
made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.
These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the
side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and
around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it
on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her
name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim
in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755

ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We
also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires
burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question
is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself
and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though
he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory
definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited
by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
 . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned
bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire,
and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of
the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to
include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to
attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial
court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them,
the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss of
merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in
the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she
overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the
bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been
telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be
true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front,
with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already
stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver
operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case
against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because
according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint,
either failed or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the
several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect
of the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on
public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the
Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from
SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the
attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.
62 Phil. 162

RECTO, J.:
Charged with and convicted of the crime of homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen years,
seven months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, Juan
Quianzon appeals to this court for the review of the case.

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a deceased

person was being held in the house of Victorina Cacpal in a barrio, near the
poblacidn, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual
attendance of relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filing of
these charges took place between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres
Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in
his care. Aribuabo was a sexagenarian and so was Quianzon. It was the
second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same
purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and
applied it to the neck of the man who so pestered him. Aribuabo ran to the
place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he was wounded and
was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his
abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the
tenth day after the incident.

There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the
foregoing facts. The question to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo.
The prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called
Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to
the witness stand.

The first witness, Simeon 'Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of
Andres Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the
testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent and contradictory
that we consider meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of
the lower court to have taken it into consideration in formulating the
findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the testimony of the other
witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said gathering,
testified that he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of Andres
Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the witness
and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded and was
going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him.
He also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by him
about the incident, admitted to him having attacked Aribuabo with a
bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumlao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being
informed of the incident, forthwith conducted an investigation, questioned
Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded
him. He likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that
he had wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought
before Julian Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon
confessed to Llaguno that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit. Before the chief of police
could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the latter retracted,
denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit
Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears
admitted by Quianzon but not that of having wounded the deceased with a
bamboo spit.

The disinterestedness of these three witnesses for the prosecution,

Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno, is not questioned by the defense. Neither
the accused, in his testimony, nor his counsel, in the brief filed by him in
this court, was able to assign any unlawful, corrupt or wicked motive that
might have actuated them to testify falsely in this ease and knowingly bring
about the imprisonment of an innocent person. Bagabay is not even a
relative of the deceased. Dumlao, the barrio lieutenant, is a nephew of the
accused. Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, is an officer of the law whose
intervention in this case was purely in compliance with his official duties.
All the appellant has been able to state in his brief to question the
credibility of these witnesses is that they were contradicted by Simeon
Cacpal, the other witness for the prosecution, who testified that he had not
seen them speak neither to Aribuabo nor to Quianzon in the afternoon of
the crime. But the position of the defense in invoking Simeon Cacpal's
testimony for the purpose of discrediting the other witnesses for the
prosecution is untenable, after having vigorously impeached said
testimony, branding it as improbable, incongruent and contradictory. If
Cacpal is a false witness and the court believes this claim of the defense as
true , none of his statements may be taken into account or should exert any
influence in the consideration of the other evidence in the case.
After discarding the testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence presented by
the prosecution relative to the appellant's criminal liability for the death of
Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement
immediately after receiving the wound, naming the accused as the author of
the aggression, and the admission forthwith made by the accused that he
had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him, besides,
with a bamboo spit. Both statements are competent evidence in law,
admissible as a part of the res gestx (sections 279 and 298, No. 7, of the
Code of Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento
and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the extra judicial confession of the
accused to the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police
Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of
Aribuabo's wound and that he had inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit.
Inasmuch as this confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly
corroborated and appears to have been made by the accused freely and
voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his liability as
author of the crime charged (U. S. vs. So Fo, 23 Phil., 379; People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U. S. vs. Jamino, 3 P. R. A., 52; Francisco's
Quizzer on Evidence).

The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had

wounded the deceased and that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses
Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the
adverse testimony of these three veracious and disinterested witnesses, all
the more because neither the accused nor any other witness for the defense
has stated or insinuated that another person, not the accused, might be the
author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because it is
admitted by the defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been
pestering with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck
with a firebrand, after which Aribuabo appeared wounded in the abdomen,
without the accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and
by whom the aggression had been made.

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused
who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not
be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said
wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it
had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to
control or isolate the infection. This contention is without merit., According
to the physician who examined and attended him, the "wound of the
deceased was very serious and it was difficult to determine whether he
could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally
results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was caused by the fecal
matter from the large intestine which had been perforated. The possibility,
admitted by said physician, that the patient might" have survived said
wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that that act of the
patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted
in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the
punishable act of the accused.

"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of

homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of
such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not
relieve the actor of responsibility. * * *" (13 R. C. L., 748.)

Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage,
had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an
act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest
instinct in living beings. It must be assumed, therefore, that he
unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state of
nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain
caused by the wound, aggravated by the contact of the drainage tube with
the inflamed peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to
a perforation of the stomach, intestine, or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated
by violent shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen,
extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which
is aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming unbearable upon
contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. , The pain is continuous but
it gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomitings of
greenish matter, which are very annoying and terribly painful, take place
from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-
American Encyclopedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that the victim in this
case was mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes
more evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the natural
consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

The question herein raised by the appellant has already been finally settled
by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of April 3,
1879, said in a case similar to the present, the following: "Inasmuch as a
man is responsible for the consequences of his act and in this case the
physical condition and temperament of the of fended party nowise lessen
the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the
means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound
which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is
evident that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."

In the case of People vs. Almonte (56 Phil., 54), the abdominal wound was
less serious than that received by Aribuabo in this case, as it was not
penetrating, merely involving the muscular tissue. In said case the death of
the victim was due to a secondary hemorrhage produced twenty-four hours
after the wound had been inflicted, because of the "bodily movements of the
patient, who was in a state of nervousness, sitting up in bed, getting up and
pacing about the room, as a consequence of which the internal vessels,
already congested because of the wound, bled, and the hemorrhage thus
produced caused his death." The court in deciding the question stated that
''when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on
by moving about against the doctor's orders, not because of carelessness or
a desire to increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his
nervous condition due to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is
homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor
was of the opinion that the wound might have healed,in seven days."

The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R. C.
L., 751, as follows:

"While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to
be the settled rule of the common law that one who inflicts an injury on
another will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that
the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself,
or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper
treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death
was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one
of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy,
and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does
not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-
operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of
the wound or its unskilful and improper treatment, which are of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case,
must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in
contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held
responsible. But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its
foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to
give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries,
it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the
immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment."
Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's testimony, there is no
evidence of record that the crime charged was committed by means of the
knife, Exhibit A, and we only have the extrajudicial admission of the
accused that he had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with which the
wound of the deceased might have been caused because, according to the
physician who testified in this case, it was produced by a "sharp and
penetrating" instrument.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of

intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be taken
into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating
circumstances adverse to him, we modify the appealed judgment by
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years
of prision correctional and a maximum of eight years of prision
mayor, affirming it in all other respects, with costs to said appellant.
 [G.R. No. 38773. December 19, 1933.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GINES

ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Gibbs & McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. HOMICIDE; SELF-DEFENSE NOT PROVEN. — According to the facts stated in the

decision, the appellant herein did not act in legitimate self- defense inasmuch as he
provoked and commenced the aggression by drawing his penknife.

2. ID.; ARTICLE 49, REVISED PENAL CODE. — Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code is a
reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in
cases where the crime committed befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 20 1899), which is not the case herein.

DECISION

AVANCEÑA, C.J. :

The judgment appealed from finds the appellant Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime
of homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years
an one day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, with the costs.

The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living
children, has been suffering from partial paralysis form some time, walks dragging one
leg and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work
since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters named Maria and
another, are married, while still another one is a nun. With the exception of the other
married daughter and the nun, all of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon
whom they depend for support.

Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had
intimate relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year
1928. It was then that the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who
frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations between Pilar and the deceased
culminated in Pilar’s giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his
daughter’s relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be
deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather’s house in Singalong,
when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant
learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he had
appeared sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family
but also because the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all
depended for support. For some time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were
hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to legitimize his
union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never
complied with his promise.

The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office
where the deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma.
They both went downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the
undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of
the neck of the deceased, causing his death.

After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of
the appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon
hearing that the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the
appellant’s attitude, the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said
appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of
the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased. We find that this conclusion is supported b y the evidence. In
his testimony the appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound
that would leave a permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would
compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him,
because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support
his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the
deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his
daughter. That the act of the appellant is stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal
wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that
appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the blow,
although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.

Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury

as the death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation,
should be taken into consideration in favor of the Appellant.

Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant’s contention that he
acted in legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the
aggression by whipping out and brandishing his penknife.

The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code,
which refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the
accused, should be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old
Code and has been interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime committed
befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897,
and June 28, 1899), which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in
article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the
concurrence therein of three mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision mayor, should be
imposed.

Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision
correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the
judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-1477             January 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.

Mariano A. Albert for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.

PER CURIAM, J.:

This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of
the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.

Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over
by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.

In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any
mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by
medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the
report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic
Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and
Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:

FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a
single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful
was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any
conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio
C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any
manner or form.
 His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto,
the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.

On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision
he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at
Plaza Miranda.

What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt
acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to
abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a
policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even
challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running
for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.

All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship

especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.

In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane
but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional
Psychopathic Inferiority.

Final Diagnosis

Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.

In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion
of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled
that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the
date in question.

THE FACTS

Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between
the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:

On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in
1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges
and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his
disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after
the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity"
measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas,
the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by
the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his
speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained
by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights
granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.

Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost
said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky.
He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to
Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas
(now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many
difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the
night of March 10, 1947.

On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare
for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-
parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote
hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original
Tagalog reads:

FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES

I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it
out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to
my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.

I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to
spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was
the welfare of the people.

Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of
their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were
frustrated.

I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this:
he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice
them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these
reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with
the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good
of those eighteen million souls.

These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I
am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said
act.

Hurrah for a free Philippines.

 Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.

May God pity on me.

Amen.

JULIO C. GUILLEN

A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which
reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de
Miranda.

When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper
bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot
located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the
chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the
grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by
Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing
his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open
space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the
President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to
the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the
platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of
the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as
the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a
barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower
of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but
Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him,
but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion,
placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila
Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that
the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was
acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few
moments previous to the explosion.

The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after
the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform
the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.

During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at
the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.

Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the
other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are
satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the
trial of this case.

THE ISSUES

In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code
in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in
the commission of crime."

The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully
well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and
causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended
victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed
by him to carry out his evil purpose.

Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal
to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it
was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in
killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.

The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that
he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum
total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.

In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in
order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it
has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People
vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)

Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:

Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y

habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa
alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se
oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos
en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al
estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia
temeraria? — La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno
al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional
por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y
no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C,
suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de
imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a
tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del
delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o
sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de
otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del
articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.

We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case
before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing
highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies,
namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of
which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the
injured parties.

The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner
put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the
qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the
person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over
acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four
other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.

In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among
others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards
the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his
electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the
nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with
the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.

The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the
single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it
necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be
applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. (Art. 248.)

It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.

The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby
do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of
the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial
court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.