Krishna Kant Jain Nego Position Paper PDF

UID – SM0115022
POSITION PAPER ON THE DISPUTE REGARDING ANNEXATION OF

CRIMEA BY RUSSIAN FEDERATION
NEGOTIATION PURSUANT TO THE CLAIM ON CRIMEA BETWEEN

UKRAINE AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION
POSITION PAPER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................................... ii
The Background of Dispute.........................................................................................................1
The Status of Dispute at present ..................................................................................................3
Issues Raised ...............................................................................................................................5
Arguments Advanced ..................................................................................................................6
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 15
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. iii
i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTE
1922- Constitution of USSR
1945- United Nations Charter
1975- CSCE Helsinki Final Act
1990- Bilateral Treaty between Russia and Ukraine
1991- Agreement on Council of Heads of State and Governments
1991- Almaty Declaration
1991- Strategic Arm Reduction Treaty (START I)
1994- Declaration on observance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and Immunity of Borders of the
States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
1994- Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1997- The Black Sea Fleet Agreement between Russia and Ukraine
1997- Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation. Kiev
CASES
Case Concerning the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ
Genocide Convention Case ICJ
The Case Concerning Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) ICJ
ii
THE BACKGROUND OF DISPUTE
Crimea is situated on the northern coast of the Black Sea and is detached from Russian region of
Kuban by the sea of Azov. The Kerch Strait connects the Sea of Azov and Black Sea and separates
the Kerch City of Crimea from Tamar Peninsula of Russia. The Crimea was annexed to Russian
Empire in 1783 during the reign of Catherine the Great from Ottomans. The peninsula became part
of Soviet Union from 1921 till 1954, when then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred the
control of Crimea to Republic of Ukraine. This transfer was praised at the 1954 meeting of the
Presidium of the USSR Soviet Supreme.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 this self-governing region had voted to join Independent
Ukraine and It became the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within newly independent Ukraine in
1991, with Sevastopol having its own administration within Ukraine but outside the Autonomous
Republic.
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution, the crisis in Crimea started unfolding. On February
26, 2014 two protestor groups i.e. pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups clashed amongst each
other in front of parliament building in Simferopol. On 27 February, masked armed individual
locked up government buildings in Crimean, including the building of Supreme Council. Under
the Military action, the Supreme Council of Crimea dismissed the autonomous republic’s
government and replaced chairman of the council of Minister of Crimea. on February 28, 2014,
Russian forces, assisted by armed “self-defense” militias, swiftly seized the strategically important
Perekop Istmus, blocked or cut off most land, sea and air connections between Crimea and
mainland Ukraine1.
“The military take-over of Crimea was obviously well-prepared, rehearsed in advance and
professionally executed. Assembled for this operation were about 2,000 naval infantrymen
(marines), stationed in and around Sevastopol, about 7,000 special troops brought to Crimea in
early March, as well as about 15,000 troops transported by ferries to Kerch across the straits. These
additional units came mainly from the Russian Southern Military District. At the time of
1
Anton Bebler, Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, available at
https://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/files/dnak/Documents/Publikasjoner/2015/Spb_1-15.pdf accessed on
November 9, 2019, p. 11
1
occupation, the Russian operational headquarters, probably located in Rostov, had on its disposal
on Crimea about 30,000 troops”2.
On March 1, 2014, the council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of Russia Federation on the
request of His Excellency President Vladimir Putin unanimously approved the request to allow a
limited military contingent of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. During
February – March 2014, Ukraine lost control of its government buildings, airports and military
bases in Crimea to unmarked soldiers and local pro-Russian militia.
On February 28, 2014 the Supreme Council of Crimea voted for a referendum on the status of
Crimea. The referendum voting was conducted on March 16, 2014 with a lot of irregularity and
breaching the principles of Democracy.
2
ibid
2
THE STATUS OF DISPUTE AT PRESENT
Ukraine had been an important contributor to the Soviet Union's economy between 1920–1991,
but in March of 2014, the current crisis erupted when Russian special forces occupied Ukraine's
Crimean Peninsula, claiming it was protecting its port access to the Black Sea. Ukraine had
planned to develop Crimea's natural gas reserves in two years in a partnership with U.S.
companies, and if they had accomplished this, Russia would have lost one of its largest customers.
Between 2014–2018, a military conflict between Ukrainian soldiers and Russian-backed
separatists continued in eastern Ukraine, and more than 10,000 people were killed. On November
25 2018, Russian ships attacked and boarded three Ukrainian vessels in the Crimean port of Azov
near the Black Sea. It placed a freighter to block the port, stating that Ukraine had violated Russian
waters, although the two sides signed an agreement in 2003 to guarantee free passage through the
strait. Critics at the United Nations Security Council meeting said Russia's attack was a violation
under international law. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization increased its military presence in
the area.
Putin's attack responded to the February 23, 2014 overthrow of his ally Viktor Yanukovych, where
the pro-West faction of Ukraine's Parliament took over the government. The crisis occurred
because Yanukovych mismanaged the budget and forced Ukraine to ask for financial help. It
appealed to the EU, then Russia, causing political unrest. Those who wanted to be closer to the EU
objected when that solution was abandoned. Russia's military strike supported Yanukovych's
return to Kiev and closer ties to Russia.
In April 2014, Russia supported local rebels who took over city halls and police stations throughout
eastern Ukraine, an area home to ethnic Russians who don't want to be part of the EU. Those
Russians were moved there 50 years ago by Joseph Stalin, who intended to strengthen the Soviet
Republic's hold on the area. Earlier that month, NATO revealed satellite photos showing Russia's
invasion of Ukraine's eastern border. An EU emergency meeting added further sanctions on
Russia's oil and banking sectors, which occurred shortly after Russia sent a convoy of trucks over
the border. They were bearing aid to Ukraine's eastern cities, held by pro-Russian rebels. Several
of those trucks entered without approval.
Ukraine had also destroyed a convoy of Russian military vehicles that were bringing arms to the
rebels. It was the first time that Ukraine attacked Russian forces directly. A few days later, Ukraine
3
reported that several military vehicles were near the Russian border at the Crimean port of Azov.
It claimed that Russia was creating a second front for the rebels and wanted land access through
southern Ukraine—a shorter route to Crimea.
In July 2014, Russia built up its military force on the border. There were 19,000–21,000 troops,
14 advanced surface-to-air missile units, and 30 artillery batteries. It was a battle-ready force that
could launch an attack into eastern Ukraine at a moment's notice. Russia had already launched
rockets across the border in support of Ukrainian rebels.
Putin's standoff over Ukraine boosted his popularity rating in Russia to 80%. To maintain this
popularity, he will continue to hold onto Ukraine despite the cost. For example, it would cost
Russia more than $20 billion through 2020 to integrate Crimea. Putin knows that NATO won't
protect Ukraine since it is not a member, and that encourages him to continue to attack.
Ukraine, which provided one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, had been the second-most
important contributor to the former Soviet Union's economy. It also supplied heavy industrial
equipment and raw materials to industrial sites throughout the former USSR.
On July 29, 2014, the United States and the EU extended economic sanctions against Russia. They
wanted to convince Putin to stop supporting those in eastern Ukraine who want to break up the
country. The United States had proof that Russia supplied separatists that shot down a Malaysia
Airlines commercial jet over eastern Ukraine on July 17, killing 298 people.
The sanctions severely limit five out of the six major Russian banks' ability to obtain medium and
long-term financing from Europe. The United States also restricted technology exports to Russia's
deep-water Arctic offshore or shale oil production. Russia had already been ousted from the Group
of Eight.
4
ISSUES RAISED
-ISSUE I-
Russia has no legal claim over Crimea.
-ISSUE II-
Crimea’s annexation by Russia is not justified.
5
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Issue I: Russia has no legal claim over Crimea.
It is important to note that the erstwhile republic of USSR gave all the sovereign rights over the
Crimean Peninsula to the Ukraine under the able leadership of his excellency Nikita Khrushchev.
This step was welcomed by the entire member community of Presidium of USSR. It was hailed as
a “noble act on behalf of the Russian People”
M. P. Tarasov on the February 19, 1954 in the meeting of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that
“The Crimean Oblast', as is well-known, occupies the entire Crimean Peninsula,

territorially adjoins the Ukrainian Republic, and is a sort of natural continuation of
the southern steppes of Ukraine. The economy of the Crimean Oblast' is closely tied
to the economy of the Ukrainian SSR.3”
The USSR then recognized the territorial proximity of Crimea to Ukraine, the commonalities of
their economies, and the close cultural ties between the Crimean Oblast and Ukraine. USSR was
a specific kind of federation, which in the soviet legal literature was referred as “soft federation”
which meant that not only was the USSR a sovereign state and subject of international law but also
its component republics had the same legal nature4. Article 80 of the Constitution of USSR 1977
provides the right of the Soviet republics to enter into relations with foreign states, to conclude
international treaties and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them, and to
participate in the activities of international organizations. 5 In the said session of Presidium, it is
essential to note that the transfer of Crimea to Ukrainian SSR was done unanimously, in effect this
mean the Russia’s consent to Crimea becoming part of Ukraine. In other words, the change of Art.
3
“Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” February 19, 1954,
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, GARF, f.7523 op.57, d.963, ll. 1-10. Published in "Istoricheskii
arkhiv," issue 1, vol. 1 (1992). Translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119638
accessed on November 8, 2019
4
Oleksandr Merezhko, Crimea’s Annexation by Russia- Contradictions of the New Russian Doctrine of,
International Law available at https://www.zaoerv.de/75_2015/75_2015_1_a_167_194.pdf accessed on November
8, 2019
5
ibid
6
14 of the Constitution of the RSFSR and the removal of the Crimean oblast provides evidence for
Russia’s consent to the transfer. Under the law of international treaties, Russia’s consent to transfer
Crimea to Ukraine and Ukraine’s acceptance may be considered an international agreement. 6
Later in 1991, when Soviet Union collapsed, the Russia became the successor of the USSR and
hence bound by all the legal framework of International character as a successor state. The
International Court of Justice in the case of Gabcicovo-Nagymaros case also held that the court
also held that the successor state is under the duty to follow obligation of the earlier state under
any international regime 7. Similarly, earlier in the Genocide Convention case also the ICJ agreed
to the same to a much extent. J. Shahbuddeen in his separate opinion also favored such a view. He
suggested that ‘'to effectuate Its object and purpose, the Convention would fall to be construed as
Implying the expression of a unilateral undertaking by each party to the Convention to treat
successor States as continuing as from Independence any status which the predecessor State had
as a party to the Convention. The necessary consensual bond Is completed when the successor
State decides to avail Itself of the undertaking by regarding itself as a party to the treaty.'8
Now it is also to be pointed out that Russia has never been a persistent objector to this issue. Russia
only raised its objection 23 years after the disintegration of USSR. Until today a lot of treaties
were signed and ratified by Ukraine and Russia. Many of such treaties provides for that each party
shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity including inviolability. One of the
first treaty between Ukraine and Russia was concluded at Kiev on November 19, 1990 about the
territorial integrity of Ukraine and inviolability of its borders. Article 6 of this Treaty provided:
“The High Parties recognize and respect the territorial integrity of the Russian Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the
existing framework of the USSR borders.”9
6
Ibid.
7
Case Concerning the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997
8
Mathew C.R. Craven, The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of the State under International Law,
available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/1/1471.pdf accessed on November 8, 2019
9
8, 2019
7
Similarly, Article 2 of Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine10 provides that:
“In accord with the provisions of the UN Charter and the obligations of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the High
Contracting Parties shall respect each other’s integrity and reaffirm the
inviolability of the borders existing between them.”
Other than that various agreements were concluded between Ukraine and Russia e.g. Almaty
Declaration of December 1991, the Agreement on Council of Heads of State and Government of
December 1991, Declaration on observance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and Immunity of
Borders of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 1994. Rather in
the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, signed at Kiev on 19 November 1990, it
recognized the currently existing frontiers of Ukraine which was reiterated in one of the Security
Council meetings11. In none of the circumstances the Russia never objected on the Crimea as a
part of Ukraine. The concept of persistent objector is well recognized in International Law 12. By
this it is implied that Russia recognized the Crimea as a part of the Ukraine and subsequently
obliged to respect it.
Issue II- Crimea’s annexation by Russia is not justified.
In the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution, the crisis in Crimea started unfolding. On February
26, 2014 two protestor groups i.e. pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian groups clashed amongst each
other in front of parliament building in Simferopol. On 27 February, masked armed individual
locked up government buildings in Crimean, including the building of Supreme Council. Under
the Military action, the Supreme Council of Crimea dismissed the autonomous republic’s
government and replaced chairman of the council of Minister of Crimea. on February 28, 2014,
Russian forces, assisted by armed “self-defense” militias, swiftly seized the strategically important
10
Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Kiev, 31 May
1997
11
Complaint by Ukraine regarding the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning Sevastopol
Initial Proceedings Decision of 20 July 1993 (3256th meeting) available at https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/93-
95/Chapter%208/EUROPE/93-95_8-22-UKRAINE.pdf accessed on November 10, 2019
12
The Case Concerning Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) 1962 ICJ 6 decided on June 15, 1962
8
Perekop Istmus, blocked or cut off most land, sea and air connections between Crimea and
mainland Ukraine13.
“The military take-over of Crimea was obviously well-prepared, rehearsed in advance and
professionally executed. Assembled for this operation were about 2,000 naval infantrymen
(marines), stationed in and around Sevastopol, about 7,000 special troops brought to Crimea in
early March, as well as about 15,000 troops transported by ferries to Kerch across the straits. These
additional units came mainly from the Russian Southern Military District. At the time of
occupation, the Russian operational headquarters, probably located in Rostov, had on its disposal
on Crimea about 30,000 troops”14.
On March 1, 2014, the council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of Russia Federation on the
request of His Excellency President Vladimir Putin unanimously approved the request to allow a
limited military contingent of the Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine 15 This act is in
clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which states that:
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.”
It also violated the CSCE Helsinki Final Act 1975 Principle 1-5 of the act provides for various
principles related to territorial integrity, refraining from threat or use of force, Inviolability of
frontiers and other sovereign rights. It also violates the provision under the friendship treaty.
Article 2 of Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation
and Ukraine16 provides that:
“In accord with the provisions of the UN Charter and the obligations of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the High Contracting
13
November 9, 2019, p. 11
14
ibid
15
Ibid p. 16
16
Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Kiev, 31 May
1997
9
Parties shall respect each other’s integrity and reaffirm the inviolability of the
borders existing between them.”
Other than that various agreements were concluded between Ukraine and Russia e.g. Almaty
Declaration of December 1991, the Agreement on Council of Heads of State and Government of
December 1991, Declaration on observance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and Immunity of
Borders of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 1994. The Russia
also rejected prior consultations with Ukraine and other states – guarantors of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity after, according to the Budapest Memorandum (1994) 17, it became a militarily
denuclearized state. In this memorandum, the US, the UK and the Russia confirmed that in
response to Ukraine becoming party to the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and its
abandoning of the nuclear weapon and other arsenal to Russia they would:
 Respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty within its existing borders;

 Refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine;
 Seek UN Security Council action if nuclear threat is used against Ukraine;
 Refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine
 Consult with one another if question arise regarding these commitments.18
The Russian Federation also violated the agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of
Ukraine from August 8, 199719, and extended in April 2010. This applies particularly to paragraph
1 of Article 6, which stated that the military units of the Black Sea fleet that “operate in places of
their dislocation in accordance with the Russian law, respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, observe
its laws and do not allow interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine.” Paragraph 2 of Article
8 obliged the military forces of the Black Sea Fleet to “conduct exercises and other activities of
combat and operational training within the training centers, landfills, positioning areas and
dispersal areas, shooting ranges and, in restricted areas, in designated areas airspace in
17
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1994
18
8, 2019
19
The Black Sea Fleet Agreement between Russia and Ukraine, 1997
10
coordination with the competent authorities of Ukraine.” The movements of Russian troops in
February-March 2014 in Crimea were in no way coordinated with the competent authorities of
Ukraine, and the Russian forces left their places of dislocation in a clear violation of the
agreement20.
The Security council in one of its meeting regarding the complaint by Ukraine regarding the
Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning Sevastopol recalled that in
the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, signed at Kiev on 19 November 1990,
the High Contracting Parties committed themselves to respect each other’s territorial integrity
within their currently existing frontiers 21.
In the trilateral Declaration of US, Russia and Ukraine it was provided that, as soon as Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty I (START-I) entered into force, and Ukraine became a part of the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state, Russia and the US would
confirm their obligation, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, and would
respect the independence and sovereignty, as well as existing borders of the state-participants in
the CSCE, recognizing that changes to the borders may be performed only peacefully and by
agreement22.
Based on all these international and bilateral instrument it is crystal clear that Crimea’s annexation
by the Russian federation was an obvious and flagrant violation of entire range of norms and
principles of International law beginning with the United Nations Charter. This annexation is the
breach of Sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Ukraine.
One of the Prime argument by Russian Federation is the right to self-determination of the “people
of Crimea.” His excellency president Putin in many of addresses has talked about “right of nations
to self-determination”. This argument is baseless and vague on various grounds.
20
November 9, 2019
21
Complaint by Ukraine regarding the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning
Sevastopol Initial Proceedings Decision of 20 July 1993 (3256th meeting) available at
https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/93-95/Chapter%208/EUROPE/93-95_8-22-UKRAINE.pdf accessed on
November 10, 2019
22
Trilateral Declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine, the USA and Russia, 14.1.1994
11
First of all, it is to be note that under the USSR’s constitution and the Constitution of the Ukrainian
SSR, Ukraine being a sovereign state, always had a sovereign right to freely withdraw from the
Union Treaty of 1922 but the same right was not available to Crimea because it was never a
separate entity. It was never a separate nation as such.
Secondly the population can hardly be regarded as a ‘nation’. Neither the population of Crimea
be made any separable from the Ukraine. The population of Crimea was never considered a
separate people, neither by Ukraine nor by Russia. In Legal sense the people of Crimea are part
of the People of Ukraine, which in its entirety.
Thirdly, according to Russian principles of international law and Courts of Russia, does not
include the right to secede from the existing state. The right to self-determination may not
undermine the territorial integrity of the state. It doesn’t allow secession and Ukraine’s criminal
law make it a crime to undermine the territorial integrity of the state. Also, the people of
Autonomous republic of Crimea never claimed or realized its right to self-determination.
Fourthly, the so-called ‘referendum’ in Crimea was unconstitutional according to the Ukrainian
constitution23 and cannot be hold good in the eyes of domestic law. Article 73 of the Constitution
of Ukraine provides: “Alterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by the
all-Ukrainian referendum.” Other than that the voting date was kept March 16, 2014, on such a
too short notice, which circumstantially did not allow for updating the voter registers.
There were only two options in the ballot paper:
1. Do you support re-joining Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?
2. Do you support restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and Crimea’s
status as a part of Ukraine?
It omitted two other possible choices – remaining part of Ukraine under the current constitutional
structure or Crimea’s independent statehood. The time shortage did not allowed for a real and
substantive public debate on such a momentous issue24. Also, the Russian security personnel had
23
At the plenary meeting of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on 14.3.2014 the decision of the Supreme Council of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to hold a referendum was found to be in contradiction to the Ukrainian
Constitution.
24
Supra
12
shut off all Ukrainian television channels, imposed a tight blockage on the land border with the
mainland Ukrainian territory, closed the Simpheropol airport’s flight from Ukraine and thus
prevented the diffusion on Crimea of Ukrainian print media and people of Crimea was thereby
subject to Russian state controlled media to spread its propaganda. The fact that the entire
takeover by Russia of Crimea and presence of security in this issue also create a doubt on free
and fair election and the democratic principle 25.
This annexation by Russia was also condemned by the world community. The general Assembly
Adopts Resolution Calling upon states not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region 26.
The general assembly requested the world community not to recognize the Crimea as a part of
the Russia but Crimea.
Trying to Justify annexation of Crimea his excellency President Putin is taking resort to the
principle of Humanitarian Intervention. On contrary to that the Russia and its principles of
International Law has always been against the use of any kind of humanitarian intervention in
international relations. 27 As a state practice Russia has always objected to this principle.
The Russian Minister for foreign affairs I. Ivanov declared in his speech “Rule of Law in
International Relations – A Guarantee of the Comprehensive Strategic Stability and Security in
XXI Century” (2.11.2000):
“We should not rule out that the use of different doctrines of ‘humanitarian
intervention’ can destabilize international order to the point which would be
dangerous even for those who would like to appropriate the ‘right’ to hold military
actions. If in international law the idea of the permissibility of the use of force
without permission of the UN Security Council becomes entrenched, then
‘humanitarian baton’ might end up in the hands of anyone28.”
25
November 9, 2019
26
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm
27
8, 2019
28
Ibid
13
It is also interesting to note that Russia has never raised the issue of human right violation in
Crimea at any platform. In arguendo, assuming but not affirming had there been violation of
Human rights in Crimea, Russia instead of using force, should have taken recourse to any
international organizations like UN, Council of Europe, ECHR and OSCE of which it is member.
Rather contrast to this violation of human rights in Crimea started only after Russia invaded and
annexed Crimea.
International law has long recognized the doctrine of estoppel, a principle which prevents states
from acting inconsistently to the detriment of others29. In other words, it basically obliges state
parties not to contradict themselves. By annexing Crimea, the Russia has violated the principle of
estoppel. It showed the obvious inconsistency in territorial issues after USSR’s disintegration. For
a very long period of time they recognized the Crimea as a part of Ukraine impliedly by never
objecting to it. Specially, when the case comes about Estonia, in the similar situation it insisted on
the border with Estonia from 24 August 1991, on the other hand denied border with Ukraine,
including Crimea. It shows the double-faced position of Russia.
29
Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice, available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1992&context=californialawreview accessed on
November 10, 2019
14
CONCLUSION
1. The government of Ukraine is of the view that the Crimea is the part of territory of Ukraine.
2. The Government of Ukraine is of the view that the Russian federation has created
interference in the internal matter of Ukraine and violated the Sovereignty of the Ukraine.
3. The government of Ukraine is of the view that Russian Federation has violated various
international legal norms by Annexing the Crimea.
4. The Ukraine wants Russia to maintain the status quo ante.
5. The Ukraine wants Russian Federation to give up the sovereign claim over Crimea and
recognize the Crimea as part of Ukraine.
6. The Ukraine implores Russia to further fulfil its obligations under various international law
and bilateral agreements toward Ukraine.
7. The Ukraine want Russia to refrain from taking any actions which undermine the relation
between two States.
8. The Ukraine hopes that these bilateral negotiations can be carried out in good faith.
15
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ew
iv
Letter of Authorization
Upon instruction from my government, I have the honour of representing the Ukraine in the
negotiation with the Russian Federation. I have been authorized to discuss the position of the
government of Ukraine with respect to the Crimean Crisis.
I look forward to successful negotiation culminating in mutually acceptable terms, taking into
account the interest of both the nations and without prejudice to the spirit of good faith and
cooperation underlying the Crimean crisis.
Sd/-

Krishna Kant Jain Nego Position Paper PDF

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UID – SM0115022

POSITION PAPER ON THE DISPUTE REGARDING ANNEXATION OF

NEGOTIATION PURSUANT TO THE CLAIM ON CRIMEA BETWEEN

POSITION PAPER ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE

The Background of Dispute.........................................................................................................1

The Status of Dispute at present ..................................................................................................3

Issues Raised ...............................................................................................................................5

Arguments Advanced ..................................................................................................................6

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. iii

1975- CSCE Helsinki Final Act

1990- Bilateral Treaty between Russia and Ukraine

1991- Agreement on Council of Heads of State and Governments

1991- Almaty Declaration

1991- Strategic Arm Reduction Treaty (START I)

Case Concerning the Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ

Genocide Convention Case ICJ

The Case Concerning Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) ICJ

THE BACKGROUND OF DISPUTE

THE STATUS OF DISPUTE AT PRESENT

Russia has no legal claim over Crimea.

Crimea’s annexation by Russia is not justified.

Issue I: Russia has no legal claim over Crimea.

“The Crimean Oblast', as is well-known, occupies the entire Crimean Peninsula,

Issue II- Crimea’s annexation by Russia is not justified.

 Respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty within its existing borders;

There were only two options in the ballot paper:

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