REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MICHAEL SANTOS ET AL (GR NO 180027)

Facts:
- Oct 1997, Michael Santos purchased three unregistered land in Indang, Cavite.
- The parcels of land were previously owned by Generoso Asuncion, Teresita
Sernal and spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively.
- Respondents caused the survey and consolidated of the parcels of land into Lot
3.
- March 2002, filed with RTC for Original Registration of Lot 3. RTC required the
Dept of Environment and Natural Resources to submit a report on the status of the lot.
The report states that the area falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land certified
on March 1982.
- A certification from DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) that the land was classified as an alienable and disposable as of March
1982.
- Respondent allege that predecessor-in-interest have been in “continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public and adverse possession of the land since time immemorial.
- To substantiate respondents’ testimonies, Tax Declarations dating back to 1948 as
the earliest were shown.
- The RTC rendered decision in favor of Santos which was affirmed by CA.
Issue: W/N the respondents should be granted original registration of Lot 3.
Ruling:
- No. Under the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine, the State is the
original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles.
Absent a clear showing that land had been into private ownership thru the State’s
imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.
- Official registration of title of land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 or Property Registration Decree which states that:
“Section 14. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land:
1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable lands
of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,1945, or earlier.
2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
- This is in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or Public Land
Act the for the judicial confirmation of “imperfect” title, the following must concur:
1. The the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain;
2. Applicants have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and,
3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
- In this case, the third requisite was not established that the predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the land for the time. The affidavits of predecessors-
in-interest that they have beenin possession the land before the outbreak of World War
2 lacks specificity and is unsupported by any other evidence.
- Unsubstantiated claim of possession are “mere conclusion of law” that is
“unavailing and cannot suffice”.
- The supported Tax Declarations fall short of proving possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier since the earliest submitted was only 1948.
- Respondents make another plea under Section 14(2) pf PD 1529 thru acquisitive
prescription.
- The DENR-CENRO Certification state that Lot 3 only became disposable land on
March 1982. It posits that period of prescription against the Stae should commence to
run only from such date. Hence, the respondents’ March 2002 application is still
premature.

Wherefore, there being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must
be enforced. The instant petition is granted.
 CAMILO F. BORROMEO VS. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned
by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a
project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of
the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-
Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz
Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire
need of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The tutorials
were held in Antonietta’s residence at a squatters’ area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in
Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at
Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
16, 19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on
the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased from the document. But it
could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside
respondent’s signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last
page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties
were issued in respondent’s name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent’s two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and
per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich
supported respondent’s sons for only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged
in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989,
Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for
which he became indebted to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he
sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for ₱250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the
three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the
Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both
Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a
buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds;
that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner
acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated
July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed in his favour.
The RTC decide in favour of Camilo F. Borromeo and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F.
Borromeo;
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the
Court of Appeals

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not
transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his
the owner thereof?
HELD:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At
the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner
of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of
Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies
to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply.
At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of
it.
The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as
reiterated in subsequent cases, is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve
the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in
dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to
keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

DY VS. ALDEA
 G.R. No. 219500, August 9, 2017
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Mamerto Dy (Mamerto) Mamerto filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of deed of sale and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with
injunction and damages on thre ground that he never executed any deed of sale in favor
of Maria Lourdes Rosell Aldea (Lourdes) and that the signature appearing on the
purported deed of sale was not his authentic signature.
2. Lourdes contends that she is an innocent purchaser for value; that while it may
be true that an impostor had fraudulently acquired a void reconstituted title over the
subject land, such circumstance did not necessarily invalidate her own title; that a valid
transfer could issue from a void reconstituted title if an innocent purchaser for value
intervenes; and that where innocent third persons rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued and acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard
such right and order the total cancellation of the certificate of title for that would impair
public confidence in the certificate of title.
3. The RTC nullified Lourdes’ title as it was based on a void reconstituted title. It
further opined that the contract of sale between Lourdes and the impostor was null and
void because the latter did not have the right to transfer ownership of the subject land
at the time it was delivered to Lourdes. The trial court held that Lourdes could not be
considered a buyer in good faith because she should have been suspicious of the
transaction which occurred at a hotel room and without any lawyer present. It noted
that Lourdes gave her money to the seller even if the owner’s copy of the certificate of
title was not handed to her; and that she decided to buy the remaining portion of the
subject land when the price was reduced to P200.00 per square meter for the flimsy
reason that it would be hard for the seller to subdivide the subject land.
4. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling. It declared that Lourdes was an
innocent purchaser for value. The appellate court ruled that a person dealing with
registered land is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are
noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. It observed that the only
annotation at the back of the title was that it was mortgaged to Audie C. Uy (Uy).
ISSUES:
1. WON the reconstituted title, from which TCT No. T-134753 in the name of
lourdes was derived, is valid.
2. WON Lourdes is an innocent purchaser for value who is entitled to the
application of the mirror doctrine.
3. WON mamerto has better right over the subject land.
HELD:
1. NO. When the owner’s duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in
fact, in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void,
because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can be
validly made only in case of loss of the original certificate.
Mamerto asserted that he never lost his owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24829 and
that he had always been in possession thereof. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that
another person impersonated Mamerto and represented before the court that the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24829 was lost in order to secure a new copy
which was consequently used to deceive Lourdes into purchasing the subject land.
Hence, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, which is
the primordial element in the validity of reconstitution proceedings, is clearly missing.
Accordingly, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings
initiated by the impostor, and its judgment rendered thereafter is null and void. This
alone is sufficient to declare the reconstituted title null and void.
2. NO. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a
full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of
any notice of claims or interest of some other person in the property. It is the party who
claims to be an innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such
assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. To
successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the presumption is that
first and foremost, the “buyer in good faith” must have shown prudence and due
diligence in the exercise of his/her rights.
Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land. During cross-
examination, Lourdes admitted that she did not conduct a thorough investigation and
that she merely instructed her uncle to check with the Register of Deeds whether the
subject land is free from any encumbrance. Further, it must be noted that Lourdes met
the seller only during the signing of the two deeds of sale. Yet, she did not call into
question why the seller refused to see her during the negotiation.
3. YES. While it is true that under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 the
decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether
deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System
would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of
land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.32 A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership
or title over the particular property described therein.33 The indefeasibility of the
Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful
owner of real property. The fact that Lourdes was able to secure a title in her name
neither operates to vest ownership upon her of the subject land nor cures the void sale.
Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to restore Mamerto’s rights of dominion over
Lot 5158.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CELESTINA NAGUIAT

G.R. No. 134209. January 24, 2006
Facts:
 Celestina Naguiat, a Filipino citizen, resident of Angeles City Pampanga, applied
for registration before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, four parcels of land located
in Panan, Botolan Zambales.
She alleges to be the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from an entity who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30)
years that had not suffered from any mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
The Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application assailing the
ownership of the respondent on the grounds of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question by the predecessors-in-
interest that is an ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant that is no
longer applicable; the subject properties are part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
The trial court adjudicated the land to the respondent and affirmed by the appellate
court, hence the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question still part of public domain?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that the areas are still part of the public domain.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belongs to the State. Accordingly public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession unless until
determined by the proper government agency or proclamation reclassifying the land
agricultural thus alienable and disposable. The respondent failed to present the
required certification from the proper government agency or proclamation reclassifying
the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Aside from tax receipts, respondent
submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property.
As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Anent thereto, under the Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying
and reclassifying lands of the public domain belongs to the Executive Branch and not
with the court. The lower court and the appellate court erred in deciding in favor
of the respondent with subsisting matters that rest in the powers of the Executive
Branch of government.
Wherefore, the Court properly REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decisions of the lower
court and appellate court and the application of the respondent DENIED.
REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 186603. April 5, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.
FACTS:
1. On October 26, 1955, by virtue of Cadastral Decree No. N-31626, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was issued on October 15, 1962 in the name of
Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa). On June 17, 1976, Espinosa sold the property to Leonila
B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
911177 on June 29, 1976.
2. On January 13, 2003, the State filed a Complaint for annulment of title and/or
reversion of land with the RTC claiming that the property is inalienable public land
because it fell within a timberland area indicated under Project No. 27-C, Block C per
Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by the Director of Forestry on
January 17, 1986.
3. Caliston countered that the property is not timberland. Invoking laches and
prescription, she argued that her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows
that the property was classified only in 1986.
4. Th trial court ruled in favor of the State and ordered the reversion of the property
to the mass of the public domain. However, the CAupheld the validity of OCT No. 191-
N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names of Espinosa and Caliston, respectively, and
found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa
when she was issued OCT No. 191-N. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that
the property is forest land. The lone piece of evidence consisting of LC Map No. 2978,
certified by the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986, was not authenticated pursuant
to Section 24,25 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest
land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.
HELD:
NO. The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time
of the grant of the cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence,
that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of
the government. Since cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued
only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts that they are entitled
to the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. As such,
the cadastral decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these
jurisdictional facts.
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No. 91117.
Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to
have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by
incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property in the
cadastral proceedings.
 This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to recover the property
if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public domain. The State may still do
so through an action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to
revert land back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporation.There are
also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a
„person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands
did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain.
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in
Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully
included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain. Since the case is one
for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove that
the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to
Espinosa.
At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived
her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land
considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion
proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion
of the property in Espinosa’s title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent
with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land
classification map prepared in 1986. The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978
was not formally offered in evidence. The rules require that documentary evidence
must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and
it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.

JOSEPHINE WEE v. FELICIDAD MARDO

G.R. No. 202414 : June 4, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Felicidad Mardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284,
dated April 26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang,
Cavite.
On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a
consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to
vacate and turnover the subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner filed an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that
she is the owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in
the application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was
however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for
reconsideration were subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by the
RTC. Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of
the petitioner. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC, hence, respondent appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her
admission that the subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to some
objections and oppositions to her title suggested that she was not exercising any acts of
dominion over the subject property, an essential element in the requirement and
occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to the subject property.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
Based on the legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1)
must sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she
could not have complied with the requirement of possession and occupation under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically
turned over to her.
A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered
under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite,
under the name of respondent Felicidad Mardo.
Hence, the Petition was DENIED.
DINAH C. CASTILLO v. ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN
GR No. 171056, 2009-03-13
Facts
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to
Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in
her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and
sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of
15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner verify the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order dated 4
March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for
conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K.
Mortilla, et al. and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial,
and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa
City, a Certification stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A,
was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of
Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certification testing that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla,
was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the
issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public
auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before
the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the
Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City
office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed
that Orense did not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by
Summit Realty.
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration
No. 00942-A,indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana
and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in Lot 13713, she
was shocked to find out that, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713
was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of
land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129642 and
Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac).
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried
On July 22, 2002, Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July
2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact. On 25 July 2002, TCT
No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty was issued in its place
On the other hand, the records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or
interest of the petitioner is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional Trial Court
Fourth Judicial Region. The registered owner, Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the
said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them (Consulta No.
1044 and 1119). If ever, petitioner’s adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the
judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.
Petitioner charge, Atty. Antonio M. Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, Aquilina
A. Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III City, Marietta Linatoc, Records
Clerk, who are public officers a with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense,
Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively of Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation for gross inexcusable negligence for cancelling TD #00942-
A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead issuing in the name of
Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A
The Office of the Ombudsman and Court of Appeals decreed that the
administrative case against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA
A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be DISMISSED, for lack of substantial
evidence; and the criminal case against the same respondents including private
respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for
lack of probable cause.
Issues:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF
PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT
Ruling:
No, Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is
ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title,
therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on
the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.
Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title,
which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of
Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally
misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate
of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner's tax
declaration.
As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner's title,
evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the
absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible
as to Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is binding upon the
whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself.
"Curiously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K.
Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot
13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent."
It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate of title,
TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and
indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to convincingly
explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in their dealings with
petitioner and/or her documents.
Respondents' actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac
over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system,
and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.

MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL. vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910
FACTS:
Dela Cruz is the heir of the tenant/occupant of the land co-owned by the petitioners.
The four petitioners, as co-owners, sought to have registered the subject agricultural
land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the
appellee was occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that
the name of the appellee does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said
two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee was occupying these parcels as their
tenant and for this reason they did not include his name in their petition, as an
occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said parcels as the
absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a
decree in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926,
directing that the land described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four
petitioners, as co-owners, subject to the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of
Remedios Grey.
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a
revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he was the absolute
owner of the two parcels of land, having inherited them from his father, Baldomero R.
de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same.
The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional
evidence presented by both parties, rendered, its decision modifying the former decree
by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la
Cruz. The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the
name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a
violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within the
meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the
grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of purchase of 1864.
ISSUES:
1. Will the court’s modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper?
Did the petitioners obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud?
2. Taking into account that appellee Dela Cruz was not notified by the
petitioners,despite that the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named
in the petition and given notice by registered mail; the main question is, is making Dela
Cruz a party defendant, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern"
sufficient alone even if Dela Cruz as occupant was not notified and not named in the
petition?
3. Differentiate in personam proceeding from in rem proceeding.
RULING:
1ST ISSUE:
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to
the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for
review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to
above.
Thus,the said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have
been opened only on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That
decree was not obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they
honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as
their tenant.
2nd ISSUE:
Yes, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to
those outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (Tyler vs.
Judges, supra.)
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have
said, upon the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the
registration of the title to lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all
occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are
notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to appear in opposition to such
application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word.
3rd ISSUE:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person,
with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some
individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession of
a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and
if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V. RAMOS

[GR. 127882, December 1, 2004]
Facts:
1.) RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation Philippines
(WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order
96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
2.) Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between
the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow
fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
3.) In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned
by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘
name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before
the Court of Appeals.
4.) EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the
DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the
FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for
the protection of Australian investments.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942) is unconstitutional for
allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
Ruling:
NO, RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to
the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease
is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for
the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms
of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical
and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by
foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil
the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited
only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUDOLFO V. MUÑOZ

Facts: Respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title of a parcel of residential
land before the RTC of Ligao, Albay. Sad land has building and improvements thereon,
situated in the Barrio of Bagonbayan, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay.
Respondent averred that no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affects his property
and that no other person has an interest, legal or equitable, on the subject lot.
Respondent further declared that the property was acquired by donation inter vivos,
executed by the spouses Apolonio R. Muñoz and Anastacia Vitero, and that the spouses
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time
immemorial for more than 70 years.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
opposed the application stating that, neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land, and muniment/s of title as well as the title do not appear to be
genuine and that the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicate the
pretended possession of application to be of recent vintage and that the parcel is part of
the public domain.
In the Respondent’s answer to the opposition, he professed that the land was originally
owned by Paulino Pulvinar and Geronimo Lozada and was sold to his parents.
In the Opposition filed by Vasquez, declaring ownership on parcels of land, adjoining
that of the subject matter of the application, that certain portions of his lands are
included in the application as respondent’s concrete fence is found within the area of
his lots, but respondent claims that the land is duly certified correct by the Bureau of
Lands and approved for registration by the Land Registration Authority. Granting that
there is an encroachment to the oppositor’s adjoining land, that it is not for the court a
quo, sitting as a Land Registration Court, to entertain the opposition because the case
should be ventilated in a separate proceeding as an ordinary civil case.
The RTC rendered a Decision granting the application for registration.
Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo stating among others
that, respondent need not adduce documentary proof that the disputed property had
been declared alienable and disposable for the simple reason that the lot had once been
covered by free patent application; hence, this alone is conclusive evidence that the
property was already declared by the government as open for public disposition.
Issue: WON PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PROPERTY
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
Held: NO, it was erroneous for the appellate court to assume that the property in
question is alienable and disposable based only on the Report dated May 21, 1997 of the
Director of Lands indicating that the "land involved in said case described as Lot 2276,
CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia Vitero."
Noteworthy is the fact that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the
land subject of this proceeding is alienable or disposable.
For clarity, applications for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the
following: (1) that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same
Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the land subject for registration is indeed alienable
and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have
evidenced the alienability of the land involved.
Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Court cannot approve the application
for registration.