Republic of the Philippines
There being none,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC 
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,  THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity
of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes"
(actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought
this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo
Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This
bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and
transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with
certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at
8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco
objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the
Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum.1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in
the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and
Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although
until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter
is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996
of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and
ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the
motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza).
approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up.
I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned
until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the
transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators
of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m.
to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.
of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4)
the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording
the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other
versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21,
1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not
contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will
raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However,
there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that,
in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend
that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35
and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting
the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the
years or nays,but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to
prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2)
in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep.
Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep.
Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on
Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and
(4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII,
§109, 5the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep.
Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved
upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon
the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering
the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of
the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In
addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of
powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there
is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although
the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each
House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be
sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days
before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as
well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee
reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under
the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is
barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering
the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr.
Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved
on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground
for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that
there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative
branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial
review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.Pendatun, 11 it
was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings.
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power
given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional
restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and
effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of
any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any
duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the
Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided
by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank,  15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it
appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to
ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with
their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature
void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend
at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893
Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before
a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that
in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,
suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district
court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending
that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may,
then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or
without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred
to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its
entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature
in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor
withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though
it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had
made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by
a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by
the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made
by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis.
407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v.
Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101,
15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by
former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House
of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view
is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved. 18
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our
government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry
into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly
decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art.
VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond
judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice,
however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is
subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the
field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope
of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to
decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether
done away with political questions such as those which arise in the field
of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this
Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII. §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There
being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this,
however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report
should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the
members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this
case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the
fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically
requires that in case such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on
the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the
House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino
and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after
the debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
 Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from
Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point of
order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had
a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is
not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement,
and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When
the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The
bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as
to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if
that motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial
compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House
he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many
are in favor and how many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter
for judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for
the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, 26 at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the members byyeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the
process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration
allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session
was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment
until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at
least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the
House shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair
declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the
afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis
added)
This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected
to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own
making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act
upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as
an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not,
in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence.30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to
any further consideration of the question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that
in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has
a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief
Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power
granted to the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a branch of
the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure
of the House with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat,
the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier
found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners
in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one,
except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the
report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeñ a did not participate in the
bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep.
Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved;
while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañ ada would
have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification
by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim
either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by
the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill
has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment
to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the
courts." 39 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the
righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings of
Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this
purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature,
they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the
Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose
hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the
name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill
sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
 than another allegation that the Conference Committee tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No.
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in proven.
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42 rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion
Congress.
made in a case 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
rule rests on the following considerations: conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect
is due the judgment of that body. 49
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of
SO ORDERED.
the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on
its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by concur.
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
Regalado, J., concurs in the result.
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 45
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the
massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure

from the rule, except to say that, with a change in the membership of the
Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on
the question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our
decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four
new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.)
Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of
the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is

confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which
shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from

time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are

required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States
v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for
regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent
character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today
upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed