Article 2: Principle and Policies

These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts.
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of a) due process (else, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively); and b) the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government emanates from them.

What is a republican form of government?

It is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, a representative government wherein
the powers and duties of government are exercised and discharged for the common good and welfare.

Purpose of Republicanism:
1. To prevent concentration of authority in one person that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in
its exercise to the detriment of the republican institutions.
2. To secure action, to forestall over action, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency.

Upon whom is the power of sovereignty vested? Explain.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. (Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). The ultimate power resides in the people. The acts of their representatives are merely
manifestations of such sovereignty. Whatever power their elected representatives have are their own
powers, exercised only through such elected officials. Such power the elected officials have is only borrowed
from the people.

Villavicencio vs Lukban

Mayor Lukban of the city of Manila, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the City
of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. At about
midnight, the police, acting pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police and Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the
steamers “Corregidor” and “Negros”. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25, 1918. It was
contended that the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the hacienda of Yñigo
and Governor Sale

The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a government of
laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The law is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. The very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself.
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The official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted
the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it
within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods
were unlawful.

By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands ?

Even when the health authorities compel vaccination. Or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous
person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain
for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or
the chief of police of that city to force citizens — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers
of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are — other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the
contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly
authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression?

(1) Civil action- slow process
(2) criminal action
(3) habeas corpus- a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Aggressive War
The Philippines only renounces AGGRESSIVE war as an instrument of national policy. It does not renounce
defensive war.
Philippines Renounces Not Only War
As member of United Nations, the Philippines does not merely renounce war but adheres to Article 2(4) of
the UN charter which says: “ All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with Purposes of the United Nations.”

The phrase, “generally accepted principles of international law” refers to: norms of general or
customary international law, which are binding on all states.
Example:
1. Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy
2. Sovereign immunity
3. A person’s right to life, liberty and due process
4. Pactasuntservanda

What is customary international law? Explain.

Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris).” This statement contains the two basic elements of
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custom: the material factor that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor, that is,
why they behave the way they do.
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of States. This includes
several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long.
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the
generality of the practice.
Once the existence of State practice has been established it becomes necessary to determine why States
behave the way they do. Do States behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave
thus or do they it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio Juris or the belief that a certain form of behavior is
obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.

If there is no express declaration that the Philippines renounce war, can the Philippines engage in an
aggressive war?
Answer: No, because of the doctrine of incorporation under Sec. 2 of Art. II.

Rule in case of conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state:
1. Efforts should first to be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both.
2. In case the conflict is irreconcilable, jurisprudence dictates that the municipal courts should uphold
municipal law.

How does international law become part of domestic law for “dualists”?
In this regard, there are two theories. The first is the doctrine of transformation. This is based on a strict
dualist approach. Since the two systems are distinct and operate separately, for international law to
become part of domestic law it must be expressly and specifically transformed into domestic law
through the appropriate constitutional machinery such as an act of Congress or Parliament. This
doctrine flows by analogy from what is applicable to treaties. Treaties do not become part of the law of
a state unless it is consented to by the state. Section VII, Article 21 of the Constitution provides that “no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts.

What does Philippine law follow? In the case of treaties as international law, they become part of the
law of the land when concurred in by the Senate in accordance with Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which sets down the mechanism for transforming a treaty into binding municipal law.
With regard to customary law and treaties which have become customary law, by saying that the
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land,” the Constitution manifests its adherence to the “dualist” theory and at the same time adopts the
incorporation theory and thereby makes international law part of domestic law. This provision makes
the Philippines one of the states which make a specific declaration that international law has the force
also of domestic law.

What elements of international law become part of Philippine law by incorporation through
Article II, Section 2?
Since treaties become apart of Philippine law only by ratification, the principle of incorporation applies
only to customary law and to treaties which have become part of customary law. This distinction,
however, is sometimes blurred in some Philippine Supreme Court decisions.

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A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Has the
status of jus cogens.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni

Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such
commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese
Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of EO No. 68, which established a National War Crimes Offices and provides that persons
accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commission; and to permanently prohibit the
Military Commission from proceeding with the case of petitioner. Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is
illegal as the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering
Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of `crimes' not based on law, national and
international.

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including
the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been
guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity
and civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and
principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our
nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was
under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all,
our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those
who committed crimes against our people.

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. An important incident to a conduct of war is
the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is
fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war
criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
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Agustin vs Edu

A presidential (Pres. Marcos) letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized
early warning devices to prevent vehicular accidents was assailed for the lack of a legislative enactment
that would authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas clauses of the assailed
LOI:
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices.

Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even
under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from
any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
will conclude, without thinking, that there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled
which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the
danger of collision."

The early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory,
much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of
car owner's as petitioner so sweepingly concludes . . . Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket' may be committed by those called upon to enforce it . . . is an
unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an
unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral

The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under
P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs
and devices; .It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs 36 and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

It was a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police
power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence
indeed for this Court to invalidate legislative or executive act of that character.

Ichong vs Hernandez

Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated
several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of

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international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith. The law in effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business.

Why is the law enacted?

The public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade. Statistics reveal that in percentage
distribution of assets and of gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is
true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for
the numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six and seven times those
of the very many Filipino retailers (they gain more because they invest more capital) It is this
domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's
target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization law.

The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay
here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty
and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien
go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and country men. The experience of the country is
that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he
makes his profit.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the
less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic
control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.

"no franchise, certicate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.

Is there a violation of international treaties and obligations?

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly. We find no merit in the above contention. The United Nations Charter imposes no
strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of
the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations
Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in
most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to
the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of
China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
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qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State

It cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Gonzales vs Hechanova (executive agreement vs municipal law/ rice importation)

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of tons of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Petitioner Gonzales - a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association filed this petition, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207 - explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.”
Respondent contended among others that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into
two contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international
law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the
parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and
the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved - under the American jurisprudence - in
favor of the one which is latest in point of time.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been
sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the
President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive
is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not
only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are NOT treaties. Said theory may be justified
upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of
its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in
our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.
YES. Section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
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 error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts
in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452,
it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus populi est
suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents,
as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice
shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian
population. But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication
that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with
a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be
rejected — we still live under a rule of law.

In re Garcia

Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in Spain. Later, he
applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar
examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to practice the law
profession in the Philippines even without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Under said treaty, nationals of each of the two countries who have obtained the required degrees can
practice their professions within the territory of the other. Efren Garcia, a Filipino, finished law in the
University of Madrid, Spain and was allowed to practice the law profession therein. He invokes the
treaty in order for him to be allowed to practice in the Philippines without taking the bar examinations.

Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino
citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of
his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice
in the Philippines.
The privileges provided in the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and the Rules of Court
which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the
Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved
only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Question: Which prevails if there is a conflict between a treaty and a rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court?
Answer: It is the rule because it is based on the Constitution.

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What is a soft law? Is it an international law? Explain.
Soft law is an expression of non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence State behavior.

Give examples of soft law.

Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The UN
Declaration of Human Rights is an example.

What is the doctrine of autolimitations?

It is the doctrine wherein the Philippines adheres to principles of international law as a limitation to the
exercise of its sovereignty.

Whenever a State enters into a treaty, it surrenders a part of its sovereignty. How is the alleged
impairment of sovereignty balanced?
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

What is exterritoriality? Extra-territoriality?

Exterritoriality is the fiction in international law by virtue of which certain foreign persons and their
things are exempted from the jurisdiction of a State on the theory that they form an extension of the
territory of their own State. Extra-territoriality is the exemption of foreign persons from laws and
jurisdiction of a State in which they presently reside, an exemption which can only exist by virtue of a
treaty stipulation to this effect.

What war is renounced by the Philippines? Why?

What is renounced by the Philippines through the Constitution is aggressive war because of its membership in
the United Nations whose charter renounces war as an instrument of national policies of its member States.
The Philippines is also a signatory to the Kellog Brian Pact, a treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national
policies of the signatory States.

Does the Philippines renounce defensive war? Why?

No, because it is duty bound to defend its citizens. Under the Constitution, the prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people.

If there is a question raised before an international tribunal, is the treaty given preference?
If the dispute is raised before an international tribunal, the treaty is given preference.
If the issue is raised before a local tribunal, the municipal law or the Constitution shall prevail. In Ichong
vs. Hernandez, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law
because it did not contravene international law, and even if there is a conflict, the statute would prevail
because it is an exercise of police power. Police power is inherent in every State and it cannot be
bargained away.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.

Question: What do you mean by civilian supremacy?

Answer: civilian political leadership rather than professional military services.

Question: Is there still civilian supremacy during martial law?

Suggested Answer: Yes

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How is civilian supremacy ensured or institutionalized?
1. The installation of the President, the highest civilian authority, as the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces of the Philippines.
2. The requirement that the members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is
the fundamental law of the land.

*But this does not mean that civilian officials are superior to military officials. Civilian official are superior to
military officials only when a law makes them so.

Q: Is the provision an assertion of the political role of the military?

A: No. The phrase “protector of the people” was not meant to be an assertion of the political role of the
military. The intent of the phrase “protector of the people” was rather to make it as corrective to military
abuses experienced during martial rule.
Q: Does this mean that the military has no political role?
A: Bernas: The military exercise of political power can be justified as a last resort—when civilian
authority has lost its legitimacy.

What is the reason for the existence of the armed forces?

They exist in order to secure the sovereignty of the State, and to preserve the integrity of the national
territory. In extraordinary circumstances they may also be called upon to protect the people when
ordinary law and order forces need assistance.
Q: Is the PNP covered by the same mandate under Article II, Section 3?
A: No. This provision is specifically addressed to the AFP and not to the PNP, because the latter is separate
and distinct from the former.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

What is posse commitatus?

It is the power of the State to require all able-bodied citizens to perform civic duty to maintain peace and
order.

How does the first sentence differ from its counterpart in the 1973 Constitution?
The 1973 and the 1935 versions spoke of the “defense” of the State being a prime duty of government. It
therefore easily lent itself to interpretations which justified a national security state offensive to the
people. The present version places the emphasis on service to and protection of the people.
The phrase “under conditions provided by law” in the second sentence also emphasizes the primacy of
serving the interest of the people and protecting their rights even when there is need to defend the State.

People vs Lagman

Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with and convicted of refusal to register for
military training as required by the National Defense Law. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was
fatherless and had a mother and eight brothers to support, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to
support, had no military leanings, and did not wish to kill or be killed; and both claimed that the statute
was unconstitutional.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against
this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
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excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. This is so because the
right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to
defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.

Without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will,
against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place
in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. What
justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from
their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they
can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.

What are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy?
1. The maintenance of peace and order
2. The protection of life, liberty, and property
3. And the promotion of the general welfare

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Question: Does separation between church and state denies influence of religion on human affairs? No,
religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs. (Aglipay v Ruiz)
Reinforced By:
1. Sec. 5, Art. III (Freedom of religion clause)
2. Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C (religious sect cannot be registered as a political party)
3. Sec. 5(2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the religious sector)
4. Sec. 29(2), Art. VI (prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit.

Exceptions:
1. Sec. 28(3), Art. VI (churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly and exclusively used for religious
purposes shall be exempt from taxation)
2. Sec. 29(2), Art. VI (prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit, except when priest, etc., is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution or government orphanage or leprosarium
3. Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV (optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students)
4. Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV (Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions, except those
established by religious groups and mission boards.
Other laws (Aglipay Case)
1. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal
holidays (Sec 29 Admin Code)
2. Certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of
the state (Revised Penal Code)

THEISTIC VIEW
Question: What is the definition of religion in this particular case? Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
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NON-THEISTIC VIEW:
Question: What is the definition of religion in this particular case?
Federal and state courts have expanded the definition of religion in Seeger to include even non-theistic
beliefs such as Taoism or Zen Buddhism. It has been proposed that basically, a creed must meet four
criteria to qualify as religion under the First Amendment.
First, there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believers’ life.
Second, the religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective.
Third, a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or
reasonableness of the belief.
Fourth, there must be some associational ties, although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a
single person rather than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause.

Test to Determine Validity of Governmental Regulation Touching on the Wall of Separation

This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when:
(1) it has a secular legislative purpose;
(2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

What does the principle of separation of church and State mean?

It means that the State should not use its money and coercive power to establish religion. It should not
support a particular religion. The State is prohibited from interfering with purely ecclesiastical affairs. The
church is likewise prohibited from meddling in purely secular affairs. But it does not mean that there is
total or absolute separation. The better rule is symbiotic relations between the church and State.

Aglipay vs Ruiz

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The Director of Posts
announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating
the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church. Respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs
of the postage for printing. Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions
of Act. No. 4052 “ AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF P 60,000 FOR THE COST OF
PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS”

The union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use
the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. It
should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
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violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country." The socials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"

The stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila. What is emphasized
is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by
the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion
that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination
to mere incidental results not contemplated.

Garces v Estenzo

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
1) Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a
waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations.
2) Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and
until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church
during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.

The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a
mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the
church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the
authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1
and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is
entirely a secular matter. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion,
nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest
or clergyman.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was
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the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for
the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. The barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. The
barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any
suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña's
claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right
to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the
image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was
acquired with private funds and is its private property. Not every governmental activity which
involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning
the use of public money or property.

Taruc vs De la Cruz

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). Due to petitioners’ adamant
drive to create dissension within the diocese by celebrating their own open mass without participation
from the parish priest, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the
Philippine Independent Church. The good Bishop did so as a last resort, as he first pleaded to the
petitioners’ to cease from riling up the community against the diocese. Because of the order of
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop de la Cruz. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best

left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not
for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization
except for the protection of civil or property rights. We hold the Church and the State to be separate
and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's

In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in disputes
involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not
touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
“Since it is claimed that the ouster was made by an unauthorized person, or in a manner
contrary to the constitution of the church, and that the ousted bishops were not given notice of
the charges against them nor were they afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts,
have jurisdiction to review the action regarding said ouster. Expulsion of a member without
notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property
right is involved.”

We would, however, like to comment on petitioners' claim that they were not heard before they were
expelled from their church. The records show that Bishop de la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several
times not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the
consequences of their actions, among them their expulsion/excommunication from PIC. Yet, these
pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears and petitioners went ahead with their plans to defy their Bishop.
BPBARRION
They should now take full responsibility for the chaos and dissension they caused

Estrada vs Escritor

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Escritor’s husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is
still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a
resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Estrada, the complainant, respondent
should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such
act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed a “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They
have a single goal — to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices.
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties
for religious beliefs and practice, while
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards
for religious beliefs and practices.

Two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses. First is the
standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version
of strict neutrality or separation, or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers to as the second theory of
governmental neutrality. Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former, both are
anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a "wall of separation" must exist between the state and the
Church to protect the state from the church. Both protect the principle of church-state separation with a
rigid reading of the principle.

The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state
from the church, and the state's hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion
and state needs to be erected. Only the complete separation of religion from politics would
eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among
political views, thus a strict "wall of separation" is necessary.

The strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the governmental neutrality theory). believes
that the "wall of separation" does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state
must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. " strict
neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be
used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action
confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the
basis of government action. It does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular
programs to religious belief.
Problem: could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive,
or even active, hostility to the religious" which is prohibited by the Constitution. Strict
neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free exercise clause

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 Dilemma of the separationist approach: whether in the form of strict separation or strict
neutrality , is that while the Jeffersonian wall of separation "captures the spirit of the American
ideal of church-state separation," in real life, church and state are not and cannot be totally
separate. This is all the more true in contemporary times when both the government and religion
are growing and expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the
intersection of government and religion at many points.

On the other hand, the second standard, the benevolent neutrality or accommodation, is buttressed
by the view that the wall of separation is meant to protect the church from the state.

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." Thus, what is sought
under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law,
but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect," whether by the legislature or the
courts.

State regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes religious belief or conduct must be subjected to
strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. According to Sherbert (refusal to work on
Saturdays), when a law of general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the state
interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to override the free exercise
claim. Otherwise, the Court itself will carve out the exemption. When government action burdens, even
inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief or practice, the state must justify the burden by
demonstrating that the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive alternative exists, and
that a religious exemption would impair the state's ability to effectuate its compelling interest. This
general test established a strong presumption in favor of the free exercise of religion.

The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines:
a) free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test if
government substantially burdened the exercise of religion;
b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed cases where the burden was direct, i.e.,
the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where the burden
was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefit;
c) the Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general
application, whether general or criminal.

The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main components.

First, action was protected — conduct beyond speech, press, or worship was included in the shelter of
freedom of religion.
Second, indirect impositions on religious conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of
unemployment insurance benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct restraints, such as the criminal
prohibition at issue in Yoder, were prohibited.
Third, as the language in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was extensive. Only extremely
strong governmental interests justified impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of
the test of the Free Exercise Clause suggests.
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Fourth, the strong language was backed by a requirement that the government provide proof of the
important interest at stake and of the dangers to that interest presented by the religious conduct at issue.
Fifth, in determining the injury to the government's interest, a court was required to focus on the effect
that exempting religious claimants from the regulation would have, rather than on the value of the
regulation in general.

A free exercise claim could result to three kinds of accommodation:

a) mandatory accommodation: those which are found to be constitutionally compelled, i.e.,
required by the Free Exercise Clause; This accommodation occurs when all three conditions of
the compelling interest test are met (mentioned below)
b) permissive accommodation: those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by
the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment Clause (e.g., tax
exemptions in US but considered as MANDATORY in PH Consti; Victoriano vs Elizalde
case which exempts employees from coverage of closed shop agreement based on religious
objections); and
c) prohibited accommodation: those which the religion clauses prohibit (e.g., optional religious
instructions in public schools).

Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the question now remains
as to how the Court should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-
accommodation approach. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and
not merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. Strict scrutiny is appropriate for free
exercise challenges because "[t]he compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's
mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.
Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny

We therefore reject total adherence to the U.S. Court's interpretation of the religion clauses to
effectively deny accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and of general
application. Our own Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and exempt
religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of general
application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and permissive
accommodations (e.g., American Bible Society case which exempts procurement of municipal license
for selling bibles; Ebralinag case which granted exemption from saluting to the PH flag).

The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process.

First, "[H]as the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?"
Second, the court asks: "[I]s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty?"
Third, the court asks: "[H]as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?"

On this point, two things must be clarified: first, in relation to criminal statutes, only the question of
mandatory accommodation is uncertain, for Philippine law and jurisprudence have, in fact, allowed
legislative accommodation (Multiple marriages allowed under Muslim law). Second, the power of the
Courts to grant exemptions in general (i.e., finding that the Free Exercise Clause required the
accommodation, or mandatory accommodations) has already been decided, not just once, but twice by

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the Court. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether this Court can make exemptions as in Ebralinag and
the American Bible Society, in cases involving criminal laws of general application.

It has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty or property, the
Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by the requirement of "due process,"
"unreasonableness," or "lawful order." Only the right to free speech is comparable in its absolute
grant. Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language, the Court cannot simply
dismiss a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause, solely on the premise that the law in
question is a general criminal law. If the burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief is not in
question, adherence to the benevolent neutrality accommodation approach require that the Court make
an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.

The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights
— "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not
enough to contend that the state's interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to
religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in
preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses.

APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE

In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or
bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to prosecute respondent
nor her partner. The State's asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. To deny the exemption would effectively break up "an otherwise ideal union of
two individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately 25 years]" and
have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the family.

Even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that
the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.

The Court grants respondent exemption from the laws which respondent Escritor has been charged to
have violated, the exemption would not apply to Catholics who have secured church annulment of
their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil court. First, unlike Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Catholic faith considers cohabitation without marriage as immoral. Second, but more important, the
Jehovah's Witnesses have standards and procedures which must be followed before cohabitation
without marriage is given the blessing of the congregation. This includes an investigative process
whereby the elders of the congregation verify the circumstances of the declarants. Also, the Declaration
is not a blanket authority to cohabit without marriage because once all legal impediments for the
couple are lifted, the validity of the Declaration ceases, and the congregation requires that the couple
legalize their union.

We find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor's
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based
on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms — including religious freedom — may be enjoyed. Although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation
of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests; The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
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WON the conjugal arrangement was immoral
YES but justified. While there is no dispute that under settled jurisprudence, respondent's conduct
constitutes "disgraceful and immoral conduct," the case at bar involves the defense of religious
freedom. We cannot summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is likewise so "odious" and
"barbaric" as to be immoral and punishable by law.

STATE POLICIES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.

The word “relations” covers the whole gamut of treaties and international agreements and other kinds of
intercourse.
Policy of the State with respect to foreign relations: in the case of Magallona v Ermita, the right to
innocent passage.

Tanada vs Angara

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine
Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national
treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First”
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either.

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
"economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community."

However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations."
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The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment
of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines its
officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-
GATT. Sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the
family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in
the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in
weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively
through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom
from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Question: Supposing the nuclear weapon is for defense of the territory, would that violate the
constitution?
Answer: Yes, the Constitution provide that the Philippines pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.
What is the constitutional policy on nuclear weapons?
The Constitution prescribes a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons. The policy includes the prohibition
not only of the possession, control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also nuclear arms tests.
Exception to this policy may be made by the political departments; but it must be justified by the
demands of the national interest. (“consistent with the national interest.”) But the policy does not
prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (Bernas Primer)
What is the implication of this policy for the presence of American troops or for any American
military base that might be established in the Philippines?
Any new agreement on bases or the presence of troops, if ever there is one, must embody the basic policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be well within the power of government to demand ocular
inspection and removal of nuclear arms.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life
for all.

Why should we promote a just and dynamic social order?

It is the foundation of a strong and prosperous nation. Poverty and injustice are the root causes of the
public discontent which gives rise to chaos and disorder, and later, to a revolution.

Saluspopuliestsupremalex: welfare of an individual yields to that of the community

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

What are the underlying principles of Sections 9 and 10?

They derive from the premises that poverty and gross inequality are major problems besetting the nation
and that these problems assault the dignity of the human person.
What has been the special impact of the social justice provision in Philippines jurisprudence?
The provision has been chiefly instrumental in the socialization of the State’s attitude to property rights
thus gradually eradicating the vestiges of laissez faire in the Philippine society.

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Calalang vs Williams

The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and
1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from
the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to reduce traffic. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a
taxpayer challenges its constitutionality contending that the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an infringement
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.

The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number.

The enactment of said law was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
The state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority.

"The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which
wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

Almeda vs CA

Respondent Gonzales is a share tenant of Angeles et al., on land devoted to sugar cane and coconuts.
The landowners sold the property to petitioners Almeda without notifying respondent in writing of the
sale. Respondent thus sued for redemption before the CAR. Petitioners counter that long before the
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered the sale of
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the land to respondent but the latter said that he had no money; that respondent, instead, went
personally to the house of petitioners and implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else
would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent is a mere dummy of someone
deeply interested in buying the land; that respondent made to tender of payment or any valid
consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for redemption.

Prior to enactment of Agricultural Land Reform Code: No right of preference in the sale of
the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer. The absence of this right freely
opened the way to the landlords to ease out their tenants from the land by ostensible conveyance
of said land to another tenant who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first tenant on ground of
personal cultivation.
After enactment: Impressed with the policy of the State, among other things, to make the
small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens. More importantly, a new
right was given to the tenants-farmers: the right of pre-emption and redemption (if land sold to
third person without knowledge of agricultural lessee).
Is this right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes.
There is nothing readable or even discernible in the law denying to tenants in sugar lands the
right of pre-emption and redemption

It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State,
in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." One
governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil
and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till.

In this case, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price accompanied the
filing of the redemption suit. Respondent is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land.

Ondoy vs Ignacio

The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio
Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s
enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and
thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Petitioner asked for compensation, however, the
testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the hearing officer due to lack of merit.
Respondent denied employer-employee relationship

"To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A
realistic view is that : 'As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance.
Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection."

In the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted.
Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law. It was proven that
the deceased drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping enterprise of
private respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of

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employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.
There is need, it seems, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high
estate accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and
protection to labor."

Salonga vs Farrales

Defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land. Even prior to the acquisition by
defendant Farrales of the land aforesaid, plaintiff Salonga was already in possession as lessee of some
156 square meters thereof, on which she had erected a house, paying rentals thereon first to the
original owners and later to defendant Farrales. Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-payment of
rentals against plaintiff. Judgment was later rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the
therein defendants, including plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them
and to pay rentals in arrears. Evidence showed that plaintiff offered to purchase from said plaintiff's
order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently refused such offer, and instead, insisted to
execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant
Farrales praying the latter be ordered to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in question.

Whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint for specific performance on the
ground that there exists no legally enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-
appellee Farrales can be compelled to sell the piece of land in question

There is here no perfected contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to
enforce against defendant Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the
land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not change the situation because, as to
said other lessees, a perfected contract existed — which is not the case with plaintiff.

As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar, it
must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners
who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in
our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not
entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.

Section 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
right.

Secretary of Defense vs Manalo

Brothers Manalo were abducted in Fort Magsaysay by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA (18 people in the bartolina). After 18
months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape,
they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said
case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo
petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
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the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody.

Background of Amparo Rule: It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime. It is intended to address the intractable problem of 1) "extralegal killings" and 2)
"enforced disappearances”. It originated in Mexico.

The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full an exhaustive proceedings.
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of
silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

While respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that
they are not "free in every sense of the word" as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that
people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are
still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life,
liberty and security." Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept
captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.

While the right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive — upon which the enjoyment of all
other rights is preconditioned — the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of
this life, viz.: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
.
In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist,
and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament,
and lawful desires of the individual."
Permutations of the exercise of right to security:
1) the right to security of person is "freedom from fear"
2) the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security
3) the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government

In the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat". While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty.
In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of
person to be invoked.

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 Rationale: To allow a State to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons
within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant (i.e.,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves
perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of
petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
government.

Q: When does life begin?

A: Life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
Q: meeting of sperm and egg, is that a human life?
A: 46 chromosomes, which is origin in every human being, hence, it is considered as human life. But
human life is different from civil personality.
Why do we say that the family is a basic Autonomous social institution?
The principle of autonomy is learned and practiced at home before it is learned in school. It is a basic
political unit of our society. The father, as the head of the family is the President of the home, and the
mother, is the Vice-President who takes over the governance in case of death or incapacity of her husband.
The children and the household are the members of the family, who are duty-bound to follow the rules at
home.
The family is a social institution because it forms part of the community. Without a family or a group of
families, the community has no one to depend on for any project it wishes to carry out. The government in
every community is the agency or instrumentality through which the wishes of the people are made
known and implemented. All the governments, taken together, form part of the Republic of the PH.
Effect of the Declaration of Family Autonomy
It accepts the principle that the family is anterior to the State and not a creature of the State. It protects the
family from instrumentalization by the State.
What is the legal meaning and purpose of the protection guaranteed for the unborn?
First, it is NOT an assertion that the unborn is a LEGAL person. Second, this is not an assertion that the life of
the unborn is placed exactly on the level of the life of a mother.
The best interest of the child can override procedural rules and even the rights of the parents to the custody of
their children.
Purpose of Assertion of Protection of the Unborn
The purpose of the assertion that the protection begins from the time of conception is to prevent the State
form adopting the doctrine in Roe v. Wade which liberalized abortion laws up to the sixth month of pregnancy
by allowing abortion any time during the first six months of pregnancy provided it can be done without danger
to the mother.

Obergefell vs Hodges

The petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of the same sex and having
their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and conditions as marriages between persons of the
opposite sex.

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 1) Obergefell, gay, living in with partner Arthur for more than 10 years. They lived in Michigan
where same sex marriage is not allowed. Arthur was diagnosed with ALS. Arthur wishes to
marry Obergefell before he die. They went to Baltimore Maryland where same sex marriage is
allowed. Arthur was so sick that they celebrated marriage inside the plane. Arthur then died.
Obergefell wished he be recognized as the surviving spouse in the death certificate.
2) DeBoer and Rowse (both lesbian nurses) live in Michigan where only legally married spouses
may jointly adopt. Each of them has respective wards, but they cannot substitute with one
another whenever one is absent. They wanted to build a family where each has a responsibility
in the other’s ward.
3) Army Reserve DeKoe and partner Kostura (both gay) were married in New York. They then
settled in Tennessee where same sex marriage is not allowed. De Koe travels a lot, as a result,
their marriage is recognized as valid in one state, and invalid in another. They want stability and
continuity.
The two questions presented by the case—the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans (the
“marriage question”) and the constitutionality of bans on recognizing same-sex marriages (the
“recognition” question)—were among various issues jointly presented in several related cases.

The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not
be deprived of that right and that liberty.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples:
a) the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy (i.e., the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State)
b) the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals (i.e., offers the hope of companionship and
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the
other).
c) it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing,
procreation, and education (i.e., many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to
their children; Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents).
d) marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. The States have throughout our history
made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and
responsibilities (e.g., taxation, succession,etc.) There is no difference between same- and
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. Laws excluding same-sex
couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic
charter.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its
inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.

Religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate that same-sex
marriage should not be condoned. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or
indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who
disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit
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the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the
opposite sex.

Whether the Constitution requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of
State
There is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed
in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

Justice Leonen opinion on same-sex marriage:

 The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly state that marriage should be between opposite-sex
couples only. “What is so wrong with people whose happiness is to have same-sex
partnerships? What is so wrong with that?” Are we not dictating what we want on other human
beings? Are we not going to interpret the Constitution and the law in such a way that we wish
and what we desire is imposed upon another couple? And I do not see – unless you can explain
to me – what is the harm of allowing a lesbian or gay couple do what ever they wish.”
 Why do we interpret our laws and Constitution in such a way that we impose something on the
freedoms and happiness of others without showing a very viable reason except tradition?” “We
choose only portions of the past that we like and call it a tradition that we must preserve,”
 Same-sex marriage battles were won only after a rigorous political process, such as tackling it
in parliament first, and having thorough consultations with other institutions like the Church.
 Same-sex couples can enter into legal contracts wherein they can specify their rights, whereas
married heterosexual couples can only do so via a pre-nuptial agreement. There are laws that
can be amended to address the rights that same-sex couples say they are deprived of, like
amending adoption law to allow same-sex couples to jointly adopt children. “Why is amending
the law on marriage more urgent than other laws?”

Imbong vs Ochoa (with Leonen dissent)

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health
and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection
clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions. It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management
perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored

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contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

On Right to Life:
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

The Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear
because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb (third kind). The theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal
or scientic mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object — it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it
is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as
an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used. Thus, the word "primarily" in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."

The Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles:
"principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." These principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

On Right to Religion:
The petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. The Court is of the view that the obligation to
refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and
the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious
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objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle
of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to
life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner
would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced
referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not
contemplate an emergency."

Principle of Double-Effect. — intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never
justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life
of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in
favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no
direct harm is intended to the other. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their
lives are equally valuable.

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend
family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance against
their religious beliefs. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. Those who receive any information during their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to
reject the information

On Family:

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because it violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding
into marital privacy and autonomy. “ Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in
case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail” It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity. The Court
agrees.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent
or had suffered a miscarriage. The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal
litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family.

Equally deplorable is the provision that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need
to tame population growth. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It disregards and disobeys the constitutional
mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."
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Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority

J. Leonen dissent:
a) The court cannot make a declaration on the beginning of life. Any declaration on this
issue will be fraught with contradictions. Even the Constitutional Commissioners were
not in full agreement; hence, the use of the word "conception" rather than "fertilized
ovum". Moreover, declaring the beginning of life complicates future constitutional
adjudication. This will have real repercussions on, among others, acceptable medical
procedures for ectopic pregnancies, medical complications as a result of pregnancy
resulting from sexual assaults, and on assisted reproductive technologies.
b) The petitions have failed to present clear cases when the provisions for conscientious
objection would truly amount to a violation of The majority has decided to nullify
portions of the law on the basis of inchoate Catholic doctrine without considering that
the law as phrased would be acceptable to other faiths, consciences and beliefs
c) The law breaks the deadlock when there is disagreement between the spouses as to
whether to avail of a reproductive health technology. The majority, in refusing to
acknowledge the autonomy of individuals over their own bodies even in the context of
marriage, has just strengthened patriarchy and increased the possibility for spousal
abuse.
d) There is no actual controversy here. Courts are not structured to predict facts, acts or
events that will still happen. Unlike the legislature, we do not determine policy. Unlike
Province of North Cotabato, there is yet no implementation of the RH law. The waiver
of justiciability is the exception. It is not the general rule.

Virtuoso vs Municipal Judge

Francisco Virtouso, Jr., a minor, 17 y/o, was charged with robbery of a TV Set. He filed an application
for the writ of habeas corpus because respondent Municipal judge of Mariveles, Bataan, failed to meet
the strict standard required by the constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause and
alleged that the bail imposed was clearly excessive. It was ascertained that Virtouso is a 17y/o minor
entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, a youthful offender being
defined therein as “one who is over nine years but under 18 years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense.” As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of the
court.

Pursuant to Sec.191 of P.D. No. 603, the court resolved that Virtouso, being a 17 year old minor,
should be released. Additionally, it held that whenever appropriate, courts should give vitality and force
to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate:
“The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being.”

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.”

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Section 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
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Section 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Q: What does the right to a balanced and healthful ecology imply? Explain.
A: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it, the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.

Oposa vs Factoran

Petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. They instituted the
present complaint, in behalf of their generation as well as generations yet unborn alleging that they are
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s
virgin tropical forests. They prayed for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae.

On legal standing of petitioners:

Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology.

On existence of cause of action:

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self preservation and self-perpetuation.

As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed
to exist from the inception of humankind.
If inherent then why still provided in the Constitution?
It is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers
and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the
said right.

On non-impairment of contracts

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A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even
an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the
non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually
been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state.

Laguna Lake Development vs CA

Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed
a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation
of an open garbage dumpsite in the area due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. After finding that the dumpsites
were maintained without the necessary certificate and clearance, and that the water collected were
contaminated with bacteria, LLDA issued an Order, through which it asked the PNP to assist in
prohibiting that entry of all garbage dump tracks into the dumpsite. This prompted Caloocan City
Government to file a complaint with the RTC. It sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction invoking the general welfare clause in the LGC.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized
in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces. Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order". However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the
power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No.
927. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express
powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives
vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies.

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Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports,
to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.

In the matter of education, the primary and natural right belongs to the parents. The State has a secondary
and supportive role.
Foreign Language. The State cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children before they
reach a certain age. Such restriction does violence both to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.
(Meyer v. Nebraska)
Public School. The State cannot require children to attend only public schools before they reach a certain
age. The child is not a mere creature of the State. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right to recognize and prepare him. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters)
ParensPatriae. However, as parenspatriae, the State has the authority and duty to step in where parents fail to
or are unable to cope with their duties to their children.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.

-What is meant when labor is called a primary social and economic force?
-It means that the human factor has primacy over non-human factors in production.
-What does protection to labor include?
-Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social
justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, CANNOT take a
backseat to the government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our
workers, local or overseas. In reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers, what
concerns the Constitution more paramount is that such an employment be, above all, decent, just and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty
bound to provide them adequate protection, personally, and economically, while away from home.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

This is a guide for interpreting provisions on national economy and patrimony. Any doubt must be
resolved in favor of self-reliance and independence and in favor of Filipinos.

Q:What is the nature of the power of the State to control and regulate trade?
A: It is an exercise of police power of the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino
citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him without the due process of law.

Garcia vs BOI

Under P.D. No. 1803, 576 hectares of the public domain in Limay, Bataan were reserved for the
Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC). Bataan Petrochemical Corp. (BPC) was formed by Taiwanese
investors, who applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic petrochemicals producer. BPC was
eventually issued a certificate of registration, given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other
incentives by BOI. Later, however, the major investor in BPC desire to amend its original registration
certification by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas and by changing the feedstock
from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG. The reason for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable
labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by

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the Philippine Shell Corporation. Petitioner Garcia opposed the proposal, but this did not stop the BOI
from approving the revision of BPC’s registration.

"Does the investor have a 'right of final choice' of plant site? Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor
in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a "'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's
choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI. By submitting its application
and amended application to the BOI for approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of
our Government.

It is the duty of the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,
Article II of the Constitution.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated like a
garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of
computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical
industry is essential to the national interest. the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving
the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the
investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding . No cogent advantage to the
government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems
best for the national interest. Moreover, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a
partner in the venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a
participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational
corporation

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is
shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors
not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain
murky to say the least. A great Filipino leader once said that said he would not mind having a
government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not
even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do
with our heritage.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Q: Is it a laissez faire?
A: While ideal in a utilitarian state, it has not been accorded respect in this State.
Q: What is the Welfare State Concept of Government? State its basis in the Constitution.
A: Under this principle, every government activity is an essential means of achieving the greatest good for
the greatest number and the State is responsible for the general and social welfare of the people. Although
the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the
power to intervene whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, as reflected in Sections
6 and 19 of Article XII.
Q: What is the principle of laissez faire?
A: It means let alone. It means that the government should leave the economic and social forces at work
without any interference on its part. It is the foundation of capitalism. This provision has been rejected by the
Constitution because of the expanded provisions on social justice.
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Section 20 is no more than an acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation.
However, it is not a call for official abdication of duty of the State to citizenry to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so requires

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Comprehensive rural development includes not only agrarian reform. It also encompasses a broad spectrum of
social, economic, human, cultural, political and even industrial development.

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of DAR

“Land for the Landless” is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. Through the brooding centuries, this slogan has become a battle-
cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their
place in the sun. In these consolidated cases, the constitutionality of several measures are challenged, to
wit: P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law). The CARP Law is
challenged in so far as Sec.18 thereof requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefore in less than money.

The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the
constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till.

The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the
power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of
taxation. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power
but of the power of eminent domain.

On just compensation
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation
is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that
medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought
to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with
here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the
population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished

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farmer to the land-glutted owner. Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos but billions
of pesos.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when
they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation
would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. The
other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped
that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forbearance and
even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian
reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

On constitutionality
The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary,
by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. To be
sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and
rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we
have to start somewhere.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the
day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At
last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will
give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living.

Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode
of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

The wording of the provision is unequivocal — the farmers and regular farmworkers have a right TO
OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2)
modes of land distribution — direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is
the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective
ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by
individual farmers. By using the word "collectively," the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of
land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that land reform
may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.

Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657:

a) Sec. 29 allows workers' cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the
b) Sec. 31 paragraph 2 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the
farmers becoming stockholders or members
The farmers will work on the agricultural land "sama-sama" or collectively. Thus, the main requisite
for collective ownership of land is collective or group work by farmers of the agricultural land.
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Irrespective of whether the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of farmers,
as long as concerted group work by the farmers on the land is present, then it falls within the ambit of
collective ownership scheme.

We emphasize that Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does not constrict Congress to
passing an agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by farmers and no
other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise,
the framers of the Constitution would have worded said section in a manner mandatory in character.

Although success is not guaranteed, a cooperative or a corporation stands in a better position to secure
funding and competently maintain the agri-business than the individual farmer. While direct singular
ownership over farmland does offer advantages, such as the ability to make quick decisions
unhampered by interference from others, yet at best, these advantages only but offset the disadvantages
that are often associated with such ownership arrangement.

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian
reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then
it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the
common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will
have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP
must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC.

TODAY: It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, 113 amending Sec. 7 of RA
6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec.
31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of
acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all intents
and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option
under existing law.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.

What is the reason for section 22?

-There should be national unity and development, not only in cities and urban centers but also in the rural
areas. The indigenous cultural communities are, in fact, the paces that deserve attention of the
government, the same being the place where trivial Filipinos lived since time immemorial. Their culture is
a rich heritage. Their ancestral land should be preserved.
What does ANCESTRAL LANDS include?
-For purposes of this Act, ancestral land of each indigenous cultural community shall include, but not
limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and its
members; provided that the Torrens System shall be respected. (sec.9(2), R.A. 6657)

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations
that promote the welfare of the nation.

What is the reason for sec. 23?

-It serves to create or induce more participation from the said organizations, which, in turn, will help the
government in finding out ways and means to improve them and their communities. The provision
recognizes the principle that volunteerism and participation of non-governmental organizations in national
development should be encouraged.

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Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

The NTC is justified to require PLDT to enter into an interconnection agreement with a cellular mobile
telephone system. The order was issued in recognition of the vital role of communications in nation-building
and to ensure that all users of the public telecommunications service have access to all other users of service
within the Philippines. (PLDT v. NTC)

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by
the President. (Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, 2002)
Nature of the power of taxation of LGUs
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies,
no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article V of the
1987 Constitution. The exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide
which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy (MIAA v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, Sept. 11, 1996).
NOTE: While the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because although the mandate to impose
taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all encompassing as
it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5, Article X of the 1987
NOTES:
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to
loca governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
authority.
Nachura:
Administrative autonomy may involve the devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following
national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code.
Q: What are the purposes of the guarantee of local autonomy?
A: 1.To give LGU’s the initiative and widest participation in the administration of their own affairs. Only
the LGU and its people have knowledge of their own needs, problems, and solutions to the same;
2.Asaprt of the political education process of the people, the local government being the smallest
government unit;
3.To release the LGUs from the almost monolithic control of the national government; and
4.To make the LGUs become self-reliant communities.

BASCO vs PAGCOR (May 1991 case)

PAGCOR was given a franchise to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos within the
Philippines.. As a result, P.D. 1869 (issued 1983 before the 1987 Consti) was issued to enable the
Government, through PAGCOR, to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. Petitioner Basco, et al., filed this present petition, seeking to annul the
PAGCOR Charter --- PD 1869, because Section 13 par 2 of the same PD which exempts PAGCOR
from paying any tax, any kind of term income or otherwise as well as fees, charges as levies of
whatever nature whether national or local is violative of the principles of local autonomy for it is a
waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees.

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation (mere creature of Congress) has no inherent
right to impose Taxes. Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax.

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law (power of control). Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until
"amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause"
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remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It
cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not
make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role (i.e., to
regulate)is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt
from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a
mere Local government. PAGCOR is a GOCC with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government.

The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits"
was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore,
only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. This doctrine emanates from
the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments”.

Limbona vs Mangelin

Cong. Matalam, House of Representatives Committee on Muslim Affairs Chair invited Sultan Limbona
in his capacity as speaker of the Assembly (Central Mindanao) to participate in consultation and
dialogue regarding the charting of the autonomous government of Muslim Mindanao to be held in
Manila. Limbona sent a telegram to all the Assembly members informing that “there will be no session
this November” in view of the invitation of Cong. Matalam. This notwithstanding, the Assembly held
session and declared the seat of the Speaker vacant, thereby prompting Limbona to file this petition,
assailing the Acts of the Assembly.

Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts (so that courts may rule on the validity of the session)? In other
words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX
and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential
Decree No. 1618. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions
"[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution," specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters
which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government. In relation to the central
government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the Autonomous Regions.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
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supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the
other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, uacting through the President (and the
DILG). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts
are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, the court may assume jurisdiction.

Discussions on associative principle per Province of Cotabato case

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative",
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to
be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the Comprehensive Compact.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free association represents a middle ground between
integration and independence. In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually
been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence

Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, etc.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or
municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship
with the national government. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence.

An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
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Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access of opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.
What is the purpose of this provision?
-Its purpose is to give substance to the desire for equalization of political opportunities. However the
definition of “political dynasties” is left to the legislature.

Pamatong vs COMELEC

Petitioner Pamatong filed his COC for the 2004 Presidential Elections but the COMELEC declared him
as a nuisance candidate along with 35 others. Pamatong seeks to reverse COMELEC resolutions which
were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service”
under Sec.26, Art.II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so
doing, Pamatong further argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions
on the electoral process and limited the power of sovereign people to choose their leaders.

There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek
the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section
26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of
an enforceable right.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration
of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access”
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which
they create.

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national
positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to
the government. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

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Rationale: The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public
concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
Access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making
by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.

Q: How to determine if a particular information is a matter of public concern?

A: No rigid test can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
Q: Why is right to information essential?
A: Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated.
What are the 3 basic principles emphasized by section 27 and 28?
1. PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. Under this principle, public officials in all ladders of our
government should always remember that they were merely entrusted by the people to perform duties
and responsibilities of their offices for a fixed period of time. They were chosen to serve the people, not to
cheat them. Their offices are not their own, nor can they be treated as private properties which they can
manage or dispose of at their whim and caprice.
2. OURS IS A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF MEN. The law should be applied equally without
fear or favor. No one in this Republic, not even the President, is above the law.
3. TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC SERVICE. Because public officials are mere trustees of the people, they
should observe loyalty and fidelity to the people who have entrusted to
It is well established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure
is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged
in nature. (Akbayan v. Aquino, 2008)

Legaspi vs CSC

Legaspi filed this instant case against the Civil Service Commission, which had earlier denied his
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
Cebu City Health Department. Legaspi claims that his right to be informed is guaranteed by the
constitution, hence, the prayer for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
CSC to disclose said information.

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right
to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may
be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a
Mandamus proceeding such as this one.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a
public right. when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general "public" which possesses the right.

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Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of
public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised
by the public. The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright
the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which
the access is to be afforded. The first (i.e., refuse outright) is a limitation upon the availability of access
to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose. The second (i.e., regulate) pertains
to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access
is to be exercised solely to the end that:
1) damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided,
2) undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly,
3) that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion.

The availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e.,
(a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, AND,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern.

In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law
from the operation of the guarantee.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express
limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty
of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying
the position becomes imperative

Province of Cotabato case

Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading
to the consummation of the contract.
Rationale: Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement
will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

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Intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of
public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands.

WON Section 28 is a self executing provision

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards". The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go
hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is
already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public
interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence
of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

Valmonte vs Belmonte

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. Said request was denied upon GSIS’ opinion that a confidential relationship
exists between GSIS and all those who borrow from it.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application
by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes
hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in the public
service. *** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making
as well in checking abuse in government.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public
character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing
interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of
the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not
to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.

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The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right
to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny

The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the
loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the
coverage and scope of the right to information. Considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are
accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of
public concern.

Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato

Petitioner, a member of respondent MTRCB, wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions (Movie here was “Mahirap ang
Magmahal”). It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the
board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the
nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. Petitioner
counters that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for
reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents have no authority
to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.

May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official
capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the
case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of
performing official functions.
Rationale: To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable
mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.

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Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. The Constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of
access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board
concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. If it be wrong to publish the contents
of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon
to devise a remedy ."

Petitioner's request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents
or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve
disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the
right of access to official records.

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