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Heffernan 1 PDF
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(~) 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
GEORGE HEFFERNAN
Merrimack College, North Andover, MA 01845, USA
Introduction
Husserl writes a great deal about evidence as well as a whole lot about Des-
cartes, but not very much about both evidence and Descartes. This essay deals
with Husserl's critique of Descartes' conception of evidence. The first part
outlines the development of Hussed's reaction to Descartes' idea of evidence.
A first excursus lays out the basic features of Descartes' conception of episte-
mic justification independently of Husserl's critique. The second part treats
of the actual phenomenological critique of the Cartesian view of evidence. A
second excursus compares and contrasts Husserl's critique of Descartes on
evidence with those of a few of the latter's contemporaries. The third part
sketches the phenomenological account of evidence with a view to making
clear what philosophical advantages it offers over the Cartesian approach.
The conclusion functions as a prospectus indicating the shortcomings of the
investigations undertaken here and now and the possibilities held out by future
analyses in this area.
As a protreptic, suffice it to say that the relationship between Husserl and
Descartes is a complicated one that has already been subject to considerable
analysis. Indeed, Husserl himself is partially responsible for the common
perception of transcendental phenomenology as a kind of Neo-Cartesianism
in that he entitles one of his most widely read works after Descartes. Yet it is
often overlooked that on the first page of that work Husserl already emphasizes
that it is necessary for him to reject almost the entire doctrinal content of Des-
cartes' philosophy. Thus, from Husserl's standpoint, the general relationship
between himself and Descartes is ambivalent. For, on the one side, he praises
Descartes for his commitment to the realization of the ideal of an absolute,
adequate, and apodictic justification of scientific knowledge; and, on the other
side, he blames Descartes for failing to recognize the only effective means to
this end.
90 GEORGE HEFFERNAN
Without assuming that the order in which Hussed develops his critique of
Descartes' conception of evidence and the order in which he presents it
coincide, one can classify the texts through which Husserl's critique of Des-
cartes' conception of evidence evolves, in so far as they are available in the
series "Husserliana", into three distinct groups.
The first group comprises those texts which are of little consequence in
regard to Husserl's position on Descartes' conception of evidence; the second,
those which are of major importance; and the third, those which, though not
themselves of comparable weight, do link the treatments in the main texts.
Here the texts of the second group will stand in the forefront.
Some of Hussed's works do not refer to evidence in Descartes' sense, for
example, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), 2 Studies on Arithmetic and Geo-
metry (1886-1901),3 Phantasy, Pictorial Consciousness, Recollection (1898-
1925), 4 On the Phenomenology of lntersubjectivity (1905-1935), 5 Thing and
Space (1907), 6 Analyses of Passive Synthesis (1918--1926), 7 et cetera - even
Experience and Judgment (1938). 8 Some of these cases may be surprising.
But it is not possible here and now to go into this.
In fact, the best way to understand the development of Husserl's critique of
Descartes' conception of evidence is to take, as the main stations, his three
principal works in which the theory of knowledge dominates, that is, the
"early" Logical Investigations (1900/01-1913/21), 9 the "middle" Ideas on a
Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1) (1913 ), 10 and
the "late" Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929).11 To do so is to be able
to observe a remarkable phenomenon.
First, in the Investigations Husserl's attitude toward Descartes' philosophy
in general is hardly a factor in the analysis) 2 Also, although Husserl does
twice refer to what he characterizes as "die Cartesianische Zweifelsbetrach-
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 91
Husserl lets Descartes reenter the text, he does so in the context of reflections
on the question of evidence.
This example of how much Husserl's attitude toward Descartes can "shift"
within a given text suffices also to show how hopeless it would be, given the
restrictive constraints of a brief survey, to try to do justice to any but the most
rudimentary aspects of the relationship between these figures. 26 Therefore,
as far as the delimitation proposed here is concerned, since Husserl - who
tends to repeat h i m s e l f - mentions Descartes at least several times in almost
all his works, one does best to confine oneself to the main works. 27 For too
much philology can entail too little philosophy.
But the first thing is a quick look at Descartes' account of epistemic justi-
fication as provided in the Meditations on First Philosophy. For Husserl's
critique relies very heavily on this source, and this is justified. 28
The arguments of the Meditations, whose purpose is to prove the existence
of God and to demonstrate the real distinction of the human soul from the
body and thus the immortality of the soul, may be arranged thus:
Meditation I a r g u e s - among other things - that, if even the most basic
beliefs can be doubted, then so can virtually all beliefs; but that even the
most basic beliefs can be doubted; and that therefore virtually all beliefs
can be doubted. 29
Meditation 11 argues - among other things - that, if I (am) think(ing),
then I am; but that I (am) think(ing); and that therefore I am. 3°
Meditation III a r g u e s - among other t h i n g s - that all that which I very
clearly and distinctly perceive is true; but that the idea of God that I have
is that idea which I perceive most clearly and distinctly of all the ideas
that I have; and that therefore the idea of God that I have is the most true
idea of all the ideas that I have. 31
Meditation IV argues - among other things - that God is the author
of all clear and distinct perceptions; but that God is veracious; and that
therefore every clear and distinct perception is veridical. 32
Meditation V argues - among other things - that the essence of God
is to possess all perfections; but that existence is a perfection; and that
therefore God exists. 33
Meditation 111argues- among other things- that the teaching of nature
informs me that the ideas of sensible things in me come from sensible
things outside me; but that God, the source of the teaching of nature, is
not a deceiver; and that therefore corporeal things exist. 34
94 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
Preliminary Remarks
What does Husserl say about all this? To put it bluntly: He accuses Des-
cartes of "circularity". Here one must be careful. For Husserl's version of
"the Cartesian circle" is sui generis and it would thus be wrong to think
that he is merely repeating a critique already advanced by Descartes' own
contemporaries. Rather, one has to work out the peculiarity of the Husserlian
critique of the Cartesian conception of evidence. Hence the question: Wherein
exactly- according to Husserl - does the circularity in Descartes' conception
of evidence consist?
The best way to find an answer is to examine carefully the major texts in
which Husserl takes a position on Descartes' account of evidence. In doing
so, one has to keep in mind two things: On the one hand, one may not reduce
Husserl's critique of Descartes on evidence to the issue of circularity; on the
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 95
other hand, one must grasp the issue of circularity as the essence of Husserl's
critique of Descartes on evidence.
The following interpretation of Husserl's critique of Descartes' conception
of evidence consists of an explication of the texts in which that critique
is located. Three aspects of the critique emerge as crucial. First, there is
the fundamental epistemological problem which - according to Husserl -
Descartes faces, namely, the problem of how to get from the immanence
of consciousness to the transcendence of being. Second, there is the basic
solution which Descartes - once again according to Husserl - proposes,
namely, the making of logical inferences from the thinking thing via the
divine veracity to the extended things. Third, there is - yet again following
Husserl - what is supposed to be faulty about Descartes' procedure, namely,
its inherent, ineluctable, and vicious circularity.
The first time that Husserl leans systematically on Descartes for his approach,
he begins with programmatic remarks positive toward him:as
Da bietet uns einen Anfang die Cartesianische Zweifelsbetrachtung: das
Sein der cogitatio, des Erlebnisses w/ihrend des Erlebens und in schlichter
Reflexion damuf, ist unzweifelhaft; das schauende direkte Erfassen und
Haben der cogitatio ist schon ein Erkennen, die cogitationes sind die
ersten absoluten Gegebenheiten. (HUA II, 4, 24-29)
Yet the resources of a procedure based on "picking up on an observation of
Descartes on clear and distinct perception ''49 are exhausted rather quickly:
und fallen lassen war bei Descartes eines. Wir tun nichts weiter als rein-
lich fassen und konsequent fortfiJhren, was in dieser uralten Intention
schon lag. - Mit der psychologistischen GefiLhlsinterpretation der Evi-
denz haben wir uns in diesem Zusammenhang auseinandergesetzt. (HUA
II, 9, 31-10, 9)
Thus Hussed's ambiguous, ambivalent relationship to Descartes in the area
of epistemology is already beginning to take shape- for the insinuation that,
according to Descartes, evidence is a "feeling" is hard to overlook•
Picking up on the prototypical basic question posed, Husserl now reformu-
lates the principal questions raised by the theory of knowledge:
Doch gehen wir zum Hauptzug unserer Betrachtung wieder zurfick. Ph/i-
nomenologische Urteile als singul/ire Urteile haben uns nicht viel zu leh-
ren. Wie aber sind Urteile, und zwar wissenschaftlich gialtige, zu gewin-
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 97
effective way out of it. Yet Husserl does not expressis verbis accuse Descartes'
account of evidence of circularity - at least not yet. But the reader has been
warned to expect "bad things" from Descartes' approach.
In lectures held between 1909 and 1911 Husserl once again admits that there
is a kernel of truth in the Cartesian approach to knowledge:
Einen Anfang bot nun die cartesianische Fundamentalbetrachtung. Die
cogitatio ist eine absolute Gegebenheit, die nicht mit dem Problem der
Transzendenz behaftet ist. (HUA X, 346, 25-28)
Still, he insists that there is more wrong than right with that procedure, saying
- for the first t i m e - that 'Descartes goes wrong' in his approach:
als cogitatio mag in der Reflexion absolute Gegebenheit sein, aber dab
das Erschlossene und Nicht-Gegebene wirklich ist, das gibt wieder ein
R~itsel, wie BewuBtsein tritlig [sich] selbst transzendieren kann. Am Ende
entspricht gar nichts dem Erschlossenen. (HUA X, 351, 15-21)
Once again in the vicinity of remarks on "Cartesian evidence", Husserl attacks
the position of 'enthusiasm', that is, that evidence is a "feeling":
Sagt man, der SchluB, als richtiger und einsichtiger Schlufl, sei begabt
mit einem auszeichnenden Charakter der Notwendigkeit oder notwen-
digen Gfiltigkeit, einem GeJ~hl, das beim Fehlschlufl mangele, einem
Gej~hl, das schlechthin untriiglich sei, so werden wir natiirlich sagen: Ja,
das ist eben das Ratsel. Wir wollen nicht etwa Triftigkeit der Schliisse
leugnen, wir sind ja nicht dogmatische Skeptiker, aber wir sind kritische
Skeptiker. Wir erkennen an, dab einsichtiger SchluB sich von uneinsich-
tigem im BewuBtsein irgendwie scheiden muB, wir sind auch herzlich
gem bereit, anzuerkennen, dab das Einsichtige objektiv giiltig sei und dab
der Charakter der Einsichtigkeit objektive Giiltigkeit verbiirge. Aber wir
verstehen nicht, wie es das me und tun krnne. (HUA X, 351, 21-35)
The point is that feelings are notoriously subjective and thus egregiously
unsuitable for bridging the gap between immanence and transcendence:
Was kOmrnert sich nicht-gegebenes Sein um die unseren Schlul3erleb-
nissen anh/ingenden Charaktere? Und ist, wie man sagt, Einsichtigkeit
ein Geffihl und im einsichtig werdenden Imum der Falschheitscharakter
ein anderes, negatives Gefiihl, so fragen wir, ob diese GefOhle nicht ihre
Funktionen umkehren krnnten, und wie wir dann dazu kommen sollen,
mehr auszusagen, denn es sei einmal das Geffthl a da und das andere Mal
das Gefiihl b. Wir aber sagen einmal, das Nicht-Gegebene und Erschlos-
sene sei wirklich, und das andere Mal, es sei nicht wirklich. (I-IUAX, 351,
35-352, 5)
Feelings are compelling, not for things, but for persons. However strongly
one feels that something must be a certain way, it does not have to be thus.
N o w - for the first time - Husserl criticizes Descartes for not appreciating
the force of "Cartesian evidence" by stopping short with "ego cogito, ergo
sum" and by not proceeding to the stream of 'cogitationes':
All solchen Fragen, Problemen, Zweifeln gegeniiber gibt es . . . nur eine
Stellung: Was uns . . . bei unserer Denkrichtung. . . fraglich ist, miissen
wir als fraglich behandeln, und nur festhalten, was unserem Fragen und
Erw?igen als sinnvollem Fragen zugrundeliegt. Also die cartesianische
Evidenz diirfen wir nicht preisgeben, wir mfissen sic a b e r . . , richtig
verstehen, richtig fassen und begrenzen. (I-IUA X, 352, 6-14)
1O0 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
Aber da muB man weiter gehen und eben fragen, wie weit diese Selbst-
gegebenheit reicht, und man daft nicht etwa meinen, das Selbstgegebene
biete tiberhaupt keine Probleme. Das Wesentliche ist, dab es selbstge-
geben ist, und dab in der Selbstgegebenheit die Probleme, die sie stellt,
selbst, also durchaus immanent, zu 16sen sind. In diesem Sinn stellten
wir schon als absolute Selbstgegebenheitdas Dauem und Eben-gewesen-
sein in Wahrnehmung, aber auch Retention fest, die Retention ist ebenso
ein absolut gebender Akt wie die Wahrnehmung, und es ist Sache eines
besonderen Studiums, alle in die Sph/ire absoluter Gegebenheit fallenden
Verh~iltnisse in diesen Akten zu erforschen. Und von da aus w/ire weiter
zu gehen. (I-1UAX, 353, 13--26)
But Descartes never gets beyond the clarity and distinctness of the cogito:
Schon Descartes fragte sich, warum kann die Evidenz des cogito absolut
gelten, und was w/ire ihr gleichzustellen? Under sagt, alles, was wir in
demselben Sinn clare et distinctepercipimus. Aber er hat den eigentlichen
Sinn der Sachen nicht erfaflt. Die perceptio, um die es sich hier handelt, ist
das reine, zum absoluten Selbst des Gemeinten vordrlngende oder allen
Gestaltungen rein selbstgebender Akte nachgehende Schauen, und wie
groB das Feld ist, das werden wir noch ausreichend sehen. (HUA X, 353,
26-35)
According to Husserl, then, Descartes does, to be sure, establish the indubi-
tability of clear and distinct perceptions in the immanence of consciousness;
none the less, he does not ask how evidence yields certainty in regard to
the transcendence of being. But, above all, the extent and the limitations
of the evidence operative must become thematic. So Husserl has noticeably
sharpened the critique and directed it at Descartes' own position.
Husserl will conclude that Descartes both does and does not ask and answer
the transcendental question, that is, that he generates a pseudo-problem in
that he tries to pose the "transcendental" question in the "natural" attitude.
Solange wir in den Wissenschaffen darin stehen und sic naiv betreiben,
leben wir in der Evidenz ihres Verfahrens, die innere Rationalit/it des-
selben bezwingt uns; Schritt fOr Schritt sehen wir ein: "So ist es und so
muB es sein" und erfreuen uns der aufeinandergebauten Theorien. Aber
sowie wir zu reflektieren beginnen, steht das R/itsel da, wie Erkenntnis
iiberhaupt mfglich, wie ihr Rechtsanspruch prinzipiell zu verstehen sei.
(HUA XXX, 322, 31-37)
Thus the task is to understand - but not necessarily to assent to - the claim
that evidence possesses a property (one knows not what) which enables it to
perform the peculiarfunction of assuring knowers of the truth known:
Wissenschaftlich Urteilen ist nicht Urteilen beliebiger Art, es ist evidentes
Urteilen. Evidenz, sagt man, ist es, die uns des Besitzes der Wahrheit
notwendig vergewissert. Wir kfnnen urteilen, ohne einzusehen, blind,
gewohnheitsmaBig u. dgl. Wir kfnnen aber auch einsichtig urteilen - nur
wenn wir das tun, hat unser Urteilen objektiven Erkenntniswert. Waren
wir nicht der Evidenz f~ihig, dann h/itte alles Reden von Wahrheit und
Wissenschaff keinen vemfinftigen Sinn. Ganz recht, sagten wir, aber wir
104 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
In the long run, the only effective way to do this is "to overcome the psy-
chologistic theory of evidence as a feeling and as an index [of truth]". 51 The
basic question is "what evidence is", 52 and without an answer it is vain to
hope for an even remotely satisfying clarification of what knowledge is.
While the reflections of First Philosophy I are mainly and mostly historical,
those of First Philosophy 11 are mainly and mostly systematic:
Begreiflicherweise muBte auch historisch die transzendentale Subjekti-
vit/it allererst entdeckt werden. In einer ersten, ungereifien, und darum
bald unwirksamen und bald in Verirrungen sich auswirkenden Form tritt
die Entdeckung im Cartesianisehen ego cogito hervor, d a r i n . . , gleich
mit dem Anspruch apodiktischer Zweifellosigkeit herausgestellt. Eine
reine wirkliche Aufweisung der transzendentalen Subjektivit/it vollzieht
sich erst in d e r . . . Methode der phdnomenologischen Reduktion. (HUA
VIII, 79, 34-80, 3)
According to Husserl, then, Descartes "discovered" transcendental subjectiv-
ity in the manner in which Columbus "discovered" America. 53
Here Husserl does not criticize Descartes' conception of evidence, but
he does repeatedly mention the circle connected with the attempt to clarify
knowledge without distinguishing between the ego and the human being:
Beging i c h . . , nicht einen erkenntniskritischen Z i r k e l ? . . . Es mag sein,
dab e s . . . einer Kritik vor allem des Selbstinneseins, Selbstwahmehmens,
das der mundanen Kritik ihren Boden gibt, ebenfalls bedarf, und ich ahne
• . . , dab sic von groBer Wichtigkeit sein diirfte. Aber was hier zun/ichst
in Frage ist: Habe ich durch solches Unterlassen wirklich einen erkennt-
nistheoretischen Zirkei begangen? Ist es nicht vielmehr klar, dab hier
zweierlei Bedeutungen yon Ich, und in weiterer Folge von "mein psychi-
sches Leben", "Selbsterfahrung" und "Selbsterkenntnis" sich abzuheben
beginnen? (HUA VIII, 70, 16-17; 71, 5-14)
This is becoming a regular topos in Husserl's critique of Descartes. The
further course of developments in this regard will also bear this out.
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 107
Phenomenological Psychology
Treating of the relationship between transcendental phenomenologyand phe-
nomenological psychology, Husserl is especially sensitive to:
•.. die Irrung des Psychologismus. Es [ist] widersinnig, wenn objektiv-
reale Erfahrung und Erkenntnis fiberhaupt transzendental in Frage [steht],
irgendwelche objektive Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse vorauszusetzen, als
ob Sinn und Recht ihrer objektiven Gialtigkeit nicht selbst zum Problem
[gehrrt]. Eine Psychologic [kann] nicht das Fundament der Transzenden-
talphilosophie sein. (HUA IX, 248, 30-36)
If the very validity of objective experience, knowledge, and evidence is in
question, then it involves apetitio principii to presuppose just this validity in
order to (re)legitimate objective experience, knowledge, and evidence.
The radical inference drawn by Husserl is that genuine epistemology is
actually only possible as transcendental phenomenology:
Nur durch diese radikale Methode [of a phenomenological epoch6 of
the real world and of a transcendental reduction to intentional subjecti-
vity] vermeidet die transzendentale Ph/inomenologieden W i d e r s i n n des
erkenntnistheoretischenZirkels: das im besonderen vorauszusetzen (als
ob es unfraglich w/ire), was im allgemeinen Sinn der transzendentalen
Frage selbst mitbeschlossen ist. Im tibrigen versteht sich jetzt erst ganz
die Versuchung des Psychologismus. (HUA IX, 249, 34-250, 3)
Otherwise one falls into "the countersense of the epistemological circle", that
is, presupposing as unquestioned precisely that which is in question.
On the other hand, Husserl's own methodological procedure in epistemo-
logy carries with it and seeks to fulfill two basic requirements:
Meine Fragestellung fordert einerseits, den transzendentalen Zirkel zu
vermeiden: das als aul3er Frage stehend vorauszusetzen, was von der
Allgemeinheit der Frage selbst umfaBt ist. Und sie fordert andererseits
Reduktion auf denjenigen Geltungsboden, den diese Frage als solche
voraussetzt: die reine Subjektivit/it als Sinnes- und Geltungsquelle. (HUA
IX, 273, 34-39)
The search is for apresuppositionless ground of sense and of validity. This is
the philosophical motivation driving the quest for the transcendental ego.
On the contrary, "the psychologistic solution" to the problem of how to
get from the immanence of subjective consciousness to the transcendence of
objective being ineluctably entails "a transcendental circle":54
108 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
In the Introduction, Husserl has the usual "nice" things to say about Des-
cartes' commitment to the search for an absolute foundation for, and a final
justification of, scientific knowledge - with some reservations:
Der erste Versuch solcher radikalsten Wissenschaftsbegrfindung- der des
Descartes selbst- miBlang. (HUA XVII, 11, 10-11)
Beyond the Introduction, Husserl's comments on Descartes are confined to
the final three chapters, whose main topic is evidence and in which Husserl
unabashedly uses Descartes' views on evidence as a grand foil for his own.
First Hussed asserts "the insufficiency of the attempts at a critique of
experience since Descartes". 55 One reason for this insufficiency is identified
as "the naive presupposition of the validity of objective logic": 56
Es g e h 6 r t . . , zu der von Descartes versuchten erkenntnistheoretischen
Reform aller Wissenschafien und ihrer Umschrpfung zu einer sie in radi-
kaler Begrfindung vereinheitlichenden sapientia universalis, dab ihnen
zur Fundierung vorangehen muB eine Kritik der Erfahrung, d i e . . , den
Wissenschaften das Dasein der Welt vorgibt. Diese Kritik fiihrt bei Des-
cartes.., zu dem Ergebnis, dab die Erfahrung der absoluten Evidenz (der
das Sein der Welt apodiktisch begriindenden) entbehre, dab demnach die
naive Voraussetzung der Welt aufgehoben und alle objektive Erkeuntnis
auf die einzige apodiktische Gegebenheit eines Seienden, n/imlich des
ego cogito gegr/indet werden mtisse. (HUA XVII, 234, 29-235, 7)
Thus Descartes is portrayed as striving for "absolute" and "apodictic" evi-
dence. But then there is talk of "obscurities and confusions":
• . . das war der Anfang der ganzen neuzeitlichen, durch immer neue
Unklarheiten und Verirrungen sich emporringenden Transzendentalphilo-
sophie. Sogleich dieser Cartesianische Anfang mit der groBen, aber nur
in Halbheit durchgebrochenen Entdeckung der transzendentalen Subjek-
tivit/it ist durch die verh/ingnisvollste u n d . . , unausrottbar gebliebene
Verirrung getrfibt, die uns jenen "Realismus" beschert hat, als dessen
nicht minder verkehrte GegenstOcke die Idealismen eines Berkeley und
Hume figurieren. (HUA XVII, 235, 7-16)
110 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
For example, Descartes confuses the ego, which is transcendental, with the
mind, which is psychological, thus misapprehending the problem per se:
• .bei Descartes wird durch eine absolute Evidenz das Ego als ein
.
erstes, zweifellos seiendes Endchen der Welt (mens sive animus, sub-
stantia cogitans) festgelegt, und es kommt . . . nur darauf an, durch
ein logisch b/indiges Schluflverfahren die tibrige Welt (bei Descartes die
absolute Substanz und die endlichen Substanzen der Welt auBer meiner
• . . seelischen Substanz) dazu zu erschlieBen. (HUA XVII, 235, 16-22)
Here two separate topoi of Husserl's long-running critique of Descartes have
finally been combined: Descartes is alleged to have confused the ego with
"thinking substance" as a piece of the world and to have attempted to make
logical inferences from this piece to God and to the external world.
But this can be accomplished only by means of the innate ideas - as well
as by not distinguishing between natural and transcendental issues:
Schon Descartes operiert dabei mit einem naiven apriorischen Erbgut,
mit dem Apriori der Kausalit~it, mit der naiven Voraussetzung ontologi-
scher und logischer Evidenzen ftir die Behandlung der transzendentalen
Thematik. Er verfehlt also den eigentlichen transzendentalen Sinn des von
ihm entdeckten Ego, desjenigen, das dem Sein der Welt erkenntnism/iBig
vorangeht. Nicht minder verfehlt er den eigentlich transzendentalen Sinn
der Fragen, die an die Erfahrung und an das wissenschaftliche Denken,
und so in prinzipieller Allgemeinheit an eine Logik selbst gestellt werden
mOssen. (HUA XVII, 235, 23-32)
Husserl's point is that,from the standpoint of the natural attitude, the human
being is always already in the world, whereas, from the viewpoint of the
transcendental attitude, the world is always already in the self.
On "the failure" to understand "the transcendental sense of the Cartesian
reduction to the ego", 57 Husserl poses a rhetorical question:
Aber kann es bei einem solchen Verh~iltnisvon positiver Wissenschafl, von
Logik und Erkenntnistheorie sein Bewenden haben? Schon nach allem,
was wir wiederholt in friiheren Zusammenh/ingen auszuftihren hatten, so
unvollst/indig und vielfach blo13 vordeutend es auch sein mul3te, ist es
schon sicher, dab diese Frage zu vemeinen ist. (HUA XVII, 236, 7-12)
Which enables him to charge Descartes with the usual petitio principii:
Ein Realismus, der wie bei Descartes in dem Ego, auf das die transzen-
dentale Selbstbesinnung zun~ichst zurfickffihrt, schon die reale Seele des
Menschen gefaBt zu haben meint und von diesem ersten Realen Hypo-
thesen und Wahrscheinlichkeitsschltisse in ein Reich transzendenter Rea-
lit~ten entwirft - dabei (sei es ausdrficklich oder implicite) die Prinzipien
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 111
logic, mit ihrem "Seelenleben", mit ihrer "inneren Erfahrung", die Welt
schon naiv vorausgesetzt hat. (HUA XVII, 260, 14-35)
Thus the critique of circularity is aimed, not at psychology per se, which has
its legitimacy, but at psychology's usurpation of transcendental tasks.
"The critique of the presupposition of absolute evidence and of the dogmatic
theories of evidence''6° - that is, of Descartes' too - continues thus:
Wohin das Wirtschaften mit einem absoluten, in vrllig leerer Weise im
voraus angenommenen Seienden ffihrt (in vrllig leerer, weil man nicht
nach seiner eigentlichen Denkmrglichkeit gefragt hat), das zeigen schon
die Cartesianischen Meditationen. Wie kann der subjektiv-psychische
Charakter der clara et distincta perceptio - d a s ist nichts anderes, als
was die Nachfahren als Evidenzcharakter, als Evidenzgefiihl, Geffihl
der strengen Notwendigkeit, "beschreiben" - eine objektive Gfiltigkeit
verborgen, ohne die es doch fiir uns keine Wahrheit giibe? (HUA XVII,
286, 3--11)
Here Husserl is careful not to impute to Descartes the view that evidence is
"a feeling". Still, how can subjective perception yield objective validity?
Hinsichtlich der Evidenz des ego cogito beruhigt, vielleicht etwas schnell,
die "Evidenz der inneren Wahrnehmung". Aber schon was fiber die
momentan lebendige innere Wahrnehmungsgegenwart hinausreicht...,
erregt Bedenken. Eventuell fiJhrt es zur Annahme rninderwertiger Evi-
denzen und doch brauchbarer, evtl. rekurriert m a n . . , auf die Logik der
Wahrscheinlichkeiten. (HUA XVII, 286, 11-18)
It seems that, beyond the living presence of inner perception, nothing can be
accomplished in this regard except via the logic of probability:
FOr die "Aul3enwelt" lehnt man zwar den originalen Cartesianischen Weg
fiber den Gottesbeweis ab, um die Transzendenz der Erfahrung und ihres
Seinsglaubens begreiflich zu machen; aber der widersinnige Typus dieses
Begreiflichmachensdurch Schlfisse, an dem wir schon Kritik getibt, bleibt
bestehen. (HUA XVII, 286, 18--23)
Of course, the Cartesian path via a proof for the existence of God is rejected,
but the countersense of an inferential procedure remains:61
Und so fiberhaupt der Grundgedanke in der Fassung der Evidenz. Sie
"muB" jedenfalls eine absolute Seins- und Wahrheitserfassung sein. Es
"muB" zuniichst eine absolute Erfahrung geben, und das ist die inhere, und
es "muB" absolut giiltige allgemeine Evidenzen geben, und das sind die
der apodiktischen Prinzipien, zuhrchst die formal-logischen, die auch die
114 GEORGE HEFFERNAN
levels. Neither is it reducible to the clarity and distinctness that guarantee truth
nor is this evidence in particular a model for evidence in general. Descartes'
evidence is absolute, and Husserl's evidence is relative.
Cartesian Meditations
Boden der Metaphysik und tier positiven Wissenschaffen und diese selbst.
Alle Schlugweisen effolgen, wie sic es m~ssen, am Leitfaden yon Prin-
zipien, die dem reinen ego immanent, ihrn eingeboren sind. (HUA I, 45,
18-27 [4, 28-37])
So far, Husserl has - remarkably- bracketed out all critique of Descartes.
But this stage-setting only serves to heighten the rhetorical effect:
So weit Descartes. Wit fragen nun: Lohnt es sich eigentlich, einer Ewig-
keitsbedeutung dieser Gedanken nachzuspOren, sind sic noch geeignet,
unserer Zeit lebendige Kr~fte einzufl6gen? (HUA I, 45, 28-30 [4, 38-5,
2])
This is the question of questions for the relationship between these two:
Es scheint so leicht, Descartes folgend, das reine Ich und seine cogita-
tiones zu fassen . . . . als ob wir in unserem apodiktischen reinen ego ein
kleines Endchen der Welt gerettet hiitten, als das ffil"das philosophierende
Ich einzig Unfragliche von der Welt, und dab es nun darauf ankomme,
durch recht geleitete SchluBfolgerungen nach den dem ego eingebore-
nen Prinzipien die iibrige Welt hinzuzuerschlieBen. (HUA I, 63, 3-27 [9,
5--27])
It is as if Husserl cannot release the tension between himself and Descartes.
Yet Husserl emphatically rejects Descartes' epistemic strategy:
Leider geht es so bei Descartes, mit der unscheinbaren, aber verh~ingnis-
vollen Wendung, die das ego zur substantia cogitans, zur abgetrenn-
ten menschlichen mens sive animus macht und zum Ausgangsglied fiJr
SchliJsse nach dem Kausalprinzip, kurzum der Wendung, durch die er
zum Vater d e s . . , widersinnigen transzendentalen Realismus geworden
ist. (HUA I, 63, 28-34 [9, 28-33])
Aside from the distinction between the transcendental ego and the human
mind, the evidentiary difference is that, whereas Descartes is satisfied to
deduce or to infer, Husserl insists that intuition be primary and ultimate:
All das bleibt uns fern, wenn wit dem Radikalismus der Selbstbesinnung
und somit dem Prinzip reiner Intuition oder Evidenz getreu bleiben, also
hier nichts gelten lassen, als was wir auf dem uns durch die epochd
er6ffneten Felde des ego cogito wirklich und zuniichst ganz unmittelbar
gegeben haben, also nichts zur Aussage bringen, was wir nicht selbst
sehen. (HUA I, 63, 36--64, 3 [9, 33--38])
So Descartes did - and did n o t - "discover" transcendental subjectivity:
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 117
Darin hat Descartes gefehlt, und so kommt es, dab er vor der gr6Bten aller
Entdeckungen steht, sie in gewisser Weise schon gemacht hat, und doch
ibsen eigentlichen Sinn nicht erfal3t, also den Sinn der transzendentalen
Subjektivit~it, und so das Eingangstor nicht iiberschreitet, das in die echte
Transzendentalphilosophie hineinleitet. (HUA I, 64, 3-9 [9, 38-10, 5])
This will soon lead to a shocking claim by Husserl about Descartes' "episte-
mology", namely, that he does not really have an epistemology.
For Husserl, "the Cartesian evidence" of the statement "ego cogito, ergo
sum" remains fruitless because Descartes neither achieves a clear sense of
the transcendental ego nor finds the field of cogitationes:
Bestimmt bezeichnet i s t . . , eine wesentliche Abweichung vom Car-
tesianisehen Gang, die hinfort for unser ganzes weiteres Meditieren
entscheidend sein wird. Im Gegensatz zu Descartes vertiefen wir uns
in die Aufgabe der Freilegung des unendlichen Feldes transzendentaler
Erfahrung. Die Cartesianisehe Evidenz, die des Satzes "Ego cogito,
ergo sum", bleibt ohne Frucht, weil er es nicht nur vers~iumt, den rei-
hen methodischen Sinn der transzendentalen epoch~ abzukl/iren, sondern
auch vers~iumt, das Augenmerk darauf zu lenken, dab das ego sich selbst
ins Unendliche und systematisch durch transzendentale Erfahrung ausle-
gen kann und somit als ein m6gliches Arbeitsfeld bereit liegt, ein vOllig
eigenartiges und abgesondertes, sofern es sich zwar auf alle Welt und alle
objektiven Wissenschaften mitbezieht, und doch ihre Seinsgeltung nicht
voraussetzt, und sofem es damit von allen diesen Wissenschatten geson-
dert ist, und doch an sie in keiner Weise angrenzt. (I-IUA I, 69, 34-70, 9
[12, 23-301)
And this is not yet to say anything about the cogitata of the cogitationes - for
whose recognition Descartes would need to appreciate "intentionality".
But Husserl's most profound concern here is that "transcendental pheno-
menology" can only be understood as "transcendental idealism": 65
Mit der Reduktion der ph/inomenologischen Problematik auf d e n . . .
Gesamttitel d e r . . . Konstitution der Gegensffmdlichkeiten mrglichen
BewuBtseins scheint die Ph/inomenologie sich rechtm~il3igauch als tran-
szendentale Erkenntnistheorie zu kennzeichnen. Kontrastieren wir die in
diesem Sinne transzendentale mit der traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie.
(HUA I, 114, 35-115, 4 [30, 26--31])
The key is the juxtaposition of traditional and transcendental epistemologies
- Descartes' epistemology is much closer to the former than to the latter.
The perennial problem of epistemology - even as an empirical science
resting on ordinary psychology- has been transcendence:
118 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
Deren Problem ist das der Transzendenz. Sic will, auch wenn sic als empi-
ristische aufder gew6hnlichen Psychologic fuflt, nicht blol~e Psychologic
der Erkenntnis sein, sondern die prinzipielle M6glichkeit der Erkenntnis
aufkl~iren. Das Problem erw/ichst ihr in der natiirlichen Einstellung und
wird auch weiter in ihr behandelt. (HUA I, 115, 5-10 [30, 36-31, 1])
To prepare for the egological difference underlying the two possible ap-
proaches to knowledge, Husserl writes in the first person singular:
Ich finde mich vor als Mensch in der Welt, und zugleich als sie erfahrend
und sic, mich eingeschlossen, wissenschaftlich erkennend. Nun sage ich
mir: Alles, was far mich ist, ist es dank meinem erkennenden BewuBtsein,
es ist for mich Erfahrenes meines Erfahrens, Gedachtes meines Denkens,
Theoretisiertes meines Theoretisierens, Eingesehenes meines Einsehens.
(HUA I, 115, 10-16 [31, 1--8])
He then reflects on who it can be who is speaking here and concludes that it
must be a matter of the natural ego who presupposes the existing world:
Die Ich-Rede dieses Anfangs ist und bleibt die nattirliche Ich-Rede, sic
h/ilt sich und auch die ganze Problemfiihrung weiterhin auf dem Boden
der gegebenen Welt. Und so heil~t es nun, und ganz verst~ndlich: Alles,
was fi.ir den Menschen, was for mich ist und gilt, tut das im eigenen
BewuBtseinsleben, das in allem BewuBthaben einer Welt und in allem
wissenschafdichen Leisten bei sich selbst verbleibt. Alle Scheidungen, die
ich mache zwischen echter und tr/igender Erfahrung, und in ihr zwischen
Sein und Schein, verlaufen in meiner Bewul3tseinssphare selbst, ebenso
wenn ich in h6herer Stufe zwischen einsichtigem und nicht einsichtigem
Denken, auch zwischen a priori Notwendigem und Widersinnigem, zwi-
schen empirisch Richtigem und empirisch Falschem unterscheide. Evi-
dent wirklich, denknotwendig, widersinnig, denkmOglich, wahrschein-
lich usw., all das sind in meinem BewuBtseinsbereich selbst auftretende
Charaktere am jeweiligen intentionalen Gegenstand. Jede Begrfindung,
jede Ausweisung von Wahrheit und Sein vefl~iuft ganz und gar in mir,
und ihr Ende ist ein Charakter im cogitatum meines cogito. (I-IUA I, 115,
21-39 [31, 15-30])
The obvious inference is that "evidence", too, is an experience occurring in
the life of consciousness- which generates a provocative question . . . .
Now Husserl once again formulates "the Cartesian problem", that is, how
evidence can go from being a subjective and immanent character of con-
sciousness to having objective and transcendent significance in being:
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 119
Darin sieht man nun das groBe Problem. DaB ich in meinem Bewul3tseins-
bereich, im Zusammenhang der reich bestimmenden Motivation zu Ge-
wil3heiten, ja zu zwingenden Evidenzen komme, das ist verstfindlich.
Aber wie kann dieses ganze, in tier Immanenz des Bewul3tseinslebens
vedaufende Spiel objektive Bedeutung gewinnen? Wie kann die Evidenz
(die clara et distinctaperceptio) mehr beanspruchen, als ein Bewul3tseins-
charakter in mir zu sein? Es ist.., das Cartesianische Problem, das dutch
die g6ttliche veracitas gel6st werden sollte. CHUA I, 116, 1-10 [31, 31-
39])
So much for the question. Husserl's answer is, not only that Descartes' "solu-
tion" is wrong-headed, but that- as posed- this is a pseudo-problem.
For Husserl tries to use transcendental epistemology to expose the exem-
plary issue of traditional epistemology as countersensical:
Was hat die transzendentale Selbstbesinnung der Phfinomenologie dazu
zu sagen? Nichts anderes, als dab dieses ganze Problem widersinnig
ist, ein Widersinn, in den Descartes selbst verfallen muBte, weil er den
echten Sinn seiner transzendentalen epochk und der Reduktion auf das
reine ego verfehlte. (HUA I, 116, 11-15 [32, 1-5])
According to Husserl, Descartes and others have misunderstood the sense of
the question because they have not understood who the questioner is:
Aber noch viel grfber, eben durch v611ige MiBachtung der Cartesia-
nischen epochS, ist die gew6hnliche nachcartesianische Denkhaltung.
Wir fragen, wer ist denn das Ich, das solche transzendentalen Fragen
rechtm/iBig stellen kann? Kann ich das als natOrlicher Mensch, und kann
ich als das emstlich fragen, und zwar transzendental: Wie komme ich aus
meiner BewuBtseinsinsel heraus, wie kann, was in meinem BewuBtsein
als Evidenzerlebnis auftritt, objektive Bedeutung gewinnen? (/-ILIA I,
116, 15-23 [32, 5-12])
If Husserl is correct, then this is a classic category mistake, since the human
being existing naturally in the world cannot inquire transcendentally- and to
think otherwise is inevitably to entangle oneself in a vicious circle:
The only effective way to avoid taking for granted precisely what is being
questioned is to engage in phenomenological epistemology by means of:
• . . der bewuBten Ausflihrung der ph~inomenologischen Reduktion, um
dasjenige Ich und BewuBtseinsteben zu gewinnen, von dem transzenden-
tale Fragen als Fragen der M6glichkeit transzendenter Erkenntnis zu stel-
len sind. Sowie man aber, statt fliichtig eine ph~inomenologische epoch~
zu vollziehen, vielmehr darangeht, in systematischer Selbstbesirmung,
und als reines ego, sein gesamtes BewuBtseinsfeld enthiillen zu wollen,
erkennt man, dab alles f~r es Seiende sich in ihm selbst Konstituierendes
ist. . . . dab jede Seinsart,... jede als in irgendeinem Sinne transzendent
charakterisierte, ihre besondere Konstitution hat. (I-IUA I, 116, 29-117, 3
[32, 19-30])
Thus the thesis of transcendental idealism- unutterable by the human being
in the natural attitude - is that all Sein constitutes itself in Bewufltsein:
Transzendenz in jeder Form ist ein immanenter, innerhalb des ego sich
konstituierender Seinscharakter. Jeder erdenkliche Sinn, jedes erdenkli-
che Sein, ob es immanent oder transzendent heiBt, f~illtin den Bereich der
transzendentalen Subjektivit~it als der Sinn und Sein konstituierenden. Das
Universum wahren Seins fassen zu wollen als etwas, das auBerhalb des
Universums m~glichen BewuBtseins, m6glicher Erkennmis, m~glicher
Evidenz steht, beides bloB/iuBedich durch ein starres Gesetz aufeinan-
der bezogen, ist unsinnig. Wesensm~iBig geh~rt beides zusammen, und
wesensm~iBig Zusammengeh6riges ist auch konkret eins, eins in der ein-
zigen absoluten Konkretion der transzendentalen Subjektivit~t. Ist sie das
Universum m/Sglichen Sinnes, so ist ein AuBerhalb dann eben Unsinn.
Aber selbst jeder Unsinn ist ein Modus des Sinnes und hat seine IJnsin-
nigkeit in der Einsehbarkeit. (I-IUA I, 117, 3-17 [32, 31-33, 7])
The harsh conclusion to which all this is driving is that, since - according
to Husserl - genuine epistemology is possible only within the framework of
transcendental phenomenology, it is unclear whether Descartes- presumably
even as the author of the Meditations- has an epistemology:
Echte Erkenntnistheorie ist danach allein sinnvoll als transzendental-
ph~inomenologische, die, statt mit widersinnigen Schliissen von einer ver-
meinten Immanenz auf eine verrneinte Transzendenz, die irgendwelcher
angeblich prinzipiell unerkermbarer "Dinge an sich", es ausschlieBlich
zu tun hat mit der systematischen Aufkl~irung der Erkenntnisleistung,
in der sic durch und dutch verst/indlich werden mi~ssen als intentionale
Leistung. Eben damit wird jede Art Seiendes selbst, reales und idea-
les, verst~indlich als eben in dieser Leistung konstituiertes Gebilde der
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 121
In the Crisis Husserl claims that one can "understand the thinkers of the
past as they could never have understood themselves".67 So he begins the
recapitulation of his mono-dia-logue with Descartes on evidence thus:
dieser tier Epoch6- und so bestimmt sich f(ir D e s c a r t e s das ego als mens
sive animus sive intellectus. (HUA VI, 80, 14-81, 4)
The phenomenological reduction discovers the transcendental ego, whereas
a psychological abstraction isolates the natural human mind or soul:
Das ego ist nicht ein Residuum der Welt, sondem die absolut apodik-
tische Setzung, die nut dutch die Epoch6, nur durch die "Einklamme-
rung" der gesamten Weltgeltung erm6glicht, und als einzige erm6glicht
wird. Die Seele aber ist das Residuum einer vorg~ngigen Abstraktion des
puren K6rpers, und nach dieser Abstraktion, mindestens scheinbar, ein
Erglinzungsstiick dieses K6rpers. A b e r . . . diese Abstraktion geschieht
nicht in der Epoch6, sondem in der Betrachtungsweise des Naturfor-
schers oder Psychologen auf dem natOrlichen Boden der vorgegebenen,
der selbstverst/indlich seienden Welt. (HUA VI, 81, 29-39)
As always, the countersensical confusion vitiates Descartes' discovery:
Hier ist es genug, dariiber klar zu werden, dab in den fundamentalen
Betrachtungen der Meditationen- denen der Einffihnmg der Epoch6 und
ihres ego - ein Bruch der Konsequenz eingetreten ist dureh die Identi-
fikation dieses ego mit der reinen Seele. Der ganze Erwerb, die groBe
Entdeckung dieses ego, wird dutch eine widersinnige Unterschiebung
entwertet: eine reine Seele hat in der Epoch6 gar keinen Sinn, es sei denn
als "Seele" in der "Klammer", d.h., als blol3es "Ph/inomen", so gut wie
der Leib. (HUA VI, 82, 2-10)
So Husserl will argue that, therefore, Descartes cannot in principle handle
primary and ultimate issues of epistemic justification- genuine evidence.
For Husserl reaffirms the connection between Descartes' confusion about
the ego and his confusion about evidence, that is, he is supposed to misunder-
stand the evidence of the insight "ego cogito, ergo sum" because he misun-
derstands the sense of "ego" operative in that statement:
In der verh~ingnisvollen Form einer Unterschiebung des eigenen seeli-
schen Ich for das ego, der psychologischen Immanenz for die egologische
Immanenz, der Evidenz der psychischen "inneren" oder"Selbstwahrneh-
mung" for die egologische Selbstwahrnehmung, wirken sich die "Medita-
tionen" bei Descartes aus und wirken sie historisch fort bis zum heutigen
Tag. (HUA VI, 83, 4-10)
Now Husserl describes how one mistake then leads to another, in that the
issue becomes how to get from immanence to transcendence - by means of
"the paradoxical and perverse proofs for the existence of God": 7°
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 123
Er [Descartes] selbst glaubt wirklich, auf dem Wege von Schlfissen auf
das dem Eigenseelischen Transzendente den Dualismus der endlichen
Substanzen (vermittelt durch den ersten SchluB auf die Transzendenz
Gottes) erweisen zu k6nnen. (HUA VI, 83, 10-14)
This has deleterious consequences for the description of the phenomenon of
evidence- how any subjective perception can achieve objective validity:
Ebenso meint er, das ftir seine widersinnige Einstellung bedeutsame Pro-
blem zu 16sen...: wie die in meiner Vemunft erzeugten Vemunftgebilde
(meine eigenen "clarae et distinctae perceptiones") - die der Mathema-
tik und mathematischen Naturwissenschaft- eine objektiv "wahre", eine
metaphysisch transzendente Geltung beanspmchen k6nnen. (HUA VI,
83, 14--20)
According to Husserl, Descartes seeks an objective science o f the subjective,
while what he needs is a subjective science o f the objective:
DaB Descartes aber im reinen Objektivismus verham, trotz dessen subjek-
tiver Begriindung, wurde nur dadurch m6glich, dab die mens, die zuniichst
in der Epoch6 ftir sich stand und als absoluter Erkenntnisboden fftr die
BegrOndungen der objektiven Wissenschaften (universal... der Philoso-
phie) fungierte, zugleich als rechtmiiBiges Thema in derselben, n/imlich
in der Psychologie, mitbegriindet schien. (HUA VI, 83, 28-35)
But there is a big difference between the self which is in the world and the
self in which the world is. Not the former, but the latter, can explain - in a
non-circular w a y - the cognitive relation between self and world:
Descartes nmcht sich nicht klar, daB das ego, sein durch die Epoch~
entweltlichtes Ich, in dessert funktionierenden cogitationes die Welt allen
Seinssinn hat, den sie je fiir ihn haben kann, unmfglich in der Welt als
Thema auftreten kann, da alles Weltliche eben aus diesen Funktionen
seinen Sinn schOpft, also auch das eigene seelische Sein, das Ich im
gew6hnlichen Sinne. (HUA VI, 83, 35-84, 7)
Husserl identifies "Descartes' overbearing interest in objectivism" and in
"objective science" as "the reason for his misinterpretation of himself": 71
So versteht es sich, warum Descartes in seiner Eiligkeit, den Objektivis-
mus und die exakten Wissenschaffen als metaphysisch-absolute Erkennt-
nis gew/ihrende zu begrtinden, sich nicht die Aufgabe stellt, das reine ego
- in der Epoch6 konsequent verbleibend- systematisch zu befragen nach
dem, was ihm an Akten, an Verm6gen eignet und was es in ihnen als
intentionale Leistungzustande bringt. Da er nicht verweilt, kann sich ibm
nicht die gewaltige Problematik erschlieBen: vonder Welt als "Phiinomen"
124 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
Concluding Remarks
10. Descartes is fatally attracted to the ideal of"triple-A type" evidence, that
is, absolute, adequate, and apodictic evidence, and he fails to do justice
to the radical relativity of evidence attested by experience.
Of course, it would be possible to continue for a long time in this direction.
Still, enough is enough. According to Husserl, then, Descartes holds a theo-
logical theory of evidence, of knowledge, and of truth, and thus there is no
way in which he can realize the ideal of a final epistemic justification.
But is Hussed judicious in regard to Descartes, for example, with respect
to the issue of circularity? For the phenomenological hermeneutics according
to which Husserl develops his interpretation of Descartes' philosophy of evi-
dence is founded on the principle that it is possible, under certain circumstan-
ces, to understand others better than they do or can understand themselves.
On the other hand, the principle of charitable interpretation demands that,
when several readings of a writing are possible, and some entail conflicts,
contradictions, and countersenses, whereas others do not, t h e n - in dubiopro
reo judicandum e s t - one should prefer those which are not burdened with
such implications over those which are. To be sure, rigorous collegial crit-
icism is an ineluctable obligation of one philosophical generation vis-h-vis
another. None the less, one also does well to appreciate "die Gnade der sptiten
Geburt". For it is not as if philosophy had reached its final and finest stage
of development in the form of transcendental phenomenology. To everything
there is a time. And everything has its time. 78 For instance, what appears to be
missing in Hussed's critical and destructive account of Descartes' conception
of evidence is a convincing argument that circularity, in and of itself, is a
dispositively vicious character in philosophizing. The only thing is that it is
very hard to see what such an argument would look like.
Of course, Hussed is aware that he is not the first to level the charge of
circularity against Descartes' procedure in the Meditations. 79 So what, if
anything, is unique about the Husserlian version of the Cartesian circle? One
way to try to provide an answer to this question is by means of a comparison
and contrast between Hussed's criticism of circularity and those of Descartes'
contemporaries Mersenne, Arnauld, and Gassendi.
Atter all, Descartes does prima facie appear to be arguing in some sort
of circle, that is, by first employing some clear and distinct ideas in order
to attempt to establish that God exists and does not deceive, and by then
appealing to the existence and veracity of God in order to try to show that all
clear and distinct ideas are true. So "the Cartesian circle" would provisionally
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 129
consist in the dilemma that one can be certain that whatever one clearly and
distinctly perceives is true only if one can be sure that God exists and does
not deceive, and that one can be certain that God exists and does not deceive
only if one can be sure that whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives is
true. Thus it is as if Descartes had set up a paradox: If God is not reliable,
then evidence is not; and, if evidence is not reliable, then God is not. But is
God reliable? And is evidence reliable? 8°
Now in the Preface to the Meditations Descartes asks the reader not to judge
the work until reading the Objections and Responses. 81 So is the epistemology
of the Meditations improved in the Objections and Responses?
In the Second Objections Mersenne becomes the first to anticipate "the
Cartesian circle", though he does not yet refer to it as such. For there he
argues that Descartes, on his own admission, cannot know anything clearly
and distinctly until he knows that God exists, while he appears to think that he
knows that he is a thinking thing well before this. 82Also, Mersenne challenges
Descartes to ascertain that, when one thinks that one knows something clearly
and distinctly, one is not and cannot be deceived. 83 Thus the problem is how
to establish that clear and distinct perceptions must necessarily be true and
cannot possibly be false.
In the Second Responses Descartes answers that, when he said that one
cannot know anything for certain until one is aware that God exists, 84 he was
speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when
one is no longer attending to - or has forgotten - the arguments by means
of which one has deduced them. 85 Thus Descartes' narrow elucidation gets
juxtaposed to Mersenne's broad interpretation. 86
This reply addresses the specific issue of memory gaps, but it avoids the
general problem of the linkage between evidence and truth. Mersenne is for
a loose construction of the rule regulating the relationship between evidence
and truth. Descartes sticks with the strict construction thereof. 87
In the Fourth Objections Amauld becomes the first explicitly to charge
Descartes with committing the fallacy of reasoning in a "circle", namely,
'one is sure that what one clearly and distinctly perceives is true because God
exists, and one is sure that God exists because what one clearly and distinctly
perceives is true'. 8s So which comesfirst- the proof for the existence of God
or the demonstration of the validity of the rule?
In the Fourth Responses Descartes tries to answer Amauld by repeating -
and by failing to add anything to - his response to Mersenne. 89
In the Counterresponses Gassendi insists both that the rule according to
which that which we clearly and distinctly perceive is true is defective in lieu
of a method following which we can recognize that we clearly and distinctly
perceive in such a way that we may not be deceived and that the circularity
130 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
lies in 'proving that God exists and is veracious because the knowledge of
him is clear and distinct, and that the knowledge of him is clear and distinct
because God exists and is veracious'ri°
In a postscript Descartes merely reiterates that he is not guilty of circularity
in the demonstration of the validity of the general rule o f truth. 91 In the end,
then, he does not get beyond the Second Responses. 92
Thus, on the one hand, Husserl is not the first to charge the Descartes
of the Meditations with circularity. On the other hand, Husserl's circle and
Mersenne's, Amauld's, and Gassendi's circle are not the same. For one thing,
Mersenne and Arnauld do not put up a strong fight against Descartes, since
they make the mistake of using temporal designators at crucial junctures in
the formulation of their objections.93 Thus they give the impression that what
is at stake is the temporal difficulty of whether and how one can know that
the idea of God - which one is clearly and distinctly perceiving during the
time during which one is trying to prove his existence- is also true. This just
does not yield a tough objection.
For another thing, Gassendi's formulation of the issue of circularity is much
heater and cleaner, since he does not employ any temporal designators in order
to express the objection, but rather uses only terms of epistemic warrant.
Therefore he prevents Descartes from flummoxing the decisive distinction by
recurring to the pseudo-defense that God guarantees the truth of the clear and
distinct perceptions of those who are not thinking of them or of him (and even
of those who do not believe in him).
In other words, whereas Merserme's and Amauld's charge permits the
interpretation that the circle is trivial because temporal, Gassendi's accusation
of circularity precludes this possibility by focusing on justification per se.
Thus, while Descartes gladly endorses the temporal version of the circle, he
is wrong to think that the response which (he thinks) works against the former
objection also does against the latter.
Thus it appears that Hussefl is taking Gassendi's point even one step further.
For in his critique of Descartes Husserl is much more radical than Mersenne,
Amauld, or Gassendi, because he is the only o n e - o f all five-to actually ask:
"Was ist das, Evidenz? ''94 So Husserl is questioning, not only what guarantees
that clear and distinct perceptions in particular are true, but also what assures
that evidence and truth in general 'correspond'. In other words: What enables
'die Immanenz des BewuBtseins' and 'die Transzendenz des Seins' to cohere?
Also, Husserl stipulates that there be no appeal to any deus ex machina. Since
Descartes has neither a concept nor a definition nor a theory of evidence itself
- as distinguished from its modes, for example, "clarity" and "distinctness"
-, it is hard to see how he can counter Husserl's objection of circularity,
HUSSERLON DESCARTESON EVIDENCE 13 1
I l L P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l v e r s u s Cartesian A c c o u n t o f E v i d e n c e
Conclusion
Hence the limits of the present investigation should be dear. For one can-
not reduce Husserl's critique of Descartes to his critique of his theory of
knowledge. Neither can one reduce Husserl's critique of Descartes' theory of
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 133
knowledge to his critique of his conception of evidence. Nor can one reduce
Husserl's critique of Descartes' conception of evidence to his critique of its
circularity. Thus, given the various levels of specification in regard to topics
in this area, many more tasks remain to be carded out.
Then, too, the more Husserl thought about evidence, the more he thought
about Descartes. And, the more he thought about Descartes, the more he
thought about Descartes' conception of evidence. Finally, the more he thought
about Descartes' conception of evidence, the more he developed his own
account in opposition to it. In fact, one hardly finds a systematic treatment
of evidence in the mature Husserl in which he does not use the Cartesian
position as a foil to make his own look better by contrast.
On the other hand, one should not forget that, in matters of knowledge,
of truth, and of evidence, both Husserl and Descartes are fundamentalists,
eschatologists, and absolutists. That is, each is firmly committed to a reali-
zation - as far as possible - of the ideal of absolute, adequate, and apodictic
knowledge through fitting evidence, and each seeks epistemic felicity in the
pursuit of a presuppositionless science. Thus some of their differences are
not so much of ends as of means, and some of these differences exist only
by virtue of the deeper similarities between them. One philosopher's God is
another philosopher's transcendental ego.
Remarkable is how emphatically Husserl places the problematic of cir-
cularity at the center of his critique of Descartes' conception of evidence.
The circle that Husserl claims to find in Descartes' conception of evidence
is new in so far as it is not the same as the ones anticipated or articulated
by Mersenne, by Amauld, and by Gassendi. For, whereas their circles are
restricted to the relationship between the clarity and distinctness of percep-
tions, on the one hand, and the existence and veracity of God, on the other
hand, his encompasses the entire relationship between evidence, on the one
hand, and anything or anyone other than evidence to which or to whom one
might appeal in order to justify evidence, on the other hand.
Yet the primary and ultimate purpose of Husserl's critique of Descartes'
conception of evidence is not as an end in itself, but as the means to a better
philosophical clarification of what evidence is and how it functions in know-
ledge. Now there can be little doubt that Husserl is right about two things:
Hermeneutically speaking, the interpretation according to which Descartes
is guilty of circularity in his account of evidence is correct. Philosophically
spealang, the Cartesian account of evidence will not work due to this cir-
cularity. In a word, Husserl's characterization of Descartes' conception of
epistemic justification as "a theological theory of evidence" is as brilliant as
it is accurate, and Husserl is basically correct in his assessment that Descartes
is trying to legitimate evidence in terms of something other than itself, failing
134 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
to see that, whatever else this might be, it, too, would have to be legitimated
in terms of evidence.
In this regard, to be sure, Husserl gives to Descartes with the one hand
and he takes away from him with the other; none the less, on balance he
takes away far more than he gives. Still, the Husserlian interpretation of the
Cartesian conception of evidence is not without its problems. Here there are
- without any claim to definitiveness - three clusters of concerns.
First, it is profoundly ironic that Husserl vehemently criticizes Descartes for
not recognizing the transcendental ego. After all, Husserl himself was unable
to find this ego at the time of the first edition of the Logical Investigations,
and he had to add, in a famously embarrassing footnote to the second edition,
that he had, in the meantime, learned how to find it. 97 But this is a superficial
- and ad hominem - retort to Husserl.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether and to what extent the discovery
and uncovering of the transcendental ego is felicitous for Husserl. For one
thing, the assertion and maintenance of this specifically epistemological ego
appears to raise at least as many questions as it answers. For instance, what
if someone does not and cannot find theirs? How about the fact that for
Hussed all pertinent findings of, by, and for this ego are supposed to be "eide-
tic"? And what about the enormous difficulties connected with the transition
from transcendental subjectivity to transcendental intersubjectivity? For Hus-
serl is adamant that objectivity cannot be clarified without a clarification of
intersubjectivity. 98 Thus, if he cannot provide a satisfactory account of inter-
subjectivity, then what does this entail for his clarification of objectivity? Et
cetera. It is a case in which the explanans requires as much explanatio as the
explanandum.
For another thing, whether or not Husserl is fight to criticize traditional
epistemologies for locating the knowing subject "in" the world, it is unclear
whether the optimal solution to this problem is to swing the pendulum in
exactly the opposite direction by situating the world "in" consciousness. Isn't
the more instructive lesson to be learned, rather, that the cognitive mode of
being "with" the world is not that one which is primary and ultimate? Surely
some of Heidegger's critical insights in Being and T~me, for example, that
knowing is not a founding but a founded mode of being in the world on the
part of Dasein, arc directed at both Descartes and Hussed in this regard. In
all fairness, though, Husserl appears to have benefitted from a reading of
Heidegger's work during the last decade of his life, and his concept of the
Lebenawelt owes a lot to his pupil in this respect. But it does appear to be a
case of too little, too late.
Second, in so far as Husserl, too, seeks to provide an absolutely and finally
valid "Letztbegriindung" of all scientific knowledge, his basic philosophical
HUSSERL ON DESCARTES ON EVIDENCE 135
project is the same as that of Descartes. 99 In the long nan, then, both projects
are surely infected with some of the same problems. Ironically, once again,
Husserl not only criticizes Descartes' conception of evidence for its vicious
circularity, but also comes painfully close to acknowledging the inherent
circularity ofallphilosophizing. Remarkably, this recognition begins to dawn
on Husserl not late, but early, in his career.
For example, already in the Prolegomena Husserl articulates what has come
to be called "the Mfinchhausen Trilemma". 100 In "the Mtinchhausen Trilem-
ma", a device against epistemic foundationalism, there are three possible but
unacceptable consequences to which the postulate of a final justification of
knowledge is supposed to lead, namely, to an infinite regress, to a logical
circle, or to the arguably arbitrary interruption of the procedure at a certain
proclaimed point.l°l The first alternative is impracticable, the second, proble-
matic, and the third, dogmatic. 102For his part, Descartes opts-nolens volens
- for a mixture of the second and of the third alternative. That is, his way out
of the Trilemma is to appeal to the clear and distinct perception of the insight
"ego cogito, ergo sum" as well as to the clear and distinct perception of the
idea of a God who exists and does not deceive. For his part, Husserl decides
on the third altemative by pursuing the argumentative-partially intuitive, but
partially discursive - establishment of the transcendental ego, his absolute
instance.
The other opportunity that Husserl has to recognize the intrinsically cir-
cular character of all philosophizing is in remarks on the very theory of
knowledge. 1°3 To be sure, he formulates the dilemma that all knowledge is
circular because, on the one side, there can be no knowledge unless there is
knowledge of knowledge, and, on the other side, there can be no knowledge
of knowledge unless there is knowledge. 104 But he quickly- all too quickly
-dismisses such reservations as "dogmatic skepticism"J °5
These missed opportunities are unfortunate because they preclude the
chance to understand what Husserl's reaction would have been if had he
taken more seriously the possibility that epistemology specifically, like phi-
losophy generally, is inherently circular. More importantly, it is hard to see
how Husserl's actual philosophical responses to the concerns involved are
not, as a result of this neglect, weaker than they might have otherwise been.
For Husserl's epistemological kuklophobia 1°6 prevents him from empatheti-
cally putting himself into the situation of someone who would take a more
skeptical approach to issues raised under these rubrics and for whom, as a
consequence, these issues would be more real. Here it is worth noting that
hermeneutical phenomenology is more appreciative of the circular character
of human experience than is Classical phenomenology. 107
136 GEORGEHEFFERNAN
No~s
1. This is essentially the text of a lecture delivered to the Hungarian Philosophical Association,
Section for Phenomenology, at the E6tvOs-Lor~nd University of Budapest, on October
18, 1996. I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to Gfibor Boros for his considerable
organizational talents as well as to both Balfizs Mezei and L/LszloTengelyi, who - with
their impressive circle of doctors and of candidates-contributed to an excellent discussion,
some of which I have been able to integrate into the printed version. I alone am responsible
for any remaining faults. Chief among them would appear to he that the commentary in the
"Guided Tour" has become too skeletal. But there was no other way to fit the monograph
into this format.
2. Cf. Edmund Husseri, Philosophic der Arithmetik, Mit ergdnzenden Texten (1890-1901),
ed. L. Eiey (The Hague, 1970), HUA XII. The standard edition of Husserl's works is
Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke or Husserliana ("HUA"). Here this edition is cited
by volume, page, and line.
3. Cf. Husserl, Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometric, Texte aus dem Nachlafl, 1886-1901,
ed. I. Strohmeyer (The Hague/Boston/Lancaster, 1983), HUA XXI.
4. Cf. Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewufltsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phiinomenologie der anschau-
lichen Vergegenw~irtigungen, Texte aus dem Nachlafl (1898-1925), ed. E. Marbach (The
Hague/Boston/London, 1980), HUA XXIII.
5. Cf. Husserl, Zur PMinomenologie der Intersubjektivit~it, Texte aus dem Nachlafl: Erster
Teil (1905--1920), Zweiter Teil (1921-1928), and Dritter Teil (1929-1935), ed. I. Kern
(The Hague, 1973), HUA XIII, )(IV, and XV.
6. Cf. Husserl, Ding und Raum, Vorlesungen 1907, ed. U. Claesges (The Hague, 1973), HUA
XVI.
7. Cf. Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskrip-
ten 1918-1926, ¢d. M. Fleischer (The Hague, 1966), HUA XI.
8. Cf. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed. L.
Landgrebe (Hamburg, 1972).
9. Cf. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, ed.
E. Holenstein (The Hague, 1975), HUA XVIII, and Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur
PMinomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Erster Teil (Investigations I-V) and Zweiter
Teil (Investigation VI), ed. U. Panzer (The Hague/Boston/Lancaster, 1984), HUA XIX/I
and 2.
10. Cf. Husseri, ldeen zu einer reinen Ph/inomenologie und phfinomenologischen Philosophic,
Erstes Buch: Allgemeine EinJ~hrung in die reine Phiinomenologie, and Ergiinzende Texte
(1912-1929), ed. IC Schuhmann (The Hague, 1976), HUA III/1 and 2.
11. Cf. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Ver-
nunfl, Mit erganzenden Texten, ed. P. Janssen (The Hague, 1974), HUA XVI[.
12. Cf. HUA XVIII, 257, 36; HUA XIX/1, 70, 15; 262 (fn.); 371 (fn.); and HUA XIX/2, 752,
18 and 25; 754, 11 ft.; 770, 10 ft.; and 771, 23.
13. Cf. HUA XIX/2, 754, 11-12, and 770, 10-11.
14. Cf. HUA Ill/I, 59, 4--I 1; 62, 18--27; 63, 36-64, 18; 65, 1 ff.; 70, 4-25; 72, 37-73, 17; 99,
8--21; 133, 22-25; and 334, 13--14.
15. Cf. Husserl, D/e ldee der Phiinomenologie, Fiinf Vorlesungen, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague,
1950, 1958, and 1973 [Second Edition/Reprint]), HUA II.
16. Cf. Husserl, Erste Philosophic (1923/24), Erster Tell: Kritische ldeengeschichte, ed. R.
Boehm (The Hague, 1956), HUA VII.
17. Cf. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Tell: Theorie der phdnomenologischen
Reduktion, ed. R. Boehm (The Hague, 1959), HUA VIII.
18. Cf. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen undPariser Vortr~ge, ed. S. Strasser (The Hague,
1950, 1963, and 1973 [Photomechanical Reprint]), HUA I, 41-183.
19. Cf. ibid., 1-39.
13 8 GEORGE HEFFERNAN
20. Cf. Husseri, Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschafien und die transzendentale Phii-
nomenologie, Fine Einleitung in die ph?inomenologische Philosophie, ed. W. Biemel (The
Hague, 1954, 1962, and 1976 [Second Edition/Photomechanical Reprint]), HUA VI.
21. Cf. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Vorlesungen 1906/07, ed. U.
Meile (Dordreeht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984), HUA XXIV.
22. Cf. Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewufltseins (1893--1917), ed. R. Boehm
(The Hague, 1966), HUA X.
23. Cf. Husserl, Logik und allgemeine Wissenschafistheorie, Vorlesungen 1917/18, Mit er-
giinzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung yon 1910/11, ed. U. Panzer (Dordrecht/Bos-
ton/London, 1996), HUA XXX.
24. Cf. Husserl, Phiinomenologische Psychologie, VorlesungenSommersemester 1925, ed. W.
Biemel (The Hague, 1962/1968), HUA IX.
25. Cf., e.g., Husserl, Aufsatze und Vortriige (1911-1921), Mit ergiinzenden Texten, ed. T.
Nenon and H. R. Sepp (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1987), HUA XXV, 3-62 (= Philoso-
phie als strenge VC'tssenschafl,in Logos, vol. I [ 1910/11 ]), andAufsatze und Vortr?ige(1922-
1937), Mit ergiinzenden Texten,ed. T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster,
1989), HUA XXVII, 205, 11-22.
26. This account does not delve into Husserl's enormous Nachlafl. But a search of his published
philosophical correspondence turns up nothing decisive in connection with his critique of
Descartes' conception of evidence. Indeed, the letters shed, as a rule, little light on this topic.
Cf. Husserl, Husserliana, Dokumente, vol. III, Briefwechsel, pts. I-X, ed. K. Schuhmann
(with E. Schuhmann) (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994). An exception that proves the
rule is Husserl's letter to Lipps of Jan. 1904, which anticipates formulations concerning
the relationship between the immanence of consciousness and the transcendence of being,
e.g., in the Idea ofPhenomenology. Cf. Briefwechsel, II, 122-127.
27. For the record: Husserl also held regular seminars on Descartes' theory of knowledge,
usually entitled "Philosophische Obungen im AnschluB an Descartes' Meditationes de
prima philosophia", e.g., in the summer semester of 1892, winter semester 1896/97, winter
semester 1913/14, summer semester 1916, and winter semester 1923/24. Cf. Husserl-
Chronik, Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls, ed. K. Schuhmann (The Hague, 1977),
Husserliana, Dolcumente, vol. I, pp. 33, 47, 184, 200, and 276.
28. Cf., e.g., HUA I, 1, 14--15; 43, 14-15; HUA II, 49, 22; HUA III/1, 99, 16-17; HUA VI,
76, 20-21; HUA VII, 60, 28; HUA VIII, 4, 36; HUA IX, 248, 16; HUA XVII, 7, 1, and
I1, 3-4; HUA XXIV, 192, 5; HUA XXV, 138, 19; HUA XXVII, 169, 4-5; HUA XXIX,
110, 16; etc.
29. Cf. MFP, Synopsis, § 1, I, §§ 9-12, III, 4, VI, 24, etc. The Meditationes de prima
philosophia are available in Ren6 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and
P. Tannery (Pads, 1996), vol. VII, pp. 1-90. In the following, references are usually by
Meditation and paragraph ("§").
30. Cf. II, 3 and 6, III, 9, IV, 10, etc.
31. Cf. III, 2 and 25. Cf. also III, 36 and 38, and IV, 1-2.
32. Cf. IV, 17.
33. Cf. V, 7-12.
34. Cf. VI, 10.
35. Cf. Synopsis, 2 and 4.
36. Cf. Synopsis, 2, and V, 6.
37. Cf. III, 2.
38. Cf. V, 15.
39. Cf. Synopsis, 2 and4, I, 9-12, II, 3 and 6, III, 2,4, 9, 16, 25, and 38, IV, 1-2, 10, 12, and
15--17, V, 6-7 and 11-15, VI, 6--7, 9--10, 11-16, and 23--24, etc.
40. Cf. III, 2.
41. Cf. Synopsis, 2.
42. Cf. Synopsis, 3.
43. Cf. III, 25, passim.
HUSSERLON DESCARTESON EVIDENCE 139
92. Cf. also Descartes, Conversation with Burman (1648), AT V, 148-149 and 178.
93. Cf., once again, AT VII, 124, 29, 125, 1-2 and 4; and 214, 12.
94. See HUA XXIV, 154, 30-31.
95. See HUA XVIII, 156, 28--30.
96. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ober Gewiflheit/On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H.
von Wright (Oxford, 1969), § 672.
97. Cf. HUA XIX/1,374, asterisked fla. to 1-3.
98. Cf., e.g., HUA I, § 41 and §§ 42--62; HUA XIII-XV, passim; HUA XVII, § 96; etc.
99. Cf., e.g., HUA XVII, 273--295, esp. 278, 3--280, 5.
100. Cf. HUA XVIII, 94-95.
101. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines ofPyrrhonism, bk. I, eh. XV. Cf. ibid., bk. II, oh. III ft.
102. Cf. Hans Albert, Traktat iiberkritische Vernunfi (Tiibingen, 1975 [3rd ed.]), pp. ! 1-15.
103. Cf. HUA XXIV, 195, 29-196, 5.
104. Cf. Plato, Meno, 80 d-81 c.
105. Cf. HUA XXIV, 196, 5 ft.
106. This appears preferable to "kirkophobia". But the sense is the same: "fear of circles".
107. Cf., e.g., Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Halle a. d. Saale, 1927), passim, esp. § 2
ft., and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzage einer philosophischen
Hermeneutik (1960), Gesammelte Werke, vol. I: Hermeneutikl(T•bingen, 1986), pp. 76,
179-180, 194-195, 202, 227-228, 296, and 463.
108. Cf., once again, HUA VI, 58--60, 71-74, and 76-77.
109. Cf. ibid., 1-17, esp. 15-17.
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