Φαντασία Reconsidered

von Deborah Modrak (Rochester, NY)

In Aristotle's psychology, φαντασία (often translated Imagination)

plays a central role.1 It is invoked in explanations of memory, dreaming,
sensory illusion, action and even discursive reasoning.2 The r nge of
its uses makes the mastery of Aristotle's conception of φαντασία
essential for students of his psychology. At the same time the r nge
and diversity of the experiences included under φαντασία call the
presupposition that Aristotle has a single, consistent conception of
φαντασία into question.
Hamlyn found little consistency in Aristotle's account of φαντασία.3
More recently Schofield has established that the account of φαντασία
found in De Anima 111,3 is consistent and that all the cases of φαντασία
1
Throughout this paper, I shall use the word "φαντασία" instead of "Imagination"
to avoid the assimilation of Aristotle's conception of φαντασία to our conception
of imagination. Our notion seems to exclude the immediate awareness of objects
in our environment and to include the manipulation of ideas. Aristotle's notion
of φαντασία, I shall argue, includes the former and excludes the latter. Cf. M.
Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination", Aristotle on Mind and the Senses.
Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by G. E. R. Lloyd
2
and G. E. L. Owen, Cambridge 1978, p. 101 and n. 15, pp. 131-2.
These explanations are found in number of difterent works — De Anima, De
Memoria, De Insomniis and De Motu Animalium — and φαντασία is mentioned
in many other works. The ubiquity of this notion has led some commentators to
make φαντασία the faculty for the Interpretation of sensory contents, thus turning
αϊσθησις into a purely passive recipient of sensible qualities. ROSS cites De Anima
III, 3, s evidence that Aristotle, at least sometimes, held this position (Arisiotle.
5th ed., London 1949), p. 142. Nussbaum says that "φαντασία is the facully in
virtue of which the animal sees his object s an object of a certain sort..."
(Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, Princeton 1978), p. 255. I shall arguc for a
conception of φαντασία which is sufficiently broad to accommodate the many
roles assigned φαντασία in the Aristotelian corpus but sufficiently narrow to
3
allow αϊσθησις to function s a critical faculty.
D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and I I I , Clarendon Press. Oxford
v
1968, p. 131. Cf. D. A. Rees, who also finds thal De Anima 111,3, "docs not
provide any one clear view", ("Aristotle's Treatmcnt of Phantasia", Kssars in
Anden t Greek Philosophy, edited by J. P. Anton with George L. Kuslas, Alhany
1971, p. 500).

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4S Dcborah M o d r a k

citcd therc sharc thc featurc of bcing non-paradigmatic sensory exper-

icnccs.4 Schofield carcfully rcstricts bis argument to a single chapter
to show that Aristotlc has a cogent notion of φαντασία. Nussbaum,
on the other band, bases her analysis of φαντασία οη the role assigned
φαντασία in the account of animal movement in the De Motu Animal-
inm and De Anima 111,9 — I I . 5 In these contexts, she argues, the role
of φαντασία is to Interpret the impress of external objects, presenting
the object of perception s a certain thing and s an object of approach
or avoidance. In addition to this broad notion, she (in De Anima 111,3
and the Parva Naturali ) finds a narrower, less satisfactory conception
of φαντασία which she describes s a decaying-sense account.
In contrast to these commentators, I shall argue that we can find a
unified and cogent conception of φαντασία in the psychological
treatises s a whole. Central to this conception is the identiflcation of
φαντασία with the awareness of a sensory content under conditions
that are not conducive to veridical perception ("the sensory content
analysis"). In the first section, I argue for the sensory content analysis
on the basis of the relationship between φαντασία and perception s
described in De Anima 111,3, and I discuss the physiological basis of
φαντασία. In the second section, I argue that the conception of φαντα-
σία found in De Anima 111,3 is also found in the Parva Naturali and
that the role Aristotle assigns to φαντασία in dreaming and remember-
ing affords further evidence for the sensory content analysis. I also
show that this conception of φαντασία is consistent with the role
Aristotle assigns to φαντασία in the explanation of animal motion.
The third section elaborates the conception of φαντασία s sensory
representation and explains Aristotle's ascription of truth values to
φαντασία. The final section considers Aristotle's analysis of φαντασία
in the light of recent discussions of mental imagery.

/. Perception and Φαντασία

De Anima 111,3 is the only chapter in the Aristotelian corpus devoted
exclusively to the topic of φαντασία. The picture of φαντασία that

4
M. Schofield, op. cit.\ G. Watson also argues for the unity of De Anima 111,3,
"ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ In Aristotle's De Anima 3.3", Classical Quarterly 32 (1982), pp.
100-113.
5
M. Nussbaum, op. cit.9 "Interpretive Essay V".

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 Φαντασία Reconsidercd 49

emerges from this text is puzzling in a number of respects. Aristotle

groups two seemingly distinct kinds of cases together under φαντασία:
cases of appearance and cases of Imagination (/. *?., cases where φαίνε-
σθαι (to appear) would be the appropriate verb and cases where
φαντάζεσθαι (to imagine) would be). Secondly, Aristotle describes
φαντασία in much the same terms s perception; for instance, just s
there is perception of special, common and incidental objects, so there
is φαντασία of these objects. Thirdly, Aristotle characterizes φαντασία
in two different and possibly incompatible ways. φαντασία is described
in intentional and in physiological terms. The object of the present
section is to extract (from De Anima 111,3) a preliminary characteriza-
tion of φαντασία that makes these features of Aristotle's account seem
less baffling than they initially appear.
The first puzzle is answered in the main by Schofield, who points
out that cases of appearance and cases of imagining share a common
feature. They are both cases of non-paradigmatic sensory experience
and for this reason are grouped together under the rubic of φαντασία.6
On Schofleld's account, a sceptical or non-committal attitude is appro-
priate with respect to the object s presented in φαντασία.7 However,
according to Aristotle, φαντασία frequently guides action.8 To play
this role, φαντασία must provide reasonably reliable Information. To
avoid this difficulty and to give content to the notion of a non-
paradigmatic sensory experience, I propose to characterize φαντασία
s the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not
conducive to veridical perception. A sensory content is a complex
of sensible characters; in the case of perception and non-veridical
appearance these characters are properties that the external object
possesses in relation to the percipient; in the absence of an external
Stimulus a sensory content is an internal representation of sensible

6
Aristotle refers to a metaphorical use of φαντασία at 428a2. One tradition
identifies this use with the use of φαντασία to describe how things appear. /. r.,
with the use associated with φαίνεσθαι (Cf. Hicks, op. eil., p. 461). Schofield
argues tellingly against this view (pp. 100—101; 115 — 123): The ancienl tradition
is nearer the mark in taking the metaphorical use of φαντασία to be any use of
it for another faculty, e. g., for perception or Intuition or belicf. (See Commentari
in Aristotelem Gracca, Simplicii In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria. cd.
M. Hayduck, Berlin 1882; Themisti In Libros Aristoielis De Anima Paraphrasis.
ed. R. Heinzc, Berlin 1899; cf. Kodier, op. eil., p. 415-16).
* Schofield, op. r/V., pp. 116-119.
« See, for instance, D. Mow An. 700bl7, b!9; 701 a5; 701a29-33; 701M6. b35.
702a19; 703bl8-19). Cf. Nussbaum, op. dt., pp. 221 -269.
4 Arch. Gesch. Philosophie Bd. 68

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50 Dcborah Modrak

characters. 9 The sensory contcnt analysis has the further advantage

that i t makes clcar what fcaturcs φαντασία has in common with
perccption and what features distinguish it from perception.
A passage in the De Insomniis, which refers to the discussion of
φαντασία in the De Anima, sums up the relationship between φαντασία
and perception: the faculty of φαντασία (φανταστικόν) is the same 10s
the perceptual faculty (αίσθητικόν), but they differ in essence (είναι).
In a similar vein, Aristotle uses the one-but-different-in-εΐναι locution
to describe the nonspecific perceptual capacity that is exercised in
connection with different types of sense objects and to describe the
critical faculty that recognizes the difference among heterogeneous
sensibles.11 In these cases, a single faculty is exercised under different
conditions and in connection with a variety of objects. These charac-
teristics provide the basis for logically distinct descriptions of the
faculty. Suppose one exercise of the faculty is an event of type E and
that another is an event of Type D, then the facuity may be correctly
described s a capacity for E-ing or s a capacity for D-ing. If E and
D are logically independent descriptions, then there are two logically
independent descriptions of the same faculty.12 The φανταστικόν and
the αίσθητικόν differ in εϊναι, because the former is exercised in
φαντασία-events and the latter in αϊσθησις-events. How αϊσθησις and

9
I shall argue that the distinction between sense objects that are perceived κατά
συμβεβηκός and those which are perceived καθ' αυτά is a distinction between
objects in the world that are represented by complexes of sensible characters and
the sensible characters. Because φαντασία has the same objects s perception
10
(428bl2— 13), it too has complexes of sensible characters s its immediate object.
De. Ins. 459al6 —17; cf. 432a31—b2. ROSS takes Aristotle's point to be that
φαντασία and αϊσθησις cannot exist separately (Aristotle Parva Naturalia, Oxford
1955). However, Aristotle does not seem to make the possession of αϊσθησις
dependent upon the possession of φαντασία (cf. 428a8 —11). According to
Nussbaum, Aristotle is saying that φαντασία and αϊσθησις are "two aspects to
be discerned in many perceptual activities" (p. 255). This Interpretation would
11
fit the text better had Aristotle used 'φαντασία' and ' αϊσθησις' at 459al6—17.
De Ins. 449al4-20; 427a3; cf. 424a25; 431al4, a!9; 429b20; De Ins. 455a20-22;
12
Met. 1036a8.
The same analysis applies to other cases where Aristotle uses the one-but-
different-in-εΐναι distinction. For instance, Aristotie says, "the activity (ενέρ-
γεια) of the object of perception and of the sense are one and the same, although
what it is for them to be such is not the same" (425b26 —27; cf. 426al5 —19,
430al9, 431al). Here a single event is being described from two perspectives —
that of the perceived object and that of the percipient; in the case of hearing, the
event is simultaneously a listening and a sounding (426al).

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 Φαντασία Rcconsidcred 51

φαντασία differ is set out in De Anima 111,3, 428a5-16:13 αϊσθησις is

common to all animals ; φαντασία is not.14 Φαντασία need not be the
immediate result of the Stimulation of a sense organ by an external
object; αϊσθησις must be. Αϊσθησις provides reliable Information
about the world; φαντασία need not.
These conditions would not be violated, were a particular psychologi-
cal occurrence to turn out to be an instance of φαντασία and of
αϊσθησις; however, a remark Aristotle makes in the middle of the
passage seems, like the distinction between the φανταστικόν and the
αισθητικόν, to indicate that a particular sensory experience is properly
described s one or the other. "Further it is not when we are exercising
our senses accurately with regard to objects of perception that we say
that this appears (φαίνεται) to us to be a man." (428al2 —14) 15
Whether a particular sensory apprehension is described s an inst-
ance of αϊσθησις or of φαντασία depends upon features of the total
Situation in which the object is apprehended; these include states of
the percipient and states of the external environment. Aristotle makes
the choice depend upon the accuracy with which the external object is
apprehended, or more precisely, the likelihood of its being accurately
perceived. For the most part, the unqualified use of αϊσθησις and its
13
I find Aristotle setting out four differences between αϊσθησις and φαντασία in
this passage: (1) Φαντασία occurs under conditions where αϊσθησις could not
occur (a6 —9; a!5 —16). (2) All animals possess αϊσθησις but not φαντασία
(a8 — 11). (3) Αϊσθησις is always true but φαντασία is not (al 1 — 12). (4) Αϊσθησις
and its cognates are not used in cases where the conditions for veridical perception
are not met, but 'φαίνεται' is (a!2—15). Other commentators have found five
differences. Hicks finds two differences at a8 — 11: (1) Αϊσθησις is always present,
but φαντασία is not, and (2) αϊσθησις is common to all animals, unlike φαντασία
(op. dt.). ROSS finds a fifth difference at a!6—18 and Hamlyn finds a fifth
14
difference at a!5 —16, which I read s a reference at a6 —8 (op. dt.).
The texts yield conflicting evidence s to whether insects have φαντασία. De
Anima 111,3 suggests that many do not (428a8-10, a21, 23; cf. 415alO); other
passages in the De Anima suggest they do (433a9 —12; 434a4 —5). Especially
problematic are the "intelligent" insects v/z. bees and ants (cf. Part. An.
659b24 — 27); Aristotle attributes memory (Met, 980b22 — 24) and social organiza-
tion (Hist. An. 488a7ff.) to them, but at 428alO Aristotle seems to deny them
φαντασία. There seems to be general agreement among recent commentators that
the M SS. reading of οίον μύρμηκι ή μελίττη ή σκωληκι should be amended
s proposed by Torstrik to οίον μύρμηκι μεν ή μελίττη, σκωληκι δ* οί>. Cf
commentaries by R. D. Hicks, Ariostot/c De Anima, Oxford 1961; D. W. Hamlyn,
. op. dt.
15
Translations follows Hamlyn. Unless otherwise noted, I shall use D. W. Hamlyn's
tranlation of the De Anima, W. S. Hett's translation of Ihe Parva Naturalia and
W. D. Ross's translation of Ihe Metaphysics.

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52 Dcborah Modrak

cognatcs in psychologial dcscriptions is limitcd to cascs of veridical

perccption. 16 To describe cases wherc thc Stimulation of a peripheral
scnsc organ rcsults in a distortcd reprcsentation of the external object,
Aristotle qualifies the usc of perccption words. If hc uses a perception
verb, he uses δοκεΐν (seems to) s well, or he uses a verb which is
derived from the relevant perception verb by adding the prefix, παρα-
(mis-). Or, he uses φαίνεσθαι (to appear). Sensory experiences de-
seribed in any of these ways are cases of φαντασία.17
A cognition whose object is a sensory content is properly described
s a perception just in case its object represents a state of affairs in
the external world s determined by normal percipients (cf.
I062b35-1063a5). It may fail to do so in either of two ways: (1) it
may represent an external object in a distorted fashion, or (2) it may
not represent an external object at all. All cases of sensory awareness
that are not cases of αϊσθησις are cases of φαντασία. The cases of
φαντασία Aristotle cites fall roughly into three groups: (1) a perceiver's
perceptual apparatus is being acted upon by an external object but
some other feature of the total Situation, for instance, distance from
the object, adversely affects the accuracy of the perception; (2) a
perceiver's perceptual apparatus is being acted upon by an external
object but a state of the perceiver, for instance, being feverish, adversely
affects the perception; and (3) a perceiver's perceptual apparatus is not
being acted upon by an external object.18 Non-veridical appearances
are instances either of (1) or of (2) while imagining, dreaming and
remembering fall under (3).
Having uncovered Aristotle's grounds for distinguishing between
φαντασία and αϊσθησις, we should now consider why the φανταστικόν

16
Aristotle's reluctance to call a non-veridical perception αϊσθησις may explain
why in De Insomniis instead of saying that αϊσθησις produces φαντασία, he
makes the cause of φαντασία a movement of an αϊσθησις (sensuous content)
(461al9, b22).
17
Commentators have been puzzled by Aristotle's claim at 428all—12 that αϊ-
σθησις is always true and frequently have read 428bl8 —19 s a correction (e. g.,
Hicks, ROSS). The puzzle vanishes, however, when we realize that the contrast
between αϊσθησις and φαντασία is the contrast between veridical perception and
sensory experience occurring under conditions that are not conducive to veridical
perception. /
18
Type (1) cases are discussed at 428al4-15, 428b3-4, De Ins. 458b29, 460bl8;
type (2) cases at De Ins. 460b4—13, 462al — 2; type (3) cases at 428a6 —8, a!6;
De Ins. 460b27—462a8. As described by Aristotle, even cases of hallucination
involve the (mis)apprehension of an external object s when a feverish person
"perceives" cracks on a wall s a terrifying animal (460bll —13).

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 Φαντασία Rcconsidered 53

and the αίσθητικόν are the same faculty. The context of the De
Insomn s passage suggests that the explanation lies with the sensory
character of the object of φαντασία. According to De Anima 111,3, the
object of φαντασία is the same type of object s the object of αϊσθησις
(482bl2). Aristotle divides the objects of αϊσθησις into the per se (καθ'
αυτά) and the per accidens (κατά συμβεβηκός) sensibles (418a8-23).
The per se sensibles consist in the objects peculiar to one sense, such
s colors and sounds, and objects directly perceived by several senses,
such s size or shape. The per se sensibles serve s the vehicle for the
perception of the per accidens sensibles "... we perceive the son of
Cleon, not because he is the son of Cleon, but because he is white,
and the white object happens to be the son of Cleon" (425a25 —26; cf.
418a21 —24). The proper sensibles seem to serve s the vehicle for the
perception of the common sensibles — presumably this is the force of
Aristotle's remark at 418a24 —25 that the proper sensibles are more
properly (κυρίως) perceptible that the common sensibles (cf. 425b6 —9).
This means that sensible characters, such s red and blue colors, and
high and low tones, will be the vehicle for the perception of any object
whatsoever. At 425b25 — 30 Aristotle extends this analysis to φαντασία
and divides the objects of φαντασία into proper, common and inciden-
tal objects.
A proper sensible exists potentially in the physical characteristic that
brings about its perception. Nonetheless, being perceptible is a property
which physical objects posses in relation to percipients (cf. 1010b32);
the actualization of this characteristic occurs in actual awareness.19
"If then movement, i.e., acting is in that which is acted upon both the sound
and hearing s actual must be in that which is potentially hearing." (426a2 —4;
cf. 425b22 - 23; 426a9 -11)
Aristotle's conception of alteration and his conception of the relation
of a sense to its object result in his placing the actualization of sensible
characters in the percipient. Aristotle holds that a proper sensible
cannot in any way affect a subject which is unable to perceive it, even
though the physical characteristic that brings about the perception of
the proper sensible may act on that subject (424b5 —8). The proper
19
424al8-24; 424bl-3, 425b25-426a1; cf. 417al3-14. In Aristotle's writings.
αΙσΟητόν does double duty, Standing on the one hand for the complex of sensible
* characters which is the vehicle for the perception of an external object (426a16.
cf. 426a6 —9, a23), and on the other hand for the object itsclf and the physical
characteristics that bring about its perception (417b27, 424b6, Cal. 7M5-8a6.
Met. 1063b4).

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54 Dcborah Modrak

sensible acts only on a percipient substance, for in that case, the proper
sensible actually exists s the object of a perception.20
The object of perception is a complex of sensible characters that
belong to an external object, s is the object of φαντασία in the case
of non-veridical appearance. In other cases of φαντασία, such s
dreaming or remein bering, its object is a complex of sensible characters
that represents an object not immediately present to the senses. Thus,
φαντασία has the same type of object s perception (428bl2); its object
like the object of perception is always a sensory content.21
In De Anima 111,3 and elsewhere, Aristotle describes φαντασία in
physiological terms.
"... since φαντασία is thought to be a kind of movement and not to occur apart
from sense-perception but only in things which perceive and with respect to those
things of which there is perception, since too it is possible, for movement to
occur s the result of the activity of perception, and this must be like the
perception — this movement cannot exist apart from sense-perception or in
things which do not perceive ... If then nothing eise has the stated characteristics
except φαντασία, and this is what was said, φαντασία will be a movement taking
place s a result of actual sense perception." (428bll — 429a2)22

20
To explain this, Aristotle appeals to the structural isomorphism between the sense
and its object. Unlike an insensate substance, the percipient organ possesses a
λόγος that enables it to receive the λόγος of sensible qualities which constitute
the sense object. See 424a4-10, a24-28, a31, bl; 429bl5-16; 431all, a!9,
435a21; cf. De Sns. 439bl8-440b22.
21
Believing that the object of φαντασία is always a sensory content, Aristotle uses
a single term, φάντασμα, for the object of φαντασία, when he gives a preliminary
defmition of φαντασία at 428al —2. In describing cases of appearance, Aristotle
typically does not employ "φαντασία" or any other term for the object of
φαντασία. In his commentary, Alexander uses "φανταστόν" for the content of
φαντασία when exercised in connection with an external object (Alexander
Aphrodisiensis, De Anima Liber cwn Mantissa, ed. Ivo Bruns, Berlin 1887, 68,
26.) But to my knowledge, Aristotle himself uses φανταστόν only once and then
s an adjective (450a24). Thus, it is a mistake for commentators to suppose that
Aristotle meant to exclude appearances from φαντασία s defmed at 428al — 2.
I agree with Schofield, who surveys the use of "φάντασμα" by earlier writers,
particularly Plato, and concludes that "φάντασμα" is often used for appearances
and presentations (pp. dt., pp. 116 — 8).
22
The many occurrences of κίνησις (movement) in this passage refer to physiologi-
cal changes. In other discussions of perception and φαντασία, Aristotle speaks
of motions in the sense organs and blood (De An. 11,7 — 11; De Ins. 2 and 3). Cf.
Thomas Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception", Philosophical Review 70 (1961),
470 — 484; cf. J. Freudenthal, U eher den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles^
G ttingen 1863, pp. 24 — 28.

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 55

For the sake of exegesis, I propose to distinguish between the

physiological and psychological components of Aristotle's description
of φαντασία and to piece together the physiological explanation on
the basis of this passage and related passages in the Parva Naturalia.
From the physiological perspective, φαντασία is a movement in a
sense organ, usually the central sense organ, which originated in the
Stimulation of a peripheral sense organ by an external object.23 In the
case of the contact senses (touch and taste), the movement in the
peripheral sense organ is caused by an object's coming into direct
contact with the bodily part (the tongue or the skin) which houses the
sense organ; in the case of the distance senses (sight, hearing, smell),
the object causes a motion in a medium which is transmitted to the
sense organ. The motion in the peripheral sense organ is ultimately
transmitted to the central sense organ in or around the heart (456al — 5,
656a28).
At the physiological level of description, establishing a firm boundary between
perception and φαντασία is difficult. Aristotle raakes perception depend on the
concurrent Stimulation of a peripheral sense organ. He identifies internal movements
that outlast the Stimulation of the peripheral sense organ with φαντασία. Το maintain
continuity between the original movement and the residual movement(s), Aristotle
envisages a movement that overlaps with perception but is identified with φαντασία.
This explains why at 428b27 — 30 Aristotle talks about the fallibility of φαντασία
in the presence of the movement identified with perception. It also makes his attempt
to give a unified account of non-veridical appearance and other cases of φαντασία
more coherent. There is a single physiological basis for all these experiences: a series
of movements initiated by an external object's Stimulation of a peripheral sense
organ and continuing (possibly) through several organs.
This is not to suggest that φαντασία is simply a physiological state. Like many
other psychological States, φαντασία has both a psychological and a physiological
component (cf. 403a5 — 25; 436a7 —10). The former is related to the latter s form
to matter; that is, the essential character of the composite state is determined by its
psychological structure. To determine whether a given psychophysical state is a case
of φαντασία, we must discover whether it is the awareness of a sensory content
under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception. If so. it is a case
of φαντασία; if not, it is not.

23
In the De Anima, Aristotle tends to speak s if perception and hence φαντασία
are simply the cognitive capacities of the live peripheral sense organs, but for
obvious reasons, a central organ is needed and Aristotle recognizes its cxistence
in a number of places (e.g., De Som. 455a21-26, 455b8-13, 456al-5; De
Part. An. 656a28; De Juv. 467b28-29). At 459alO-11, Aristotle describcs the
φάντασμα s a πάθος of the κοινή αΐσθησις.

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56 Dcborah Modrak

In Ihis scction, wo liavc cstahlishcd on thc basis of De Anima 111,3 that φαντασία
is thc awareness of u sensory contcnt under conditions that are not conducive to
vcridical pcrccption. All cuscs of φαντασία fit this dcscription, so the sensory content
unalysis cxplains why Aristotle assigns such a wide varicty of sensory experience to
φαντασία. By postulating a common physiological basis for all of these experiences,
Aristotle further strengthens the case for treating them all s cases of φαντασία.
Thus, Aristotle seems to have an answer for the critics who question the coherence
of his notion of φαντασία.

//. Φαντασία in O t he r Roles

The description of the relationship between αϊσθησις and φαντασία
in De Anima 111,3 provides ample evidence that in certain contexts the
object of φαντασία is a sensory content. In this section, to allay any
lingering doubts about the unity of Aristotle's account of φαντασία, Ι
propose to look at the relationship between δόξα (opinion) and φαντα-
σία, memory and φαντασία, and dreams and φαντασία and to show
that in each case Aristotle's description of φαντασία accords with the
sensory Contents analysis. A comprehensive account of φαντασία must
also come to terms with Aristotle's account of the role of φαντασία in
voluntary animal movement, so the section will conclude with an
argument showing that the sensory content analysis is consistent with
the account of animal movement.
The distinction between δόξα and φαντασία that figures in the De
Anima account of φαντασία and in the account of dreaming in the De
Insomniis Supports the sensory content analysis. According to De Anima
111,3, both δόξα and φαντασία are critical faculties (423a3 —5) and
both are subject to error (428al9). They differ in that φαντασία is up
to us, while δόξα is not (427bl7 —20), and that δόξα carries conviction
(πίστις), while φαντασία does not (428a20 — 22). At 428al8 —25 Aris-
totle argues that φαντασία and δόξα must be different faculties because
animals possess φαντασία, but (lacking reason, and hence, lacking
conviction) must lack δόξα. Since animals exhibit beliefs (where belief
is defmed operationally in terms of nonverbal behavior), conviction
and δόξα must involve some cognitive Operation that animals cannot
perform.24 What animals lack would seem to be the ability to manipul-

24
S. Stich presents a balanced account of the arguments for and against attributing
beliefs to animals in "Do Animals Have Beliefs?", Australasian Journal ofPhiloso-
phy 57 (1979), pp. 15 — 28. Aristotle recognizes the need to attribute some belief-
like cognitions to animals in order to explain their behavior, so he construes

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 57

ate concepts of a logically complex sort, or s Aristotle puts it, to

reason discursively (434a5-11; cf. 453alOff.)- The cognitive operations
required for human reasoning exceed the scope of sensory representa-
tion and hence the scope of φαντασία. This also explains why Aristotle
rejects the claim of φαντασία to be a kind of ύπόληψις (supposal), the
species of which are knowledge, δόξα, understanding and their opposi-
tes (427b24 —26). The difference between φαντασία and perception, on
the one hand, and ύπόληψις and δόξα, on the other, is the difference
between the employment of sensory representation alone and the em-
ployment of some mode25 of representation that enables its possessors
to manipulate concepts.
Further evidence that the distinction between δόξα and φαντασία
rests on a distinction between cognitive faculties that are not limited to
sensory representation and those that are is provided by the De Insom-
niis. Aristotle groups together faculties for thinking including δόξα
and contrasts them to faculties through which sensory characters are
apprehended, v/z. αϊσθησις and φαντασία, to argue that a dream
(ένύπνιον) is a kind of φάντασμα (458blO — 459a22).26 Dreaming is
not to be identified with opining, because "we seem to see that the
approaching object is white s well s a man [in a dream]" (458bl5).
Thoughts occuring during sleep which are contrary to the φαντάσματα
occurring then are not part of the dream (462a29). Not only do
these distinctions establish the sensory character of the φαντάσματα
constituting dreams, they also establish φαντάσματα s representational
entities. Were a φάντασμα non-representational, no conflict could arise
between i t and a thought.
Aristotle also appeals to the conception of φαντασία s sensory
representation to account for memory. As defined in the De Memoria*
memory "is the disposition of a φάντασμα regarded s a likeness
(είκών) of that of which it is the φάντασμα, and belongs to that part

perception and φαντασία s faculties for making rudimentary judgements. At De

Motu An. 700015—20, they are said to have the same place s νους (cf. 429a4 —6;
25
433alO).
Because humans have recourse to a non-sensory mode of representation. we are
able to arrive at a φαντασία s the result of deliberation (cf. 434a7 —12). Aristotle
calls the form of φαντασία that is exercised in connection with reasoning delibera-
tive (βουλευτική or λογιστική) φαντασία (433b29-434a7) and the form that is
exercised solely through the perceptual faculty αϊσΟητική φαντασία.
26
Just s J have not translated "φαντασία" to avoid misleading connotations. l
shall not translate "φάντασμα(τα)", which is Aristotle's term for the object of
φαντασία (cf. note 21 above).

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5<S Dchorah Modrak

of us hy which wc perccive timc and to the primary sense organ

(αισθητικόν)" (45la14— 17.27 Aristotlc explains the notion of an είκών
by reference to pictures and a viewer's taking a portrait to be a
representation of its subject (450b20 — 451a2). Even in the case of
intelligible objects (τα νοητά), memory employs φαντάσματα, just s
thought does. Comparing the φάντασμα used in thinking to the di-
agram a geometer uses, Aristotle maintains that, like the diagram, it
must be definite size (450al —6).
This conception of the φαντάσματα employed in thinking finds
expression in the De Anima s well s the De Memoria. In De Anima
111,8, in support of the claim that all thought is grounded in sense
perception, Aristotle asserts that all thinking requires φαντάσματα:
"And for this reason unless one perceived things one would not learn or under-
stand anything, and when one contemplates one must simultaneously contemplate
a φάντασμα; for φαντάσματα are like sensuous Contents (αισθήματα) ...
(432a7-9).
If φαντάσματα did not preserve the characteristics of the objects of
perception, they could not function s αισθήματα (cf. 431 al 4 —15),
nor could they mediate between perception and thought.28
To sum up, Aristotle's treatment of φαντασία and the φάντασμα in
a number of different contexts provides strong evidence that φαντασία
always has a sensory content s its proper object.29 φαντασία is closely
associated with αϊσθησις and sharply differentiated from δόξα in
Aristotle's psychological writings; both relationships are explained if
φαντασία, like αϊσθησις and unlike δόξα, employs only sensory repre-
sentation, that is, if its proper object is a complex of sensible characters
that represents a sensible particular. Φαντάσματα play crucial roles in
dreaming, remembering and thinking. These roles depend upon the
φάντασμα being a sensory content.

27
Plato holds a similar view; at Phb. 34a memory is defined s the preservation of
28
αϊσθησις.
Aristotle uses "αίσθημα" infrequently and, for the most part, for the sensuous
content of a perception in contradistinction to the external object represented
through the content. (Cf. De Ins. 461 b27; 1010b33; cf. Kodier, Aristote, Tratte
de l' me, II, Paris 1900, p. 525.) He also uses "αίσθημα" in explanations of
cognitive states, such s thinking (431al5, 432a9) and dreaming (De Som. 45j6a26;
De Ins.. 460b2, 461al9, b22), which employ sensory Contents not presented in
concurrent perceptions.
29
Bonitz lists eighteen occurrences of "φάντασμα". In all but one of these passages
"φάντασμα" is used for a sensory content. The exception is De Mundo 395a29
but this work is now considered spurious. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Berlin 1870.

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 59

The rolc of φαντασία in the account of animal movement remains to be discussed.

Anstelle often appeals to φαντασία in explanations of animal behavior including
the actions of persons.30 Aristotle seems to assign φαντασία two related functions
- to focus desire on a particular object and to provide the Information that an
animal needs to act on its desires. Both of these functions can be explained on the
sensory content analysis.
Aristotle, like many modern theorists, draws a distinction between affective states
leading to an action and cognitive ones. Not only must we mention some form of
desire to explain an animaFs behavior but also some form of cogniton. In the De
Moiu AnimaUum, Aristotle appeals to three cognitive faculties in this connection —
perception, φαντασία and thought (700bl7—19, 701a29-33, 702bl6—19). These
faculties provide the Information which inspires the animaFs desire and channels it
in a particular direction. For instance, the desire to do what is appropriate may
take the form of walking s a result of perceptions or thoughts about one's present
Situation (cf. 701a27 — 28). In this capacity, φαντασία presents sensory contents
which embody Information not currently available through perception (cf. 429a5,
431 b2 —10). It serves s a kind of memory — not memory in the strict Aristotelian
sense which depends on the self-conscious awareness of past experience (451 a5 —7)
but memory in our sense, viz. the recall of Information acquired in the past.
To move an animal, desire must be aroused and focused on a particular object.
Some cognitive faculty must present a concrete particular or envisaged state of
affairs to the animal in a way that arouses the desire to obtain the object or avoid
it. Although Aristotle also mentions perception and thought in this regard, he
emphasizes the role of φαντασία:
"In general, therefore, s we have said, in so far s the animal is capable of desire
so far is it capable of moving itself; and it is not capable of desire without
φαντασία." (433b27—28)
A passage in the De Motu Animalium explains at greater length:
"For this reason at the same time so to speak, one thinks that one ought to go
forward and one goes forward ... For the affections suitably prepare the organic
parts, desire the affections and φαντασία the desire; and this arises either through
thought or through perception." (702al5 —19)31
These passages establish the importance of φαντασία to desire. The connection
between φαντασία and desire they assert may be construed in more than one way:
φαντασία may be involved in the presentation of the object of desire in every casc
or it may be involved in most cases. To decide this question would take us far aficld.
although I believe that on balance the relevant texts support the weaker reading. ^

30 431b2-ll; 433a9-12; De Motu An. 700bl7-25; 701a29-702a20; 703bl8-l*i;

. cf. Met. 980b25-27.
31
32
Translation is mine.
The many passages that the treat φαντασία, αϊσΟησις and νους s bcing individu-
ally suftlcienl to move an animal in conjunction with desire argue for a gcncral

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60 Dcborah Modrak

K will sutTice Tor thc purposc of thc prescnt discussion to show that the scnsory
contcnt analysis is compatible with cithcr rcading.
Anstelle is probably led to affirm a general conneclion bctween φαντασία and
desirc by considerations of the following sort. Desirc is always for the sake of
somcthing (433al5). In the case of articulated human desires, the object is desired
under a description that rationalizes the desire.
"... sometimes one calculates on the basis of φαντάσματα and thoughts, s if
seeing ... and when one says, s there, that something is pleasant or painful, here
one avoids or pursues." (431b6—10; follows Hamlyn trs.)
In the case of inarticulate desires, for instance, the desires of non-human animals,
there must also be some representation of the object s desirable. That is, there
must be some form of cognition that plays the part that a desirability characterization
plays in human thinking. The association of pleasurable or painful sensations with
certain objects s a result of past experience could play this part. Φαντασία would
serve s the vehicle for these associations, by presenting the sensible qualities to
which these sensations attach. Were the stronger reading of 433b27 —28 adopted,
v/j., that φαντασία is always involved in the apprehension of the object of desire,
it would still be possible to explain the connection between φαντασία and desire on
the sensory content analysis. On this reading, even when a physical object that is
present to the senses inspires desire, it does so through the mediation of φαντασία.
This would be explained by making φαντασία the vehicle for the association of
pleasant or painful sensations with the object s presented in perception.
A different account of the relationship between desire and φαντασία has been
offered by Nussbaum.33 She has argued that φαντασία interprets the impress of the
external object enabling a percipient to perceive an object s a particular thing and
to perceive it s desirable.34 For the most part, Nussbaum treats αϊσθησις s a
purely passive faculty that receives the impress of external objects (pp. 257 — 259).
This treatment of αϊσθησις conflicts with Aristotle's description of it s a critical
faculty (κριτικόν),35 the many passages where Aristotle speaks s if αϊσθησις were

rather than a universal connection between φαντασία and desire (see e.g.,
431b3-9; 433a9-12; 700bl7-20; 703bl8-19). Although 702al5-19 read in
Isolation suggests a universal connection, taken in context with the rest of the
discussion of action in the De Motu Animalium, it appears to be a description of
many but not all cases of desire.
33
Nussbaum, op. dt.
34
Nussbaum, ibid., p. 255ff. According to Nussbaum, φαντασία enables a percipient
to see X s Υ and provides the animal with "the awareness of something qua
what-it-is-called" (p. 259). These descriptions are not particularly helpful when
applied to many of the creatures possessing φαντασία, e.g., insects (cf. note 14
above). If the "seeing s" idiom means only that one Sensation is somehow
associated with another through φαντασία, it is unproblematic but also uninfor-
mative.
35
Aristotle describes the perceptual faculty s κριτικόν (424a6, 432al6) and s one
of the faculties through which we discriminate (κρίνομεν) (428a3—4), because

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 61

adequate for the perception of sensible particulars,36 and, more importantly for the
present discussion, the passages that make the recognition of the desirability or
undesirability of some object a feature of αΐσθησις. For instance, at 431alO —13,
Aristotle says, "to feel plesure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean
(αισθητική μεσότητι) towards the good and bad s such" (cf. 431b3 —6). If,
according to Aristotle, it is possible through αΐσθησις to perceive an object s a
certain thing and s desirable, then we need an account of the role of φαντασία in
animal movement that does not depend upon its being the interpretative component
of perception.37
The sensory content analysis avoids this difiiculty and provides the basis for an
alternative account. Moreover, the appeal to φαντασία in explanations of non-
human animal behavior provides further evidence that φαντασία presents its object
sensorially.

///. Φαντασία s Sensory Representation

Establishing that φαντασία always has a sensory content s its object
does not answer all the questions we might ask about the kind of
sensory representation characteristic of φαντασία. We might wonder
whether the ability of the φάντασμα to represent depends upon the
inclusion of judgment in φαντασία. If so, can Aristotle consistently
maintain that the object of φαντασία is always a sensory content? I
shall argue that he can.
Φαντασία enables its possessor to employ sensory contents to repre-
sent complex states of affairs. In this capacity, φαντασία performs the
same function s belief. The sensory content represents a state of affairs
that, were it articulated, would be an object of belief. The belief-like
character of φαντασία is a key element in Aristotle's accounts of
dreaming, memory and animal movement. Perception and φαντασία
often guide human action and always guide animal behavior. To guide

animals make rudimentary judgments about their environments through αΐ-

σθησις. This is not to say that the possession of αΐσθησις enables an animal lo
deliberate.
36
37
Cf. Schofield, op. dt., p. 110.
One might think that Nussbaum's recognition of a generic use of αΐσθησις is
sufficient to defuse this objection. But what is at issue is not whether Aristotle
has a broad notion of αΐσθησις s an interpretive faculty but whether he has a
narrow notion of it s a passive faculty. Nussbaum finds evidence for (he lattcr
. in Aristotle's appeal to φαντασία in explanations of animal movement. Howcvcr.
if there are passages where Aristotle appeals to the broad notion of αΐσθησις to
explain behavior then the case for the distinction bctwccn two scnscs of αΐσθησις
is appreciably wcakcncd.

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62 Dcborah M o d r a k

behavior thc sensory contcnts grasped in pcrception and in φαντασία

must embody bclicfs about thc world.
This aspcct of φαντασία might tempt us to argue that φαντασία
ultimutely depends upon symbolic representation or to identify φαντα-
σία with δόξα or like Plato to make δόξα a component of φαντασία.38
By contrast, Aristotle insists on the distinctness of φαντασία and δόξα
and on the autonomy of sensory representation. As a consequence, on
his account, sensory contents must represent complex states of affairs.
The notion of sensory representation I appeal to on Aristotle's
behalf is controversial. First, sensory contents are representational39only
insofar s they are intentional, that is, are about something. As
experienced, the sensory content Stands for some characteristic, object
or state of affairs. Second, although sensory contents might be inten-
tional in that the awareness of a sensory content amounts to the
ascription of a sensible quality, sensory contents might not represent
complex states of affairs.40 On our reading of Aristotle, sensory con-
tents must be intentional and must — at least sometimes — represent
complex states of affairs. Suppose Aristotle held the opposite view,
namely, that sensory contents are nonrepresentational, for instance,
that a sensing of red is not an ascription of red. We would need to
explain why Aristotle identifies αισθητά in one sense with external
characteristics. More importantly, on this hypothesis, Aristotle's ac-
count of goal-directed behavior would become unintelligible. Percep-
tion and φαντασία could not play the role assigned them in behavior,
were these faculties limited to the presentation of non-intentional
sensory contents. As we have seen, they are limited to the employment
of sensory contents; this leaves no alternative to the supposition that
sensory contents are intentional.
Similar considerations count in favor of ascribing, not only intention-
ality, but also relatively complex structures to sensory contents. If this
is right, however, sensory contents are not exclusively presentations of
sensible qualities. To put this point in Aristotelian language: in percep-
38
Plato's position is stated at Sophist 264a —b; cf. Tim. 52a.
39
Cf. R. Schwartz' claim that images may bear semantic-type relations to things
("Imagery — There's More than Meets the Eye", in: Imagery, ed. N. Block).
Whether philosophers ought to attribute intentionality to sensory contents is a
question too large to be considered here. For an interesting exchange of views
on this subject, see Romane Clark, "The Sensuous Content of Perception", and
Wilfrid Seilars, "The Structure of Knowledge: Perception", in: Action, Knowledge
and Reality, Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, Indianapolis 1975.
40
For a contemporary defense of this position, see Clark, ibid., pp. 117—123.

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 Φαντασία Rcconsidered 63

tion and φαντασία, incidental objects are presented s well s proper

objects.41 Incidental objects are proper objects construed s such-and-
such's or so-and-so's. Aristotle's favorite example of an incidental
object has the following form: the son of X, where X is replaced by a
proper name like "Cleon" or "Diares" (418a20,425a25). The distinction
between proper and incidental objects turns upon the difference be-
tween a minimal notion of sensory representation and a broader notion.
The classification of the incidental objects s sense objects presupposes
the broader notion which allows the immediate object of sensory
awareness to be a structured and interpreted sensory whole.
Nonetheless, one might argue that Aristotle should have demarcated
two components in the judgment made through φαντασία — being
aware of the sensory content and referring the content to an extra-
mental state of affairs. Aristotle explicitly rejects one way of making
this distinction. According to Plato, φαντασία is perception combined
with δόξα. Aristotle argues that on Plato's analysis the belief-com-
ponent would have to accord with the sensory content of the perc-
eption-component, but that sometimes what is believed about an object
conflicts with the sensory content, s when "the sun appears a foot
across, although we are convinced that it is bigger than the inhabited
worid" (428b3-4).
Of course, Aristotle might have distinguished two components within
φαντασία without identifying either with δόξα. The fact is he did not.
Had he been pressed on this point, he would probably have argued
that the awareness of the sensory content includes the recognition that
it refers and recognition of what it refers to. In general, Aristotle
prefers to avoid a proliferation of faculties. In De Anima 111,2, he
argues that seeing includes the awareness of seeing, hearing of hearing
and so forth, because the awareness of seeing would involve the
awareness of color and would be a kind of seeing. To avoid an
infinite regress, we must posit a seeing which includes self-awareness.
Intelligibility and simplicity dictate positing a first order seeing which
is self-aware (425bl7).

The recognition that the sensory content underdetermines the incidental object
led Charles Kahn to hold that the perception of incidental objects was "not an
act of the sense faculty s such" ("Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotlc's
Psychology", Archiv f r Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1966), p 46). But Cashdol-
lar has argued convincingly that incidental objects are bona fidc scnsc objects for
Aristotle ("Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception", Phmnesis 18 (1 W), pp
156-175).

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64 Deborah Modrak

Λ difficulty remains: what a scnsory contcnt rcprcscnts sccms to be underdeter-

mincd. The same sensory contcnt can be apprehcndcd under diffcrent descriptions;
for instancc, an imagc of a trcc may bc contemplated simply s an image or s a
rcprcscntation of an actual tree (cf. 450b26 —31). The representative function of a
particular occurrence of a sensory content cannot be explaincd simply in terms of
l he awareness of that content. Aristotle does not speak to this point. We might
attcmpt an answer by postulating differences in the apprehension of a sensory
content caused by differences in the total state of the organism at the time. Whether
we adopt this solution or not, it seems clear that allowing other states of the
organism to affect the awareness of a sensory content is s conceptually satisfactory
s restricting the impact of these states to other forms of cognition.
The recognition that, on Aristotle's theory, sensory contents are representational
will help solve another, frequently mentioned, conundrum. For the most part,
Aristotle seems to be happy to speak of φαντασία s true or false (428al2,
428bl7 —30). Since it is a philosophical commonplace that only propositions are
true of false, Rees takes such passages to suggest a second form of φαντασία,
whose object is a proposition rather than a mental image.42 I, on the other band,
have argued that φαντασία always takes the same kind of object, a sensory content,
so I need to explain how φαντασία can be both a type of sensory awareness and a
proper subject for ascriptions of truth and falsity.
Since a related puzzle comes up in connection with perception, we should first
consider what Aristotle means when he describes a perception s true or false. First,
the ascription of truth or falsity does not seem to depend upon how the object is
apprehended nor on whether the object appears to have a propositional structure.
In this respect, Aristotle does not distinguish between proper and common objects,
which are directly perceived, and incidental objects, which are not. But only the
latter are described in terms that suggest propositions, for instance, this white
[object] is the son of Cleon (418a21, cf. 428b21).
Second, a version of the correspondence theory of truth holds for perception.
The truth of a perception is not a function of the incorrigible awareness we have
of how things appear to us but rather a function of the correspondence between
the perception and the world. Aristotle vacillates between saying that the perception
of the proper objects is always correct (418al2, a!5; 430b29) or usually correct
(428bl9). This vacillation, I suspect, is the product of his conflating incorrigibility
with truth at times. "But at least the sweet such s it is when it exists, has never yet
changed, but one is always right about it." (1010b23 — 25) However, according to
Aristotle's considered view, the same thing would not taste sweet to one person and
bitter to another, unless one of them has a damaged sense organ (1063a4; cf.
1176al3 —16). To resolve conflicts of this sort, Aristotle appeals to the authoritative
perception. This notion, discussed above, makes the healthy observer perceiving the
object under normal conditions the measure of the truth of a perception.43 A' false

42
D. A. Rees, op. c/7., pp. 500 — 502.
43
In the cases where δόξα checks a form of sensory awareness, the optimal
conditions for perception do not obtain, e. g., the object is very far away

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 Φαντασία Rcconsidcred 65

pcrception is simply a pcrception that fails to providc thc Information that the
authoritative perccption would provide about the object in question. Hence, on the
rcalist assumption that perception in general provides us with reliable Information
about the world, the false pcrception is the perception which fails to represent the
external world correctly.44
Aristotlc believes that the proper subject for an ascription of truth or falsity is
a Statement or a mental representation that is equivalent to an assertion. A name
used alone, even when it has a clear denotation, is neither true nor false. "Truth
and falsity imply combination and Separation. (16al 1) Once when Aristotle explicitly
has in mind the conception of truth s a property of complexes of terms, and where
hc seems to have in mind φαντάσματα that correspond to isolated terms, he suggests
that φαντασία is neither true nor false (432alO—11). A likely explanation for his
failure to act on this reservation elsewhere can be found in the differences among
φαντάσματα. The object of φαντασία, like the object of perception, is frequently a
sensorial representation of a state of affairs s, for instance, in dreaming. In such
cases, the sensory content seems to be implicitly propositional, and truth-values
could be assigned to such φαντασίαι on the basis of the assignment of truth values
to the propositions that correspond to their sensory contents. If so, we can avoid
the conflict between the claim that only propositions have truth values and the
claim that we can ascribe truth and falsity to φαντασίαι and perceptions. Even for
the proper and common objects, there is a strategy open to Aristotle. The perception
or the φαντασία of an object such s red or round would be true just in case it
refers this quality to an external object, that is, just in case we can represent
perception or φαντασία s implicitly making the claim that this object is red or
round (cf. 1010bl9-26).
Although Aristotle sometimes finds it convenient to talk s if the object of
φαντασία was a proposition, its propositional content is expressed sensorially. There
are not two kinds of φαντασία — one having a propositional content and the other,
a sensory content.45 However, some sensory contents are more easily expressed in
propositions than others, because sensory contents may fall anywhere along a
continuum from the sensorial representation of complex states of affairs to sensory
fragments. For instance, a memory image might consist in a composite of visual
and auditory features representing a group of people engaged in conversation. This
image would represent a quite complex state of affairs. By contrast, another image

(428b3 —5), the organ is tampered with (De Ins. 462alfT.) or thc percipient is
44
diseased (De Ins. 460bl 1-16).
Since, on Aristotle's view, natural functions have ends and the end of perception
is obtaining Information about the extra-mental world, the distinction between
an authoritative perception and a perception that correctly represcnts thc external
reality disappears. If Aristotle is unwilling to countenancc the possibility that a
" perception might be false even if all the conditions for veridical perccption obtain.
then all cases of false perceptions are, strictly speaking. cascs of φαντασία (cf.
428al 1 — 1 2 and notcs 16 and 17 abovc).
45
Pace Recs, op. dt., p. 500.
5 Arch. Gesch. Philosophie Bd. 6K
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66 Dcborah Modrak

might simply prcsent a singlc musical notc. In onc contcxt, this Image might exhibit
a statc of affairs corresponding to the proposition, "this is C flat"; in another
contcxt, s a component of a larger sensory whole, thc imagc might function very
much s a singlc word functions in a Statement.

IV. Contemporary Criticisms

Recent commentators have tended to minimize the role of mental
imagery in Aristotle's theory of φαντασία.46 Presumably, this tendency
has been reinforced by the widespread criticism of mental Images in
contemporary philosophy; beginning with Ryle, a number of philoso-
phers have argued that it is a mistake to posit mental images or to
give imagist accounts of Imagination.47 Against this background, the
desire to downplay the importance of mental imagery in Aristotle's
theory is understandable; unfortunately, the commentators have gener-
ally failed to appreciate the strengths of imagist accounts or the unique
character of Aristotle's imagist account.
The most frequently stated objection charges that we cannot give a
philosophically satisfactory account of mental imagery. The ontological
Status of images seems problematic s does the attribution of intention-
ality to imagery. To rebut the objections to imagist accounts would
require another paper. My objective is less ambitious — to show that
mental imagery should not be rejected out of hand and to show that
at least some of the Standard objections to imagist accounts are not
telling against Aristotle's account. Leaving open the question whether
mental imagery can play an explanatory role will allow us to take
Aristotle at his word and attribute an imagist account to him.
Philosophers and psychologists are far from agreement about the
coherence or usefulness of the concept of imagery.48 In a survey of
recent philosophical treatments of Imagination, Russow notes that,
despite concerted attempts to discredit imagist theories, mental images
have shown remarkable resilience.49 Moreover, recent work in psychol-
ogy seems to support the hypothesis that images are employed in
46
For instance, both Schofield (pp. dt., p. 102) and Nussbaum (op. dt., pp.
223 — 321) advise us to appeal to mental imagery only when absolutely necessary.
47
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind., eh. 8. This is not to say that Ryle's position
has met with universal acceptance. Cf. Lilly Russow, "Some Recent Work on
Imagination", American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), pp. 57 — 66.
48
See Imagery, N. Block, ed., Boston 1981.
49
Russow, op. dt., p. 57.

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 67

certain kinds of thinking. These findings suggest that a decision to

excise mental imagery from the account of φαντασία would be prema-
ture.
The editor of a recent volume containing articles on imagery by
psychologists and philosophers points out that questions about the
nature and Status of images have not been defmitively settled and
concludes that only this much is certain — images and perceptions
should be treated in the same way s either pictorial or descriptional.50
Aristotle opts for the former alternative. Even if we agree that giving
a unified account of φαντασία and perception is desirable, we might
prefer the descriptional approach on the grounds that the representative
capacity of a sensory content is very limited. However, another paper
in the same volume challenges this assumption. Schwartz defends the
thesis that images may have symbolic functions and calls into question
the distinctions which seem to secure the widely accepted antithesis
between pictorial and non-pictorial forms of symbolization.51 If we do
not limit an image's representative capacity to simple resemblance, if,
like Schwartz, we recognize the symbolic function of mental imagery,
then we need not be troubled by the relative complexity of the Informa-
tion which, on the sensory content analysis, φαντασία may convey.
A quick survey of three other common objections to Imagist accounts will show
that none of these poses a serious threat to Aristotle's analysis of φαντασία. The
objections concern the distinction between images and sensations, the redundancy
of images and the intentionality of imagery. If images and sensations both consist
of sensible features, distinguishing between them would be impossible, or so critics
of imagery have argued. Although he treats images s sensation-like, Aristotle has
an answer to this objection. We distinguish between φαντασία and perception, not
by the features of the object of the experience, but rather by the conditions under
which the experience occurs. This provides a way for Aristotle to distinguish between
a φάντασμα and an αίσθητόν.
Matthews has raised a different objection to imagist accounts, the Charge of
redundancy. The postulation of images, he argues, does not significantly add to the
content of a theory of Imagination; an adequate account of imagining can be given
in terms of doing something like seeing, doing something like hearing and so forth. 52
This argument cannot be extended to Aristotle's theory of φαντασία. Cognitive
objects are assigned a non-trivial role in the delineation of cognitive faculties in the
De Anima. A sense is potentially what its object is actually, s is a thoughl

5P N. Block, op. dt., Jntroduction.

51
52
R. Schwartz, ibid., chapter 5.
Gareth B. Matthews, "Mental Copies", Philosophien! Revicw 78 (1969), pp
53-73. Cf. G. Ryle, op. dt.

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68 Dcborah M o d r a k

(426a 15—16, 429a 16—17). The cxercise of a cognitivc faculty is always thc actualiza-
tion ofonc of its objccts. Doing somcthing like seeing on Aristotlc's account would
involve thc rcalization of somcthing like color. In the casc of seeing, thc potentiality
for heing seen s colored belongs to physical objects; however, in the case of
φαντασία in the absence of an external Stimulus, this potentiality would belong to
the φάντασμα that is actualized in the act of awareness.
Imagist accounts have also been criticized on the grounds that they
fail to account for the intentionality of imagery.53 Suppose one employs
a visual image in thinking about a friend. What features of the image
make it an image of the person in question? The most obvious answer
that the image resembles the person lacks explanatory force, it is
argued. At best, the recognition of the resemblance requires explana-
tion. Moreover, resemblance seems to be neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for an image's being apprehended s an image of
its archetype. This criticism is pertinent to Aristotle's treatment of
φαντασία. In the preceding section, we found that φαντάσματα, if they
are to play the cognitive roles assigned to them, must be intentional.
Aristotle does not offer a philosophical analysis of intentionality. Only
in the De Memoria does he come close to an explicit treatment of this
feature of imagery. To explain the difference between remembering and
simply being aware of the same sensory content on different occasions,
Aristotle says:
"Insofar s it [the φάντασμα] is regarded in itself, it is only an object of
contemplation or an image; but when considered in relation to something eise, for
instance, s its likeness, it is also a mnemonic token (μνημόνευμα)." (450b25 — 27)
We are able to use the φάντασμα in this way because we recognize the
causal role played by the past event in the formation of the φάντασμα.
"Sometimes we are in doubt whether it is memory or not. But sometimes it
happens that we reflect and recollect that we heard something or saw it before."
(451a5-7)
These brief remarks are a far cry from a general theory of intentionality
that we could use to explain in every case how the φάντασμα represents
an object or state of affairs. Appealing to the origin of the φάντασμα
works reasonably well for some cases of φαντασία such s memory
and poorly, if at all, for other cases such s fantasy.
How serious a difflculty is this for Aristotle's account of φαντασία?
Certainly addressing the issue of intentionality would have enriched

53
E. Casey, "Imagination: Imagining and the Image", Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 31 (1970), pp. 475-490.

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 Φαντασία Reconsidered 69

the account, but failing to do so does not defeat it. The ultimate
justification for Aristotle's conception of sensory representation is the
work it does in his psychology. By assuming intentionality, Aristotle
is able to give a unified and sophisticated account of the mental
activities included under φαντασία. At most, the present objection
shows Aristotle's theory of φαντασία employs a hypothesis that ideally
would be subsumed under a comprehensive theory of intentionality.
In sum, the Standard objections to mental imagery should not lead
us to reject the sensory content analysis because it attributes a position
to Aristotle which is philosophically suspect. The objectors have not
yet carried the day against the arguments put forward by proponents
of mental imagery. In addition, Aristotle's theory of φαντασία is not
vulnerable to many of the objections raised against modern imagist
theories. Only one of the objections discussed here proved to be at all
problematic for Aristotle. The problem it raised suggested the need for
additional work rather than the rejection of the theory s propound-
ed.54

54 I would like to thank W. Tait, M. Frede, J. Bogen, R. Elguardo, D. Glidden. M.

Schofield, E. Curley and two anonymous referees for helpful commcnls and
suggeslions on earlier versions of this papcr.

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