Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 21 Ohio St.2d at 69, 255 N.E.2d at 249.
which DOUGLAS, HARLAN, BRENNAN, and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BLACK, J., filed a separate Beyond this, the only construction put upon the
opinion, post, p. 402 U. S. 616. WHITE, J., filed a ordinance by the state court was its unexplained
dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and conclusion that "the standard of conduct which it
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 402 U. S. 617. specifies is not dependent upon each complainant's
sensitivity." Ibid.But the court did not indicate upon
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the whose sensitivity a violation does depend -- the
Court. sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the
arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical
A Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance makes it a criminal reasonable man. [Footnote 3]
offense for
Page 402 U. S. 614
"three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the
sidewalks . . . and there conduct themselves in a manner We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the
annoying to persons passing by. . . . [Footnote 1] " ordinance itself. If three or more people meet together
on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct
Page 402 U. S. 612 themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or
other person who should happen to pass by. In our
The issue before us is whether this ordinance is opinion, this ordinance is unconstitutionally vague
unconstitutional on its face. because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly
to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally
The appellants were convicted of violating the broad because it authorizes the punishment of
ordinance, and the convictions were ultimately affirmed constitutionally protected conduct.
by a closely divided vote in the Supreme Court of Ohio,
upholding the constitutional validity of the ordinance. Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy
21 Ohio St.2d 66, 255 N.E.2d 247. An appeal from that others. Thus, the ordinance is vague not in the sense
judgment was brought here under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
[Footnote 2] and we noted probable jurisdiction, 398 imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but
U.S. 902. The record brought before the reviewing rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
courts tells us no more than that the appellant Coates specified at all. As a result, "men of common
was a student involved in a demonstration and the other intelligence must necessarily guess at its
appellants were pickets involved in a labor dispute. For, meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to "It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to
encompass many types of conduct clearly within the assemble, except at a public meeting of citizens, on any
city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so, indeed, of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots or mouths of
it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner
sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of
committing assaults, or engaging in countless other adjacent buildings. Whoever violates any of the
forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than
reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days or both."
prohibited. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 394 U.
S. 118,394 U. S. 124-125 (BLACK, J., concurring). It Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of
cannot constitutionally do so through the enactment and Cincinnati (1956).
enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may
entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is [Footnote 2]
annoyed. [Footnote 4]
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
Page 402 U. S. 615 court of a State in which a decision could be had, may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: "
But the vice of the ordinance lies not alone in its
violation of the due process standard of vagueness. The "* * * *"
ordinance also violates the constitutional right of free
assembly and association. Our decisions establish that "(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity
mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
basis for abridgment of these constitutional repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
freedoms. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 394 United States, and the decision is in favor of its
U. S. 592; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 379 U. S. validity."
551-553; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S.
229, 372 U. S. 238; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. [Footnote 3]
1; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S.
311; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 161. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568,
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a where this Court upheld a statute that punished
State to make criminal the exercise of the right of "offensive, derisive or annoying" words. The state
assembly simply because its exercise may be courts had construed the statute as applying only to
"annoying" to some people. If this were not the rule, the such words "as have a direct tendency to cause acts of
right of the people to gather in public places for social violence by the persons to whom, individually, the
or political purposes would be continually subject to remark is addressed." The state court also said:
summary suspension through the good faith
enforcement of a prohibition against annoying conduct.. "The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of
[Footnote 5] what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what
men of common intelligence would understand would
Page 402 U. S. 616 be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight. . . . The English language has a number of words
And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious and expressions which, by general consent, are 'fighting
invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those words' when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such
whose association together is "annoying" because their words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a
ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.
resented by the majority of their fellow citizens. Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming
[Footnote 6] within the purview of the statute as heretofore
interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
The ordinance before us makes a crime out of what plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of he
under the Constitution cannot be a crime. It is aimed peace."
directly at activity protected by the Constitution. We
need not lament that we do not have before us the This Court was "unable to say that the limited scope of
details of the conduct found to be annoying. It is the the statute as thus construed contravenes the
ordinance on its face that sets the standard of conduct Constitutional right of free expression." 315 U.S. at 315
and warns against transgression. The details of the U. S. 573.
offense could no more serve to validate this ordinance
than could the details of an offense charged under an [Footnote 4]
ordinance suspending unconditionally the right of
assembly and free speech. In striking down a very similar ordinance of Cleveland,
Ohio, as constitutionally invalid, the Court of Appeals
The judgment is reversed. for Cuyahoga County said:
to less obvious methods of coercion might raise doubts Even accepting the overbreadth doctrine with respect to
about the adequacy of the standard of guilt, in the case statutes clearly reaching speech, the Cincinnati
before it, it was ordinance does not purport to bar or regulate speech as
such. It prohibits persons from assembling and
"plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would "conduct[ing]" themselves in a manner annoying to
not be allowed in evidence whatever the school of other persons. Even if the assembled defendants in this
thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due case were demonstrating and picketing, we have long
Process Clause." recognized that picketing is not solely a communicative
endeavor, and has aspects which the State is entitled to
Id. at 341 U. S. 101. The claim of facial vagueness was regulate even though there is incidental impact on
thus rejected. speech. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), the
Court held valid on its face a statute forbidding
So too in United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. picketing and parading near a courthouse. This was
S. 29 (1963), where we considered a statute forbidding deemed a valid regulation of conduct, rather than pure
sales of goods at "unreasonably" low prices to injure or speech. The conduct reached by the statute was "subject
eliminate a competitor, 15 U.S.C. § 13a, we thought the to regulation even though [it was] intertwined with
statute gave a seller adequate notice that sales below expression and association." Id. at 379 U. S. 563. The
cost were illegal. The statute was therefore not facially Court then went on to consider the statute as applied to
vague, although it might be difficult to tell whether the facts of record.
certain other kinds of conduct fell within this language.
We said: In the case before us, I would deal with the Cincinnati
ordinance as we would with the ordinary criminal
"In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute statute. The ordinance clearly reaches certain conduct,
must of necessity be examined in the light of the but may be illegally vague with respect to other
conduct with which a defendant is charged." conduct. The statute is not infirm on its face, and, since
we have no information from this record as to what
Id. at 372 U. S. 33. See also United States v. conduct was
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954). This approach is
consistent with the host of cases holding that Page 402 U. S. 621
"one to whom application of a statute is constitutional charged against these defendants, we are in no position
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that to judge the statute as applied. That the ordinance may
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other confer wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances
persons or other situations in which its application is irrelevant when we may be dealing with conduct at
might be unconstitutional." its core.
United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Ohio
21 (1960), and cases there cited. Supreme Court.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful The State shall afford full protection to
dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not labor, local and overseas, organized and
merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, unorganized, and promote full
is a property right of which a person is not to be employment and equality of employment
deprived without due process, but also the opportunities for all.
compensation that should have accrued to her during
the period when she was unemployed? It shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular the right to strike in accordance with
employment, the employer shall not law. They shall be entitled to security of
terminate the services of an employee tenure, humane conditions of work, and
except for a just cause or when a living wage. They shall also participate
authorized by this Title. An employee in policy and decision-making processes
who is unjustly dismissed from work affecting their rights and benefits is may
shall be entitled to reinstatement without be provided by law.10(Emphasis
loss of seniority rights and other supplied)
privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the
benefits or their monetary equivalent 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration of
computed from the time his Principles and State Policies that provides:
compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied) to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the work opportunities regardless of sex,
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor race, or creed, and regulate the relations
Code: between workers and employers. The
State shall ensure the rights of workers
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of to self-organization, collective
regular employments, the employer shall baegaining, security of tenure, and just
not terminate the services of an and humane conditions of work. The
employee except for a just cause as State may provide for compulsory
provided in the Labor Code or when arbitration. 11
authorized by existing laws.
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure"
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee as one of the rights of labor which the State is mandated
who is unjustly dismissed from work to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the
shall by entitled to reinstatement without intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to
loss of seniority rights and to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied) "full protection," at least greater protection than
heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be geographical location of the workers and whether they
recalled that the present Constitution has gone further are organized or not.
than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice
including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to
several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional the present formulation of the protection to labor
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in
the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and
on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
light of the special importance that we are giving now estrangement" between the employer and the
to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the employee. 22
scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12 In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered
the payment of backwages and separation pay 23 or
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of solely separation pay. 24
the labor provisions in our Constitution and the Labor
Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private
to be dismissed from his job except for a just or respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor
authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is
importance under the 1987 Constitution with the unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on reinstatement. . . . and to his full
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory
translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from
where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-
hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly
stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further express its intent or will and preclude the court from
by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed
on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
generated which watered down the constitutional intent such words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis
to grant to labor "full protection." 13 non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. Neither does the provision
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the
to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-
dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not application of the above-cited provision, this should be
only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement
backwages." 14 may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages In such cases, it should be proved that the employee
is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust
her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
conditione positions etc. from which one had been antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the
removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both
remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's
"whole." application of the above principles: where the employee
is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is
thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the
and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union
the outside looking in. who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to
organize the workers in commercial and industrial
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit
by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
of the case and the law applicable thereto; that maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its
long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because Energy Equipment Sales. 32
of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement
will not serve the best interests of the parties can never be possible simply because some hostility is
involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not litigation. That is human nature. 33
serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts
have transpired which make execution on that score Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an
employee who shall assert his right could be easily It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report
separated from the service, by merely paying his came out after Saldivar had already resigned from
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have
his employer had already become strained. 34 the opportunity to refute management's findings, the
report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the
respondent as systems analyst is one that may be alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation,
that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations stringent examination should have been carried out to
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
dismissed. records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public
reposed in her by engaging in transactions that may respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner
GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
prohibits its employees from involving themselves with Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to
any company that has business dealings with GMCR. her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a This decision is immediately executory.
supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an SO ORDERED.
untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
respondent that such a circumstance did not create a
conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
revolved around the development of systems and
analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other
words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust
relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and
company assets.
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question
convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether
rather than with his innocence. An accused may on the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only
appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a
crime, but that does crime has been committed and the accused is probably
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on
for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a
his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of conviction based on such degree of proof is
the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an
unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
to say as does respondent, that under the law liability
for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to
the accused. show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross
ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co- # Footnotes
accused were in league, because petitioner is the father-
in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner 1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute.
Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. — The
together in the hut of the victims and forced their way following may file claims for
into it. compensation before the Board:
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy a) any person who was unjustly accused,
only because there was no proof that he did or say convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court. released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal;
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show
the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have b) any person who was unjustly detained
committed any act at all. Both fail to and released without being charged;
show Felicito Basbacio as having said
anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal
Basbacio as having committed anything detention by the authorities as defined in
in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the Revised Penal Code under a final
the crimes charged against the judgment of the court; and
defendants. It seems to be a frail and
flimsy basis on which to conclude that d) any person who is a victim of violent
conspiracy existed between actual killer crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito crimes shall include rape and shall
Basbacio to commit murder and two likewise refer to offenses committed
frustrated murders on that night of June with malice which resulted in death or
26, 1988. It may be asked: where was serious physical and/or psychological
the coming together of the two injuries, permanent incapacity or
defendants to an agreement to commit disability, insanity, abortion, serious
the crimes of murder and frustrated trauma, or committed with torture,
murder on two counts? Where was cruelty or barbarity.
Basbacio's contribution to the
commission of the said crimes? Basbacio Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. — For victims of
was — as the record shows — nothing unjust imprisonment or detention, the
but part of the dark shadows of that compensation shall be based on the
night. . . . number of months of imprisonment or
detention and every fraction thereof shall
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely be considered one month: Provided,
conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and however, That in no case shall such
other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son- compensation exceed One thousand
in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And pesos (P1,000.00) per month.
what about the fact that there was bad blood between
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These In all other cases, the maximum amount
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the for which the Board may approve a
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating claim shall not exceed Ten thousand
his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount
and imprisoned before he was released because of his necessary to reimburse the claimant the
acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these expenses incurred for hospitalization,
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of
Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its support or other expenses directly related
discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for to the injury, whichever is lower. This is
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309. without prejudice to the right of the
claimant to seek other remedies under
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. existing laws.
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition. (b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. – The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the
was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the following powers and functions:
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE xxxx
Authority. Among other things, the law gives the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power (7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-
under Sec. 7 (f), viz: related activities subject to priorities and standards set
by the Subic Authority including games and
Section 7. amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and
casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by
xxxx the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas
subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related as a national park;
activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities; xxxx
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion
authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate of the Office of the President which, after
and/or license games of chance/gambling. differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan
Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the Authority, states that while the former is authorized to,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, among other things, operate gambling casinos and
either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing
agreements, the latter is not. The relevant portions of private respondent Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction,
said Opinion read: Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST
from operating any games of chance pursuant to the
The difference in the language and grant of powers to license granted to it by public respondent.
CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the
former, the grant of powers is not only explicit, but SO ORDERED.
amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is
merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
differences in language telling, it will be noted that both Associate Justice
charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed Acting Chairperson
into law only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e.,
February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE WE CONCUR:
and February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x
Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of
PRESBITERO J.
what Congress intended them to be, and the distinction DANTE O. TINGA
VELASCO, JR.
that the lawmakers made when they enacted the two Associate Justice
Associate Justice
laws.
TERESITA J.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE LEONARDO DE ARTURO D. BRION
Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related CASTRO* Associate Justice
activities including games and amusements without Associate Justice
stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand,
the grant to CEZA included such activities as horse- ATTESTATION
racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
xxxx been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that Division.
under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by Associate Justice
law or other laws specifically allowing the same. Acting Chairperson
(Emphasis supplied)
CERTIFICATION
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the
supervision of the Office of the President, the latter’s Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for that the conclusions in the above decision had been
administrative or practical construction. In applying reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the
courts to give the principle controlling weight in REYNATO S. PUNO
particular instances, or as independent rules in Chief Justice
themselves. These factors include the respect due the
governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently
are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the
agency is the one on which the legislature must rely
to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents
the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements
in the statute.8
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of THAT:
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING applicable to marriages solemnized before the
THAT THE FACTS AND THE effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia,
ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE. dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT the Family Code.
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IS She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of
SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the
PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized,
CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after
PERTAINS TO THE WORD the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of
"PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the
THE WORD "MARRIAGES." marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. action was filed and decided after the effectivity of
NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE both.
ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT 11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with
OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
RECONSIDERATION IS A "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss,"
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
BY HEREIN RESPONDENT. required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
RESPONDENT REFUSED TO
COMPLY WITH A Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M.
CASE. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the
II Rule, in fact, reads:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL Code of the Philippines.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
III
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE those marriages entered into during the effectivity of
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF marriages covered by the Family Code and those
THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT solemnized under the Civil Code.8
PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT
INTENDED FOR DELAY.5 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code"
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02- rather than to the word "marriages."
11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench. law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
is no room for construction or interpretation. There is the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from
only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, the constraints of technicalities.
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct
animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." institution of marriage.
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage
should be no departure."10 as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional
policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance
of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and union between a man and a woman entered into in
again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
must be faithfully complied with and should not be and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming inviolable social institution whose nature,
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
time for doing specific acts or for taking certain not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to settlements may fix the property relations during the
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory.12 This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s autonomous social institution and marriage as the
motion for extension of time to file a motion for foundation of the family.16
reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a break up of families weakens our social and moral
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas alone of the family members.17
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety
SUPREME COURT bond of P50,000, thus:
Manila
Upon approval of the application, the
FIRST DIVISION applicant shall pay a license fee of
P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000
from a bonding company acceptable to
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993 the Administration and duly accredited
by the Insurance Commission. The
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, bonds shall answer for all valid and
INC., petitioner, legal claims arising from violations of
vs. the conditions for the grant and use of
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION the license, and/or accreditation
and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent. and contracts of employment. The bonds
shall likewise guarantee compliance with
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner. the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent. regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which
CRUZ, J.: the Administration may impose. The
surety bonds shall include the condition
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of that the notice to the principal is notice
the order of respondent National Labor Relations to the surety and that any judgment
Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the against the principal in connection with
petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine matters falling under POEA's
Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of jurisdiction shall be binding and
failure to post the required appeal bond.1 conclusive on the surety. The surety
bonds shall be co-terminus with the
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article validity period of license. (Emphasis
223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that: supplied)
In the case of a judgment involving a In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow
monetary award, an appeal by the the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank
employer may be perfected only upon in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the
the posting of a cash or surety bond same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal
issued by a reputable bonding company claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
duly accredited by the Commission in an violations or money claims."
amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the
appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the
of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows: Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Labor Arbiter involves a monetary Rules:
award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within
bonding company duly accredited by the the reglementary period as provided in
Commission or the Supreme Court in an Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
amount equivalent to the monetary oath with proof of payment of the
award. required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to accompanied by a memorandum of
decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal which shall state the grounds
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed relied upon and the arguments in support
recruiters for overseas employment because they are thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the statement of the date when the appellant
POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 received the appealed decision and/or
award and proof of service on the other Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of
party of such appeal. the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which
is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of
A mere notice of appeal without the recruiter.
complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed
the period for perfecting an appeal. on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there
is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement
Administration involves a monetary because of the special risks to which our workers
award, an appeal by the employer shall abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against
be perfected only upon the posting of a whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse.
cash or surety bond issued by a The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign
reputable bonding company duly employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
accredited by the Commission in an intended to insure more care on the part of the local
amount equivalent to the monetary agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our
award. (Emphasis supplied) overseas workers are to be sent.
The question is, having posted the total bond of It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still care should be taken that every part thereof be given
required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC? measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under
It was. the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required
by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow
shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect
the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any
equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section
an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is
appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of that a construction that would render a provision
the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC. inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money whole.
placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment
of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary
these claims are not limited to monetary awards to obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in
employees whose contracts of employment have been Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the
violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it
violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of
the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other the POEA.
liabilities the recruiter may incur.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate
intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling
used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant
enforcement against it of every claim of recruited employee, this Court affirms once again its
workers that may be adjudged against the employer. commitment to the interest of labor.
This amount may not even be enough to cover such
claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims. against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be
depleted if this award were to be enforced not against
the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow
money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of
the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Republic of the Philippines and/or the transfer of any property by
SUPREME COURT and for the said respondents-debtors to
Manila another, upon petitioners' putting up a
bond by way of certified and reputable
THIRD DIVISION sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their
creditors with the attendance, of course, of the opposition, stating among other things, that subject
assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that motion is improper and premature because it treats of
time the proposals, which the respective matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and
representatives of the parties-claimants desire to premature, for the reason that the properties covered by
clear with their principals, shall have already TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought
been reported. to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the
the insolvents which are now in the actual or insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the
constructive custody and management of the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the
receiver previously appointed by the Court on motion referring to matters involved in a case pending
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex
under this actual or constructive custody and "l").
management, such as he is able to do so, as the
Court hereby dissolves the receivership Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise,
previously authorized, it having become a respondent court came out with its assailed extended
superfluity. (Annex "F"). order with the following decretal portion:
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in
CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a
issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles similar motion of the movant, the Court denies,
City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-
seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of sale Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the
over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer latter to participate in the supposed meeting of
Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly
petitioner. (Annex "G"). elected assignee. (Annex "J").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-
sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a
and other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of Intermediate Appellate Court.
preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon
application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision
bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's
levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a
the real properties registered in the names of spouses motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of
Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two
"A" and "B"). issues —
SO ORDERED.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s This general rule is subject to certain
contention that the same of P15 Million was exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion
received from former President Estrada and not to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in
from the coffers of the government, is a matter a excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
defense that should be properly ventilated discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.
during the trial on the merits of this case.16 The reason is that it would be unfair to require
the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for and expense of a trial if the court has no
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense,
in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18 or is not the court of proper venue, or if the
denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to
Issue quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or
a whimsical and capricious exercise of
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
"THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING following are a few examples of the exceptions
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN to the general rule.
NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the
THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19 jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no directed the respondent court to dismiss the
jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public case.
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
personally came from President Estrada, not from the jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
government. the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the
Our Ruling case.
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
grave abuse of discretion. the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher,
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is of the Compensation and Position Classification
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
R.A. No. 3019, as amended. specifically including:
We first address petitioner’s contention that the " (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that other city department heads;
petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion " (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in assessors, engineers, and other city department
her memorandum of authorities.27 heads;
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere "(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service
clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that occupying the position of consul and higher;
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections
made by the Sandiganbayan.28 " (d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that " (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A while occupying the position of provincial
brief legislative history of the statute creating the director and those holding the rank of senior
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was superintended or higher;
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was " (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
conduct required of public officers and employees, Office of the Ombudsman and special
based on the concept that public officers and employees prosecutor;
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or " The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa
managers of government-owned or controlled Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
corporations, state universities or educational the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
institutions or foundations. thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
Compensation and Position Classification Act of cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
1989; the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
to the provisions of the Constitution; Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional in 1986.
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and " In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
" (5) All other national and local officials public officers or employees, including those
classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the employed in government-owned or controlled
Compensation and Position Classification Act of corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
1989. public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or jurisdiction over them.
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in " Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
subsection a of this section in relation to their contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action
office. and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, determined in, the same proceeding by the
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
" In cases where none of the accused are necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
occupying positions corresponding to Salary action, and no right to reserve the filing such
Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said civil action separately from the criminal action
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
officer mentioned above, exclusive original where the civil action had heretofore been filed
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper separately but judgment therein has not yet been
regional court, metropolitan trial court, rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their said civil action shall be transferred to the
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action,
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive otherwise the separate civil action shall be
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, deemed abandoned."
resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
herein provided. certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019,
original jurisdiction over petitions for the all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
issuance of the writs of mandamus, filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In
over petitions of similar nature, including quo fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
or which may be filed under Executive Order Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: individuals. We quote:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. –
Court. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having
family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage public officials and employees mentioned in
of such family or close personal relation by subsection a of this section in relation to their
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any office.
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage
from any other person having some business, Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
transaction, application, request or contract with other felonies committed by public officials in relation
the government, in which such public official to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
has to intervene. Family relation shall include exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one
affinity in the third civil degree. The word of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
"close personal relation" shall include close subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
personal friendship, social and fraternal committed by public officials and employees mentioned
connections, and professional employment all in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
giving rise to intimacy which assures free access (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
to such public officer.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
knowingly to induce or cause any public official indictment for estafa versus a director of the National
to commit any of the offenses defined in Section Parks Development Committee, a government
3 hereof. instrumentality. The Court held then:
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as The National Parks Development Committee
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was created originally as an Executive
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties. development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta
and other national parks (Executive Order No.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
the offense of estafa. Development Committee (NPDC) on February
7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
contends that estafa is not among those crimes were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard Department of Natural Resources, on December
to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the
statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio July 27, 1981).
talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and decrees listed NPDC as a regular government
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong agency under the Office of the President and
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat allotments for its maintenance and operating
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa. expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-
A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be Bondoc read:
taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the the simple reason that the latter would not have
statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of
prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon the government employees separately charged
ay ang mismong batas. for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of
the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or fine of P6,000.00, committed by government
complexed with other crimes committed by the employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the includes other executive officials whose positions may
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
the fact that even if the cases could be so of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
be possible. provision of law.44
Petitioner UP student regent Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
is a public officer. the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. or controlled corporations, state universities or
She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
time that We will be called upon to define a public the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions
and concepts are found in different statutes and Moreover, it is well established that compensation is
jurisprudence. not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.47
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
A public office is the right, authority, and duty public office. An investment in an individual of some
created and conferred by law, by which for a portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual one a public officer.48
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs
Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right a legitimate governmental function by providing
to hold a public office under our political system advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the
is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
exists at all only because and by virtue of some training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
law expressly or impliedly creating and Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is corporation created for profit.50
no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in
an office, or even an absolute right to hold The offense charged was committed
office. Excepting constitutional offices which in relation to public office, according
provide for special immunity as regards salary to the Information.
and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is
Jur. 881). a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition committed in relation to her office.
of Mechem of a public office:
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there
created and conferred by law, by which, for a was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada;
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
is invested with some portion of the sovereign body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was
functions of the government, to be exercised by done in a private capacity and not in relation to public
him for the benefit of the public. The individual office.
so invested is a public officer."42
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with averments in the information.51 More than that,
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee- jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student honesty before the courts.58
regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
office and taking advantage of her position, with intent merit.
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there SO ORDERED.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x." (Underscoring supplied) Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,
Corona*, Nachura, JJ., concur.
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.