I.

Civil Actions
a) What is a civil action?
A civil action (Rule 1, Sec. 3 (a)) is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prvention or redress of a wrong. A civil
action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
b) Forms of civil actions
1. Applicable Rules
2. When Rules not applicable?
Section 4 of Rule 1 enumerates the cases where civil action does not apply. It
will not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whaetver practicable and convenient.
c) How commenced
Section 5 of Rule 1 provides that a civil action is commenced by the filing of the original
complaint in court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action
is commenced with regard to him on the date of the filing of such later pleading,
irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
II. PLEADINGS
a) What is a pleading?
Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (Rule 6, Sec. 1)
b) What is a counter-claim?
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party
(Rule 6, Sec. 6)
1. Compulsory Counter Claim
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim (1) is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, (2) arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (3) Such
a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the
Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless
of the amount. A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action is
barred, unless otherwise allowed by these Rules.
2. Permissive Counterclaim - A permissive counterclaim is essentially an
independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
3. Counter Counter claim
Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-cross-claims. — A counterclaim
may be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.
c) What is a cross-claim?
A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction
or occurence that is the subject matter either of the original action or a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may cover all or part of the original claim. (Rule 6, Sec. 8,
amended)
d) What is a counter cross-claim?
A counterclaim may be asserted against an original counter-claimant. A cross-claim may
also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (Rule 6, Sec. 9)
e) What is a reply?
All new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. If the plaintiff wishes
to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such shall eb set forth
in an amended or supplemental complaint. However, the plaintiff may file a reply only if
the defending party atatches an actionable document to his or her answer. (1)

A reply is a pleading, the office or fucntion of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or
avoidance of new matters alleged in, or relating, said actionable document.
 In the event of an actionable document atatched to the reply, the defendant may file a
rejoinder if the same is based solely on an actionable document.
1. When allowed?
2. Effect if no reply is filed.
Under in the old rules, if a party does not file such reply, all the new matters
alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. However, the new rules did not
cite any provision which proves when there is no reply what will be its effect.
f) What is a rejoinder?
1. When allowed?
In the event of an actionable document attached to the reply, the defendant
may file a rejoinder if the same is based solely on an actionable document. (Sec.
10, Rule 7, as amended)
g) What is a third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint?
A third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth,etc.)-party
defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
or her opponent’s claim.

The third (fourth,etc.)-party complaint shall be denied admission, and the court shall
require the defendant to institute a separate action, where: (a) the third (fourth,etc.)-
party defendant cannot be located within thirty (30) calendar days from the grant of
such leave; (b) matters extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised; or (c) the
effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into the action. (Rule 6,
Sec. 11, as amended)
1. Requisites
General Rule:
a. Complaint filed by a defendant party
b. With Leave of Court
c. File against a person not a party to the action
d. Claim for Contribution, Indemnity, Subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his or her opponents’ claim
When the complaint has been denied admission, the court shall require the
defendant to institute a separate action, where:
a. the third (fourth,etc.)-party defendant cannot be located within thirty
(30) calendar days from the grant of such leave;
b. matters extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised; or
c. the effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into
the action.
2. Answer to third (fourt, etc.)- party complaint
a. Defenses against the third (fourt, etc.)-party plaintiff
A third (fourth, etc.)- party defendant may allege in his or her answer
his or her defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such
 defenses that the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff may have against the
original plaintiff's claim.
b. Defenses against the original plaintiff
In proper cases, he or she may also assert a counterclaim against the
original plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-party
plaintiff.
h) Parts and contents of pleading (Rule 7, as amended)
1. Caption
Section 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the
action, and the docket number if assigned. The title of the action indicates the
names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition;
but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on
each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
2. The body
Section 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets forth its designation, the
allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of
the pleading.
(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into
paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each of which shall contain a
statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done with
convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding
pleadings.
(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action are joined, the statement of
the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of action,'' of the second by
"second cause of action", and so on for the others. When one or more paragraphs
in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint,
they shall be prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or
"answer to the second cause of action" and so on; and when one or more
paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be
prefaced by words to that effect.
3. Relief

(c) Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a
general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable.

4. Date

(d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated.

5. Signature and address

 Section 3. Signature and address. — (a) Every pleading and other written
submissions to the court must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him or her.
(b) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him or her that he or she
has read the pleading and document; that to the best of his or her knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1)It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2)The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying,
or reversing existing jurisprudence;
(3)The factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of
discovery under these rules; and
(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

(c) If the court determines, on motion or motu proprio and after notice and
hearing, that this rule has been violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction
or refer such violation to the proper office for disciplinary action, on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule, or is responsible for the
violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly and
severally liable for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
The sanction may include, but shall not be limited to, non-monetary directive or
sanction; an order to pay a penalty in court; or, if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant
of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly
resulting from the violation, including attorney’s fees for the filing of the motion
for sanction. The lawyer or law firm cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the
client. (3a)

i) What are constituted by the signature of the counsel?

(b) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him or her that he or she has
read the pleading and document; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1)It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2)The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
jurisprudence, or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing jurisprudence;
 (3)The factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after availment of the modes of discovery under these
rules; and
(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

(c) If the court determines, on motion or motu proprio and after notice and hearing,
that this rule has been violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction or refer such
violation to the proper office for disciplinary action, on any attorney, law firm, or party
that violated the rule, or is responsible for the violation.

Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly and severally liable for
a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee. The sanction may include,
but shall not be limited to, non-monetary directive or sanction; an order to pay a
penalty in court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees
and other expenses directly resulting from the violation, including attorney’s fees for
the filing of the motion for sanction. The lawyer or law firm cannot pass on the
monetary penalty to the client.
1. Effect if rule is violated
2. Extent of coverage
a. Exception
j) Effect of an unsigned pleading

An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion,
allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action.

k) Aside from signature of lawyer, what else are required?

Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari III, A.C. No. 10525, September 1,
2015

Facts:

Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the RTC praying that she be designated
administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. Hofileña
was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy’s
children, on behalf of Jose Uy’s spouse and other children. In its Order the RTC
designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy’s estate. Subsequently, Hofileña’s
claims in the settlement of Jose Uy’s estate were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution.

In other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy’s estate, Hofileña was
represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed
in the course of these proceedings Atty. Natu-El indicated the following details:

MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny
K.H. Uy. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)
Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash.

Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy’s Opposition. In signing
this Reply, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC subsequently denied Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash. Thereafter, Maghari
filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration. In signing this Motion, Maghari
indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a
Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated
the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)

At this point, Wilson Uy’s counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the
March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records. Upon doing so, he learned
that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the
pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.

Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment. Pointing to
Maghari’s act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer’s professional details,
Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer’s Oath and acted in a deceitful
manner.

For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III
engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may be meted on him.

Issue:

Whether or not a signature is required in a pleading.

Held:

The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this

requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post
office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion,
allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere
means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a positive
declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the
pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a
lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a
solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the
delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel
alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons,
something the law strongly proscribes.
Republic vs. Kenrick Development Corp., G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006
FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil
Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) claiming ownership over
those lands. Its encroachment resulted to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228
square meters of prime land. Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its
name and which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the name of Alfonso
Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has no record of
them and that their ascendant title, allegedly in the name of Concepcion, was non-
existent in their office. Thus, the OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and
cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and
Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre
Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located and be served with summons, the
trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him.

While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on
Justice and Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles. During the
hearing, Atty. Garlitos was summoned and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer
and transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong. Apparently, the
signature appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized anyone to
sign it in his behalf, and he did not know who finally signed it.

Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion in default for
failure to file a valid answer because the person who signed it was not the counsel for
the respondents. Thus, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3,
Rule 7 of the ROC, an unsigned pleading is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal
effect.

RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be a sham and false
and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also ordered that the answer be
stricken from the records, declared Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to
present its evidence ex parte.

Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally
offered its evidence.

Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the matter to the CA
via a petition for certiorari.

CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for certiorari and lifted
the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick Then, it ordered the trial court to
proceed to trial with dispatch. It ruled so because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in
the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-
examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer and
concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.

Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that its
pleading was unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.

HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the party or counsel
representing him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and authority to sign a
pleading is personal to him and may not be delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel
alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not.

B.M. No. 1922 June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED

IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June
3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel’s
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. – The Court Resolved to
NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the
diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all
pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue
of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be
applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 79-2014

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE
OFFICE OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR,
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: BAR MATTER NO. 1922 (RE: RECOMMENDATION

OF THE MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION [MCLE] BOARD TO INDICATE
IN ALL PLEADINGS FILED WITH THE COURTS
THE COUNSEL'S MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLIANCE OR CERTIFICATE OF EXEMPTION)
In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in
the above-cited administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to:
(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing
the phrase “Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records” and replacing it with “Failure to
disclose the required information would subject the counsel to
appropriate penalty and disciplinary action”; and
(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure
of current MCLE compliance/exemption number in the
pleadings:
(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of
P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for
the second offense and P4,000.00 for the
third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed
as a delinquent member of the Bar pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850
and its implementing rules and regulations;
and
(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be
discharged from the case and the client/s
shall be allowed to secure the services of a
new counsel with the concomitant right to
demand the return of fees already paid to the
non-compliant lawyer.
This revokes OCA Circular No. 66-2008 dated July 22, 2008, and
any prior circular from the Office of the Court Administrator on this matter
which is contrary to the foregoing is hereby superseded.

For your information, guidance and strict compliance.

26 May 2014
JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ
Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 99-2008 THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS, THE OFFICE OF THE STATE
PROSECUTOR, PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES SUBJECT EXTENSION OF THE DATE OF EFFECTIVITY OF BAR MATTER NO.
1922 TO JANUARY 1, 2009 For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted
hereunder is the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 2, 2008 in Bar
Matter No. 1922.- [Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Coulis the Counsel's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Celiificate of Exemption.]- The Court Resolved to NOTE the:
"(a) 1 st Indorsement, dated August 26, 2008, of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, relative
to the letter of Atty. Feliciano M. Baustista, IBP National President and resolution of the
Board of Governors dated August 21, 2008, requesting the Supreme Court to defer or
extend the effectivity of the resolution in Bar Matter No. 1922, which makes mandatory
for all lawyers to indicate in all pleadings filed with Courts, their respective MCLE
Certificates of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; "(b) Aforesaid Board of
Governors Resolution "Requesting the Supreme Court to Defer or Extend the Effectivity
of the Resolution in the Bar Matter No 1922 until December 31, 2008", "(c) Letter-
 Comment, dated August 22, 2008, of Justice Carolina C Grino-Aquino, Chairperson,
MCLE, in compliance with the resolution of the Court dated August 19, 2008. "The Court
further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board, to: "(a)
GRANT the above request of the IBP Board; and "(b) AMEND the effectivity date of the
implementation of Bar Matter No. 1922 to January 1, 2009 instead of August 25, 2008."
October 14 ,2008

l) Verification
Section 4 of Rule 7 under the proposed amendments in the Rules of Court provide:

Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath or verified. A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign
said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in
the form of a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached
to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations:
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his or her personal
knowledge, or based on authentic documents;
(b)The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation; and
(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery. The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the
truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading.
A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on “information and
belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading.
1. Authorized signature- verified by an affiant
2. Attachment – authorization in any form be attached.
3. Allegations
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his or her
personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents;
(b)The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation; and
(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for discovery.
4. What does the signature of the affiant certifies? - The signature of the affiant
shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
pleading.
5. Effect of lack of proper verification - A pleading required to be verified that
contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or upon “knowledge,
 information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.

m) Certification against forum-shopping

1. When required?
2. What should be certified?
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he or she has not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or
she shall report that fact within five (5) calendar days therefrom to the court
wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of
a secretary’s certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the
pleading.
3. Effect of non-compliance
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his or her counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
Bacolor, et al. V. Makabali Memorial Hospital, Inc., et.al., G.R. No. 204325, April
18, 2016
In Altres v. Empleo, the Court summarized the basic tenets involving non-
compliance with the requirements on, or filing of defective verification and
certificate against forum shopping, to wit:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons".
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. V. CIR, G.R. No. 151413, February 13, 2008

One of the issues raised before the CA is the irregularity of the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping as it was signed by the president without
any proof of authorization by the Board of Directors of Cagayan.

A) Yes, the president can sign the verification and certification. The Court has
recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting
general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping;
in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an
“employment specialist” who had not even presented any proof of her authority
to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines, Inc., v. CA, we ruled that a
personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from
the company is authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping
certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the Board and
 President of the Company can sign the verification and certificate against non-
forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company
can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1)
the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3)
the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized

signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the
determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case
basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or
certificate against forum shopping, being “in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition.”

Mid-Pasig Land Dev. Corp. Vs. Tablante, G.R. No. 162924, February 4, 2010

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company
can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1)
the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3)
the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5)
an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

n) What are to be attached to the pleading?

Section 6. Contents. — Every pleading stating a party’s claims or defenses shall, in addition to
those mandated by Section 2, Rule 7, state the following:
(a) Names of witnesses who will be presented to prove a party’s claim or defense;
(b) Summary of the witnesses’ intended testimonies, provided that the judicial affidavits of said
witnesses shall be attached to the pleading and form an integral part thereof. Only witnesses
whose judicial affidavits are attached to the pleading shall be presented by the parties during
trial. Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as basis for the admission of additional
witnesses, no other witness or affidavit shall be heard or admitted by the court; and
(c) Documentary and object evidence in support of the allegations contained in the pleading.

III. Jurisdiction
a) What is jurisdiction? – The power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a
case.
b) Aspects of the concept of jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
 2. Jurisdiction over the parties
3. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case
4. Jurisdiction over the res or thing involved in the litigation (Boston Equity
Resouces Inc. Vs. Court of Appeals)
Case: Boston Equity Resources, Inc. Vs. CA., G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
Summary: The case pertains to a complaint filed by Boston Equity Resources for money
claims against spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Respondent contended in her motion
that Manuel Toledo is already dead. Respondent wanted to raise the issue on
jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the motion for having been filed out of time. The motion of
reconsideration was deemed denied because the attack on jurisdiction was barred by
estoppel by laches. Upon appeal, petition was granted. Jurisdiction over the person was
granted upon voluntary submission of the defendant or appeared to the court or by
coercive processed issued by the court. It was undisputed that the court could not have
acquired jurisdiction over defendant Manuel wh was dead. Hence, we have this petition.
The Supreme Court held that the denial of the motion to dismiss was valid. One point
raised was failure to raise the issue for almost six years. Several cases held that the
aspect can be raised due to laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Sec. 1 of Rule
9, and Sec. 8 of Rule 15 indicates the objection on jurisdiction grounds which is not
waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction can
be raised anytime even for the first time. However, jurisdiction over the person was not
listed under sec. 1 under Rule 9, it must be indiciated therein as a personal defense. As
to the case on whether the estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party, the court
held NO. An indispensable party is one who has such intent in the controversy or subejct
matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest. In this case, the issue at hand can be resolved by the
wife.
c) Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission
and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as
amended by R.A. No. 7902.)
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (400,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (400,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (300,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (400,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where
there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That
when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
1. Totality Rule

Case: Pantranco North Express vs. Standard Insurance

Summary: The case involves an accident between a passenger jeepney and a

driving bus while along the National Highway of Talavera, Nueva Ecija. The
driver of the bus was Alexander Buncan. The driver of the jeepney is Crispin
Gicale. The issue is a case on which court has jurisdiction as to the amount of
claim. Respondents filed with the RTC. Petitioners opposed as MTC has claim.
The Supreme Court claim that RTC has jurisdiction. Under the Totality Rule, the
sum of the all claims determines the jurisdictional amount. In this case, the total
amount of the claim was over Php 20,000 which gives RTC the right to hear over
the case. Moreover, the cause of action applying the totality rule, must rise
from the same transaction.

Case: Iniego vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006

Summary: The case stems from an action for damages based on quasi-delicts.
Private respondent file a quasi-delict and damages against the driver of the
truck and against the owner of the truck. The issue is a question of jurisdiction
whether or not RTC or MTC has cognizance over the case over quasi-delict. This
leads to an secondary issue whether actions based on quasi-delict are actions
capable of municipal courts if the claim does not exceed P400,000 in Metro
Manila. The Supreme Court ruled actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are
therefor capable of pecuniary estimation. The court cited the case of Lapitan vs
Scandia to determine whether the subject matter of the action is capable of
pecuniary estimation. The ruling was in determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. The
amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the
claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of detemrining the jurisdictional
costs, whether the claim for damages arises from the same or from different
causes of action.

Case: First Sarmiento vs PBCOM, G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

Summary: Case initially started by a loan secured worth P51.2 M but increased
to P100M by PBCOM. PBCom filed extradjudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage as failure to pay principal of money by First Sarmiento. First
Sarmiento filed for annulment of real estate mortgage with the RTC. RTC ruled
that the real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary examination. The
property invoved was stold to PBCom who was the highest bidder. First
Sarmento claimed they never recieved the 100M yet they proceeded with the
foreclosure. PBCom asserted that RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction because the
action for annulment of mortgage because the action for annulment of
mortgage was a real action; thus the filing fees should be based on FMV of
mortgaged properties. (Home Guaranty ruling). Petitioner explained that it
sought the removal of the lien on the mortgaged properties and was not
intended to recover ownership or possession since it was still registered to the
owner. To add, the real eastate action was incapable of pecuniary estimation
because it merely sought to remove the lien on its properties, not the recovery
or reconveyance of the mortagaged proeprties. The issue lies on jurisdiction.
Hence, the Supreme court ruled that RTC has jursidiction. The case where
respondent was banking on which is Home Guaranty. The SC said its time to
turn down the doctrine laid in that case. Home Guaranty stated that to
determine whether an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy prayed for must first be
determined, whereby they treated the action as a real action. Another
jurisprudence contested and cited "where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental
to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Considering that the principal remedy sought
by R-II Builders was the resolution of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance,
the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and Home Guaranty erred in
treating it as a real action simply because the principal action was accompanied
by a prayer for conveyance of real property.
d) Jurisdiction over the parties – Jurisdiction over the parties refer to the power of the
court to make decisions that are binding on persons. “Jurisdiction over the person or
jurisdiction in personam xxx is an element of due process that is essential in all actions,
civil or criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem” (Guy v. Gacot, G.R. No.
206147, January 13, 2016). It commences as soon as the complaint or petition was filed,
or voluntary submission to th court. Service of summons is also a way to acquire
jurisdiction over the party.
1. Additional Defendants
e) General Rule – Jurisdiction can be questionned at any time of the proceedings, even at
appeal until before finality of judgment.
1. Exceptions:
Case: Tiam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
The landmark case dicusses the doctrine of estoppel by laches. Spouses Tijam
commenced a civil case against Sibonganoy to recover a sum of P1908 with legal
interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendant’s properties,
but the same was dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. (Surety). The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. The
Surety filed its opposition on these grounds: (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of
a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy
the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the
counterbond. Upon failure of Surety to file an answer, the Court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ was issued. The CA affirmed the order appealed
from. Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking
for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA granted
the motion. Two days later the Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging:
that appellee’s action was filed in the CFI for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of
interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
The CA required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal.
RULING:
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour
for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then
in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.
The Court frowns upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.
Case: Figueroa vs. People, G.R No. 147406, July 14, 2008
Facts:

On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the
RTC’s jurisdiction.
CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to
have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches
from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
[Sidenote: While not an issue, the SC clarified that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. In this case, at
the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with
violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by Republic
Act No. 7691. And so as the imposable penalty for the crime charged is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (imprisonment for 2 years 4 months
and 1 day, to 6 years), jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on MTC.
Therefore, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate
court and the Solicitor General acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction,
they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on
for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising
the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the
first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will
not be applicable.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue
during the trial and the alleged laches in relation to the doctrine in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.
Held: YES. SC dismissed the case without prejudice.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the
general rule. For it to be invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. SC clarified that in its
past decisions concerning the same issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early
as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere
consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the
adverse party does not suffer any harm.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by
laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof
in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain
the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his
rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches
has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if
the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of
equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting
inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more
after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
Case: Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 204 Phil 25, 118 SCRA 399
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel
Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the
same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not
being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali
failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title.
This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to
declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition
was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a
new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that
her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a
complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with
respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed
to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his
name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the
instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations.
Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment
Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein
petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by
prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the
defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior
action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If
there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential
element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the
case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent
invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court.
Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it
provides that a Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of
limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the
litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
Case: Mangaliag vs Catubig-Pastoral, G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005
FACTS:

On January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., private respondent Apolinario Serquina,
together with Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a
tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte. While in Pagal, San Carlos City, a dump truck owned by
petitioner Norma Mangaliag and driven by her employee, petitioner Narciso Solano,
coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in front of it
and thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the tricycle ridden by private
respondent. Due to the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of petitioner
Solano in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers sustained serious
injuries and permanent deformities. Petitioner Mangaliag failed to exercise due
diligence required by law in the selection and supervision of her employee. As a result,
private respondent was hospitalized and spent ₱71,392.00 as medical expenses. Private
respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a fractured nose and suffers
from severe depression as a result thereof, for which he should be compensated in the
amount of ₱500,000.00 by way of moral damages. As a further result of his
hospitalization, private respondent lost income of ₱25,000.00 and even engaged the
services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to 25% of the total award.
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private
respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or negligence in
the vehicular accident on the tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte, who was allegedly driving
without license.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000, petitioners, assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim,
alleging that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the
principal amount prayed for, in the amount of ₱71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the MTC or RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
HELD:
MTC. It is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. Note also that the judicial hierarchy of courts is
not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations.
For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the
evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be
brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a
strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by
estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule
but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after
fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA.
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was
defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides
inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds ₱100,000.00,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the
same law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint does not exceed
₱100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the
Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The jurisdictional
amount was increased to ₱200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5
of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
Case: Frianela vs. Banayad Jr., G.R. No. 169700, July, 30, 2009
Summary: This case involves a will wherein petitioner was named as desiree. A case was
filed before the RTC. Respondent contested the holographic wills. RTC revoked the
holographic wills. CA ruled that the HW are revoked insofar as the testamentary
disposition of Moises’s real property was concerned. Hence, the petition for review. The
 issue revolves whether or not RTC could have validly exercised jurisdiction to “hear and
decide teh probate proceedings. The court ruled no jurisdiction. The applicable law (Sec.
19 and 33) says that probate preceedings involve gross value of the estate. Nowhere to
be found in the petition contains the gross value amount. In Tijam, the issue of lack of
jurisdiction has been raised during the execution stage. In this case, the RTC’s
assumption has been discovered during teh appeal stage of the main case. Thus, Tijam
will not apply.
Case: Duero vs. CA, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied
petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San
Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value
of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and requested the
latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent
remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two
others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial
court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the
Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of
Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was
declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment
was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and
turn over the lot.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he
turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord,
the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on
it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating
the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter
granted.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
 2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC
after he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

HELD:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691
amending BP 129.

2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a
tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito
Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the
summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before
the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence
he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for
the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was
already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default,
denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his
two motions for reconsideration

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express
consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage
of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the
RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss
an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.'
(Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)
f) Payment of Docket Fees
Case Doctrines:
1. Manchester Dev. Corp vs. CA, GR No. L-75919, May 7, 1987
Facts:
Manchester contended that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint,
citing the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete. The environmental facts of Magaspi as compared to the current
Manchester case were as follows:
 Magaspi v. Ramolete
Action for recovery of ownership and
possession of parcel of land with
damages.
Seeks not only the annulment of title of
defendant to property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession to
Magaspi;
But also for the payment of A/M/E
damages and attorney’s fees arising
therefrom with the amounts specified
therein
There was an honest difference of
opinion as to nature of action. The
complaint was considered an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of
parcel of land. Damages were treated as
merely to the main cause of action.
Thus, docket fee of P60 and P10 for
sherrif’s fee were paid.
RTC ordered Magaspi to pay P3k as
Manchester v. CA
Action for torts and damages and
specific performance, with prayer for
temporary restraining order
Prayer is for the issuance of writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction
during the pendency of action against
defendant’s announced forfeiture of
P3M paid by Manchester for the
property in question;
To attach such property of defendant
that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered;
And after hearing, order defendants to
execute contract of purchase and sale of
property and annul defendant’s illegal
forfeiture of Manchester’s money;
Ordering them to pay A/C/E damages
and attorney’s fees;
And declaring the tender of payment of
purchase price of Manchester valid and
producing the effect of payment and to
make injunction permanent.;
The amount of damages sought is not
specified in the prayer, although the
body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of P78M as damages.
No such honest difference of
opinion. As per complaint, it is both an
action for damages and specific
performance;
Docket fee paid upon filing of complaint
P410 because the action is merely one
for specific performance where the
amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is wrong, because
the body of complaint totaling P78M
should be the basis of assessment of
filing fee.
When the under-reassessment of the
filing fee covering the damages alleged
in the original complaint, as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or
incidental to the action for recovery of
ownership and possession of real
property;
The amended complaint was filed by
Magaspi with leave of court to include
the State as defendant and reducing the
amount of damages and attorney’s fees
to P100k. Such amendment was
admitted.
Action was not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for damages should be the
basis of assessment.
Although docket fee of P60 was
insufficient, SC held that the payment
was the result of an honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee. As such, the court
had acquired jurisdiction over the case,
and the proceedings thereafter were
proper and regular.
Hence, as amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the
computation of filing fee.
Issue:
In relation to docket fees as applied in Manchester case:
a) Must it be based in original complaint or in the amended complaint?
b) In which part of the pleading must the amount of damages being prayed for stated?
filing fee in Manchester was brought to
the attention of SC together with other
similar cases, an investigation was
immediately ordered by the Court.
Manchester, thru another counsel and
with leave of court, filed an amended
complaint for the inclusion of Philips
Wire and Cable Corporation as co-
plaintiff, and by emanating any mention
of the amount of damages in the body of
complaint.
RTC directed Manchester to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for. It
was only then that Manchester specified
the amount of damages in the body of
complaint in the reduced amount of
P10M.
Still, no amount of damages were
specified in the prayer. Such amendment
was admitted.
No such honest difference of opinion is
possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation, and the
prayer showed clearly that it is an action
for damages and specific performance.
The docket fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the orig
c) Is the court devoid of jurisdiction for failure to pay the correct docket fees?

Held:

1.a) It must be based in the original complaint (as compared from Magaspic case where the docket fee
was based from amended complaint due to honest difference of opinion.
1.b) The amount of damages being prayed for must be stated in both the body of the pleading and the
prayer. Such amount will be the basis of the filing fees.
1.c) Yes

In Magaspi case, SC declared that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of docket fee regardless of
the actual date of filing in court. As such, in Manchester, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by payment of only P410 as docket fee. Neither the amendment of complaint vested
jurisdiction upon the court because in essence, there was no such original complained that was duly
filed which could be amended. The orders admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the RTC are null and void.

CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

SC frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint by omitting any specification of the
amount of damages in the prayer, although the real amount is alleged in the body of the complaint. This
is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of correct filing fees or to mislead
the docket clear in the assessment of filing fee. Such fraudulent practice was compounded when
Manchester, through another counsel, filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount
of damages being asked for in the body of complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of the
SC that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that Manchester wrote the
damages in a reduced amount in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to
avoid payment of the required docket fee was obvious.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
2. Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937, August 7, 2007
FACTS: Sun Insurance filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po
Tiong with the RTC of Makati. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary period. Later, Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of
actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation,
and costs of suit with the RTC of Quezon City. However, the amount of damages sought by Tiong was
not specified, though it can be inferred from the body of the complaint that it's around P50 million.
Tiong only paid P210 as docket fee for his complaint which prompted Sun Insurance to raise an
objection, which was disregarded by the then presiding judge of the case Judge Jose Castro.
Upon the order of the SC, the records of the complaint filed by Tiong along with 22 other cases
assigned to the branches of the RTC of Quezon City were under investigation for under-assessment of
docket fees. Later, the SC returned the records to the RTC and were re-raffled to the other judges of the
said court with the exclusion of Judge Castro. The SC also ordered the judges, through a Resolution, to
reassess the docket fees of the re-raffled cases and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The
clerks of court were also required to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. However, the
clerk of court who was assigned to reassess the docket fee of the complaint filed by Tiong had a
difficulty complying with the Resolution because the exact amount sought to be recovered was not
indicated in the complaint. Thus, the now presiding Judge Maximiano Asuncion required the parties to
comment on the clerk of court's report.
Tiong filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" and indicated P10 million as actual
compensatory damages in his prayer. But, in the second amended complaint Tiong filed, he alleged P44,
601, 623.70 as actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Judge Asuncion admitted the
second amended complaint and the clerk of court reassessed the docket fee to be P39, 786, which was
subsequently paid by Tiong. Sun Insurance questioned the order of Judge Asuncion admitting the
second amended complaint with the CA. However, while the case filed by Sun Insurance was still
pending in the CA, Tiong filed another supplemental complaint claiming an additional P20 million as
damages, making his total claim for damages to be P64, 601, 623.70. Seven months after filing said
supplemental complaint, Tiong paid the additional docket fee of P80, 396.
Subsequently, the CA ruled on the petition filed by Sun Insurance. The CA ordered the RTC to
reassess the docket fee to be paid by Tiong on the basis of the amount of P25, 401, 707. The case was
then elevated to the SC. But during the pendency of this petition in the SC and after the promulgation of
the decision in Manchester, Tiong complied with the CA's decision and paid an additional docket fee of
P62, 132.92 based on the amount stipulated by the CA. Thus, Tiong paid a total of P182, 824. 90 as
docket fee.

Sun Insurance (Pet): The docket fee paid by Tiong is not sufficient. Tiong should pay a total of P257,
810.49 because the total damages Tiong actually sought was P64, 601, 620.70. Pursuant to the ruling in
Manchester, Tiong's complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled for Tiong's failure to pay the proper docket fee.
Tiong (Res): The ruling in Manchester cannot be applied retroactively. At the time the complaint was
instituted, the Manchester ruling was not yet made. The correct jurisprudence to apply in the case,
then, is the Magaspi v. Ramolete doctrine wherein the SC held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.

ISSUES: 1) WON the Manchester ruling can be applied retroactively.

(MAIN ISSUE) 2) WON Tiong could be considered to have filed the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient and that the trial court could be considered to have acquired jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: 1) Yes, The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.
2) Yes, although there was an obvious intent on the part of TIong to defraud the government of the
docket fee due through his amendments in his complaints, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike in the Manchester case, Tiong demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Thus, even if the Manchester ruling was applied, the SC, through this case provided the
following guidelines regarding docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

This petition was then dismissed. The Clerk of Court was also instructed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee to be paid by Tiong considering the total amount of the claim sought
in his original complaint and supplemental complaint; and to require Tiong to pay the deficiency.

3. Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. vs. RTC Negros Occidental, GR No.
179878, December 24, 2008
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial rights of a litigant.
NOPA's Petition for Certiorari is seeking the reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPA's Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of
docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.

There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals' exercise of
discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless
unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of
substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of
contract from being decided on the merits. What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party
cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure while, at the same time,
hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.

There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting this
Court's reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former. However, even if we decide to brush aside
the lapses in technicalities on the part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that
such Petition would still fail.

NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Court's ruling in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,14 wherein we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.

In denying15 NOPA's Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,16
wherein we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the case at bar, since Campos
deliberately concealed his claim for damages in the prayer.

In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros,17 we discussed how Manchester was not
applicable to said case in view of the lack of deliberate intent to defraud manifested in the latter:

This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion that the private
respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in omitting the amount of damages claimed in its Second
Amended Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the complainant in Manchester, when it
is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the amount of P410.00,
notwithstanding its claim for damages in the amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the
private respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the original complaint.

Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body of the complaint, damages in the
amount of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees.
Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in the instant petition.

Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-payment of docket fees in Manchester, the
complainant therein filed an amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of
damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when directed by the court to specify the
amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced the same from P78,750,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent
scheme is wanting in the case at bar.

This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of our rulings in Manchester
and Sun Insurance. Its attempt to strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to
bolster its arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing must be struck down by this
Court.

All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the
strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.

In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the amounts of
P10,000,000.00 representing the value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00
as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorney's fees. The total
amount considered in computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos
deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in
the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the amount that should have been considered in
the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly deliberately omitted was therefore
only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Campos's pleadings
furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees when
required by the Court.

Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the
Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by
NOPA should be denied.
4. United Overseas Bank vs. ROS
It must be stressed that the application of the doctrines enunciated by this Court in the cases of
Manchester and Sun Insurance must be guided by the prevailing circumstance attendant to each and
the respective strict and liberal construction of the rules on the payment of docket fees prescribed
therein must not be sought to evade penalty of one's fraudulent act or to attribute fraud, in the absence
of any.

In Manchester, we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading. The strict set of guidelines provided in Manchester was prompted by the fraudulent
intent of the counsel in said case to avoid payment of the required docket fee.40

Faced with an entirely different set of circumstances in Sun Insurance, we modified our ruling in
Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within reasonable period of time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the
justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.41

The petitioner posits that this Court's pronouncement in Sun Insurance is not applicable to the private
respondent, since it employed fraudulent schemes in order to deprive the court of the docket fees due.
It highlights the private respondent's act of omitting the amount of damages in its Second Amended
Complaint and emboldens such act in order to make it appear that the present case is of the same
circumstance as that of Manchester.

Again, we do not agree. This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion
that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in omitting the amount of damages claimed
in its Second Amended Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the complainant in
Manchester, when it is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.

First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the amount of P410.00,
notwithstanding its claim for damages in the amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the
private respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the original complaint.

Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body of the complaint, damages in the
amount of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees.
Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in the instant petition.

Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-payment of docket fees in Manchester, the
complainant therein filed an amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of
damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when directed by the court to specify the
amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced the same from P78,750,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent
scheme is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of our rulings in Manchester
and Sun Insurance. Its attempt to strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to
bolster its arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing must be struck down by this
Court.chanrobles virtual law library

All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the
court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the
strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.

In the case at bar, it was not shown that the private respondent, in failing to state the exact amount of
damages it was claiming in its Second Amended Complaint intended to defraud the court of the docket
fees due. In the first place, upon filing of the original Complaint, the private respondent paid docket fees
in the amount of P42,000.00. Clearly, the circumstances attendant in Manchester, that prompted this
Court to dismiss the case then before it, are wanting herein. Thus, in PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,42 we ruled:

With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court
of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the
docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to fee the docket fee
corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment
even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its
amended complaint.

Based on the foregoing, it is but proper therefore, that this case should not be dismissed but be allowed
to continue until judgment, and the private respondent's unpaid docket fee should be considered as a
lien on any monetary judgment in its favor.
g) Docket Fees for Civil damages in criminal actions
Case Doctrines:
1. General vs. Claravall, 195 SCRA 623
When a civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court - because the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action — the rule is as
follows: (1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information"
filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial; (2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so
alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and
shall simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages."
 2. Manuel vs. Judge Alfeche, Jr., et.al., GR No. 115683, July 26, 1996
Petitioner also posits the non-necessity of paying the filing and docket fees by reason of
the non-specification of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages being claimed by
her, purportedly on the authority of this Court’s ruling in General v. Claravall (supra.).
For the sake of clarity, we quote from General:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Court’s plain intent — to make the Manchester doctrine requiring payment of
filing fees at the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly
instituted civil actions under Section 1, Rule 111 only when ‘the amount of damages,
other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information’ — has thus been made
manifest by the language of the amendatory provisions (adopted by this Court with
effect on October 1, 1988).

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and
certainty, categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil
action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court — because the offended party has NOT waived the civil
action, or reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior
to the criminal action — the rule is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) when the ‘amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information’ filed in court, then ‘the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in Court for trial;’

2) in any other case, however — i.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in
the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be
paid and shall simply ‘constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for
actual damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

We hold that said General ruling, especially the last subparagraph above-quoted, was
actually intended to apply to a situation wherein either (i) the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or (ii) the complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary,
temperate and/or nominal damages but has not specified ANY amount at all, leaving the
quantification thereof entirely to the trial court’s discretion, 7 and NOT to a situation
where the litigant specifies some amounts of parameters for the awards being sought,
even though the different types of damages sought be not separately or individually
quantified. Were we to hold otherwise, the result would be to permit litigants to
continue availing of one more loophole in the rule on payment of filing fees, and would
not serve to attain the purpose of the revised Sec. 1 of Rule 111, which is "to discourage
the ‘gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal’s office to include in the criminal
 information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without
paying any filing fees.’"
h) Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Case Doctrines:
1. Paloma vs. Mora, GR NO. 157783, September 23, 2005
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.36 In Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,37 we
revisited the import of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to wit:

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also
judicial in character. . .

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. In Machete v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the
primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian
dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In Concerned Officials of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Vasquez [240 SCRA 502], the Court recognized that
the MWSS was in the best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was
compatible with its development plan.
2. Villaflor vs. CA, 280 SCRA 297, 327
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.21

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also
judicial in character. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view."22

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.23 In Machete vs. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the
primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian
dispute over the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract.24 In Concerned Officials of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Vasquez,25 the Court recognized that the MWSS
was in the best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible
with its development plan.

The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the
questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an
awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the
administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude
prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.26

One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by
our regular courts.27

Petitioner initiated his action with a protest before the Bureau of Lands and followed it through in the
Ministry of Natural Resources and thereafter in the Office of the President. Consistent with the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, the trial and the appellate courts had reason to rely on the findings of these
specialized administrative bodies.

The primary jurisdiction of the director of lands and the minister of natural resources over the issues
regarding the identity of the disputed land and the qualification of an awardee of a sales patent is
established by Sections 3 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act:

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Natural Resources) shall be the
executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who
shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decision as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

Thus, the Director of Lands, in his decision, said:28

. . . It is merely whether or not Villaflor has been paid the Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos stipulated
consideration of the deed of relinquishment made by him without touching on the nature of the deed of
relinquishment. The administration and disposition of public lands is primarily vested in the Director of
Lands and ultimately with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources), and to this end —
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on
issues of mixed facts and law (Ortua vs. Bingson Encarnacion, 59 Phil 440). Sections 3 and 4 of the Public
Land Law thus mean that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the final arbiter on
questions of fact in public land conflicts (Heirs of Varela vs. Aquino, 71 Phil 69; Julian vs. Apostol, 52 Phil
442).

The ruling of this Office in its order dated September 10, 1975, is worth reiterating, thus:

. . . it is our opinion that in the exercise of his power of executive control, administrative disposition and
allegation of public land, the Director of Lands should entertain the protest of Villaflor and conduct
formal investigation . . . to determine the following points: (a) whether or not the Nasipit Lumber
Company, Inc. paid or reimbursed to Villaflor the consideration of the rights in the amount of P5,000.00
and what evidence the company has to prove payment, the relinquishment of rights being part of the
administrative process in the disposition of the land in question . . . .

. . . . Besides, the authority of the Director of Lands to pass upon and determine questions considered
inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of his powers like the incident at issue, i.e. , whether
Villaflor had been paid or not, is conceded bylaw.

Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the
Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality,29 by the courts.30 The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected as long as
they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before
the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in
respect of sufficiency of evidence.31

However, the rule that factual findings of an administrative agency are accorded respect and even
finality by courts admits of exceptions. This is true also in assessing factual findings of lower courts.32 It
is incumbent on the petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual issues by the administrative
agency and/or by the trial court falls under any of the exceptions. Otherwise, this Court will not disturb
such findings.33

We mention and quote extensively from the rulings of the Bureau of Lands and the Minister of Natural
Resources because the points, questions and issues raised by petitioner before the trial court, the
appellate court and now before this Court are basically the same as those brought up before the
aforesaid specialized administrative agencies. As held by the Court of
Appeals:34
We find that the contentious points raised by appellant in this action, are substantially the same matters
he raised in BL Claim No. 873 (N). In both actions, he claimed private ownership over the land in
question, assailed the validity and effectiveness of the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights he executed in
August 16, 1950, that he had not been paid the P5,000.00 consideration, the value of the improvements
he introduced on the land and other expenses incurred by him.

In this instance, both the principle of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies and the doctrine of
finality of factual findings of the trial courts, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this
case, militate against petitioner's cause. Indeed, petitioner has not given us sufficient reason to deviate
from them.

IV. Venue
a) What is a real action? – A real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein.
b) What is a personal action? – All other actions in contrast to a real action as defined are
personal actions
c) Venue of Real and Personal actions

Case: Latorre vs. Latorre, 617 SCRA 88

SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real

property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.

xxxx

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

d) What is an action quasi in rem? –

In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the
parties who joined in the action.
 jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
e) Venue of Actions quasi in rem
Significantly, suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are
neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant.
However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties. A
proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons
to the discharge of the claims assailed. 26

In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal
with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off
the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties
who joined in the action.27

According to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, summons on the defendant in actions in
personam must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him.28 Meanwhile, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the defendant in order to
satisfy the due process requirements.29

In Alba v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court further elucidated that:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. The
service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. (Emphasis supplied.)

Given that Civil Case No. 515-M-99 is a an action for quieting of title, settled to be quasi in rem, the RTC
was not required to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, it being sufficient for the
said court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. By San Pedro’s institution of Civil
Case No. 515-M-99, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the subject properties – the res.
Therefore, the service of summons to the defendants in said case, including Dela Peña, did not affect the
jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide Civil Case No. 515-M-99, and did not invalidate the
proceedings held therein on the basis of jurisdiction.
Admittedly, there was a defect in the service of the summons on Dela Peña. The Sheriff immediately
resorted to substituted service of summons on Dela Peña without attempting first to effect personal
service within reasonable time. The Sheriff’s Return31 merely stated that he served a copy of the
summons on Dela Peña’s sister-in-law who refused to sign the same.

Personal service of summons is preferred to substitute service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must
(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts
exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances
be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and
fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.32 Indisputably, the Sheriff did not comply with any of the foregoing requirements, thus,
rendering his service of summons on Dela Peña invalid.

Nonetheless, the improper service of summons on Dela Peña did not void the proceedings conducted by
the RTC in Civil Case No. 515-M-99, for lack of jurisdiction. As the Court has underscored herein, in quasi
in rem proceedings, the court need not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, for as
long as it has acquired jurisdiction over the res. The defect in the service of summons merely infringed
Dela Peña’s right to due process that precluded the RTC from rendering a valid judgment with respect to
her personal liability. And since Dela Peña’s right to due process is personal and pertains to her alone, it
could not be invoked by her other co-defendants in Civil Case No. 515-M-99 so as to escape the
judgment of liability against them.
f) Venue of actions for specific performance
Case Doctrine:

Sps. Saraza vs Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013

Venue of an Action for Specific
Performance

As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have been instituted with the
RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of the
respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for
specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute
sale based on a contract which he had previously made.

Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation31 is instructive. In the
said case, a complaint for specific performance that involved property situated in Parañaque City was
instituted before the RTC of Pasig City. When the case’s venue was raised as an issue, the Court sided
with therein petitioner who argued that "the fact that ‘she ultimately sought the conveyance of real
property’ not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence
and beyond the cause for which the action [for specific performance with damages] was instituted."32
The Court explained:

[I]n La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly reneged on their contract to sell
to them a parcel of land located in Bago City – a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner
while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim ownership but, by
annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized defendants’ ownership thereof. This Court
ruled that the venue had properly been laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in
Bago.

In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance with damages
before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a
third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial
court’s order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with damages.
Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint.
The Court reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action
which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.33 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)

The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals34
where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution of a deed of sale over a parcel of land is for
recovery of real property, and not for specific performance, because the primary objective is to regain
ownership and possession of the property.35 It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was not
in any way connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party against whom the
complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had earlier executed an Undertaking for the
property’s transfer, correctly giving rise to a cause of action either for specific performance or for
rescission, as in this case.

Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides
that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the
respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite,36 the filing of his case with the
RTC of Imus was proper.

Gochan vs Gochan, 327 SCRA 256

It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless
prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to
recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be
filed in the proper court where the property is located:
In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance, and, therefore,
personal and transitory in nature.

This very issue was considered and decided by this Court in the case of Manuel B. Ruiz vs. J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. et al., L-18692, promulgated 31 January 1963. There the Court, by unanimous vote of all the
Justices, held as follows:

This contention has no merit. Although appellants complaint is entitled to be one for specific
performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City be
issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering said parcel of land be issued to him
shows that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because
to execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a finding that he is the
owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action
must be commenced in the province where the property is situated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the
Rules of Court, which provides that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property
shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.15cräläwvirtualibräry

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action,
although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for
determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value
thereof as alleged by the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC, provides:

Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - x x x

(b) xxx

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall
be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.

We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, 16 to the effect that in case
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied
in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have never demonstrated
any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have
stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they
actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint. Thus, it was
stated in the case of Sun Insurance: 17cräläwvirtualibräry
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint
but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by
this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the
respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional
docket fee as may be ordered.

Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions before the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there was no forum-shopping as there was no
identity of issues or identity of reliefs sought in the two petitions.

We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping. The deplorable practice of forum-
shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort to two
different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one. In the case
of Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 18 we laid down the following test to determine whether there is
forum-shopping:

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a person who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.
g) Recovery of deficiency after EJF
BPI Family Savings Bank Inc vs Sps Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015

Facts: On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the
expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent
Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331 and
TCT No. 261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking Corporation, the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. On June 30, 2000, the Regional
Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated
for public use. The judgment became final and executory on January 28, 2001 and was entered in the
book of entries of judgment on March 23, 2001. The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene
in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion
for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the petitioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents’ loan. After holding the
public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at ₱10, 000,
000.00. Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18, 522155.42, the petitioner sued the respondents to
recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint
stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished. In
the reply, respondents objected and alleged that the venue is improper.
Issues: Whether or not improper venue as a ground for objection maybe raised at anytime.
Whether or not a claim for deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure is a real action.
Held: No. We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed,
venue is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts.
In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its
being the improper venue.
No. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court
and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may
include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to
the person or property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
h) Exlcusive Venue
BRIONES vs. CA, GR No. 204444
FACTS:
Virgilio C. Briones filed a Complaint before the RTC Manila, for nullity of contracts, and damages against
Cash Asia, alleging that he is the owner of the subject property, and that his sister informed him that his
property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia.

Upon investigation, Briones discovered that: (a) he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan
agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage covering the subject property in favor of Cash Asia in
order to obtain a loan from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded
to foreclose his property.

Briones claimed that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia, and assailed the validity of the
contracts claiming his signature to be forged.

Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss, praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue. Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating
that “all legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject
hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City.”

The RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

On appeal, the CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly dismissed Briones’s complaint without
prejudice to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City.

Briones moved for reconsideration, which was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of Briones’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions.

Under Rule 4, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of
personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Republic instructs that the parties, thru a written
instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be
filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:

The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by
Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit
not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is
essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such
stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving
for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of
the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement
on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Conversely, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be
bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the
general rules on venue.

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
effectively limiting the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However,
given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as
his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the
general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where
the subject property is located.
i) Limitation on exclusivity of Venue
San Miguel Corp vs. Monasterio, GR No. 151037, June 23, 2005

xclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit
relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all
encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to
the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the
specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to contract might work to
the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the
parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements.23 Thus, the restriction should
be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is
embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted
restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
Moreover, since convenience is the raison d’etre of the rules on venue,24 venue stipulation should be
deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties’
convenience.25 Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court should govern.26 Accordingly,
since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal
action,27 we find no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place
where plaintiff resides.

AM No. 99-10-05-0, August 7, 2001

PROCEDURE IN EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

In line with the responsibility of an Executive Judge under Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30,
1975, for the management of courts within his administrative area, included in which is the task of
supervising directly the work of the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex Officio Sheriff, and his staff, and
the issuance of commissions to notaries public and enforcement of their duties under the law, the
following procedures are hereby prescribed in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages:

1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage whether under the direction of the sheriff or
a notary public, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed
with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff.

2. Upon receipt of an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, it shall be the duty of the
Clerk of Court to:

a) receive and docket said application and to stamp thereon the corresponding file number, date and
time of filing;

b) collect the filing fees therefor and issue the corresponding official receipt;

c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure, whether the applicant has complied with all the
requirements before the public auction is conducted under the direction of the sheriff or a notary
public, pursuant to Sec. 4 of Act 3135, as amended;

d) sign and issue the certificate of sale, subject to the approval of the Executive Judge, or in his absence,
the Vice-Executive Judge; and

e) after the certificate of sale has been issued to the highest bidder, keep the complete records, while
awaiting any redemption within a period of one (1) year from date of registration of the certificate of
sale with the Register of Deeds concerned, after which the records shall be archived.
Where the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages of real estates and/or
chattels in different locations covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee corresponding to such
indebtedness shall be collected. The collecting Clerk of Court shall, apart from the official receipt of the
fees, issue a certificate of payment indicating the amount of indebtedness, the filing fees collected, the
mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the real estates and/or chattels mortgaged and their respective
locations, which certificate shall serve the purpose of having the application docketed with the Clerks of
Court of the places where other properties are located and of allowing the extrajudicial foreclosures to
proceed thereat.

3. The notices of auction sale in extrajudicial foreclosure for publication by the sheriff or by a notary
public shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1709, dated January 26, 1977, and non-compliance therewith shall constitute a violation of
Section 6 thereof.

4. The Executive Judge shall, with the assistance of the Clerk of Court, raffle application for extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage under the direction of the sheriff among all sheriffs, including those assigned to
the Office of the Clerk of Court and Sheriffs IV assigned in the branches.

5. No auction sale shall be held unless there are at least two (2) participating bidders, otherwise the sale
shall be postponed to another date. If on the new date set for the sale there shall not be at least two
bidders, the sale shall then proceed. The names of the bidders shall be reported by the sheriff or the
notary public who conducted the sale to the Clerk of Court before the issuance of the certificate of sale.

This Resolution amends or modifies accordingly Administrative Order No. 3 issued by then Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on 19 October 1984 and Administrative Circular No. 3-98 issued by the Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 5 February 1998.

The Court Administrator may issue the necessary guidelines for the effective enforcement of this
Resolution.

The Clerk of Court shall cause the publication of this Resolution in a newspaper of general circulation not
later than 27 December 1999 and furnish copies thereof to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

This Resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth day of January year 2000.

Enacted this 14th day of December 1999 in the City of Manila.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, Puno, Kapunan,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ.

Sps. Ochoa vs. China Banking Corp, GR No. 192877, March 23, 2011
For resolution is petitioners’ motion for reconsideration1 of our January 17, 2011
Resolution2 denying their petition for review on certiorari3 for failing to sufficiently show
any reversible error in the assailed judgment4 of the Court of Appeals (CA).

Petitioners insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated exclusive venue of
Makati City is binding only on petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and
Damages filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, but not on respondent
bank’s Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with the same
court.

We disagree.

The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages." Sections 1 and 2
thereof clearly state:

Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-
estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of
any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner
in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is
made in the power.

Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is
situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is the
subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of
the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.5

The case at bar involves petitioners’ mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City over
which respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by
express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in Parañaque City.

The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties6 and sanctioned by Section
4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,7 cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of
actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.

Pertinent are the following disquisitions in Supena v. De la Rosa:8

Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise:
"Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

Hagans v. Wislizenus does not depart from this definition when it states that "[A]n action is
a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. x x x." It is clear that the determinative or operative fact which converts
a claim into an "action or suit" is the filing of the same with a "court of justice." Filed
elsewhere, as with some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be
categorized under either term. Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of
the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.1avvphi1 By no stretch of the
imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a court of justice. And
as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever the executive judge comes into the picture, it
is only because he exercises administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this
administrative supervision, however, does not change the fact that extrajudicial foreclosures
are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits.9

These pronouncements were confirmed on August 7, 2001 through A.M. No. 99-10-05-0,
entitled "Procedure in Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage," the significant portions of
which provide:

In line with the responsibility of an Executive Judge under Administrative Order No. 6,
date[d] June 30, 1975, for the management of courts within his administrative area,
included in which is the task of supervising directly the work of the Clerk of Court, who is
also the Ex-Office Sheriff, and his staff, and the issuance of commissions to notaries public
and enforcement of their duties under the law, the following procedures are hereby
prescribed in extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages:

1. All applications for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage whether under the direction of
the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, and Act 1508,
as amended, shall be filed with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court who is also
the Ex-Officio Sheriff.

Verily then, with respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as
amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure
sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on
Venue of Actions.

Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions
arising from or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners’ complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
The other arguments raised in the motion are a mere reiteration of those already raised in
the petition for review. As declared in this Court’s Resolution on January 17, 2011, the same
failed to show any sufficient ground to warrant the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
j) Dismissal due to improper venue
1. Summary Procedure
The court may, however, effect a motu proprio dismissal of the complaint based
on improper venue in an action covered by the rules on summary procedure. In
this type of action, the court may motu proprio dismiss a case, from (a) an
examination of the allegations in teh complaint, and (b) such evidence as may
be attached threto, on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal
of a civil action. The dismissal may be made ouright, which means that the court
may do so without need for waiting for the filing of a motion to dismiss.
2. Small claims
In small claims, the court determines that the action falls under the rules for
such cases, it may from an examination of the allegations in the statement of
claim, and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss the outright on any
of the grounds for the dismissal of the case.