D.

NAPPO: POLICY IN THE RED SEA

Part III. A Transitional Sea:

The Late-Antique and Early Islamic Red Sea

69
CONNECTED HINTERLANDS

70

Roman Policy in the Red Sea between
Anastasius and Justinian
Dario Nappo
Introduction
During the Roman period the Red Sea acted as a gateway
for the goods coming from India and other regions of the
East. The analysis of the Roman settlements in the area can
help us to understand the general lines of the Roman eco-
nomic policy concerning the commerce with the East. It is
known that at the peak of the Roman Imperial age, several
ports were operating on the Red Sea coast. Many literary
sources help us to reconstruct how this ‘harbour system’
worked during the 1st and 2nd centuries AD. The most im-
portant are Strabo’s Geography, Pliny’s Naturalis Historia,
Ptolemy’s Geography and chiefly the anonymous Periplus
Maris Erythraei. According to Ptolemy these ports were
from north to south Clysma, Philoteras, Myos Hormos,
Leukos Limen, Nechesia and Berenike (on the Egyptian
side); Aila and Leuke Kome (on the Arabic side).1
How the Romans actually managed their trade relations
with India in the same period is equally well known: once
a year, Roman ships would depart from the aforemen-
tioned ports and sail towards India where they would col-
lect those eastern items (such as spices, silk, pearls, ivory,
etc.) for which broad demand existed within the borders of
the Empire.2 The literature on the Red Sea trade in the 1st
and 2nd centuries AD is abundant and such topic shall be
therefore not discussed here.3 What I aim to analyse is the
evolution of such a system in the late Roman age, from the
4th century AD onwards, with special regard to the period
between the emperors Anastasius and Justinian, ie the 6th
century AD.
It has been argued that the imperial harbour system in the
Red Sea collapsed as a consequence of the ‘third century
crisis’ and that since the 4th century onwards the Roman
(then Byzantine) merchants gradually relinquished the di-
rect route from the Red Sea to India. During this crisis,
Axumite middlemen would have taken over the place of
the Roman sailors in the Indian Ocean, gradually forcing
the Romans to deal with them in order to access Indian
resources. A progressive lack of knowledge about India in
the late Roman-Byzantine literary sources has been taken
1. Ptolemy, Geography 4.5.14-15.
2. The proper time to leave Egypt for India, as the author of the Periplus
says (39.13.12-13) was in July. It enabled traders to sail down the Red
Sea with northerlies that prevail over that body of water during the sum-
mer. Then they would sail through the Gulf of Aden with the southwest-
erly monsoon across the Indian Ocean to India.
3. See Miller 1969; Warmington 1974; Raschke 1978: 604-1378;
Sidebotham 1986; De Romanis 1996; Young 2001; Tomber 2008.
71
D. NAPPO: POLICY IN THE RED SEA
as evidence for a decline in direct contact between India
and the Mediterranean. Such a scenario would lead us to
assume that late imperial influence in the Red Sea area had
weakened in comparison with the Augustan or Antonine
periods, leaving the Romans out of direct trade connec-
tions with India (as they had now to rely on the Axumites
to import eastern goods). According to this theory, a gener-
al decline in the volume of imports should be explained as
a consequence of the inability of western traders to reach
India.
To challenge such an interpretation, I will analyse some
pieces of evidence that can help us to acquire a clearer
picture of the situation. Such a reanalysis will be carried
on through two main points. First of all, we have to under-
stand the real reasons of the change in the general struc-
ture of the Roman harbour system after the 3rd century AD.
On the other hand, we need to clarify the real meaning of
the stronger relations between Romans and Axumites (or
Arab) middlemen in late antique period.
Roman Direct Control of the Red Sea
from the 4th Century onwards
Very briefly, we could say that the functioning of the har-
bour system from the 4th century onwards has been consid-
ered very differently to the early Imperial one. During the
1st and 2nd centuries of the Roman presence on the Red Sea,
Berenike and Myos Hormos were clearly the mainstay of
the system.4 After the 3rd century AD this situation chang-
es: Myos Hormos declines and falls out of use, whereas
Berenike, after a difficult period over the 3rd century as
well, seems to regain its role in the international trade, un-
til the middle 5th century AD.5 Nevertheless, it is also clear
that since the 4th century AD, Aila and Clysma play a sig-
nificant role in the area.6 Some scholars have interpreted
this change as the outcome of the long crisis occurred in
the area through the 3rd century, but this interpretation is by
no means satisfactory.7 The reason for such a readjustment
has to be found in the geography of late-antique trade.
Since the time of Diocletian the Roman Empire displayed
a clear policy in the Red Sea aimed to develop the role
4. On the history of Berenike during the early empire, see Sidebotham
& Wendrich 1995; 1996; 1998; 1999; 2007; Cappers 2006. On Myos
Hormos, see Whitcomb 1996: 747-773; Cuvigny et all. 2003; Peacock
& Blue 2006.
5. Sidebotham 2002: 217-240.
6. Nappo 2007: 233-244.
7. Young 2001: 150-155.
CONNECTED HINTERLANDS
and the importance of the northern ports in the Red Sea,
such as Aila and Clysma. The first one became the basis
of the Legio X Fretensis8 and witnessed a consistent ur-
ban boom from the 4th century AD onwards. Reports of
the archaeological campaigns clearly show that the port
was flourishing during the late-antique period, connected
to the other main settlements of the region and to the inter-
national routes to East.9
Connected under Trajan through a navigable canal to
the Nile and Alexandria, Clysma had already acquired
a prominent role in the region in the 4th century AD, as
many sources seem to suggest.10 Among the accounts on
Clysma, I would now like to draw attention to that of the
monk Peter the Diaconus (Liber de Locis Sanctis). It reads
as follows:
Clesma autem ipsa in ripa est, id est super mare; nam
portus mittit ad Indiam vel excipit venientes naves de In-
dia; alibi enim nusquam in Romano solo accessum habent
naves de India nisi ibi. Naves autem ibi et multe et ingentes
sunt; quia portus famosus est pro advenientibus ibi merca-
toribus de India. Nam et ille agens in rebus, quem logote-
tem appellant, id est, qui singulis annis legatus ad Indiam
vadit iussu imperatoris Romani, ibi ergo sedes habet, et
naves ipsius ibi stant.11
The account is very interesting, but needs to be proper-
ly interpreted. We know that Peter wrote his book in the
12th century AD, when Clysma and Egypt in general were
no longer part of the Empire. This means that his des-
cription of Clysma cannot be contemporary to him-
self. Hence it is likely that he borrowed this description
from an older source. Scholars usually agree that he pro-
bably copied part of Egeria’s account of her own travel
through the Holy Lands, which took place most likely
between AD 381 and AD 384.12 If we accept this expla-
nation, Peter’s account would describe the role of Clysma
at the end of the 4th century AD. According to his text,
the port would have been the dwelling place of an agens
in rebus (also called logotetes), who once a year Iussu
Imperatoris Romani would lead an expedition from Clys-
ma to “India” in order to collect and import goods from the
east.
There are a few points that need to be clarified. First of
all, what does portus famosus est pro advenientibus ibi
mercatoribus de India really mean? It has already been
proved by scholars that it would be extremely difficult for
8. Euseb., Onom., ed. Klosterman: 6, 17-21.
9. For more details about Aila, see Parker 1989: 355-372; 1996: 231-
257; 1998: 375-394; 2000: 373-394; 2002: 409-428; 2003: 321-333.
10. For an overview, see Mayerson 1996: 119-126.
11. Petr. Diac., Liber de locis sanctis, CCSL, vol. 175, p. 101.
12. In the version we have of Egeria’s report, Clysma is actually men-
tioned, but there is no reference to an agens in rebus or even to Indian
goods coming to the port. It has so suggested that Peter used a different,
and larger, version of Egeria’s work, which would now be lost. See
Mayerson 1996: 61-64; Brandes 2002: 614-621.
72
a Roman ship starting from as far north as Clysma to reach
directly India and then to go back. There are geographical
differences between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean that
would have made this journey rather difficult.13 The shal-
low waters typical of the northern Red Sea best suited light
and easily manoeuvrable vessels whereas to sail on the
ocean big and heavy ships capable of resisting the strong
monsoon winds were required. Although Peter explicitly
refers to ships arriving at Clysma from India, this is by
no means proof of a direct route linking up the two re-
gions: as many studies have confirmed, late-antique
sources used the toponym India to mean Ethiopia and
South Arabia.14 From this perspective, Peter’s words can
be interpreted in a different way. I would rather suggest
that the most likely destination for a ship leaving from
Clysma would have been the Axumite port of Adulis,15
which lies within the limits of what late-antique sources
call India. The existence of a route linking the northern
ports of the Red Sea and Adulis, and its use by private
merchants is attested by our literary sources, which make
it clear that Roman traders would go there in order to col-
lect “Indian” goods.16
There is also a second point that I would like to stress:
Peter clearly says that the agens in rebus would go singulis
annis legatus (…) ad Indiam iussu imperatoris Romani.
Such a statement allows us to identify a proof of a direct
involvement of the Roman State in the general manage-
ment of the Eastern trade. Peter makes it clear that the
agens in rebus operates according to an order of the em-
peror (iussu imperatoris Romani). We can now affirm that
at least from the end of the 4th century onwards, the Roman
State decided to control directly part of the commercial
traffic on the Red Sea.
Such a policy is perfectly consistent with the general re-
adjustment of the harbour system on the Red Sea occur-
ring during the 4th century; the increasing use of the north-
ern ports could be related to the need to keep a tight con-
trol on the trade and to better exploit the route link-
ing to the Axumite ally. According to the general theory
on transport costs,17 it might be argued that it was cheap-
er to cover the distance from Adulis to the North of the
Red Sea with only one journey on the sea, rather than
to stop at Berenike, unload the cargo, deliver the goods
by land through the Eastern desert to Coptos, and finally
from there via the Nile to Alexandria.18 As we have prev-
iously seen, sailing northward on the Red Sea was diffi-
cult, because of the winds and shallow waters, but this
problem could be sorted by using small and light ves-
sels, definitely suitable for navigation within the limits of
13. See Casson 1991: 8-11; De Romanis 1996: 21-28.
14. See Mayerson 1993: 169-174; Schneider 2004.
15. See Peacock & Blue 2007.
16. Cosmas Indicopleustes, Topographia Christiana 2.54.
17. Jones 1964: 841-844; Hopkins 1980: 101-125; Adams 2007: 5-8.
18. See Whitewright 2007.

the Red Sea.19 The increasing importance of ports such as
Aila and Clysma and of this specific route might also be a
key to understand the reasons behind the ultimate decline
of Berenike after the middle of the 5th century AD.
Another piece of evidence consistent with the scenario
that we have just offered comes from the analysis of the
taxation in the Red Sea area in Late Antiquity. We know
that during the 1st and 2nd centuries AD the Romans used
to levy a tax called tetarte upon exotic merchandise from
the East, which was a tax ad valorem, 25% of the value
of the items.20 The latest attestation of such a tax on the
eastern frontier is dated to AD 174 and comes from a tri-
lingual inscription found in Palmyra, where Lucius Anto-
nius Callistratus is called tetartones.21 At some point this
tax was halved, so that our sources refer to it as an octava
(12.5%).22 The first attestations of the octava from the Red
Sea area are two laws from the Codex Thoedosianus dated
to AD 36623 and AD 381.24
These pieces of evidence give us only a terminus ante
quem, but it is perhaps not by chance that the first appear-
ance of the octava is almost contemporary to the account
of Peter-Egeria about the agens in rebus from Clysma. It
could be suggested that from the 4th century onwards the
Roman state had become more and more involved in the
Red Sea trade, reducing the space for the initiative of au-
tonomous merchants. That would have led to a contraction
of the profits for the latter, which the State tried to compen-
sate by curtailing the tax on incoming goods.
To conclude this part of the discussion, we can say that
from the 4th century onwards the Romans reorganised their
positions on the Red Sea: the ports of the northern Red Sea
were linked up with Axum and the Roman state became in-
creasingly involved in trade with that country. Proof of the
increasing importance of the northern Roman settlements
on the Red Sea in the general economy of the area can be
also found analysing the pottery shreds from sites on the
southern Arabian coast, such as Khor Rori and Qana’.25 It
is clear that those two ports became more and more com-
mercially connected to Aila and Axum from the end of the
5th century AD, and even more from the beginning of the
6th century. So, from what we have seen so far, it is pos-
19. A clue about this possibility can be inferred from the account of the
Periplus Maris Erythraei (19) on Leuke Kome, a harbour on the Arab
coast of the Red Sea. The author describes it as an important hub and
attests that many ships would berth there to download merchandise
coming from the South of the Red Sea. The author also makes it clear
that the ships were very numerous, but of a rather small size (πλοίοις
ο μεγάλοις).
20. See De Romanis 1998: 11-60; Rathbone 2000: 39-50.
21. AE 1947, 180.
22. For a complete discussion on the origin of the octava and its mean-
ing, see De Romanis 1998: 48-55.
23. Cth IV 13, 6 (= CI IV 61, 7).
24. Cth IV 13, 8 (= CI IV 61, 8).
25. On Khor Rori, see Avanzini 2002; 2008. On Qana’, see Peacock &
Williams 2007: 79-89.
73
D. NAPPO: POLICY IN THE RED SEA
sible to spot a trend, starting during the 4th century AD and
that seems to become stronger afterwards. We are now
going to see how it became even more evident from the
end of the 5th century, when the conflict with the Sasanian
Empire led again to the closure of the overland trade route.
The relations between the Roman Empire and the Sasanids
are indeed the key to understand the development of such
a system over the centuries.
Policy in the Red Sea in Late-Antiquity
If we look at the history of the relations among the two
Empires, we can recognise that the policy of the Romans
on the Red Sea is closely dependent on the accessibility of
the overland route passing through Persia. From this point
of view, we see that the 4th century had been characterised
by the long reign of Šāpūr II whose aggressive policy led
to numerous armed confrontations with Rome, which ex-
plains the policy displayed by the Romans in order to fos-
ter the links with the Axumites. On the other hand, the 5th
century showed an easing of tension between the two Em-
pires: in AD 408/409 the two sides came to an agreement
that regulated trade between West and East and served the
interests of both sides.26 It is otherwise true that in AD 421
the new Persian emperor Bahrām V started a war with By-
zantium, but as neither of the two sides achieved any note-
worthy success, the war did not last long and a peace was
concluded the following year.27 Subsequently armed con-
frontations were only occasional and of short duration.
So when in AD 499 Kavādh I became emperor, the Eastern
frontier had been experiencing an unusually long period
of peace. However the strategy of the new ruler led to a
sudden change: in AD 502 Kavādh I decided to wage war
against Constantinople, after Anastasius had refused him
funds to pay the Hephthalites. This war opened a long pe-
riod of almost constant warfare between the two Empires,
which lasted almost a century.28
The closure of the overland route to India led the Roman
rulers between Anastasius and Justinian to extend and de-
velop the Roman influence over the Red Sea area once
more, but this time, as we are going to see, to an extent
never seen before. Economic, religious and foreign poli-
cies were aimed at controlling all the area, in order to by-
pass the Persian Empire and manage the commerce with
the East autonomously.
We can recognise the change in the overall approach to the
Eastern frontier since the reign of Anastasius. If we draw
our attention on the situation in the Red Sea, we can recog-
26. The sources further illustrate good relations at the beginning of this
century by telling us that the emperor Arcadius asked Yazdgard I to
become the guardian of his infant son Theodosius after his death. See
Blockley 1992: 52-59.
27. Dignas & Winter 2007: 135-138.
28. Jos. Styl. 309.12 – 310.3; Marc. Com. A. 518; Proc. De Bell. Pers.,
I, 11.6 and 29-30. See also Dignas & Winter 2007: 100-106.
CONNECTED HINTERLANDS
nise a very consistent policy displayed in the area, aimed
to foster the Roman influence. A milestone in this process
was the recapture of the island of Iotabe. In AD 473 the
Arab chieftan Amorkesos (Imru’ al-Qays) had set out from
Roman Arabia, taken possession of the island, evicted the
Roman tax collectors, and had become wealthy by collect-
ing taxes on cargoes coming from the East.29 This situation
weakened the Roman prestige and deprived the Empire
of an important source of revenue. In AD 498 Anastasius
sent the dux Romanus against Scenite (ie, Saracen) sheiks,
whose raids were causing serious damage in the province
of Palaestina III. The most important outcome of Ro-
manus’ expedition was the recapture of Iotabe.30 The dux
liberated the island and turned it over “to Roman traders to
live there as an autonomous community, to export cargoes
(of merchandise) from India, and to produce regular rev-
enues for the emperor.”31
The importance of the recapture of Iotabe is not to be un-
derestimated. After few decades of weakness in the Red
Sea area, the emperor had decided to re-establish the Ro-
man authority and to take over the island, an important
source of revenues. This was the first step of a process of
reorganization of the whole region. Probably related to the
re-annexation of Iotabe is an interesting document dated
to the reign of Anastasius. It is an edict issued by the em-
peror, most likely after Romanus’ campaigns, regulating
the careers of Byzantine officers. The precise interpreta-
tion of the text is still quite controversial, but nevertheless
is a unique source of information about Anastasius’ activ-
ity in the Red Sea. The edict makes it clear that Clysma
plays now a major role in the general economy of the area,
being perhaps the dwelling place of a commerciarius and
definitely a customs. It has been argued that the edict was
issued after the recapture of Iotabe since it seems to be
aimed to clarify the way Anastasius wanted the revenues
to be assigned to his duces, now that also Iotabe (and the
taxes levied there) belonged to the Empire.32 On the other
hand, the emperor worked on the relations with the Arab
tribes that occupied the empty lands between the Roman
and the Persian empire: his priority was to ensure military
support from them.
In fact, it is known that by the end of the 5th century AD
the Diocletianic system of defence had been abandoned
and many troops had been withdrawn to the fortifications
of the more threatened Western borders. Regional security
was increasingly left to Arab foederati, especially along the
south-eastern frontier. In the Arab peninsula the Salîhids,
as symmachoi, became guardians of Roman interests in the
29. Malch.: 2.404-6
30. Theophanes (p. 141, 12-16) makes it clear once more that the island
had at one time produced considerable tax revenue for the Roman
emperor before its occupation by Scenites.
31. Theoph. p. 141, 17.
32. For a general discussion about the edict, see Sartre 1982: 107-119;
Haarer 2006: 45-46; Nappo 2006: 329-352.
74
area. In AD 502 this agreement came to an end and the
Salîhids were replaced by new allies. It is uncertain which
Arab tribe Anastasius made the new treaty with: although
this foedus is mentioned in several sources, they do not
agree about the name of the tribe. Taking the evidence of
all our sources into consideration it is possible however
to argue that Anastasius concluded a treaty with both the
Kindites and the Ghassanids in AD 502.33
Anastasius sought to encourage the loyalty of his new al-
lies with their cultural and religious assimilation into the
empire. It appears that the Ghassanids had converted to
Christianity as part of their deal to settle on the limes, and
it is assumed that the Kindites would have done the same
(though some scholars suggest they had already been Chris-
tianised). With rather less success, Anastasius also tried to
win the support of the Lakhmids of al-Hira by attempting
to convert them to monophysite Christianity.34 The analy-
sis of Anastasius’s whole policy in the area should leave
no doubt as to what the aim of the emperor was. Moreover,
when in AD 502 the war of Kavadh I closed the overland
route to India, the Roman emperor had already started his
wise policy of improvement of the Red Sea bases, and later
on he also began his policy towards the Arabs tribes, which
as we have seen was consistent and effective.
Efforts to consolidate alliances by religious affiliation also
stretched further south to southern Arabia, in particular to
the Himyarites and their Ethiopian neighbours across the
Red Sea, which was a key area for the control of trade.
There it is possible to see the continuity in the policies
displayed by Anastasius and his successor Justin I, who
tried to extend Roman influence on the Red Sea even fur-
ther, and not without success. Although there had actually
been missionary activity among the Himyarites as early
as the 4th century, under the emperor Constantius II,35 the
Himyarite king and his family did not abandon their Jew-
ish religion, whereas in the same period Romans managed
to christianise Ethiopia.36 Otherwise, in the 5th century
Christianity gained ground in South Arabia over Judaism
33. Eustathius of Epiphania simply says that a treaty was made with
the Skenite Arabs, and so does Evagrius (III, 36); Theophanes (AM
5995) and Nonnosus suggest that it was the Kindite tribe; two Arabic
historians, Ya‘qūbī and Ibn Khaldūn suggest that it was the Ghassanid
tribe. The inclusion of both tribes represented a sharp political decision:
on the one hand Anastasius was signing a treaty with the old and presti-
gious Kindite tribe; on the other he was giving to the Ghassanids, who
were the new masters of the region, the power to displace the Salîhids
who had previously proved themselves ineffectual protectors of Roman
interests. See Capizzi 1969: 177-178; Haarer 2006: 34-36; Dignas &
Winter 2007: 169-172.
34. It seems that the difficulty was not in conversion to Christianity for
it is known that al-Mundhir had espoused Nestorianism at some point,
and perhaps even Chalcedonianism, but monophysitism was associ-
ated specifically with the religion of the hostile Roman Empire, and as
a vassal of the Persian king the Lakhmid chief could not be persuaded.
Haarer 2006: 36-37, 223-224.
35. Greatrex 1998: 226-228; Haarer 2006: 40.
36. Robin 1996: 699.
 D. NAPPO: POLICY IN THE RED SEA

and Najrān became the centre of the Christianity and the
Himyarites developed closer links with the Ethiopians.37 In
the lead-up to the Persian war and afterwards, Anastasius
was keen to encourage the spread of Christianity since he
needed the support of both Himyarites and Ethiopians to
ensure the security of Roman trade passing through the
Red Sea, as it was obviously impossible to use the land
route across Persia. Silvanus, a monophysite bishop, was
dispatched to Himyar during Anastasius’ reign and it is
from this period that we have the first attestation of an
organised ecclesiastical hierarchy.38 We do not know the
exact dating of the arrival of Silvanus in Himyar, but it is
during the reign of the Christian king Martad‘īlān Yanūf,39
suggesting that his reign saw both political rapprochement
with the Romans with the AD 502 foedus, and closer re-
ligious affiliation. His successor, M‘adikarib Y‘afur was
also a Christian, and probably installed (or at least backed)
by the Ethiopians, and in AD 516 he waged war against al-
Mundhir.40 At Najrān Christian activity developed and the
religion spread to the towns of the South.
In AD 517 M‘adikarib Y‘afur unexpectedly died and his
place was taken by a Jewish leader, Dhu Nuwas. The
Ethiopian king Ella Asbeha decided to attack him, but his
campaign was unsuccessful, and Dhu Nuwas also tried to
win the Persian support in order to completely defeat his
Ethiopian enemy. Nevertheless, the Persian king Kavadh
did not heed Dhu Nuwas’ request. So the Hymyarite king
started a campaign against Najran, killing thousands of
Christians dwelling in the area.
Justin decided to put an end to Dhu Nuwas’ desire for
conquest and in the winter of AD 524-25 sent a flotilla of
Byzantine merchantmen from the Red Sea fleet mustered
at the port of Adulis and carried an Axumite army across to
Yemen. In two campaigns the Himyarite king was defeated
and as a consequence of these wars Yemen fell again un-
der the control of the Axumites, who put on the Himyarite
throne a malleable king.41 But this puppet ruler did not last
long. Fugitive slaves from the Axumite army led a revolt
which overthrew him and set up instead one Abraha, by
origin the slave of a Greek trader of Adulis. He was even-
tually allowed to keep his throne, but had to pay a tribute
to Axum.42 Following this, the area experienced a period
of peace till the reign of Justinian. The main source about
these events is the Martyrium Arethae, written in ca. AD
530, which reads as follows:43
37. Haarer 2006: 41.
38. Smith 1954: 461; Harmatta 1974: 103; Robin 1996: 700; Haarer
2006: 41.
39. The king adopted Christianity in fulfilment of a vow. The chronol-
ogy of this episode is still controversial. See Greatrex 1998: 227-229
40. See Robin 1996: 700-702; contra Hareer 2006: 41.
41. Vasiliev 1950: 291-293; Greatrex 1998: 228-230; Haarer 2006:
41-42.
42. Evans 1996: 113-114.
43. Martyrium Arethae, in Acta Sanctorum, Octobris, vol. 10, 747.
75
Ετυχην δ πρω τν θεράποντα το Θεο
λεσβα! συνάξαι #κ πάσης βασιλείας ατο κα%
&λλων #θν'ν, πλ(θος χιλιάδων )κατν ε*κοσι.
Κα% κατ-ο/κονομίαν το σωτη-ρος, ε/σ(λθεν πλο0α
τ'ν #μπόρων 2Ρωμαίων κα% Περσ'ν κα% Α/θιόπων,
κα% #κ τ'ν νήσων Φαρσ!ν, )ξήκοντα· ο8τως, 9π
μν :ειλ! τ(ς πόλεως πλο0α δεκαπέντε, <π
το Κλύσματος ε*κοσι, <π >οταβ(ς )πτ!, <π
Βερωνίκης δύο, <π τ(ς Φαρσ!ν )πτά, 9π >νδίας
#ννέα.
“Early in the day the servant of God Elesbaà happened to
gather a number of 120,000 men, taking them from all his
kingdom and other nations. And according to the plan of
the Saviour, ships came of Roman, Persian and Ethiopian
traders, and from the Farasan islands, sixty in total: fifteen
from the city of Aila, twenty from Clysma, seven from
Iotabe, two from Berenike, seven from Farasan, nine from
India.”
The account tells us that the emperor sent ships from sev-
eral ports of the Red Sea: Aila, Clysma, Iotabe, Berenike
and also the Farasan islands, an archipelago placed in the
southern Red Sea. Since the Martyrium also records how
many ships came from each port, this information has been
used to figure out the importance of each harbour. Although
we should be careful in assessing the extent to which we
can take these figures as precise means of quantification
of the overall commercial activity that entailed each port,
it is indeed clear that Aila and Clysma must be considered
the most important ones, since they provided the Axumite
army with the biggest amount of vessels. The presence of
the Farasan archipelago is also extremely suggestive. Until
a few years ago, this archipelago was believed to be rather
part of the Axumite kingdom than the Roman Empire, but
recent excavations in the area have proved that a Roman
vexillatio was based in the islands in the 2nd century AD.44
Although it is unlikely that the Romans could hold the ar-
chipelago from the 2nd through the 6th century, the account
of the Martyrium certainly sheds light on the late Roman
expansion in the southern Red Sea. As far as the Farasan
islands are concerned, we can either say that the Romans
had taken them over again or that they had turned them
over to their Axumite allies. So, after the conclusion of the
campaign against the Himyarites, the Roman Empire was
once again (through his Axumite ally) a prominent force in
the Erythrean Sea.
The last stage of such development was reached under
Justinian. First of all, the emperor promoted a new cam-
paign to take control of Iotabe, after a period of political
turmoil in the island, caused by the rebellion of the Jew-
ish merchants living in the island.45 With this action, the
emperor made it clear that the Empire would not loosen
its leadership on the Red Sea, once more a crucial area to
import Eastern goods, because of the renewed wars against
44. Villeneuve 2004: 419-429.
45. Choric. Gaz. Laud. Arat. et Steph., 67-75.
CONNECTED HINTERLANDS
the Persians. We can easily recognise that Roman political
influence on both sides of the Red Sea was at its high-
est point: in the North, the Empire ruled Egypt and Pal-
aestina; in the South, a strong alliance with the Axumites
allowed Roman traders to collect Indian goods at Adulis;
to this we should add Himyarite Yemen, which was con-
trolled through the Ethiopian allies. The actual power of
this control can easily be understood when one considers
that the emperor was even able to use Abraha, the new
ruler of Yemen, to make a (fruitless) expedition against
Persia.46
So finally during the reign of Justinian the long process of
extending the Roman influence through the Red Sea area
was concluded. For a short but significant period, the Ro-
mans were so able to make the Red Sea a Mare Internum,
like the Mediterranean. This aim was achieved through
two strategies. First of all, by improving Roman direct
presence on Red Sea and reorganising Roman settlements
in the area. On the other hand, a sharp foreign policy led
to include Axum (and consequently even Yemen) within
the Byzantine ‘commonwealth’. This achievement was
exploited by Justinian who established a trade route via
Himyar and Axum bringing silk into the Empire while by-
passing Persia.
This arrangement of the area did not last long. In the late
AD 570’s, the Persian emperor Khusro I was able to re-es-
tablish the Sasanian leadership in South Arabia, by install-
ing in the area a Persian governor. Before the great king was
dead, Persians controlled Bab al-Mandab, the entrance of
the Red Sea. In the following decades, the area witnessed
the big Persian expansion in the eastern regions of the Ro-
man Empire, then the Roman recovery under Heraklius.
Unfortunately, the glorious victory of the Roman basileus
against the Persians came too late and Heraklius could not
exploit his new achievements in the East. It was now time
for a new power to rise: the Arabs.
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