TRADEMARK DILUTION: INDIAN APPROACII

T.G.Agitha*

I Introduction

T R A D E M A R K P R O T E C T I O Ni s o n e a r c ao f i n t e l l e c t u apl r o p e r t yt h a t
attracted muchjudicial andlegislative attentionin the lasthalf of the 20th
century.The changingtrendsin business andthe impactof globalization
hadtremendous influenceon expanding trademarkprotectionbeyondits
traditionallirnits.One hasto be very carefulagainstthe moderntrendof
expandingIP protectionbeyondany rationallirnits.rRalphBrorvnJr. was
p r o p h e t iw
c h e nh e s a i d : l
In an acquisitivesociety,the drive for monopolyadvantage is a
very powerfulpressure.Unchecked, it u,ouldno doubtpatentthe
wheel,copyrightthe alphabet, arrdregisterthe sun and moon as
exclusivetrademarks.
In the caseof trademarks, theradicalexampleof this trendof expansion
is clearlyvisible in the concept of trademark dilution.
The justifications for trademarklarvaredifferentfrom tliejustifications
for otherformsof lP astrademark law doesnot encourage furthercreativity.
O r i g i n a l l y t h e f u n c t i o n o f t r a d e m a r kr v a s c o n s i d e r e dt o b e s o u r c e
identification3 andtrademarkprotectionis prirnarilymeanlfor promoting
this function. Trademark larvairnedat protecting consurlersfrom confusiott
anddeception'l alongwith securing a trader'shard-earned reputation so as

* RcsearchOfficer,MI{RD Chairon IPR, Schoolof Legal Studies.CochinUniversity

o f S c i c n c e& T c c h n o l o g y .1 - h ea u t h o r i s t h a n k f u l t o N . S . G o p a l a k r i s h n a n for his
v a l u a b l es u g g e s t i o n s .
l . I l e a d D a v i d V a v c r . " l n t e l l e c t u aP
l r o p e r t yL a w : S t a t eo f t h e A r t " l l 6 L Q R 6 2 1
a t 6 3 6 ( 2 0 0 0 ) .H e s a y st h a t t h e p r e s e n t r e n do f e x p a n d i n gi n t e l l e c t L r a p lr o p c r t yc o u l d
b e s e e n a s a n e n d i n i t s c l f r a t h e rt h a n a m e a n st o t h e e n d o f s t i m u l a t i n gd e s i r a b l e
innovation.
2 . R a l p h S . B r o u , n ,J r . , " A d v e r t i s i n ga n d t h e P u b l i c I n t e r e s t :L e g a l P r o t e c t i o no f
Trade Symbols". 57 Yale L J l165 at 1206 (1948).
3 . M a r k A . L e m l e y ," T h e M o d e r n L a n h a mA c t a n d t h e D e a t h o f C o r r m o n S e n s e "
108 Yale L J 1687 ar 1695 (1999). Also read Robert G. Bone, "A SkepticalVierv of
'lradcmark
D i l u t i o n R e v i s i o nA c t " l l I n t e l l P r o p L l ] u l l 1 8 7 a t 1 8 8 ( 2 0 0 7 ) .
4 . G e o g r a p h i c aal n d p r o d u c tm a r k e tl i m i t a t i o n so f t r a d e m a r kp r o t e c t i o ne v i d e n c e
thisasoect.

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 3.10 .lo(,R.\"1t.ot: 7.iil,,1.\.D/..1,\r
L.4Lr tI.STIT.|TIi [ V o l .5 0 : 3

to facilitatchim to seil his products.5 T'hesocial benefiti' protecting

trademarks is consumerprotectionby rva1,of reducingcorsurnerconfusion
and consurner searchcosts.6Therefore, earlier,consumerconfusionwasa'
essential requirement for constituting an actionable harrn.T Linritations orr
trademarkprotectionbasedon geographical areaand productclassificatio'
areevidences ofthis aspect.
However,the doctrineof trademarkdirution. launcrredby Fra'k
Schechter.s markeda fundamentar shift in theextentandscopeof trademark
protection.It was a turningpoint in the historyof trade,rarklaw.
Unlike
traditional infringement Iaw,theprohibitions against trademark dilutionare
not the productof conrmo'rlarvdeveloprnent, andarenot motivatedby an
intcrcstin protectingconslurers.e The trademarkdilutiondoctrineis an
obviousrefleclionof the ever-increasing clemand for extendingrlore and
moreprotectiorr to famoustrademarks. Ttis quiteunderstandabl. tt.,utth"
traditionaldoctrineof "territoriality"'ot traclemarksr0 is losingits hold in
t h i s t e c h n o l o g i c a le r a ' , v h e r et e r r i t o r i a l b o u n c l a r i e a
s r e -b e c o m i n g
meaningless. Increased globalmarketingandadvertising. alongrvithfree
flow of informationresultingfrom the informationtechnologyievolution
justify the concernshownbl,international traders.A strict udll.r.n." to
traditionalterritorialconceptof trademarks. in thesecircumstances becomes
an "economicconcern"to thosebig businesses rvhoventureto conquerthe
entireglobe.llA famousmark'sreputationnot only transcend territorial

5 . R o b e L tG . I l o n e . " i l u n t i n g G o o d r v i l l :A I l i s t o r y o f t h c c o n c e p t o f G o o d u , i l !
in
Tradernark Larv" 86 Bosron Uttir L Rcv 517 at 567 (2006). Also read
Mark
Bartholomerv."Advertising and thc'l-ransformationof 'rrademarkLarv,.Forthcoming
in 38 Aleu,A{exicoz Rev, (2008) atailable ar http://ssrn.corn/abstracr:l 023930
6. I{obcrt G. Ilonc. slpra note 3.
L lbid.
8. lr. Schcchtcr.''llarional Basis of- -i'radcnrarkIrrotectior.r",10 Hart, l. t?et, gl3
'l'he
{19211 a u t h o ri s r r o tu n n t i n d f u o
l f t h c v i c r vt l i a t t h e c o n c c p to f t r a d c n r a r d. ki l u t i o n
originatcd in Iingland in the case t>l'['.asrnanpltotogrophic ntoteria!s Co. t.
John
G r i / / i t h C o r p . 1 5 R P C 1 0 5 ( 1 8 9 8 ) .I { e a dJ u l i e A r r h u r G r a c i a ,, . ' l ' r a d c r n a rDki l u r i o n :
l l l i m i n a t i n gc o n f u s i o n " 8 5 7 ' M R4 s 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) .I l o r v e v e rt,h e c o n c c p la n d i t s p h i l o s o p h l .
$'cre discusscdin dctail in Schcchter''s article and thereforehc is considcrctlto be the
founder of the concept in its totality.
9 . l v o s e l e yv . L ' s e c r e t C o t a l o g u e ,\ n c . . 5 3 7 u . s . 4 l g a t 1 2 9 ( 2 0 0 3 ) . r ' r h i s
casc. horvcver, the uS Supleme court insisted that ..actual dilution,' needs
to be
provcd.
10.'lcrritorialitv of trademarks,rvhich is a basicprinciple of trademarklarv, rnsists
that trademarkri-ehtsare sccurcd in a country-by-countr.v basis and they have onl.v., a
l i m i t e d g c o g r a p h i c asl c o p e .G r a c m ew . A u s t i n .' . T h e T c r r i t o r i a l i t yo f u n i t e d
'fradcrnark states
Law" a1'qil6ble at http:llpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id:
S96(120.
ll. Frcdcrick w. lvlosterr. I.'crntousand LIrell-Kno.wn A,larks 4( Buttcnvorths,
I 997).

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 2 0 0 8| TR,,1DE,\IARK
DII,UTIOAI IAID1.1A'APP]IOACII 341

b o u n d a r i ebsu t a l s oe x t e n d tso u n r e l a t efdi e l d so f a c t i v i t l , f a b

r e y o n dt h e
s c o p co f t h e o r i g i n a lg o o d so r s e r v i c e isn r e l a t i o nt o w h i c h t h em a r k i s
uscd.l2The tradenarkdilution theoryis intendedto extendrnaxinrum
protection to this capacityof a famousnark. In effect,thistheorydefends
f'amousnrarksfrom comnetition.

I I T h e c o n c e p ot f t r a d e m a r kd i l u t i o n

Dilutiontheorydiscards theview thatthe solefunctionof tradernark is

sourceidentification,as archaic.llAccordir"rg to Schechter, the proper
expansiorr of trademarklarvhasbeenhamperedby obsoleteconceptions
bothasto the functionof a trademark andasto the needfor its protection.la
I-lefeelsthat the functionof trademarktodayis not only symbolicbut also
crcativein nature.l5As perthe theorv,the prescrvation of the uniqueness
and singr.rlarity of the trademarkis of paramountimportance l6
to its o'"vner.
Accordingto Schechter, trademarkis not merelythe owner'scornmercial
signature. but is "a silentsalesrnan" throughwhichdirectcontactbetween
the ownerof the mark andthe cousumeris obtainedand maintained.lT In
his view, the mark actuallysellsgoods.So thereis the possibilitythat use
of trademarks evenon entirelynon-related goodsrnayinjurethe trademark
owner.In suchcasesabsence ofactualconfusioncreatedby suchrlisuse,
resultingin eitherdiversionof tradeor otherconcretefinancialliabilityor
injuryof tradeor reputeis qLrite irrelevant.l8
However,Schechter intended
to lirnit the much broaderdegreeof protectionextended to famousmarks
to "arbitrary.coinedor fancifulmarks"excluding"cornmonplace marks"
from its ourvieu'.le

12. Id. at 5.
1 3 . F . S c h e c h l e rs, u p r a n o t e 8 a t 8 2 2 .
1 1 . I d . a t 8 2 4 . T h a t i s , t h e c o n c e p t h a t t h c l u n c t i o n i s t o d e s i , e n a tsco u r c ea n d t h c
l a r v w i l l p r e v c n t t h c m i s u s eo f t h a t m a r k o n l y r v h e n t h c r c i s a n a c t u a l c o n f u s i o n
c r c a t e db y s u c hm i s u s e r, e s u l t i n gi n c i t h e rd i v c r s i o no f t r a d e o r o t h e rc o n c r e t ef i n a n c i a l
l i a b i l i t y , o ri n j u r y o f t r a d e o r r e p u t e .
1 5 . I d . a t 8 1 6 - 1 7 . A c c o r d i n gt o h i r n ," t o d e s c r i b ea t r a d e m a r ka s a m c r e s y m b o lo f
g o o d r v i l lw i t h o u t r e c o g n i z i n gi t a s a n a g e n c vf o r t h e a c t u a lc r e a t i o na n d p e r p e t u a t i o n
of goodu'ill. ignores the most potent aspectof the nature of a trademarkand that
p h a s em o s t i n n e e do f p r o t e c t i o n . "
16. Id. at 822. He is of the opinion that preservationof these values of a
t r a d e m a r ki s t h e o n l y r a t i o n a lb a s i sf o r t r a d e m a r kp r o t e c t i o na t 8 3 l .
1 7 . F r a n k i S c h e c h t e r".F o g a n d F i c t i o n i n T r a d c m a r kP r o t e c t i o n "3 6 C o l L R e t ,
60at64(1936).
1 8 . I l o r i ' ev e r . T o n l , 1 4 o r , 1 , .irso o f t h e v i o v t h a t i t i s n o t s u r e r i h e t h e rS c h e c h t e r
i n l e n d e dd i l u t i o n t h e o r y t o a p p l ) 't o n o n - c o m p e t i t i vsei t u a t i o n sa l o n eo r t o t h e u s eo f
c e r t a i nm a r k so n r e l a t e da n d u n r e l a t e dg o o d s .T o n l , M a r t i n o .T r a d e m a r kD i t u t i o n 2 6 (
C l a r e n d o nP r e s s .1 9 9 6 ) .
1 9 . S u p r a n o t e 8 a 18 2 8 " 8 3 0 .
 312 JOLTRNALOt. TI|E IITDIANLtilt: INSTITUT,E
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

Trademark dilutionLlsualry
occurseitherby way of bluningor tarnishing.
Sorneevenadd 'free riding' to the categories
of injury causeiby dirution.2'
However,'free riding' carnotbe accepted asan injury/danrage in tradernark
law asthe defendant's gain neednot alwaysresurtin the praintiffs loss
and
the trademarklaw doesnot recognizemonopory
over the mark even in
casesof famousmarksundertheguiseof dirution
doctrine.2r A thirdparty
userr'vhoderivesbenefitfrom the useof the farnous
mark neednot always
inflict any h-arrn
upon the trademarkholder,especiailywhen he is
not a
compctitor.:2
In casesof blurrin-e.erosionor wateringdown of trre,.distinctiveness,
uniqueness, effectivenessandprestigiousconnotations" of the trademark is
apprehended.23 Tarnishment happens whe'a third parr.vusesthe markto
besmirch or debasethe markholder.Thus,dirutionti.,.oiyenvisages
injury
to trademarkevenin circurnstances whenthereis no confusion"and euen
u'hentlie marksinvolvedarenon-competing. what the proponents of the
dilutiontheoryargueis that it shouldbe givenequalprotection
rviththe
interestagainstconfusion.2a

I I I E c o n o m i cs, o c i a la n d p o l i t i c a l
overvieryof the doctrine

However,the literatureon thesubjectrevealsthattheconcept

of dilution
has not been able to muster whole-hearted support from the entire
international cornmunity. Underthetraditional trademark systemthevalue
of trademark was basedon its abilityto identif.v th" soLrrce of the product
b e a r i n gt h e m a r k ,t h e q u a r i t yi t a s s u r eas n d t h e g o o d w i l r
it embodies.
Interestingl.v, the modernrrendprovesto be the converse.Rather
than
ide'tiff ing the goodswitrr a particularsource,therebyguaranteeing
their
quality,the niarkitserfbecomes theproduct.I.steadof qirarityandensuing
goodwill,the charmbehindtrremark,artificiailycreated
aridboostedby
persuasive advertising techniques becomes determinative of the valueof a

20 Readfor exampre, clarisaLong."Dirutior" 106CotL Rev1029at r059(2006)

,,Trademark
D.-ilurion.
SearchCosts,and NakedLrcensing,,
Ti,:lll1. at 5.,.:-rT"",
available http:/lpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id:g700g9.
2l- Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
shows, Inc., v. [Jtah Division
of Travel Developntent170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
22' clarisa Long, "Dilution" 106 Cor L Rev 1029ar
, r060 (2006). The aurhorfeers
t h a t p r e v e n t i o no f f r e e r i d i n g u n d e rt h e g u i s eo f d i r u t i o n
i s e q u i v a l e n t o c o n f e r r i n ga
r i g h t o f p r r b l i c i t yf o r c o r p o r a t i o n sl,v h i c ha r et h e o w n e r s
o f f a m o u sm a r k s .
2 3 . M i c h a e l B I a c k e n e l ''.' w e l l - K n o r v nM a r k s " r 6
EIpR 4gl at 4g4 (r994).
24. Supra note 2 at 1192.
 20081 TI?ADEIITI]IKDI LUTIo\'. IA,DIA,\,,1
PPRo,1CH J.+J

t r a d e m a r k . :l -i h e m a r k n o m o r ea s s u r eqs u a l i t yo f t h e p r o d u c t b . utgets
v a l u e di n i t s e l fb y c u s t o r n e rTs h. u st h et r a d e m a rbke c o m e s , .sai l e n ts a l e s
man".The rlain reasonbehindthe gradualacceptance of the demandfor
wider protectionto well-knon,nmarksaretlie trendsin modernadvertising.
especially persuasive advertising. The trendsin thisfield demanda shift in
the functionof advertiselrent frorn beinginformative26 to that of being
persuasive.zT with time,thepersuasive powerof theadvertising resultedin
the markacquiringa "commercialmagnetism" of its own.28But manyjr_rrists
believethat protectionof commercialrnagnetism of trademarkis not the
functionof trademarklaw. RalphBrown feelsthat persuasive advertisingis
simplya wasteof resources andas it orrlypersuades a purchaser to choose
a particularproductfrom amongequallygoodsirnilarproductsat a higher
price(by way of distortionof consumerchoice).the persuasive function
of tradesymbolsis of "dubioussocialutility".2e He, therefore. wondersas
t o w h y t h e c o u r t ss h o u l dr e c o g n i zoer p r o l e c itn t e r e s tdse r i v i n gf r o m i t . r 0
Accordingto hirn,the clearest, rnostcandid,andmostfar-reaching clairn
on behalfof persuasive valuesof trademarks findsreflectedin the dilution
theory.3l
Anotherapprehension aboutthe merchandising rightsof trademark
owner is that suchrightsdivorcetrademarks from the goodsthey advertise
andtherebyfrom the trademark theoryitself.Accordingto Mark A. Lemley,
the point of trademarklau,hasneverbeento maxirnizeprofitsfor trademark
ownersat theexpense of competitors andconsurners.32 And the investment
which the merchandising rights intend to protectis not investmentin

25. Read for example.sttpra nore8 at 830-83l. IJe savs:',lrrom the nccessitiesof
modcrntrademarkprotectionmentioncdabove.on the one hand.and fi.omthe decisions
o f e m p h a s i z i n gt h e g r e a t e rd c g r c eo f p r o t e c t i o nr o b e g i v e n c o i n e d .r a t h e r t h a n t o
c o m n r o n p l a cm e a r k s .t h e f o l l o u , i n gp r i n c i p l e sn e c e s s a r i levm e r g e (: l ) t h a tt h e y a l u eo f
t h e m o d e r nt r a d e m a r kl i e s i n i t s s e l l i n gp o r v e r :( 2 ) t h a t t h i s s e l l i n gp o r v e rd e p e n d sf b r
i t s p s y c h o l o g i c ahl o l d u p o n t h e p u b l i c , n o t m e r e l yu p o n t h e m e r i t o f t h e g o o d su p o n
rvhichit is used.but equallyupon its uniqueness and singularitl,;(3) that suchuniqueness
a n d s i n g u l a r i t ; "i s v i t i a t e d o r i m p a i r e db f i t s u s e u p o n e i t h e r r e l a t e do r n o n - r e l a t e d
g o o d s ;a n d ( 4 ) t h a t t h e d e g r e eo f p r o t c c t i o nd e p e n d si n t u r n u p o n t h e e x t e n tt o w h i c h ,
through the efforts or ingenuity'of its orvner, it is actually unique and different from
o t h e rm a r k s . "
26. The informativefunctionof trademark
is identification
of sourceRead supra
note2atll85.
2 7 . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,t h e p c r s u a s i v ef u n c t i o na i m s a t d i v e r t i n gd e m a n dt o w a r d a
p a r t i c u l a ra d v e r t i s e da r t i c l e .I d . a t l l 8 ' 7 .
28. rbid.
29. Id. at 169,1190.
30. Id. at I90.
3 1 .I d . a t l9l.
3 2 .M a r k . Lemle1,.
sltpranote3 at 1708.
 344 JOL'Rl',lLOI: T.f{EL\DIAI, I-.,|il IitsI.|I.L,TIi
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

ensuringthe quarityof the underryingproduct,

but in merchandising the
brand itself and this ougrrtnot tl ue'ttregoar
of rarv.33 The elfect of
merchandising right.overa mark is to givetrademark ,,owners,,
somethi'g
theyhavenevertraditionailyhad_; therigtrttocontrortheuseof the markin
totallyunrelated circurnstances.i4
It rnaybe correctthat the societytodayvarues
trrepersuasive functions
of trade syrnbolsmore than anythingeise.
Consumersare ofien least
botheredaboutthe quarityofthe productand are
foundto be carriedarvay
by the persuasive effectof the tradesymbol.35 Th.t;r;;;.1.*.on."rn.o
aboutthe prestigethat the possession of goodsbearingsuchtrademarks
bringin dueto theiruniqueness. But the facttrratthe peisLrasive functions
of trademarksare more varuedby the customers
does not warrantits
intellectualpropertyprotection.36 It is truethatthoseconsumers, who want
to p.urchase the higherpricedgoodsfor trrereasorof their
uniqueness,
oughtto be ensuredthat they arepayingthe higher
pricefor the genuine
brandedarticle'This.couldbe ensuiedly protecting
consumersagainst
confusionand deceptionand conventional trademarllaw doestrrat.But
trademarklaw doesnot suppoftassigning broadrightsto preventcompetitive
or dilutinguservhenno confusionseemsrikery.t
Thejustificaiionfor the
demandfor such extendedrightsseemsto be
that producers, who have
investedin theirtradesyp$6lsandthusearnedthem,
areentitledto them.
Butif it is not the quaritybut the brandthat matters,
and if thereis no
corfusion,why shourdIp law protectsuch marks?38
what is wrong in
allowi'g othersto enjoytrreprideof possessing an imitationof a branded
good if the purchaseris buying it rvith the fuil
knowredgethat it is an
imitation,just to satisfyhis desireto berongto the
eritecrasswho aloneis
entitled to orvn goods bearingsuch maiks? only
the uniquenessor

33.tbid
34.Id at tiji.
35 For exampre,a box of Kelrogg'scornflakes
with Batman,spicture on it is more
v a l u e d b y c h i l d r e nt h a n o n e r v i t h o u ts u c h p i c t u r e
a e v e n i f i t i s o f t h e s a m eo r e v e n
s u p e r i o rq u a l i t r , /i r r e s p e c t i v eo f t h e q u a l i t l ,o r t a s t e
o f c e r e a l .S a n t ei s t h e c a s ew i t h
a d u l t sa l s o r ' i t h r c s p e c t o o r h 0 rc o n s u m c r i t e m s .
w h e t h e r i t i s c a r so r m e d i c i n ei t i s
t h e b r a n dn a n t et h a t s c l l s t h c p r o d u c t .R e a dJ e s s i c a
'i'he L i t m a n . . . B r e a k f a sr tv i t h B a t m a n :
P u b l i c I n t e r e s ri n t h e A d v e r t i s i n gA g e " r 0 g y a r e
L J 1 7 1 7a t 1 7 2 7 .
36. Id. at t729.
37. Id. at t730
3 8 . I d a t 17 3 0 - 3r . S h e s a y s :" T o t h e e x t e n tt h a t
t h e i m p u r s et o p r o t e c ts o m e t h i n g
b e 1 ' o n da n y p r e ' e n t i o n o f c o n s u m e rc o n f u s i o n
d e r i v e sf r o m t h e p e r c e p t i o nt h a t t h i s
t h i n g h a s v a l u e ' t h a t i t i s s o m e t h i n gp e o p r e
want to buy, then giving its purveyor
i n t e l l e c t u api r o p e r t )p' r o t e c t i o ni s . t h ew l r o n gr e s p o n s e .
I f t h e t h i n g i t s e l f i s v a l u a b l e i,f
i t i s i n s o m e s e n s ei t s c r f a p r o d u c t ,t h e n r v e
w a n t o t h e r p u r v e y o r st o c o m p e t ei n
off'eringit to consumersin their orvn forms and
in their orun terms. competition is.
a f t e r a l l , t h e p r e m i s eo f t h e s y s t e n rw . i t h o u t c o m p c t i t i o n n, o n eo f t h e r e s t
of therules
r n a k e sa n y p r a c t i c a ls c n s c . '
 20081 TIL,IDETI.4RK
DII,I]7ION, INDIAN'APPROAC11 345

prestigious connotation of tlremarksuffers.Is thetrademarklaw boundto

protectit? It may be wrongto diverttradefrom the first userof a trademark
by rnisleading customers rvhonean to dealwith hirn.But whatis wrongin
so divertingcustomersif the decisionof the customers to deal with the
first useris influencedby persuasive advertisement ratherthan informative
advertisements? In otherwords,is therea right on the advertisers to ward
off competitorsusingpersuasive advertisingand then to take resortto
trademarklaw to ward off its imitators?
The ardentsupporters of dilutiontheoryput forwardthe argumentthat
one who hasusedhis intellectual,physical,or financialpowersto createa
commercialproductshouidbe affordedjudicial relief from a competitor
who seeksto "reapwherehe hasnot so*'n".leDavidVaver'sanswerto this
is that this argumentis equallytrue in the caseof the owner of famous
mark as he is alsoreapingu'herehe hasnot sownwhenhe stopsa traderin
a geographicor marketfield remotefrom the owner'sfields frorn using
the sameor a similarmark uncompetitively.aO Accordingto him, granting
rightsas indeterminate as dilutionrightsto the orvnersof famousmarks
placesanotherweaponof harassment in the handsof the powerfulagainst
the weak.The allegedinfringermay opt for changinghis mark ratherthan
defendingit againsta corporategiantwhich is a costlyaffair for him. As
rightly said by JessicaLitman, "(t)o agreeto treat a classof stuff as
intellectual property,we normallyrequirea showingthat,if prctectionis
not extended, badthingswill happenthatwill outrveigh the resultinggood
things.But it would be difficultto arguethatthe persuasive valuesembodied
in tradesyrnbolsare likely to suffer from under protection. Indeed,the
Mattels.Disneys,and WarnerBrothersof the rvorldseemto protecttheir
atmospherics just fine withoutlegalassistance."4l
However,Mark A. Lemleyis of the opinionthatthe doctrineof dilution
i s n o t e n t i r e l yi l l - c o n c e i v e d .Aac2c o r d i n gt o h i m , p r e v e n t i n dg i l u t i o ni n
appropriatecaseswill lessenaggregate consLrmer cotrfttsionand tirus
encourage investment in the qualityof the Lrnderlying product. He is of the
oninionthat moderndilutioncasestakea goodideaand stretchit too far.al

39. Sce for example,Rudolf Callmann,"He Who ReapsWhcre He Has Not Sorvn:
Unjust Enrichment in the Larv of Unfair Competition" 55 Harv L Rev 595 at 612
'srveat the
( 1 9 1 2 ) . A s i m i l a r a r g u m e n tc o u l d b e s e e n i n t h e of b r o w ' d o c t r i n ef o r
' o r i g i n a l i t y 'i n t h e c o p y r i g h tl a w .
determining
40. David Vaver. "Unconventionaland Well-Kno'uvn TradeMarks" 2005 Singapore
Journal of Legal Studies l-19 available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id:95 233 4.
4 1 . S u p r a n o t e 3 5 a t 1 7 2 9 . A l s o r e a dt h e o p e n i n gs e n t e n c eo f R i n g l i n g B r o s . -
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., supra note 21.
42. Lemley, supra note 3 at.1704.
43. Ibid.
 346 JOLRNIL OI.'T'IIE I.\'DIIN LAII' I.\],'7-ITL,TE
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

T h i s v i e r v a p p e a r st o l i m i t a p p l i c a t i o n
o f d i l L r t i o ' t h e o r yt o c a s e so f
consumer confusion.u'hichevidentlyis not the plrrpose of thetheory.

to bre
msin
"' "'';11[iil'l*,,ffiff :1,
lro
theory of dilution

A c c o r d i n gt o J o n a t h a nE . M o s k i n , d i l u t i o ' i s a p h e n o m e n o nt h a t h a s
p r o v e nw h o l l v r e s i s t a ntto a n a l l ' s i s . aTah i s c o n f u s i o ns u n o u n d i n gt h e c o n c e p t
i s t h e r n a i n f o c u s o f c r i t i c i s m s p o s e d a g a i n s ti t . S o m e h o l d t h e v i e w t h a t
t h e k e 1 ' d e f i c i e n c vr v i t h r e s p e c t o t h e d i l u t i o n d o c t r i n ei s c o n c e p t u a rl a t h e r
t h a n d e f i n i t i o n a l . aIi n o t h e r r v o r d s ,i t i s i t s c o r r c e p t u arlv e a k n e sish a t r e n d e r s
a d e f i n i t i o n r a t h e r c h a l l e n g i n g ,i f n o t i m p o s s i b l e .D u e t o i m p r e c i s i o na n d
d i f f i c u l t y i u p r o v i n g t h e e x i s t e n c eo f d i r u t i o nl h a r r n ,i t i s g e n e r a l l yt h o u g h t
t h a t d i l u t i o n d o c t r i n e h a s t o b e a p p l i e d o n l v n ' i t h c a u t i o r - r . aT6h o s e w h o
s u p p o r t t h e c o n c e p t t h e m s e i v e sa r e n o t c l e a r a b o u t t h e e x a c t s c o p e o f i t .
T h e r e a s o n r n a y b e t h a t i n t h e i r u r _ e et o s a f e g u a r dt h e i r i n v e s t m e n t i n
p r o c u r i n g" g o o d w i l l " u s i n g p e r s u a s i v ea d v e r t i s e r n e nt h t ey fail to take note
of the legal constraintson trademark law.
T h e c o n f u s i o n s i n t h i s a r e a a r e m a n y ; i t s t a r t sf r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f
" r v e l l - k n o w n "a n d " f a m o u s " m a r k s .A s i t i s e v i d e n tf r o m t h e d i s c u s s i o n s
on
t h e I n d i a n c a s el a u , t h a t f o l l o r v .t h a t t h e r e i s a l a r g ea m o u l l to f c o n f u s i o na s
t o t h e m e a n i n g o f ' r . v e l l - k n o w n ' a n d , f a m o r - r s 'T. h e c o u r l s i n I n d i a f a i l t o
m a k e a n y d i s t i n c t i o nb e t r v e e n" w e l l - k n o w n " a n d " f a m o u s " m a r k s a n d t h e y
a p p l y t h e s t a n d a r d so f f a m e a p p l i c a b l et o r v e l l - k n o l v nm a r k s o r e v e n l e s s e r
s t a n d a r d st o d i l u t i o n c a s e s .U n d e r t h e U S l a w d i l u t i o n t h e o r y i s a p p l i c a b l e
o n l v i n t h e c a s e o f f a n r o u sm a r k s . 4 7T h e r e i s a v i e w t h a t . , f a r n o u s "m a r k s
a r e a s p e c i a lc a t e g o r yo f l v e l l - k n o r v nm a r k s a n d a r e t r a d i t i o n a l l yc o n s i d e r e d
t o h a v e a h i g h e r d e g r e eo f r e p u t a l i o nt h a n r . v e l l - k n o w nm a r k s . 4 sH e n c e i t i s
b e l i e v e dt h a t t h e y d e s e r v ea b r o a d e rs c o p eo f p r o t e c t i o n a n d t h i s i n c l u d e s
p r o t e c t i o na g a i n s t l i e u s e o f t h e m a r k o n n o n - c o m p e t i n gg o o d s .S u c h b r o a d
p r o t e c t i o np r o v e st o b e a n e x c e p t i o nt o t h e " p r i n c i p l e o f s p e c i a l i t y " ,w h i c h

4 4 . J o n a t h a nE . M o s k i n , " D i l u t i o n o r D e l u s i o n :T h e R a t i o n a lL i m i t s o i ' f r a d e m a r k
P r o t e c t i o n "8 3 T A I R 1 2 2( 1 9 9 3 ) .T h e I r o u r t hC i r c u i t a c l d r e s s er hs e c o n c e p to f d i l u t i o n
a s " d a u n t i n g l ye l u s i v e ' 'i n I l i n g l i n g B r o s . ,s u p r a n o t e 2 1 .
4 5 . s u p r a n o t e l 8 a t 6 7 . A l s o r e a dJ c r o m eG i l s o n ., , A F e d e r a lD i l u t i o n S t a t u t e
: Is
i t l i m c ? "8 3 f l l R l 0 E .
1 6 . H a z e lc a r r r ' ." 1 ) i l u t i o na n d p a s s i n go l f : c a L r s ef b r c o n c c r n " l 1 2 L o R
6 3 2a t
6 55 .
, 1 7 .S . 4 3 ( c ) o f L a n h a mA c t ( 1 5 U . S . C . i l 2 5 ( c ) ) .
5s
48. supra note ll at 19,21. Ilorvcverh , e a d n r i t st h a t a h i g h l y p r e c i s e s, t r i c r
d i f f c r e n t i a t i o nb e t * e e n " f a m o u s " a n d " r v e l l - k n o * , n "m a r k s i s n o t p o s s i b l ea s
these
c o n c e p t sa r e r c l a t i v c .
 20081 TRADEIt.fARK
Dlt,tiTIOIt INDIA^' /lppROACH J+ J

stipulatesthattrademarks canbe protected only in relationto the same,or

sirnilargoodsor servicescoveredby their registration or use.As a result
of the broaderprotectionertendedto famousmarks,the requirements to
becolnea "falnous"mark are stricterthan the requirements for being
inclLrdedin a "rvell-known"markcategory. Theextentof protectiouallowed
in the casesof trademarkdilutionjustifiestherequirement that in orderto
demandprotectionagainsttrademark dilutionthemarkneedsto be ,.famous"
. and notjust "well-knowr.r". Mostertsuggests thatknowledgeof the public
at largeor of non-consumers may be relevantin assessing the commercial
magnetismof a famousmark in contrastto the requirement of a well-
knorvnthat it shouldbe known to the "relevantsectorof the pLrblic',.ae
Horvever,thereappcarsto haveno uniformityin international practices.
D ifferentcountries fo Ilow differentstandards.
There is also confusionas to whetherthe doctrineof dilution is
applicableto competingas well as non-competing goods.For example,J.
Mccarthy is of the view thatthe doctrineis applicable only in the caseof
non-competing goods.5O Accordingto him, a contraryview pavesway for a
dangerousmisuseof the dilution theory.5lHolvever,there are others,
inclLrdingcoufts,rvhothink differently.For example,RalphBrorvnlvonders
as to how therecouldbe unfaircompetitionin the caseof non-competing
goodsas practicallythereis no competition.s2 confusionas to the harm
doneby dilutionand with respectto the necessity of confusionetc.,make
dilutionclaimsmorecomplex.
Harrnor damagedoneto a farnousmarkby dirutionis eitherby blurring
of the distinctivequality'of the mark or by tarnishment. such harm is
al"va1's speculative and exceedirrglydifficurtto prove.s3Moreover.mosr

' 1 9 . I d . a t 2 7 - 2 8 . A i s o r e a d J . ' f h o m a s M c c a r t h r , ." D i l u t i o n

of a Tradcmark:
I i u r o p e a na n d L l n i t e ds r a t e sL a w c o m p a r e d " g 4 T M R I 1 6 3 ( 2 0 0 4 ) .I l c s a l , s :. ' l n m ; ,
v i e \ \ ' ,t o i n v o k e t h e P a r i s c o n v e n t i o n A r t i c l e 6 6 i s i n t h e t j n i t e d s t a t e s ,t h e m a r k
s h o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t l v* ' e l l k n o r v n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e si n t h c r e l e v a n ts e c t o ro f t h c
p t t b l i c s u c ht h a t t h e . i u n i o ru s e r ' su s e i s l i k e l y t o c a u s ec o n f u s i o n T . h i s s h o u l dn o t b e
confused with the degree of lame required to qualify a mark as famous, in order to
i n v o k e t h e s p e c i a ls c o p eo f e x c l u s i v i t yg r a n t e db y t h e a n t i - d i l u t i o nl a r v . T h a r i s a n
e n t i r e l l 'd i f f e r e n tm a t t e r ,r v h i c h r e q u i r e sa c o n s i d e r a b l lh, i g h e r d e g r e eo f r e p u r a t i o n
a n d r c n o u ' n . "( a t I 1 7 5 ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t! s q u i t e i n t u n e r v i t h t h c A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n
r v h e r et h e L a n h a m A c t r e q u i r e st h a t t h e m a r k t o b e l a m o u s . i t s h o u l d h e . ' w i d e l y
r e c o g n i z e db y t h e g e n e r a lc o n s u m i n gp u b l i c o f t h e U . S . a s a d e s i g n a t i o no f s o u r c e o f
t h e g o o d s o r s e r v i c e so f t h e r n a r k ' so r v n e r " .S e es . 4 3 ( c X 2 X A ) o f t h e L a n h a mA c t .
5 0 . J . T h o m a sM c C a r t h y ,i d . a t 1 1 7 7 .
51. lbid.
52. Supra note 2 at 1192.
5 3 . D a v i d J . F r a n k l y n ," D e b u n k i n gD i l u t i o n D o c t r i n e :T o r v a r da C o h e r e n rT h c o r l ,
of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in Anrerican Trademark Larv" 56 Hastinss Lav,
JournalI l7 (2001).
 348 JOt,'RAIAI, OF TIIE I,\IDI,1A'I,ATI' I\IST]T(/T'E [ V o l .5 0 : 3

trademarksare not sufficientlywell-knownthat their use on unrelated

productsfails to createevenan association in the mindsof consumers.5q
The insistence by alrnosteverytrademarkownerof somereputethat his
mark mustbe treatedas famoLrs, is anotherseriousissueto be handledby
thejr-rdiciary
in everyjurisdiction.Thereis a strongfeelingthat this legal
doctrineis bein-eusedto servepurposes, wliichtrademark theorydoesnot
support.5-'

V N a t i o n a la n d i n t e r n a t i o n al la r v

It lvill be interesting to analysetlie Indianlarvin comparison with the

US anti-dilutionlaw and the international larv-TRIpS agreement. If one
takesthe lar.vof the US asa yardstickin definingtheconceptof dilution,it
may haveto be statedthat neitherthe Indianlaw nor the provisionsof the
TRIPSagreement, fit the standards as envisaged in the Americanlarv.For
example,the f,anhamAct, I 946 of the US56requiresthe mark to be ,,a
f a m o i r s m a r k t h a t i s d i s t i n c t i v e , i n h e r e n t l yo r t h r o u g h a c q u i r e d
distinctiveness" to attractan actionfor dilution.For beingfamous,the
markneedsto be widelyrecognized by thegeneral consuming publicof the
US as a desiguationof sourceof the goodsor servicesof the mark,s
o w n e r . 5A7 n d t h e c a u s eo f a c t i o ni s e x p l a i n e ad s d i l u t i o nb y b l u r r i n go r
dilution by tarnishmentof the famousmark.58The US larv also define
"dilutionby blurring"and "dilutionby tarnishrnent"se S. a3(cX2XB)and

54.Supra note2 at I 192.

5 5 . I - c m l e 1 ,s.u p r a n o t c 3 a t 1 7 0 5 .
5 6 . A s a n r e n d e db v t h e l - r a d c m a r kD i l u t i o n I { e v i s i o nA c t o f 2 0 0 6 .
5 7 . S . 4 3 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( A )o f t h e L a n h a mA c t . S . , 1 3( 2 ) A s r a r e sr h a r" a m a r . ki s l a m o u si f
it is wideh' r'ecoonizeb d y t h e g e n e r a lc o n s u m i n gp u b l i c o f t h e u n i t e d S t a l e sa s a
d e s i g n a l i o no f s o u r c e o f t h e g o o d s o r s e r v i c e so f t h e m a r k ' s o u , n e r .I n d c t e r n r i n i n g
rvhethea r m a r k p o s s e s s etsh e r e q u i s i t ed e g r e eo f r e c o g n i t i o n ,t h e c o u r t m a l , c o n s i d e r
all relevantfactors,includingthe follorving:
( i ) ' I h e d u r a t i o n .e x t e n t .a n d g e o g r a p h i cr e a c ho f a d v e r t i s i n ga n d p u b l i c i t l , o f t h c
m a r k .u , h e t h e a r d v e r t i s e do r p u b l i c i z e db y t h e o r v n e ro r t h i r d p a r t i e s .
( i i ) T h e a m o u n t . v o l u m e , a n d g e o g r a p h i ce x t e n t o f s a l e s o f g o o d s o r s e r v i c c s
offered under the mark.
( i i i ) ' I h e e x t e n to f a c t u a lr e c o g n i t i o no f t h e m a r k .
1 i r ) W h c t h e rt h e m a r k * a s r e g i s t c l e u d n d e rt h c A c t o f N l a r c h3 , 1 8 8 1 ,o r t h e A c t
o 1 ' F e b r u a r 2r ,0 . I 9 0 5 . o r o n t h e p r i n c i p a lr e g i s t e r . "
5 8 . S . 4 3 ( c X l ) o 1 't h c L a n h a n rA c r .
5 9 . S . , 1 3 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( B ) a n d ( C ) o f r h e L a n h a m A c r . U n d e r r h c A c t , , , c l i l u t i o nb v
blurrinc" is association a r i s i n gf r o m t h e s i m i l a r i t l , b c t * ' e e n
a m a l k o r t r a d en a m ea n d
a f a l l o u s m a r k t h a t i m p a i r st h c d i s t i n c t i l c n c s so l t h c 1 ' a n t o unst a r k . I n d c t c r m i n i n g
u h e t h c ra m a r k o r t r a d cn a m ei s I i k e l y , t oc a u s ed i l u t i o nb 1 ' b l u r r i n gt.h c c o u r t m a ) '
c o n s i d e ra l l r e l l ' a n t f a c t o r s i, n c l u d i n gt h e l b l i o n . i n g :
 20081 7'RAD E11ARK D IL L,I' I O,\r. l l\rD L,l ltttl p p RO..t C/ I
),+v

( C ) o f t h eL a n h a mA c t . U n d e r t h eA c t . ' . d i l u t i obny b l L r r r i n g . , i s
a sociarion
arisingfrom the similaritvbetrveen a rnarkor tradenam*eand a famous
markthat impairsthe distinctiveness of the famousnrark.In deterrrining
whethera mark or rradenameis likely to causedilution
by brurring,the
courtmay consideralr rerevantfactors,includingthe foilorving:
(i) The degreeof similaritl,betrveen the markor tradenameandthe
famousmark.
(ii) The degreeof inherenror acquireddistinctiveness
of the famous
mark.
Apart frornthe fact that thereis no mentionof dilLrtionin the
Indianor
international laws,neithertlie IndianlarvnortheTRIpSagreement requires
the ma.k to be farnous.Nor do they requirea reputati-orr of thc degree
envisaged in the US law.This is evidentfr.omtheanalysis ol.tlreprovisions
in the India' TrademarkAct, 199960 andthe TRIps agreernent layingdorvn
the requirements for acquiringweil-knownrnarkstatus.Both tiese rcgal
instruments demandonly k'owledge/reputation arnong.tlrerele'art sector
o f t h e p u b l i c ' . ' r l r i si s a v e r y l i m i t e dg r o u pr v h e nc o m p a r e d
to thc ,rvide
recognitionamongthe generarconsumingpubric'rcqriire,ilent
in the US
lar.vandasa resultevenmarks,not evenwell-knorvnin the realsense
of the
word,may becomeeligiblefor beingprotectedfrorndilution if one
acceDts
thatprotection againstdilutionof trademark is envisaged underthesclegal
instruments. This is quitecontraryto the conceptof dilution.
The India' situationis graver,as the requirement of knorvledge among
'relevant
sectorof tlie public' is liberalunderthe Indiandcflnilion..fhe
I n d i a nl a w . i n l i n e w i t h t h e w l p o / p a r i sU n i o nJ o i n tR e c o m r r c ' d a t i o r . ( ' l

( i ) T h e d e g r e eo f s i m i l a r i t yb e t r v e e n t h e m a r k o r r r a o cname and thc fhmous mark.

( i i ) T h e d e g r e eo f i n h e r e n to r a c q u i r c dd i s t i n c t i v e n c s s
o f t h e f a m o u sm a r k .
(iii) l'he cxtcnt to w'hichthc orvnerof the famousmark
i s e n g a g i n gi n s u b s t a n t i a l l y
c x c l u s i v eu s c o f t h c m a r k .
'fhe
(iv) d e g r e eo f r e c o g n i t i o no f t h c f a n t o u sn r a r k .
( v ) w h e t h c r t h e u s e r o f t h e m a r k o r t r a d c n a m ei n t c n d e d
t o c r c a t ea n a s s o c i a t i o n
r v i t h t h e l a m o u sm a r k .
( v i ) A n 1 ' a c t u a la s s o c i a t i o nb e t r v c e nt h e m a r k o r t r a d c
n a r n ea n d t h e f a m o u sm a r k .
A n d " d i l u t i o n b y t a r n i s h m e n t "i s a s s o c i a t i o an r i s i n gl l ' o m t h c s i m i l a r i t l , b c t r v e ean
mark or tradc name and a fanrousrnark that harmsthe reputation
of the larnousmark.
60.]'his Act does not contain any rel'crcnceto .dilution of tradcmark.
per se, butit
i n t r o d u c e st h e c o n c e p to f a " r , r ' e lkl n o w n t r a d e m a r k "d e f i n e d
u n d e rs e c i i o n 2 o f t h c
n e n A c t . S e e S e c t i o n2 ( l ( z i l .
61. wlPo/Paris [Jnion Joint Recommendation concerning provisionson rne
P r o t c c t i o n so f w e l l - K n o u , n M a r k s a d o p t c db y t h e A s s e m b l l ,
of rhe paris Union for
the Protectionof IndustrialPropertl'andthe GencralAsscnrbly
of thc \\rorld Intellccrual
Propcrtl'O|ganization (wlPO) at thc 1'hirt1,-Fourlh Sericsof N;lcetings of the Assemblics
of the N{cmberstatesof \\'rpo Scpt 20 to 29, 1999ayairabre
ar hr.-tp://r'*,r.r,.rr.,ipo.int/
edocs/rndocs/sct/en/sct_3/sct 3 g.pdl'
 350 JOURN.,IL OF 7'l{E I.\tDIilX' L.'1lr I^tS7'17'U7-lt [ V o l .5 0 : 3

stipulates thatn'herea tradernark hasbeendeterniined to be rvell-known in

at leastone sectior.r of the 'relevantsectorof thepublic' in India62by any
courtor registrar,that ntarksliallbe considered aswell-knor.vn. This further
diminishesthe sizeof the group,n'hichhasto determinethe fameof the
mark,and thus furtherweakensthe safeguards to be takenin providingthe
type of exclusivitvensuredb1,dilutiondoctrine.Theretbre,interpreting
theseprovisiolrs to covercasesof dilr.rtion rvill havedisastroLls consequences.
The safervielv is that lvhatis envisaged underthe Trademarks Act, 1999is
only protectionof well-knor.vnnrarksor marks having trans-border
reputation, tlie scopeof r.vhich is verymuchlimitedwhencompared to the
protectionunderthe doctrineof dilution.Suchan irrterpretation will not
havethe elfectof rendering the Indianlarvin non-compliance with'fRIPS
agreement sincethe TRIPSagreement simplyincorporates article6 6ls of
the Pariscorrvention in to it. Protectionunderarticle6 bis is lirnitcdto
caseswhere there is car-rse of confusion.Moreover,article 16.3of the
T R I P Sa l s os p e c i f i c a l lsyt a t e st h a t6 6 i s i s a p p l i c a b lteo d i s s i m i l agr o o d s
andservices only if the useof the tradelrarkto suchgoodswould indicate
a connectionbetr,veen those goods or servicesand the orvnerof the
registered trademark.6r lt also requiresthat the interestsof the ownerof
the registeredtradernarkare likely to be damagcdby such use.These
requirements renderthe causeof actiondifferentfrorndilution.Arrdthis
makesthe sc.ope of protectionextendedunderthe l'RIPS provisionlesser
thanthe proteclionenvisaged underthe doctrineof dilLrtion.
A n o t h e rp r o v i s i o ni n t h e T r a d e m a rA k c t , I 9 9 9 o n t h e s u b j e cut n d e r
consideration is section29. rvhichstates thata registered trademark having
reputation in Indiais infringedin the caseof useof an identicalor similar
mark evenon dissin-rilar goodsby a personrvhousesit in the courseof
trade,if suchuseis r.vithout duecauseand"takesunfairadvantage of'or is
d e t r i m e n t atl o t h e d i s t i n c t i v ec h a r a c t e or r r e p u t eo f t h e r e g i s t e r e d
trademark.6a Unlikethe otherprovisiorrs dealirrgr.vithinfringernent, there
'l-his
i s n o r e q u i r e m e notf c o n f u s i o ni n t h i s s e c t i o n . p r o v i s i o ni s r e a l l y
ccnfusingas it tries to preventuseson dissirrilargoodsor services,of
m a r k sw h i c hh a s" a r e p u t a t i oinn I n d i a " ,i f s u c hu s ei s w i t h o u td u ec a u s e
and"takesunfairadvantage of or is delrirnental to the distinctive character
or reputeof the registered mark".It is a srvecping provision.In spiteof the
factthatthe provisionis no1asslrictasthe FederalDilLrtion Act of the US,

6 2 . \ \ r h r c hc o n s t i t u t ct h c a c t u a io r p o t e n t i a cl o n s L r m e ftsh.c p e r s o n si n v o l v e di n t h c
c h a n n e l os f d i s t r i b L r t i oonf t h e g o o d so r s e r v i c c as n dt h e b u s i n e scsi r c l e sd c a l i n gr r i t h
t h c g o o d so r s e r v i c c st o r v h i c ht h e t l a d e m a r ka p p l r c s .
6 3 . l J n d e rt h c d o c l r i n c o f d i l L r t i o n i t i s t h e a s s o c i a t i o n
b c t u ' c e nt h e m a r k a n d t h e
o r l ' n e ro f t r a d c r r r a rtkh a t b c c o r n e si n r p o r t a nat n d t h e c o n n c c t i o nb e t t i , c c nt h e t r a d c r n a r k
o * ' n e r a n d t h c g o o d so r s e r v i c e si s i r l c l c v a n t .
6.1S . .29(,1)
 20081 7'RADElt'l.4RK
DILLTTION:IATDIANAppt?O.4CH
351
rI appearsto confer the owner of "reputed
trademarkin India" rights
equivalentto protectionagainstdilution
of distinctivecharacterof the
mark' Unrikethe uS larv,it doesnot require
the marksto be ,.famous,,.The
extentof reputation-required to craimprotectionunderthis
not clearlydefined.Moreover,theprovision frovision is
intendsto pr.u.nilJting ,,unfair
advantage" of the distinctivecharacteror reputeof the mark.It is submitted
tliat to preventtaking unfair advantage
of the reputeof a trademarkhas
neverbeenthe purposeoftrademarkliw
evenunderthe extendeddoctrine
. of dilution.
If the purposeof this provisionis to protect
the weil-knownmarks,as
requiredunder the internationar instruments, it has to undergourgent
amendments. As arreadystated,thereis no needto avoid
the requirement
as to corfusion.6s And the reputationrequirement shourdbe madestrict.
Even in the caseof protectionof weli-known
marks the standardof
reputationof the mark shourdbe higher
thanthat requiredin-ih".ur" of
ordinarytrademarks. Anotherirnportant amendment requiredin thisprovision
is.withrespectto equatingunfaiiadvantage
with infringement. Takingunfair
advantageof the repute or distinctiv"lhuru.t",
of the mark has to be
excludedfrom the purviewof infringement.
Section29 (sxb) & (c) are arsoprovisions
which requireimmediate
amendment. Theseprovisionsstatethata..registered trademark,, is infringed
advertisingof that registered trademark ..if
9t lnt such advertisingis
detrimentarto its distinctivecharacter;66 or is againsttt," r.priuiion of the
tradernark."6T In effect,trreseprovisionspreventcomparative
advertising
a1! useof arl registered
trademarks. when compared
lair rviththeUS rarv,
which clearly excludesany fair use including
use in connectionwith
advertisingor promotionthat permitsconsumers
to comparcgoodsor
services;or identifyingand parodying,criticizing,
or comm"niinguponthe
famousmark owneror the goodso. seruices
of the farnousmark-owner; alr
formsof newsreportingand any non-commerciar
useof the mark,frornthe
purviewof dilution by tarnishmenr or blurring,6s thi, ;;;;;;;n ,onf..,
absolutepropertyright on trre owner of
every trademark- r.loteven a

65' SinceArt.6 bis,rvhichnorvbecamcpart

of 1-RIpSprotccts,u.il-knoii-iili
o n l yi n c a s e o sf confusion.
6 6 .S . 2 e ( 8 ) ( b )
6 7 ' s . 2 9 ( 8 x c ) . i t i s i n t e r e s t i nt go n o r et h a t
t h eL a n h a mA c t c x c r u d clsa i r u s eb y
w a y o f c o m p a r a t i vaed v c r r i s c m e npia. r o d y i n g .
c r i t i c i s i n go r . o ; ; . " t ; ; g u p o nr h c
famousmarkorvneror thegoodsor serviccs
of tha ru*ou, markowner.alr for.msof
nervsrcporting.news conrn'lentary and any non-commcrcial
d i l u r i o nb y b l u r r i n go r d i r u r i o nb i ' i a r n i s h m e n t . use of a nrark ',orn
S e es . 4 3 ( 3 ) o f t h c r , a n h a m Act.
6 8 . S . 4 3 ( c ) ( 3 )o f t h e L a n h a nAr o r e a d s(:3 )
Exclusions
1'hefbllorving shailnotbeactionable asdllutlonby blurringor clilution
u n d e trh i ss u b s e c l i o n : b,,tarnishment
 352 JO(]RNAI, OF THE IAIDIAAILA'II INSTITUTE [ V o l .5 0 : 3

reputedmark.This rvill leadto absurdresultsand it is apprehended that

section29 (8Xb) & (c) mightbe usedto curbfreedomof expression in the
future.lf this prdvisionis meantto limit infringementproceedings in cases
of comparative advertisementsto actswhicharecontraryto honestpractices
in industrialand commercialmatters,thus allowing all other casesof
comparative advertisements. The clauses(b) and(c) will haveto be removed
from sub-section 8 of section29.
The rviderangeof the us casesin whicirdefendant'suseof similaror
identicalmarksof plaintiff s markssuccessfully raisedthe defenceof parody
revealstlre strengthof sucha defenceand the limitationit hasplacedon
dilutionclaims.It alsorevealsthe predicament in whichIndianjudiciaryis
placed,as a resultof the presentlaw, in similarsituations.
I^ CharlesSmithv.Ilal-tr4artSlores,Inc.6e,CharlesSmith,an avid
and vocal critic of wal-Mart, believingthat wal-Mart has a destructive
effecton communities,treatsworkersbadly,andhasa damaginginfluence
on the US as a whole,createdvariousdesignsandslogansthat incorporated
the word "walocaust,"a word Smithcoined,by combiningthe first three
Iettersof wal-Mart's namewith the lastsix lettersof the word "holocaust."
He alsoarrangedfor someof his designsto be printedon t-shirtsand other
itemslike mugs,nnderwear,teddybears,bumperstickersand bibs that
couldbe purchased tlrroughwww.CafePress.com.
Wal-Mart wrote to Srlith and to CafePress, assertingthat Smith's
WalocaustCafePress u'ebpagetvasviolatingWal-Mart'strademarkrights,
anddernanding thattheyceasesellingall products irnprintedwith hisvarious
anti-wal-Martdesigns.wal-Mart alsoobjectedto Srnith'sregistralionand
useof the domainnarle ww\v.r.valocaust.com, demandingSmithto stop
usingthe domainname and to transferownershipof it to Wal-Mart.In
response, cafePressremovedall of Smith'swal-Mar.t-related merchandise
from his online store so that only non-wal-Mart-related merchandise
remainedavailableat wrvr.v.cafepress.com/walocaust and then soushtfor a

( A ) A n y f a i r u s e .i n c l u d i n ga n o m i n a t i v eo r d e s c r i p t i v ef a i r u s e ,o r f a c i l i t a t i o no l
s u c h f a i r u s e , o f a f a m o u s m a r k b y a n o t h e rp e r s o no t h e r t h a n a s a d e s i g n a t i o no f
s o u r c cf o r t h c p e r s o n ' so r v n g o o d so r s e r v i c e si,n c l u d i n gu s e i n c o n n e c t i o nr v i t h -
,t, uOu.rrtsing o r p r o m o t i o nt h a t p e r m i t sc o n s u m e r tso c o m p a r eg o o d so r s e r v i c e s l
o,.
( i i ) i d e n t i f y i n ga n d p a r o d fi n g , c r i t i c i z i n g ,o r c o m m e n t i n gu p o n t h e f a m o u sm a r k
o w n e r o r t h e g o o d s o r s e r v i c e so f t h e f a m o u sm a r k o r . v n e r .
(ll) All forms of.neu'sreporting and nervscommentary.
( C ) A n 1 ' n o n c o m m c r c i aul s c o l a m a r k .
6 9 . D c c i d c d o n 2 0 . 0 3 . 2 0 0 8a n d a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p ' l l u , w ' u . c i t i z e n . o r g / d o c u m e n t s /
walrnartDecision.pdf.Read Peoplefor tlie Ethical rreatntent of Animars ("pETA")
v . l t l i c h a e l T ' . D o u g h n e y2 6 3 F . 3 d 3 5 9 ( 4 r h c i r . 2 0 0 1 ) f o r t h e i n r e r p r c t a r i o na s r o
w h a t c o n s t i t u t c sa p a r o d y ' i n t h c t r a d e m a r k c o n t e x t . A l s o r e a d H o r m e l F o o d s
Corporation t'. Jint Ilenson Productions, Inc. 73 F .3d 49j.
 20081 TRADEI'IARK D I LUI' ION: INDIAN APPROACI I 353

declaratory judgmentof his rightto sellhis Walocaust merchandise. After

filing his declaratoryjudgmentcomplaint,Smithalsoregistered the dornain
nameswww.wal-qaeda. cornandwrvlr,.walqaed a.com.
Wal-Martcontended that Srnithwasa merchantrvhornisappropriated
its trademarks andbusirress reputationin pursuitof illegalprofit andSrnith's
Walocaustand Wal-Qaedaconcepts.by associating Wal-Mart with tlre
perpetrators of suchatrocitiesasthe Holocaustandthe attacksof September
I 1,200l, unquestionably tarnished the Wal-Martmarks.Smith'contention
was that Wal-Martis attemptingto misusetrademarklau,sto censorhis
criticisrnof the company.Accordingto Smith,at stakein this caseis a
person'srightto publiclycriticizethervorld'slargestretailer,,or anyothcr
business.
Courtrefusedto recogr-rize dilutionby tarnishrnent on the groundthat
tarnishment causedmerelyby an editorialor artisticparodywhichsatifizcs
the complainant's productor its imageis not actionableunderau anti-
dilr-rtionstatutebecauseof the free speechproteqtionsof the first
amendment.T0 A claimof dilutionappliesonly to pLrrely commercial specchTl
andas Smithprimarilyintended to express himselfr.vithhis Walocaust and
Wal-Qaeda conceptsand sincecommercial success rvasonly a secondary
motiveof Smith'sparodicrvor'k,it shouldbe treatedas non-cornmercial
speechand,therefore,not subjectto Wal-Mart'strademarkdilLrtionclairns,
despitethe fact that Smithsold the designsto the public on t-shirtsand
othernovelty-merchand i se.
Sucha strongdecisior-r would be an impossibilit,v underthe present
IndianTrademarks Act, 1999.Similarlyin Louis VuittonA,Ialletier S.1.,v.
HauteDiggiryDog. I.LC.72HauteDiggityDog. LI-C, a Nevadacorporation
that manufactures and sellspet productsnationally,ar-rd which,it claims,
parodyfamoustrademarks on luxury products,includingtl-rose of [.oLris
VuittonMalletierwasheldnot to dilutethefamousLOUISVUI'|]-ON marks
for luxury luggage,handbags,and accessories. Haute Diggity Dog
manufactures. amongotherthings,plushtoys on which dogscan clrewand
their Dog's "ChewyVuiton" dog toys looselyresemblerniniaturehandbags
andundisputedly evokeLVM handbags of similarshape,design,andcolor.
In lieu of the LOUIS VUITTON mark,the dogtoy uses"ChewyVuiton"; in
lieLrof the LV rnark,it uses"CV"; and the other symbolsand colors
employedarc imitations,but not exactones,of thoseusedin the LVM
multicolorandcherrydesigns.

70. Courtherereliedon thedecisioninllottel, Inc. v.Il/alkinsJlountainProds.,

3 5 3I r . 3 d7 9 2 . 8 t 2( 9 t hC i r . 2 0 0 3 ) .
I t. IDtd.
7 2 . 5 0 7 F . 3 d 2 5 2 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) . f h c i n i p o r t a n co
e f t h i s c a s ei s t h a t t h i s i s t h e f i r s t
c a s ed c c i d e db 1 ,t h e U . S . A p p e l l a t cC o u r t u n d e l T D R A , 2 0 0 6 . I
 354 JOL'RNALOF TIlE ]AID]ANLAW'I.\'STI7'U7'E [ V o l .5 0 : 3

l-he courtaccepted the argumentof the defcndant

thatthe mark adopted
by the defendantis only a parody,relyingon the decisionin Peoplefor the
Ethical Treatmentof Animals(PETA)v. Doughney.T3 Applying the pETA
criteriato the factsof this case.the court held that the "Chewy Vuitou"
dog toys aresuccessful parodiesof LVM handbags andthe LVM marksand
trade dress used in connectionwith the marketingand sale of those
handbags.Ta
In spiteof the fact that parodyis not automatically
a completedefense
to a claim of dilutionby bluning wherethe defendantusesthe parodyas its
own designation of source,i.e., as a trademark,underthe TDRA,T5the
courtrejectedthe claim of "dilutionby blurring".It felt that The TDRA,
however,doesnot requirea courtto ignorethe existence of a parodythat
is usedas a trademark. and it doesnot precludea courtfrom considering
parody as part of the circurnstances to be consideredfor determining
whetherthe plaintifflrasmadeout a claimfor dilutionby blurring.Indeed,
the statutepermitsa courtto consider"all relevantfactors,"includingthe

7 3 . 2 6 3 F - . 3 d3 5 9 , 3 6 6 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) . T h i s c a s ed e f i n e d ' p a r o d y ' f o r t r a d c m a r k
p u r p o s et h u s : " a ' p a r o d 1 , ' i s d c f i n e da s a s i m p l e f o r m o f e n t e r t a i n m e ncto n v c l , c db y
.iuxtaposingthe irrevercnt rcprescntationof the trademarkrvith the idealized irnage
c r c a t e db y t h c m a l k ' s o w n e r . " . . . . " A p a r o d y m u s t c o n v e yt r v o s i n r u l t a n e o u-s a n d
contradictory- mcssages:that it is thc original. but also that it is not the original and
is instead a parody. l'his second messagemust not only differentiate the alleged
p a r o d y f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l b u t m u s t a l s o c o m m u n i c a t es o m e a r t i c u l a b l ee l e n r c n to f
s a t i r e .r i d i c u l e ,j o k i n g , o r a m u s c m e n tT. h u s , " a p a r o d yr c l i e su p o n a d i t T e r - e n cl ico m
t h e o r i g i n a l m a r k , p r e s u m a b l ya h u r n o r o u sd i f f e r e n c ei.n o r d e rt o p r o d u c ei t s d c s i r e d
effect." See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg lltyld, Ltd.,828 F.2d 1482, 1486
( l O t hC i r . 1 9 8 7 )
74. The court appliedthe "PETA" factorsthus: "First. the pet chew toy is obviously
an irrevcrent.and indeed intentional,rcpresentationofan LVM handbag,albeit much
smaller and coarscr.1'he dog toy is shapedroughly like a handbag;its name "Chovy
V u i t o n " s o u n d sl i k e a n d r h y r n c sr v i t h I , O U I S V U I ' | ' I ' O N ; i t s m o n o g r a mC V m i m i c s
I - V M ' s L V m a r k ; t h e r e p c t i t i o u sd e s i g n c l e a r l y i m i t a t e st h e d c s i g n o n t h c L V M
handbag:and the coloring is similar. In short, the dog toy is a small.plush imitation of
an LVM handbag carried by u'omcn. r,r,hichinvokes thc marks and dcsign of the
handbaga , l b ei t i r r c v e r e n t l ya n d i n c o m p l e t e l yN . o o n e c a n d o u b tt h a t l , V M h a n d b a g s
a r e t h c t a r g e to f t h e i m i t a t i o nb y , H a u t eD i g g i l y D o g ' s " C h o v y V u i t o n " d o g r o y s . ' '
7 5 . S . 4 3 ( c ) ( 3 ) ( A ) s t a t c s :T h e f o l l o w i n g s h a l l n o t b e a c r i o n a b l ea s d i l u t i o n b y
b l u r r i n go r d i l u t i o nb y l a r n i s h m e nut n d c rt h i s s u b s e c t i o n :
( A ) l n l t f a i r u s e , i n c l u d i n ga n o m i n a t i v co r d e s c r i p t i v ef a i r u s e ,o r f a c i l i t a t i o no f
such fair use. o1'a famous mark by another percon other thon as a designation of
sourcefor the person's ou,n goods or services,including usc in connection with-
(i) advertisingor promotion that permits consumersto comparegoods or serviccs,
o,
( i i ) i d e n t i f l , i n ga n d p a r o d y i n g .c r i t i c i z i n g .o r c o m r n e n t i n gu p o n t h c f a m o u sm a r k
o w n c r o r t h e g o o d s o r s c r v i c e so f t h c l - a m o u sm a r k o r v n c r( e m p h a s i s u p p l i e d ) .
 20081 7'H4DEMIRKDILUTION: INDIAi,i APPROACH 355

six factorssuppliedin $ 1125(cX2XB).In other words. even rvhena

defendant's useofa parodyasa markdoesnot supporta "fair use"defense,
it maybe considered in deterrnining whetherthe plaintiff-owner of a famous
mark has provedits claim that the defendant'suseof a parodymark is
likely to impairthe distinctiveness of tlie famousmark.
Even admittingthat the establishment of the factsin the casesatisfies
essentialelementsof LVM's dilutionclaim,the court felt that the facts
imposeon LVM an increased burdento demonstrate thatthe distinctiveness
of its famousmarksis likely to be impairedby a successful parody.Even
as HauteDiggity Dog's parodymimicsthe farnousmark,it cornmunicates
simultaneously that it is not the famousmark,but is only satirizingit. And
because the famousmarkis particularly stronganddistinctive, it becomes
morelikely that a parodywill not irnpairthe distinctiveness of the mark.
The courtconcludedthat as HauteDiggityDog's "ChervyVuiton" lnarks
area successful parody,_1hey will not blur the distinctivenessof the famous
markas a uniqucidentifierof its source.76
All thesecasesclearlyrevealsthe scopeof fair useprotectionunder
trademark law, its necessity andthe extentto rvhichit is recognized under
the US trademarklaw.77l{aving in view the natureof protectionto be
extended to "farnous"marksunderthe doctrineof dilutionandthe reluctance
shownby thejudiciaryirr acceptingit evenin countrieslike the US, it is
felt thatthe interpretation thatthe Indianlaw doesnot recognize the doctrine
is moreapt.Sincethcreis no clearinclusionof the doctrinein the Indian
'l'rademarks
Act, 1999it couldvery well be reasoned that sucha doctrine
whichconferscxtensivepowersto the strongmarksrequit'es specialmention
in the larvof a countryfor it to recognizeit. Moreover,as alreadynoted,
Indiais not underany international obligationto extendprotectionagainst
trademarkdilution.Henceit could very well be concludedthat it is not
necessary for us to give such an expandedprotectionto the so-called
"famousmarks".

7 6 . T h e c o u r t , h o r v e v e r s. t r u c k a n o t e o f c a u t i o ns t a t i n gt h a t i f t h e p a r o d y i s s o
s i m i l a r t o t h e f a m o u s m a r k t h a t i t c o u l d b e c o n c l u d e da s a c t u a l u s c o f t h e f a m o u s
mark itscll. this finding rnight not hold good. It added:"Bu1 in this case.tlaLrteDiggity
D o g m i m i c k e d t h e f a m o u sm a r k s ;i t d i d n o t c o m c s o c l o s et o t h s m a s t o d c s t r o yt h e
s u c c e s so f i t s p a r o d ya n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y t, o d i r n i n i s ht h e l - V M m a r k s ' c a p a c i t l ' t o
i d e n t i f y a s i n g l e s o u r c e .H a u t e D i g g i t y D o g d e s i g n e da p e t c h c w t o y t o i m i t a t ea n d
s u g g c s t .b u t n o t u s e , t h c m a r k s o f a h i g h - f a s h i o nL O L J I S V U I T ' I O N h a n d b a g . "
H o r v e v e r t, h i s s t a t e m e nits r a t h c rc o n f i r s i n ga t i t a p p e a l st o b r i n g b a c k i n d i l e c t l y .t h c
r e q u i r e m e not f c o n f u s i o ni n t o t h e c o n c e p to f d i l u t i o n .
77. Also see Horntel Foods Corporation v. Jint llenson Productions, Inc. 73
F . 3 d 4 9 7 . I n t h i s c a s eI l e n s o n ' sp a r o d ym a r k " S p a ' a m ' 'f o r w i l d b o a r i n h i s l l l m r v a s
h e l d n o t t a r n i s h i n gH o r m e l ' s S P A M m a r k u s e df o r l u n c h e o nm e a t .
 356 JOL'I?,YAL
OF THE ]NDIIA' LAH/ INSTITL/TE
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

V I I n d i a n c a s el a r y_ A c r i t i c a la p p r a i s a l

In viervof theaboveanarysis of thedoctrineof dirution,it is interesting

to havea criticarovervie*'of the Indian
caselarvon the subject,for the
purposcof examininghow carefur
the Ind_ian jLrdiciaryi, in lpprou.r,ing
this new conceplagainstthe backdrop
of Indianeconomicand industriar
Ir aRRears that trrejudiciary is oflen too uncorcer'ed
i"":*l:"j'_
lnsensrtlveto undertakefurther deriberations a.d
as to the need for or
desirabilityof suchexpansionin trre
Indiancontextor as to rrowfar the
societyis benefited o..affectedby suchexpansion.This situation
to be-iuxtaposed lr:r has
rviththe situationin the US, wherethe
conceptrrasgai'ed
its prese'tshapeand whereantidirution
raw is existingfor morethanharf
a centlrry'As arreadyseen,the judiciary
is very .u,itiou, in the US in
identif-l'irgcasesof trademarkdlrution
and fixing responsibirity.T8 It is
intcresting io notethat thougha numberof states
in tlre US enactcdanti_
dilutioniarvsstartingin r91i, untirthe
enactmenr of trreFederarr-radenrark
DilutionA- in r996 dirutionwasnot
a hotrydebatedirru" uy tt* barand
the.judiciaryin the uS.7eEvenaftertrre
enactment of trreFcdcrarrrademark
Dilution Act, 1996,the courtsinsisted
for actualdirution8'andthis paved
way for the Tradernark DirutionRevisionAct,2006.rJowever,
areapprehensions still trrere
aboutthej,diciary's reaction1othe revised
precisereasonfor thisapprehension larv.sr The
ls saidto be the distasteof thejLrdges
"forrights that appearunconnected to the protectionof consumers,,.s2
For correctappreciation of Indiancaseraw it is wortrryro nu""
. l a look
at the attitudeof the Americanjudiciary
underIrrDA a'd trrencw TDI{A.
l'he courtsappearto be weil awareof
itreirresponsibiriry to be carefurin
not broadeningthe statutoryprovisions
so as ,,to prohibit all usesof a
distinctivernarkthattrreowneiprefcrs
not be made',evenwhireuprrordirg
dilution.s3.They interpreted eachand everyrequirernent under. the sratute
verl'strictl.v.For example,in star ttarkits,
LTD., v. I,exaco,Inc.B,rthc

78. Read Clarisa Long, .,Dilution,

106CcttL ilev 1029(2006).
79. Supra note 49 at 1166.
80 Read Ringling IJros.-R.arnum
& Baitey Combinecr shov.s, Inc.. supra
2l; itfoseley v. I/ Secret Caralogue, norc
tnc., s3i'rJ. S.4lg (2003) etc.
8l Read Graeme B. Din"t,oodie&
A4arko. Lorir.,,oitr,ioniristilr) LJncerrain
I r u t u r e " 1 0 5 , i c h 1 . 1 ? e vF i r s t
Imprcssions 98 (2006) nroit),iir"'ot
rvivrv.michiganlau're ttttp:/i
vierv.org/firstinrpressions/vorr 05/dinrvoodie.pdr. .f
that " t h c r c hc authors fccr
a r e g o o d r e a s o n st o b e r i e ' e t h a t
the I'DRA has not put to resr
c o n c er n s t h a t g c n e r a t e d the
. j u d i c i a lr c s i s t a n c e
u n d e rp r e _ . l . D R Al a u , , . .
82. Ibid.
83. Deere & Co. v. llT.D products,
Inc. 4l F.3d 39 (lgg4).
8 4 9 5 0 F . S u p p .r 0 3 0 . I n t h i s c a s ; t h e
p l a i n t i f r h a so p e r a t e da s u n e r m a r k e r
i n I l a * ' a i i u n d c r t h e n a m e" s t a r busircss
M a r k e t s "s i n c c r 9 4 6 . D e f c n c r a n t s
s t a t r o n st h r o u g h o u t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s . o p e f a t eg a s o r i n c
A d i l u t i o nc r a i mb 1 , t h cp r a i n t i r f* . a s
rcyecteh d'
 20081 7'M D ETI,1RK DI I,UI' ION. I,YDI.'1A' A PPROACI I 357

courtheldthat a mark mustbe especially famousanddistinctiveto merit

protectionunderthe Act because a violationof the Act triggersextensive
relief- preventingall othersfrom usingthe mark.So the courtheldthat
the degreeof distinctiveness requiredunderthe Act is higherthanthat is
neededto be provedin inliingementcases.85 ln deterrnining the fameof
the mark,the court rnadedetailedenquiryas to eachof the eightfactors
thatareto be considered by the courtasstipulated by the Act andconcluded
thatt"heplaintiff'smarkis not famousasrequiredunderthe Act.
Similarly,thetrvomajortypesof dilution,blurrirrgarrdtarnishment are
also strictlyinterpretedby the US courts.Blurring,as has alreadybeen
dealt.typicallyinvolves"tl-rervhittlingawayof an established trademark's
sclling power thror-rgh its unauthorized use by othersupon dissimilar
products."86 "Tarnishmerrt"generally ariseswhenthe plaintiff'strademark
is linkedto productsof shoddyqualit;r.or is portrayed iu an unwholesorne
or unsavorycontextlikely to evokeunflattering thoughtsaboutthe orvner's
product.8T In suchsituations,the trademark's reputationand commercial
valuemight be dinrinishedbecausethe public rvill associate the lack of
quality'or lack of prestigein the defendant's ,qoods rvith the plaintiff s
unrelatedgoods.or because tl-redefendant's usereducesthe tradernark's
reputationand standingin the eyesof consumers as a u,holesome identifier
of the owner'sproductsor services.8s
ln lr[eqdDatacentralv. To1,61q8e SweetJ, in his conc,rrringopinion,
has layeddorvna six factortest to determinedilution by blurring.e0 ln
RinglingBros.-Barnum& Bailey CombinedShows,Inc., v. Utah Division
of travel Developmenlel the court felt that the Mead-factoranalysisis not
appropriate a claimunderthe federalAct and,ofthe factors,
for assessing
only marksimilarityand,possibly,degreeof "renowrr"of the seniormark

tlre courl as it felt that the plaintifl's mark *'as not sufficicntly "famous". Reasonslbr
the court in reachingthis conclusionrverc:lack ofhigh level distinctivencss, insufficiency
o f t h e g e o g r a p h i ca r e at o r v h i c ht h e f a m eo f t h e m a r k r v a ss p r e a d t, h e e x t e n to f u s e o f
s a m co r s i m i l a r r n a r k sb y t h i r d p a r t l ' a n d l a c k o f f e d e r a lr e g i s t r a t i o no f t h c m a r k .
85. In /.P. l.und Trading ApS and Kroin Inc., v. Kohler Co. and llobern, [nc.,
1 6 3 F . 3 d 2 7 , 4 9 t J. S . P . Q . 2 d1 2 2 5( l s t C i r . 1 9 9 8 )a l s ot h e c o u r t r n a d ei t c l e a rt h a t a
p a r t y s e e k i n gt o e s t a b l i s ht h e l a r n eo f a t r a d e d r e s su n d c r t h c d i l u t i o n A c t b c a r sa
" s i g n i f i c a n t l lg r c a t e r "b u r d e nt h a n t h a t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g
d i s t i n c t i v e n e sf o
sr inlringcment
p ur p os cs .
86. trlead Datacentral v. Toy-ota875 F.2d 1026
8 7 . S u p r a n o t e 8 3 . S e c f o r e x a m p l e ,C o c a - C o l aC o . v . G e m i n i l l i s i n g ,I n c . , 3 4 6
F . S L r p p .l l 8 3 ( E . D . N . Y . 1 9 7 2 ) .I n t h i s c a s c .t h c d c l e n d a n tc r e a t e da p o s t c r" E n j o 1 '
C o c a i n e "i n t h e s a m ef o r r n a to f t h e p l a i n t i f f s t r a d e m a r l"t l i n . i o l C o c a - C o l a " .
88. Supra notc 83.
8 9 . S u p r an o t c 8 6 a t l 0 3 l
9 0 . T h e s i x l a c t o l s a r e : s i n r i l a r i t l ,o f n r a r k s .s i n r i l a r i t yo t ' p r o d u c t s .c o n s u m c r
s o p h i s t i c a t i o np.r e d a t o r fi n t e n t .a n d r e n o l n o f t h e s e n i o ra n d . j u n i om r arks.
9 1 .S u p r an o t e2 1 .
 358 JOLIRAIAILOf THE I\IDIAN LAW INSTIT{JTE
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

would appearto havetrustworlhyrelevance underthe federalAct. It rejected

the argumentof Ringlingthat ,.dilution,,by ,,blurrir.rg,,
occurswhenevera
junior markis eitheridenticalto or sufficiently
sjmilarto thefamousmark
that personsviewingthe two i'stinctivelywill make ,,mental
a association,,
betweenthe two. The court fert that r,,ih un interpretation
of the concept
would havethe effectof creatingpropertyrights gross
'category in in the narrow
of marksprotectedby diruiiondoctrine,makingthern
- withouttheirtime-rimirs comparable
- to thoseprotected by patentandcopyright
law.e2The courtfert that it coLrldnot acceptas a generar
propositionthat
congresscould haveintendedto createpropertyrights
unrimitedin time
(vla injunction),withoutmakingits intentionto
do sL perfectry crear,even
in "famous"trademarks.
lnstead,the courtinterpreted theAct asrequiringfor proofof ,.dirution,,:
(i) a sufficientsimilaritybetweentheju'ior and
seniormarksto evokean
"instinctivementarassociation"of the two by a rerevant
universeof
consLlmers which (ii) is the effectivecauseof (iii) an actuarressening
of
the seniormark'sseilingpower,expressed as ,,its capacity to iderrtifyand
distinguish goodsor services.,,
The court went on addingthat it is not necessary that in an casesof
junior uses,a seniormark'seconomicvaluegets
affected.on the contrary,
thereare chancesthat thereis absorutely no impacton the seniormark
because of lack of exp',5s1s, generarconsumerdisinterest in both marks,
products,or for other reasons.In certaincasesa junior
rrsemight even
enhance a seniormark's"magnetism" as imitationis the ,,sincerest form of
flattery"evenin the contextof marketplaces.
The courtconcluded the "u,hittringaway',of the selring
.trrat powerof
thesenioruser'smarkis thc ultimateconcer'of dilutionla*, anithercfore,
lossof thatpower,a.d theeconomicvalueit represents,
wasthe endharm
at which the anti-dilutionstatutes wereaimed.It suggested threegeneral
m e a n sr o a s s e stsh e" w h i t t l i n ga w a y "o f t h e . . s e l l i npgo * . r . . o f
t h es e n i o r
mark derivingfrom its distinctiveness that it forrneriyhad:
Most obviously,but rnostrarely,theremight be proof of
an actual
lossof revenues, and proofof repricating Lrse ascauseby disproving
o t h e r p o s s i b l ec a u s e s M
. o s t o b v i o u s l yr e r e v a n ta, n d r e a d i r y
available,is the skirfuilyconstructed consumersurveydesigned
not just to demonstrate'rnentarassociation"of the
mark-sin
isolatio',bLrtfurtherconsLrrner impressions from wrrichactuarharm
and cause'ight rationallybe inferred.Finally,relevant
co*textual
factorssuch as the extentof the junior rnark,sexposure,
the

9 2 . T h e court '''hilc doing so rvasagreeingrvith Ir.obert

N. Krieger. Read I{obert
N . K l i e g e r ." l ' r a d e m a r k D i l u t i o n : T h e w h i t t r i n g A r v a y
o f t h e R a r i o n a rB a s i s f o r
I'radcmarkProtection"58 Lt pitt L Rev7g9. SOZ
ttsgl\.
20081 APPROICH
DILUTION IAIDIAAI
TRADL,]\,1,,1!?K 359

sirnilarityof the marks,the firmnessof the seniormark'shold,are

of obviousrelevance as indirectevidencethatmightcomplement
otherproof.
Even in Y SecretCatalogue,Inc v. L'ictot'Ir[oseleye3 the districtcourt
reigcrated the SupremeCourt's vieu'e4tl-ratblurring is not a tlecessary
conseqllence of a mentalassociation in the nlindof the consutner between
an accusedmark and a famous mark. What is needed is the proof of any
lessening of the capacitvof the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark to identify and
distinguish goodsor servicessoldin Victoria'sSecret stores or advertised
in its catalogues. The districtcortrtagreedwith the vieu' of the Sttpreme
Courtthat V Secret'sexpertdid not address tl-reimpactof the Moseleys'
useof theirmarkon the strength of the VICTORIA'SSIICRETmark.'fhus
1hecourt foundthat therewas actualassociation betrveert the marks,bttt tto
e v i d e n c eo f a c t u a ld i l u l i o no f t h e f a m o u sm a r k .W h i l e c o n s i d e r i ntgh e
matterafreshaftera "thoroughanalysisof the facts, in the applicationof
the nervstatute"underthenew statute'se5 "likelihoodof dilutionstandard",
the court concludedthat there has beenno shorvingof a likelihoodof
dilutionby blurring.
In reachingthis conclusionthe courtconsidered tlle soleevidenceof
tlic experience of the offendedarmycolonelin this case rnilitatedagainsta
findingthatthe distinctiveness of the VICTORIA'SSECRETmark rvould
l i k e l yb e i m p a i r e db y t h c u s eo f t h e " V i c t o r ' sS e c r e t o" r " V i c t o r ' sL i t t l e
Secret"rnarks.The evidencein the caseestablished that a consutner, the
armycolonel,readilyassociated the Moseleys' mark with the VICTORIA'S
sECRETmark,but did rrotlirrkthe storeto the Victoria'ssecretbrand.It
neverappeared in his mind thatthe Moseleys'offeringsof intimatelingerie,
sextoys,andadultvideoswereV Secretmerchandise. Thoughthe choice
of name and presentation by the Moseleys, being jLrst slightlydifferent
from the VICTORIA'S SECRIII'mark, conjUred an association with the
famousmark,it fcll shortof blLrrring its distinctiveness in this instance.e6
W h i l ea c c e p t i n tgh e p o s s i b i l i t tyl i a ta b l u r r i n go f t h a td i s t i n c t i v e n e s s
c o u l d o c c u r i n t h e r n i n d so f s o m ec o n s u t n e r st h. e c o u r t h e l d t h a t i n
corrsidering the likelihoodof blurringit mustaddress the evidencebefore

9 3 . 2 0 0 8 w I . 2 1 5 2 1 8 9 ( W . D . K 1 ' ) . ' , f h i s t l i e f i n a l d c c i s i o nb y t h c d i s t r i c tc o u r t
d c l i v c r c do n l g t h N , I a 12,0 0 t t .a f t e r t h e c a s ew a s r c m a n d c dt o t h e l o r v e rc o u r t b 1 ' t h e
S u p r c m eC o L r r ti n i t s I " a m o u si t ' l r s s e l ec;aus, cd e c i s i o n .I n t l t e n t e a n w ' h i l ei n . orderto
c u p r c m cC o u r t ' s s t a n dt h a t p r o o f o f a c t u a ld i l L r t i o rits c s s e r - r t iianl d i l u t i o n
r e c t i l _ r ' t hS
c a s e s r. h e ' l ' r a d e n r a rD k i l u t i o n l { e v i s i o nA c t 2 0 0 6 ( - f D R A 2 0 0 6 ) $ a s p a s s e d .
9 4 . S e c l r l o s e l e t ' t 'I.' S e c r e (C a t a l o g t L e\ n, c . . 5 3 7 t J S . 4 1 8 ( 2 0 0 3 )
'l'radcmalk
95. D i l t r t i o nR e v i s i o rA r ct. 2006
9 6 . l l c r e a l s ot l - r er e a s o n i n g o f t h e c o u r tr a i s c st h e d o u b tr v h c t h e irt i s s u r r e p t i t i o u s l v
b r i n e i n ei n c o n l u s i o ns t a n d a r d isn t o a c a s eo l ' ' d i l L l t i o nb 1 ' b l u l r i n g " .
 360 JOURNALOF THE INDIAITLAI4/ INST-IT]J,I-E
[ V o l 5 0: 3

it whichmilitatedagainsta findirigof likelihood.However,

the courtnoted
that v secretcould havemet the evidencemilitatingagainst
a findingof
blurring,but as it chosenot to do so evenafterremanding
the caseto the
districtcourt,in spiteof the supremecourt clearlysuggestirig
an evidentiary
deficiency,it rejectedthe claim of dilution by blurring.
with respectto tarnishment also the Americancourtsappearto be
strict.Thereis alsoinconsistency amongthecourtsin defining;,dilution by
tarnishment".For example,in Deere& co. v. MTD products,
Inc.s7itwis
h e l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' st e l e v i s i o nc o m m e r c i a lf o r i t s
competing
lawnmowertfactor,arteringthe famousDeeretrademarkfrom
a proud,
majesticdeer,to onethatwascorvardlyandafraidamounted to tarnishment.
However,in HorntelFoodscorporationv. Jim Hensonproducrions,
Inc.e8
this decision was consideredas one recognizinga .,broadview,,
of
tarnishment. In thatcase,it washeldthatdefendantis useof ,,Spa,am,,for
the nameof a wild boar,a characterin defendant'sfilm did not tarnish
plaintif{-sdistinctiveandfamousrnarkSpAM for luncheonmeat
as it is a
parody and the plaintiffs urark was not made to suffer any
nesative
associations throughdeferrdant's use.ThoughHormelclaimedtlat llnking
its lunclieonmeat rvith a wild boar would adverselycolourconsurrers,
impressions of sPAM, the courtheldthata simplehumorousreference to
the fact that SPAM is madefrom pork is unlikelyto tarnishHormel,s
mark.
However,India could be proudof (if it is a reasonfor beingproudof)
the facl that its courtsstaftedextendingwholehearted supportto tle doctrine
rvithoutrnuchdiscussion from as earlyas 1993onwardsor evenbefore.ee
For example, in Daintler Benz v. H1,SsHindusthan,l00 without even
attemptingto analysethe conceptof dilution, or any regal principres
underlyingtrademarkviolationsfor that matter,the court vehemently
attacked"the greatperversionof the Iaw relatingto Trademarks"carried
out when"a mark of the orderof the "MercededBenz" washumbledby
the
defendantsby using it on undergarments. The court appearsto be
flabbergasted by the statusof the mark and was quite en-,ptraiic in stating
thatsucha mark is not up for grabs.In spiteof beingthe firstjudgrnentin
I n d i at o b a s ei t s d c c i s i o no n t h e c o n c e pot f d i l u t i o n ,v a g u e l yt h o u g h ,
the
courtneverthoughtit important to analyzethe conceptandthe desirability

97. Supra nore 83.

9 8 . 73 t :. 3 d 4 9 7
99. Iror example, read Bata India Lintitecl v. pvarelal & Co.
& others p.l.c
(Suppl)(l) I l6 (All), sttrjit singh v. M,ts.Alembic Glass
IndLtstriesLtd., AIR lggT
D e l h i 3 1 9 e t c . I n a l l r h e s e c a s e sr e m e d y u , a s g r a n t e d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f
rvhcrcthe
d c f c n d a n t sr v e r eu s i ' g s i m i l a rm a r k se v e n i n t h e a b s e n c eo f c o m m o n
ficld ol-activity.
1 0 0 . 1 9 9 4( t 4 ) P ' . t C2 8 7 .
 20081 TRADEMARKDI LUTION..IA'DIANAPPROACH 361

of bringingsuchan extendedform of protectionto trademarks.r0r However,

the Delhi High Courtwas neverconcerned aboutthe legalissuesinvolved
and their possiblesolutions.It simplygot carriedaway by the nameof a
motorvehiclemanufacturing company.The couftneverbotheredto measure
the injurycausedto thernark'Benz'eitherby way of blurringor tarnishment,
the_twomajor formsof trademarkdilution.It alsothoughtit unnecessary
to examinehow far the elementsof dilr-rtion werepresentin that case.It is
interesting to notethat this decisioncameat a time whenIndiawas under
no obligation,either nationalor international, to protect well-known
m a r k s . l 0 2T h e c o u r t n e v e r l o o k e d i n t o i s s u e sl i k e r e q u i r e m e n ft o r
registration, use or reputationof the mark in India,who constituted the
relevantsectorof the publicetc.This moveto confermonopolyoverthe
mark without any discussionis quite disturbingas it remindsus of the
apprehension of David Vaverthata conceptlike dilutionconfersworldwide
perpetLral copyrightfor a rvordwhich is not legallyqualifiedfor copyright
protection.l03
ln Caterpillarv. MehtabAhmed,l0'1 the plaintiff,a US basedcompany,
'caterpillar'
was usingtrademarks and 'cat' in respectof manufacture for

1 0 1 . .I t , i s q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n gt o n o t e t h a t e v e n a s l a t e i n 2 0 0 3 i n t h e U S . r v h e r et h e
d i l u t i o n d o c t r i n ef i r s t d e v e l o p e di n i t s p r e s e n st h a p ea n d g c t s t h e m a x i m u m s u p p o r r ,
t h c S u p r e m eC o u r t h e l d t h a t i n o r d c r t o a t t r a c tr c m e d y u n d e r t h e F e d e r a lD i l u t i o n
R e v i s i o nA c t , a c t u a l d i l u t i o n n e e d e dt o b e p r o v e d .M o s e l e yv . V S c c r e tc a t a l o g u e ,
supra nole 94.
1 0 2 I n d i a b e c a m ea s i g n a t o r yt o t h e p a r i s c o n v e n t i o no n l y a s l a t e i n D e c 7 , l g g g
a n d t h e T r a d e m a r kA c t , 1 9 9 9 ,e n f o r c i n g ' l R I p So b l i g a t i o n sr v a si m p l e m e n t c do n l l , i n
2 0 0 3 .N o n e o f t h e s e l e g a l i n s t r u m e n t sr e q u i r et h e t y p e o f p r o t e c t i o n e x t e n d e db 1 , t h e
I n d i a n . i u d i c i a r yM . o r e o v e r ,t h e T r a d e a n d M e r c h a n d i s eM a r k s A c t . l 9 5 g r e q u i r e d
defensiveregistrationfor extendingtrademarkprotectionto dissimilar.goods.
103.David vaver, "Unconventionaland well-Knou'n TradeN,larks"2005Singapore
Jotrrnal of Legal studies l-19 available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id:952334#PaperDownload If the decisionin Mead Datacentral
t'. Toyota could be accepted,the fact that the consumersol'both the goods are
d i f f c r e n tu . o u l di r - r c a f f e c t c dt h e p l a i n t i f f sa d v e r s e l yI.n t h a t c a s ct h c c o u r t h e l d t h a t
t h e f a c t t h a t a m a r k h a s s e l l i n g p o r v e ri n a l i m i t e d g e o g r a p h i c aol r c o m m e r c i a la r c a
d o c s n o t e n d o u ' i t r v i t h a s c c o n d a r ym e a n i n gf b r t h e p u b l i c g e n e r a l l y .A s p e r t h e
m a j o r i t y ' v i e l vt h e s t r e n g t ha n d d i s t i n c t i v e n e sosf L I I X I S i s l i r n i t e dt o t h e m a r k e tf o r . i t s
scrvices- attorneysand accountants.Outsidcthe market.LEXIS has verv little selling
p o u ' e rb e c a u s eo n l v o n e p e r c e n to f t h e g c n e r a lp o p u l a t i o na s s o c i a t eLs E X I S r v i t h t h e
a t t r i b u t c so f M e a d ' s s c r v i c e .T h e r e f o r e ,i t c a n n o tb c s a i d t h a t L E X I S i d e n t i f i e st h a t
s e r v l c et o t h e g e n e r a lp u b l i c a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e ist f r o m o t h e r s .N 4 o r e o v e rt h . e buik of
Mead'sadvertisingbudgetis devotedto reachingattorne)sthroughprofessional.iournals.
I f t h i s i s t h e c o r r e c t v i e ' , r ,i.t i S e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l et o t h i s c a s e .' l ' h e q u e s l i o nt o b e
a d d r e s s ehde r ei s r r i t h r e s p e c t o n ' h i c hg r o l p / c l a s so f t h e p u b l i ct h e d i s t i n c t i y e n e sosf
a m a r k h a s t o b e e Y a l u a t e do. r i s i t t o b c a s s e s s c bd a s c do n i t s r e p u t a t i o na m o n gt h c
g e n e r apl u b l i c .
1 0 4 . 2 0 0 2( 2 5 ) P T C 4 3 8 ( D e l ) .
 362 ./OURA'ALOF THE INDIAN L,4I,I/I,\IST17'L'TE
[ V o l .5 0 : 3

construction' mining,roads,buildingagriculture industries, footwearand

garmentsetc. since 190.1(footwearand garmentsespecialry)
in the US.
But they neithergot the mark or logo registeredin India
ior fbotwear
(thoughthey got them registeredin India for someothergoods)
till the
time of the decisionnor the productswere sold in India.Defendant
was
sellingarticlesincludingfootwearunderthetradernark ,cat'and,caterpillar,
in India. Howe'er, as the praintiffs trademarkenjoy a reputation
and
goodwill as they are extensivelysold and advertisea in ttre US and the
countriesworld over.it is averredby the plaintiffsthatthereis a spill
over
of reputationinto Indiaandamongthe relevantcustomers.
while decidingthis case,the court madesrveepingremarksto
the
effect that tradernarkis like a propertyand no rnurihoiir.d person
can
comrnita trespass. As per the court,adoptionof similaro, ,.,"u.sirnilar
marks,ever in respectof samegoods,by sr,rbsequent userwould resultin
tlie dilLrtion of the mark.The courtstatedthatthedoctrineof dilutionis an
independent anddistinctdoctrineandobserved thus:r05
The underlyingobjectof trrisdoctrineis thatthereis presumption
tliat the relevantcustomers startassociating the marliwith a new
and differentsource.It resultsin smearingor partiallyaffecting
the descriptiveIink betweenthe mark of the prior user and its
goods.In otheru'ords,the link betweenthe markandthe goodsis
blurred.It amounlsto not only reducingthe forceor valueof the
trademarkbut alsoit graduallytapersthe comnrercial valueof the
m a r k ss l i c eb y s l i c e .S u c hk i n d o f d i l u t i o ni s n o t a f a i r p r a c t i c e
that is expectedin tradeandcommerce.
In this casealsothe courtdid not considerwhetherIndiawasunderany
legalobligationto recognize suchan extensiveprotectionas extendedby
the protectionagainsttrademarkdilr-rtion. when comparedwith the US
decisions,it cor-rld be seenthat the court did not look into the reqLrired
fame underthe doctrineof dilution.Spill over of iepr-rtation into India,
,whichis considered insufficientin manycountries evenin casesof ,,well_
known" mark protectionwasacceptedin this case,as enoughto corlstitute
trademarkdilution.It alsofailedto examinethe natureandextentof dilution
causedto tlre plaintiff s tradernark. As opposedto the decision in Ringling
Bros'case,lnerementalassociation betrveen
boththe marksin the rninds
of consurrers wasconsidered enoughto co'stitutedilution.Thecourtnever
bothcred to cxanrine theextentof "blurring,,caused to rhedistirrctive
quality
o f t h c p l a i n t i f fs m a r k .
l'he court heldthatthe markof the plaintiffhasbecornesynonymfor
qualityof high degreeandadoptionof its namealongwith dis;inctive
and

1 0 5 .I d . a t 4 4 1 .
 20081 7'K4DEA,IARK
DILLJ'I-IOA'INDIAN APPROACTI 363

uniqLre characteristics of styleby defendants discloses propensity to trade

or cashupongoodwilland reputation of the plaintiffs trademarkand it is
nothingbLrtpiracy of trade narne.l06 It is subrnittedthat cashingLrpon
goodwillandreputationof a seniormark is not theconcernof the trademark
law. on the otherhand.theconcernof tradernark law is the harmdoneto
the plaintiff'smark. Even if the dilutiontheoryis acceptedwithor-rt any
objection,dilutionby blurringor tarnishment hasto be proved.The court,
in this casealso, did not botherto enquireaboutsuch proof. And the
standardusedby the courtto measurethe fameof the plaintiffs mark also
is not the one requiredin an actionfor dih-rtion.
I n t h i s c a s e ,l l r e c o u r ta l s oe x a m i n e d t h e q u e s t i o nw h e t h e ru s eo f a
sameor similarrnarkon cornpeting goodswould an-lount to dilutionand
arrswered it in the affirmative.The court did this after considerinsthe
c o n f l i c t i n gv i e w se x i s t i n gi n t h i s s u b j e c t . l 0I n
T thiscontexthe coriccrn
expressed by McCarthyis wortliquotir.rg: l()8
'fo
apply "dilution" in the cascof corr-rpeting litigantsis, in rny
vierv,a dangerous misuseof the dilution tl-reory. It is boundto
resultin harmto the balanceof freeandfair cornpetition. I believe
that "di.lution"(of whateverdimensions)must be definedas a
separateand distinctkind of protectionfor a few (a very few)
rvidel.vknor.vn trademarks.
Another factor to be taken into accountin this respectis that the
traditionaltradentarkIarvis enoughto handlecasesof Llseon c o m p e l i n g
gooos,
AnotherIndiancasein rvhichremedyrvasgrantedundertrademark
dilLrtionis Aktieholagetvolvo v. volvo steelsLimited.t0eIn this case
salesof plaintiffs'productsin Indiawere absolutelyinsignificant and the
activitiesand productsof the plaintiffsand the defendants rveredifferent
anddistinct.1'hecourt,afterhavinga discussion on the law of passingoff
andsonrecases.runninginto pages. cameto an abruptconclusion thatit is
a casefor protection of theplaintiffs'brandname.volvo'.il0
againstdilLrtion
As in all othercases,rvherethe courthasupheldthepresence of tradernark
dilr-rtion,
the courtin this casealsodid not discussor analysethe scopeor
rneaning or extentof the conccptof dilution.It is interesting
to notethat ir-r
tl.riscase,despitethe fact that therewas virtuallyno salesof plaintiffs'
in India -- which mcansthatthe mark wasnot competentenoush
prodr-rc,ts

t 0 6 . 2 0 0 2( 2 5 )P ] ' C4 3 8 a t 4 4 3 ( D e l ) .
1 0 7 .S t t p r an o r c 1 0 . 1a t 4 4 2 .' f h c c o u r th e l d :" l ' h e v i c ' " r ' h o l d i nfgl c l d i s r h a tt h e
c o n c e pot f d i l u t i o nd o e sn o ts u b s t i t u t h
e cr u l er e l a t i ntgo l i k e l i h o oodf c o n f u s r oun, h e n
t h ep a r t i e
s h a p p c n ctdo b e c o m p e t i t o r s . ' ,
1 0 8 .S u p r an o r e4 9 a l | 1 7 7.
1 0 9 .1 9 9 8P l ' C ( 1 8 )4 7 ( B o n r () D I } ) .
l l 0 . I d .a t l 0 l .
 364 JOUR\IAI, OF THE INDI,4A:
I,AIT, INSTIT,UTI:
[ V o l .5 0 : 3
to meeleventhe rveil-knownmarkrequirements - trrecourt founddilution
of the plaintiffs'trademark. In otherwords,thecourtneverlookedinto
natLlreof the distinctiveriess the
of the mark which is of paramountimportance
in casesof dilution.''].rn. courtthoughtit enough
for rhepraintiffto have
reputationand goodrviilthroughoutthe rvorld
ani.a printa-facie presence in
Indiato rneetthe dilutionrequirement. Insteadof searching for thereputation
of the plaintiffs'mark,the courtquestioned the reasonsfor the defendants,
adoptingthe word 'Volvo'. It is not clearhow
thisbecornes relevantwhen
the plaintiffs markitserfis not famousenough
amongthegeueralconsuning
publicin Indiaso asto indicatea connectiorr
or association in trremindsof
the publicbetweenthe plaintiffandthe mark.
are
- -'fhere rnany other casesrike Gtaxo India Ltcr. & Anr v. Drug
Laboratories,tt2llondct Motors ContpcutyLimitecr
v. Chctranjitsi,gh ancr
others,)l3 in which the courtsappliedtrre co'cept
of dilLrtionwitrrout
botheringto attributeany meaningto the term.
A croseperusalof these
casesrevearthat the court in armostall these
casesnever botheredto
alllxse the conceptr-rar.differences, if any, betrvcen infringernent, passing
off and dilutionof trademark. Moreover,mostoftenthe courtsare found
satisfiedwith the requirementfor a rvell-known
mark to meet dilution
requirement. It is felt that the overallattitudeof the Indianjudiciary
in
dealingr'vithdilutioncasesis indifference to the widerimplications of the
conceptof dilutionand its impacton Indiantrade
and iniustry.Thus,the
judiciaryfailsto evolvea trendsuitedto
the Indianscenario. This is quite
unlikethe situationin the US.

VII Conclusion

Flavingin view the extensiveprotectionextended

to reputedmarksby
the dilutiondoctrine,a Iiberarinterpretation of thedoctrineby thejudiciary
is not in publicinterest. It promptseverytrademark ownerto get his mark
i'clLrdedin the classof famousmark.Moreover,
the riberarlpproachof
thejudiciaryin examiningthe fameandotherstandardsxequired
to constitute
dilution makesthis field artogether murky.As apprehended by Mark A.
Lemlcy.if courtsarenot carefurto restraintthe nlw
doctrine,iiwiil soon
t a k ea l i f e o f i t s o w n .l l a

I I l . S o l c l l b a s e do n r e g i s t r a t i o nof the plaintiffs'

mark in class 7 for varioirs
p r o d u c t sa n d a d v e r t i s e m e not n S t a r l . . \ r .
f r o m l 8 t h O c t t o l s t N o v 1 9 9 4 ,t h e c o u r t
c o n c l u d c dt h a t t h o u g h , V o l v o 'h a sn o t b e c o m e
a h o u s e h o l dn a n t e ,i t i s r e c o g n i s e da s
o n c o f t h e d i s t i n c t i , " 'ber a n d .
| 1 2 .2 0 0 2 ( 2 5 ) p ' r c 1 0 5( D e l ) .
I 1 3 .2 0 0 3 ( 2 6 ) p ' r c I ( D e l ) .
l l 4 ' I - e m l e y .s l t p r a n o r e3 a t r 6 9 g . H e c a i l s
t h i s t h e p r o b r c mo f , . d o c t r i n acr r e e p . .
a n d i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t t h e r n o s lo b ' i o u s e x a m p r e
o f d o c i r i n a rc r e e pi n t r a J e n r a r kr a r v
 2008I I'lU D1.,14..1
RK DI I. L'T'I O^' ; t XD I Ah, it p p t?O.,1
Ct l 36i

one may be at a rossto understantr lvhv the conceptof dirutionis

gaininggroundin viervof the flexibility,o*, avairabre
in assigningan,J
licensingtrademarks whichproclairns thatquarityconlrorb,vtrreorvneror-
the mark is no more expcctcdin the presc't da1,contexi.
what is the
justificationin sayingthatwhatharmtheowncrof
the tradernark is fi.eeto
cau;eto his markcannotbe causedby othcrs?Docsthe rradenrark
dilution
conceptgo to the extentof asserting that the purposeof trademarklaw is
simplyto protectthe economicinterestof owncr of tradernark
who invests
in generatinggoodwiil not by quarity assurancebut by pcrsuasive
advertisements? Trademarkdilutiondoctrine,alongrvithunurict"apower
to alienatethe mark may resurtin absorutepropertization of trademarks.
absolvingit from the obligation1otakecarcof the consumcrintcrcsts.-l-hc
rationalefor prevenlingfreealienation of trademarks is closelyassociatcd
to the goalsof tradernarks raw viz., preventing consumerco'fusion and
encouraging investment in productquality.It is doLrbtful horvthcsegoals
arcto be servedin a theor.v merchandising the markitself.Assie,nmcnts in
grossdo active damageto the goals of trademark1u*.ils
llhe rlental
associationsconsumersmake betrveentrademarksand products
arc
weakenedby suchtransfers.while pennittingthis to happenby libcralising
'on
the rules of assignments and licensingof trademarks the one hand,
clamouringfor maximunrprotectionof sucrr mentar association
by
demandingprotectionagainsttrademarkdirutionappearsto be,aparadox.
In this backdropone may haveto agreewith Mark A. Lemleywho
said
that if tradernark owrers areobtainingpropertyrightsthat tradcmarklhcory
cannotjLrstify,the courtscould handlethis problernto a grcatcxtent.
il.
thcy are vigilantin relatingthc protectio'plaintiffi seekt<r-the principles
of tradcmarkthcory and rejectingclairnsthat arc not rvell-founded
on
lrademark principles. courtsshouldconsiderthe irrccntives oneanticipates
thetradcnrark law lo creatc,theharmdone1ocorsumcrsby the conductat
issucand the intcrestsof socictyat largein upholdingthc inrcrest
of thc
trademarkowner.l l('
It is submittedthal if at all the tlreoryof dilution is accepted
by thc
courts,its applicationshouldbe lirnitedto casesof rron-cornpeting
rnarks
asotherremedies areavailablcundertraditionaltrademark law in casesof
compctingmarks.Even in the caseof norr-compcting marks,it hasto be
l o o k e di n t o i f r h e r ei s a c t u adl i l u t i o no r a n y p o s s i b i l i i oy f a c t u a l
dilurion.
In caseswherea reasonable buyeris not at all likelyto think of the scnior
user'smark on seeingthe subsequent mark,thereis no questionof dilution.
It doesnot appearthatall usesof a famousrnarkshouldbe prohibitcd
everr
underthe doctrineof dilution.If all Lrses of a similarrnarkby a subsequent

I t 5 .Id a t 1 7 1 0 .
I 1 6 .td. a t l 7 l 3
 366 JOU'|lNALOf: 7'IIE IIDtArr' LAU.'IlttS7'tI't-.tT't: l V o l .5 0 . 3

userare construedas actionable, the eff-ectrvill be conferringcopyrigfit-

like rightsin grossin trademarks.llT Moreover,it is rot rcccssarl, that all
usesdilutefarnousrnarks.on thecontrary, thesubsequent usemay act like
a freeadvertisement to the scniorrnalkandnotrringmore.llsIt apr.:arsto
b e t r u e r v h e nw e c o n s i d e r h eB e n zc a s e .A u s c o f t l i e r n a r k ' B e n z ' o n
0ndergarments lxay not wcakenthe markthor-rgh it may rernindone of the
corporategiantmanuf'acturing highlyexpJnsiveautomobiles underthe same
name.Therefore.unlessstrictproof of actualdilirtioneitherby way of
b l u r r i n go r t a r n i s l r r n c inst a d d u c e di t. i s d e s i r a b lteh a tt h ec o u r t sa b s t a i n
from grantingany relief-.
Section29 of the Trademarks Act. 1999requiresLlrgcnt amcndments.
Sub-section 4 of section29, rvlrichtreatsLrseby anothcrpcrson,of a
registered trademark havingreputation in India,evenon dissimilar goodsas
infringement,if rnadcwithout due causetaking unfair advantageof or
affectingits distinctivecharacter detrimentally is very vastin its scopeas
i t d o e sn o t i n s i s to n c o n f u s i o nA. s I n d i a i s n o t u n d e ra n y o b l i g a t i o nt o
recognizetrademarkdilLrtion, this provisioncould ',vellbe interpreted to
protectwell-knownmarks.-fhenthereis no requireprerrt for avoidingthc
confusionrequirement. Moreover,eqr"rating takirrgof unfairadvantage u,ith
thc infi'ingement of trademarklaw is sirnplvstretchirrg trademark law beyond
itsjustifiablelimitsandthatshouldbe droppedfrornthe section.Another
suggestion is that as clauses(b) and (c) of sub-section 8 of section29
block fair useand evenfair usingof comparative advertisement techniqr-res.
which are legallypcrmittedby countrieslike the US andthe UK, thereby
preventing itealthycornpetition, hasto be droppedfrom the section.
with respectto recognition of trademark dilutionby Indiantrademark
law, it is subrnitted that as thereis no international prcssureon India to
introducesuclra far-reaching concept,Indianccdnot bringin provisions
recognizirrg it, espcciallyin thebackdropof tlrc AmericanjLrdiciary rejcciing
thc attcrnpts to strcnglhcn the protcctionagainstdilution.

I 1 7 . J o n a t h a nI l . M o s k i n . . v r p r . 7n o t e . 1 4a t 1 3 2 .
l 1 8 . I d . a t 13 5