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VILLAFLOR V. CA

280 SCRA 297

FACTS:

On December 2, 1948, petitioner filed a sales application with the Bureau of Lands covering a tract of
public lands consisting of 140 hectares. In paragraph 6 thereof, he recognized that the land is of public
domain. On August 16, 1950, petitioner entered into a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights in favor of
private respondent in consideration of P5,000. On the same date, August 16, 1950, private respondent
filed a sales application over two parcels of land which was correspondingly awarded the following day.
On January 31, 1974, petitioner protested the sales application of private respondent claiming
ownership, and claiming that it has not paid the P5,000 provided for in the deed. The Director of Lands,
however, found that petitioner was paid the stipulated amount, the same being part of the
administrative process in the disposition of the land in question, that his sales application was rejected
for leasing the same to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights thereto and that he
recognized the public character of the land in his application and relinquished any and all rights he may
have by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation thereon. The same was affirmed by the Minister
of Natural Resources. On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City for Declaration of Nullity (Deed of Relinquishment of Rights),
Recovery of Possession and Damages, at about the same time he appealed the decision of the Minister
of Natural Resources at to the Office of the President. The trial court dismissed the complaint, which on
appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this recourse, petitioner assailing the findings of the
Bureau of Lands and the capacity of corporations to acquire public lands.

HELD:

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to
apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view. "In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly
applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

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COMM OF CUSTOMS V. NAVARRO

77 SCRA 264

FACTS:

Petitioner stresses on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set aside in order of respondent
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents, restraining petitioners from
proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer
commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited
importation or importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by
petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Petitioners pointed out that seizure and forfeiture proceedings, which, as held in a number of decisions,
was a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities. SC required
respondents to file an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for
by petitioners to prevent the challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented. Instead of
preparing an answer, they just submitted a manifestation stating that “after an intensive and serious
study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon its interest in the case.” The
rationale behind such a move was ostensibly the desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the fact
that “the shipments, being perishable, have already deteriorate

HELD:

The opinion of Justice Zaldivar for the Court emphatically asserted the doctrine anew in the following
language: 'It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction
over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the
present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so
from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would
the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said,
as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent
Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not
acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and
so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967 releasing said goods

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NUESA V. CA

GR NO. 132048

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels
of agricultural land under certain conditions. After twenty-one years, private respondent filed an
application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots
claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the order. Restituto Rivera, herein
petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the
manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had
been cultivating the same. Petitioner filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that of
private respondent. After investigation, petitioner, Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, ordered
the cancellation of the Order of Award in favor of private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition
with the Provincial Adjudication Board for annulment of said order. Herein petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from the order of the Regional Director. The DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss and reversed the order of the Regional Director.
The said decision was affirmed by the DAR Appellate Adjudication Board and later on by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition for review

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the revocation by the DAR Regional Director of the earlier Order of Award
by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its
Provincial Adjudicator or Board of Adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding
the case on the merits without affording the petitioner the opportunity to present his case. While it
bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts,
care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional
boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency

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REGIONAL DIR. V. CA

GR NO. 110193

FACTS:

A return-to-work order was promptly issued by one of the petitioners, Regional Director of the DECS,
with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were not to resume their classes within twenty-four
hours, administrative charges would be filed. Since the order was not heeded, administrative complaints
against the teachers concerned were thereupon filed. The teachers were each given five days from
receipt of said complaints within which to submit their respective answers and supporting documents.
An investigation panel, composed of three DECS lawyers was constituted to look into the case. Prior to
the start of the hearings by the DECS Investigating Team, the private respondents filed with the RTC, a
complaint for injunction, prohibition and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction which was
granted. The petitioners filed their answer, later followed by a motion to dismiss which was denied
holding that the complaint stated a cause of action and that the court had jurisdiction thereover. The
pre-trial, however, was pre-empted by the petitioners when they filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Court referred the petition the CA which denied the petition

HELD:

The issuance, however, of the restraining orders by the lower court against further proceedings on the
administrative complaints is inappropriate inasmuch as the authority of the DECS Regional Director to
issue the return to work memorandum, to initiate the administrative charges, as well as to constitute
the investigating panel, can hardly be disputed; and The court cases and the administrative matters
being closely interrelated, if not interlinked, it behooves the court, in the interest of good order and
conformably with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases before it
pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings.

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LAGUNA CATV V. MARAAN

GR NO. 139492

FACTS:

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV, conducted an inspection within the
premises of Laguna CATV Network, Inc. After the summary investigation, Regional Director Alex E.
Maraan directed Laguna CATV to pay the concerned employees of their unpaid claims. Laguna CATV
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, for failure of Laguna CATV to comply with the
aforementioned Order, Director Maraan issued a writ of execution. The sheriff levied the L300 van and
garnished the bank deposits of Dr. Bernardino Bailon as owner of Laguna CATV. Laguna CATV and Dr.
Bailon filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy and sale on execution. But it was
denied by Director Maraan on the ground that Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal and the writ of
execution should be considered as an "overt denial" of Laguna CATV's motion for reconsideration.
Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review. Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the
Secretary of Labor "would be an exercise in futility considering that the said appeal will be filed with the
Regional Office and it will surely be disapproved." Consequently, it was dismissed by the appellate court
for reasons, among others, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, Laguna CATV filed the
instant petition.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have first
appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not
entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum. Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy.

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CORPUS V. CUADERNO

4 SCRA 749

FACTS:

The Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, Marino Corpus, was administratively charged
with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He
was suspended by the Monetary Board despite the recommendation of the investigating committee that
he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned
as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition
to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was
awarded PhP 5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment.
Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has
spent for attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position
may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Miguel
Cuaderno, Sr

HELD:

On the other hand, the doctrine (of exhaustion of administrative remedies) does not apply where, by
the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is
permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy
even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted.

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MADRIGAL V. LECAROZ

91 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Public respondents abolished petitioner-appellant Madrigal's position as a permanent construction

capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads and Bridges Fund Budget which
was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was
not essential. Madrigal appealed to CSC which declared the removal was illegal. Lecaroz moved for a
reconsideration which was denied. Madrigal sent a letter to the Provoincial Board requesting for his
reinstatement. He also later filed a petition to the CFI of Marinduque against public respondents which
was dismissed on the ground of laches. Hence petition

HELD:

1 year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy. Actually, the recourse
by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case where pure questions
of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of
law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of
orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot
decide such issues with finality. In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved, that is,
whether or not the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.

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CABADA V. ALUNAN

260 SCRA 838

FACTS:

A complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed
with the Office of the CHR Tacloban by private respondent Valdez. The complaint was referred to the
PNP RECOM 8 which, after the conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave
Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings. Reg. Dir of PNP
RECOM 8 find the petitioners guilty and ordered their dismissal. Petitioner Cabada stated under oath in
his Appeal filed with the DILG that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said
motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB. RAB 8 affirmed the
decision of Reg. Dir and denied the petitoners’ motion for recon which the latter had received a copy.
Petitioner appealed to the DILG which was denied. Hence petition

HELD:

The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was
the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for
review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47,
Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Section 31 and 32 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed with
the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their
case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. In view of all the
foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners relating to the merits of the case
and on the issue of due process is unnecessary.

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DATILES AND CO. V. SUCALDITO

186 SCRA 704

FACTS:

Petitioner has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement whereby the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, agreed to lease to the company 175 hectares of public
land with an original period of 10 yrs extended to 25 yrs. About the middle of 1973, petitioner-lessee
filed a complaint for "Injunction with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and Prohibitory Injunction,
with Damages before the CFI of Zamboanga Del Sur alleging to have been resorted to after the
vehement refusal of the respondents to obey the orders of the then Philippine Fisheries Commission
and Bureau of Fisheries to vacate that portion of the area covered by FLA No. 1902 which they (private
respondents) were occupying without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and consent of petitioner.
CFI granted the petition. Thereafter Barrio Council of Batu submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries a
resolution which attests that the 49 hectare controverted fishpond area was never occupied by the
Datiles family and that it was the private respondent. A formal investigation was conducted. Presiding
judge herein respondent issued restraining order hence this petition for review which was previously
denied for lack of merit

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an executive officer, the petitioner must first
exhaust administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption that the administrative body,
board or officer, if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error, may amend its/his decision on a
given matter. 20 It follows therefore that there has to be some sort of a decision, order or act, more or
less final in character, that is ripe for review and properly the subject of an appeal to a higher
administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to operate. In
the present case, however, there is no administrative order or act as above described, that can be
appealed from. The respondent Regional Director has not rendered any decision, or made any final
finding of any sort, and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the very act
sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must be exhausted, although
available, cannot be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping public respondent Guieb's
investigation but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioner's
recourse to the respondent court for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper.

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NFA V. CA

253 SCRA 470

FACTS:

The NFA, conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of its properties and
facilities all over the country. Twelve security agencies were awarded one-year contracts, among whom
were private respondents. Petitioner became NFA administrator. A special order was thereafter issued
for the implementation of the new rules and procedure to undertake the prequalification of prospective
bidders, conduct the bidding, evaluate the bids tendered and recommend to the Administrator the bids
accepted. The prebidding and bidding dates were later reset however two of the applicants who failed
to prequalify filed separate complaints with the RTC QC. to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC
from proceeding with the public bidding. As prayed for, restraining orders were issued by the two courts
on which the NFA received. During the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction, Administrator
David sent to all incumbent security agencies, including four of herein private respondents, notices of
termination and the former contracted the services of seven new security agencies. Private respondents
filed with RTC for prohibition, mandamus and damages and a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and restraining order. NFA appealed with the CA which find the petitioner meritorious in part
and partially given due course. Hence petition.

HELD:

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some
limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents' contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In fact,
respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public
bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to

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the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the
implementation of these negotiated security contracts.

GRAVADOR V. MAMIGO

20 SCRA 742

FACTS:

The petitioner was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental
when he was advised by the then Superintendent through the respondent, of his separation from the
service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. Few days later
respondent was designated as teacher in charge of the said school. The petitioner wrote the Director of
Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November
26, 1897 but December 11, 1901 and also wrote to the Division Superintendent of Schools, reiterating
his claim that he had not reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in support thereof. He filed
for quo warranto at CFI Negros Oriental against respondent. Respondents filed their answer. The trial
court concluded that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901 and accordingly granted his
petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was reinstated.
Respondents appealed and contend that the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war
records to establish the date of birth (December 11, 1901) of the petitioner.

HELD:

The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial
evidence, is a settled rule of administrative law. But whether there is substantial evidence supporting
the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The school official based
his determination of the petitioner's age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the
petitioner does not appear to have taken a part. On the other hand, the petitioner relies on post-war
records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his birth.

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ALMINE V. CA

177 SCRA 796

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the
Operation Land Transfer Program with the MAR, Regional Office in Tabaco, Albay. After due hearing,
said office filed an investigation report for the cancellation of the CLT of private respondent who
appears to be petitioner's tenant over her Riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary
action, petitioner reiterated her application alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to
deliver her landowner's and that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. A
reinvestigation was conducted this time and a report recommending the cancellation of private
respondent's CLT was filed. Said report was elevated to MAR. In and endorsement Reg. Dir held that the
properties of the petitioner are not covered by the OLT program. However then minister denied the
petitioner’s application for retention. Petitioner appealed to IAC. Private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal and later a motion for reconsideration which was both denied. Both appealed to the
CA which dismissedg the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to
whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings, if administratively
decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of
Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129

HELD:

Whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively
cognizable by the Minister of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the
courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be under

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Rule 65 of the Rules of court. The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS V. NTC

408 SCRA 678

FACTS:

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners-
communications companies filed an action for declaration of nullity of the billing circulars, alleging,
among others: that NTC contravened the Civil Code provisions on sales in regulating the sale of prepaid
call cards; and that the billing circular violated the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of
property without due process of law. The NTC moved to dismiss the case for failure of petitioners to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and enjoined the NTC
from implementing the questioned circulars. The CA, however, dismissed the case on appeal without
prejudice to the referral of the petitioners' grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances with the
NTC

HELD:

the Supreme Court held that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case. Judicial
power includes the authority of the courts to determine the validity of the acts of administrative
agencies. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This
principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power. In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi judicial or adjudicatory function.

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UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. RASUL

200 SCRA 685

FACTS:

The UP Board of Regents appointed Dr. Felipe Estrella as the Director of Philippine General Hospital or
PGH from September 1986 till April 1992. Barely 2 weeks after appointment, Dr. Abuava, as the
President of the UP sent a memorandum to the Board of Regents to Reorganize PGH. Upon this
recommendation, the Board of Regents approved the re-organization plan and Nomination Committee
was formed. This committee ought to choose a replacement for Dr. Estrella as to fill up the alleged
vacant UP-PGH Director. Dr. Estrella filed an injunction case against the Nomination Committee and the
Board of Regents to forestall the removal or dismissal of Dr Estrella

HELD:

Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, We hold
that this case has special circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions
to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was about to be replaced by the Nomination
Committee. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be
fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by
the implementation of the proposed reorganization.

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ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORP V. BOT

63 SCRA 193

FACTS:

Private respondent was issued a provincial permit to operate a public utility bus without any publication.
Pending a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the latter filed this certiorari petition on ground
that there having been no publication the Board did not acquire jurisdiction and therefore the issuance
of the order is illegal or was performed without jurisdiction.

HELD:

Where a motion for reconsideration is pending with the court or administrative agency whose decision
or order is assailed in a petition for certiorari, the resolution of said motion should ordinarily be awaited,
and prior thereto an objection grounded on prematurity or ripeness of the certiorari petition can be
raised. However, the Supreme Court would minimize the technical aspect of the ripeness concept where
the issue raised is important and the matter to be resolved is impressed with strong public interest; in
which event the Court would be impelled to go into the merits of the controversy and resolve what
could be a debilitating uncertainty by working out a solution to the problem pose

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TAN V. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION

105 PHIL 377

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Natividad Tan brouth a petition before the court of first instance of manila a varified
petition for mandamus against respondent veterans backpay commission, to declare deceased Lt, Tan
chiat Bes alias Tan Lian Lay a chines national who claims back right, privileges, and prerogative under
Rep act no 304 as amended by Republic act no 897 and second to give due course to the claim of
petitioner that the petitioner is the widow of the late Lt Tan Chiat Bes alias Tan Lian Lay and bonafide
member of the 1st regiment of united states chinesevolunter in the phil,,the secretaryy and chief of
office staff, the veterans backpay commission sent a letter to general vicente lopez of the united states
chinese volunters in the phil apprising the latter that the commission has reaffirmed its solution granting
the backpay for alien members the AFP certified that deceased veteran has rendered service as a
recognized guerilla that after due deleberation respondent revoked its previous stand and ruled that
aleans are not intitled for backpay

HELD:

The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were
"advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any
aggrieved party has the court for recourse", thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

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