[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW
312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role
colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of
the law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and
would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins."cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it
does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on Appointments — that the appointment of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by error so
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this
Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I
therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification
for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It
is the bounded duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge;
it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v. Villanueva: 2

"Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647.) . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice of law’
(Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation
is expected, `all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).

3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin supra).

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law
books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he
did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not
qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there
must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v.
Villanueva: 4

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting his
viewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee’s credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our
review.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of
the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The
stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That
covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that
is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and
observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."cralaw virtua1aw library

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and
2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.chanrobles law library

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he
has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law,
if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see
how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged"
in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is
obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm. Even
then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist
of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following
companies:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"

(Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as
would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least
ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving
legal advice of legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged
in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times
in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator,
mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to
name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in
the practice of law?.

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It
is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years.."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any
sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of
such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar
Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462, 176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776).

For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or
customarily, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to how
many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-mine years of his
business, he said: ‘I have no idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his
answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly
what was said.’ When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of
preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe so, that is
not a practice.’ Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: ‘I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.’

x       x       x

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do
any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate
contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that

x       x       x

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to
act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and
act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto
for another, without being an attorney at law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and
defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties of an attorney are (1)
to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill,
and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his
secrets confided to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’
Bouv. Law Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to do
or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life;
to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x       x       x

". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to
the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ." (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding one’s self out
to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

x       x       x

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was
not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are
not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this
Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissents.

Endnotes:

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary.

2. 14 SCRA 109.

3. Commission on Appointments’ Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT

CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4. 14 SCRA 109.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24,
Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to
the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to
pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to
reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was
thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded.
The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter
referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article
Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section

12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of
the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body

to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of
his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues
that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally
justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar
have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an
important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an
officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's
avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress
in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire
to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal
liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams,
70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration
in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the
Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established
by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him
to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and
not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is
not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name
of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a
power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty.
It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed.
It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted
to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution, promulgated on January 9, 1973,

ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.

2 114 A.L.R. 101.

3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar Integration, cited in

the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January 9, 1973,
ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.

4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of Florida State
Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134
Fla. 851, 186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; Commonwealth
ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway 303
Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515;
Clark vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar
Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292
291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of State Bar
of Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S.
Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs. Third District Committee of Virginia
State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d
230,102 N. W. 2d 404.

5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR

AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on September 17,1971.

6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex.

550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404;
Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826; Railways
Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.

7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration — A Sword and a Shield for Justice" (Manor
Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.

8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar — Aloha!", Journal of the Am. Judicature
Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,
102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L, ed. 2d 1191, 81 S.
Ct. 1826.

9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.

10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of
California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of California, 211
Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re Scott, 53 Nev.
24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex.
550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623.

11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re Integration of

Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216
Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification
of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d
643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla, 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs.
State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10
Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.

The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The objection would make
every Governmental exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the
income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other
end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of
the agencies of Government." (Concurring opinion of Harlan, J, joined by
Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367

U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J. with Branders and
Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S.
245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)

13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.

14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.

A.C. No. 6792             January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto

Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral
turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was
submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD
directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a
taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground.
He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to
the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of
the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought
the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of
his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano
sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled
him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be

disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that
the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went
back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that
he had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are
as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether
his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to
the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x."16 (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from
the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of
any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself.
In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed
the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of
the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-
court settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if
not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession,
and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable --
lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We
are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration
for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not
the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

2
 "CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes."

"Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."

3
 "Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice x x x."

4
 Rollo, p. 32.

5
 Id., p. 36.

6
 Id., pp. 40-46.

7
 The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused, ATTY. MANUEL DIZON, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, as charged. There
being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and one aggravating
circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty
of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum period to 6 years of prision correccional as
maximum period.

"The accused is also adjudged civilly liable and is hereby ordered to pay unto the private
offended party, Roberto Soriano[,] the following:

a. P76,293.00 as actual damages;

b. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

c. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 27)

8
 RTC Decision, pp. 18-19; rollo, pp. 23-24. Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall of
Branch 60, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City.

9
 Id., pp. 6-7 & 11-12.

10
 Probation Order, p. 2; rollo, p. 29.
11
 Rollo, p. 3.

12
 IBP Report, pp. 4-5.

13
 Nuñez v. Astorga, 452 SCRA 353, February 28, 2005.

14
 International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 760, 767, May 12, 1993, per
Nocon, J. citing Can v. Galing, 155 SCRA 663, 667-668, November 27, 1987, per
Padilla, J.; Tak Ng v. Republic, 106 Phil. 727, 730, December 23, 1959, per
Barrera, J.; In Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275, 276, December 7, 1920, per Malcolm, J.

15
 Id.

16
 Id., p. 768. Citations omitted.

17
 Id., pp. 767-768.

18
 RTC Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 10.

19
 IBP Report, p. 5.

20
 "I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not
delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God." (Emphasis supplied)

21
 The RTC Decision is dated November 29, 2001, while the Probation Order is dated
May 3, 2002.

22
 People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, January 30, 1990.

23
 See Co v. Bernardino, 349 Phil. 16, January 28, 1998.

24
 Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, February 24, 1992.

25
 RTC Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 26.

26
 Id., pp. 12 & 17.

27
 Id, pp. 11-12 & 16-17.

28
 Id., pp. 20 & 25.

29
 Tan v. Sabandal, supra.
 30
 Olbes v. Deciembre, AC No. 5365, April 27, 2005.

31
 Resurreccion v. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129, December 14, 1998, per curiam.

32
 Ting-Dumali v. Torres, 427 SCRA 108, April 14, 2004; De Jesus-Paras v.
Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569, April 12, 1961.

A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this
Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according
to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented
him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A.
title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously
of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in
Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our
Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and
is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. L-23959. November 29, 1971.]

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENEZA, Petitioners, v. BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY,
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & QUINTIN MUNING, Respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates, for Petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ATTORNEY’S FEES; SHARING THEREOF WITH NON-

LAWYERS, UNETHICAL AND IMMORAL. — Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle
enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al.,
L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a
court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-LAWYER REPRESENTING A PARTY IN LABOR CASES, NOT ENTITLED
THERETO. — The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that — "In the proceeding
before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the
party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney’s fees: for the same section adds that — "it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court
or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to
assist in the orderly presentation of evidence," thus making it clear that the representation
should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY THEREOF IMPORTS EXISTENCE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP. — The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of the party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative
to compensation for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
providing — "Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, . . ." imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client’s representative in
court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore,
recover attorney’s fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of
parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are
sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR DISALLOWING NON-LAWYERS TO RECOVERY THEREOF,

CITED. — The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that
acting as an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person reap the fruits or benefit of an
unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are
not amenable to disciplinary measures. "And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-
recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were
purely legal, by seeking to recover as an ‘agent’ and not as an attorney."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR UNIONS; LEGITIMATE LABOR

ORGANIZATION MAY APPEAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES WHICH ARE DEDUCTIBLE
FROM BACKPAY OF ITS MEMBERS. — We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization
may appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial
court, on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the
employees’ moral, social and economic well-being" ; hence, if an award is disadvantageous to
its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6,
Republic Act 875, which provides: "Sec 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines . . .," since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the
financial burden of litigations.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL. — Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual
practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many others like him who are not
licensed to practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily
before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that
respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by position action to that purpose. But
since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the
present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be
illegally engaged in the practice of law.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo,
granting respondent Quintin Muning, a non-lawyer, attorney’s fees for professional services in
the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et
al, v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Et. Al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final On 18 October 1963, Cipriano
Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney’s
hen equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also
filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney’s
fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning’s petition was
opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates 10%

Quintin Muning 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but,
considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent’s answer
to the petition for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without
respondent’s brief. 3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’

Association, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees: for the same section
adds that —

"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence."cralaw
virtua1aw library

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court
on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney’s agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition h the recovery of

attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client’s representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship
with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney’s fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is

stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not
licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly legal services cannot be
recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction
where the service were rendered." 5
"No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has
been duly admitted to practice . . . and is an attorney in good standing at the time." 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as
an attorney without authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an
unlawful act or an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are
not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

"And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
‘agent’ and not as an attorney." 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney’s
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of
special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and
cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney’s fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was
the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for
review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contented that, as to them
(Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney’s fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization
is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the
union was organized "for the promotion of the employees’ moral, social and economic well-
being" ; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines . . .",

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden
of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the
Court of Industrial Relations, and many others like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If
true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively
pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in
issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however,
may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of
the backwages as attorney’s fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all
other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepaion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and

Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, page 37.

2. Rollo, page 62.

3. Rollo, Page 75.

4. 22 SCRA, 1266.

5. 4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.

6. 7 C.J.S. 1022.

7. See also, Foundation Finance Co, v. Robins, 153 So. 833, 179 La. 259, reversing (App.) 149
So. 166.

8. Rule 71, Rules of Court.

9. Harris v. Clark, 142 N.E. 881, 81 Ind. App. 494.

10. Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.

11. 4 A.L.R. 1089.

12. NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G. No. 4, 1933.

13. Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.

[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIMPLICIO

VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Magno T. Bueser, for Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE
IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; MEANING. — Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of
law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH
PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by his superior, of an assistant city
attorney in a criminal case for malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where the
offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

DECISION

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, Et Al.,
v. Blanco, Et Al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of
law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal
Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127,
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a
legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was
being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal
case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which We consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against Appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119             June 30, 2008

[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ]

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA
CITY, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba City, of "demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and berat[ing]" him during the hearing on February
27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan,
et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.

To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the
proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de
Guzman, viz:

COURT:

. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?

ATTY. MANE:

No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.

 COURT:

No, you're not from UP.

ATTY. MANE:

I am very proud of it.

COURT:

Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because
there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all
law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the
Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.2 (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were "duly recorded in a tape recorder"
by stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to
direct her to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of
the date he filed the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.

In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist
Indorsement dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on
December 15, 2005 an "Urgent Motion to Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was malicious and "a
direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge" as it
"succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27 September 2005 for [a] consideration
other than the merits of the case." He thus could not "simply sit idly and allow a direct assault on
his honor and integrity."

On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the
"unedited" tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 37 of the
motion which, to him, implied that the trial court was "illegally, unethically and unlawfully
engaged in 'editing' the transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of
[complainant's] client."

Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered
complainant, by separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days8 why he should
not be cited for contempt.

Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,9 stating that it was a
mere result of his impulsiveness.

In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came up with the following evaluation:

. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative

complaint does not divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and
personnel. Thus, the complainant's withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the
continuity of the instant administrative proceeding against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions
made by the respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondent's comment and the
documents at hand, we find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during
the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the stenographic notes. The happening of the
incident complained of by herein complainant was never denied by the respondent
judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his complained
actuations.

xxxx

. . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties
should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A
judge must at all times be temperate in his language. Respondent judge's insulting
statements which tend to question complainant's capability and credibility
stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school
is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate
language, the lawyer can return the attack on his person and character, through an
administrative case against the judge, as in the instant case.

Although respondent judge's use in intemperate language may be attributable to human

frailty, the noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of
the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
conduct and language.

xxxx

Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and
civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of
respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected but
free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential
part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge
desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who
sows the wind will reap a storm.

It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make
insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary "lecturing" and
"debating". . .

xxxx

Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by
complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that
there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting
 remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. It betrays the judge's lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.

Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or
debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.11 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.12

By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed.
Respondent complied on February 26, 2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:

Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially
the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

An author explains the import of this rule:

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those
others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language
during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should
be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in
their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be
tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment.

A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to
a proper appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse
party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before
the court. He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional
conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so in an insulting
manner.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during
the February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even
threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly "still young," "unnecessary
lecturing and debating," as well as unnecessary display of learning:

COURT:

xxx

Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?

ATTY. MANE:

Ah, with due respect your…

COURT:

Tell me, what is your school?

ATTY. MANE:

I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.

COURT:

Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare
Decisis and the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of
procedure where it states that if there is already a decision by the Supreme
Court, when that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court
otherwise non-compliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial
sanction, and I quote the decision. That's why I quoted the decision of the
Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third
party claimants and I state, "The fair market value is the price at which a property
may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who
is not compelled to buy." Sir, that's very clear, that is what fair market value and
that is not assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court
further state, "the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the
basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just
reading the decision or was I inventing it?

ATTY. MANE:

May I be allowed to proceed.

COURT:

Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and
which you should have researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme
Court decision sir? Please answer it.

ATTY. MANE:
 No your Honor.

COURT:

Please answer it.

xxxx

COURT:

That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to
the Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am
grossly ignorant or corrupt.

ATTY. MANE:

Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .

COURT:

No, sir.

ATTY. MANE:

Yes your Honor . . .

COURT:

No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi
naman ako ganon. I am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take
cover from the instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a client
is "secret." Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform
with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, that's the rule of practice. In my
twenty (20) years of practice I've never been haled by a judge to any question of
integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or
decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical
behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit
errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court,
this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity
and honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I
have now.

Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?

ATTY. MANE:

I think that is not necessary your Honor.

COURT:
 No counsel because the imputations are there, that's why I want you to
see. Show him my assets and liabilities for the proud graduate of
MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I joined the
bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be tempted
to accept bribe but I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years and that's how much I
have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wife's assets which is more than
what I have may be triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I have.
And look at my assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to cash
basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please,
look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife and
you will be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir,
she is the Chief Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. That's
why I have the guts to take this job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na
lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still young. Other
judges you would already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that
you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day notice rule, again the Supreme
Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite the
quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day notice
rule is considered as useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any
judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I was the one subject
because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you will
see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many
motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an
exception because of this, then I would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir
again, please look again on the record and you will see how many motions I
threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. It is not only your
case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate of the
MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were
taught in thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in
order to give the other party time to appear and plead. In all books, Moran,
Regalado and all other commentators state that non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion a useless scrap of
paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground to
grant exception to your motion? Tell me.

xxxx

COURT:

Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse the Court. Despite of
being away for twenty years from the college of law, still I can remember my
rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things to the Court. Sir please read
your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you
be the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po
ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga
anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever
heard of anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask
around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck,
you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a
judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know
 whether a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3)
whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and
please ask around before you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a
public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only, the
only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or
favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang,
not even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang
ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong
mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng
corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong
tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi
po naman lahat kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa
husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko
po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko
hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the
respect, not to me but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot
respect the Court then you have no business appearing before the Court
because you don't believe in the Court system. That's why one of my classmates
never appeared before Court because he doesn't believe in that system. He
would rather stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court is
useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment because in their own ways
they know the futility and they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a
hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've never disrespect the courts and I
can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice
para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong
babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And
you can quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the
only sir, the only treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could have easily
let it go because it is the first time, but the second time is too much too soon. Sir,
masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po
ninyo ako ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the injury po. Hindi ko po sana
gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a
case against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.

xxxx

COURT:

I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not
imputing any wrong doing to me I will apologize to you.

Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose
integrity is unchallenged.

Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so
be it.

Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old
practitioner hammered out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation
precedes you. Please read what your younger companero has written to this
 Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled to the
Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your
honest opinion of an implication sir.

Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember

the word you said honest opinion.

Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the
pursue of pride. But if you are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the
line.

Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?

ATTY. HILDAWA:

There will be some . . .

COURT:

What sir?

ATTY. HILDAWA:

. . . indiscretion.

COURT:

Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could
say to the Court because of respect.

Sir, salamat po.

xxxx

COURT:

Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now

you say that is your honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through
years of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more
I who sits in this bench?

Now is that your honest opinion?16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the
Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the
Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties
as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a
judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent
felt that his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted properly when he directed
complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds,
however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show,
engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.

This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from
those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and
high officers of the court.17

Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of
the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not
exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court
imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and
is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 8-10.
 2
 Id. at 15.

3
 Id. at 34-36.

4
 Id. at 33.

5
 Id. at 37-38.

6
 Paragraph 3 read:

Without imputing any wrongdoings to the Honorable Presiding Judge, the content
of the said Order [dated September 27, 2005] of the Honorable Presiding Judge
has induced doubt as to his competence to handle this case.

7
 Should have been paragraph 6.

8
 Both dated June 5, 2006, rollo, pp. 44-46.

9
 Id. at 47-48.

10
 Id. at 1-7.

11
 Id. at 2-7.

12
 Id. at 7.

13
 Id. at 51-52.

14
 Id. at 54.

15
 Agpalo, Legal And Judicial Ethics 558-559 (2002 ed).

16
 Rollo, pp. 17-27.

17
 Re: Anonymous Complaint dated Feb. 18, 2005 of a "Court Personnel" against Judge
Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Br. 12, Ormoc City, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25,
2007, 523 SCRA 175, 181-182; Bravo v. Morales, A.M. No. P-05-1950, August 30, 2006,
500 SCRA 154, 160.

G.R. No. 89591-96             January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of
Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial
court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty. del
Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to
be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were
a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990
prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,1 the latter
accepted cases and continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a
motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel
refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana
considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"2

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the
trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial
jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent
motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the
motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold
and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the
regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the
personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus,
the trial court's order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be
recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is
not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to
roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred
not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private
respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.3 He must be detained in jail during
the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on
bail or on recognizance.4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention
or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more
than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch
and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are
ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and
shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior written
permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police
Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San
Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 
During the pendency of G.R. No. 89591-96, on July 16, 1990, private respondent
Avelino T. Javellana filed a motion seeking permission from this Court to be allowed to
appear as counsel for accused Norberto Patino in Criminal Case No. 4262, then pending
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique. This Court denied his motion
and ruled that being a detention prisoner, he cannot be allowed to appear as counsel for
the aforesaid accused. Rollo, p. 510.

2 
Rollo, p. 1445.

3 
Rule 113, Sections 2, 3, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

4 
Rule 114, Section 1, 1985. Rules on Criminal Procedure.
B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and
"the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted
as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge,
he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after
receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.,
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave) (On official leave)

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes

* On leave.

** On official leave

1
 Rollo, p. 1; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

2
 Id.

3
 Id. at 2.

4
 Id.

5
 Id. at 10.

6
 Id. at 2.

7
 Id.

8
 Id.

9
 Id.

10
 Id. at 3.

11
 Id. at 4.

12
 Id. at 20; TSN, 21 September 2012.

13
 Id. at 35-43; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.

14
 Id. at 42.

15
 Id.

16
 Rollo, p. 28; Report and Recommendation of the OBC dated 24 January 2013.

17
 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

18
 Id. at 22; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 3.

19
 Id. at 34; id. at 15.

20
 Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.

21
 Rollo, p. 35; TSN, 21 September 2012, p. 16.
22
 Id. at 3; Petition dated 6 February 2012.

23
 Wooden v. Civil Service Commission, 508 Phil. 500, 515 (2005).

24
 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 836 (2005).

25
 Id.

26
 Aguirre v. Rana, 451 Phil. 428, 435 (2003).

27
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3(e).

28
 Tan v. Balajadia, 519 Phil. 632 (2006).

29
 Id.

30
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 3.

31
 See Tapay v. Bancolo, A. C. No. 9604, 20 March 2013; Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente,
A. C. No. 7269, 23.
 [A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001.]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA,

Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People v. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for
Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40. 1 While respondent’s letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the
private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated
September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent’s authority to appear
as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. 2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the
Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. 3

In his Comment, 4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin
who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the
other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even
with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position.
In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the
presiding judge.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent’s request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file
formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the
Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
"Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the

administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who
belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From
childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him
while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms.
Ladaga sought respondent’s help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No.
84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in
filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his
cousin’s discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter’s husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left
the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4
Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the
subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the
only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga’s plea to be her counsel
since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also
pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with
honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk
of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the
criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent’s comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of
Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of
said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover,
his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely. 6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. The said section reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one’s self to the public as a lawyer.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the case of People v. Villanueva, 7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice"
prohibited by the said section, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his — livelihood or in consideration of
his said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative. 8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as
pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private
practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent’s isolated court appearances did not amount to a private
practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the
Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict
between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of
his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer
of the board of directors. 9

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions,
i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own
admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby

REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with. more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, p. 16.

2. Id., p. 10.

3. Id., p. 9.

4. Id., pp. 6-7.

5. Id., at 20.

6. Id., at 57-58.

7. 121 Phil. 894 (1965).

8. Id., at 897.

9. Emphasis supplied.

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and
one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted
by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued
a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now
be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint
efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment
on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes

impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of
justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution, p. 8.

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003.]

EMILIO GRANDE, Complainant, v. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, Respondent.

DECISION
 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to
96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus
Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of
P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the
civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but
respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank.
She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded.
Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he
desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the
dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for
the reason: "Account Closed." On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent
demanding that she pay the face value of the check. 1 However, his demand was ignored by
respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the
necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva. 2

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. 3

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondent’s given address at Carmelo

Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. 4 However, it was returned unserved with the
notation "Moved." 5 The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of
respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. 6

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned
unserved with the notation: "Refused." Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation. 7

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found

respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. Thus, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which
adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by
way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the
check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived
complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she
drew against a closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly
penalized. 8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance
is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice
of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. 9

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension
or disbarment, 10 because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform
to the highest standards of morality. 11 Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the
profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a
lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. 12

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her
betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession. 13 Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also
brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order
which is at the very core of her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because
obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even
simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her
with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion.
The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She
can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients. 14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
honorable profession.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt
hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, p. 4.

2. Id., pp. 5-6.

3. Id., pp. 1-3.

4. Id., p. 7.

5. Id., p. 16.

6. Id., p. 21.

7. Id., p. 27.

8. Cesar A. Espiritu v. Atty. Juan Cabredo IV, A.M. No. 5831, 13 January 2003.

9. Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277 [1954].

10. Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865 [1963]; In re De los Angeles, 106 Phil. 1 [1959]; Mortel v.
Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 [1956].

11. Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil. 1 [1981].

12. Constantino v. Saludares, A.M. No. 2029, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 233.

13. Sencio v. Calvadores, A.M. No. 5841, 20 January 2003.

14. Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 2 February 2002.

G.R. No. 154207             April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May
3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case
No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the
RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the
rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC,
in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that
can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner
argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect.
And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for
the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking
the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter
No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;
 II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO

IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING
FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law
student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court
as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf
of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member
of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC
on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of
Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must
have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission
to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the
basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. >MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

 Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alberto Mina.

2
 211 Phil. 373, 378 (1983).

3
 Rollo, p. 26.

4
 Rollo, pp. 7-9.

5
 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574,
593; Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA
148, 157.

6
 273 SCRA xi.

7
 Id. at xiii-xiv.

8
 See Bulacan v. Torcino, G.R. No. L-44388, January 30, 1985, 134 SCRA 252, 257-258

9
 Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005, 475
SCRA 97, 111.
 10
 Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150793, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 259,
267-268

G.R. No. 176530               June 16, 2009

SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners,

vs.
NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G. GARCIA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CA–G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a
complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.

The case stems from the following antecedents:

On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and
Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante
Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title,
reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father,
Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez.
Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez
executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result,
TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the
name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the
property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that
the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in
good faith, and that the action had prescribed.

On the day set for the presentation of the respondents’ (plaintiffs’) evidence, petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not
the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had
been awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been
filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based
on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had
no tenancy relationship.

In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners’ motion and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the
subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs,
and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. 3

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the
motion.4

Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC, which gave due course to the
same.6 The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a
letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they
were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of
appeal was ready for disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal
agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA,
because one of the plaintiffs was still in America.7

On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive

portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order
dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated and
the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.1avvphi1

SO ORDERED.8

The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature.
According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought
was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject property. It
also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the
parties.

Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact
that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents’ knowledge and
consent;

2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that
Atty. Magbitang’s appellants’ brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants’ brief;
and

3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the
DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction
over respondents’ complaint.9

The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive
grounds.

A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client
before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcia’s letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually
withdraw Atty. Magbitang’s authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely
stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.10 Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing
therefrom.11 Respondents’ silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to
the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and
diligence."12 Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.13 In light of such
mandate, Atty. Magbitang’s act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to
direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the
DARAB.

For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.14

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint.15 Respondents’ complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the
slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in
full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point:

x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought
by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees.
Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform
laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latter’s
entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is
purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

On the alleged deficiency of the appellants’ brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice
it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in
arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants’ brief
sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We
have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be
allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of courts.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe with Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring;
rollo, pp. 29-36.

2
 Penned by Judge Victoriano B. Cabanos; rollo, pp. 37-38.

3
 Rollo, p. 38.

4
 Records, p. 105.

5
 Id. at 106.

6
 Id. at 108.
7
 Id. at 109.

8
 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

9
 Id. at 15.

10
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Development Co., G.R. No. 167886,
October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 344, 350.

11
 Chong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148280, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 144, 160.

12
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 18.

13
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 18, Rule 18.03.

14
 Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No.
162890, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743, 758.

15
 Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132561, June 30, 2005, 462
SCRA 336, 342.

16
 Acme Shoes, Rubber & Plastic Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 531 (1996).
A.C. No. 9000

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint1 filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr.

(complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution arc: a)
whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court: by not abiding by the order of her
suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a ₱350,000.00 loan
with 12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an
undated Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105- square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered
by Transfor Certificate of Title No. 20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista.
Attached to said Deed was a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's
parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property.
Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or
before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of
Deeds (RD).5

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to
settle her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD
of Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent
to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it.6

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved
her loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and
her moral ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be
sanctioned for her infraction.7

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009; Commissioner Jose I. de la Rama, Jr.

(Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in
the mandatory conference, He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized respondent
to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling t.lie property, and not just
mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority.
Having done so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,9 Rule
1.01,10 and Canon 711 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 2011, which sustained the findings
and conclusion of the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper,
pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended
respondent from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon
respondent because its previous copy sent to her was returned unserved.14 In its August 13,
2012 Resolution,15 the Court considered .the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served
upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same
resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Naga City, Branch 2 wrote1 a letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and appear in courts. She also
asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from
the inten1et, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of
her suspension.

According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case
pending in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge Arrr1ea's attention
regarding the legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that
respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had not yet
received a copy of the Court's resolution on the matter.

In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of
such downloaded decision, Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III
(Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance
in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made through
the inte1net. She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's.
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011
Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA
issued OCA Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts.20 the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5,
2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No XX-2013-35921 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation22 of Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Comrnissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According
to Commissioner Cachapero. there is no rule allowing the service of judgements through the
internet; and. Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they
implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual service upon her of the
resolution concerning her suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 .Statement.23 the OBC stressed that respondent received the August
13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion, for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution) on November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity
of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also
pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension.
It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the
concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.

The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that respondent has no authority
to practice law and appear in court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that
the Court has lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her
suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court
where she practices [h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she
has ceased and desisted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013,
immediately: and 2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not
be sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359,
dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of merit.25

On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply
with the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of her suspension as enunciated in Maniago
v.Atty. De Dios.27

Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a Certification,28 which
stated that respondent had been ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months,
and as of the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint29 for nullity of
clearance, damages, and preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining
order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.

Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the practice of
law even if the administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise
faulted the OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her
practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this
supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to
practice law.

In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks
reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that
respondent should raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative
case, instead of filing a complaint with the RIC. It also stated that the instance of OCA Circular
No. 14-2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO,
and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.

For its pmt, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that during and after the
period of her suspension, without the same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and
appeared in courts in the following cases:

x x x (l) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor of Naga City, et. al.),
(2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3)
Other Spec. Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O. Laborado).32

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court
had not yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refi1sed to obey a lawful order
of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.

On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2015-0007 for lack
of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was respondent's motion for reconsideration.33

Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but
a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its 1igid standards, which
include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance with the
rules of the legal profession.36

With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios,37 The Court laid down
the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:

l) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order
of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer tmder oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.38

Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011
suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective immediately.
Respondent filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the
notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered
mail,39 and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to
respondent is not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her
suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration
on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It
thus follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial
of her motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.

In lbana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the Resolution anent her

suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared
as counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six
months in addition to her initial one month suspension, or a total of seven months.

Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty. Lozada, appeared and

signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband, during the period of her suspension from
the practice of law. For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she was
very well aware that when she represented her husband, she was still serving her suspension
order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from
the Court if she can represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty.
Lozada for six months for her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.

Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued
to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the
period of her suspension.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of
law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal
knowledge witl1in the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the
legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.''43 In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the pendency of
his or her suspension.44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of
her suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent
signed pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in
violation of the order of her suspension to practice law.

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an order
from the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law.1âwphi1 To note,
in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of
one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such statement shall be
considered proof of the lawyer's compliance 1Nith the order of suspension.

In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines
for the lifting of the suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter.
However, respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007)
against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so,
respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the
lifting of the order of suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold: 1) she filed
pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to
t1e lifting of such order of her suspension: and 2) she did not comply with the Court's directive
for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order.

Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines
for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months
from the practice of law against respondent is in order.46

WIIEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an
additional period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to infom1 the Court of the date of her receipt of this
Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. 'The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as
member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rolla, pp. 16-19.

2
 Id. at 23-24.

3
 ld. at 20-22.

4
 ld. at 25.

5
 Id. at 16.

6
 Id. at 17.

7
 Id. at 17-18.

8
 id. at 72-77.

9
 CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the com;titution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for Jaw and for legal processes.

10
 Rule 1O1. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct

11
 Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all time uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

12
 Rollo, p. 7 l.

13
 Id. at 82-87; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by
then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin and Mariano C. del Castillo.

14
 Id. at 96.
15
 Id. at 98.

16
 Id. at 103.

17
 ld. at 119-125.

18
 Id. at 99.

19
 Id. at 176.

20
 The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts.
Shari’a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Shari’a Circuit Courts.

21
 Id. at 187.

22
 Id. at 188-192.

23
 Id. at 179-180.

24
 Id. at 200-201.

25
 Id. at 201.

26
 Id. at 203.

27
 631 Phil. 139(2010).

28
 Rollo, p. 264;

29
 Id. at 231-239.

30
 Id. at 266-271.

31
 Id. at 272-273.

32
 Id. at 272.

33
 Id. at 274.

34
 Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, supra note 27 at 145.

35
 Lingan v. Atty. Calubaquib, 737 Phil. 191, 209 (2014).

36
 Id.

37
 Supra note 27.
38
 Id. at 145-146.

39
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 13, Section 9.

40
 763 Phil. 687 (2015).

41
 755 Phil. 349 (2015).

42
 Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada, id. at 354.

43
 Eustaquio v. Navales A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA 377, 384.

44
 Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada, supra note 41 at 354-355.

45
 Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

46
 Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017.
 [G.R. No. 82760. August 30, 1990.]

FELIMON MANANGAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA,

BRANCH 28, Respondent.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases
and pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no
less than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real name is
Andres Culauag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment
for contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.

The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek the annulment of the entire
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by it, dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter alia, that
respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in making it appear that petitioner was
duly tried and convicted when the contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was
irregularly issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property bond.

In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent Court had irregularly
assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
case considering that he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he had
supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.

Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the Decisions in the different
cases filed by petitioner, we recite the relevant ones below.

On 7 November 1977, Petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer

I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p. 98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon Manangan alias Andres
Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with
"Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code (the Criminal
Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by than Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent
Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).

On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with Writ of Preliminary Injunction entitled `Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of
First Instance, Et Al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try the
criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was
dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).

On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up
and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On 31 July 1973, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61,
Rollo), this time identifying the accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon
Manangan, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through alleged counsel posted a bailbond with the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva
Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B, Petition, p. 2).

On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued by Judge Gabriel Dunuan. It is this Alias
Warrant that is challenged herein.

On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Case, which
was denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).

Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva
Vizcaya." The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27 March
1980, finding petitioner, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office and
ordering his dismissal from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February
1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis"
and holding, among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds
by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision). 1

On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be
dismissed on the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such that
respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The Motion was denied.

On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a final judgment of

conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen
to produce the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9
July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by
this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect"
(Annex F, Petition).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in another Petition
for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for
petitioner, this time praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the
ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the crime . . .
was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come
to this Honorable Court through counsel . . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November
1982, Certiorari was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to
show that such dismissal had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the
Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by respondent Court).

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the accused, on 10 February
1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of
the Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.

On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused to declare the case
closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his
bailbond (citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the Court
on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the accused as in full
force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.
No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral,
etc." The Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the
closure and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan Decision and the
Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the Aquino Decision), 3 holding, inter alia, that
"whether or not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan
Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the
action for that purpose may take."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner accused filed an Omnibus Motion with
Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In
the same Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the accused is
brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that:"
(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted
of the offense charged." cralawnad

It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on the Motion to Quash, that
the present Petition was instituted.

The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the Petition is without merit.
Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to Quash before respondent Court and should have
awaited resolution thereon. The had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.

Contrary to petitioner’s pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded
arrest by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication
in the records that the property bond, filed by petitioner accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of
San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner
discharged on the basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged.
Unlike a search warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a
Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court,
therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full
force and effect.

Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of respondent Court arising
from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has
not made it appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried, let alone
convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again, therefore, no grave abuse of discretion
can be attributed to respondent Court.

Petitioner’s argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition that it is the
Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction over the Criminal Case neither holds water
considering that not only is he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands,
Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed from the service on 27
March 1980 by the Director of lands, who found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural
Resources, guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office (CA-GR No. 11588-SP,
p. 2).

The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.

However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out" the
present petition for being fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for
contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be excused from filing a
Comment on petitioner’s Second Amended Petition, which we resolve to grant.

The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in the Criminal shows
that:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M. Culanag, the person charged in Criminal
Case No. 639;

"b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September
29, 1971 in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver died on the spot; and

"c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon Manangan and knowing about the latter’s death,
assumed the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By
means thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer and to actually practice law, using
even the Certificate of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon Manangan which states that
he was admitted to the Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M. Culanag] succeeded in
obtaining a position as Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands."cralaw virtua1aw library

In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person, having been born out of the
lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is
sufficient basis to charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of
prescription.

Petitioner’s posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor General had also
disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner [Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed
Sp. Procs. No. 23 with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch, for the
change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon Manangan. In that petition, he claimed
that his real name is Andres Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name as Filemon
Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the latter being his real name.
The impersonation was carried to the extreme when, in petitioner’s Manifestation, dated 10
February 1983, before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused had died
before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971, the exact date of death of the real
Filemon Manangan. More, petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M.
Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal Case.

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner had also committed
impersonation when, representing himself as Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with
this Court praying that his right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In
those cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres Culanag, an
impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres Culanag to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September
30, 1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not discover that he is a
poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court promising that he would not commit the
same act if he is excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his
explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6)
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, entitled "In Re Andres
Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena v.
Andres Culanag" wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner be
subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental Hospital" after noting that
petitioner was suffering from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat
petitioner’s present liability for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing antecedents, petitioner still has
the gall to claim that he is, in truth and in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand,
without need for more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply establishes that
petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is guilty of continued fraudulent
misrepresentation and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade,
and make a mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions allude to Filemon
Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements
actually refer to the person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long
since dead.

The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the contumacious acts
continue to this day.

WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second Amended Petition are
hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2) petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely
censured, and sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be served at the
Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his appearance during the trial of the subject criminal
case; (3) respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639 from its
archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate dispatch; (4) all Courts are directed
not to recognize any person representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon
Manangan, or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner’s real name is declared to be Andres
Culanag.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. Penned by Justice Milagros A. German and concurred in by Justices Emilio A. Gancayco and
Lino M. Patajo.

2. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, ponente, with Justices B.S. dela Fuente and Edgardo L. Paras,
concurring.

3. Per Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, concurred in by Justices Nestor B. Alampay and

Reynato S. Puno.

4." (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; .
. . ."
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a disbarment complaint[1] filed by Dennis M. Magusara (complainant) on March 1, 2011
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD)
charging Atty. Louie A. Rastica (respondent) of violating Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.[2]

The Facts

On November 14, 2007, Yap-Siton Law Office filed a formal complaint before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) on behalf of its client Ramie P. Fabillar (Ramie), charging
complainant of committing an election offense punishable under Section 261, paragraph (e) of
the Omnibus Election Code.[3] Attached to the formal complaint are Ramie's ComplaintAffidavit,
[4]
 his medical certificate,[5] a police blotter,[6] and Wilson Fabillar's (Wilson) affidavit.[7] Ramie's
complaint-affidavit and Wilson's affidavit were subscribed and sworn to before respondent. On
February 10, 2008, Ramie filed an Affidavit of Desistance[8] before the COMELEC, claiming that
he was surprised to find that there was a complaint for election offense against complainant
supposedly filed by him. He narrated that he thought that what he signed was a complaint for
grave coercion against complainant. Since the contents of the complaint-affidavit prepared by
respondent were not translated to him in the local dialect, he did not understand its meaning
when he signed the same. According to complainant, this alleged act of respondent violated
Section 20(d),[9] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

To support the present complaint, complainant attached several documents which appear to be
pleadings and supporting documents he submitted before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter in
relation to a 2008 disbarment complaint he filed against respondent. Among these documents
are: (1) two affidavits[10] executed by Wilson dated December 7, 2007 and August 5, 2008,
respectively, showing different signatures appearing above his name; (2) a
manifestation[11] dated February 21, 2011 where complainant reiterated his allegations in the
2008 disbarment complaint and accused IBP Negros Oriental Chapter of causing delay in the
proceedings for releasing the resolution only after two years and six months from the filing of the
complaint; and (3) two documents[12] allegedly notarized by respondent despite the expiration of
his notarial commission.

In his answer,[13] respondent maintains that the allegations are baseless and the present
complaint should be dismissed outright for lack of a certification of non-forum shopping. He
claims that the present complaint was instituted by complainant as revenge for having been
defeated by respondent's mother in the election for barangay chairperson. Respondent pointed
out that the facts stated in the complaint-affidavit are similar to those which are declared in the
police and barangay blotters attached therein, and to the complaint-affidavit[14] filed before the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office charging complainant of grave coercion. Aside from these, the
facts and circumstances attested to by Ramie in his complaint-affidavit for the election offense
were corroborated by Wilson's affidavit, which was subscribed and sworn to before Prosecutor
Violeta Baldado. Moreover, Ramie graduated from high school and worked in Metro Manila. His
education and work experience show that he is capable of managing his affairs; thus, he cannot
disavow knowledge and understanding of the contents of his complaint-affidavit in the election
offense. Lastly, the divergence in the affidavits of desistance Ramie executed shows the
influence and deceitful intentions of complainant. In the affidavit of desistance dated February 4,
2008 Ramie filed in the grave coercion case, he said that he was "doubtful of [his] actuations
that [he was] also a paredelicto and that being neighbor and friend, [he] absolutely withdraw the
case."[15] On the other hand, in the affidavit of desistance dated February 10, 2008 Ramie filed
before the COMELEC, the reason he gave for desisting was "I was only made to sign the
Complaint-Affidavit and the same was not translated to me, and the person who prepared the
[same] is the son of Brgy. Chairman Lorna Rastica, Atty. Louie Rastica and the same was not
translated x x x in local dialect so as I can understand."[16] As clarification, he presented an
affidavit executed by Ramie on August 5, 2008 where the latter stated that he fully understood
the contents of the complaint-affidavit for the election offense.[17]

On June 22, 2011, complainant filed his preliminary conference brief, where aside from violation
of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, he included as issue the alleged notarization of
respondent without authority.[18]

On September 9, 2011, complainant filed before the IBP-CBD a verified complaint "in
compliance" with the order of the Investigation Commissioner during the August 19, 2011
hearing. In this verified complaint, complainant accused respondent of violating notarial laws
and rules. Notably, the description of the two documents allegedly notarized without authority is
similar to the two documents presented in the 2008 disbarment complaint filed before the IBP
Negros Oriental Chapter.[19]

During the scheduled clarificatory hearing, only respondent appeared.[20] Both parties failed to
submit position papers.

In his Report and Recommendation dated November 14, 2012, Investigating Commissioner
Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent for lack of merit. He noted that Ramie graduated from high school, where
the English language is the medium of instruction. As such, he "must have been equipped with
the basic learning of the said language and must have fair understanding of the same whether
written or spoken."[21] It is, thus, incredible that he was aware of the contents of the complaint-
affidavit in the grave coercion case he executed and filed which is written in the English
language, yet not have any knowledge of the contents of a similar complaint for election offense
he filed against complainant. Further, Ramie in his affidavit[22] dated August 5, 2008 has already
clarified that he understood the contents of the complaint-affidavit for election offense. There is,
thus, no sufficient evidence showing respondent's supposed breach of his ethical duties.[23] No
discussion was made regarding the alleged notarization of documents without authority.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation to dismiss the
complaint in Resolution No. XX-2013-250.[24] Complainant, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the IBP Board of Governors erred in not taking into consideration
the fact that respondent engaged in notarial practice without authority.[25]

On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-245[26] where it
resolved to grant complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Board of Governors found that
respondent notarized two documents prior to the approval of his notarial commission.
Accordingly, it disqualified respondent from being commissioned as a notary public for a period
of two years and ordered the revocation of his notarial commission, if existing.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[27] He claims that he was not given the chance to
be heard and defend himself because: (1) the issue on the notarization of documents without
authority was not part of the original complaint; and (2) no investigation was ever held to give
him an opportunity to verify the authenticity of the alleged documents notarized without
authority.[28]

The Court's Ruling

We do not agree with the IBP Board of Governors.

At the outset, we note, through complainant's own submissions, that he filed two complaints
against respondent. The first is the 2008 disbarment complaint for violation of the rules on
notarial practice filed before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The second is the present
complaint for violation of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court filed before the IBP-CBD.

We agree with Commissioner Cachapero's finding that there was no substantial evidence to
prove that respondent violated Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Respondent's
narration of facts and the documentary evidence he presented, especially the affidavit of Ramie
clarifying that he understood the contents of the subject complaint-affidavit, substantiated his
claim of innocence.

We also agree with the Commissioner Cachapero in exluding the allegation that respondent
engaged in notarial practice despite the expiration of his notarial commission in his resolution of
the complaint. A review of complainant's pleadings shows that this issue, along with the
documents submitted to support the charge (specifically the compromise agreement between
the Municipal Treasurer of Bindoy, Negros Oriental and Felix Villanueva, Jr. and the verification
executed by Kristie Marie E. Fernandez),[29] were already subject of an earlier investigation by
the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The records also show that the IBP-CBD did not order the
consolidation of these two complaints. From these, it is apparent that the inclusion of the
additional issue (i.e., notarizing documents without authority) in resolving this complaint would
result in a situation where two separate complaints are filed against respondent by the same
complainant concerning the same offense based on the same set of facts.
There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[30] To include this additional ground in the
present complaint would constitute forum shopping as the same is similar to complainant's
cause of action in the 2008 disbarment complaint he filed against respondent. Therefore, we
find that the IBP Board of Governors erred when it took into consideration the additional ground,
which, to repeat, is identical to the charge in an earlier disbarment complaint.

In essence, we find that respondent was able to refute complainant's claim that he violated
Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The additional charge of violating notarial rules,
on the other hand, is already subject of an earlier disbarment proceeding. Consequently, there
is no basis to impose disciplinary action against respondent at this time. The proceedings in the
2008 disbarment complaint filed before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter against respondent
should be allowed to run its course to determine the latter's culpability as to the charge that he
notarized documents without authority. This will also prevent the situation of two or more courts
or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue[31] and ensure
that the proceedings for the disbarment and discipline of attorneys are followed. The procedures
outlined by Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just due. Obviously, these
requirements cannot be taken lightly.[32]

The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only after observing due process and upon
showing of lawyer's administrative guilt by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. This
norm is aimed at preserving the integrity and reputation of the Law Profession, and at shielding
lawyers, in general, due to their being officers themselves of the Court.[33] Further, filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the
administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[34]

The public must be reminded that lawyers are professionals bound to observe and follow the
strictest ethical canons. Subjecting them to frivolous, unfounded, and vexatious charges of
misconduct and misbehavior will cause not only disservice to the ideals of justice, but a
disregard of the Constitution and the laws to which all lawyers vow their enduring fealty.[35]

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XXI-2014-245 dated May 3, 2014 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors is SET ASIDE. The complaint filed against Atty. Louie A.
Rastica is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-6.
[2]
 This disbarment complaint shall be hereinafter referred to as the present complaint.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 48.
[4]
 Id. at 49-50.
[5]
 Id. at 52.
[6]
 Id. at 51.
[7]
 Id. at 53-54.
[8]
 Id. at 7.
[9]
 Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney:

xxxx

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as
are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law[.]
[10]
 Rollo, pp. 12-13, 14-15.
[11]
 Id. at 24-26.
[12]
 The first document is a compromise agreement between the Municipal Treasurer of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental and Felix Villanueva, Jr. (Id. at 16-17). The second document is a verification
executed by Kristie Marie E. Fernandez (Id. at 18).
[13]
 Id. at 29-40.
[14]
 Id. at 42-43.
[15]
 Sic. Id. at 73.
[16]
 Sic. Id. at 7.
[17]
 Id. at 74-75.
[18]
 Id. at 82.
[19]
 Id. at 96.
[20]
 Id. at 103-104.
[21]
 Id. at 112.
[22]
 Id. at 74-75.
[23]
 Id. at 112-113.
[24]
 Id. at 108.
[25]
 Id. at 114-115.
[26]
 Id. at 131-132.
[27]
 Id. at 150-153.
[28]
 Id.
[29]
 See footnotes 12 and 19.
[30]
 De la Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576, 587.
[31]
 Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 454.
[32]
 Cottam v. Laysa, A.C. No. 4834, February 29, 2000, 326 SCRA 614, 619.
[33]
 Domingo v. Rubio, A.C. No. 7927, October 19, 2016, 806 SCRA 411, 422.
[34]
 Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 454.
[35]
 Domingo v. Rubio, supra.

SECOND DIVISION

[ADM. CASE No. 3319. June 8, 2000.]

LESLIE UI, Complainant, v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, Respondent.

 DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disablement against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City 1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University
of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.chanrobles.com.ph:red

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the Respondent. Complainant then

visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal
wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui
and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on
and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March
1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no
avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos
Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. 3 Upon their return to Manila, respondent
did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. 4chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by
a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20,
1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm 5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding
to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in
Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents’ funds. 6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against Respondent.

In her Reply 7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give
birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.chanrobles.com : law library

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Complainant’s evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to
the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and
was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still
living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later
1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant’s evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent’s cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainant’s evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. v.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed 9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However,
the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record
on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos
Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as
claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false
allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her
first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such
act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also
contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her
Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity
and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine
Bar.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she
did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on
what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995, and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner. 17

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this
case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that
upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.
18chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible
for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that
the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to
make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the
fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted
respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person
responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant’s evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and
ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the
house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private
security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent
presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing
the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice
21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with
Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or
shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she
believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with
him.chanrobles.com.ph : red

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondent’s mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her
husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was
the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant’s Memorandum, 24 respondent stated that complainant miserably

failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that such information was made known to Respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report
and Recommendation, finding that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to
believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard
to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio,
Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of
having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x       x       x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross
Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice
of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held: —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to
be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not
only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from
what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps
respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised
prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui’s personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent’s suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos
Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent’s allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting
her.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent’s act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a
marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year
when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense
of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1. Records, Vol. I, p. 5

2. Records, Vol. III, .p. 8.

3. Records, Vol. III, p. 17.

4. Records, Vol. III, pp. 10-11.

5. Rilloraza Africa De Ocampo & Africa Law Offices.

6. Records, Vol. III, p. 12

7. Records, Vol. III, p. 26.

8. Records, Vol. III, pp. 71, 73-74.

9. Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.

10. Records, Vol. III, pp. 113-117.

11. Records, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.

12. Records, Vol. III, 114-115.

13. Art 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath in cases in
which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.

14. Art 184. Offering false testimony in evidence. — Any person who shall knowingly offer in
evidence a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as
guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section.

15. Records, Vol. III, p. 133.

16. Records, Vol. III, pp. 265-287.

17. Records, Vol. III, pp. 275, 281.

18. Records, p. 278 citing TSN dated January 22, 1993, p. 52.

19. Records, Vol. III, pp. 52, 54-56.

20. Records, Vol. III, pp. 71-74.

21. Resolution No. 030, Series of 1992 of the Department of Justice dated December 18, 1991,
Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.

22. Records, Vol. III, pp. 289-300.

23. Records, Vol. III, p. 296.

24. Records, Vol. III, pp. 317-321.

25. Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, (1985).

26. Arciga v. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591, 594 (1981).

27. Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 454, 464 (1998).

28. Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673 citing Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court;
Soberano v. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel v. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil.
587, 591-593; Royong v. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar v. Simbol, April 29,
1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa v. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-
445.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.
A.C. No. 6057             June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent")

for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized
by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property
located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon
City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby

disqualified to own real property in his name – agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
 C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several
documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,

recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a
loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed
that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting
Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable
for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as
Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent
stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of
his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his
family and his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because
the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of
the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from
owning real property.11 Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the
Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided
Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by
preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code
when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for
three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In
re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year
for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of
separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon

1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

 Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Canon 1--A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

2
 Rule 1.01.--A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

3
 Rule 1.02.--A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
lessening confidence in the legal system.

4
 Docketed as I.S. No. 02-2520 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City.

5
 Docketed as I.S. No. 03-0474.

6
 Rollo, pp. 15-16. Emphasis in the original.

7
 Respondent, in turn, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan
docketed as CBD Case No. 03-112.

8
 Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.-

xxx

(b) If the Board, by vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.

9
 E. Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics 35-36 (1994).

10
 In re: Terrell, 2 Phil. 266 (1903).

11
 Rollo, p. 15.

12
 Id. at 99.
13
 In respondent’s 30 December 2002 affidavit, he enumerated all the documents he
prepared for Stier:

A. A Deed of Sale over the property, which Mr. Stier could consolidate in favor of
any person of his choice at anytime;

[Note: The deed of Sale had an open date, and the name of the transferee was
to be indicated by Mr. Stier, at his discretion.]

B. Occupancy Agreement, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the
property for his residence and business operations;

[Note: The Occupancy Agreement was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had
extended to Mr. Donton.]

C. Real Estate Mortgage over the property, which Mr. Stier could enforce
anytime; and

D. Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney to sell, mortgage or lease the property,

which Mr. Stier could exercise anytime.

14
 Article XII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be

transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

15
 In re: Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940).

16
 94 Phil. 277 (1954).

17
 Supra.
A.C. No. 7204             March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty.

Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:

Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal
advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel
and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as
Annex "I") to the concerned parties.

On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to
discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they
did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home
and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on
the cheek and embraced her very tightly.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks
coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in
Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they
met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she
just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of
Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent
stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was
holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his
criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she
decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from
him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other

At 5:33:46 pm lawyer
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage
at 6:17:59 pm of the situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t
Sent by complainant have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the
At 6:32:43 pm situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling.
S sri" (I’m very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the
situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of
feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can
by respondent show u my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it
at 6:42:25 pm again. Will you still see me so I can show you my
sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at
3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I
don’t know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).

Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her
at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really
sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2

In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant;
that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant
matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of
Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions,
complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the
former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue,
where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would
have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.

By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since
she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her
husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was
respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report

and Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month
suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and
adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a
lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly
immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s
actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to
be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of
law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members
of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership
in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the
duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.
The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but
also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not
a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left
cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed
her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.

xxxx

35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed
it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on
her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast
holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except
saying "sexual harassment."

During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas
Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

ATTY. MACABATA:

That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of
Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my
car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen
minutes then she arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I
said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her
to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case,
we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine?
She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her
case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I
said let’s go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed
me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place
where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner
of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand,
I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her
on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, that’s it.

COMM. FUNA:

February 10 iyan.

xxxx

ATTY. MACABATA:

Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we went out,
we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner.
So before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left
cheek. So I kissed her again.

COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?

ATTY. MACABATA:

I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left
hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x
x.14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which
is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.

The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:

In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had
abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court
declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different

women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached
the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man
with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in
asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful
wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself
as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to

legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent
undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of
our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no
other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."

In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute
"a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to
the bar.

In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and

thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality
and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred
from the practice of law.

Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as
mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The
acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on
the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot
be considered grossly immoral.

Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as
a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden
of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel
the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he
who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam
factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply
with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not
suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed
her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message,
respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text
message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the
vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent
truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a
more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral nor
highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are
means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important
function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may
deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated
by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict
compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the
public.

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on
clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character
should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the
moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature
and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law.
The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to
commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should
also be considered.36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.
It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the client.37 In the
Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client,
kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude
and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondent’s
first offense, reprimand would suffice.

We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to
her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse
her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly
subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to
be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-2.

2
 Id.

3
 Id. at 13-20.

4
 Id. at 149-155.

5
 Id. at 148.

6
 Mortel v. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956); Cordova v. Cordova, A.C. No. 3249, 29
November 1989, 179 SCRA 680, 683.

7
 A.C. No. 5082, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 135, 140-141.

8
 Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 708 (2000).

9
 A.C. No. 1512, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.

10
 Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001).

11
 In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar
Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar, B.M.
No. 1154, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 146.
12
 Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582, 589.

13
 Rollo, pp. 27, 35.

14
 TSN, 26 July 2005, pp.18-24.

15
 Ui v. Bonifacio, supra note 8.

16
 446 Phil. 861, 867 (2003).

17
 117 Phil. 768, 776 (1963).

18
 213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).

19
 Supra note 12 at 588.

20
 A.C. No. 1334, 28 November 1989, 179 SCRA 653, 659.

21
 A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 315.

22
 A.C. No. 6148, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 42, 54-55.

23
 A.C. No. 5170, 17 November 1999, 318 SCRA 229, 231.

24
 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).

25
 106 Phil. 256, 259 (1960).

26
 Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr., 375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999); Alfonso v. Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-
904, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 239, 255-256, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.
(1990), p. 751.

27
 Atty. Aquino v. Judge Acosta, 429 Phil. 498, 510 (2002).

28
 Angeles v. Figueroa, A.C. No. 5050, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 186, 195.

29
 Reyes v. Wong, Adm. Case No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63 SCRA 667, 673.

30
 Angeles v. Figueroa, supra note 28.

31
 Uytengsu III v. Baduel, Adm. Case No. 5134, 14 December 2005, 477 SCRA 621,
632.

32
 Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr., A.C. No. 5225, 29 April 2003,401 SCRA 622, 627.

33
 Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS (4th Ed., 1989), p. 445.
34
 In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware Joel D.
Tenenbaum, 6 February 2007.

35
 Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 108, 119.

36
 Id. at 445-446.

37
 Id.

38
 428 N.E. 2 d 786 (Ind. 1981).

[G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000.]

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., Petitioner, v. FASGI ENTERPRISES,

INC., Respondent.

DECISION
 VITUG, J.:

On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America,
entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated
("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian
corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the
United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant to the contract, PAWI
shipped to FASGI a total of eight thousand five hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels, with an FOB
value of US$216,444.30 at the time of shipment, the first batch arriving in two containers and
the second in three containers. Thereabouts, FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels.
Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with
stated requirements, viz;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A. contrary to the terms of the Distributorship Agreement and in violation of U.S. law, the
country of origin (the Philippines) was not stamped on the wheels;

"B. the wheels did not have weight load limits stamped on them as required to avoid mounting
on excessively heavy vehicles, resulting in risk of damage or bodily injury to consumers arising
from possible shattering of the wheels;

"C many of the wheels did not have an indication as to which models of automobile they would
fit;

"D. many of the wheels did not fit the model automobiles for which they were purportedly
designed;

"E. some of the wheels did not fit any model automobile in use in the United States;

"F. most of the boxes in which the wheels were packed indicated that the wheels were approved
by the Specialty Equipment Manufacturer’s Association (hereafter, SEMA’); in fact no SEMA
approval has been obtained and this indication was therefore false and could result in fraud
upon retail customers purchasing the wheels." 1

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. In January 1980, during the pendency of the
case, the parties entered into a settlement, entitled "Transaction" with the corresponding Italian
translation "Convenzione Transsativa," where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would
accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price of
US$268,750.00 via four (4) irrevocable letters of credit ("LC"). The rescission of the contract of
distributorship was to be effected within the period starting January up until April 1980. 2

In a telex message, dated 02 March 1980, PAWI president Romeo Rojas expressed the
company’s inability to comply with the foregoing agreement and proposed a revised schedule of
payment. The message, in part read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are most anxious in fulfilling all our obligations under compromise agreement executed by
our Mr. Giancarlo Dallera and your Van Curen. We have tried our best to comply with our
commitments, however, because of the situation as mentioned in the foregoing and currency
regulations and restrictions imposed by our government on the outflow of foreign currency from
our country, we are constrained to request for a revised schedule of shipment and opening of
LCS.

"After consulting with our bank and government monetary agencies and on the assumption that
we submit the required pro-forma invoices we can open the letters of credit in your favor under
the following schedule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A) First L/C — it will be issued in April 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"B) Second L/C — it will be issued in June 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"C) Third L/C — it will be issued in August 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"D) Fourth L/C — it will be issued in November 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"We understand your situation regarding the lease of your warehouse. For this reason, we are
willing to defray the extra storage charges resulting from this new schedule. If you cannot renew
the lease [of] your present warehouse, perhaps you can arrange to transfer to another
warehouse and storage charges transfer thereon will be for our account. We hope you
understand our position. The delay and the revised schedules were caused by circumstances
totally beyond our control." 3

On 21 April 1980, again through a telex message, PAWI informed FASGI that it was impossible
to open a letter of credit on or before April 1980 but assured that it would do its best to comply
with the suggested schedule of payments. 4 In its telex reply of 29 April 1980, FASGI insisted
that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed schedule of payments, specifically its
undertaking to open the first LC within April of 1980, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened
by April 30, 1980, then . . . [it would] immediately take all necessary legal action to protect [its]
position." 5

Despite its assurances, and FASGI’s insistence, PAWI failed to open the first LC in April 1980
allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and restrictions," prompting FASGI to pursue its
complaint for damages against PAWI before the California district court. Pre-trial conference
was held on 24 November 1980. In the interim, the parties, realizing the protracted process of
litigation, resolved to enter into another arrangement, this time entitled "Supplemental
Settlement Agreement," on 26 November 1980. In substance, the covenant provided that
FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC opened and paid by
PAWI:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. Agreement

"3.1 Sellers agree to pay FASGI Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty and
00/100 Dollars ($268,750.00), plus interest and storage costs as described below. Sellers shall
pay such amount by delivering to FASGI the following four (4) irrevocable letters of credit,
confirmed by Crocker Bank, Main Branch, Fresno, California, as set forth
below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(i) on or before June 30, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-Five
Thousand, Three Hundred Sixty-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($65,369.00), (b) plus interest on that
amount at the annual rate of 16.25% from January 1, 1980 until July 31, 1980, (c) plus Two
Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and 00/100 ($2,940.00) and (d) with interest on that sum
at the annual rate of 16.25% from May 1, 1980 to July 31, 1980, payable on or after August 31,
1980;

"(ii) on or before September 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,940.00), plus (c) interest at
an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, and
on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, payable ninety days
after the date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit;

"(iii) on or before November 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,490.00), plus (c) interest at
an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, and
on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, payable ninety days
after the date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit;

"(iv) on or before January 1, 1981, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Five Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighty and 00/100 Dollars ($5,880.00), plus (c) interest
at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, and on the
amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the date
of the bill of lading under the letter of credit." 6

Anent the wheels still in the custody of FASGI, the supplemental settlement agreement provided
that —chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"3.4 (a) Upon execution of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement, the obligations of FASGI
to store or maintain the Containers and Wheels shall be limited to (i) storing the Wheels and
Containers in their present warehouse location and (ii) maintaining in effect FASGI’s current
insurance in favor of FASGI, insuring against usual commercial risks for such storage in the
principal amount of the Letters of Credit described in Paragraph 3.1. FASGI shall bear no
liability, responsibility or risk for uninsurable risks or casualties to the Containers or Wheels.

"x       x       x

"(e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are delayed past
such date pursuant to the penultimate Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and after such later
date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the Containers or
Wheels." 7

The deal allowed FASGI to enter before the California court the foregoing stipulations in the
event of the failure of PAWI to make good the scheduled payments; thus —

"3.5 Concurrently with execution and delivery hereof, the parties have executed and delivered a
Mutual Release (the ‘Mutual Release’), and a Stipulation for Judgment (the ‘Stipulation for
Judgment’) with respect to the Action. In the event of breach of this Supplemental Settlement
Agreement by Sellers, FASGI shall have the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of
Judgment pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment in the full amount thereof, less credit for any
payments made by Sellers pursuant to this Supplemental Settlement Agreement. FASGI shall
have the right thereafter to enforce the Judgment against PAWI and FPS in the United States
and in any other country where assets of FPS or PAWI may be located, and FPS and PAWI
hereby waive all defenses in any such country to execution or enforcement of the Judgment by
FASGI. Specifically, FPS and PAWI each consent to the jurisdiction of the Italian and Philippine
courts in any action brought by FASGI to seek a judgment in those countries based upon a
Judgment against FPS or PAWI in the Action." 8

In accordance with the aforementioned paragraph 3.5 of the agreement, the parties made the
following stipulation before the California court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned parties hereto, having entered into a Supplemental Settlement Agreement in
this action,

"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between plaintiff FASGI Enterprises, Inc. (’FASGI’) and
defendants Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc., (’PAWI’), and each of them, that judgment may
be entered in favor of plaintiff FASGI and against PAWI, in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty
Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty And 01/100ths Dollars ($283,480.01).

"Plaintiff FASGI shall also be entitled to its costs of suit, and to reasonable attorneys’ fees as
determined by the Court added to the above judgment amount." 9

The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the motion for the entry of
judgment, was executed by FASGI president Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas
Ready.

PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the supplemental settlement
agreement. While it opened the first LC on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on it nine (9)
months after, or on 20 March 1981, when the letters of credit by then were supposed to have all
been already posted. This lapse, notwithstanding, FASGI promptly shipped to PAWI the first
container of wheels. Again, despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI
readily delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in opening and paying the
third and the fourth LCs, scheduled to be opened on or before, respectively, 01 September 1980
and 01 November 1980, and each to be paid ninety (90) days after the date of the bill of lading
under the LC. As so expressed in their affidavits, FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI
president Elena Buholzer were more inclined to believe that PAWl’s failure to pay was due not
to any restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its inability to pay. These doubts
were based on the telex message of PAWI president Romeo Rojas who attached a copy of a
communication from the Central Bank notifying PAWI of the bank’s approval of PAWI’s request
to open LCs to cover payment for the re-importation of the wheels. The communication having
been sent to FASGI before the supplemental settlement agreement was executed, FASGI
speculated that at the time PAWI subsequently entered into the supplemental settlement
agreement, its request to open LCs had already been approved by the Central Bank. Irked by
PAWI’s persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of
California the following stipulation for judgment against PAWI.

"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. in the Courtroom of the Honorable
Laughlin E. Waters of the above court, plaintiff FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. (hereinafter
‘FASGI’) will move the Court for entry of Judgment against defendant PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM
WHEELS, INC. (hereinafter ‘PAWI’), pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment filed concurrently
herewith, executed on behalf of FASGI and PAWI by their respective attorneys, acting as their
authorized agents.

"Judgment will be sought in the total amount of P252,850.60, including principal and interest
accrued through May 17, 1982, plus the sum of $17,500.00 as reasonable attorneys’ fees for
plaintiff in prosecuting this action.

"The Motion will be made under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to
and based upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the Supplemental Settlement Agreement filed
herein on or about November 21, 1980, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
Affidavits of Elena Buholzer, Franck G. Ker and Stan Cornwell all filed herewith, and upon all
the records, files and pleadings in this action.

"The Motion is made on the grounds that defendant PAWI has breached its obligations as set
forth in the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, and that the Supplemental Settlement
Agreement expressly permits FASGI to enter the Stipulation for Judgment in the event that
PAWI has not performed under the Supplemental Settlement Agreement." 10

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. A certificate of finality of

judgment was issued, on 07 September 1982, by the US District Judge of the District Court for
the Central District of California. PAWI, by this time, was approximately twenty (20) months in
arrears in its obligation under the supplemental settlement agreement.

Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a
complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" in February 1983, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order of 11
September 1990, dismissed the case, thereby denying the enforcement of the foreign judgment
within Philippine jurisdiction, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and
clear mistake of law and fact. 11 The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by
PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI
the third and fourth containers of wheels. 12 This situation, the trial court maintained, amounted
to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the trial court said, the supplemental
settlement agreement and the subsequent motion for entry of judgment upon which the
California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr.
Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization.

FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. In a decision, 13 dated
30 July 1997, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the full
enforcement of the California judgment.

Hence this appeal.

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; 14 however, the rules of
comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. 15
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as
the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court
of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a
prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment. 16 A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings
and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders — The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Soorajmull Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc., 17 one of the early Philippine
cases on the enforcement of foreign judgments, this Court has ruled that a judgment for a sum
of money rendered in a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a right between the parties and
their successors in-interest by subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a
Philippine court, such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. In Northwest Orient Airlines,
Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court has said that a party attacking a foreign judgment is
tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this
jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action or
subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best
serve his client’s interest. 19

In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the parties, including
Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case on
26 November 1980 or two (2) days after the pre-trial conference held on 24 November 1980. If
Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement
agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement.
Instead, more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement,
particularly on 09 October 1981, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to
Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. Ready’s supposed lack of authority. On the
contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance
for the impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in
the agreement.

It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the
judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be
heard to complain about it. 20

Nor could PAWI claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from possibly paying
FASGI substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy litigation expenses normally
generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the agreement was afforded time to reimburse
FASGI the price it had paid for the defective wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to
enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms
thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.

PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready’s authority to sign on its behalf the Supplemental Settlement
Agreement but denounced likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before
the California court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had by then already terminated the
former’s services. For his part, Mr. Ready admitted that while he did receive a request from
Manuel Singson of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately
came too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial
Procedures when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would not be
permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the time the stipulation for
judgment was entered into on 26 April 1982 until the certificate of finality of judgment was
issued by the California court on 07 September 1982, no notification was issued by PAWI to
FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready’s services. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by
Mr. Ready who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue
before the forum which issued the judgment in line with the principle of international comity that
a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so
assuming the power of passing judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the
evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal. 21

Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic,
i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered,
22 or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against
whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case
or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of
action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already adjudged, and
it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. 23

Even while the US judgment was against both FPS and PAWI, FASGI had every right to seek
enforcement of the judgment solely against PAWI or, for that matter, only against FPS. FASGI,
in its complaint, explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"17. There exists, and at all times relevant herein there existed, a unity of interest and
ownership between defendant PAWI and defendant FPS, in that they are owned and controlled
by the same shareholders and managers, such that any individuality and separateness between
these defendants has ceased, if it ever existed, and defendant FPS is the alter ego of defendant
PAWI. The two entities are used interchangeably by their shareholders and managers, and
plaintiff has found it impossible to ascertain with which entity it is dealing at any one time.
Adherence to the fiction of separate existence of these defendant corporations would permit an
abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote injustice against this plaintiff because
assets can easily be shifted between the two companies thereby frustrating plaintiff’s attempts
to collect on any judgment rendered by this Court." 24

Paragraph 14 of the Supplemental Settlement Agreement fixed the liability of PAWI and FPS to
be "joint and several" or solidary. The enforcement of the judgment against PAWI alone would
not, of course, preclude it from pursuing and recovering whatever contributory liability FPS
might have pursuant to their own agreement.

PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return the second and the third
containers of defective wheels before it could be required to return to FASGI the purchase price
therefor, 25 relying on their original agreement (the "Transaction"). 26 Unfortunately, PAWI
defaulted on its covenants thereunder that thereby occasioned the subsequent execution of the
supplemental settlement agreement. This time the parties agreed, under paragraph 3.4(e) 27
thereof, that any further default by PAWI would release FASGI from any obligation to maintain,
store or deliver the rejected wheels. The supplemental settlement agreement evidently
superseded, at the very least on this point, the previous arrangements made by the parties.

PAWI cannot, by this petition for review, seek refuge over a business dealing and decision gone
awry. Neither do the courts function to relieve a party from the effects of an unwise or
unfavorable contract freely entered into. As has so aptly been explained by the appellate court,
the over-all picture might, indeed, appear to be onerous to PAWI but it should bear emphasis
that the settlement which has become the basis for the foreign judgment has not been the start
of a business venture but the end of a failed one, and each party, naturally, has had to negotiate
from either position of strength or weakness depending on its own perception of who might have
to bear the blame for the failure and the consequence of loss. 28chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Altogether, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its appealed
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Complaint for Damages filed by FASGI before the US District Court for the Central District of
California, Case No. 79-03661-HP, entitled "FASGI Enterprises v. PAWI and FPS, filed on 21
September 1979." (Rollo, p. 68).

2. Pertinent provisions of the "Transaction" executed between the parties

include:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2) FPS and PAWI accept the return to them of the products supplied to FASGI, at the forfeit
global price of USA$268,750 and more precisely $13,273 for the wheels and bolts supplied by
FPS and to be returned to them, and $253,477 for wheels and caps supplied by PAWI and to be
returned to them.

"3) FASGI therefore agrees to return to PAWI not less than 8,100 wheels plus relative caps, still
in their original packing; agrees to return to FPS the 120 wheels and bolts received;

"4) PAWI reserves the right, recognized by FASGI, to take back the materials supplied — four
containers — either in one lot or in four separate lots, respectively by January, February, March
and April 1980. In case PAWI should opt for the second alternative, It must pay to FASGI the
sum of US$6,000 for storage and custody, provided the withdrawal takes place not later than
the 30th of April, 1980.

"x       x       x

"6) In case all the goods are returned in one lot by January 1980, in payment of the same and
before their shipment from Fresno, PAWI will issue four Letters of Credit, irrevocable, each one
of the same amount, payable at 90-120-150-180 days from the date of the invoice that FASGI
will issue for the goods returned.

"If on the other hand the goods are returned in four lots, the four Letters of Credit, increased
each one by $1,500 covering the amount referred to point 4), will be issued at 90 days from the
date of each shipment, which must be in January, February, March, April 1980.

"However, in both cases, each Letter of Credit must include also the USA current interests
retroactive from the first January 1980 to the each Letter of Credit maturity, in addition to the
fixed amount. Above interests will be calculated on the base of USA current ‘prime rate’,
increased by two points.

‘The Letters of Credit must be accepted and confirmed by Crocker Bank of Fresno, California.

"7) The same method of payment will apply to FPS goods, and precisely Letter of Credit as
above confirmed with expiry 60 days from shipment date and relative interests from the first
January 1980.

"8) FASGI will issue the appropriate invoices for goods returning with interest calculated from
the first January 1980 on the base of USA current rate and precisely the ‘prime rate’ increased
by two points.

9) The judicial proceedings initiated by FASGI ENTERPRISES before the Los Angeles Court
will be abandoned with compensatory costs. The Parties undertake to sign any documents
necessary to formalize the renunciation of any legal action.

"x       x       x

"11) With the issue of the aforesaid Letters of Credit accepted as above and of the payments
having taken place and the return of the wheels as stated above having been carried out, any
and every reason or claim between the Parties, relative to the agreement of exclusive sale as
given in point 1) of the PREMISE, the summons brought before the Los Angeles Court will be
resolved, settled and concluded." (Rollo, pp. 100 101).

3. Rollo, pp. 106.

4. Rollo, p. 107.

5. Rollo, p. 109.

6. Rollo, pp. 88-90.

7. Rollo, pp. 91-92.

8. Rollo, p. 93.

9. Rollo, pp. 113-114.

10. Rollo, pp. 117-118.

11. Rollo, pp. 237-244.

12. Ibid.

13. Penned by Justice Emeterio C. Cui, concurred by Justice Corona Ibay Somera and Justice
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

14. Cuculu v. Louisiana Ins. Co. (La) Mart NS 464.

15. Ibid.

16. Private International Law, Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore, Manila, Philippines, 1995
Edition, p. 543.

17. 33 SCRA 46.

18. 241 SCRA 192.

19. Caballero v. Deiparine, 60 SCRA 136; Acenas v. Sison, 8 SCRA 711.

20. Dungo v. Lopena, 116 Phil. 1305.

21. Salonga, supra., at 558.

22. Labayen v. Talisay-Silay Milling, Co., 40 O.G., 2nd Supp. No. 3, p. 109.

23. Salonga, supra.

24. Rollo, p. 71.

25. See Petition for Review on Certiorari, G.R No. 137378, pp. 14-15.

26. "Transaction", supra.

27. (e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are delayed
past such date pursuant to the penultimate paragraph of Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and
after such later date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the
containers or wheels.

28. Decision, Court of Appeals, 30 July 1997, Rollo, p. 53.

A.C. No. 9881               June 4, 2014

(Formerly CBD 10-2607)

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board
of Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty.
Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a contract on the
complainant's client who had never been a party to the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square"
at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M.
Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr.
and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu.
The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of
internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the
exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty.
Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning
the parking arrangements.

On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina2 for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the
effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the
contract.

In his Answer,3 Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He
maintained that the Times Square Preamble4 was entered into for purposes of maintaining order
in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.5

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases
against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the
Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The
second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were
dismissed.6

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the
Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own
hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter’s
egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a
Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order
dated 12 December 2008.7

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and

Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds:
1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent
Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of
proof of malice or bad faith.8

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9

Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors on 29 December 2012.10 Notices of the denial were received by the parties
on 21 March 2013.11

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with
the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is
derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated
unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on 21 March 2013, as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for
review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15
days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).

Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the
findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered:
quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is
on the complainant.12

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty.
Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that
the Times Square Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a
signatory to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice, however, was not
substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do
the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the
latter. Bare allegations are not proof.13

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held
administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice.
The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an
attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law;
God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to
know all the law. x x x.14

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never
presumed.1âwphi1 It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question
of fact and is evidentiary.15 There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice,
assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of
good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2607.

2
 Rollo, pp. 2-7.

3
 Id at 23-27; Filed on 5 March 2010.

4
 Id. at 8-14.

5
 Id. at 24. Answer, p. 2.

6
 Id at 24-25.

7
 Id. at 25.

8
 Id. at 89-92.

9
 Id. at 88.

10
 Id. at 87.

11
 Id. at 96-97.

12
 De Zuzuarregui Jr. v. Soguilon, 589 Phil. 64 (2008).

13
 Real v. Bello, 513 SCRA 111.

14
 Id.

15
 Magaling vs. Peter Ong, G.R. No. 173333, 13 August 2008, 562 SCRA 152.
A.C. No. 6677               June 10, 2014

EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE

BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D.
SIOTING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainants Euprocina I.

Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie
Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D.
Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him
with making false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in
disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 The Facts

Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties) in

Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International Development
Corp. (Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and construction defects3 in the housing units
and the subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the
monthly amortizations they had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein
complainants Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10, 2002,
while the second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants Balatucan8 on March 3,
2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M. Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and
Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by
herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.

Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission
cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review13 before the
HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said
petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated
that it has not commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the
same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that
Rudex, under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on
September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the
Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC).15

On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another
complaint16 against Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and
the latter’s ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the
certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its Credit and
Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan,17 Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not
aware of any action or proceeding involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal
or agency.18 The said certification was notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19

On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment,
plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of
Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum
shopping attached thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any
knowledge of any similar pending action before any court, tribunal or agency.21

On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was
its counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings
have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or
agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein
complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment
complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition,
complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he
only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against
forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative charges
against him.23

In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 200524 and May 12,
2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment26 on the ground that its
statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the
existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty.
Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.

The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that
the certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps.
Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said
complaint in September 2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May
24, 2002, was already pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its
existence, more so, since both complaints involve the same transaction and essential facts, and
a decision on the rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment
complaint.28 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno
cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s counsel but the
notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject certifications
against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be
held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.29

In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended
penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively
liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.

Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v.
CA32 as follows:

The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement
should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the
certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with
the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes
sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal
thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.33

Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification
against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring
counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied)

In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as
follows:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be
held administratively liable.

Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions
for review assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases
without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment
case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission
cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint
for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as
well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally,
on April 1, 2004,Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against
the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against forum
shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.

Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have
truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even
bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to
deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability.1âwphi1 However, as for the
penalty to be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law was
imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false and
untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a
similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion,
had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year.

Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the
certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a
separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the
document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.35 Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.

Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e.,
that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability
of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule
1.01,Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty.
Beradio,36 to wit:

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it,
the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of
the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 (Emphasis supplied)

In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had
his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a
period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to
additionally impose the same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the
multiplicity of his infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the
office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify
him from being commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded
that:38

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
large must be able to rely upon he acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument.

xxxx

When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand
and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should
surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given
without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a
graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of
his unwarranted actions.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false

declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as
malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, he is
PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial
commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney.1âwphi1 Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-12.

2
 Id. at 167.

3
 Complainants uniformly alleged the following defects in the subdivision and subject
properties:

1. the walls and stairs of the house started to crack;

2. the rain water is oozing in the window;

3. the foundation of the house is weak;

4. bad smell is coming out of the lavatory, comfort room and floor drainage;

5. the water tank is too small for the subdivision, water being supplied is dirty,
unsanitary and not potable and inadequate;

6. defective road, the water stays in the middle of the street;

7. defective clogged drainage;

 8. no garbage disposal;

9. no security guard;

10. no street lights; and

11. no open areas for parks and garden as in the supposed area, the water tank
was installed.

(See id. at 86.)

4
 See the complainants’ individual complaints; id. at 83-139, 260-261, and 275-283.

5
 Id. at 275-283.

6
 Id. at 6 and 83-92.

7
 Id. at 6 and 102-111.

8
 Id. 6 and 112-121.

9
 Id. at 6.

10
 Id. at 6 and 130-139.

11
 Id. at 6 and 122-129.

12
 The HLURB rendered a Judgment by Default in favor of Sioting on May 27, 2003. (Id.
at 7 and 298-304.) The HLURB also rendered a Judgment by Default in favor of
Crisostomo and Marquizo on July 7, 2003 and March 27, 2003, respectively. (Id. at 6.)

13
 Id. at 264. See also petition filed against Sioting; id. at 180-192, against Crisostomo;
id. at 635-650, and against Marquizo; id. at 651-663.

14
 Id. at 7-8, 153, and 171.

15
 Id. at 470. See Decision dated November 18, 2004; id. at 470-475.

16
 Id. at 167-170.

17
 Id. at 171.

18
 The specific portion of the certification against forum shopping of the complaint reads:

4. That [Rudex] has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency.
 5. If I should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency,
I undertake to report such fact to [the HLURB] within five (5) days thereafter. (Id.)

xxxx

19
 Id.

20
 Id. at 13-17, 24-28, 35-40, 46-50, 59-64, and 72-76.

21
 Id. at 2-3.

22
 See id. at 1-9.

23
 Id. at 729-730.

24
 Id. at 476-477. Signed by Housing and Land Use Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino and
Director Belen G. Ceniza.

25
 Id. at 478-479. Signed by Housing and Land Use Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda and
Director Belen G. Ceniza.

26
 Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment were dismissed in favor ofEderlinda
M. Villanueva, Crisostomo, Solis, Balatucan, Batang, and Sioting. (There is no resolution
attached to the records of this case acting on Rudex’s complaint for rescission and
ejectment against Marquizo.)

27
 Rollo, pp. 727-732.

28
 Id. at 730-731.

29
 Id. at 731-732.

30
 Id. at 726. IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-434.

31
 "Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The
established rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of
actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x." (Cruz v. Caraos, 550 Phil. 98, 107 [2007].)

32
 433 Phil. 490 (2002).

33
 Id. at 501-502.

34
 See A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1.
 35
 See Section 2(a) and (e), Rule VI of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, entitled the "2004 RULES
ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE."

36
 541 Phil. 17 (2007).

37
 Id. at 22-23.

38
 Bernardo v. Atty. Ramos, 433 Phil. 8, 15-18 (2002).

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

 RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine

Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI),
another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating
purposes”.  The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and
President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18,
2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President
of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.  He also never received any notice
of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up.  He has never
accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI.  She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply
with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for
voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter.  She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting
held on March 3, 2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder.  Atty. Limpin said that on October 13,
2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed
of Assignment concerning shareholdings.  Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he
would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008.  Guarin, however, neglected to show up at
the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin.  On the strength of Guarin’s
positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s
Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s
signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors
and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso
de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a
defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured.  She averred that this
Court held that “when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in
court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.”11 During the mandatory preliminary
conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was
dismissed as to Guarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment.  She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any
unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of
the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three
months.  It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder
of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD.  Neither was there proof
that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank accounts. 
This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or
designate directors or officers of Legacy.  Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not
legally permissible.  Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon
and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the company. 
The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment
since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and these do not
show that Guarin was a stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. 
Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of
the IBP Board of Governors.

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure,
rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19  A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.  As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed
his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.  Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that
there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23  It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS.  While she posits
that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she
made a due verification of the statements contained therein.  That Atty. Limpin believed that
Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. 
We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was
in fact a stockholder.  We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of
law.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1,

Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2475. Rollo, pp. 2-5.
2
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1 provides:

Canon  1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
3
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.01 provides:

Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
4
Rollo, p. 10. The November 27, 2008 GIS states as follows:

CORPORATE NAME: LEGACY CARD, INC.

DIRECTORS / OFFICERS
NAME INC’R BOARD STOCK OFFICER EXEC
HOLDER COMM
CELSO DE LOS ANGELES, JR. Y Y N/A N
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN N C Y PRES N
NAMNAMA D. PASETES N M Y TREAS N
ERIC PURUGGANAN N M Y N/A N
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN N Y CORP N
SEC
CAROLINA G. HINOLA N M Y N/A N
ROY A. HILARIO N M Y N/A N

(Other informations omitted)

5
 Id. at 58-60.  But see rollo, p. 8 where GIS states that Date of Actual Meeting was March 10,
2008.
6
 Id. at 66.
7
 Id. at 67.
8
 Id. at 68.
9
 I.S. No. XV-05-INV-09C-00982.
10
 I.S. No. XVI-INV-09B-0128.
11
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
12
 Id. at 93.
13
 Id. at 165-168. Penned by Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa.
14
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,  Rule 1.02 provides:

Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
15
Rollo, p. 167.
16
 Id. at 164.
17
 Id. at 148-152.
18
 Id. at 162-163.
19
Suico Industrial Corp. v. Lagura-Yap, G.R No. 177711, September 5, 2012, 680 SCRA 145,
162.
20
Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, 526 Phil. 1, 5 (2006).
21
In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191, 194 (1922).
22
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
23
 Corporation Code, Sections 23 and 25, provide:

SEC. 23.  The Board of Directors or Trustees. – Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business
conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or
trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among
the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are
elected and qualified.

Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of
which he is a director, which share shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation. Any
director who ceases to be the owner of at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the
corporation of which he is a director shall thereby cease to be a director. Trustees of nonstock
corporations must be members thereof. A majority of the directors or trustees of all corporations
organized under this Code must be residents of the Philippines.

SEC. 25. Corporate officers, quorum. – Immediately after their election, the directors of a
corporation must formally organize by the election of a president, who shall be a director, a
treasurer who may or may not be a director, a secretary who shall be a resident and citizen of
the Philippines, and such other officers as may be provided for in the bylaws.  Any two (2) or
more positions may be held concurrently by the same person, except that no one shall act as
president and secretary or as president and treasurer at the same time.

The directors or trustees and officers to be elected shall perform the duties enjoined on them by
law and by the bylaws of the corporation. Unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws
provide for a greater majority, a majority of the number of directors or trustees as fixed in the
articles of incorporation shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of corporate business, and
every decision of at least a majority of the directors or trustees present at a meeting at which
there is a quorum shall be valid as a corporate act, except for the election of officers which shall
require the vote of a majority of all the members of the board.

Directors or trustees cannot attend or vote by proxy at board meetings. (Emphasis supplied)
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457               February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of
the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he
married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In
1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in
Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their
marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At
the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth
was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When
Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733.
Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against
moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint
against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for
Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP
for investigation, report and recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the
facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of
the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the
same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the
phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued
that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude.
Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and
desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on
the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide.
The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded
the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas
maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001
following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor
Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this
Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading
to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be
a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to
have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the
early morning of June 3, 1993.

The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the
earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v.
Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks
who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural
display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate over
reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred
for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño
alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that
the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He
further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and
thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his
wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for
bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He
alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.

On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying
Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C.
No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C.
No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-
2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of
the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this
Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x
x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion
or exclusion as the cases are reached.7

In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of
HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances
show the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house
when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle,
and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less,
from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they
turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran
away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he
heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process.
Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño
in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his
house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong
place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño
that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and
political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory
penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only
states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL
SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court
and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4
months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an
indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can
grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the
law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that
shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his

receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE (On leave)

CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(no part)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1
 G.R. No. 97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760.

2
 Rollo (A.C. No. 10457), pp. 275-276.

3
 515 Phil. 635 (2006).

4
 Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA
366.

5
 Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, 24 July 2012, 677 SCRA 352.

6
 Supra note 1.

7
 Supra note 1, at 768.

8
 372 Phil. 762 (1999).

9
 Id. at 795.

10
 161 Phil. 437 (1976).

11
 Id. at 441.

12
 Id.

13
 Rollo (A.C. No. 10457), p. 154.

14
 Id.

15
 Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution. See Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 75025, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 356.

16
 Cabantag v. Wolfe, 6 Phil. 273 (1906).

17
 Article 94, Revised Penal Code.

18
 Rollo (A.C. No. 10457), p. 155.
 19
 Overgaard v. Atty. Valdez, 588 Phil. 422 (2008).

20
 Id.

21
 Id.

A.C. No. 10050, December 03, 2013

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERLINDA ESPEJO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty.
Erlinda Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts

Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio
(Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in
need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her
(Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty.
Espejo where they discussed the terms of the loan.  Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as
her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same
meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the
amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued
and turned over to Victoria a check1 dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five
thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest.

On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason
that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check.
However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to
whether or not the check was already funded enough.

In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment
of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check
bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated
demands.

Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit
to her account the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of
the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.

Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for
instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3, 2009.3 When Atty.
Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18,
2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.4

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office which she personally received and continued to ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended
only one (1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.5

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount
of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the
said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6

Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. On
November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without Atty. Espejo’s participation.7

Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD.

On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an
Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint failing
which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any
Answer.

On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner Villanueva-

Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The
notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her right
to participate in further proceedings.9

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10 Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala

issued an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear during the mandatory conference and
her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in default. Victoria, on the
other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper, which she filed on June 11,
2010.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the
suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of
five (5) years. The CBD reasoned:
The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear
on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.

Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated
demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for
preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her
for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary
action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five
(5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP
250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time
the demand was made. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondent’s grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to
complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to
Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of this case.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.

Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegations that she issued
unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to
pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned.16 Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained that
the prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered
no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both
verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although
he acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made
arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor
shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent
must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay
his financial obligations.17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private
capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. As We have held in several cases,
a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also
for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.  While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the
Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally
unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer.18

In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is
exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyer’s low regard for her
commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession she should hold in high esteem.

xxx

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he
was convicted in the criminal case filed against him.

In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-
year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-
lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks
in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the
orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts
to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must
maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted
authorities, including the IBP: 
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the
IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the
mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave
him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this
directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct
unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal
processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also
to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the
directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01;
Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended
by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.

We, however, cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the
money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our
only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other.21 Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action,
but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the complainant.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and of violating

Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law for two (2) years, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and
recorded in the personal files of respondent.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, p. 34. The Real Bank Check No. 3026852, Annex “A” of Victoria C. Heenan’s Position
Paper.
2
 Id. at 35. The Real Bank Check No. 3152815, Annex “B” of Victoria C. Heenan’s Position
Paper.
3
 Id. at 36. Annex “C” of Victoria C. Heenan’s Position Paper.
4
 Id. at 38.
5
 Id. at 21-22.
6
 Id. at 50.
7
 Id. at 22.
8
 Id. at 10.
9
 Id. at 11.
10
 Id. at 12.
11
 Id. at 13.
12
 Id. at 17-45
13
 Id. at 49-51.
14
 Id. at 48.
15
 Id. at 47.
16
Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227.
17
 A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006, 483 SCRA 154, 159-160.
18
Lao v. Medel, supra note 16, at 233.
19
Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1, 8, 10.
20
 A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 402, 408.
21
Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8232, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 700.
22
Ronquillo v. Cezar, A.C. No. 6288, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 1, 8.
A.C. No. 6760               January 30, 2013

ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed.

In his complaint,1 Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of
Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special
Proceeding No. 99-95587,2 involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro.
While the settlement proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted
Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207,3 for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance
and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases,
according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of
Atty. Gonzales.

Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted,
however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in
terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant
only filed the disbarment case to harass him.4

The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings

In our Resolution5 dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation6 dated July 5, 2010,
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping.

According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No.
00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate
property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-
Marcial.

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was
the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs,
Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the
heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of administration so that Manuela’s properties could be
inventoried and settled in accordance with law.

In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held
by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They
alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked the
trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names.

The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other.
Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207
without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum
shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping
and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the
practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe
penalty.

The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioner’s recommendation. In a

resolution7 dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.

The Issue
The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping
and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, but we modify the commissioner’s recommended penalty to censure
and a warning that another violation would merit a more severe penalty.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari.8

There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought.9

Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case
No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.

Identity of Parties

An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207.
In both cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato, Teodoro-Marcial,
Jorge I. Teodoro, Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T. Teodoro. They represented
the same interest in both cases. All claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners
of the land that she held in trust for them.

Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the sole
defendant in Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same interest, as
transferee-owner of the lot allegedly held in trust by Manuela.

Identity of causes of action

The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken, but on
whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action.10 The heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the
form of their action or by adopting a different method of presenting it.11

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over the case,
as Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate, Manila, which was the
sole property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included in her estate, has been sold to
Rogelio and Anastacio when Manuela was still alive. The trial court did not give credence to
their claim that Manuela held the property in trust for them.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting Anastacio’s
Motion for Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had been unable to prove
their claim that Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither were they able to prove that
the sale of a portion of the lot to Anastacio was void.

In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had to be
decided by the trial court. The initiating parties’ claim in the two cases depended on the
existence of the trust Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence necessary to
prove their claim was the same.

Identity of relief sought

In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration, the liquidation of Manuela’s estate, and its distribution among her legal heirs.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment of the
deed of absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to
cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter, and to issue a new
one in their names.

While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in form, a
ruling in one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot been
declared as part of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, there would
have been no need for a decision annulling the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207. Conversely,
had the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207 been annulled, then the property would go back to the
hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing the property under administration, as prayed for in
Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, would have been unnecessary.

Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are substantially
similar in the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res judicata are present, Atty.
Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating
that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending.

As Commissioner Dulay observed:

Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue
of trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that
he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case xxx

To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second case
(annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar issue
would constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to
advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate assertion that there was
no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to
promote respect and obedience to the law.12

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes this obligation."13
The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice
clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings.14 Willful and deliberate forum
shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.15

In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice,16 and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court
processes.17

To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all the
circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioner’s recommended penalty of suspension
consistent with prior rulings of the Court.

In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al.18 we severely censured Renecio
Espiritu, the counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a similar
petition had been filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of direct contempt.

The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty. Gonzales
misused court processes in contravention of the express rule against forum shopping. We held
then that Espiritu should be penalized and we imposed the penalty of censure —the penalty
usually imposed for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.19

Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyer’s duty to the Court or the
client.20 As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales’ act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey
and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes.21 It also violated his duty as an officer of the court
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.22

WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty.
Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of
his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand should be
attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales’ personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-8.

2
 Id. at 14-16.

3
 Id. at 19-23.

4
 Id. at 39-45.

5
 Id. at 46.

6
 Id. at 145-154.

7
 Id. at 144.

8
 Polanco v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182426, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 489, 495.

9
 Id. at 495-496.

10
 Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company, 172 Phil. 237, 241 (1978).

11
 Linzag v. CA, 353 Phil. 506, 518 (1998), citing Filinvest Credit Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66641 March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 59, 63;
Sangalang v. Caparas, L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 53; and Ibabao v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, L-74848, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 76, 85.

12
 Rollo, pp. 153-154.

13
 Lim v. Atty. Montano, 518 Phil. 361, 371 (2006).

14
 Ibid.

15
 Additional requisites for civil complaints, petitions and other initiatory pleadings filed in
all courts and agencies, other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, to
prevent forum shopping or multiple filing of such pleadings.

16
 Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility.

17
 Rule 12.04 of Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility.

18
 218 Phil. 692, 697 (1984).
 19
 Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600, 617.

20
 Ibid.

21
 Rule 12.04 of Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility.

22
 Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility.

A.C. No. 4697, November 25, 2014

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

A.C. NO. 4728

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

DECISION
 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with

conditions,1 including continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. 
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a
consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.2 
Failure to live by the standards of the legal profession and to discharge the burden of the
privilege conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the suspension or revocation of that
privilege.

The Factual Antecedents

Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with
right of repurchase) to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga,
Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00.  Under
the said deed, respondent represented that he has “the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee
simple” the subject property and that the said property is “free from all liens and
encumbrances.”3  The deed also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years
within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased within the said period, “the
parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement.”4

Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and
no renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand
dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property.  Complainant remained in peaceful
possession of the property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank
of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to
RBAI, that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should
therefore vacate the property.5

Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation.  He learned the following:

(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;

(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife
on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27, 1979 between PNB and
respondent;

(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on
the property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.6

Complainant was subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.7

Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144.  The Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte approved the Resolution8 dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding
that “[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x
has been committed and that respondent herein is probably guilty thereof.”9  Accordingly, an
Information10 dated January 8, 1996 was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay,
Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1
and 2 of the Revised Penal Code,11 committed as follows:

On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera,
Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and
owner at that time was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de
Retro Sale which accused executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981,
without first redeeming/repurchasing the same.  [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s]
unlawful act only on or about the last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed
him of the property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered
damages and was prejudiced by accused[’s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.

The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-
A.

Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing
before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental
Complaint13 dated February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No.
4728, respectively.  In both complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.

The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.14

In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied
that his agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale.  He claimed that it was an
equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the
produce of the land, the total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the

IBP Board of Governors

In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” but later on claimed that
the agreement was one of equitable mortgage.  Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud
when he represented in the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981
that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of
the said certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17,
1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB).  Respondent made
matters even worse, when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-
7235 under his and his wife’s name on January 4, 1982 without informing complainant.  This
was compounded by respondent’s subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to
the acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of complainant.  Thus, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice
of law for one year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more
severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retro sale, with interest at the legal rate.

Considering respondent’s “commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral

turpitude, acts of dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit,” the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with
modification as follows: respondent is (1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with
warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to
return the sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration of the pacto de retro sale, with legal
interest.17

The Court’s Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to
return the P15,000.00 consideration, plus interest.

Respondent does not deny executing the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated
December 2, 1981 in favor of complainant.  However, respondent insists that the deed is not
one of sale with pacto de retro, but one of equitable mortgage.  Thus, respondent argues that he
still had the legal right to mortgage the subject property to other persons.  Respondent
additionally asserts that complainant should render an accounting of the produce the latter had
collected from the said property, which would already exceed the P15,000.00 consideration
stated in the deed.

There is no merit in respondent’s defense.

Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one
of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction
with complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the
highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from
lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable.

When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to
“obey the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion.”18  He gravely violated his oath.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed,
that respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” as he was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument.  Respondent
could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself
and complainant as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee,” respectively, rather than as “vendor
a retro” and “vendee a retro.”  If only respondent had been more circumspect and careful in the
drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could
have been avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved.  His imprecise and misleading wording
of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal competence on his part.  He thereby fell short
of his oath to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion.”

More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human
relations as embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a
lawyer, he should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an
instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the contracting parties.  A lawyer who drafts a
contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the
contracting parties.  Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties
will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties.  Indeed, the
uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation of the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” was a significant factor in the legal controversy between respondent and
complainant.  Such poor formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal
competence of respondent.

Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,19 the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired
the subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor
of a purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final,
such purchaser becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a
memorandum thereof shall be “indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original certificate.”20  TCT No. T-
662, which respondent gave complainant when they entered into the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981, does not bear such memorandum but only a
memorandum on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment
of the mortgage.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into
the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981 with the latter.  He made
it appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving
complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT
had already been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. 
He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed when he was subsequently
issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a month after the
execution of the said deed.  All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty
and deceit against complainant.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal
processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto.  On the other
hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22

Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient
to, or disregards the law is “unlawful.”  “Unlawful” conduct does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.23

To be “dishonest” means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be

untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straightforwardness.  On the other hand, conduct that is “deceitful” means as follows:

[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal
terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed
acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.24

The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase” clearly fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct.  They
violate Article 19 of the Civil Code.  They show a disregard for Section 63 of the Land
Registration Act.  They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on respondent’s part. 
Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court’s
referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused
delay in the resolution of these administrative cases.

In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint in

A.C. No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25,
1997, respectively.25  While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit
his comment, no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a
Resolution dated February 4, 1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for such failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.26 
Respondent neither showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, nor submitted the consolidated comment.

When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his
consolidated answer.  He only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this
Court originally required him to do so.  The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties
to submit their respective position papers.  Despite having been given several opportunities to
submit the same, respondent did not file any position paper.27

Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner,
which caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.

xxxx

Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.

Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a
disciplinary sanction before.  In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.

Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.

The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return
the sum of P15,000.00 he received from complainant under the “Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase.”  This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the
present administrative cases.

In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that “[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar.  Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.  Our
findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.”  While the respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the
same time to criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the law
applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.  Section 5,30 in relation to Sections
131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, such as the ones
at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal
cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases.  Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.33

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative
cases, complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3112-A, before the MTC.  When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.34  Unless the
complainant waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, then his civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. 
The civil liability that complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A includes restitution;
reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for consequential
damages,35 which may already cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the
subject property.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyer’s

Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing
undue delay of these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar
misconduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Manzano v. Atty. Soriano, 602 Phil. 419, 421 (2009).
2
 Preamble, 2nd paragraph, American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1983), cited in Code of Professional Responsibility (Annotated), p. 1.
3
 Joint Memorandum for complainant, rollo, Vol. III, pp. 173-205, 173-174, 192-193.
4
 Id. at 192-193.
5
 Id. at 174-175, 195-197.
6
 Id. at 175, 198-203.
7
 Id., Vol. II, p. 67.
8
 Id. at 21-25.
9
 Id. at 24.
10
 Id. at 26.
11
 ART. 316.  Other forms of swindling. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than
three times such value, shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell,
encumber, or mortgage the same;

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same,
although such encumbrance be not recorded[.]
12
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-5.
13
 Id., Vol. II, pp. 1-7.
14
 Id., Vol. I, p. 51; Resolution dated February 14, 2000.
15
 Id., Vol. III, pp. 146-154.
16
 Id., Vol. II, pp. 52-69.
17
 Id. at 50-51, Notice of Resolution.
18
 The Lawyer’s Oath states in full:

I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphases
supplied.)
19
 Act No. 496 enacted on November 6, 1902.
20
 Section 63 of the Land Registration Act provides:

Sec. 63. Mortgages of registered land may be foreclosed in the manner provided in the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings. A certified copy of the final decree of the
court affirming the sale under foreclosure proceedings may be filed with the register of deeds
after the time for appealing therefrom has expired, and the purchaser shall thereupon be entitled
to the entry of a new certificate and to the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate, a
memorandum thereof being at the same time likewise indorsed upon the mortgagor’s
original certificate and the mortgagee’s duplicate, if any, being first delivered up and
canceled: Provided, however, That nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to prevent
the mortgagor or other person interested from directly impeaching by any proper legal
proceedings any foreclosure proceedings affecting registered land, prior to the entry of a new
certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied.)
21
 It appears from the annotations/memoranda at the back of TCT No. T-3211 that said
certificate of title was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 when the deed of sale dated March 27,
1979 between PNB and respondent was registered with the Register of Deeds. Respondent,
however, lost his owner’s duplicate and was issued a new copy of such owner’s duplicate on
January 4, 1982.  (Rollo, Vol. III, p. 200.)
22
 Code of Professional Responsibility (Annotated), pp. 1, 16.
23
 Id., citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1536.
24
 Id. at 6-7.
25
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 25, and Vol. II, p. 37, respectively.
26
 Id., Vol. I, p. 40.
27
 Id., Vol. III, pp. 222-224, Order dated January 24, 2005.
28
 492 Phil. 450, 460 (2005).
29
 A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 700.
30
 SECTION 5.  Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
31
 SECTION 1.  Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.  In determining
where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial.  The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
32
 SECTION 2.  Proof beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.  Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty.  Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
33
Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 1, 12-13.
34
 Rule 111, Section 1(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
35
 Articles 104 to 107 of the Revised Penal Code.
 A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days
from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the
status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the
Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only
on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed
his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be
reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the
morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8,
2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her
legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal
services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to
the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a
loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having
trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount
of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the
high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the
service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the
fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent
was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When
asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to
handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the
trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were
not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point
of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant
obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount
of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of
P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant
prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance.
Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally
checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was
not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him
to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to
include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the
defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a
message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon
reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included.
On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was
also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998
to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise
admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered
the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction
was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in
the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed
with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant
who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said
that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in
the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that
another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the
nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the

receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in
the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations
long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was
never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found

respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to
return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting
to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a
motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG
that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a
corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration
but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1)
year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
 The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies
the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The
Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to
the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be
incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee,
when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only
expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith
expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes
on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.”28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should
be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts
from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the
excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the
case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that
he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme
penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be
used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust
but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their
utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his
claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The
absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of
the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent
was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that
he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the
rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out
of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.
Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients
are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is
a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court
cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was
the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity
of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof
were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made
exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent
that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the
validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully
that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with
each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient
punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant
in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer
to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each
other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative
cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla
but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately
related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable
for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against
him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in

violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of
P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Peralta, J., no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 192-193.
2
 Id. at 5-9.
3
 Id. at 9.
4
 Id. at 35.
5
 Id. at 43.
6
 Id. at 45-49.
7
 Atty. Loreto C. Ata, Commissioner, Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
8
Rollo, pp. 44.
9
 Id. at 110-120.
10
 Id.
11
 Id. at 11.
12
 Id. at 12-13.
13
 Id. at 14.
14
 Id. at 15.
15
 Id. at 16.
16
 Id. at 29.
17
 Id. at 31.
18
 Id. at 31-32.
19
 Id. at 101.
20
 Id. at 33.
21
 Id. at 45-49.
22
 Id. at 86-97.
23
 Id. at 136-139.
24
 Id. at 145-161.
25
 Id. at 162-165.
26
 Id. at 168-179.
27
Navarro v. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014, citing Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No.
8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699.
28
Belleza v. Macasa, 611 Phil. 179, 190 (2009).
29
Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing, A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012, 678 SCRA 68.
30
Belleza v. Macasa, supra note 28, at 191.
31
Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 48, 63.
32
Yuhico v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 684, 688.
33
Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 76, 81.
34
Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 472, citing Hilado v. David, 84
Phil. 576, 579 (1949).
35
Catu v. Rellosa, 569 Phil. 539, 550 (2008).
36
Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.
37
Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio, 520 Phil. 538, 552 (2006).
38
Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, 611 Phil. 399, 410 (2009).
39
 A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 1.
40
Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).
41
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, 429 Phil. 47, 54 (2002).
42
Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, 523 Phil. 17, 19 (2006).
43
Suzuki v. Tiamson, 508 Phil. 130, 142 (2005).
44
 Id.

G.R. No. 137590            March 26, 2001

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of
the family.1 It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of
morality and provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability.2 Marriage is
immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes
irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.

However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab
initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it
so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the justification.3 Where it applies and is duly proven, a
judicial declaration can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences
stemming from their marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application
of procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly
devolves upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure.
Should there be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand
the case to the lower court for proper trial.

The Case

What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals5 which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City6 dismissing petitioner Florence
Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.

The Facts

On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent
Philipp T. Sin (hereafter "Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish
in San Miguel, Manila.7

On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a
complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp.8 Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.

On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.9

On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.10

After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant."11

On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.12

On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.13

Hence, this appeal.14

The Court's Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson15 filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties,16 he did not actively
participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing
more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal
to contribute to the proceedings.

The Family Code mandates:

"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).

"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be
prevented (i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation
of the State was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution
requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement:

"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,17 briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (italics ours)."18

The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case
not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the
"manifestation" filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any
pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely
rendered" since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.

Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

Obiter Dictum

For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows
(omitting guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
 "(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts."

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.

Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Article 1, Family Code of the Philippines.

2
 Article XV, Section 1, "The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development." Section 2, "Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State."

3
 Article 36, Family Code of the Philippines, "A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

4
 Via an appeal under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

5
 In CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998, Callejo, Sr., ponente, Umali
and Guttierez, JJ., (now an Associate Justice of this Court), concurring.

6
 In Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995, Judge Jose S. Hernandez, presiding.

7
 Regional Trial Court Record, p. 37.

8
 Petition, Rollo, p. 16.

9
 Regional Trial Court Record, pp. 81-83.

10
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, CA Rollo, p. 3.
 11
 Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 45.

12
 Petition, Rollo, p. 15.

13
 Petition, Rollo, p. 16; CA Rollo, p. 142.

14
 On August 30, 1999, we resolved to give due course to the petition, Rollo, p. 144.

15
 4th Asst. Provincial Prosecutor.

16
 Regional Trial Court Record, p. 17.

17
 No such certification appears in the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.

18
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 679-680 (1997).

19
 G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001.

20
 Supra, Note 18, pp. 676-678.

A.C. No. 9872               January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P.
Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the
case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the
release of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the
subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The
agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed
to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to
PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the
filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the
expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent
received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came
out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s
services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of
30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from
Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the
property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would
not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of
10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in
Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also
agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan
as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an
account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce,
Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against
an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under
the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-
square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to
Navarro.

However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a
total of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon.
In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When
complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.

In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent
countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants
also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high
interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his
son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the
identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-
square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that
it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him
that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed
the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages
and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to
Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because
the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro
was valuable and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him.
Respondent also denied that he was hiding from complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for
September to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that
complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account and they were the
ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he
already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it could be
completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February
2006 and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the
IBP-CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD
found that based on the documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good
faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to
pay the very high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in
accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and
her husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also
mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was
only ₱300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000.
Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later
claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the
amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all
the money he borrowed in three months except for his claim that the price of sugar went down.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of
the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed
them that it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with
Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration
of Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he

mortgaged to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
 (6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received
from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records
were not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD
likewise found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his
cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be
instead imposed upon respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no
longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the
interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-
square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only
₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property.
Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that
he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only
claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that
they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to
agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged
to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued
to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks
belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity.2 The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity.
Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-
client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a
loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he
mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made
a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with
respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the
terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates
were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same
MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was
similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will
show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the
IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could
not account for all of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent
received ₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate
taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he
paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he
paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not
substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been
less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of
Yulo’s property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo
who had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent
received ₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how
respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he
received from Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from
his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1 Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.5

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the
time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his
son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks
issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already
closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes
that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage
of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see
no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the
penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession.7 Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to
secure undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we
cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his
unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his
client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of
the Bar.9 Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. 10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to
file against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a
particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting
to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does
not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his
client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must
return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero,
amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this
order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, 21 April 2010, 618 SCRA 693.

2
 Id.

3
 Id.

4
 Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, 23 July 2009, 593 SCRA 549.

5
 Id.

6
 Frias v. Atty. Lozada, 513 Phil. 512 (2005).

7
 Tabang v. Atty. Gacott, A.C. No. 6490, 9 July 2013.

8
 Id.

9
 Roa v. Moreno, supra note 1.

10
 Id.

11
 Id.

12
 Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, 15 November 2011, 660 SCRA 48.

13
 Id.
A.C. No. 11078

VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath
for deceiving the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.

Antecedents

In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
sent several demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid obligations secured
by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City.2 To avoid the
foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond
Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the status of the obligations.
Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and
that the matter of the mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was
not around at that time.

On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and
Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to
redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure.3
In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their intention to
redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and scheduled an
appointment with them on August 30,2013.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around 1:30
p.m., carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired
on the status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented them on the
procedure for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who
signed an acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two acknowledgment receipts for
the redemption price and for litigation expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC
identification card. Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents
for redemption were ready for their mother's signature.6

On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter7 that she had
signed, along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter
reads:

Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff

Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City

Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013

Dear Atty. Dabalos,

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property
covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as to the full
redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.

Thank you.

Truly yours,

(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the redemption,
but discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On
September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
where she was attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under process,
and that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three weeks time.9

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally
went to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On November 27,
2013 to inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent had
not deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the
property.10

On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial
Court in Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their demand letter
requiring her to return the amount she had received for the redemption.11 She acknowledged the
letter and promised to return the money on December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in
Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not show up for her
subsequent scheduled hearings in Branch 145.12

With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought their
disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1âwphi1

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend the
mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex
parte.13

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and Recommendation,14 whereby

he found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension from the
practice of law for two years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal
interest from December 2, 2013.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as stated in its
Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15 viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the
oath may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other
commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and
moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also
essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession.17 Any conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the
complainants after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the
redemption in their mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the
redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough,
however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to
have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by
falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them
the real story that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured
them she would do. Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part
with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a
lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal
Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with
competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to
neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her
liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to
communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect
and dishonesty attending her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent
within the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.20The Code exacted
from her not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their
fiduciary relationship.21

Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent
to her by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her
undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the
authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her
irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It
cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court
and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has
particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney misconduct.22

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the
IBP Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of law,
and her return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is
not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction
of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the
clients' interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing
with trusting clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too willing to
repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal
professional. In this connection, we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty
by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering
that she had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return
of the P350,000.00 to the complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair
and just because she did not comply in the least with her ethical undertaking to work on the
redemption of the property of the mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned
against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of

violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of
P350,000.00 within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court
written proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE (On Leave)

CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

*
 On leave.

**
 On official leave.

1
 Rollo, pp. 9-11.

2
 Id. at 12.

3
 Id. at 3

4
 Id. at 14.

5
 Id. at 15-16.

6
 Id. at 4.

7
 Id. at 17.

8
 Id. at 18.

9
 Id. at 5.

10
 Id.

11
 Id. at 19.

12
 Id. at 6.

13
 Id. at 37.

14
 Id. at 37-38.

15
 Id. at 36.

16
 Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April I, 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 179.

17
 Penilla v. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA l, 11.

18
 Arroyo-Posidio v. Vitan, A.C. No. 6051, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA l, 8.
 19
 Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility

20
 Re. Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty.
Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV. Regional Trial Court, Oras, Eastern Samar, A.M. No.
P-06-2177, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 25, 28-29.

21
 Anacta v. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA 352, 360.

22
 Pesto v. Millo, A.C. No. 96 J 2, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 281, 289-290.

23
 Agpa1o, legal Ethics, 2009 ed., p. 518.

A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015

FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court’s disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment
complaint against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused
of gross misconduct.

Antecedents

Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC
San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a
complaint for illegal dismissal brought against CVC (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-9261-05
entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang Makabayan (KMM) Katipunan CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz
Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu).2 On
September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a decision adverse to CVC.3 Atty.
Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.

According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s
residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial
amount of money to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a
favorable decision.4 On June 10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised
P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office at No. 48 Times
Street, Quezon City, and to give the money to his assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu
complied, and later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered the money to Nardo.
Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at the UCC Coffee Shop
on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. At the UCC Coffee Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of
an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC.5 The draft decision6 was printed on the
dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that
occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC
Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could only produce P280,000.00, which he
brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007 accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and
one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the amount without issuing any
receipt.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007. However,
Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the status after
Christmas. On January 11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who invited him to lunch at the Ihaw
Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner had
accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo
assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who would return it should the NLRC
Commissioner not accept it.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC.9 Chu confronted Atty.
Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After the
denial of the motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an
appeal in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25,
2009.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his position paper,11 Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies
and inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He denied
demanding and receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo corroborated with his own
affidavit.12 He further denied handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating
from his office, surmising that the used paper must have been among those freely lying around
in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled
for Chu.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Findings and Recommendation of the

IBP Board of Governors

IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and
1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving
P580,000.00 from Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of
extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal
profession.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP Commissioner
Villanueva in its Resolution No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the recommended penalty of
disbarment to three years suspension, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A,” and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty.  Jose C. Guico, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred  Eighty
Thousand (P580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.cralawred

Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion for
reconsideration on March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis-à-vis Resolution No. XX-2013-87 and
Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.

Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a
favorable decision from the NLRC?

Ruling of the Court

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish

respondent attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court
has consistently required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of either
disbarment or suspension as penalty.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses,19 and presented the draft decision that Atty. Guico
had represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the draft
decision was printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s
office,20 inferring that Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office.
Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s
participation in the generation of the draft decision was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico
impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used paper had originated from his
office, claiming only that used paper was just “scattered around his office.”21 In that context,
Atty.

Guico’s attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper from his office was futile because he
did not expressly belie the forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way of
deflecting the imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have been
easily taken from his office by Chu’s witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for
Chu,22 pointing out that everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was
“open to the public xxx and just anybody has access to everything found therein.”23 In our view,
therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was fully aware that the used
paper had unquestionably come from his office.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the
act of Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on
used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the
imputed gross misconduct by demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a
favorable decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his defense,
but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that
the production of the draft decision by Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money
to ensure the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu
discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to establish his complaint against Atty.
Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x
x.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to

wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain
membership in the Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not
render any service or give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that
he was bound to uphold and obey,25 for he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law
abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession.26 Verily, he or she
must act and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence
in the integrity of the Legal Profession.27 Any lawyer found to violate this obligation forfeits his or
her privilege to continue such membership in the legal profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large
sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law
against bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as
his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own
personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach
of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man for money or malice;
and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that forbade him from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the
people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so,
he ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct
is “improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in  character, and implies a wrongful intent and not
mere error of judgment.”28 There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his
professional or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a
ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral
character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of
such privilege.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the
practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be
disbarred,30 for he exhibited his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal
profession. As the Court has reminded in Samonte v. Abellana:31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted
the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.
Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law
Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up
one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an
unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the
unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to return
the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from
Chu in the guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the purpose for the
amount was unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for and to
return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is administrative in character, for,
as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes:32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the
ethical responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the
respondent lawyer’s legal obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and
inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property
should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative proceeding has
already established as the respondent’s liability. x x x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR.

GUILTY of the violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. His name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Guico’s personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
courts and quasi-judicial offices in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
concur.cralawlawlibrary
Brion, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, p. 98.
2
 Id. at 109.
3
 Id. at 115-132.
4
 Id. at  99.
5
 Id. at 99-100.
6
 Id. at 6-13.
7
 Id. at 100.
8
 Id. at 100-101.
9
 Id. at 154-168.
10
 Id. at 170.
11
 Id. at 187-202.
12
 Id. at 219-220.
13
 Id. at 192-200.
14
 Id. at 226-230.
15
 Id. at 224-225.
16
 Id. at 231-252.
17
 Id. at 528-529.
18
Aba v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 371; Ceniza v.
Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 1, 8.
19
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
20
 Id. at 5, 16-23.
21
 Id. at 248.
22
 Id.
23
 Id.
24
 Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
25
Donton v. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 1, 5.
26
 Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility.
27
Rangwani v. Diño, A.C. No. 5454, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 408, 419; Ducat, Jr. v.
Atty.  Villalon, A.C. No. 3910, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 622, 628.
28
Whitson v. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 10.
29
 Id.
30
Ong v. Grijaldo, A.C. No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 1, 11.
31
 A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014.
32
 A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 490, 506.

G.R. No. 173188               January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA

ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA,
PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R.
CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part
the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty.
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses
Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued
Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on
July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses
Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before the
RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of
money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance
of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo
Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.

On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and
the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the
public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya
on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on
contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the
sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6

In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses
Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.

On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was
pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No.
T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their children’s names.
On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of
the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses
Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue
another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused
the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-
25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the
spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.

With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21,
1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses
Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the
spouses Ames’ children).

On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on
October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He
caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected
the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No.
215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.

On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion
obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC
approved the compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC
subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the
CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.

The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case
No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among
others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be
ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the
RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses
that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of
Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled
and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the
proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.

The Ruling of the RTC

In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent
fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to
5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.

The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed
attorney’s fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that
the parties novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC
added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of
Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned
out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.

These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject
lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC
was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and
complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote
much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.

Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess
portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to
receive its fruits.

On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and
deliver the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the
RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988
until final restoration of the premises.

The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September
17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the
compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served
as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the present case
against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty.
Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case
No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted
for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
entered into a compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty.
Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and
(7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in several
cases.

Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the
lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya
rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other
employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo,
and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya,
instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the
respondents accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion
(that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding
the validity of the purported oral contract between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13

The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services,
especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s
fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case,
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was
₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.

The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent
attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue
that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of
one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult
questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in
research. They point out that the two subsequent civil cases should not be considered in
determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his
services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus,
these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim
that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for
each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in
the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.

The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the
case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half
of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous
contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary
relationship between a lawyer and a client.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They
reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.

The Case for the Respondents

In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended
complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the
questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would
inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.

The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and
subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession
with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2)
Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case)
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the
conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and
(5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.

While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife
-Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L.
Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-
Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present
controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel.
For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings
pertinent to each) as follows:

Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights
due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23,
1981.

Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed
on May 21, 1982.

Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between
the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement
on May 13, 1982.

Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).

The agreement on attorney’s fee

consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession

The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the
subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the
reasons discussed below.

A. The written agreement providing for

a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as
asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.

Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the
court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a
representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in
the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.

At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by
both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was
not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the
spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his
client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing
contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on
attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of
₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee
agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous

Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral
contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is
nevertheless void.

In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses
Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.18

Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common
law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was
directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the
intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without
justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a
share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions,
however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer
must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of
assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation
that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in
exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to
safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down
champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds
of public policy."24

In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to
"conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the
law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of
the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action
which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a
settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27

In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between
therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy.
There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against
public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in
consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client.29
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same
reasons discussed above underlie this rule.

C. The attorney’s fee consisting of

one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable

We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive
and unconscionable.1âwphi1 The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly
agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for
only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil
Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then
stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that
special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as
observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya
extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale
of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases
did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As
assertedby the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate
arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for
the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of Based on these
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and
unreasonable.

D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of

the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code

Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.33

A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the
judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when
Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following
established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed
Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted
the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses
Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot
was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one
of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the
compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an
agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion
(which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts.
Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a
client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.

Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and
the compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find
them to be prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared
void by law are considered in existent and void from the beginning.37

What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated
the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the
transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil
cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to
the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent
fee agreement.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception
to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position,
however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an
agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent
fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after
the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion
to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client
relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition
provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in
jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the
basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.

Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of
the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if
not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it
undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42

E.The compromise agreement could not

validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement

The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No.
215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and
possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which
had for its object a void transaction, should be void.

A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor
the action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any
contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46

Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee
agreement providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from
questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced
thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case.
The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise
agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be
attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of
possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession
founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present
action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half
portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.

Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis

In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any
express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on
a quantum meruit basis.

"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a

lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors
in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by
one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify
him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The
doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services,
the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service,
to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer
is entitled.

In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not
novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the
performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant
case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching
up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property
subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765
hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification
on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the
disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder
of the disputed one-half portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit
of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and
express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium
consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped
the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer
does indeed effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed
property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION
that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to
two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The
fruits that the respondents previously received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form
part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired
pursuant to the compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division's Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 15-41.

2
 Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia; id. at 45-60.

3
 Id. at 71.

4
 Penned by Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez; id. at 82-97.

5
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1721 (Cadavedo v. Ames).

6
 Rollo, p.47; emphasis ours.

7
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 3352 (Ames v. Cadavedo).

8
 Id. at 89-90. The compromise agreement, in part, reads:

That defendants recognize the possession of plaintiff Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. over the
northern half of Lot 5415 to be designated as Lot 5415-A, being his share as
payment of attorney’s fees on contingent basis originally covered by O.C.T. No.
P0376 and now covered by T.C.T. No. T-25984 in the name of Rosario Ames, et.
al., situated at Lower Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte;

xxxx

III.
 That the parties shall cause these portions to be surveyed and segregated from
each other by a licensed surveyor and the portion of Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. shall be
identified as Lot 5415-A; that of Vicente Cadavedo as Lot 5415-B; x x x

IV.

That the defendants shall vacate the premises of the portions belonging to the
plaintiffs and, in fact, have already vacated the premises in question and restored
the plaintiffs in their respective peaceful possession thereof since March 5,
1982[.] [emphasis ours]

9
 Action for "Judicial Determination of Attorney’s Fees, Recovery of Possession,
Accounting of Products, Ejectment and Damages with Prayer for Receivership and
Preliminary Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction."

10
 Supra note 4.

11
 Rollo, pp. 98-100.

12
 Supra note 2.

13
 See also the Petitioners’ Memorandum dated September 26, 2007, rollo, pp. 157-196;
Reply to the respondents’ comment to the petition dated May 8, 2007(id.at138-140),and
Reply to the Respondents’ Memorandum dated November 12, 2007(id.at242-250).

14
 Comment to the Petition dated November 17, 2006 (id. at 116-135. See also the
respondents’ Memorandum dated October24, 2007(id.at212-239).

15
 Copy of the Death Certificate indicated the date of death as September 18, 2007; id. at
205.

16
 Formal Notice of Death and Substitution of Parties dated October 3, 2007; id. at 200-
204.

17
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 24.

18
 Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266, 281(1990).

19
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2; and
www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising%20for%20Litigation.pdf.

20
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing British Cash and Parcel
Conveyors Ltd.v.Lamson Store Service Co.Ltd.(1908)1 K.B. 1006 at 1014, per Fletcher
Moulton L.J.
21
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing Giles v Thompson
(1994)1 A.C. 142; (1993) 2 W.L.R. 908; (1993)3 All E.R. 321 at 328, per Steyn L.J. See
also Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modifiedby Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

22
 Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

23
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf.

24
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179, www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

Recent foreign legal developments vary at their treatment of champertous

contracts. Several jurisdictions have abolished criminal and tortuous liability for
champerty (and maintenance). To name a few: Australia –abolished by the
Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act of 1993 for New South
Wales and the Wrongs Act 1958 and Crimes Act 1958 for Victoria; England and
Wales -by the Criminal Law Act 1967.
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Champerty_and_maintenance) and
www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. Other jurisdictions,
particularly some states in the United States of America, have relaxed the
application of this common law doctrine or have adopted it in a modified form as
the peculiar conditions of the society that gave rise to this doctrine have changed
(Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other American states have completely
repudiated it unless a statute specifically treats a contract as champertous.
These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas and West Virginia (Contracts,
Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions,
California Law Review, Vol.1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other jurisdictions, like Canada for one,
have retained the rule against champerty on public policy considerations, the
purpose being to prevent one party from inciting another to initiate or defend
litigation that would never have been brought or defended; or to prevent increase
in lawsuits, harassment of defendants, and suppression or manufacturing of
evidence and subornation of witness (www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising
%20for%20Litigation.pdf).

25
 See Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, supra note 18, citing JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S., 166
F.Supp. 324 (1958);and Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242
(1918).
26
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392.

27
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392, citing A.B.A. Op.
288 (Oct. 11, 1954); Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Mel 96 (1853).

28
 Supra note 18.

29
 Id. at 281.

30
 See CANON 16, specifically Rule 16.04, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The pertinent portion of Rule 16.04 reads:

"Rule 16.04 -x x x Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client."

31
 Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics reads in full:

"42. Expenses.

A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of
convenience, but subject to reimbursement." (emphasis ours)

32
 The pertinent provision of Article 1491 reads:

"Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession[.] [Emphases
ours]

33
 Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides:

"10. Acquiring interest in litigation.

The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."
 See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, 467 Phil. 1111, 1120(2004); Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, 273 Phil. 534, 543(1991); and Ordonio v. Eduarte, Adm. Mat. No.
3216, March 16, 1992, 207 SCRA 229, 232.

34
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico,522 Phil. 295, 308-309(2006); and Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, supra at 542.

35
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico, supra, at 310. See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, supra note
33, at 1121.

36
 See Fornilda v. The Br. 164, RTC IVth Judicial Region, Pasig, 248 Phil. 523,
531(1988); and Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33,at 542.

37
 See paragraphs 1 and 7, Article 1409 of the Civil Code. See also Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico,
supra note 34,at. 310.

38
 Rollo, p. 58.

39
 See Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 28,
35; and Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, 177 Phil. 467, 479(1979).

40
 See Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, supra, at 475.

41
 See Biascan v. Atty. Lopez,456 Phil. 173, 180(2003);and Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra note 39, at39

42
 See Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33, at 542; and Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,
supranote 18, at 281.

43
 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1409 (1).

44
 Id., last paragraph.

45
 Id., Article 1410.

46
 Id., Article 1422.

47
 Spouses Garcia v. Atty. Bala, 512 Phil. 486, 494(2005); citation omitted.

48
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Dallas Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Colbert, 127 SW2d 1004.

49
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733 (1997).

50
 Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in part, reads:

"SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable."

51
 The pertinent provision of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

"CANON 20 –x x x x

Rule 20.01 –A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the proffered
case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the character of the employment,
whether occasional or established; and

h)The professional standing of the lawyer."

A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a
ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him
from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11,
2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan,
Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition
was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed
his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20,
2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that
he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for
the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his
legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention
to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s
authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients
that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the
case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
(emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY

of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, p. 13.

2 
Id., pp. 14-15.

3 
Id., p. 9.

4 
Id., pp. 21-57.

5 
Id., p. 60.

6 
Id., p. 62.

7 
Id., p. 72.

8 
Id., p. 75.

9 
Id., p. 73.

10 
Id., p. 109.

11 
Id., p. 110.
12 
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.

13 
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.

14 
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].

15 
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.

16 
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L.
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].

17 
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.

18 
Id., p. 110.

19 
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.

20 
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.

21 
Id., p. 65.

22 
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.
A.C. No. 6622               July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent)
with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for
nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while
respondent’s first marriage was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent
to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They
submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees

to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his
on 01 August 2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions
for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in
the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients.
He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of
pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also
claimed that he was entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the
courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by
their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the
computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of

Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial
consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used
them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and
Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of
payment made to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent,
contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in
the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in
Ermita, Manila.13

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was
not an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and
Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant,
resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding
the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that
his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would
handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to
the financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically
address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To

the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places
and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a
marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15
July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon,
and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane
E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third
Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were
filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan,
Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently
discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for
their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory

hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he
would not attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for
the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited
two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage
Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of

two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano
was still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for
his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit.
The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it
was only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter,
complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the
Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having
advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be
reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he
violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary
evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the
latter’s first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission
should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate
cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having
entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered
by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the
punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to
disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome
of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage
Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.44

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with
the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in
the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to
divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on
the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the
lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s
allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against
respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts
by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in
the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in
corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for
the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of
a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle
used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The
letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent
would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by
respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a
law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the
attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice
by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03
and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case
had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are
not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification
and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1âwphi1 For the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages.
He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one
in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null
and void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his
wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name
of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the
NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and
death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case,
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed
civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment
and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code
provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his
gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old
Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only
as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply
and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as
the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice,
in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree
of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

*On leave

1 
Rollo, p. 1.

2 
Id. at 22.
3 
Id. at 22-35.

4 
Id. at 36.

5 
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, p. 1.

6 
Id. at 3.

7 
Id. at 60.

8 
Id. at 186.

9 
Id. at 1.

10 
Id. at 10-20.

11 
Id. at 5 & 6.

12 
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, pp. 202-212.

13 
Id. at 195, 201.

14 
Id. at 61.

15 
Id. at 66.

16 
Id. at 67.

17 
Id. at 78-82.

18 
Id. at 74.

19 
Id. at 75.

20 
Id. at 10.

21 
Id. at 215.

22 
Id. at 217-219.

23 
Id. at 217.

24 
Id. at 218.

25 
Id. at 220.

26 
Id. at 221.
27 
Id. at 226.

28 
Id. at 231.

29 
Id. at 237.

30 
Id. at 238.

31 
Id. at 244.

32 
Id. at 239.

33 
Id. at 240.

34 
Id. at 256.

35 
Id. at 241 & 243.

36 
Id. at 256.

37 
Commission on Bar Discipline Records Vol. III, pp. 2-13. The Commission’s Report and
Recommendation dated 27 February 2008 was penned by Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.
Reyes.

38 
Id. at 8.

39 
Id.

40 
Id. at 9-10.

41 
Id. at 13.

42 
Id. at 1.

43 
Id. at 14-27.

44 
On the 36th page succeeding Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. III (no pagination
on the rollo).

45 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement; or

(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the
plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

46 
211 Phil. 547 (1983).

47 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

48 
RUBEN A. AGPALO, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 124 (2009), citing A.B.A. Op. 57 (19
March 1932); Re, 97 A2d 627, 39 ALR2d 1032 (1953).

49 
Rollo, p. 6.

50 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

51 
AGPALO, supra note 48.

52 
Commission on Bar Discipline Records, Vol. II, p. 221.

53 
A.C. No. 6593, 04 February 2010, 611 SCRA 508.

54 
Aba v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7649, 14 December 2011.

55 
Commission on Bar Discipline Records Volume II, pp. 226-234.

56 
A.C. No. 4256, 467 Phil. 139 (2004).

57 
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 501 Phil. 1 (2005).

58 
Rule 138, Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
 [A.M. No. P-03-1690. April 4, 2003.]

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)

JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, Petitioner, v. EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, Respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363. April 4, 2003.]

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, Petitioner, v. Judge ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, Respondent.

[A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC. April 4, 2003.]

IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF

HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA M.
PAAS.

DECISION
 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas
administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with "discourtesy,
disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties, disloyalty, solicitation of monetary
consideration and gross violation of the Civil Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M.
OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.

In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his co-employees,
lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court
premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to insubordination; was, and on several
instances, habitually absent from work or made it appear that he reported for work by signing
the logbook in the morning, only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention
prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for
amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and pocketed the
difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and kept for his own use the
amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged confidential information to litigants in
advance of its authorized release date for a monetary consideration, thus giving undue
advantage or favor to the paying party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). 1

Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit, 2 and
members of the court staff, 3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed to maintain the
cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown discourtesy in dealing with Judge
Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero’s affidavit also corroborated Judge Paas’ allegation that
Almarvez would merely sign the logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the
office.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000, 4 attested that
the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000 was not included in the list of
registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office on said date.

Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both assigned to the
Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits, 5 attested that on several occasions, they saw
Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to P200.00 in consideration of the release
of their Release Orders.

Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000, 6 denied Judge Paas’ charges, and alleged that
the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was because she suspected him of
helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal his marital indiscretions; since she failed to
elicit any information from him, she resorted to calling him names and other forms of
harassment; on September 6, 2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other
employees of the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang
utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted that he sign a
prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to keep.

Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following incidents of
oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by the Judge to her
chambers where she berated him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang dami mong alam, hindi ka
nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo itong resignation letter, kung hindi
kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification;" the next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit
ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her
chambers and told him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok
dito dahil driver kita."cralaw virtua1aw library

Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing incidents to
Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised him to report the same to
the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000, he executed a sworn statement-
complaint 7 against Judge Paas and went to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file
it, but he was advised to try to talk the matter over with her who then told him that they should
forget all about it.

On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in exchange for the
release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and Macabasag executed their
respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a principal sponsor at their respective weddings;
Hernandez was in fact indebted to the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee
under his charge; the court’s mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for
mailing and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter was
actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of registered mail,
because the money given to him for the purpose was insufficient; and on the days when he was
out of the office, he was actually performing personal errands for the judge and her husband,
Atty. Paas, who treated him as their personal driver and messenger.

As further proof of Judge Paas’ oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez claimed that she
ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated September 7, 2000, 8 even if he
had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or continuous basis as shown by the test results of
his examination. 9

The Court treated respondent’s Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas and
docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.

The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the OCA, which
assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC, Branch 114 for
investigation.

In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed that Judge
Paas’ husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife’s office as his office address
in his law practice, in support of which were submitted copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by
Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect
to the case of People v. Louie Manabat, Et. Al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty.
Paas’ address to be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City, 10 the office assigned to Pasay City
MeTC, Branch 44.

Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B 11 of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme Court to
motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this Court resolved to docket the
matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM
No. MTJ-01-1363.

In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution 12 of the Court en banc, Judge and Atty.
Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit 13 wherein they vehemently denied the
charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office
address, they claiming that Atty. Paas actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta,
Manila with his partner Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only
when he has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor’s Office, or when he lunches
with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such as Christmas party and
her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas would never consent nor tolerate the
use of the court for any personal activities. Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate
sworn statements of Atty. Paas’ law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez 14 and secretary Nilda L.
Gatdula 15 attesting that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint
Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel 16 attesting that Atty. Paas’ visits to
the court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never used the court in the practice
of his profession.

On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit 17 wherein she admitted
that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices and orders in Crim. Case
Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198, "People v. Louie Manabat y Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y
Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC,
Branch 109, but only to ensure and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were
terminated, all notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.

By Resolution of February 12, 2002, 18 the Court referred the matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No. MTJ-01-
1363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28, 2002. 19

On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated March 1,
2002. 20

I. OCA Findings and Recommendations

A. On the charges against Almarvez:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Almarvez of
exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official communication, absence
without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination. Given Almarvez’ unsatisfactory
performance ratings for three rating periods covering January to June 2000, 21 July to
December 2000, 22 and January to April 2001, 23 however, the OCA recommended that he be
duly penalized for inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month
suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum Circular No. 12,
s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to observe the procedure thereunder for dropping of
employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at the later portion of this decision.

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of supporting
evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment, harassment and verbal
abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas "had used her administrative power of supervision
and control over court personnel for her personal pride, prejudice and pettiness" 24 when she
issued her September 7, 2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she
had already filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability, the
purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish for evidence to
support the administrative case she had already filed against him.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple misconduct in
office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

II. This Court’s Findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. On the charges against Almarvez:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge of violation of
confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The charge against Almarvez in
Judge Paas’ complaint-affidavit which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which is
confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date before the
release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of money thus giving undue
advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to the due administration of
justice.25cralaw:red

in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to intelligently meet
the same.

As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were echoed in the
affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a conviction and are contrary
to what is reflected in his performance rating that he cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly,
with his fellow employees.

On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): Absent
any evidence to support the charge, the affiants jail officers who claimed to have witnessed
Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in exchange for the release of their Release
Orders not having been presented, hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez’ categorical
denial and counter-allegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or
favor to Judge Paas gain light.

As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would thereafter leave the
office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr.
While she submitted in evidence a copy of her October 6, 2000 memorandum 26 requiring
Almarvez to explain why he was not in the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5,
2000, despite his affixing of his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he
reported for work, Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he
submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 2000 27 memorandum,
which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog,
Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board. 28 As to his whereabouts on October 5,
2000, Almarvez’ explanation that he was actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon
for the Supreme Court 29 was not controverted.

On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the OCA that he
should be faulted therefor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods covering January
to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001 evidently shows that he failed
to perform his official duties. The fact that respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance
ratings given him is tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal
through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure to file an appeal within the
prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such right."cralaw virtua1aw library

The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to drop him from
the Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed to comply with the
requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service
Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he was able to make up and cure his
inefficiency after he was given the opportunity to improve his performance in his detail to Branch
11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by his performance rating for the period April to June 2001 with a
"very satisfactory" rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be appropriate 30 (Emphasis
and Italics supplied.)

Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the above-quoted findings
of the OCA reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.

(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be
dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee
concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is
sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation
from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester
and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an
explanation. (Emphasis and Italics supplied.)

The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by the OCA, is
thus in order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

B. On the charges against Judge Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas, Almarvez
failed to substantiate the same.

Judge Paas’ order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees are required to
undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are drug-free. To be drug-free is
not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a continuing requirement to ensure the highest
degree of productivity of the civil service. However, considering that the order was issued after
Judge Paas filed the administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was
only a fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary,
for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
C. On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

By Judge Paas’ own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit, 31 she was
aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court notices and orders in a
case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it," [w]hile the same appears to be innocuous, it
could be interpreted as a subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a
judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court
personnel." 32

The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge and her
spouse, Atty. Paas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice
and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers" reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be preserved and
enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees
must:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for disciplinary action
under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code of Judicial Conduct; and
Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply with the norms of conduct and perform the duties
prescribed in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(R.A. No. 6713);

2. Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;

x       x       x

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial
functions. (Emphasis and Italics supplied.)

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule 2.03 thereof provides
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence the judge. (Emphasis supplied.)

SC Circular No. 3-92, 33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL OR

COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only
for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may
not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court
personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra), a
case involving unauthorized and improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by
respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found
respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient
administration of justice and best interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of
SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court’s premises inevitably
degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of
loss or damage. (Emphasis supplied.)

By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other courts, Judge
Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of advancing his private interest,
in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct" 34 and of the above-stated Supreme Court
circulars, which violation is classified as a less serious charge under the Rules of Court 35 and
is punishable under the same Rule. 36

A judge’s official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his
behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be
beyond reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judge’s official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judge’s attributes depend
the public perception of the Judiciary. 37

On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that
had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his
client, that he has close ties to a member of the juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 13 — A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE
OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL

HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer’s case, instead of banking on his relationship with
a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the
court, cannot be overemphasized. It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to
misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer’s prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may
be eroded by such reprehensible and improper conduct.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure
receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have
his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases,
Atty. Paas used his office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices
sent to that address. While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he
is properly informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyer’s oath or the Code
of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to
breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of inefficiency and is
hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;

(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of conduct
unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED, with warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely;

(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,

(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC Circular No. 3-92
and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of
TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with warning that repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely; and

(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and appended to respondents’ personal record.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1. A.M. OCA IPI 00-956-P Rollo at 2–4.

2. Exhibit "B," Ibid. at 5.

3. Exhibit "F," Ibid. at 11.

4. Exhibit "C-1," Ibid. at 8.

5. Exhibit "D" and "E," Ibid. at 7 and 10, respectively.

6. AM No. MTJ-01-1363 Rollo at 2–4.

7. Ibid. at 5–6.

8. Annex "2," Ibid. at 5–6.

9. Annex "3" and "4," Ibid. at 8–9.

10. A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 3–6.

11. As provided in Sections 13–14 of Rule 139-B, Rules of Court, in proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires,
the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer
of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court . . . . Based upon the evidence adduced at the
investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations
together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court (Emphasis supplied). See Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, February
12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, 158.

12. A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 9.

13. Ibid. at 10–11.

14. Annex "A," Ibid. at 12.

15. Annex "B," Ibid. at 14.

16. Annex "C," Ibid. at 15–16.

17. Ibid. at 29.

18. Ibid. at 34.

19. A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 271–280.

20. A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 37–39.

21. A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P at 118–119.

22. Ibid. at 120–121.

23. Ibid. at 122–123.

24. OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 308.

25. Ibid. at 3.

26. Exhibit "J," Ibid. at 61.

27. Annex "2," Ibid. at 20.

28. Ibid. at 64.

29. Exhibit "K," Ibid. at 62.

30. OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P Rollo at 307–308.

31. A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 29.

32. OCA Recommendation, A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 38.

33. See Bautista v. Costelo, Jr., A.M. No. P-94-1043, February 28, 1996, 254 SCRA 148, 157.

34. OCA Recommendation, AM No. 01-12-02-SC Rollo at 38.

35. Rule 140, Sec. 4 (4). This was amended on September 11, 2001 by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
"Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Sandiganbayan."cralaw virtua1aw library

36. Rule 140, Sec. 10B.

37. Balderama v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1449, January 18, 2002, at 11 (Citations
omitted).
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought
to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker
& McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the
release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

G.R. No. 125440           January 31, 2000

GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND

SURETY COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND);
and STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD), petitioners,
vs.
THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E. TOTANES and ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that seeks to annul and set
aside the Ombudsman Resolution dated May 15, 1995 in OMB-CRIM-0-93-1597 which
dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners against respondent Assistant Solicitor General
(ASG) Magdangal M. de Leon, and the Ombudsman Order dated March 13, 1996 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.

Petitioners General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide Insurance and Surety
Company (Worldwide), Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co.,
Inc. (Standard) filed a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon on July 5, 1993. Docketed as
OMB-CRIM-093-1597, the complaint accused respondent ASG de Leon of violating section 3
(e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for allegedly —

. . . causing undue injury to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the GBTC
Stockholders in giving Lucio Tan unwarranted benefit or advantage in the discharge of his
official functions by protecting and defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank
relative to (sic) verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation Plan of GBTC under
Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.1

and charged respondent administratively with malfeasance in office, for his alleged —

. . . deliberate and adamant refusal to comply with his statutory duty to protect and defend the
interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan
and the Central Bank relative to the verbatim adoption of the Lucio Tan Bid as the Liquidation
Plan of GBTC under Monetary Board Resolution No. 677, March 29, 1977.2

OMB-CRIM-093-1597 was assigned to respondent Raul E. Totanes, Ombudsman Graft

Investigation Office II, Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB). Respondent
Totanes dismissed the criminal case against respondent ASG de Leon in the assailed
Resolution dated May 15, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator respectfully recommends

that the above-entitled case be forthwith DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence to hold
respondent CRIMINALLY liable for the acts complained of in the instant complaint.

SO RESOLVED.3

Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 10, 1995 that was denied in an Order
dated March 13, 1996. Hence, this petition.

The relevant facts as summarized by the Office of the Ombudsman are:

On March 27, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank passed Resolution No. 677 to the
effect that GBTC is insolvent and therefore has to stop its banking business operations. It
designated a Liquidator and approved a Liquidation Plan whereby (sic) Lucio Tan Group shall
purchase all the assets and assume all the liabilities of GBTC;

On April 07, 1977, the Central Bank of the Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano in his capacity
as the Monetary Board of the Central Bank Liquidator of GBTC filed through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) a Petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking the court's
assistance in the liquidation of GBTC. The Court docketed the said petition as Spec. Proc. No.
107812, entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of GBTC";

On May 05, 1982, three minority stockholders of GBTC, namely, Worldwide, Midland and
Standard through their counsel, ATTY. ANGEL C. CRUZ, filed an intervention in the said case,
praying for the annulment of the closure and liquidation of GBTC by the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank as these were allegedly done arbitrarily and in bad faith. Later, GBTC itself joined
and adopted the intervention of its aforesaid three minority stockholders;

Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, to whose Team the said case was assigned by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, re-assigned the said case from Solicitor Juan C. Nabong
to the herein respondent in view of Juan C. Nabong's appointment as RTC Judge;

From that time on, all the pleadings, filed with the Liquidation Court RTC of Manila, were signed
by Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and the herein respondent in behalf of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon with the
Ombudsman is the alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec. Proc. No. 107812
and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan.

Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) through the OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio
Tan, former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al.

Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the causes of actions therein as
stated in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) alleges that:
(A) The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 25,
1977;

(B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 29, 1977;

are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and taking advantage of the
close relationship between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed President and Wife, other
CB officials, with the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros and former
PNB President Panfilo O. Domingo . . . .4

The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention
of petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of
GBTC amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank.5 Petitioners
maintain that the position taken by the OSG represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812 is "against the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines'
as contained in the statement of ultimate facts set forth in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) of EDSA-SDB
Civil Case No. 0605, ANNEX "C".6

On December 16, 1992, counsel of petitioners wrote respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit
himself from appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to defend the interest of the Government
of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No. 0005.7

When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank in Spec.
Proc. No. 107812, petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In dismissing the case, the Office of the Ombudsman held:

Thus, the records of this case convincingly show that, whenever the herein respondent
Assistant Solicitor General appears in court or signs any pleading in the aforesaid case, he is
doing so not in his personal capacity but in his official capacity as one of the lawyers in the
OSG, which is headed by the Solicitor General.

Everything stated in the pleadings filed by the OSG in the aforesaid case is not the personal
stand or opinion of the herein respondent but the official stand or opinion of the OSG. Hence,
OSG as counsel of the Central Bank of the Philippines in the aforesaid case is defending its
client, the Central Bank. It is not defending the interest of Lucio Tan. The fact that, under the
Liquidation Plan approved by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, the Lucio Tan Group
purchased the assets and assumed the liabilities of GBTC, is merely incidental. What is at issue
in the aforesaid case, which is now before the Court of Appeals, is whether or not the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in its actions, leading to the closure
and liquidation of GBTC.1âwphi1.nêt

As regards the complaint in the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0005, which is an
action for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth against Lucio Tan, et. al., the same was
signed by Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Chairman Ramon Diaz and
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. While it is true that, the said case is in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, yet it was filed by the PCGG which is the only agency involved in
that case. The said PCGG case has nothing to do with Spec. Proc. No. 107812 (CA-G.R. CV
No. 39939) which involves the issue of validity of the closure and liquidation of GBTC. Neither
the Central Bank nor GBTC Liquidator Arnulfo B. Aurellano of the Central Bank, petitioners-
appellants in the said CA G.R. CV No. 39938, are parties in the said Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0005.

With the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution having been denied, petitioners filed this
petition raising the following issues:

I.

THAT RESPONDENT OMB AND RESPONDENT INVESTIGATION OFFICER RAUL E.

TOTANES COMMITTED OUTRAGEOUSLY WRONG FINDINGS (A) THAT THE OSG "IS NOT
DEFENDING THE INTEREST OF LUCIO TAN" IN SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R.
NO. 39939, AND (B) THAT THE EDSA CASE SANDIGANBAYAN CIVIL CASE NO. 0005 HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH SPEC. PROC. NO. 107812, NOW CA-G.R. NO. 39939,
ARE DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY THE FACTS ON RECORD.

II.

THAT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMPLETELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT

THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL NOR ANY LEGAL PROVISION NOR ANY DECISIONAL
AUTHORITY NOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY VESTING UPON OSG THE RIGHT
AND OR DUTY TO REPRESENT INTEREST "IN CONFLICT OR OPPOSED" TO THE
INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OF WHICH OSG IS THE CHIEF
COUNSEL, IN ANY ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASE SUCH AS THAT ARISING FROM THE
ILLEGAL AND FRAUDULENT CB CLOSURE AND LUCIO TAN'S TAKEOVER OF GBTC, AS
SET FORTH IN PAR. 14 (a)-(1) TO (3), EDSA-SDB CIVIL CASE NO. 0005, ANNEX "C".

III.

THAT RESPONDENT OMB IS TOTALLY WRONG IN NOT FINDING THAT A PRIMA

FACIE CASE EXISTS AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e), RA No.
3019, AS AMENDED CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, BEING
DOCUMENTARY, IS SO CLEAR AND SO PLAIN.8

The petition must be dismissed. Not only are the charges against respondent ASG de Leon
baseless, they are also misplaced.

In accusing respondent ASG de Leon of malfeasance and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
petitioners would like this Court to believe that respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the
Central Bank in Spec. Proc. 107812 (now CA-GR CV No. 39939) is also defending the interest
of Lucio Tan. Considering that Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 is a complaint against Lucio
Tan filed by the PCGG through the OSG and includes averments pertaining to the alleged illegal
and arbitrary closure of GBTC, petitioners are convinced that respondent ASG de Leon must be
held personally liable for the alleged inconsistent interest or position taken by the OSG in these
two cases.

To be criminally liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, these elements must be present: (1) That
the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in
relation to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.9

Respondent ASG de Leon, in representing the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-
G.R. CV No. 39939 was acting in his official capacity as Assistant Solicitor General.10 As
Assistant Solicitor General, respondent was a member of the legal staff of the OSG tasked to
represent the Central Bank, an agency of the Government, in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-GR
CV No. 39939. Based on the records, the case was originally assigned to Solicitor Nabong, but
was re-assigned to respondent who at the time was a Solicitor, in view of the appointment of
Nabong as RTC judge.

In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was merely acting in
the interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful
defense of the interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the benefit of the
Lucio Tan group. However, such benefit would just be an incidental result of the position that the
government has taken in justifying the closure of said bank because the approved Liquidation
Plan for GBTC provided that the Lucio Tan group shall purchase all the assets and assume all
the liabilities of GBTC and such Liquidation Plan would be in force upon a judgment upholding
the legality of the closure of GBTC.11 Whatever benefit the Lucio Tan group would reap upon a
favorable judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 is but a natural
consequence of a successful defense of the actions of the Central Bank in closing GBTC.
Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing undue injury to a party by giving it
unwarranted benefits or advantage.

We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal
duty to defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing he position taken by it.
Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in
Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member
of the legal staff of the OSG. We note that in all of the pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc.
No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared
therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General. However, it must be noted that
these pleadings also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other members of the legal
staff of the Office of the Solicitor General.12

Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of the OSG which had
consistently defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV
No. 39939. Four Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Frank Chavez and
Raul I. Goco have maintained the policy of defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank
and respondent ASG de Leon merely acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing
the State.

To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur. In
the absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the
official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG
de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to
prove the fifth element is fatal to their cause.
Petitioners harp on the alleged conflicting positions of respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc.
No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. However, the
records fail to disclose the nature and extent of respondent ASG de Leon's participation in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005. What has been set in detail is the participation of
respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939.
Assuming arguendo that respondent ASG de Leon participated in these two cases, this Court
cannot hold him personally liable. The perceived inconsistent positions are the official positions
taken by his office as the principal law office and legal defender of the Government.13

Petitioners have already raised the issue of "inconsistent positions" of the OSG in Spec. Proc.
No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 033642 (Appeal of the Central Bank from the decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch IV in
Spec. Proc. No. 107812).

In CA-G.R. CV No. 033642, petitioners sought to have then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez
cited in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for said inconsistency. In upholding the
position of Solicitor General Chavez, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution dated July 19,
1988:

The second ground in support of the motion for contempt may have some basis per se, that is,
appellant's counsel espouses two inconsistent positions or interests: the first, in favor of Central
Bank and Lucio Tan, which is the position taken in the case at bar, and the second, in favor of
the Republic but against Lucio Tan and his cohorts in the Civil Case before the Sandiganbayan.
The situation of the appellant's counsel may therefore be likened to one whose choice is
between the devil and the deep blue sea.

Still and all, we are not ready to condemn appellant's counsel because of the fix in which he
found himself. On the contrary, we might commiserate with him. He is under the payroll of the
State and he represents the State sometimes through its instrumentality like the Central Bank
and its officials, as in the instant case. In other words, the State in both cases has knowingly
allowed counsel to represent it, and for this reason, the latter not be held in contempt and
subjected to any disciplinary action.14

This Court agrees that even the Solicitor General cannot be personally liable for the
predicament he found himself in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0005. Basic to a prosecution under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is that public officers must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in performing
his legal duty. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of respondent Totanes that there was
no prima facie case against respondent ASG de Leon. The perceived conflict of interest or
position undertaken by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 and in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0005 should be addressed to the OSG or the Solicitor General in
particular.

Furthermore, in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, we ruled that the "courts cannot interfere with the
discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the
averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be
insufficient in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry;
or he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper
form."15
The power of the Ombudsman to determine the merits of a complaint is mandated by the
Constitution and courts should not interfere in the exercise thereof. There is also a practical
reason behind this rule, to wit:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitioners assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same was that the courts would be extremely swamped
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.16

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Records, ANNEX "I", pp. 208-209.

2 
Ibid.

3 
Ibid., ANNEX "A", p. 31.

4 
Ibid., p. 6.

5 
Ibid., p. 14.

6 
Ibid.

7 
Ibid.

8 
Ibid., p. 4.

9 
Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), p. 574.

10 
§ 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:

The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or
head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled
corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.1âwphi1.nêt

11 
Supra note 1, p. 224.

12 
The brief of the Central Bank in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 was signed by Solicitor General
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Agpalo and respondent Solicitor Magdangal M. de Leon.

The motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Central
bank in the same case was signed by Solicitor Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General
Carlos Ortega and respondent Solicitor Magdangal M. de Leon.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Central Bank's comment on the petition was
signed by Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, Assistant Solicitor General Ortega and
respondent Solicitor Magdangal M. de Leon.

When the case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court, the memorandum for the Central
Bank was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Ortega and respondent, as Assistant Solicitor
General.

When the Central Bank appealed the adverse decision in CA-GR CV No. 39939, the appellant's
brief dated October 6, 1993 was signed by Solicitor General Raul I. Goco, respondent ASG de
Leon and Solicitor Irahlyn S. Lariba. (Emphasis ours)

13 
Supra note 10, § 34:

The Office of the Solicitor General shall be headed by the Solicitor General, who is the principal
law officer and legal defender of the Government. He shall have the authority and responsibility
for the exercise of the Office's mandate and for the discharge of its duties and functions, and
shall have supervision and control over the Office and its constituent units.

14 
Supra note 1, p. 102.

15 
225 SCRA 725 (1993), pp. 729-730.

16 
Ibid., p. 730.
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976

LORENZO JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and
Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for respondents.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade)
and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial which was denied him by
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by respondent Court of Appeals.

Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did respondent appellate court
commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for
new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use
handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68
and code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated 31 January 1968)"? 1

The following incidents are not in dispute:

On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose was

arrested by the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm (Crim. Case
6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives (Crim. Case 6237).
These three cases were jointly tried after which the trial judge, Hon. Honorio Romero, in a
decision dated December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15, 1970 2 acquitted accused
Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal
possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the time of his arrest.

After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed his notice of appeal. Nine
days thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion praying that
the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the
course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court in its order
of January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was
promulgated. 3

The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where petitioner
as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of
explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous
denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess the
handgrenade. 4 In his brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the
remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial.

Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision of March 8, 1972,
affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of the court a quo, and declaring
that no reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of the case as
the court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its decision." 6

A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that "assuming arguendo that
the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant's motion for new trial because of the
perfection of the appeal, this Honorable Court — before which said motion was reiterated and
which has competence to act thereon — should have granted the same if for no other reason
than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is the inevitable result of its denial." 7 This motion
for reconsideration was denied in respondent court's resolution of April 3, 1974. 8

A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose 9 but this was
also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974. 10

Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon, filed with Us
this petition for review which We denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the question raised
being factual and for insufficient showing that the finding of facts by respondent court are
unsupported by substantial evidence, and for lack of merit."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following grounds should
justify this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate court to wit:

1. petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being imprisoned for five
(5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on hand is a result so harsh that the
Honorable Court may well undertake a review of the case just to satisfy itself of the justice and
inevitability of such a result;

2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court is involved, as the
evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is, technically, not newly discovered: and

3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-quoted statement of the
main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable Court because under these
decisions, the new trial should have been granted since there is a 'strong, compelling reason' in
this case for granting the relief prayed for, such strong compelling reason being the very strong
probability of petitioner's acquittal if a new trial were granted. (Workmen's Insurance Co. vs.
Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison vs. Gatchalian, 51 SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano 52 SCRA 338;
Montecines vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14; Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April
25, 1974; please see Annotation: 52 SCRA 346 ... (pp. 157-158, rollo)

The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for reconsideration claiming
that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of
respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it being admitted
by petitioner that the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly
discovered evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly papers as correct". This Opposition drew
a lengthy reply from petitioner's counsel.

On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the
Court that in view of the " Persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this
Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as PC
Agent and/or authority to handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make
pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated
December 27, 1974 with enclosures, xerox copies of which are being attached to the
manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11

Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General reads:

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza

Padre Faura, Manila

Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:

With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that Colonel Pedrito C.
de Guzman who is now Provincial of Sorsogon Constabulary Command, confirmed that he
executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that he appointed Mr.
Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC Agent on January 31, 1968.

The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command also confirmed

the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.
Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said appointment.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

FIDEL V. RAMOS

Major General, AFP

Chief of Constabulary (p. 191, rollo)

Inclosure:

Appointmenmt paper

of subject person dtd

Jan. 31, 1968 with

Personal History

Statement

Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a PC Agent
of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code Nanie "Safari"
with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We quote:

This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our firearms and such other equipment which
it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the need basis which will be covered by
separate written authority. (p. 192, rollo)

In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial of this petition
for review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a special civil action. In another
Resolution of April 4, 1975, the parties were given time to submit their respective memorandum.

This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal
of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible
legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of
Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual,
thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court.

At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the time-
honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al that a
prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn
responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocene shall not suffer. (69
Phil. 556, 564-565, qouting Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law
Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of
justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.

We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence
sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered
evidence because the same — his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine
Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade — were supposed to be known to
petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.

It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a different result if admitted. 12

However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered
evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the Court of First
Instance, the appellate court may affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the
penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case ito the Court of First Instance for new trial or
retrial, or dismiss the case.

Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over an
appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where the
court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in Section 13 of the
same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. 13 While Section 13, Rule 124, and
Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence,
and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial. Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above
does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a
case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or
re-trial.

Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and not to obstruct the proper
administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and
chain the hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.

Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the
purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard them. 15 In this jurisdiction, in not a. few
instances, 15* this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the
statute, vis retraction of witness, 16 negligence or incompetency of counsel. 17 improvident plea
of guilty, 18 disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial
court, 19 and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the
prosecution and the defense. 20

Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us which may
be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an opportunity to
establish his innocence of the crime charged.

Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade in
the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to
possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a
situation where he had to make a choice — reveal his Identity as an undercover agent of the
Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and face
possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that
Floridablanca the site of the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a
possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.
Without revealing his Identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the
trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the
same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work
activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year
imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail
for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's
appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a handgrenade for
the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in the
meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.

We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner's cas to afford
him the opportunity of producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from
this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the
Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought to
be produced, and of cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the
accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence
during the trial.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the herein
petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for purpose
of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial court shall
inform this Court of the final outcome of the case within a reasonable time. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 p. 19, rollo

2 p. 21, Ibid.

3 pp. 20-21, Ibid.
4 pp. 4-5, appellant's brief, Court of Appeals, p. 151, Ibid.

5 Third Division; L.B. Reyes, J. ponente, Gatmaitan, Palana, JJ., concurring

6 p. 56, Ibid.

7 pp. 58-59, Ibid.

8 p. 85, Ibid.

9 pp. 86-96, Ibid.

10 pp. 132-137, Ibid.

11 pp. 189-195, Ibid

12 U.S. vs. Luzon, 1905, 4 Phil. 343; People vs. Mangulabnan, et al., 1956, 99 Phil. 883; Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 4, pp. 345-346.

13 Section 13, Rule 124:

"Motion for new trial. — At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected
and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter
may move for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his defense,
the motion. to conform to the provisions of section 3, Rule 121." Section 2, Rule 121:

Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduced and
admitted, would probably change the judgment."

14 Russell vs. McLellan 3 Wood & M. 157

15 Clark vs. Brooks, 26 How.

15* See Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969 Ed. p. 866

16 People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., 111 Phil. 54

17 U.S. vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74

18 People vs. Solacito, L-29209, August 25, 1969, 27 SCRA, 1037; People vs. Mengote et al.,
L-30343, July 25, 1975; People vs. Vicente del Rosario, L-33270, November 28,1975

19 U.S. vs. Laranja 21 Phil. 500

20 U.S. vs. Pobre, 11 Phil. 51

21 Kearney vs. Snodgrass pp. 309, 310, 12 Or. 311

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.
SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY
CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other,
its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later
found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended
emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega
loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business
with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977,
wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for
the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section
29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos,
Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan
Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano
Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank),
Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost
Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries,
Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade
Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive
Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp.,
(collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the
filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases,
respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK,
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central
Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila
and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a

resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position
adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It
further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was
beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he
ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public
official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from
public office.13 The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from

the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11,
2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in
Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied
in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG
alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-
bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance
on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession
and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I

Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble
modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly
were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards
the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation
as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods
and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --
competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor --
originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in
the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over
time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated
within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the
substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of
litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley
Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform
standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in
several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators,
such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh
out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in
unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A
number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed
lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no falsehood" oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly,
limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with
less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus,
all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal
law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated
and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast,
were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice — the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the
academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur
of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that
states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was
the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically
during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late
nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State
Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive
standards of conduct for their members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the
foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain
the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the
Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that
the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and
former are adverse.26 On the other hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.27 For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual
amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon
36 was minted which disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest representation conflicts."29 The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that
the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to
take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons
46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The
committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA
Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary
disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the
government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct
to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the conduct standards
were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the
emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In particular, the
ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite
nature.38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a

proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar
and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive
phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly
applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the
issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict" sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former
government lawyer on the "matter." The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342,
defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by

respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts
of respondent Mendoza as constituting the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor
General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division)
in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that
Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by
advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain
key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C.
Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the
Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference
with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the
liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised
that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision
to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where
it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to
GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s
liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,
1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in
then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine,
the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The procedure
of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the
appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition
of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board
may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its
assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall
be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of
the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in
the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of
any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007,
1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the "matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and cannot
disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may,
the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts
speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision
of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in
filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but
is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the
alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK.
Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the
reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and
liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to
the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of
the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that
Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule

6.03. "Intervene" means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall,

or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance
or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same
city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of
others.42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first

interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is
irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only
includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied
by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36

provided that a former government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office
or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase "which he has investigated or
passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code
restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which
the lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model
Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long
number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors.
In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable

effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been
without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-
101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of
equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to
reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government
may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge
Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most
men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can
only make it less appealing to enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical use of motions to
disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so
prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic
commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of
Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game."49 In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza.
For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four
years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme
Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to
the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an
individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51 The client with a disqualified lawyer must
start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of this prejudice
to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: "An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment
upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or
she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who
lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any
system that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit
on the ability to quit inhibits official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of
Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly
stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal
of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who
violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of

the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification
of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.55 Former government
lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is
a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to untoward results.57 No less than Judge
Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have
any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory
has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts
have abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the
witnesses in the case, and the public.60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger
that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the
process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the
act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate
GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about
the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the
danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,
there are no inconsistent "sides" to be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no
question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the
action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their
interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.61 The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer
who plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be
tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar
Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of
government policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably
excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding
someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the government. Interviews with
lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the ones who
were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this
particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent
Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later
defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the
interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of
what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her
position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him
further: "x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship
rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former co-worker
friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza
was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court,
and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose
length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to
the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that.
Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee
on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December
5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.

Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family
Group and the directors and officers of GENBANK.

2
 Rollo, pp. 240, 242.

3
 Rollo, p. 7.

4
 Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.

5
 Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.

6
 Rollo, pp. 217-218.

7
 Rollo, p. 143.

8
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.

9
 Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.

10
 Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.

11
 Rollo, p. 63.

12
 Rollo, p. 61.

13
 Rollo, pp. 57-63.

14
 Rollo, p. 178.
15
 Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The "Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for
petitioners" in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division.
However, the motion was ultimately resolved by the Sandiganbayan’s Fifth Division in its
proceedings held on July 11, 2001.

16
 Rollo, p. 42.

17
 Rollo, p. 43.

18
 Rollo, pp. 2-40.

19
 Rollo, pp. 12-14.

20
 Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385
(2004).

21
 Ibid.

22
 Ibid.

23
 Ibid.

24
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).

25
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).

26
 Id. at 457.

27
 Ibid.; The use of the word "conflict" is a misnomer; "congruent-interest representation
conflicts" arguably do not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a
private practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are
entirely parallel.

28
 Supra, note 20.

29
 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (1963), DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR
1.11(a) and (b) (1983).

30
 Supra, note 25 at 458.

31
 Supra, note 20.

32
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).

33
 Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly
encompassing." ABA Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: "A lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of professional impropriety."
34
 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary
Rules ... are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."

35
 DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.

36
 Supra, note 20.

37
 Ibid.

38
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): "The other rubric formerly
used for dealing with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First,
the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that
might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would
become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since
‘impropriety’ is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore
has to be recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the
very general concept of appearance of impropriety."

39
 Supra, note 32.

40
 See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.

41
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183
(1993).

42
 Id.

43
 Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of "intervene" which is "to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events."

44
 Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of "intervene" which is "to come in or
between by way of hindrance or modification," and the second definition of "intervention" which
is "interference that may affect the interests of others."

45
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).

46
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 657 (1957).

47
 Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger
Lawyers, 1976 Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).

48
 Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education
of New York City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v.
Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1980).
49
 Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).

50
 Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in
August 1986. The motion for disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February
5, 1991.

51
 United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).

52
 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr
Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp.
867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

53
 Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an
Agency, Duke L.J., Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.

54
 Ibid.

55
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).

56
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986).

57
 Id. at p. 321.

58
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L.
Rev. 657 (1957).

59
 Supra, note 38.

60
 United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708
F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983).

61
 Supra, note 53 at 44.

62
 Ibid.

63
 Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.

64
 Ibid.

65
 Id. at 45.

66
 Id. at 42.

67
 Id. at 42-43.

68
 Id. at 43.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his ponencia. Motions to disqualify counsel from
representing their clients must be viewed with jaundiced eyes, for oftentimes they pose the very
threat to the integrity of the judicial process.1 Such motions are filed to harass a particular
counsel, to delay the litigation, to intimidate adversary, or for other strategic purposes. It
therefore behooves the courts to always look for the parties’ inner motivations in filing such
motions.

This case illustrates the sad reality that the filing of motions for disqualification may be
motivated, not by a fine sense of ethics or sincere desire to remove from litigation an unethical
practitioner, but to achieve a tactical advantage.

The facts are undisputed.

Subsequent to the downfall of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, came the first edict2 of
President Corazon C. Aquino creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their subordinates, and associates.

PCGG’s initial target was Lucio Tan and the above-named private respondents (Tan et al., for
brevity). It issued several writs of sequestration on their properties and business enterprises. To
nullify such writs, Tan et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction.
On February 15, 1990, after comments thereon were submitted, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to it Fifth Division,
docketed as follows:

(a) Civil Case No. 0095 - Sipalay Trading Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering Lucio Tan’s shares of stocks in Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Hotel);

(b) Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding
and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG,
which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of
stocks in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan,
Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp.
and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

(c) Civil Case No. 0097 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr. and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Foremost Farms,
Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;
(d) Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tabacco
Corp. v. PCGG., which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering
the shares of stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and /or in the name of Lucio Tan,
Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N.
Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and

(e) Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Shareholdings, Inc.
held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos and Natividad Santos.

(f) Civil Case No. 0100 – Allied Banking Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Search and Seizure Order dated August 13, 1986, issued on bank documents of Allied
Banking Corp.3

Civil Cases Nos. 0096 and 0100 involve Tan, et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank).

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1987, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages" against Tan et al. This time, the case was raffled to the Second Division, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 0005. Among the properties sought to be reconveyed were Tan et
al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank.

Since 1987, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza has been the counsel for Tan et al. in all the above
cases. But it was not until February 5, 1991, or after four years, that the PCGG filed three
(3) identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. In Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG
filed a motion to disqualify him. It filed another similar motion in Civil Case No. 0100. The last
motion was filed in Civil Case No. 0005. His disqualification was sought under Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

In each motion, PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, then Solicitor General of the Marcos
Administration, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK), subsequently acquired by Tan et al. and became Allied Bank. PCGG’s allegations
are similar in every aspect, thus:

(1) He was the former Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines for almost 14 years
appearing on behalf of the Republic in multitudes of cases.

(2) The records show that, as then Solicitor General, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank of the Philippines in Special Proceedings No. 107812, pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in connection with the Central Bank’s Petition for
assistance in the Liquidation of General bank and Trust Company (herein called "Genbank", for
brevity). The records also show that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group were the same persons
who acquired Genbank’s assets, liabilities and interest.

(3) Consequently, Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Defendant herein runs
counter to the long-cherished ethical canon of the legal profession which prohibits a counsel to
appear in litigation adverse to the interests of his former client. Interpreting this sanction,
jurisprudence has held, that:

‘The lawyer’s obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to keep his
confidences, also forbid the lawyer from accepting retainers or employment from others in
matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been
reposed in him. (Canon of Professional Ethics, 6). The prohibition stands even if the adverse
interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have
been honest. (5 Am. Jur. 296).’

(4) The reason for the prohibition is obvious. Apart from the obligation to keep inviolate the prior
relationship between counsel and his former client, such counsel obtains material information in
confidence. Consequently, he should not be allowed to represent a party with adverse interest
to his former client, arising out of the very transaction subject of the former relationship.

(5) In the case at bar, it should be stressed that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group acquired
the assets and liabilities of Genbank. This manner of acquisition has been alleged to have been
fraudulent, arbitrary and a product of collusion between them and the Central Bank officials.
(Refer to Criminal Case No. 005 pending before this Honorable Court.) Atty. Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for Defendants, clearly violates the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that:

‘A lawyer shall not after leaving the government service accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service." (Code of
Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Rule 6.03)’

(6) In the liquidation of Genbank and its eventual acquisition by Lucio Tan and his group, Atty.
Mendoza, as Solicitor–General, personally advised the Central Bank officials on the procedure
to bring about Genbank’s liquidation. In the Memorandum for the Governor of the Central Bank
dated March 29, 1977 (signed by the following subordinates of then CB Governor Gregorio
Licaros, namely: Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas (deceased), Deputy Governor
Jaime C. Laya, Deputy Governor & General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, Special Asst. to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, Asst. to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and Director
Antonio T. Castro, Jr.), the following portion disclosed Atty. Mendoza’s participation:

‘Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General (atty.
Mendoza) and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:

‘(1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976
and it is believed that the bank cannot be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

‘(2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
(3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

(4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank."

Plainly stated, it was Atty. Mendoza who was the legal author of the closure of Genbank
and the eventual sale to Mr. Lucio Tan and his Group. Clearly, Atty. Mendoza should be
disqualified in this case."

On April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution4 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying
PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza.

On May 7, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution5 in Civil Case No. 0100 also denying
PCGG’s similar motion.

Motions for reconsideration were filed but to no avail. The PCGG took no further action. These
Resolutions, therefore, became final and executory.

Subsequently, in a Decision dated August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan jointly granted Tan et
al.’s petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. On March 29, 1996, this Court, in G.R.
Nos. 112708-096 affirmed the said Decision. The PCGG neither assigned as error nor
mentioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case
No. 0100.

In the interim, the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-
0099 remained pending with the Sandiganbayan. It was only on July 11, 2001, or after ten (10)
years, that it denied the PCGG’s motion by merely adopting its Resolution dated April 22,
1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying a similar motion, thus:

"Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5,1991 which appears not to have been
resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly
the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza
in his ‘OPPOSITION’ dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition
to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated
March 7,1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case
No. 0005 (pp.134-135,Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates
and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second
Division (pp.1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as
its Resolution in the case at bar."7

The PCGG moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but was denied. In the
Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

"Acting on respondent PCGG’s ‘MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION’ dated August 1, 2001

praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion
to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed
an ‘OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001’ dated
August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s ‘REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration)’ dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re:Republic
vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had
become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to the
Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. 8

Hence, the PCGG’s present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., in his Dissent, granted the petition. On the procedural issues,
he ruled that the assailed Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying PCGG’s
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza are interlocutory orders, hence, in challenging such
Resolutions, certiorari is the proper remedy, not appeal, as invoked by Tan et al. Based on the
same premise, he likewise rejected Tan et al.’s claim that the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the
doctrine of res judicata.

On the substantive aspect, Mr. Justice Callejo’s Dissent states that Atty. Mendoza violated Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to him, Atty. Mendoza’s acts
of (a) advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK,
and (b) filing Special Proceedings No. 107812, a petition by the Central Bank for assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, constitute
"intervention." And that while it may be true that his posture in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 is
not adverse to the interest of the Central Bank, still, he violated the proscription under the
"congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine.

Crucial to the resolution of the present controversy are the following queries:

(1) Is certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated July 11 and
December 5, 2001 denying the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos.
0096-0099?

(2) May Sandiganbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 be considered a
bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata?

(3) Does Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK constitute intervention?

There are some important points I wish to stress at this incipient stage. I believe they should be
considered if we are to arrive at a fair resolution of this case. The scattershot manner in
which the PCGG filed the various motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza shows its intent to
harass him and Tan et al. It may be recalled that the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions,
one in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, another in Civil Case No. 0100 and the last one in Civil
Case No. 0005. Of these cases, only Civil Cases Nos. 0096, 0100 and 0005 actually involve
Tan et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank. Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099 have
entirely different subject matter. Thus, insofar as these cases are concerned, the motions to
disqualify lack substantive merit. Why then would the PCGG file identical motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in these unrelated cases? Its intention is suspect. To subject Tan et al.
to numerous and baseless motions to disqualify their lawyer is, no doubt, a form of
harassment.

As this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer,

our minds are not bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined
effect of a party’s right to counsel of his own choice, an attorney’s interest in representing a
client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and any tactical abuse
underlying a disqualification proceeding.9

I. Whether the PCGG’s proper

remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan

Resolutions dated July 11 and

December 5, 2001 is appeal, not

certiorari.

The bottom line of this issue lies on how we categorize an order denying a motion to disqualify
an opposing party’s counsel. Is it interlocutory or final?

An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can
be done with it in the lower court.10 On the other hand, an interlocutory order is one made during
the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by
the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.11

In Antonio vs. Samonte,12 this Court defined a final judgment, order or decree as "one that finally
disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some rights or rights of the parties, either
on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch, thereof and which
concludes them until it is reversed or set aside x x x." In De la Cruz v. Paras,13 it was held
that a court order is final in character if "it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of," such that no further questions can come
before the court except the execution of the order. In Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City,14 this Court ruled that an order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and
appealable, although the other issue or issues have not been resolved, if the latter issues are
distinct and separate from others.

With the foregoing disquisition as basis, it is my view that an order denying a motion to
disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza
should be disqualified from representing Tan et al. is separable from, independent of and
collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable from
the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari, to my mind, is dismissible.

II. Whether the Resolution dated April

22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005

constitutes a bar to similar motions to

disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the

doctrine of res judicata.

I am convinced that the factual circumstances of this case justify the application of res judicata.

The ponente refuses to apply res judicata on the ground that the Sandignbayan Resolution

dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 is just an interlocutory order.

Assuming arguendo that an order denying a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is indeed an

intelocutory order, still, I believe that res judicata applies.

It will be recalled that on August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision granting
Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. Such Decision reached this Court
in G.R. Nos. 112708-09.15 On March 29, 1996, we affirmed it. The PCGG could have
assigned or raised as error in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
May 7, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0100 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza but it
did not. The fact that a final Decision therein has been promulgated by this Court renders the
Resolution dated May 7, 1991 beyond review. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of
disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.16 To
rule otherwise is to encourage the risk of inconsistent judicial rulings on the basis of the same
set of facts. This should not be countenanced. Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of
judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require
that stability should be accorded judicial rulings and that controversies once decided shall
remain in repose, and that there be an end to litigation.17

III. Whether Atty. Mendoza’s

participation in the liquidation of

GENBANK constitutes intervention.

As stated earlier, Atty. Mendoza is sought to be disqualified under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

In determining whether Atty. Mendoza committed a breach of this Rule, certain factual
predicates should be established, thus: (a) in connection with what "matter" has Atty. Mendoza
accepted an engagement or employment after leaving the government service?; (b) in
connection with what "matter" did he intervene while in government service?; and (c) what acts
did he particularly perform in "intervening" in connection with such "matter"?

The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor General, "actively intervened" in the closure
and liquidation of GENBANK. As primary evidence of such intervention, it cited his act of filing
Special Proceedings No. 107812 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; and the
Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 of certain key officials of the Central Bank stating that he
(Atty. Mendoza) advised them of the procedure to be taken in the liquidation of GENBANK and
that he was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to such liquidation.

Tan et al. denied Atty. Mendoza’s alleged "intervention," claiming that when he filed Special
Proceedings No. 107812 with the CFI of Manila, the decision to prohibit GENBANK from doing
business had already been made by the Central Bank Monetary Board. Also, Atty. Mendoza, in
appearing as their counsel in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, does not take a position adverse to
his former client, the Central Bank.

The first concern in assessing the applicability of the Rule is the definition of "matter." The
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated in its
Formal Opinion 342 that:

"Although a precise definition of "matter" as used in the Disciplinary Rule is difficult to formulate,
the term seems to contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions
between identifiable parties. Perhaps the scope of the term "matter" may be indicated by
examples. The same lawsuit or litigation is the same matter. The same issue of fact involving
the same parties and the same situation or conduct is the same matter. By contrast, work as a
government employee in drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations, or laws, or in briefing abstract principles of law, does not
disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101 (B) from subsequent private employment involving
the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the same "matter" is not involved
because there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transaction or conduct involving a
particular situation and specific parties.

In the case at bar, the Court’s task is to determine whether Special Proceedings No. 107812
falls within the concept of "matter." This must be analyzed in relation with Civil Case No. 0096.
Anent Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099, there is no doubt that they do not involve the
shares of stocks of Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Thus, only Special Proceedings No. 107812 and
Civil Case No. 0096 must be considered.

Special Proceedings No. 107812 is a "petition by the Central Bank for Assistance in the
Liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company" filed by Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General.
The parties therein are the Central Bank of the Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano, on the one
hand, and the Worldwide Insurance & Surety Company, Midland Insurance Corporation,
Standard Insurance Co., Inc and General Bank & Trust Company, on the other. The issues,
among others, are whether or not the Central Bank acted in good faith in ordering the liquidation
of GENBANK; and, whether the bidding for GENBANK is a sham.

Civil Case No. 0096 is for the annulment of various sequestration orders issued by the PCGG
over Tan et al.’s properties. The parties therein are Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied
Banking Corporation, Iris Holdings & Development Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp.,
and Jewel Holdings, Inc., as petitioners, and the PCGG, as respondent. The issues here are
"whether the Sequestration Order issued by the PCGG on June 19, 1986 over the shares of
stocks in Allied Bank of Lucio C. Tan and his co-petitioners in Civil Case No. 0096 was issued
without notice, hearing and evidence."
A careful perusal of the above distinctions shows that the two cases are different in all aspects,
such as the parties, issues, facts and relief sought. Special Proceedings No. 107812 cannot
therefore be considered a "matter" in connection with which Atty. Mendoza accepted his
engagement as counsel in Civil Case No. 0096. The connection between the two cases, if there
be, is very minimal as to give rise to the application of the proscription.

As aptly stated by Justice Puno:

"But more important, the ‘matter’ involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from

the ‘matter’ involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again the bald facts speak for themselves. It is
given that Atty. Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The ‘matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject
‘matter’ Sp. Proc. No. 107812, however, is not the same nor related to but different from
the subject ‘matter’ in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration
of the stocks owned by Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill- gotten.
The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stocks of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-
gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK
was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the banking malpractices of its
owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in
the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution
and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096."

As Solicitor General, Atty. Mendoza represented the Republic of the Philippines in every case
where it was involved. As a matter of practice and procedure, he signed every pleading
prepared by his Associates. Taking this into consideration, will it be just to disqualify him in all
the cases containing pleadings bearing his signature? The answer must be in the negative. His
disqualification might be too harsh a penalty for one who had served the government during the
best years of his life and with all his legal expertise.

Webster Dictionary18 defines "intervene" as "to come or happen between two points of time or
events;" "to come or be in between as something unnecessary or irrelevant;" or "to come
between as an influencing force. The ponencia defines "to intervene" as "to enter or appear
as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance." "Intervention" is interference that
may affect the interest of others. Corollarily, the counterpart of Rule 6.03 is the Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 9-101 (B) of the American Bar Association (ABA), thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a manner in which he had "substantial
responsibility" while he was a public employee.

Substantial responsibility envisages a lawyer having such a heavy responsibility for the matter in
question that it is likely he becomes personally and substantially involve in the investigative or
deliberative processes regarding the matter.19 Since the word "intervene" has two connotations,
one affecting interest of others and one done merely in influencing others, Rule 6.03 should be
read in the context of the former. To interpret it otherwise is to enlarge the coverage of Rule
6.03. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the drafters of our Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Further, that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent papers relative to the liquidation of
GENBANK is not sufficient to disqualify him in Civil Case No. 0096. In Laker Airway Limited v.
Pan American World Airways,20 it was held that:

"Like the case law, policy considerations do not support the disqualification of a
government attorney merely because during his government service he had access to
information about a corporation which subsequently turned out to become an opponent
in a private lawsuit. If the law were otherwise, the limiting language of the Disciplinary Rule
could be bypassed altogether by the simple claim that an attorney may have viewed confidential
information while employed by the government, and government lawyers would face perpetual
disqualification in their subsequent practices."

In fine, I fully concur in Justice Puno’s Dissent that "Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.

Footnotes

1
 Gregori v. Bank of America, 207 Cal.App. 3d 291 (1989); McPhearson v. Michaels Co., No.
CO34390, March 4, 2002.

2
 Executive order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986.

3
 Resolution, at 3-4. See also Memorandum for Respondents, rollo, at 397-398.

4
 Attachment "F" of the Petition, rollo, at 57-63. Civil Case No. 0005 involved the PCGG’s and
the OSG’s complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages"
against Tan et al.’s shares of stock in Allied Bank.

5
 Comment on the Petition, rollo, at 148. Civil Case No. 0100 involved Allied Bank’s petition
seeking to nullify PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order against Tan, et al.’s shares of stock.

6
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good
Government, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking
Corporation, respondents. 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

7
 Attachment "A" of the Petition, rollo, at 42.

8
 Attachment "A-1" of the Petition, rollo, at 43.
9
 7 Am Jur 2d §197 citing Higdon v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 227 Cal App 3d 1667, 278 Cal
Rptr 588, 91 CDOS 1622, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2595.

10
 Mejia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 573, 1905, Insular Government v. Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17
Phil. 487, (1910); People v. Makaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 1930.

11
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations,
22 SCRA 785 (1968).

12
 111 Phil. 699 (1961).

13
 69 SCRA 556, G.R. No. L-41053. February 27, 1976.

14
 191 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 79119. November 22, 1990.

15
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good
Government, vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking
Corporation, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

16
 46 Am Jur 2d § 516.

17
 46 Am Jur 2d § 515

18
 Second Edition, New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, 183.

19
 ABA Formal Opinion 342 (November 24, 1975.

20
 103 F.R.D. 22; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15513, June 26, 1984.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

While I concur in the scholarly and ably-written dissent of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I feel
compelled to write a separate dissenting opinion to reflect the additional reasons behind my
position.

Justices Artemio V. Panganiban and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez are of the opinion that the
petition can be dismissed on procedural grounds, they contending that the Presidential
Commission on Government (PCGG) is precluded from filing a motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito
P. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0096 since the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
had already denied PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case No.
0005. In short, they are invoking the doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and law of the
case.

I believe Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato1 penned by the distinguished Justice Vicente V.

Mendoza is instructive.

To recall, Kilosbayan, Incorporated (Kilosbayan, Inc.), et al. filed on January 28, 1994 a petition
with this Court challenging the validity of the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) on
the ground that the same was made in violation of the charter of the PCSO. This Court
in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.2 invalidated the contract.

One of the issues raised before this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. was the
standing of petitioners to maintain the suit. On that score, this Court held through Associate
Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that petitioners had standing to sue.

As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., PCSO and PGMC

entered into negotiations for a new agreement which would conform to the Court’s decision.

On January 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).

On February 21, 1995, Kilosbayan, Inc, et al. filed a petition against then PCSO Chair Manuel
Morato seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it was substantially the same as
the Contract of Lease nullified in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.

Its ruling in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. notwithstanding, this Court in Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato ruled that the therein petitioners did not have standing to sue.

It explained that the doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do not pose a
barrier to the determination of petitioners’ right to maintain the suit:

Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of
the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is
a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is
before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court. Thus in People v. Pinuila, 103
Phil. 992 999 (1958), it was stated:

"‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
these case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be facts of the case before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)

"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or
succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters,
questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all
subsequent appeals and will not be considered or re-adjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)
"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite
determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to
examine question other than those arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or
other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court below has
proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be
questioned on a second appeal . . .

"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of the case
whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved to
seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77)

"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law
of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the
opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point
decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the
opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87)"

As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of
an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has
been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not
dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It relates
entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its
operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979))

It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G.R.
No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The
parties are the same but the cases are not.

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of
"conclusiveness of judgment."3 According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed
upon and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
between the same parties involving a different of action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313
(1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 [1960])

It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or
collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222
(1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held
in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned
to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his
wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income,
this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his
wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes
what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which
was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on collateral estoppel it
was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical
in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and
applicable legal rules remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907)
Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be
similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the
second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical
with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a
court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters
at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)

This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated
in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, as follows:

§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:

....

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially
unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening
change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the
laws; . . .

Illustration:

....

2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain
B's defense of sovereign immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings
the second action against B for an unrelated tortious injury occurring after the
dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive on the question whether the
defense immunity is available to B. Note: The doctrine of stare decisis may lead the court to
refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity. See §29, Comment i.

The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal
question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in
this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the
PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the
petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties
does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

The doctrine of law of the case does not, I believe, apply to the present case for this is the first
time that the issue to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before this Court. It is the
decision in this case which will be the law of the case. A reading of Republic v.
Sandiganbayan4 cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez shows that the issue currently before this
Court was not passed upon. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan stated:

The key issues, in query form, are:

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss proper?
(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than
resolving it as part of the judgment?

(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search
and seizure order issued against ALLIED correct?

(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure
to bring an action in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed
period?5

I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case
at bar, the question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is
undoubtedly a legal question. Moreover, Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve
two different substantially unrelated claims.

Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the Sandiganbayan
in Civil Case No. 0005 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is not an
interlocutory order but a final order, and that as a result, the principle of res judicata applies.

With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines interlocutory in the
following manner:

Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement
and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy. An interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally determine a
cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and
which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to adjudicate the
cause on the merits.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Oscar M. Herrera, an authority in remedial law, distinguishes between a final judgment
and interlocutory order in this wise:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or executory
as of right (final and executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect
thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court
is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of
the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of
the judgment once it becomes final, or to use the established and more distinctive term, final
and executory. (Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals cited in Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280; see also Bank of America NT & SA, G.R. No. 78017, June 8,
1990 186 SCRA 417)
An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole
controversy.7 (Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123553, July 13, 1998, 96 SCAD 205)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Florenz D. Regalado is of the same view:

An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves

something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. An order is final, for
purposes of appeal, if it disposes of the entire case.

Where the order is interlocutory, the movant has to wait for the judgment and then
appeal from the judgment, in the course of which appeal he can assign as error the said
interlocutory order. The interlocutory order cannot be appealed from separately from the
judgment. The general rule is that where the interlocutory order was rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus depending on the facts of the case.

Where the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appellate court can dismiss the appeal even
if no objection thereto was filed by the appellee in either the trial or appellate court.8 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Another respected scholar of remedial law, Justice Jose Y. Feria, has formulated this guideline
in determining whether an order is final or interlocutory:

The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final: Does it

leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when
there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.9 (Emphasis and
underscoring)

In fact, this same test was used in Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,10 cited by Justice Panganiban
to determine whether the trial court’s order was interlocutory or final:

In this particular instance, the test to determine whether the order of 06 January 1995 is
interlocutory or final would be: Does it leave something else to be done by the trial court on
the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it does not, it is final. Evidently, the trial court
would still have to hear the parties on the merits of the case…

xxx

Indeed, the word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement
and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy." An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the
is (sic) case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Applying the foregoing test, it is clear that the order denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case.

Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court is in agreement with Justice Callejo’s conclusion
that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is an
interlocutory order. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Risjord,11 the American Court ruled
that an order denying motions to disqualify the opposing party’s counsel in a civil case are not
appealable prior to final judgment in underlying litigation since such an order does not fall within
the collateral order exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,12 which is cited
by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.

Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court." We have consistently interpreted this language as indicating that a party may not take
an appeal under this section until there has been "a decision by the District Court that ‘ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.’" Coopers s & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57
L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89
L.Ed. 911 (1945). This rule, that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single
appeal following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of important purposes. It
emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially
called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial.
Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well
as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in
accordance with the sensible policy of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come
from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various
rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). See DiBella v. United
States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962). The rule also serves the
important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974).

Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals
under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
supra, we held that a "small class" of orders that did not end the main litigation were
nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a shareholder's derivative
action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff in
such a suit to post security for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final
judgment on the merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be
posted. We held that the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant
to § 1291 because the District Court's order constituted a final determination of a claim
"separable from, and collateral to," the merits of the main proceeding, because it was "too
important to be denied review," and because it was "too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., at 546,
69 S.Ct. at 1225. Cohen did not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving §
1291 a "practical rather than a technical construction." Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. River
Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413-414, 46 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339 (1926); Bronson v.
LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 67 U.S. 524-531, 2 Black 524, 530-531, 17 L.Ed. 347
(1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203, 6 How. 201, 203, 12 L.Ed.2d 404 (1848); Whiting
v. Bank of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15, 13 Pet. 6, 15, 10 L.Ed. 33 (1839). We have recently
defined this limited class of final "collateral orders" in these terms: "[T]he order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (footnote
omitted). See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651
(1977).

[1] Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final judgment at
the time the notice of appeal was filed. [FN11 the order denying petitioner's motion to
disqualify respondent is appealable under § 1291 only if it falls within
the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 of the other 10 Circuits
have also reached the conclusion that denials of disqualification motions are not immediately
appealable "collateral orders." [FN12] We agree with these courts that under Cohen such an
order is not subject to appeal prior to resolution of the merits.

FN11. Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the case was, at
that time, in the discovery stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.

FN12. See n. 10, supra.

An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the "collateral order" test. It
"conclusively determine[s] the disputed question," because the only issue is whether challenged
counsel will be permitted to continue his representation. In addition, we will assume, although
we do not decide, that the disqualification question "resolve [s] an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action," the second part of the
test. Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that an order denying
disqualification is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment" within the
meaning of our cases.

In attempting to show why the challenged order will be effectively unreviewable on final appeal,
petitioner alleges that denying immediate review will cause it irreparable harm. It is true that the
finality requirement should "be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost
and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n.
11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In support of its assertion that it will be
irreparably harmed, petitioner hints at "the possibility that the course of the proceedings may be
indelibly stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions
prompted by a divided loyalty," Brief for Petitioner 15, and at "the effect of such a tainted
proceeding in frustrating public policy," id., at 16. But petitioner fails to supply a single concrete
example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The only ground that petitioner urged in
the District Court was that respondent might shape the products-liability plaintiffs' claims for
relief in such a way as to increase the burden on petitioner. Our cases, however, require much
more before a ruling may be considered "effectively unreviewable" absent immediate appeal

[2] To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must constitute "a
complete, formal and, in the trial court, final rejection," Abney v. United States, supra, 431
U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040, of a claimed right "where denial of immediate review would
render impossible any review whatsoever," United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91
S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). Thus we have permitted appeals prior to criminal trials
when a defendant has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden double
jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supra, or a violation of his constitutional right to bail, Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) because those situations, like the posting of
security for costs involved in Cohen, "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical
value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). By way of contrast,
we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United States v. Ryan,
supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has been that in the rare case when
appeal after final judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the
order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against him, and challenge the order on direct
appeal of the contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 327, 60 S.Ct. at 542.
We have also rejected immediate appealability under § 1291 of claims that "may fairly be
assessed" only after trial, United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860, and those involving
"considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's
cause of action.’" Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469, 98 S.Ct., at
2458, quoting Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 522, 9
L.Ed.2d 523 (1963).

An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders that
are indeed reviewable on appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller
class of those that are not. The propriety of the district court's denial of a disqualification
motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be
evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. The decision whether to disqualify an
attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual situation of the case then at hand, and the order
embodying such a decision will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of
fundamental right that cannot effectively be reviewed following judgment on the merits. In the
case before us, petitioner has made no showing that its opportunity for meaningful review will
perish unless immediate appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the Court of Appeals
conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was prejudicial error,
it would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial.
That remedy seems plainly adequate should petitioner's concerns of possible injury ultimately
prove well founded. As the Second Circuit has recently observed, the potential harm that might
be caused by requiring that a party await final judgment before it may appeal even when the
denial of its disqualification motion was erroneous does not "diffe[r] in any significant way from
the harm resulting from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders
requiring discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the
trial judge." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431. But
interlocutory orders are not appealable "on the mere ground that they may be
erroneous." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275, n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305
(1967). Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not only would constitute an unjustified
waste of scarce judicial resources, but also would transform the limited exception carved out
in Cohen into a license for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291.
This we decline to do. [FN13]

FN13. Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged if forced to
wait until final resolution of the underlying litigation before securing review of an order denying
its motion to disqualify opposing counsel, it is not necessary, in order to resolve those situations,
to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all such orders. In the proper circumstances,
the moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification, such as a protective order limiting
counsel's ability to disclose or to act on purportedly confidential information. If additional facts in
support of the motion develop in the course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the trial
court to reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the result in the District Court and
absolutely determined that it will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to have the question
certified for interlocutory appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see n. 7, supra, and,
in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a writ of mandamus from the court
of appeals might be available. See In re Continental Investment Corp., supra, 637 F.2d, at
7; Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C., at 262, 546 F.2d, at
1028. See generally Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification
of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not be
concerned with the availability of such extraordinary procedures in the case before us, because
petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might suffer if forced to await the final
outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its disqualification motion is any greater
than the harm suffered by any litigant forced to wait until the termination of the trial before
challenging interlocutory orders it considers erroneous.

III

[3][4][5] We hold that a district court's order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not
appealable under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. [FN14

FN14. The United States in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner's standing to attack
the order permitting respondent to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. In light of our
conclusion that the Eighth Circuit was without jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal, we have no
occasion to address the standing issue.13 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the
original)

The ruling in Firestone was subsequently reiterated in Flanagan v. United

States14 and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller.15

Justice Panganiban further suggests that the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is not perpetual but merely lasts for five years primarily relying on
the Civil Code provisions on prescription and the doctrine that the right to practice law is a
property right protected by the Constitution.

I do not agree with this framework of analysis. Carried to its logical conclusion, Justice
Panganiban’s proposal would mean that after five years from the termination of the attorney-
client relationship, all lawyers would be able to represent an interest in conflict with that of the
former client and that they would no longer be bound by the rule on privileged communication.

It bears emphasis that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble profession at
that.

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted
only to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. If the respect of the
people in the honor and integrity of the legal profession is to be retained, both lawyers and
laymen must recognize and realize that the legal profession is a profession and not a trade, and
that the basic ideal of that profession is to render public service and secure justice for those who
seek its aid. It is not a business, using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those
who conduct it. From the professional standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals – organization,
learning and public service. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. The professional spirit – the spirit of public service – constantly curbs the urge of
that instinct.
The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions and carries with it the responsibility to live up to its exacting
standards and honored traditions. A person enrolled in its ranks is called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the state – the administration of justice. That the
practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers repute and of eminence welcome their
designation as counsel de oficio, as an opportunity to manifest fidelity to the concept that law is
a profession.

The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The lawyer’s conduct
is to be measured not by the standards of trade and counting house but by those of his
profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the ethical rule against
advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests on the fundamental postulate that
the practice of law is a profession.

In the matter of fixing his fees, an attorney should never forget that "the profession is a branch
of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade" and that his standing as a
member of the bar "is not enhanced by quibbling relative to just fees, equivalent to the
bargaining between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the market before a sale is
made." Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater
deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. However, while the practice of law is a profession and an attorney is
primarily an officer of the court, he is as much entitled to protection from the against any attempt
by his client to escape payment of his just fees, as the client against exaction by his counsel of
excessive fees.

To summarize, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business
are: (a) "a duty of public service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;" (b) "a relation as officer of the court
to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability;" (c) "a
relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;" and (d) "a relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

These characteristics make the law a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. Its
basic ideal is to render service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to
remain a noble and honorable profession and attain its ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should
not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity
to them. And because they are the vanguards of the law and the legal systems, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves in their professional and private dealings with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach.16

Moreover, the relation of attorney and client is, however, one of trust and confidence of the
highest order. It is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.

… A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from
his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take
advantage of the client’s secrets.
The rule is a rigid one designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where
he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, and to protect him from unfounded
suspicion of professional misconduct. The question is not necessarily one of right of the
parties but of adhere to proper professional standards. An attorney should not only keep
inviolate his client’s confidence but should likewise avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in Nakpil v. Valdes,18 this Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno held that the test to
determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not
certainty of conflict.19

Justice Panganiban justifies his theory on the ground that in 5 years time, the lawyer will
develop a mild case of amnesia such that "in all probability, the lapse of the said period would
also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case
despite active participation in the proceedings therein." He thus cites his own personal
experience as a member of this Court:

Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand
cases in full-length ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended
Resolutions. This does not include the thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of
the Court, in which I actively took part during their deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that
I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each of these cases,
especially in their earlier ones.

While it is true that over time memory does fade, the ravages of time have been mitigated with
the invention of the paper and pen and its modern offspring – the computer. It is not uncommon
for lawyers to resort to note taking in the course of handling legal matters.

The proposition that "a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees" is not unqualified. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals20 which Justice Panganiban relies on, this Court held:

A profession, trade or calling is a property within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.
One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights
are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,

business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of
a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State,
the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to
define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a valid and proper
regulation.

In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then Solicitor
General in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), saying that "it is
indubitable from the facts that Atty. Mendoza had no iota of participation in the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK" and that his only involvement was "advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila." Justice Puno observes that "the procedure of liquidation is
simple and is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29."

Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK
is to me not material. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK
through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just
mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer
known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his
position he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank.

Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a strict
interpretation would cause "a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent."

With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the premise that
this is "the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers." Effectively, this is likely to
result in the compromising of ethical standards which this Court must never allow. While it is
desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify the
disturbance of our mores.

The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed.
Admittedly the salary for serving in government often pales in comparison to that of the private
sector. I submit, however, that while financial considerations are important, they are not the sole
factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving
in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to
know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been
tempted by the promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the end,
we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe
that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal coil than the
pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts it: "What is the use of living if it be not to
strive for noble causes and make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it
after we are gone?"

ACCORDINGLY, concurring in the dissenting opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I vote to
grant the petition insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned, thus granting the motion to
disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza in the said case.

Footnotes

1
 246 SCRA 540 (1995).
2
 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

3
 The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" is also called "collateral estoppel" or "preclusion
of issues," as distinguished from "preclusion of claims" or res judicata. In the Rules of Court, the
first (conclusiveness of judgment, collateral estoppel or preclusion of issues) is governed by
Rule 39, §49 (c) while the second (res judicata or preclusion of claims) is found in Rule 39, §49
(b).

4
 255 SCRA 438 (1996).

5
 Id. at 448-449.

6
 Black’s Law Dictionary 815 [1991], 6th ed.

7
 II O. Herrera, Remedial Law 528 (2000).

8
 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 492 (1997), 6th ed.

9
 2 J. Feria & M. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 152 (2000).

10
 365 SCRA 359 (2001).

11
 449 U.S. 368 (1981).

12
 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

13
 449 U.S. 368, 373-380 (1981).

14
 465 U.S. 259 (1984).

15
 472 U.S. 424 (1985).

16
 R. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial
Conduct 3-5 (2004).

17
 Id. at 165.

18
 286 SCRA 758 (1998).

19
 Id. at 773.

20
 260 SCRA 319 (1996).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial "bad man" who
wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without
running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the "good man" as a beacon to assist
him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of professional
conduct.1

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves
the Court to strictly apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical
compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the profession, often find themselves in the
unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without exception, no
profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity;
in which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually arising.2 The Code of
Professional Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal
profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its
provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow"
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesar’s
wife – to be pure and appear to be so.3

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 14 of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages"
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian,5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong
(represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan,
Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo,
Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and
Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea,
Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.
After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan
(Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein as follows:
a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v.
PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares
of stock in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan,
Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp.
and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by
and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco
Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen
Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Shareholdings, Inc.; and

d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s
Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by
and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos
and Natividad Santos.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of
former President Marcos.

The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to the Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General
Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was subsequently acquired by respondents
Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated
properties are the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).

The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as follows:

1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The
Central Bank then extended an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of ₱310 million.
In extending this loan, the Central Bank, however, took control of GENBANK with the execution
of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK’s outstanding shares in favor of the Central Bank
and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of Directors of
GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued
a Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it under
receivership.

2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was
scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a)
submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to
guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a 2-year period
to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through
a Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy
Co. This bid, among other things, offered to pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets
estimated at ₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of ₱25,698,473.00;
and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required letter of credit
was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O.
Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the
advances of the Central Bank in the amount of ₱310 million. Without this letter of commitment,
the Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud
because it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O.
Domingo conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the doing away
with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the term of payment from two years
to five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances
which was deficient by more than ₱90 Million, and many other concessions to the great
prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK stockholders.

3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents
Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they
are also the major shareholders of this new bank.6

Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
since Atty. Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank’s
officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation. Further, he appeared as
counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of
GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Manila and docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812.7

The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers
from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service."

Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Resolution
dated July 11, 2001 stating:

Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been
resolved by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly
the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in
his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to
the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March
7, 1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No.
0005 (pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and
adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp.
1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in
the case at bar.8
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which reads:

Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001

praying for the reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion
to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed
an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated
August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s "REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs. Lucio
Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying
the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and
executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant
motion is hereby DENIED.9

The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005, which was adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence,
that the PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza’s
former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group."11 The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:

... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is
not whether the attorney has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear,
but whether his accepting the new retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new
client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
formerly represented against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use
against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through their former connection.
Nor does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once been employed
by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids the
attorney’s appearance or acting against the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment
of such client, the information and confidences acquired during the existence of their relation as
attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs.
PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGG’s "Reply" does not controvert Atty. Mendoza’s claim that in
appearing in the instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf
of the Central Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty.
Mendoza’s claim that the position he took as Solicitor General in behalf of the Central Bank in
1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been maintained by his successors in
office. In fact, even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no objection
to Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as long as he maintains
the same position he has taken on behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor
General, which position refers to the various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of
the Central Bank in regard General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance with
law (Annex "A", Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12

The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year
1986. The said provision prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year
from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.

As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was
adopted by the Fifth Division in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the
recourse to this Court by the PCGG.

Procedural Issues

The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final
and executory; hence, the PCGG should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2)
whether the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.

In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant petition
for certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
likewise, states:

Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above-

mentioned rules do not preclude the resort to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil
action of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.13

In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order;
hence, not appealable. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy."14 An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally
dispose of the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.15
Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example,
in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,16 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition
for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the petition for bail,
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San
Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions
for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of
stock in the San Miguel Corp.

To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail
the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant
petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22,
1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in this case.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar by former judgment
and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res
adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or
conclusiveness of judgment.19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit,20 Justice Artemio
Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments or final orders in the above
section has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer
appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the
highest possible tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves
nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory.22 The phrase refers to a
final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental,
subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial,
denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res
judicata or conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.23
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must
concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between
the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.24 When there is no identity
of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment.25

In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of

judgment, the doctrine of res judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which,
as earlier discussed, leaves nothing else to be done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a
judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is
upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle
only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 denying the PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or
finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein.
As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the
other cases because, strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by
prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or
orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.27

Substantive Issue

The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction
embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN

THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted
from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA).28 Rule 6.03, in
particular, is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:
36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not
after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which
he intervened as a public official.29 Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows that the interdiction (1)
applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service."

In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to former
government lawyers is called the "revolving door" – the process by which lawyers temporarily
enter government service from private life then leave it for large fees in private practice, where
they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.30 To
address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private
practice may be sought based either on "adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest
representation conflict."

In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a

client in private practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and if the interests of the current and former clients are
adverse.31 It must be observed that the "adverse-interest conflict" applies to all lawyers in that
they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the
interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in "congruent-interest representation
conflict," the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the
lawyer from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government
client and the new client are entirely parallel.33 The "congruent-interest representation conflict,"
unlike the "adverse-interest conflict," is unique to former government lawyers.

I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in
Civil Case No. 0096, which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp.,
violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest representation conflict."

Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject

matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with

or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation

of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had

intervened as the Solicitor General

The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any matter" and
(2) "he had intervened" thereon while he was in the government service.34

The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a
precise definition of "matter" as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested
that the term "contemplates a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transaction between
identifiable parties."35

There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on
the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by
respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI of Manila, the petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No. 107812).36 GENBANK was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose
shares of stocks have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No.
0096.

The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely advised the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which procedure is "given in black
and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29." This procedural advice, according to the majority
opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."

On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the
contemplation of the term "matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty.
Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central Bank on the procedure to go about GENBANK’s
liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No. 107812 did not
merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.37 These acts
were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently,
the same can be properly considered "matter" within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03
does not only apply if precisely the same legal issues are involved in each representation.38 The
Comments of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of Professional
Responsibility explained that the restriction covers "engagement or employment, which means
that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the
matter in which he intervened as a public official."39 The sequestration of the shares of stock in
Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No.
0096, necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in
which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s liquidation is

sufficient to place his present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was significant and substantial. The
Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials40 of the Central Bank, is
revealing:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision
to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.41

The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him
in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of
the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March
29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.

for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank."42

By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and,
more significantly, by filing the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly
intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents
Tan, et al.

I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having
intervened as it describes the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of
participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK."

That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank, without
the participation of Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in the
proceedings taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank on
how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his filing of the petition in Special Proceeding
No. 107812 pursuant to Section 2943 of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes "intervention" as to
place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means –

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or

come between points of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things …44

Further, "intervention" is defined as –

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;

2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45

With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank
on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with
the court, Atty. Mendoza "had intervened," "had come in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation
of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking
institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its
stockholders.

Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not

take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if

no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s

former government client (Central Bank) and

his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)

As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s Canons of

Professional Ethics, now superseded by the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu
of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–101(B) commands, thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee.

The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion
No. 37, is –

"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s] action as a public
legal official might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope
of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he had done.46

The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy
consideration that an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil.47

Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and
the ABA has persuasive effect on the interpretation of Rule 6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case
of General Motors Corporation v. City of New York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were
applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US
court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case it
filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in the latter’s case against General Motors
Corp. but signed the complaint in that action.

George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a
trial attorney assigned at the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation
of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the city and intercity bus business.
The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors
Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time
that he left the Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.

In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft "has not
changed sides" – i.e. "there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in
question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the
ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of the side chosen in private
practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks great potential for
lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of
governmental resources."50

The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the
complaint in that action and admittedly had "substantial responsibility" in its investigatory and
preparatory stages. It thus concluded that "where the overlap of issues is so plain and the
involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the appearance of impropriety must be
avoided through disqualification."51

The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation conflict"

doctrine. It bears stressing that this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and
has been distinguished from the normal rule applicable for non-government lawyers in this wise
–
To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has
represented passenger A and has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No
conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the lawyer from later representing passenger B
against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the benefits of the
lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B’s advantage
information and strategies developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the
interest of A and B do not conflict.

The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is
arguably more connected with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice
represents Small Soap Company in its suit for damages under the federal antitrust laws against
Giant Soap Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing Medium Soap
Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same
conspiracy. The congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost
certainly mean that the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a conflict – an
opposing interest between the two clients – the existence of a substantial relationship between
the matters involved in both cases is irrelevant.

Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap
Company to force divestiture of an acquired company on a theory that, because of the
acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an industry in conflict with antitrust laws. May the
lawyer, after leaving government service and while in private practice, represent Medium Soap
Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy?
Does the absence of opposing interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former
government client similarly mean that there should be no disqualification?

At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal former-
client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in private
practice, despite the fact that the interests of the client and the lawyer’s former government
client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is the relationship between
the former and the succeeding representations.52

The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been explained,
thus:

The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would
have upon the decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the
earlier representation of the government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the
fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government client that later could be to
the advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers that a government lawyer’s
largely discretionary actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private
practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients …

The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers
who represent the government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual
client who oversees the lawyer’s work. For that reason a special rule is needed to remove the
incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with an eye cast toward
advantages in future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes
that and, particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm
with which the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging
lawyers from entering temporary public service.53

The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of
Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or
adverse interests is required for the interdiction to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests
were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule 15.03)54 would apply. Rather,
the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our
Code of Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept
any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he
intervened as a public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he served during
his public employment."55

In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank but
respondents Tan, et al. Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice
clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former government client (Central Bank) are apparently
aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.

Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

temporal limitation because cases have to be

resolved based on their peculiar circumstances

Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the
provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is
deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to consider in determining its
applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For example, in Control Data
Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of Minnesota held that the
lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in
charge of negotiations in antitrust case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting
as counsel for the plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose
conduct was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself 10 years removed
from the matter over which he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at the time
he accepted the private engagement relating to the same matter.57 Clearly, it is the degree of
involvement or participation in the matter while in government service, not the passage of time,
which is the crucial element in Rule 6.03.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of principles
by which the conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and
practically considered, legal ethics may be defined as that branch of moral science which treats
of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients, to the courts, to the bar, and to the
public."58 In this connection, the Court has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings,
including disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, thus:

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may
be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice…59

For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in
disqualification cases against lawyers.

In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is
not sufficient to consider it far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said
liquidation is still pending with the Court.60 The validity of the sequestration of the shares in Allied
Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily intertwined
with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the acquisition
thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are so
overlapping and the involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain,
direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application

of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a
"chilling effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests."
This concern is similar to that raised by the City of New York in the General Motors case where
it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill the ardor for Government
service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ."61 It appeared that
the City of New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v.
Standard Oil Co,62 known as the Esso Export Case, thus:

If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long
a time, or will prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has
devoted years in acquiring, and if that sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes
associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be too great for most men to
make.63

Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F.
Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that
the said court denied the motion to disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export
Case because the lawyer therein "never investigated or passed upon the subject matter of the
pending case … never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to
the regulations involved in the litigation."64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high
ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry
into Government service, on the other, was struck under far different circumstances of the Esso
Export Case.

In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics65 was considered more to the point:

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney,
although he did not "investigate" or "pass upon" it, …, there would undoubtedly be an
appearance of evil if he were not disqualified.66

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the
cautious application of the "appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former Government
lawyer’s connection with the matter at issue was the tenuous one of mere employment in the
same Government agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and
preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US court,
where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Government employ so
direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving former
government lawyers will have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending
each case. A balance between the two seemingly conflicting policy considerations of
maintaining high ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and
encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter
alia, the relationship between the former and the succeeding representations of the former
government lawyer. Likewise, as already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter
while in Government employ is a crucial element in determining if his present representation is
within the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of
GENBANK while he was the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety
must be avoided through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly
influenced while in government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to
represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I am constrained to vote for his disqualification in
Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public
and private segments of the legal profession.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty.
Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.

Footnotes
1
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (1974).

2
 Foreword of Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics.

3
 Abragan v. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 (2001).

4
 EO No. 1, promulgated on February 29, 1986, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.

5
 Mariano Tan Eng Lian in some pleadings.

6
 Memorandum of the PCGG, pp. 7-9.

7
 The case is now pending with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152551.

8
 Rollo, p. 42.

9
 Id. at 43.

10
 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (retired), with Associate Justices Jose S.
Balajadia and Nathanael M. Grospe, concurring; Id. at 57.

11
 Rollo, p. 61.

12
 Id. at 61-62.

13
 People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672 (2003).

14
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations,
22 SCRA 785 (1968) citing BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd Revision, Vol. I, p. 1651.

15
 Ibid.

16
 396 SCRA 443 (2003).

17
 340 SCRA 289 (2000).

18
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715 (2000).

19
 FERIA, II CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 2001 ed., p. 123.

20
 344 SCRA 838 (2000).

21
 Ibid.

22
 Id.
23
 Id.

24
 Id.

25
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, supra.

26
 Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, supra.

27
 Id.

28
 The ABA first adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics on August 27, 1908. Canons 1 to 32
thereof were adopted by the Philippine Bar Association (PBA) in 1917. In 1946, the PBA again
adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics. The ABA’s
Canons of Professional Ethics were superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility on
January 1, 1970. In 1980, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code
of Professional Responsibility, which it later submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. On
June 21, 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. (AGPALO, infra.)

29
 AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2001 ed., p. 52.

30
 WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986), p. 456.

31
 Ibid.

32
 This prohibition is restated in Rule 15.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

33
 WOLFRAM, supra.

34
 AGPALO, supra.

35
 WOLFRAM, supra.

36
 MEMORANDUM for Respondents Tan, et al., p. 56; Rollo, p. 446.

37
 According to the ABA Formal Opinion No. 342, these acts do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and do not disqualify a lawyer under DR 9-101(B) from subsequent private
employment involving the same regulations, procedures or points of law. WOLFRAM, supra.

38
 In United States v. Trafficante (328 F.2d 117 [1964]), the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth
Circuit) held that, under Canon 36, the attorney who was formerly employed in the office of the
Regional Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service and who handled the tax claims against
Trafficante which resulted in stipulated settlement in the tax court was disqualified from
representing the latter in subsequent suits for foreclosure of liens for balance due on those
income taxes and for other federal taxes. The court therein rejected the lawyer’s claim that
disqualification should be ordered only if precisely the same issues were involved in each
representation.

39
 AGPALO, supra.

40
 Then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Assistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then
Director of the Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.

41
 RoIllo, p. 109.

42
 Id. at 113. (Emphasis supplied.)

43
 The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by the head of the

appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition
of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be
disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department
head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board
may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its
assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these
purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public
interest requires, orders its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of
First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do
all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under
this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in
the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board
under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and
executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the
court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of
the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files
with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall
be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of
the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in
the usual and ordinary course of business: Provided, however, That this shall not include the
inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly
evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of
any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007,
1771 & PD No. 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

44
 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p. 1183.

45
 Ibid.

46
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

47
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70
Harv.L.Rev. 657 (1957).

48
 See Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259 (2000).

49
 Supra.

50
 Id. at 650.

51
 Id. at 652.
52
 WOLFRAM, supra.

53
 Ibid.

54
 See note 32.

55
 See note 39.

56
 318 F.Supp. 145 (D.Minn.1970).

57
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

58
 MALCOLM, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ADAPTED FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (1949 ed.), p. 8.

59
 Heck v. Santos, 423 SCRA 329 (2004) citing In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).

60
 See note 7.

61
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

62
 136 F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.1955).

63
 Quoted in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

64
 Id.

65
 See note 42.

66
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically,
conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription.

In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,1 because after leaving his post as
solicitor general, he appeared as counsel in a "matter in which he had intervened while he was
in said service" (as solicitor general). He postulates that the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be a beacon to assist good lawyers "in navigating an ethical course through the
sometimes murky waters of professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of
impropriety." He adds that the Code should be strictly construed and stringently enforced.

On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in his ponencia that
Rule 6.03 of the Code has been incorrectly applied by Justice Callejo, because the "procedural
advice" given by Atty. Mendoza is not the "matter" contemplated by the said Rule.
The ponencia explains that an "ultra restrictive reading of the Rule" would have "ill-effects in our
jurisdiction."

With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully submit that there is no need to
delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss
the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent
private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same
court resolving the very same issue on the "disqualification" of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving
the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can
no longer be altered or changed.

I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be
barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving
the very same ground for disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject
matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he
ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the
Code) was raised.

Conclusiveness

of Judgment

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
relevant part of which I quote as follows:

"Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

"(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and

"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto."
The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata serves as
an absolute proscription of a subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (1) the
former judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits;
(3) it was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) between the first and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.2

In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only an identity
of issues, res judicata exists under the second concept; that is, under conclusiveness of
judgment. In the latter concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues
involving the same parties but on different claims or causes of action.3 Such rule, however, does
not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which prohibits the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.

In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction; it has thus been conclusively settled by a judgment or final order issued
therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them) are concerned,
and while the judgment or order remains unreversed or un-vacated by a proper authority upon a
timely motion or petition, such conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in
any future or other action between the same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, the
only identities required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is that
between parties and issues.4

While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes
subsequent actions, conclusiveness of judgment nonetheless operates as an estoppel to issues
or points controverted, on which the determination of the earlier finding or judgment has been
anchored.5 The dictum laid down in such a finding or judgment becomes conclusive and
continues to be binding between the same parties, as long as the facts on which that judgment
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding
effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be re-litigated, since the said issue or
matter has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.6

Relevant Antecedents

Showing the Application of the

Conclusiveness Doctrine

Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case of res
judicata, specifically the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued sometime in June to August 1986 several
Writs of Sequestration over certain properties of Respondents Lucio Tan et al., properties they
had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of their close relationship with former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint against the
same respondents for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" vis-à-vis
their sequestered properties. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN).

Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration Writs was
questioned by herein respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the Court to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to the SBN Fifth Division and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil Case No. 0096, in particular,
involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG over herein private
respondents’ shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation (formerly General Bank and Trust
Company or "GenBank").

In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan et al.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion7 to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for therein Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution8 dated April 22, 1991,
the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied that Motion. The anti-graft court likewise denied
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCGG.9 Because the latter did not appeal the denial,
the Resolution became final and executory.

Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion10 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for Respondents Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court, "the motion is exactly
the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005"; in fact, both incidents were
taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan.11 Indeed, a perusal
of both Motions reveals that, except as to their respective captions, the contents of the Motions
are identically worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same ground: that by
virtue of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was prohibited
from acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pending cases. During his tenure as solicitor general,
Atty. Mendoza had allegedly "intervened" in the dissolution of GenBank, Allied Bank’s
predecessor.

Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to reiterate and
adopt "the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division x x x
denying the motion."

Resolution in Civil Case

No. 0005 a Final Order

As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts an end to
(or disposes of) a case or a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else -- except its
execution -- is left for the court to do. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative
task of the court on the particular matter involved is likewise ended.12 Such an order may refer to
the entire controversy or to some defined and separate branch thereof.13 On the other hand, an
order is interlocutory if its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial
proceedings to be further conducted by the issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy
to rest.14
I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, in the
Dissenting Opinions of Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for determining whether
an order is interlocutory. Such test, however, applies to orders that dispose of incidents or
issues that are intimately related to the very cause of action or merits of the case. The exception
lies when the order refers to a "definite and separate branch" of the main controversy, as held
by the Court in Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant.15

Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents is a "defined and separate branch" of the main case for "reversion, reconveyance,
and restitution" of the sequestered properties. This matter has no direct bearing on the
adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal controversy. The final judgment resolving
the main case does not depend on the determination of the particular question raised in the
Motion. The April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 had finally and definitively determined the issue of Atty. Mendoza’s disqualification to act
as counsel for Tan et al. Since that Resolution was not appealed, it became final and executory.
It became a conclusive judgment insofar as that particular question was concerned.

Applying the Doctrine of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and
0096. Neither has the jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan
been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter raised in the two Motions to Disqualify, though
separately filed at different times in those two cases, are likewise the same or identical. Also
undisputed is the fact that no appeal or certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991
Resolution of the Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG’s Motion.

To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the said April
22, 1991 Resolution was merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an incidental or collateral matter
x x x; it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other
cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains. I beg to disagree.

True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of "reversion,

reconveyance and restitution." However, I submit that the question with respect to the
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had nonetheless been conclusively settled. Indeed, the April
22, 1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the Motion to Disqualify on its merits.
Since no appeal was taken therefrom, it became final and executory after the lapse of the
reglementary period.16

While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the
Resolution should be differentiated from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves an incident
arising from the very subject matter or cause of action, or one that is related to the disposition of
the main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an order is not appealable, but may still be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds adduced before final judgment. Verily, res
judicata would not apply therein.17

But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is separate from and
independent of the substantive issues in the main case for "reversion, reconveyance and
restitution." This particular question, in relation to Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution of April 22, 1991, issued by the SBN Second
Division. In fact, I submit that this question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded,
so as not to prejudice the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious.
Otherwise, the Motion would be rendered naught.

In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 finally came up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The Fifth Division correctly noted that the pending Motion was "exactly the same in substance
as that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it resolved to reiterate and adopt the Second
Division’s April 22, 1991 Resolution denying the Motion. Interestingly and understandably, the
Fifth Division of the anti-graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion
before it, because the Second Division’s Resolution disposing of exactly the same Motion and
involving the same parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That Resolution became
a conclusive judgment between the parties with respect to the subject matter involved therein.

Exception to Application of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,18 in which the Court19 said that "the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to
issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved." Explaining further, the
Court cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the exception in Restatement of the Law 2d,
on Judgments, thus:

"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:

xxxxxxxxx

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially
unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account or an intervening
change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the
laws; x x x. [Emphasis and omissions in the original.]"

In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment does not apply to this case, because the issue at bar --
disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a legal question" and "Civil Case No. 005 and Civil
Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims."

I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the exception. I
believe that the two cases involve substantially related claims. Civil Case No. 0005 seeks to
recover alleged ill-gotten shares of stock of respondents Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Civil Case No.
0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ over the same shares of stock involved in
Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate analysis, both cases refer to the determination of who has a
valid ownership claim over said stockholdings.
In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required for the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and
issues.20

Similar Motions in

Other PCGG Cases

Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum,21 Respondents Tan et al. aver

that similar Motions to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in Sandiganbayan Civil Case
Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former case, Sipalay Trading v. PCGG, involved shares of stock of
Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation; the latter case, Allied Banking
Corporation v. PCGG, sought the invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure of certain
documents of Allied Bank.

In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well as the
Motions for Reconsideration. No further actions were taken by the PCGG on such denials,
which thus became executory. Consequently, Atty. Mendoza was allowed to represent Lucio
Tan in those cases.

On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan granted both
Petitions on August 23, 1993, by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration questioned in Civil Case
No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure Order assailed in Civil Case No. 0100. On March
29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN’s Decision in the aforementioned consolidated
cases.22 Consequently, now deemed res judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case Nos. 0095
and 0100 -- principal, incidental and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged
disqualification of Atty. Mendoza.

Presence of Identities of

Parties and Issues

As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment
to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues. In the case before us, both identities
are clearly present. Hence, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment applies and bars the
present Petition.

From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of
conclusiveness of judgment. Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July 11, 2001 and
the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) should have been a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The certiorari proceeding before this
Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, deserving only of outright dismissal.23 In any
event, contrary to the allegations of petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.

Proscription

Time-Barred
True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify the period
of its applicability or enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer that, ergo, the
prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent.

All civil actions have a prescriptive period.24 Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or
lays down no other period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five (5) years after the
right of action accrued.25 Criminal offenses -- even the most heinous ones -- as well as the
penalties therefor, likewise prescribe.26 Relatedly, even so-called perpetual penalties and
multiple sentences have maximum periods.27

Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers and
employees from practicing their profession for only one year after their resignation, retirement or
separation from public office, in connection with any matter before their former office. 28

Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions or
facts that have been obscured by defective memory or the lapse of time.29 It was designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until relevant proofs are lost, memories faded, and witnesses no longer
available.30 Consistent with law and jurisprudence and the purpose of statutes of limitations, the
prohibition on former government attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part
long ago, pursuant to their official functions while in public service, should likewise have an
expiry or duration.

In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly participated
as then solicitor general, took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a century ago. Since early
1986, he has ceased to be solicitor general and has since engaged in the private practice of
law. In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents Tan et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and, since
1990, in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to 0100.31 At the time, at least ten (10) years had passed since his
alleged involvement in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions
to Disqualify were filed by PCGG in these aforementioned cases, he had been outside
government service for about five (5) years, and fifteen years had gone by since the said
liquidation.

Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the individual
participation of government officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed "have become so
obscure from the lapse of time," if not from "defective memory."

It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases simultaneously or

within overlapping periods of time. This is in fact a common remonstration, especially among
prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors, government corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even
trial and appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful public servants, they cannot reject or shrink from
assignments even if they are already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private
practice, whether by themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.

It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in government
service would have handled or interfered in hundreds of legal matters involving varied
parties.32 Thousands of attorneys who have chosen to dedicate their service to the government
for some years are in such a situation. Hence, to perpetually and absolutely ban them from
taking part in all cases involving some matter in which they have taken part in some distant
past, pursuant to their official functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It
would be tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of the exercise of their profession. Be it
remembered that a profession, trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property right within
the meaning of our constitutional guarantees.33

Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule because of
participation in a matter that has been forgotten in good faith due to the lapse of a long period of
time and does not involve interest adverse to the government would likewise be harsh,
unreasonable and unfair.

Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their long
careers, would wish to serve the government. Would their fine and wide-ranging practice and
experience, which would otherwise be beneficial to the government, likewise forever bar them
from getting involved in matters that concern a party with whom they have had dealings several
years ago and whose interests are not adversely affected? In the case of acknowledged experts
in specific fields of law, of what use would their needed expertise be to the government if they
have to inhibit themselves from every case involving a party they have served in the distant
past, considering the limited number of parties that may actually be involved in a specific field
(for instance, intellectual property or bioethics law)?

I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one’s profession, or right of employment including
that of attorneys formerly in government service, must survive the test of fairness and
reasonableness. The restriction should not be as pervasive and longer than is necessary to
afford a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the government. After all, the
disqualification of government attorneys is a drastic measure, and courts should hesitate to
impose it except when necessary.34

Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers -- specifically with respect to
subsequent engagement or employment in connection with matters falling under the
"congruent-interest representation" -- should be allowed to expire after a reasonable period
when no further prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The duration of this prohibition
should be no more than five (5) years from retirement or separation from government service.
Five years is the prescriptive period for suits for which no period is prescribed by law.35

It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, one would
most likely have lost the loyalty of one’s former personal contacts, if not the loyal associates
themselves, who may be able to facilitate the acquisition of important information from the
former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to a
reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in
the proceedings therein. This principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other
legal matters as is so common among lawyers in government offices.

Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed to take up
cases involving matters that were brought before them during their incumbency in public office,
so long as such matters do not come within the "adverse-interest conflict" doctrine and the
conflict-of-interest rule36 applicable to all lawyers in general.

For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section 5(b) and
(d)37 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct38 should also prescribe in five (5) years
from the time they assumed their judicial position; or from the time they retire from or otherwise
end their government service.
I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to many members of the
bar who have served, or who aspire to serve, the government.

On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by discouraging
attorneys in government from so shaping their practice as to give unfair advantage to their
future private clients, or from jeopardizing confidential information learned while in government
service. On the other hand, government service should not be discouraged by overly strict
ethical rules that perpetually prohibit government lawyers from later making reasonable and
appropriate use in private practice of the expertise or experience they have gained.39

The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector sooner or
later, and the government will hardly be able to attract them if they would later be unreasonably
restricted from putting their government experience to some use.40 After all, government service
should afford lawyers the opportunity to improve their subsequent private employment. The
nature of the job brings such lawyers into inevitable contact with clients interested in their fields
of expertise. Because the practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the likely
consequence of a wholesale approach to disqualification would be encouragement of a two-
track professional structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The suspicion, and the reality,
of ethical improprieties unrelated to particular government cases would be eliminated -- but at
the cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy.41

Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from entering
government service, to the detriment of the public.42 The Court must strike a balance. I believe
that the adoption of the aforementioned period of limitation would achieve the purpose behind
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 5 of Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.

To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,

because the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 --
which resolved on the merits the very same ground for the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza,
and which involved essentially the same parties and the same subject matter as the present
case -- constituted a final and executory order, no timely appeal having been taken therefrom.

Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent-interest

representation under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be effective
only for a period of five (5) years from the retirement or the separation from government service
of the official concerned. The purpose of such prescriptive period is to prevent undue restraint
on former government lawyers from the private practice of their profession, especially in the field
of expertise that they may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of
members of the judiciary, under Section 5 (b) and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct should end five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position.

Implications of the

Dissenting Opinions

Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by the
opinion of the dissenters that the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan’s Second
Division in Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza from other cases between the same parties. Such a holding would effectively allow
herein petitioner to file exactly the same Motion in each of other and future cases involving the
same parties or their privies and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving
the same question or issue will have already been finally resolved in one of like cases.

Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one case
become final through petitioner’s withholding recourse to a higher court in order to await a
possible favorable ruling in one of the other cases. As it is, absurdity already surrounds the
handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which involve the same parties and the
same subject matter.

In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired properties
consisting of shares of stock of Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty. Mendoza is allowed
to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case No. 0096, which merely questions the validity
of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the shares of stock in Allied Bank of the same
respondents, he is prohibited, per the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is
preposterous.

Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no appeal or
certiorari has timely been taken therefrom, would allow the questioned counsel to act as such
throughout the trial period until final judgment by the court a quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his
alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the other party as an issue. If the appeals court
or this Tribunal ultimately finds that the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground of
conflict of interest or "congruent-interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial
court’s ruling, the case would necessarily be remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire
proceedings would become naught and thereby unnecessarily waste the precious time, effort
and resources of the courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence (or defense) adduced by
the "disqualified" counsel through his prior connections with the government (or the adverse
party) could have already created bias in the court or in the public mind.

These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res judicata, the
fundamental principle of due process and of the rule proscribing forum shopping.

Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this point for his
alleged violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, due to res judicata and
prescription, I submit that there is no more need to discuss on the merits whether indeed there
was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be merely academic and moot.

May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap, who
was himself a former PCGG commissioner, on the soundness of upholding final judgments even
"at the risk of occasional errors":

"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and
deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a
state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question
litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than an important principle of public policy: and
that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of the jural
sytem. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies."43

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Footnotes

1
 "Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

2
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715, June 19, 2001.

3
 Ibid.

4
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732, February 7, 1991 (reiterated in Calalang v.
Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88, March 11, 1994; and in Intestate Estate of San Pedro v.
Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733, December 18, 1996).

5
 Camara v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608, July 20, 1999.

6
 Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302, February 11, 1986; Vda. De Sta. Romana v.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 118 SCRA 330, November 15, 1982.

7
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.

8
 Penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal (chairman) and concurred in by Justices Jose S.
Balajadia and Nathanael M. Grospe (members); rollo, pp. 57-63.

9
 Resolution dated July 24, 1991; rollo, pp. 233-237.

10
 Rollo, pp. 221-225.

11
 Resolution dated July 11, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), referring to the Record
of Civil Case No. 0096, Vol. I, pp. 134-135; rollo, p. 42. This unsigned Resolution was
unanimously approved by Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Division chairperson, now a
member of this Court), Rodolfo G. Palattao and Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (members).

12
 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 355 Phil. 804, August 17, 1998 (citing Investments,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334, January 27, 1987; and Denso [Phils.], Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280, February 27, 1987). In this case, the Court held:

"The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim was a final order since the
dismissal, although based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the court
with respect to that specific subject except only to await the possible filing during the
reglementary period of a motion for reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom."
The Court further said that errors of judgment, as well as procedure, that do not relate to the
jurisdiction of the court or involve grave abuse of discretion are reviewable by timely appeal, not
by a special civil action for certiorari, unless for valid and compelling reasons.

13
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683, September 17, 2001 (citing Republic v.
Tacloban City Ice Plant, 258 SCRA 145, July 5, 1996; and Dela Cruz v. Paras, 69 SCRA 556,
February 27, 1976).

14
 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, supra (citing Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235,
December 28, 1966).

15
 Supra, p. 155.

16
 Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214, December 16, 1998; Navarro v. NLRC, 327
SCRA 22, March 1, 2000; Testate Estate of Manuel v. Biascarr, 347 SCRA 621, December 11,
2000; People v. Alay-ay, 363 SCRA 603, August 23, 2001; Vda. de Sta. Romana v. Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank, supra.

17
 Manila Electric Co. v. Arciaga, 50 Phil. 144, March 18, 1927 (citing Reilly v. Perkins, 56 Pac
734).

18
 246 SCRA 540, 561, July 17, 1995, per Mendoza, J.

19
 Voting here was close (5 justices fully concurred in the ponencia, 2 wrote separate concurring
opinions, while 5 dissented.)

20
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, supra.

21
 Rollo, pp. 391-471.

22
 GR Nos. 112708-09, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

23
 Spouses Morales v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 337, January 28, 1998; Cabellan v. Court of
Appeals, 304 SCRA 119, March 3, 1999; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81, January
18, 2000.

24
 See Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code.

25
 Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66, June 10, 1988.

26
 Arts. 90 & 92 of the Revised Penal Code provide as follows:

"Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of
those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months."

"Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence
prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which
prescribes in five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year."

See also Act No. 3326, as amended.

27
 "Art. 70 [Revised Penal Code]. x x x.

"Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the
convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the
most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

"Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

"In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall
be computed at thirty years."

28
 "Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. x x x.

"These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b); (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply."

29
 Ochagabia v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 233, March 11, 1999; Peñales v. IAC, 229 Phil. 245,
October 27, 1986.

30
 Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342 (1944); Alcorn v.
City of Baton Rouge, 2004 WL 3016015, December 30, 2004.

31
 Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 399-400.

32
 Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand
cases in full-length ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended
Resolutions. This does not include the thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of
the Court, in which I actively took part during their deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that
I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each of these cases,
especially in the earlier ones.

33
 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, August 5, 1996.

34
 Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp 551, 1995.

35
 Art. 1149, Civil Code.

36
 Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility:

"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."

37
 "Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which
they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but
are not limited to, instances where

xxxxxxxxx

(b) The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;

xxxxxxxxx

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

x x x x x x x x x"

[Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the old Code of Judicial Conduct.]

38
 AM No. 03-05-01-SC, promulgated on April 27, 2004 and effective June 1, 2004.

39
 In re Sofaer, 728 A2d 625, April 22, 1999.

40
 Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A2d 37, December 21, 1984.

41
 Ibid. (citing Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1244, 1428-30
[1981]).

42
 Ibid.

43
 Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194, February 26, 1988, per Yap, J. (later CJ).
 

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They pertain to a
significant and material dimension to this case which deserves greater illumination.

To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be disqualified as
counsel in Civil Case No. 0096, as the dissenters are wont to hold, there should be a clear legal
basis that would mandate such disqualification. The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable
for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, while
the ponencia disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed transgressed. I maintain that
Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so
would be violative of his right to due process.

I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, in connection with acts that they may have engaged in as
government officials before the enactment of the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty.
Mendoza entered the government service he had no idea of the kind of inhibition proposed to be
foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for representing the respondents in Civil
Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor General and in the discharge of his
official functions, he had advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the
liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company, which was subsequently acquired by the
respondents. However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in
the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed
to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been
promulgated.

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June
1988.1 Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines
enacted by the Supreme Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.

I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza’s culpability on the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that the Code of Professional
Responsibility has application even as to acts performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown
upon the prospectivity of statutes. Article 4 of the Civil Code declares that "Laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no declaration in the Code of
Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its canons and rules. It is settled that
the presumption is that all laws operate prospectively absent clear contrary language in the
text,2 and that in every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation
of laws.3

The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on the scope of the rule

on the prospective application of statutes:

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many
cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic
Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay
certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of
the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as
amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship
cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending
Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil.
640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank,
when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;
Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of
tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389
which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given
retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be
accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should
have only prospective application; (See also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v.
CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and
circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142,
holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given
retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that
Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was
ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as
to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired
before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .’"4

I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal liabilities against its infringers. It
is well entrenched that generally, penal laws or those laws which define offenses and prescribe
penalties for their violation operate prospectively.5 The Constitution itself bars the enactment
of ex-post facto laws.6 I do not think it necessary to flirt with the constitutional issue whether the
Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute within the definition of an ex-
post facto law, but I am satisfied with the general rules, affirmed by jurisprudence, that abhor the
retroactivity of statutes and regulations such as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be necessary to ascertain
whether his accession to represent the respondents violated any binding law or regulation at the
time of the engagement. It is but proper to frame the question in such manner, for only then
could it be ascertained whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should have known that his professional
representation of the respondents was illegal. It would also be unfair to ascribe liability to any
lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in government service, was not guided by any definitive
rule prescribing the possible subsequent restrictions on the lawyer’s professional activity as a
consequence of the exercise of public office.

Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza’s actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which some authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7 Canon 36 states:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ.

Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza. However, a
thorough review should first be examined on whether Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics may be used as legal basis in resolving this case.

The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar Association.8 They were
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association as its own in 1917 and in 1946.9 There is no denying
the high regard enjoyed by the Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly
one hundred years of existence. However, there is also no denying that the Philippine Bar
Association, a civic non-profit association,10 is a private entity of limited membership within the
Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted are per se binding only on its members, and
the penalties for violation of the same could affect only the status or rights of the infringers as
members of the association.

At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of Professional Ethics in
deciding administrative cases against lawyers, especially prior to the adoption of the Code of
Professional Ethics. Hence, the belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve
as a source of legal ethics in this country. However, I think it would be grave error to declare
that the Canons of Professional Ethics, on their own, serves as an indisputable source of
obligations and basis of penalties imposable upon members of the Philippine legal profession.
This would violate the long-established constitutional principle that it is the Supreme Court
which is tasked with the promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice of law, as
well as the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.11 The task of formulating ethical rules
governing the practice of law in the Philippines could not have been delegated to the Philippine
Bar Association by the Supreme Court. Neither could such rules as adopted by the private body
be binding on the Supreme Court or the members of the bar.
If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar Association have
jurisprudentially been enforced, or acknowledged as basis for legal liability by the Supreme
Court, they may be recognized as a binding standard imposable upon members of the bar, but
not because said Canons or the Philippine Bar Association itself said so, but because the
Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line with the entrenched rule, as evinced by Article 8
of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system."

Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza when he deigned to
represent the respondents if at such time, this Court had expressly acknowledged Canon 36 as
a rule or standard which deserves obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be
through such process of judicial recognition that these guidelines adopted by a private entity
could be considered as a normative rule compulsory on all practitioners. Unfortunately, no such
case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.

It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36 or even as stated
in American case law, subsisted within that penumbra of ethical standards from which the Court
could have derived a jurisprudential rule had one been called for by a particular case. However,
it remains that none such was pronounced by this Court in jurisprudence, and indeed the
prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the
enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty.
Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing
him from such engagement or penalizing him for such representation.

I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion, and not just mere error in fact or law, in denying the
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza. The absence of a definitive disqualificatory rule that would
have guided Atty. Mendoza when he undertook the questioned acts sufficiently justifies the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.

We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising as they do from an
understandable concern that the line dividing the professional activities and the government
services rendered by lawyers should remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that
there is no unanimity on prevalent legal thought on the matter, and a healthy debate on the
issue will result in no harm. Still, the due process dimension, as highlighted by the absence of a
definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza could have been held accountable, proves determinative
to my mind. The Court is the enforcer of the constitutional guarantees of due process to all
persons, and my vote is but a consequence of this primordial duty.

Footnotes

1 
R. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers (1st ed., 1991), at 369.

2 
R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (5th ed., 2003), at 355; citing Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234
(1950); People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955); Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
12174, 28 December 1962, 6 SCRA 886; Commissioner v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co.,
Inc., 164 SCRA 27 (1988).
3 
Id., citing Montilla v. Agustina Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Cebu Portland Cement
Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 20563, 29 October 1968, 25 SCRA 789 (1968).

4 
Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993.

5 
Agpalo, supra note 2, at 357; citing People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923).

6 
See Article III, Sec. 22, Constitution.

7 
See, e.g., G. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at 9.

8 
Agpalo, supra note 1, at 381.

9 
Ibid.

10 
See Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 228 Phil. 564, 572 (1986).

11 
See Section 5(5), Article VIII, Constitution. See also Section 5(5), Article X, 1973 Constitution
and Section 13, Article VIII, 1935 Constitution.

A.C. No. 10697, March 25, 2019

LARRY C. SEVILLA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. MARCELO C. MILLO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 filed on November 14, 2014 by complainant

Larry C. Sevilla (complainant), before the Office of the Bar Confidant,2 against respondent Atty.
Marcelo C. Millo (respondent), charging the latter of harassment, misconduct, obstruction of
justice and ignorance of the law.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he is the publisher of Pampango Footprints (Pampango), a provincial

newspaper circulated in Tarlac Province.3 Sometime in April 2014, he issued a statement of
account4 in the amount of P33,120.00 to Spouses Avelino and Melendrina Manalo (Sps.
Manalo) as fee for the publication of the notice of auction sale relative to Sps. Manalo's petition
for foreclosure of mortgage, which was published in three (3) consecutive issues of
Pampango.5 Claiming that the publication fee was "exorbitant and shocking," respondent, as
Sps. Manalo's counsel, refused to settle the account, threatened complainant that he would
petition for the disqualification of Pampango, and thereafter, wrote an undated letter6 to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City in furtherance of such
threat.7 Consequently, complainant filed this administrative complaint against respondent.

During the pendency of this complaint, Sps. Manalo negotiated for a discount of fifty percent
(50%), to which complainant agreed. Yet, respondent intervened and forbade his clients to pay.
For this reason, complainant called respondent, but instead of explaining his side, respondent
shouted, "I am busy I don't want to talk to you!" and banged his cellphone.8

For his part,9 respondent denied administrative liability, averring that he merely acted on behalf
of his clients, who found the fee "exorbitant and shocking."10 He also claimed that after the
Executive Judge advised them to just settle the matter with complainant, he withdrew as Sps.
Manalo's counsel to give way to the said settlement.11 Finally, he maintained that complainant's
non-issuance of an affidavit of publication and non-submission of copies of the issues where the
notice of auction sale was printed caused the non-completion of the foreclosure proceedings.12

In a Resolution13 dated July 4, 2016, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report14 dated May 4, 2017, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent

administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.04,15 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly, recommended the penalty of reprimand or one (1)-month
suspension.16

The Investigating Commissioner found that the matter simply involves a misunderstanding in the
collection of publication fee which could have easily been settled if respondent did not prevent
the settlement. In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Sps. Manalo had
already successfully negotiated for a settlement, but the same did not push through because of
respondent.17 Further, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the respondent's claim of
withdrawal as Sps. Manalo's counsel was belied by complainant's allegation that respondent
intervened and forbade his clients to pay, which respondent did not deny.18

In a Resolution19 dated February 22, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
Investigating Commissioner's Report, with modification lowering the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month to mere reprimand.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs and affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors with modification as
to the penalty.
It is well to stress that lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and are expected to serve
the latter with competence and diligence. Consequently, lawyers are entitled to employ every
honorable means to defend the cause of their clients and secure what is due them.20 However,
professional rules set limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.21 In this regard, Canon 1 of the CPR provides that lawyers "shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and of legal processes." In
furtherance thereto, Rule 1.04 of the CPR mandates lawyers to "encourage [their] clients to
avoid, end, or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement."

Guided by the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, that respondent indeed fell short of what is expected
of him, despite his avowed duties as officer of the court. Records reveal that respondent did not
endeavor to initiate the settlement of the publication fee being charged by complainant.
Disagreeing with the statement of account, respondent chose not to pay and immediately
referred the matter to the Executive Judge, instead of negotiating and discussing the matter with
complainant. Remarkably, respondent's obstinate refusal to settle culminated in forbidding his
clients, Sps. Manalo, to pay the reduced publication fee, which the latter secured for
themselves. He even shouted at and ignored complainant when the latter called him up in an
effort to finally settle. Ultimately, respondent's acts, which are violative of Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of
the CPR, prejudiced his clients as they resulted in the non-completion of the foreclosure
proceedings, since complainant did not issue the affidavit of publication nor provide copies of
the issues where the notice of auction sale was actually printed.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, under the circumstances and
considering that this is his first offense, the Court finds it appropriate to impose on respondent
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month. This is in line
with the Court's ruling in Caspe v. Mejica,22 where respondent therein was suspended for
violating Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the CPR, among others. Similarly, the Court has held that
suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and
there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference
with a legal proceeding,23 as in this case.

As a final note, it must be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
legal profession as a whole.24 As such, the Court will not hesitate to impose the necessary
penalty to a lawyer whose conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the Bar.25

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo C. Millo (respondent) is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of one (1) month, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this Decision
by respondent. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his
suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has
entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Dated November 12, 2014. Rollo, pp. 2-4.

2
 Initially, the same complaint was filed before the Office of the Court Administrator on October
24, 2014, which was forwarded to and received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on October
28, 2014 (see id. at 7-9).

3
 See id. at 1-2.

4
 Id. at 28.

5
 See id. at 3 and 64.

6
 Id. at 5.

7
 See id. at 2-3 and 64.

8
 Id. at 64. See also complainant's Verified Position Paper dated April 5, 2017; id. at 48-49.

9
 See respondent's comment dated May 27, 2015 (id. at 15-18); and Position Paper for the
Respondent dated March 6, 2017 (id at 45-47).

10
 See id. at 16 and 45.

11
 See id. at 17 and 45.

12
 See id. at 17.

13
 Id. at 36. Signed by the Division Clerk of Court (now Clerk of Court En Banc) Edgar O.
Aricheta.

14
 Id. at 64-66. Signed by Commissioner Narciso A. Tadeo.

15
 Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.

16
Rollo, p. 66.
17
 See id. at 65.

18
 Se id.

19
 See Notice of Resolution in CBD Case No. 16-5191 issued by Assistant National Secretary
Doroteo B. Aguila; id. at 70-71.

20
 See Avida Land Corporation v. Argosino, 793 Phil 210, 222 (2016).

21
 Id.

22
 See 755 Phil. 312 (2015).

23
 See Avida Land Corporation v. Argosino, supra note 20, at 225-226.

24
 See Nulada v. Paulma, 784 Phil. 309, 317 (2016).

25
 See id. at 317-318.
 A.C. No. 11584 (Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3604), March 06, 2019

ROLANDO T. KO, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ALMA UY-LAMPASA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rolando T. Ko

(complainant) against Atty. Alma Uy-Lampasa (respondent) with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).2

Complaint
In his Complaint dated October 2, 2012, complainant alleged that respondent violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers (CPR). First, he claimed that respondent notarized
two purported deeds of sale between Jerry Uy (Jerry) and the Sultan siblings (heirs of a certain
Pablo Sultan) over a parcel of land despite knowing that the two deeds of sale were spurious.
From the records, it appears that the Sultan siblings are: Pablito, Anicieto, Cristita, Juanito,
Felix, Leonardo, Crispen,3 Lilia, Victoriano and Lucita.4

The Deeds of Absolute Sale dated October 12, 20115 and October 19, 2011,6 are similar in the
following respects: the vendee, the property covered, and the consideration. However, the two
deeds differ as regards the name of the vendors. For the Deed dated October 12, the vendors
named were Juanito, Felix, Leonardo, Crispen, Lilia, Pablito, Victoriano and Lucita, but only
Leonardo, Lilia and Victoriano signed the deed. For the Deed dated October 19, Victoriano and
Lucita were not included in the vendors and among those named, i.e., Juanito, Felix, Leonardo,
Crispen, Pablito, and Lilia, Pablito did not sign the deed. It is noted that only eight of the ten
Sultan siblings are involved, as Anicieto and Cristita do not appear in either of the deeds.

In this regard, complainant claimed that an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute
Sale7 (Extra-judicial Settlement) covering the same property was executed on October 20, 2011
between his son, Jason U. Ko (Jason), and all ten of the Sultan siblings. Complainant calls the
attention of the Court to the fact that in contrast with the deeds of sale notarized by respondent,
this Extra-judicial Settlement contains the signatures and thumbmarks of all the Sultan siblings.

Second, complainant also claimed that respondent, as counsel for Jerry (the vendee in the
abovementioned Deeds of Sale), filed a malicious case of Estafa against his son Jason and the
Sultan siblings, grounded on the allegation that the Extra-judicial Settlement was not published
when in fact, it was published as evidenced by an Affidavit of Publication.8

Lastly, complainant averred that respondent also committed perjury and has filed pleadings in
court without the necessary Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance
number, attaching to his complaint several pleadings and manifestations in support of such.9

Answer

In her Answer10 dated November 10, 2012, respondent countered that she has not violated any
provision of the CPR, arguing that: (1) the matter of whether the deeds of sale were spurious is
now the subject of separate cases pending in court and with the City Prosecutor's Office of
Catbalogan City, Western Samar; (2) the determination of whether the estafa case is malicious
is within the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor's Office conducting the preliminary investigation;
and (3) she was exempted from MCLE requirements for the first up to the third compliance
period because she was a former judge, and that she is currently in the process of complying
with the requirement for the latest compliance period.11

Subsequently, the parties submitted their Reply12 and Rejoinders13 before the CBD in support of
their arguments and counter-arguments. A mandatory conference was held on September 19,
2013 and upon its termination, both parties submitted their respective position papers.14

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

On December 18, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,15 the pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
xxx Stripped of the non-essentials, a scrutiny of the records would show that respondent has,
indeed, notarized two (2) documents of sale involving the same parties but containing different
dates of notarization. Respondent has never denied notarizing the subject documents in her
verified answer and in her subsequent pleadings filed before the CBD. Very clearly, this alone is
a violation of the notarial law. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that respondent
failed to indicate her MCLE Compliance Certificate Number in various pleadings filed before the
courts and the Prosecutors Office of Catbalogan City, Western Samar. Her argument that she
was on the process of obtaining her MCLE certificate for the latest compliance period does not,
in any way, exempt her from the mandate of the circular. Prudence dictates that respondent
should have refrained from signing pleadings while her MCLE certificate is being processed.
Unfortunately, however, she failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that respondent shall

be suspended as a Notary Public for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.16 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

In a Resolution17 dated October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, finding the same
to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws. The IBP Board found that
respondent indeed violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and Bar Matter No. (B.M.) 850.
However, the IBP Board modified the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
imposed on respondent the penalty of immediate revocation of her notarial commission and
disqualification for re-appointment as notary public for two (2) years, not six months as
recommended by the Investigating Commissioner. In addition, the IBP Board also suspended
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 (MR), which was denied by the IBP Board in a
Resolution19 dated February 25, 2016.

The Court notes that in respondent's MR before the IBP Board, she argued that the latter
merely adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which was
likewise not exhaustive enough in its findings and conclusions. Moreover, respondent claimed
that the IBP Board failed to cite any specific violation of the Notarial and MCLE Rules. Lastly,
respondent argued that the IBP Board increased the penalty imposed on her without citing any
additional fact or basis.

Indeed, despite the numerous submissions of the parties, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner as well as the Resolutions of the IBP Board leave much to be
desired. Thus, the Court shall expound on respondent's administrative liability.

Ruling of the Court

Non-compliance with the MCLE Requirements

On the issue of compliance with the MCLE, the Court disagrees with the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board.

B.M. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law."20 The First Compliance Period for
the MCLE requirement was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance
Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15
April 2007 to 14 April 2010; and the Fourth Compliance Period was from 15 April 2010 to 14
April 2013.21

Here, complainant alleged that in several pleadings filed by respondent, the latter did not
indicate her MCLE compliance number. He cited five pleadings filed by respondent which were
dated December 7, 2011,22 February 25, 2012,23 March 8, 2012,24 and two pleadings dated
March 27, 2012,25 thus falling under the Fourth Compliance Period.

For her part, respondent explained that she was exempted from MCLE compliance for the First,
Second, and Third Compliance Periods, until she resigned as a judge on March 2010. After
which, she endeavored to comply with the Fourth Compliance Period while also in the process
of requesting copies of her certificate of exemption.26

The Court notes that respondent eventually completed the required units on May 19, 2012,
which is still within the Fourth Compliance Period. Likewise, she was also issued Certificates of
Exemption27 on September 4, 2012 for the First, Second, and Third Compliance Periods.28

Moreover, respondent manifested that the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
where the cases involved were pending required her to submit her Certificates of Compliance.
When respondent received said certificates, she immediately submitted the same to the trial
court.29

In finding respondent administratively liable, the IBP Board merely stated that she violated B.M.
850. The relevant provisions thereof are Rules 12 and 13, which provide:
RULE 12
Non-Compliance Procedures
xxxx

SECTION 2. Non-compliance Notice and 60-day Period to Attain Compliance. —

Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response
clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. xxx

xxxx

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to
attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. xxx

RULE 13
Consequences of Non-Compliance

SECTION 1. Non-compliance Fee. — A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SECTION 2. Listing as Delinquent Member. — A member who fails to comply with the

requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as
a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Based on the rules, an IBP member shall only be declared delinquent for failure to comply with
the education requirements "after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired." This 60-
day period shall commence from the time such member received a notice of non-compliance.
Without the notice of compliance, a member who believes that the units he or she had taken
already amounts to full compliance may be declared delinquent without being made aware of
such lack of units and with no chance to rectify the same.30

In the instant case, there is no showing that respondent had ever been issued a Notice of Non-
Compliance. On the contrary, the records show that for the first to third compliance periods, she
was exempted for being a member of the judiciary, and that she was able to complete the
requirements for the fourth compliance period. The Court also notes that when complainant filed
the disbarment case on October 12, 2012, respondent still had until April 14, 2013 to comply
with the fourth compliance period. She eventually completed the required units on May 19,
2012. Thus, there is no reason for respondent to be held liable and declared delinquent under
B.M. 850.

Violation of the Notarial Rules

Despite the foregoing, the Court agrees with the IBP Board that respondent can be held liable
for violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice.

The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary public must observe
the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his or
her duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial
system.31 In this case, respondent failed to faithfully comply with her duties as a notary public.
It appears that respondent notarized two Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same property
and involving substantially the same parties. In the October 12, 2011 Deed of Absolute Sale, the
Acknowledgement reads in part:
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Province of Samar, personally
appeared JUANITO A. SULTAN, FELIX A. SULTAN, LEONARDO A. SULTAN, CRISPEN A.
SULTAN, LILIA A. SULTAN, PABLITO A. SULTAN, VICTORIANO A. SULTAN, LUCITA S. UY
and JERRY I. UY, exhibiting to me their Community Tax Certificate numbers, known to me
to be the same persons who executed the foregoing instrument, which they acknowledged to
me as their free and voluntary act and deed.32 (Emphasis supplied)
However, among the vendors, only Leonardo, Lilia, and Victoriano actually signed the deed.
Details of the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) of Juanito, Felix, and Crispen were provided,
but they did not sign the deed. As for Pablito and Lucita, the space for the signature and
identification details was left blank.

Likewise, in the October 19, 2011 Deed of Absolute Sale, the Acknowledgement reads in part:
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Province of Samar, personally
appeared JUANITO A. SULTAN, FELIX A. SULTAN, LEONARDO A. SULTAN, CRISPEN A.
SULTAN, LILIA A. SULTAN, PABLITO A. SULTAN, and JERRY I. UY, exhibiting to me their
Community Tax Certificate numbers, known to me to be the same persons who executed the
foregoing instrument, which they acknowledged to me as their free and voluntary act and
deed.33 (Emphasis supplied)
As compared with the earlier deed, this latter deed no longer contains the names of Victoriano
and Lucita as vendors. Also, while Juanito, Felix, Leonardo, Crispen, and Lilia appear to have
signed, there was no signature for Pablito even though he was listed as a vendor.

In this regard, the Court notes that complainant submitted a copy of another deed of sale
involving the same property, specifically the Extra-judicial Settlement between his son Jason
and all the Sultan siblings. In contrast with the Deeds of Sale notarized by respondent, this
Extra-judicial Settlement contains the names of all the Sultan siblings, along with their
signatures and thumbprints affixed on all pages of the said document. Nonetheless, the issue
on the genuineness of these deeds is subject of a pending civil case; hence, the Court will not
rule on the matter. The instant resolution will focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Section 6 of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice states:

SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. — A notary public shall not notarize:

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.
Here, respondent clearly violated this provision when she notarized the deeds of absolute sale
despite the incomplete signature and identification details of the vendors. Moreover, when the
identification details were indeed provided in the deeds, the proof of identity indicated for all of
them was the CTC Number. Jurisprudence34 already holds that a CTC is not considered as
competent evidence of identity as it does not bear a photograph and a signature of the
individual concerned, as required in Rule II, Section 12 of the Notarial Rules.35

Worse, while there are some signatures that do appear on the instruments, the vendors therein
claimed that they did not actually sign the deeds. In support of this, complainant attached in his
Complaint the counter-affidavits of some of the Sultan siblings in the estafa case filed by Jerry
(the vendee in the assailed deeds of sale), with respondent as counsel. The pertinent portions
of the counter-affidavits are reproduced below:
In Victoriano Sultan's Counter-Affidavit,36 he stated that:
18. Later[,] I was surprised unpleasantly that the deed [of absolute sale] had already been
signed by my other siblings, by the witnesses[,] and subscribed to before the notary public,
which, on my part, I did not appear before her. xxx37 (Emphasis supplied).
Similarly, Crispin Sultan stated in his Counter-Affidavit38 the following:
15. Later[,] I was surprised to know that I supposedly appeared, signed and acknowledged
the deed before a notary public on 19 October 2011, the truth of the matter being that on
such date I was in Bacolod City discharging my duties as security guard[.]39 (Emphasis
supplied).
Also, in Felix Sultan's Counter-Affidavit,40 he stipulated that:
19. It is noteworthy that I did not appear before a notary public in Catbalogan
City supposedly to execute and sign any deed of conveyance in the month of October
2011; and specifically[,] I did not receive the amount of P500,000.00 from
complainant[.]41 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, Juanito Sultan made a similar statement as Felix's in his Counter-Affidavit:42
22. It is noteworthy that I did not appear before a notary public in Catbalogan
City supposedly to execute and sign any deed of conveyance in the month of October
2011; and specifically[,] I did not receive the amount of P500,000.00 from
complainant[.]43 (Emphasis supplied)
This is also in clear violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 2 of which
provides:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. — xxx

xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a
notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or
document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document, the notary public should
require the presence of the very person who executed the same. Thus, he or she certifies that it
was the same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of what were stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed is
necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature.44

When respondent affixed her signature and notarial seal on the deeds of sale, she led the public
to believe that the parties personally appeared before her and attested to the truth and veracity
of the contents thereof when in fact, they deny doing so. Respondent's conduct is laden with
dangerous possibilities, bearing in mind the conclusiveness accorded to the due execution of a
document. Her conduct did not only jeopardize the rights of the parties to the instrument; it also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Thus,
respondent should be liable for such act, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
For having violated the Notarial Rules, respondent also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR,
which requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. She also violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.

Based on recent jurisprudence, a lawyer commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge
his or her duties as such is penalized with revocation of his or her notarial commission and
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.45 In
addition, he or she may also be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for notarizing a document without the appearance of the parties.46 Thus, the Court
affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board.

WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Alma Uy-Lampasa GUILTY of violating the Rules on Notarial

Practice and Rule 1.01 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6) months; REVOKES her notarial
commission, effective immediately; and PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary
public for two (2) years. She is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,*JJ., concur.

Perlas-Bernabe, J., on wellness leave.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2630 dated December 18, 2018.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-9.
2
 CBD Case No. 12-3604, id. at 2.
3
 Spelled as "Crispin" in some parts of the rollo.
4
Rollo, pp. 40 and 44.
5
 Id. at 12-14.
6
 Id. at 15-17.
7
 Id. at 44-46.
8
 Id. at 55.
9
 Id. at 5-6.
10
 Id. at 78-83.
11
 Id. at 78-82, 194.
12
 Id. at 91-97.
13
 Id. at 109-112, 121-129.
14
 Id. at 303.
15
 Id. at 194-195.
16
 Id. at 195.
17
 Id. at 193-193-a.
18
 Id. at 196-210.
19
 Id. at 298-299.
20
 B.M. 850, Rule I, Sec. 1.
21
Arnado v. Atty. Adaza, 161 Phil. 696, 704 (2015).
22
Rollo, p. 43.
23
 Id. at 66.
24
 Id. at 58.
25
 Id. at 65 and 68.
26
 Id. at 80.
27
 Id. at 212-214.
28
 Id. at 80, 212-215.
29
 Id. at 203.
30
 See Strongbuilt Property Holdings, Inc. v. Belmi, A.C. No. 11014, February 15, 2016, pp. 2-3
(Unsigned Resolution).
31
Atty. Bartolome v. Atty. Basilio, 771 Phil. 1, 5 (2015).
32
Rollo, p. 14.
33
 Id. at 17.
34
Baylon v. Almo, 578 Phil. 238 (2008).
35
 SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. — The phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based on: (a) at least one current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual
xxx.
36
Rollo, p. 18-21.
37
 Id. at 20.
38
 Id. at 22-25.
39
 Id. at 24.
40
 Id. at 29-31.
41
 Id. at 31.
42
 Id. at 34-36.
43
 Id. at 36.
44
Ferguson v. Ramos, A.C. No. 9209, April 18, 2017, 823 SCRA 59, 65.
45
Baysac v. Atty. Aceron-Papa, 792 Phil. 635, 646-647 (2016).
46
Ferguson v. Ramos, supra note 44, at 67, citing Ocampo-Ingcoco v. Atty. Yrreverre, Jr., 458
Phil. 814 (2003).

A.C. No. 9917, January 14, 2019

NORBERTO S. COLLANTES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO B. MABUTI, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint affidavit,1 executed on May 10, 2013, filed
by complainant Norberto S. Collantes (complainant) before the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court, against respondent Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti (respondent) for violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules)2 and of his duties as a lawyer.3

The Facts
Complainant alleged that on October 10, 2009, respondent notarized a document entitled
"Memorandum of Agreement"4 in the City of Manila. Upon verification, however, he discovered
that respondent was not commissioned as a notary public in the City of Manila for the years
2008- 2009. In support thereof, complainant attached a Certification5 dated February 27, 2012
issued by the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila attesting to the same.

In his Comment6 dated January 15, 2014, respondent denied the allegations and claimed that
the signature in the "Memorandum of Agreement" is not his. Respondent questioned
complainant's motives for filing the present case against him, claiming that the latter has
pending cases for Estafa filed against him.7 Finally, he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of double jeopardy.8 In this regard, he pointed out that the present case is based
on the same cause of action subject of an earlier complaint, filed by a certain Mina S. Bertillo
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3036, for
which he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.9 In
support thereof, he attached a copy of the Commissioner's Report10 dated August 3, 2012 and
the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution11 dated March 21,2013 in CBD Case No. 11-3036.

The complaint was thereafter referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.12

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation13 dated December 7, 2016, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner (IBP-IC) found respondent administratively liable for failure to comply with the
Notarial Rules, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years.

The IBP-IC found the evidence convincing that respondent was indeed not commissioned as a
notary public at the time the subject "Memorandum of Agreement" was notarized.14 Corollary
thereto, the IBP-IC brushed aside respondent's claim of double jeopardy, pointing out that the
present administrative action concerns an act that is entirely different from the act for which he
was found guilty of violation of the Notarial Rules in CBD Case No. 11-3036, i.e., for notarizing a
letter dated December 28, 2010 when he was likewise not commissioned as a notary public.

In a Resolution15 dated August 31, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the above
findings and recommendation with modification, increasing the recommended penalty to: (a)
perpetual disqualification from being commissioned as a Notary Public since this is respondent's
second offense; (b) revocation of his notarial commission, if subsisting; and (c) suspension for
two (2) years from the practice of law.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent liable
for violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings and adopts with modification the recommendations of the IBP
Board of Governors.
The Court has emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.16 A notarial document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit,17 and as such, notaries public are obligated to observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.18

For these reasons, notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.19 As a corollary to the protection of
that interest, those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.20 The requirements for the issuance
of a commission as a notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.21 Where the
notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, an act which the Court has characterized as
reprehensible, constituting as it does, not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action.22 Jurisprudence
provides that without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial
acts.23 A lawyer who performs a notarial act without such commission violates the lawyer's oath
to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Rules.24

In this case, the IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document, "Memorandum of
Agreement," without being commissioned as a notary public at the time of notarization. This fact
has been duly certified to by none other than the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.25 Thus, by knowingly
performing notarial acts at the time when he was not authorized to do so, respondent clearly
violated the Notarial Rules and in consequence, should be held administratively liable.

It should be emphasized that respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a
bearing on his standing as a lawyer.26 In Virtusio v. Virtusio,27 the Court observed that "[a]
lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his lawyer's oath to
obey the law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in
deliberate falsehood that the lawyer's oath forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well,"28 to wit:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Notably, while the Court agrees with the IBP's findings as regards respondent's administrative
liability, the Court, however, cannot adopt the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
increase the penalty against respondent to "[p]erpetual [d]isqualification from being
commissioned as [a] [n]otary [p]ublic"29 in view of an alleged earlier infraction for which he was
found guilty of violating the Notarial Rules by the IBP in CBD Case No. 11-3036. After an
examination of respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar, it has been ascertained
that the resolution of the IBP in the said case has yet to be forwarded to the Court for its
approval. As case law explains, the "[f]actual findings and recommendations of the [IBP]
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors x x x are recommendatory, subject
to review by the Court."30 In Torres v. Dalangin:31

It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers. The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended
penalties are also, by their nature, recommendatory.32

Thus, pending approval by the Court, the findings and resolution in CBD Case No. 11-3036 are
only recommendatory, and hence (1) fail to establish the fact that respondent has already been
held liable for a prior offense, and (2) cannot consequently serve to aggravate the penalty in this
case.

In fine, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,33 respondent is meted with the following: (a)
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year; (b) immediate revocation of his notarial
commission, if any; and (c) disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of one (1) year only.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti

(respondent) GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, effective
immediately, the Court: SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him
from being commissioned as a notary public for one (1) year. He is WARNED that a repetition of
the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, and disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect immediately upon receipt of this
Resolution by respondent. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that
his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasijudicial bodies where he has
entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,*JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated December 18,
2018.

1
Rollo, pp. 1-4. Docketed as CBD Case No. 16-5078.

2
 A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, July 6, 2004.
3
 See rollo, p. 2.

4
 Id. at 5-6.

5
 Id. at 8. Signed by Assistant Clerk of Court Clemente M. Clemente.

6
 See Comment/ Answer/ Motion to Dismiss; id. at 25-26.

7
 See id. at 25.

8
 See id. at 26.

9
 Id. at 25.

10
 Id. at 29-31. Penned by Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.

11
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2013-369 signed by then IBP National
Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 27.

12
 See Court's Resolution dated June 13, 2016; id. at 37.

13
 Id. at 46-47. Penned by Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles.

14
 Id. at 46.

15
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXIII-2017-034 signed by Assistant National
Secretary Doroteo B. Aguila; id. at 44-45.

16
 See Mariano v. Echanez, A.C. No. 10373, May 31, 2016, 791 SCRA 509, 514; Spouses
Gacuya v. Solbita, A.C. No. 8840, March 8, 2016, 785 SCRA 590, 595; and Gaddi v. Velasco,
A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014, 735 SCRA 74, 79.

17
 See Mariano v. Echanez, id.; Spouses Gacuya v. Solbita, id.; and Gaddi v. Velasco, id.

18
 See Mariano v. Echanez, id.; Spouses Gacuya v. Solbita, id.; and Uy v. Saño, 586 Phil. 383,
388 (2008).

19
 See Villaflores-Puza v. Arellano, A.C. No. 11480, June 20, 2017, 827 SCRA 515, 517-518,
citing Mariano v. Echanez, id. See also Spouses Gacuya v. Solbita, id.

20
 See Maniquiz v. Emelo, A.C. No. 8968, September 26, 2017; and Saquing v. Mora, 535 Phil.
1, 7 (2006), citing Nunga v. Viray, 366 Phil. 155, 161 (1991).

21
 See Uy v. Saño, supra note 18, at 388 (2008).

22
 See Maniquiz v. Emelo, supra note 20; Saquing v. Mora, supra note 20, at 7, citing Nunga v.
Viray, supra note 20, at 161. See also Spouses Gacuya v. Solbita, supra note 16, at 596;
and Uy v. Saño, id. at 389.
23
 See Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr., A.C. No. 12196, September 3, 2018.

24
 See Maniquiz v. Emelo, id.; and Saquing v. Mora, id., citing Nunga v. Viray, id.

25
Rollo, p. 8.

26
Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr., A.C. No. 12196, September 3, 2018.

27
 694 Phil. 148 (2012).

28
 Id. at 157.

29
 Id. at 44.

30
 See Torres v. Dalangin, A.C. No. 10758, December 5, 2017, citing Vasco-Tamaray v.
Daquis, A.C. No. 10868, January 26, 2016, 782 SCRA 44, 65.

31
 Se id.

32
 See id.

33
 See Virtusio v. Virtusio, supra note 27, 158

A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC : December 4, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

A.C. No. 8292

ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUELM.MARAMBAAND NASSER

MAROHOMSALIC, Complainants, v. ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO
C.ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON AND
RAYMUNDJORGEA.MERCADO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subjects of this disposition are the: (1) Resolution Urgently Requesting the Supreme Court to
Issue Clarification on the Query of Western Visayas IBP Governor Erwin M. Fortunato Involving
the Application of the Rotational Rule in the Forthcoming Elections in his Region1Ï‚rνll (IBP
Resolution), filed by the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG); and the (2) Urgent Motion for
Clarification with Prayer for Leave of Court to Admit Motion and to Intervene and for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order2Ï‚rνll (Urgent Motion) filed by Atty. Marven B.
Daquilanea (Atty. Daquilanea), immediate past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter.
The Court shall likewise act upon the Petition-in-Intervention3Ï‚rνll filed by the IBP-Southern
Luzon Region, regarding its qualification to field a candidate for the position of Executive Vice-
President for the 2011-2013 term.

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

On December 14, 2010, the Court resolved the various controversies persistently pestering the
various IBP chapter elections in a resolution,4Ï‚rνll the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A. Marohomsalic
as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao
Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;

2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term is hereby
ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of
this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to represent
and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective regions;

3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and
Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their
actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and
May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent
election. While their elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled
as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of IBP Executive
Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and, therefore, barred from succeeding as IBP President
for the 2009-2011 term;

4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section
47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the
Special Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and adopted; and

5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP shall
continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011.

SO ORDERED.

In the December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court once again upheld its Resolution in Bar Matter
No. 586, dated May 16, 1991, that the "rotation rule" under Sections 375Ï‚rνll and 396Ï‚rνll of
the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented, "so that all prior elections for governor in the
region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be
selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors."7ςrνll

A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the Court in its Resolution, dated
February 8, 2011.8ςrνll

On April 15, 2011, Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Gov. Fortunato) of IBP-Western Visayas Region
wrote a letter9Ï‚rνll to the IBP-BOG seeking confirmation/clarification on whether "Capiz is the
only Chapter in the IBP-Western Visayas Region eligible and qualified to run for Governor in the
forthcoming election for Governor."10ςrνll

As the IBP-BOG was unable to reach a unanimous resolution on the matter, it issued the
subject IBP-Resolution, urgently requesting the Court to issue a clarification on the query of
IBP-Western Visayas Region Gov. Fortunato involving the application of the rotational rule for
the next regional election.

On April 29, 2011, Atty. Daquilanea, the immediate past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter, filed
the subject Urgent Motion likewise seeking clarification on the application of the rotational rule
for the election of Governor for IBP-Western Visayas Region for the 2011-2013 term,
specifically, whether the IBP-Capiz Chapter would be the only chapter to be allowed to
nominate candidates for said election.

On May 3, 2011, upon filing of the subject Urgent Motion and the IBP-Resolution, then Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona issued a Temporary Restraining Order11Ï‚rνll (TRO) suspending the
election for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region and directing retired Justice Santiago
M. Kapunan (Justice Kapunan), Officer-in-Charge of the IBP and Gov. Fortunato of the IBP-
Western Visayas Region to file their respective comments thereon.

On May 31, 2011, the TRO was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the Court En Banc.12ςrνll

On May 17, 2011, the majority of the presidents of the various chapters composing the IBP-
Western Visayas Region filed their Respectful Comment-in-Intervention,13Ï‚rνll praying for the
lifting of the TRO without prejudice to the resolution on the Urgent Motion.

In its Comment,14Ï‚rνll dated June 2, 2011, the IBP-BOG, through Justice Kapunan, presented
the view that with the completion of a rotational cycle with the election of Gov. Fortunato
representing Romblon, "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie of the governorship for the
2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-
ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the
rotation."15ςrνll

Like the IBP, Atty. Daquilanea espoused the view that upon the completion of a rotational cycle,
elections should be open to all chapters of the region subject to the exclusionary rule.16ςrνll

On June 23, 2011, the IBP-Capiz Chapter filed its Comment-in-Intervention with Motion for Early
Resolution,17Ï‚rνll praying for a declaration that it was its turn to serve as Governor for IBP-
Western Visayas Region and moving for the early resolution of the controversy.

Issues for the Courts Consideration

A reading of both the IBP-BOG Resolution and the Urgent Motion discloses that the respective
movants are praying that the Court determine whether at the start of a new rotational cycle,
nominations for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region are: a] once again open to all
chapters subject to the rule on "rotation by exclusion"; or b] limited only to the chapter first in the
previous rotation cycle, following the previous sequence or "rotation by pre-ordained sequence."

The issue, therefore, in the IBP-Western Visayas Region is whether, after the first cycle, the
rotation rule will be the rotation by pre-ordained sequence or rotation by exclusion. The rotation
by pre-ordained sequence is effected by the observance of the sequence of the service of the
chapters in the first cycle, which is very predictable. The rotation by exclusion is effected by the
exclusion of a chapter who had previously served until all chapters have taken their turns to
serve. It is not predictable as each chapter will have the chance to vie for the right to serve, but
will have no right to a re-election as it is debarred from serving again until the full cycle is
completed.

As can be gleaned from the records and all pleadings, there is no dispute that the IBP-Western
Visayas already completed a full cycle with the election of Gov. Fortunato of Romblon for the
2009-2011 term. The first governor was Eugene Tan of the IBP Capiz Chapter and, later, all
chapters were able to serve as governors.

Thus, under the rotation by pre-ordained sequence, only members of the IBP-Capiz Chapter
may vie for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region. Under the rotation by exclusion,
every chapter in IBP-Western Visayas Region may compete again.

Resolution of the Court

Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region

After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments raised by the parties
involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan, that at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed
qualified to vie of the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle
provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation." Stated differently, the IBP-BOG
recommends the adoption of the rotation by exclusion scheme. The Court quotes with approval
the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

6. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and resolved to recommend
adherence to the principle of "rotation by exclusion" based on the following reasons:

a) Election through rotation by exclusion is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule
prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be
excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation
cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled
to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.

b) Election through a rotation by exclusion allows for a more democratic election process. The
rule provides for freedom of choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which
assures the every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.

c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order
as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice which is
crucial to a democratic process is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election at
every turn as the entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in the
previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of
choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process.
d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme Court may have adopted
in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous election for
GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the GMR elections.

7. Thus, applying the principle of rotation by exclusion in Western Visayas which starts with a
new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for
the Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a
consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter
will have its turn in the rotation.18ςrνll

The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by succession scheme. Through the
rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve
as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has
already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case
where only one chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation
rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the
electorate as expressed through the ballot."19ςrνll

Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the chapters shall have the
equal opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no
chapter shall serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its term. Romblon
then joins the succeeding elections after the first winner in the cycle.

Re: Query by IBP-Southern Luzon

On July 27, 2012, the IBP-Southern Luzon Region filed its Petition for
Intervention,20Ï‚rνll seeking a declaration that it was qualified to nominate a candidate for the
position of Executive Vice-President for the 2011-2013 term. It argued that since the Court
removed its member, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, as IBP Executive Vice-President for the 2007-2009
term, it should not now be prejudiced and disallowed to vie for the position of Executive Vice-
President of the IBP for the 2011-2013 term. To do so would be a violation of the rotational
system and the principle of equal rotation among the different regions to lead the IBP.

On September 21, 2012, Gov. Fortunato filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Vigorous

Opposition/Comment,21Ï‚rνll opposing the position of the IBP-Southern Luzon on the ground
that:

1) in its December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court found that it was only the IBP-Western
Visayas chapter and the IBP-Eastern Mindanao chapter that had yet to have their turns as
Executive Vice-President. Since IBP-Eastern Mindanao, through now IBP President Roan I.
Libarios, was elected as the Executive Vice-President, it is only IBP-Western Visayas which is
the only region qualified to file a candidate for the 2011-2013 term;

2) Section 2, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court allows for intervention only before the rendition of
judgment; and

3) Atty. Vinluan was actually able to serve his 2007-2009 term as Executive Vice President even
if he was later on disqualified by the Court in December 14, 2010 Resolution. To allow IBP-
Southern Luzon to vie for the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP for the 2011-2013
term would allow said chapter to serve twice as Executive Vice President since Atty. Raul R.
Angangco of IBP Southern Luzon had already served as Executive Vice President for the 1995-
1997 term.

The Court finds merit in the contentions of both parties, and thus believes that the IBP-BOG
should be given its say on the matter pursuant to the dictates of due process.ςηαοblενιrυ
αllαωlιbrαr

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby holds that in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, the rotation by
exclusion shall be adopted such that, initially, all chapters of the region shall have the equal
opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon.

The Temporary Restraining Order dated May 3, 2011 is hereby lifted and the IBP-Western
Visayas Region is hereby ordered to proceed with its election of Goven10r for the 2011-2013
term pursuant to the rotation by exclusion rule.

The IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to file its comment on the Petition for
Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 On Leave.

**
 Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1384 dated December 4, 2012.

1
Ï‚rνll Rollo, pp. 3281-3285.

2
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3259-3268.

3
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3454-3460.

4
Ï‚rνll Id. at 2998-3026.

5
Ï‚rνll Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor
for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only.
The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region. (As
amended pursuant to the Resolution of the Court dated December 14, 2010.

6
Ï‚rνll Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one (1) month before the
national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region,
who shall be chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented among
the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in the rotation order, its place shall
redound to the next Chapter in the line. Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the
Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its
turn in the next round, in the same place that it had in the round completed.

7
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3014-3015.

8
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3240-3242.

9
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3287-3289.

10
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3289.

11
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3243-3246.

12
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3315-3317.

13
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3309-3314.

14
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3325-3329.

15
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3328.

16
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3318-3323.

17
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3339-3348.

18
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3327-3328.

19
Ï‚rνll Resolution dated December 14, 2010, p. 22.

20
Ï‚rνll Rollo, pp. 3454-3456.

21
Ï‚rνll Id. at 3480-3500.
 B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014

ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R.

OPINION, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the Appeal dated June 11, 20131 (with Urgent Motion to Prohibit Protestant-
Appellee to Participate in the Election for Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines [IBP] Set on June 15, 2013) filed by Atty. Aileen R. Maglana, President of IBP
Samar Chapter, assailing the June 7, 2013 decision of the IBP Board of Governors
(BOG).2cralawred

This BOG decision granted the election protest of Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion; declared Atty.
Opinion as eligible to run for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; annulled
the proclamation of Atty. Maglana as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas; and proclaimed Atty.
Opinion as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.3cralawred

The Antecedents

On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas Region gathered at the
Session Hall of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Capitol
Site, Maasin, Leyte, to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term.  Also present
during the meeting were the Court’s designated observer, Judge Bethany G. Kapili (Executive
Judge of the RTC, Branch 24, Maasin, Leyte), other lawyers of the Southern Leyte Chapter and
outgoing Governor Manuel Enage, Jr.  Governor Enage presided over the election.  He then
called the election to order and opened the nominations for the position of Governor of IBP
Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.4cralawred

Upon a motion duly seconded, Atty. Maglana - the incumbent President of IBP Samar Chapter -
was nominated for the position of Governor.  Atty. Maglana then moved that Governor Enage
declare that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the position of Governor
for IBP Eastern Visayas, to the exclusion of all the other eight (8) chapters.  Atty. Maglana cited
the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start of the
implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP
Eastern Visayas.5cralawred

Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, thereafter, took the floor and
manifested that before he decided to run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he
was still qualified to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the immediately
preceding term.  Atty. Opinion stated that he received an opinion dated April 2, 2013 from
Governor Vicente M. Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee, that pertinently
stated:6cralawred
This has reference to your Letter dated March 15, 2013 addressed to former IBP President
Roan I. Libarios seeking clarification on your Chapter’s qualification to field a candidate for
Governor on May 25, 2013.

Please be informed that your having lost the Governorship elections for Eastern Visayas in 2011
does not disqualify your Chapter from seeking an election for Governorship of Eastern Visayas
Region.  Thus, under the present set up, the IBP Chapters of Eastern Samar, Samar, and
Biliran are qualified to field their respective candidate for the scheduled Regional Elections on
May 25, 2013.7

Atty. Opinion also manifested that in the 2011 Regional Elections for IBP Eastern Visayas, the
representative of IBP Samar Chapter, Judge Amanzar, waived “the votes as he cannot pursue
an election at that time.”  Instead, Atty. Opinion was “asked to run.”8 The Chapter President of
Samar in 2011, however, categorically denied the waiver and said, “I did not pursue my
intentions, although I had one at that time to run for governor, because I was financially
handicapped... but I did not categorically waive our right to the governorship, because I believe
that waiver should be, - should not be implied.  I categorically say that I did not waive my right,
or the right of the chapter to run for governor.”9cralawred

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon, the delegate from Biliran, meanwhile pointed out that Governor
Joyas as Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee had no authority to make the above-cited
pronouncement; it is only the Supreme Court that has the authority to determine the qualified
chapters in the region.10cralawred

After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the rotation rule to the present case,
Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the
position of Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas.11  Thereafter, some delegates protested the
decision of Governor Enage which prompted him to call a recess.  When the session resumed,
Atty. Malig-on, Vice President of IBP Cebu Chapter, moved that the election be suspended and
the issue of Atty. Opinion’s objection to Governor Enage’s ruling be resolved by the IBP BOG. 
Governor Enage, however, denied this motion and, thereafter, ordered the distribution of the
ballots.12cralawred

The counting of the ballots revealed that only ten (10) out of the eleven (11) ballots cast were
filled up.  Governor Enage counted the votes, with six (6) votes in favor of Atty. Opinion
considered as stray votes and four (4) votes in favor of Atty. Maglana.  He then proceeded to
proclaim Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the
disqualification of the other nominee, Atty. Opinion.13cralawred

The Protest

On May 27, 2013, Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the IBP BOG.14  In support of his
election protest, Atty. Opinion raised two points.

First, he noted that since its introduction in 1990, the rotation rule had not been followed in the
elections for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas since Cebu Province, Cebu City, Bohol and
Northern Samar have had two elected governors each, as opposed to other chapters which only
had one governor elected.  Since the rotation rule was not followed, IBP Eastern Samar Chapter
cannot be disqualified to run since it was merely exercising its right to run for the second time in
the same manner as that of the other chapters that had elected two governors.15cralawred
Second, he emphasized that IBP Samar Chapter had waived its turn in the rotation when it did
not field a candidate for Governor in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 elections. He notes that IBP
Samar Chapter should not be allowed to assert its turn in the rotation at anytime; otherwise, it
would disrupt the sequence considering it “follows Cebu City sequence wise.”  Thus, for the
2013 regional elections, both Eastern Samar and Samar should have been declared eligible to
run for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas.16cralawred

In her Comment,17 Atty. Maglana argued three points.

First, IBP Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation.  In fact, the former IBP Samar
Chapter President, Atty. Cesar Mabansag, categorically denied, during the May 25, 2013
regional elections, that he had waived the right of IBP Samar Chapter to the governorship. 
Even if there was a waiver during the 2011 election, IBP Samar Chapter can reclaim its right to
the governorship before the rotation is completed, pursuant to Section 39, Article VI, as
amended, of the IBP By-Laws.  Thus, for the 2013-2015 term, IBP Samar Chapter, which
remains to be the only chapter that did not have its turn in the rotation, should be allowed to
reclaim its right to the governorship.18cralawred

Second, she noted that since Bar Matter No. 586, dated May 14, 1991, mandated the strict
implementation of the rotation rule, and based on IBP records, all chapters in the region, except
IBP Samar Chapter, have already had their turn in the rotation.  Thus, she argued that in order
for the rotation cycle in the region to be completed, IBP Samar Chapter, which had not yet had
its turn in the rotation, should be deemed the only qualified chapter to field its candidate for
governor in the May 25, 2013 regional elections.19cralawred

Third, she contended that even if the rotation cycle is reckoned from 1973, it is still IBP Samar
Chapter’s turn in the rotation, pursuant to the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as
amended, of the IBP By-Laws.  She notes that with the election of Governor Enage in the 2011-
2013 term, the remaining chapters that have not served as governor are Samar, Biliran and
Eastern Samar Chapters.  Thus, pursuant to Section 39, IBP Samar Chapter should be able to
field its candidate for governor first, ahead of Biliran and Eastern Samar Chapters.20cralawred

The IBP BOG Decision

In its June 7, 2013 decision, the IBP BOG granted the election protest of Atty. Opinion and
declared him the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.

First, the IBP BOG held that IBP Samar waived its turn in the first rotation cycle, from 1989 to
2007.  It noted that under the rotation rule, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as
many as the number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a chance to
represent the region in the IBP BOG.  In the case of IBP Eastern Visayas, the region consists of
nine (9) chapters, thus the cycle consists of nine governorship terms (from 1989 to 2007). 
Based on the records, it is clear that four chapters have been represented twice; IBP Eastern
Samar was represented once while IBP Samar was never represented at all.

Based on these considerations, the IBP BOG concluded that IBP Samar Chapter effectively
waived its turn in the rotation order when it did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007, as
well as when it did not invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates
whose chapters had already been previously represented in the rotation cycle.21cralawred

Second, the IBP BOG ruled that the first rotation cycle had already terminated with the 2005 to
2007 term despite the lack of representation from Eastern Samar as it has effectively waived its
turn in the first rotation cycle.  It emphasized that the rotation rule is not absolute and is subject
to waiver, such as when the chapters, in the order of rotation, opt not to file or nominate their
own candidates for governor during the election regularly done for that purpose.  It also held
that Atty. Maglana’s contentions that IBP Eastern Samar can reclaim the governorship at any
time and that the first rotation cycle cannot be completed unless IBP Eastern Samar has had its
turn are completely anathema to the concept of the rotation cycle; the rotation cycle should run
its course and the rotation in the region cannot be held hostage by any one chapter.22cralawred

Third, the IBP BOG found that based on the rotation by exclusion rule (i.e., once a member of
the chapter is elected as governor, his or her chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all
have taken turns in the rotation cycle), the six (6) remaining chapters in the region were actually
qualified to field a candidate for governor in the May 25, 2013 regional elections. It also noted
that the IBP Eastern Visayas region is actually already in its second rotation cycle with
governors from Leyte (2007-2009), Bohol (2009-2011) and Southern Leyte (2011-2013) already
having served the region.  In the present case, both IBP Eastern Samar and IBP Samar were
actually qualified to field their candidates for Governor, alongside IBP Cebu City, IBP Cebu
Province, IBP Biliran and IBP Northern Samar Chapters.23cralawred

Fourth, the IBP BOG concluded that Atty. Opinion, who was actually a qualified candidate for
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern
Visayas for the 2013-2015 term, considering that he garnered the majority six (6) votes, as
opposed to the minority four (4) votes garnered by Atty. Maglana.24cralawred

The Appeal

On June 11, 2013, Atty. Maglana filed the present Appeal (With Urgent Motion to Prohibit
Protestant-Appellee to Participate in the Election for Executive Vice President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Set on June 15, 2013).  In support of her Appeal, Atty. Maglana submits
the following arguments:

First, IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor for the
2013-2015 term, to the exclusion of all other chapters in the IBP Eastern Visayas region.  She
emphasizes that based on the records, IBP Samar Chapter clearly had never served as
governor for IBP Eastern Visayas since the introduction of Bar Matter No. 491 in
1989.25cralawred

Second, IBP Samar Chapter never waived its turn in the rotation cycle because under the
rotation by exclusion scheme, it does not know when its turn to serve as governor would be. 
Even assuming that there had been a waiver, Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
Laws allows the chapter that waived its turn in the rotation order to reclaim its right at any time
before the rotation is completed.26cralawred

Third, the rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas region can only be completed once a
nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as Governor for the 2013-2015 term. The rotation
cycle cannot simply be deemed complete by just equating the number of terms with the number
of chapters in the region.  Atty. Maglana contends that the situation of IBP Samar Chapter is the
same as that of Romblon Chapter in 2009 when the Court, in In the Matter of the Brewing
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,27 affirmed IBP Romblon
Chapter’s right to the 2009-2011 term despite the fact that there were other chapters in the
Western Visayas region that had served more than one term.28cralawred
On July 2, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution denying Atty. Maglana’s prayer to restrain Atty.
Opinion from voting in the election on June 15, 2013, the same having become moot and
academic.  In the same Resolution, the Court also required Atty. Maglana to furnish the Court,
within five (5) days from notice, a certified true copy of the IBP BOG decision dated June 7,
2013.29cralawred

On August 3, 2013, Atty. Maglana submitted her Compliance with the Court’s directive in its July
2, 2013 Resolution.30cralawred

The Issues for Resolution

The core issues raised by the present Appeal are the following:

Whether the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas, since the implementation of Bar Matter
No. 491, has been completed;

Whether IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order so that it can no longer claim
its right to the governorship position for the 2013-2015 term;

Whether IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor in IBP
Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; and

Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for
the 2013-2015 term.

Our Ruling

We affirm the IBP BOG decision dated June 7, 2013 and declare Atty. Opinion the duly
elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.

We begin with a brief background on the organizational structure of the IBP.  The IBP is divided
into nine (9) geographic regions, namely: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon,
Bicolandia, Greater Manila, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao and Eastern
Mindanao.31cralawred

Each of these regions is subdivided into chapters and is represented by a Governor elected by
delegates from among the member-chapters of each region.32 In the case of IBP Eastern
Visayas, the region is composed of nine (9) chapters, namely: 33cralawred

Biliran

Bohol

Cebu Province

Cebu City

Eastern Samar
Leyte

Northern Samar

Samar

Southern Leyte

At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates from each region shall
elect the Governor for their region, who shall be chosen by rotation.34cralawred

These nine (9) Governors constitute the IBP BOG which governs and has general charge of the
IBP’s affairs and activities. Aside from the Governors, the other national officers of the IBP are:
the IBP President, the EVP, the National Secretary, the National Treasurer, and the heads of
the National Committees.35cralawred

The Rotation Rule

The logical starting point in resolving the present matter before us is Section 39, Article VI of the
IBP By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter No. 491.  This provision established the rotation rule in
the IBP.  The provision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, the Court decreed without
amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and
39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented “so that all prior elections for
governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the
governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of
Governors.”36cralawred

Despite the call for strict implementation of the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 586 in 1991,
the Court amended Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws only in 2010 in In the Matter of the
Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,37  by mandating
the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule, as well as recognizing that the
rotation rule is subject to waivers by the chapters of the regions.  The provision, as further
amended, now reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 39.  Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region,
who shall be chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly implemented among
the Chapters in the region.  When a Chapter waives its turn in the rotation order, its place shall
redound to the next Chapter in the line.  Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the
Governorship at any time before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its
turn in the next round, in the same place that it had in the round completed.38
Broken down into its components, Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws
contains the following elements:

(a) Delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region who shall be
chosen by rotation;
(b) Rotation of the governorship of each region shall be mandatory and to be strictly
implemented;
(c) A chapter may waive its turn in the rotation order which shall redound to the next
chapter in the line; and
(d) The chapter that waived its turn may reclaim its right to the governorship at any time
before the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next
round, in the same place that it had in the round completed.

Elements a, c and d are key elements that are decisive in resolving the present controversy. As
far as element (a) is concerned, the problem relates to the element of rotation where the
manner of implementation is the disputed issue.  Elements (c) and (d) also assume significance
because of the assertion of waiver on the part of IBP Samar Chapter of its right to the
governorship.

As has been interpreted and applied by the Court in the past, the rotation rule under Section 39,
Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws actually consists of two underlying directives.

First is the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule.  The rule
mandates that the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be
chapters in the region.  This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to represent
the region in the IBP BOG.

Second is the exception from the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule.  This
exception would allow a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to
reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed.  Thus, as the Court held
in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, “[t]he rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the
order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose.”39cralawred

The Operation of the Rotation System in IBP Eastern Visayas

Pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491, the delegates for the 1989-1991 term elected Atty. Benedict H.
Alo of Cebu Province as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas. This development ushered in the
implementation of the rotation system for the governorship of IBP Eastern Visayas.  Thus, the
rotational cycle should be counted from the time of Bar Matter No. 491, when the Court provided
for the rotation system.  This term (1989-1991) constituted the first “turn” in the cycle and should
be considered the starting point for consideration in resolving the various aspects of the present
controversy.  Note, however, that part of this term was under a caretaker that served as a
preliminary and preparatory measure under the developments that initiated Bar Matter No. 491.

The tabulation below shows the election developments for the position of Governor for IBP
Eastern Visayas from the 1989-1991 term up to the present, viz.:

Term Elected Governors Chapter

 1989-1990 Caretaker Board N/A
1990-1991 Benedicto H. Alo Cebu Province
1991-1993 Baldomero C. Estenzo Cebu City
1993-1995 Agustinus V. Gonzaga Bohol
1995-1997 Jose Aguila Grapilon Biliran
1997-1999 Kenny A.H. Tantuico Northern Samar
1999-2001 Celestino B. Sabate Eastern Samar
2001-2003 Emil L. Ong Northern Samar
2003-2005 Manuel M. Monzon Cebu Province
2005-2007 Manuel P. Legaspi Cebu City
2007-2009 Evergisto S. Escalon Leyte
2009-2011 Roland B. Inting Bohol
2011-2013 Manuel L. Enage, Jr. Southern Leyte
2013-2015 Disputed Disputed

a.  The First rotation cycle has been completed in 2007. 

Counting from the governorship of Atty. Benedicto H. Alo of IBP Cebu Province Chapter, the
first rotation cycle of governors, consisting of nine (9) governorship terms from 1989 to 2007,
followed the following pattern and succession:

Cebu Province - Benedicto H. Alo, 1990-1991

Cebu City - Baldomero C. Estenzo, 1991-1993

Bohol - Agustinus V. Gonzaga, 1993-1995

Biliran - Jose Aguila Grapilon, 1995-1997

Northern Samar - Kenny A.H. Tantuico, 1997-1999

Eastern Samar - Celestino B. Sabate, 1999-2001

Northern Samar - Emil L. Ong, 2001-2003

Cebu Province - Manuel M. Monzon, 2003-2005

Cebu City - Manuel P. Legaspi, 2005-2007

leaving three chapters – Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte – with no governor elected to
represent the chapter’s slot in the rotation.  Pursuant to the rotational rule, the governorship of a
region shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the region, to give every
chapter a chance to represent the region in the IBP BOG.  However, not every chapter was
represented in the first rotational cycle.  As the IBP BOG noted, there were instances when the
Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same chapter, such as Northern Samar (1997-
1999 and 2001-2003), Cebu Province (1990-1991 and 2003-2005) and Cebu City (1991-1993
and 2005-2007).

These “aberrant” developments, strictly speaking, sidetracked the smooth and proper
implementation of the rotation rule in the first rotational cycle that started with the 1990-1991
term of IBP Cebu Province and which should have ended in the 2005-2007 term with all the
chapters, including Samar, Leyte and Southern Leyte, given the chance to be governor.  Stated
otherwise, had the chapters strictly and mandatorily followed the rotation rule, the first rotational
cycle should have been completed in 2007.

We cannot sustain Atty. Maglana’s arguments, that: (1) the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern
Visayas region had not been completed in 2007; and (2) that the rotation cycle can only be
completed once a nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the 2013-2015
term, for two reasons.

First, as the IBP BOG established, the primary reason why some chapters, such as Northern
Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City, were represented twice (in the first rotation cycle) was
because Samar either did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it failed to invoke the
rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose chapters had already been
represented in the rotation cycle.  We agree with the IBP BOG that Samar Chapter effectively
waived its turn in the rotation order, as will be further explained below. Because of this waiver of
its turn in the first rotation cycle, we conclude that the first rotation cycle had been completed in
2007.

Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s right to the governorship in
the 2013-2015 term because it is contrary to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
Laws.  This provision states that the chapter which has waived its turn in the rotation cycle may
reclaim its right to the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed.  Having been
established that the first rotational cycle had been completed in the 2005-2007 term, IBP Samar
Chapter can no longer belatedly reclaim its right to the governorship in the 2013-2015 term as it
should have exercised its claim on or before the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007.  In
this regard, we quote with approval the disquisition of the IBP BOG:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, protestee’s view that the Samar chapter, by virtue of its being the only chapter that
has yet to have its turn as governor in the rotation rule era, can reclaim the governorship at any
time it opts to and that the rotation cycle cannot be deemed completed until it does is anathema
to the very concept of the rotation rule.  The region cannot be held hostage indefinitely by one
chapter.  The rotation has to run its course.  Indeed the flaw of protestee’s reasoning would be
even more apparent if the issue of the election of the Executive Vice President would come into
play inasmuch as the Samar Chapter could then invoke its perceived right to the governorship
when it is the turn of Eastern Visayas Region to have an EVP elected from its ranks, thus, giving
it an undue advantage over the other chapters in the region.40cralawlawlibrary

The dissent, however, emphasizes that the preferred policy as mandated in Section 39, Article
VI, as amended of the IBP By-Laws, is the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation
by exclusion rule. The dissent posits that unless and until IBP Samar Chapter had actually been
given the opportunity to seat as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, the first rotation cycle for the
position of IBP Eastern Visayas cannot be considered complete.41cralawred

The dissent’s reliance on the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation by exclusion
rule, as mandated by Section 39, as amended, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, is inaccurate.
Despite the amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws mandating the strict
implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule, the Court cannot ignore the reality that prior to
the present amendment (i.e., from the 1989-1991 term until December 2010), the prevailing
rotation rule was not mandatory; the choice of governor should only be rotated as much as
possible among the chapters of the region.

Note that this rule even prevailed after the first rotation cycle of governors, consisting of
nine governorship terms from 1989 to 2007.  Thus, the dissent cannot simply apply
Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws in the present case because this
amendment calling for the strict implementation of the rotation rule cannot be interpreted
retroactively, but only prospectively, so that it would only take effect in the 2011-2013
term.

As previously emphasized, not every chapter was represented in the first rotation cycle; there
were three instances when the Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas came from the same Chapter,
such as the case of Northern Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City. These aberrant
developments can only be justified under the “as much as possible” qualifier cited above. 
Based on these considerations and from a practical perspective, we can reasonably conclude
that the first rotation cycle has been completed in 2007 despite the non-participation of Samar,
Leyte and Southern Leyte, after considering the following premises:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Bar Matter No. 491 lays down the starting point of the IBP's rotation system that called for the
election of a governor for a region to be rotated as much as possible among the chapters of the
region;

This rule on rotation prevailed until the amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws
on December 14, 2010 decreeing the mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule;
and

The recent amendment of Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws should be interpreted
prospectively so that it would only take effect from the 2011-2013 term.

b. IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle.

As mentioned, the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws is
not absolute as it is subject to a waiver, as when a chapter in the order of rotation opts not to
field or nominate its candidate for governor during the election regularly called for the purpose.
The dissent, however, posits that IBP Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation cycle
because there was no clear or unequivocal waiver on its part. 42cralawred

First, the dissent notes that no express waiver was executed by the IBP Samar Chapter to
forego its turn in the rotation cycle. Second, the second and third elements of a valid waiver
were not proven.  The dissent argues only during the election for governor for 2013-2015 that
IBP Samar Chapter could have been aware of its right to be the sole and only remaining
Chapter that should vie for the position of Governor because it is only during that time that it
becomes clear that it is the only remaining Chapter of IBP Eastern Visayas which remains
unrepresented in the IBP BOG.  Lastly, the IBP By-Laws is silent on how and when the waiver
should be made and whether or not the Chapter President or the Board of Directors is clothed
with authority to waive the turn of the Chapter in the rotation cycle on behalf of its members. 
Thus, the dissent concludes that it remains unclear that there was a clear and unequivocal
intention on the part of IBP Samar Chapter and its members to waive its right to the
governorship.43cralawred

The dissent’s citation of Article 6 of the Civil Code and its application of the elements of a valid
waiver of a right under civil law is misplaced.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates the Court’s power of supervision over the
IBP.  In Garcia v. De Vera,44 the Court held that implicit in the constitutional grant to the
Supreme Court of the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP (under Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution) is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of
its officers.  In administrative matters concerning the IBP, the Court can supervise the IBP by
ensuring the legality and correctness of the exercise of its powers as to means and manner, and
by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations affecting the means and
manner of the exercise of its powers.  For this reason, the IBP By-Laws mandates that the Court
has the plenary power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws in accordance with policies
it deems, not only consistent with the Constitution, laws and regulations, but also as may be
necessary, practicable and appropriate in light of prevailing circumstances.45cralawred

Pursuant to the Court's power of supervision over the IBP, the Court already spoke decisively
on the issue of waiver under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws in In the
Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.46 As
mentioned, the Court ruled that the rotation rule under Section 39 is not absolute, but is subject
to a waiver, as when a chapter in the order of the rotation opts not to field or nominate a
candidate for governor during the election regularly called for that purpose.  Notably, the Court
in that case also established the standards by which a chapter may be deemed to have waived
its turn in the rotation cycle under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws. 
Thus, the dissent's reliance on the standards of waiver of rights under civil law cannot simply
prevail over the standards set by the Court in the Brewing Controversies case.

In the Brewing Controversies case, the Court held that the six chapters in the region that should
strictly take precedence in the rotation rule over Lanao del Sur Chapter (i.e., IBP Sarangani
Chapter and the other five chapters) waived their turn in the rotation order by not fielding a
candidate for governor and by failing to invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations
from the latter.  In ruling that Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter was qualified to run
for governor in the 2009 elections, the Court noted that there were instances when the governor
of Western Mindanao Region came from the same chapter and that the other chapters opted
not to field or nominate their own candidates, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP
Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as
Governor for the 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty. Benjamin
Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur Chapter. A third candidate, Atty. Escobar
from the Sarangani Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.

While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region, including Sarangani, are
entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains
that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during
the April 25, 2009 election.  Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of the
Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of rotation.

By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of its
Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its
turn in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are
deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a
candidate from among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to
challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the contrary, they fully
expressed their concurrence to the cited nominations, which may be interpreted as a waiver of
their right to take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011
term.

It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there were instances when the
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region came from the same chapter such as
ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 & 1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus,
Atty. Marohomsalic could  not  be faulted if the other chapters opted not to field or nominate
their own candidates. Having been validly nominated and duly proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to assume his position
during the remainder of the term.

It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of rotation fielded its own
candidate or invoked the rotation rule to challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination. But the
record is bereft of any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was challenged on
that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely referred to his nomination by Atty.
Macalawi which the Committee itself has found to be in order. Thus, no compelling reason
exists to disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting delegates as
expressed through the ballot.

The “rotation rule” is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order
of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election
regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of
votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless
obtained through fraud as established by evidence. Such is not the case here.

Suffice it to say, the “rotation rule” should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of,
the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot.  Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic
cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is
not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling
circumstances.47

The same facts obtain in the present case.  As the IBP BOG noted, not all the nine (9) chapters
of Eastern Visayas were able to field a governor for the first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007
since three chapters were represented twice.  IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, to which Atty.
Opinion belongs, was represented once while IBP Samar Chapter, which Atty. Maglana
represents, was not represented at all.  The IBP BOG also established that some chapters were
represented twice during the first rotation cycle because Samar Chapter either did not field any
candidate for governor from 1989 to 2007 or it did not invoke the rotation rule to challenge the
nominations of those candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented in
the rotation cycle. Based on these considerations and pursuant to the Court’s December 14,
2010 ruling, we conclude that IBP Eastern Samar effectively waived its turn in the first rotation
cycle.

To justify its position that it is the sole Chapter qualified to field a candidate in the 2013-2015
term, Atty. Maglana cites the December 14, 2010 Resolution of the Court in In the Matter of the
Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines48 where it upheld
the turn of IBP Romblon Chapter which then completed the rotation cycle in IBP Western
Visayas region.

The citation is also misplaced.  In this case, the Court upheld the election of Atty. Fortunato as
Governor of IBP Western Visayas since he obtained the highest number of votes and also
because under the rotation rule, it was the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent IBP
Western Visayas Region in the IBP BOG.  Contrary to Atty. Maglana’s contentions, the Court in
that case never made a finding that there were also chapters that had two governors in one
cycle and that these second terms were considered as “aberrations.”  Furthermore, unlike the
case of IBP Samar Chapter, the Court did not make any finding regarding the waiver of the right
to the governorship in IBP Romblon Chapter’s case.

c.  IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor
for the 2013-2015 term.

With the end of the first rotation cycle in 2007 during the term of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi of IBP
Cebu City Chapter, the election of Atty. Evergisto S. Escalon of IBP Leyte Chapter in that same
year effectively ushered in a fresh second rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas region.
Thus, the second rotation cycle for governor in the IBP Eastern Visayas region now follows the
following pattern and succession:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Leyte - Evergisto S. Escalon, 2007-2009

2. Bohol - Roland B. Inting, 2009-2011
3. Southern Leyte - Manuel L. Enage, Jr., 2011-2013

With the IBP Eastern Visayas region already in the second rotation cycle and with governors
from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters having served the region as starting points,
Atty. Maglana’s position that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter qualified to field
a candidate for governor in the 2013 -2015 term clearly fails. The rotation by exclusion rule
provides that “once a member of [a] chapter is elected as Governor, his [or her] chapter would
be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle.  Once a full
rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again
entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.”49cralawred

Under this rule, considering that Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte Chapters already served in
the second rotation cycle, the six remaining chapters are qualified to field their candidates for
governor in the 2013-2015 term.  Applied in the present case, it is clear that both IBP Eastern
Samar and IBP Samar, along with Cebu Province, Cebu City, Biliran and Northern Samar
Chapters, are qualified to field their candidates in the May 25, 2013 regional elections in the IBP
Eastern Visayas region.

d. Atty. Opinion is the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015
term.

Based on the above considerations, we agree with the IBP BOG that Governor Enage seriously
erred in disqualifying Atty. Opinion as a candidate and in declaring the six (6) votes he garnered
as stray.

The election of Atty. Opinion is well-settled.  He did not only come from the chapter which is
entitled to be elected for the position but also got the majority of six (6) votes, as opposed to the
four (4) votes garnered by Atty. Maglana in the May 25, 2013 elections.

As the Court held in its December 14, 2010 Resolution in In the Matter of the Brewing
Controversies in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,50 “[i]f a validly nominated
candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate
deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence.”51 
Similarly, such is not the case here and thus, Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas in the 2013-2015 term.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion is qualified to run for Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas region for
the 2013-2015 term;

The six (6) votes cast in favor of Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion are valid votes and should be
counted in his favor;

The proclamation of Atty. Aileen R. Maglana by Governor Manuel Enage, Jr. be annulled since
she failed to obtain the majority of the votes cast in the May 25, 2013 elections; and

Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion be declared the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas
region for the 2013-2015 term, having garnered the highest number of votes cast in the May 25,
2013 elections.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. velasco
Velasco, Jr., J., I dissent. pls. see dissenting opinion.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Velasco.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-8.
2
 Id. at 64-70.
3
 Id. at 70.
4
 Minutes of the Regional Election for IBP Governor of Eastern Visayas, Held On May 25, 2013
at the Session Hall, RTC Br. 24, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Capitol Site, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, id. at 37-38.
5
 Id. at 39-40.
6
 Id. at 40-41.
7
 Id. at 20.
8
 Id. at 40.
9
 Id. at 41-42.
10
 Id. at 41.
11
 Id. at 47.
12
 Id. at 55.
13
 Id. at 55-56.
14
 Id. at 10-17.
15
 Id. at 14.
16
 Id. at 14-15.
17
 Id. at 22-29.
18
 Id. at 23.
19
 Id. at 25.
20
 Id. at 26.
21
 Id. at 68.
22
 Id. at 68-69.
23
 Id. at 69.
24
 Id.
25
 Id. at 2-4.
26
 Id. at 4-5.
27
 A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, December 14, 2010, 638 SCRA 1.
28
 Id. at 5-6.
29
 Id. at 60.
30
 Id. at 62-71.
31
 See Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in In The Matter of the Brewing Controversies in
the Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292,
April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 8, 97.
32
 Id. at 99.
33
Rollo, p. 3.
34
 Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws.
35
 Supra note 31.
36
 See In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, December 4, 2012, 686 SCRA 791, 794.
37
 Supra note 27.
38
 Id. at 14; italics and emphasis supplied.
39
 Id. at 33-34.
40
Rollo, p. 69.
41
 Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco, p. 7.
42
 Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco, p.7.
43
 Id. at 9.
44
 463 Phil. 385 (2003).
45
 See Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in
the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, supra note 31, at 137-138.
46
 Supra note 27.
47
 Id. at 32-34; emphases supplied.
48
 Supra note 27.
49
 Supra note 36, at 798.
50
 Supra note 27.
51
 Id. at 34.

DISSENTINGOPINION
 VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before this Court is another incident in the elections of Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
wherein IBP Samar Chapter pleads that it should be given its fair opportunity to serve as
Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas Region pursuant to the “rotation rule” established in Bar
Matter No. 491,1 as amended.

Brief Statement of Facts

IBP Eastern Visayas Region (IBP-EVR) is composed of nine (9) Chapters, namely: Biliran,
Bohol, Cebu Province, Cebu City, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar and Southern
Leyte.

On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of IBP-EVR convened to elect the Governor of the
said Region for the 2013-2015 term. The candidates for the coveted position were Atty. Aileen
R. Maglana (Atty. Maglana), representing IBP Samar Chapter, and Atty. Jose Vicente R.
Opinion (Atty. Opinion), representing IBP Eastern Samar Chapter. The outgoing Governor of
IBP-EVR, Atty. Manuel Enage Jr. (Gov. Enage) presided over the elections.

After her nomination as candidate for Governorship, Atty. Maglana immediately moved that IBP
Samar Chapter be declared as the sole and only chapter qualified to field a candidate for the
position of Governor of IBP-EVR. Invoking the “rotation rule” established in Bar Matter No. 491,
and considering that since the establishment of the aforementioned rule in
1989 ALL chapters except Samar Chapter had already served as Governor of IBP-EVR, Atty.
Maglana claims that IBP Samar Chapter is the only remaining chapter which could field a
candidate for Governor of IBP-EVR.2cralawred

On the other hand, Atty. Opinion rejected the foregoing arguments on the basis of a letter of
Governor Vicente M. Joyas (Gov. Joyas) of IBP Southern Luzon Chapter, who was then acting
as Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Please be informed that your having lost the Governorship elections for Eastern Visayas in 2011
does not disqualify your Chapter from seeking an election for Governorship of Eastern Visayas
Region. Thus, under the present set up, the IBP Chapters of Eastern Samar, Samar and Biliran,
are qualified to field their respective candidate for the scheduled Regional Elections on May 25,
2013.3

To which, Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon of IBP Biliran Chapter immediately asserted that it is only
the Supreme Court which can decide as to who among the chapters are qualified to field a
candidate for governor and that Gov. Joyas has never been competent or qualified to make the
pronouncement.4cralawred

Atty. Opinion also alleged that during the previous elections for the position of governor, there
was already a representative of Samar Chapter but the votes were waived.5 However, the
previous President of IBP Samar Chapter categorically denied that he made such waiver and
further stated that he cannot waive, nor has any authority to waive, the right of IBP Samar
Chapter to field a candidate for governor.6cralawred

After heated debates, Gov. Enage ruled that Atty. Opinion, as nominee from IBP Eastern Samar
Chapter, was disqualified to run for Governor of IBP-EVR.7 Gov. Enage likewise denied the
motion to suspend the elections and allow the IBP Board of Governors (IBP BOG) to rule on the
issue of Atty. Opinion’s disqualification.8 Consequently, Gov. Enage ordered the distribution of
ballots to the delegates. Of the eleven (11) ballots, Atty. Opinion obtained six (6) votes, Atty.
Maglana got four (4) votes while one ballot was unfilled. Nevertheless, since Atty. Opinion was
earlier declared disqualified for the position, the votes made in his favor were considered stray
and, thus, Gov. Enage proclaimed Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of IBP-EVR for
the 2013-2015 term.9cralawred

Atty. Opinion then filed an election protest before the IBP BOG. In its June 7, 2013
Decision,10 the IBP BOG reasoned that for its failure to field a candidate for governor from 1989
to 2007 or to invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose
chapters had already been previously represented in the rotation cycle, IBP Samar Chapter is
deemed to have waived its turn in the rotation order.11  It also ruled that the IBP-EVR is already
in its second rotation cycle with governors coming from Leyte, Bohol and Southern Leyte
Chapters, and, thus, the six (6) remaining Chapters, which include Samar Chapter (where Atty.
Maglana belongs) and Eastern Samar Chapter (where Atty. Opinion belongs), were qualified to
field their respective candidates.

Thus, the IBP BOG nullified the proclamation of Atty. Maglana and declared Atty. Opinion as
eligible to run and proclaimed him as the duly elected Governor of IBP-EVR for the 2013-2015
term, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board resolves as follows:

1) Protestant Atty. Jose Vicente R.M. Opinion is eligible to run for governor of Eastern Visayas
Region for the term 2013-2015;

2) The six (6) votes cast in the name of protestant Atty. Jose Vicente R. M. Opinion are valid
and counted in his favor;

3) The proclamation of protestee Atty. Eileen Maglana is annulled; and

4) Protestant Atty. Jose Vicente R.M. Opinion is declared the duly elected governor of Eastern
Visayas Region for the term 2013-2015.

SO ORDERED.12

Hence, Atty. Maglana filed the present appeal. She reiterated that considering that IBP Samar
Chapter is the only chapter which had not been represented as Governor of IBP-EVR since this
Court’s 1989 pronouncements in Bar Matter No. 491, it is the only qualified Chapter to field a
candidate for the position of Governor of IBP-EVR for term 2013-2015.13 She also asserts that,
contrary to the conclusions of the IBP BOG, IBP Samar Chapter never waived its turn in the
rotation because it does not know when should be its turn to serve as governor.14cralawred

The Issues

The ponencia presented the following as the core issues to be

resolved:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whether the first rotation cycle in the IBP Eastern Visayas, since the implementation of Bar
Matter No. 491, has been completed;

Whether IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order so that it can no longer claim
its right to the governorship for the 2013-2015 term;

Whether IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor in the
IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term; and

Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for
the 2013-2015 term.15

Discussion

In the present controversy, the ponencia affirmed the findings of the IBP-BOG and declare Atty.
Opinion of IBP Eastern Samar Chapter as the duly elected Governor of IBP-EVR. The ponencia
found that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

the first rotation cycle has been completed in 2007;

IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle;

IBP Samar Chapter is not the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor for the
2013-2015 term.

In this regard, I am constrained to express my dissent for the following reasons:

1. The first rotation cycle in the IBP-EVR, since the implementation of Bar Matter No. 491,
has NOT been completed.

In concluding that the first rotation cycle has been completed in 2007,
the ponencia reasoned:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We cannot sustain Atty. Maglana’s arguments, that: (1) the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern
Visayas region had not been completed in 2007; and (2) that the rotation cycle can only be
completed once a nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the 2013-2015
term, for two reasons.

First, as the IBP BOG established, the primary reason why some chapters, such as Northern
Samar, Cebu Province and Cebu City, were represented twice (in the first rotation cycle) was
because Samar either did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it failed to invoke the
rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose chapters had already been
represented in the rotation cycle.  We agree with the IBP BOG that Samar chapter effectively
waived its turn in the rotation order, as will be further explained below.  Because of this waiver
of its turn in the first rotation cycle, we conclude that the first rotation cycle had been completed
in 2007.

Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s right to the governorship in
the 2013-2015 term because it is contrary to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-
laws.  This provision states that the chapter which has waived its turn in the rotation cycle may
reclaim its right to the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. Having been
established that the first rotational cycle had been completed in the 2005-2007 term, IBP Samar
Chapter can no longer belatedly reclaim its right to the governorship in the 2013-2015 term as it
should have exercised its claim on or before the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007. In
this regard, we quote with approval the disquisition of the IBP BOG:

Moreover, protestee’s view that the Samar chapter, by virtue of its being the only chapter that
has yet to have its turn as governor in the rotation rule era, can reclaim the governorship at any
time it opts to and that the rotation cycle cannot be deemed completed until it does is anathema
to the very concept of the rotation rule.  The region cannot be held hostage indefinitely by one
chapter.  The rotation has to run its course.  Indeed the flaw of protestee’s reasoning would be
even more apparent if the issue of the election of the Executive Vice President would come into
play inasmuch as the Samar Chapter would then invoke its perceived right to the governorship
when it is the turn of Eastern Visayas Region to have an EVP elected from its ranks, thus, giving
it an undue advantage over the other chapters in the region.16

This is incorrect.

Giving a glimpse at the history of the governorship in IBP Eastern Visayas Region (IBP-EVR),
the ponencia presented a list of previous Governors for IBP-EVR as follows:

Term Elected Governors Chapter

1989-1990 Caretaker Board
1990-1991 Benedicto H. Alo Cebu Province
1991-1993 Baldomero C. Estenzo (1st) Cebu City
1993-1995 Agustinus V. Gonzaga (2nd) Bohol
1995-1997 Jose Aguila Grapilon (3rd) Biliran
th
1997-1999 Kenny A.H. Tantuico (4 ) Northern Samar
1999-2001 Celestino B. Sabate (5th) Eastern Samar
2001-2003 Emil L. Ong Northern Samar
2003-2005 Manuel M. Monzon (6th) Cebu Province
2005-2007 Manuel P. Legaspi Cebu City
2007-2009 Evergisto S. Escalon (7th) Leyte
2009-2011 Roland B. Inting Bohol
2011-2013 Manuel L. Enage, Jr. (8th) Southern Leyte
2013-2015 Disputed Disputed

  According to the ponecia, this is the first rotation cycle which allegedly ended in 2007.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that of the nine (9) chapters in IBP-EVR, only six (6) of them
were able to sit as Governor as of 2007. Beyond 2007, Leyte Chapter was the seventh chapter
to choose the IBP-EVR Governor while Southern Leyte Chapter was the eighth. Therefore, IBP
Samar Chapter is the ninth and the last chapter who is yet to have a Governor for IBP-
EVR.

Contrary to the postulate stated in the ponencia, the rotation cycle could NOT have been
completed or finished in 2007.

The “rotation rule” in the election of IBP-EVP was introduced in Bar Matter No. 491, In the
Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.17 In that
case, the Court made the following amendments to the IBP By-
Laws:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region, the
choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
(emphasis supplied)

On December 14, 2010, in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Magsino v. Vinluan, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292
(Brewing Cases), the Court adopted the proposed amendments18 to the foregoing provision as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

E. That the provision for the strict implementation of the rotation rule among the Chapters
in the Regions for the election of the Governor for the regions, (as ordered by this Honorable
Court in Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) should be incorporated in Sec. 39, Article VI of the
By-Laws, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for their region,
who shall be chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly
implemented among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in the
rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the line. Nevertheless,
the former may reclaim its right to the Governorship at any time before the rotation is
completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next round, in the same place that it
had in the round completed.

A perusal of the amended provision reveals the Court’s preferred policy of imposing
the mandatory and strict implementation of the “rotation by exclusion rule.” Unlike the
previous rule which merely provides the “as much as possible” exception, the amended rule
only accepts a “waiver” for the non-compliance with the said rule.

In fine, the “rotation by exclusion rule” means that once a member of a Chapter is elected
Governor, the said Chapter is excluded and becomes ineligible to have another member elected
as Governor until all the other Chapters in the region have had a chance to elect a Governor
from among its members. The series of exclusions takes place at each election until the cycle of
rotation among all the Chapters is concluded. After all the Chapters have had their respective
Governors elected, then the Governor-slate is wiped clean. Thereafter, the second rotation
cycle begins and all the Chapters are once again eligible to have one of their members elected
as Governor. Once a Chapter has its member elected as Governor, it is again excluded from
having another member elected as Governor until all the other Chapters in the region have had
a chance to elect a governor in the second cycle, and so on.19cralawred

It must be further emphasized that the rotation rule is meant to ensure an equitable sharing of
responsibility in the Integrated Bar.20  It was adopted under the pretext of giving each and every
chapter of a certain IBP region the opportunity to be represented in the IBP BOG.
Hence, more than the results of popular vote, every examination of election in the IBP must
proceed and be scrutinized under this precept. Simply put, it must always be borne in mind
that strict compliance with the rotation by exclusion is still the general and mandated
rule.

In this case, removed of all the analysis or any form of legal hermeneutics, interpretation and
evaluation of Section 39, Article V of the IBP By-Laws, a glaring fact remains that, since the
establishment of the rotation rule in Bar Matter No. 491, IBP Samar Chapter had never been
granted the opportunity to serve as Governor of IBP-EVR and be represented in the IBP-BOG.
As the records would bear, ALL of the other eight chapters, except IBP Samar Chapter, had
already made their complete turns as Governor of IBP-EVR. Since 1991, or for twenty-two (22)
years now, NO ONE from the IBP Samar Chapter had been granted this opportunity to have a
seat in the IBP BOG. This is the uncontroverted, nay unfortunate, fact.

To my mind, this is contrary to the very purpose for the establishment of the “rotation by
exclusion” rule. If the true objective of the rule is to give each and every chapter the opportunity
to be represented in the IBP BOG, then it cannot be said that the rotation is actually completed
when one chapter in the region is left out and remains to be unrepresented in the IBP BOG
more than twenty years after the rotation rule was created.

In addition, the Chapters of IBP-EVR do not seem to agree that the rotation was to be
completed and that they would have a fresh start of the rotation after 2007. There is also no
showing that the concerned chapters have agreed on a sequence or a definite period or term
that each of them would be seated as governor.

As stated, back in 2007, the rotation rule is still subject to the “as much as possible” exception,
which must be contradistinguished with the “waiver” exception promulgated by this Court in
2010. This means that prior to the 2010 amendment, the Court gave much discretion on the
chapters and allowed them to elect the governor of their respective regions without strictly
complying with the rotation rule. Prior to 2010, the Chapters nominate and elect their governors
without considering their turns in the rotation and without following any mandated or agreed
sequence. This also means that prior to 2010, there is no conclusive term or period when the
rotation cycle would end.

On this point, the ponencia argues that “the dissent cannot simply apply Section 39, Article VI
as amended in the present case because this amendment calling for the strict implementation of
the rotation cannot be interpreted retroactively, but only prospectively, so that it would take
effect in the 2011-2013.”

However, it is my understanding that the amendments introduced and approved by this Court in
2010 are curative or remedial in nature in the sense that it was made to cure or remedy an
existing defect in the IBP By-Laws––the defect being the seeming inequality in some IBP
Regions wherein some IBP Chapters dominate and control the election of governor or president
to the prejudice of the other chapters. Thus, in order to address this predicament and give each
and every IBP Chapter the opportunity at the IBP leadership, the Court preferred to impose the
strict and mandatory implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule. Like any other rule or law
which are primarily established as a remedial measure, this curative amendment should be
given retroactive effect in the sense that it should address not only the defects after this Court’s
2010 pronouncement in the Brewing Cases but also the defects which are still existing. In this
case, the retroactive application of the rule seems inevitable since the defect remains apparent
because, as far as IBP Eastern Visayas Region is concerned, the envisioned objective that all
its Chapters should be given the opportunity to serve as governor is yet to be achieved.

Furthermore, on a strict legal standpoint, if this Court indeed meant the rule to be prospective,
this Court should not even consider the previous elections and the corresponding aberrations in
the IBP Elections and just simply declare that, in view of the strict and mandatory
implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule, there should be a fresh start or new rotation
among the Chapters. But then again, to my mind, this is not the policy which the Court intends
to adopt.

Thus, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the ponencia that the first rotation cycle for the
Governor of IBP-EVR has already been completed for unless and until IBP Samar Chapter had
actually been given the opportunity to seat as Governor for IBP EVR, the first rotation cycle
for the position of IBP-EVR cannot be considered complete.

2. IBP Samar Chapter did NOT waive its turn.

The ponencia asserts that the rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP
By-laws is not absolute and may be waived. Citing this Court’s pronouncements in the Brewing
Cases, the ponencia ruled that IBP Samar Chapter waived its right under the rotation cycle
when it did not field or nominate any candidate for governor from 1989 to 2007 or it did not
invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose chapters had
already been previously represented in the rotation cycle.21cralawred

In any case, what appears to be clear is that a perusal of the records shows that NO express
waiver was executed by the IBP Samar Chapter to the effect that it is already foregoing its
turn in the rotation cycle. Thus, the question now is: Should we consider IBP Samar Chapter’s
“failure to field or nominate its candidate for governor during an election or to challenge the
nominations of those candidates whose chapters had already been previously represented” as
an implied waiver that is sufficient to conclude that the entire IBP Samar Chapter is foregoing or
relinquishing its right to serve as Governor of IBP-EVR?

The ponencia find that IBP Samar Chapter waived its right to the position of governor.

I believe otherwise.

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that “Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.” To validly waive a right, there are three (3) essential elements: (a)
existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (c) an intention to
relinquish such right.22cralawred

In the present case, there is no question on the presence of the first element considering that it
is clearly established that IBP Samar Chapter has the right to be given the opportunity to be
seated as Governor of IBP-EVR. However, I find that the second and third elements were not
satisfied.

According to the ponencia, IBP Samar Chapter should have invoked its right to have its turn
under the first rotation cycle on or before the elections for the 2005-2007 term.

Again, I disagree.
It was held that the standard of a valid waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but
must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.”23  In here, it must be emphasized that it is only during the election for
governorship for 2013-2015 that IBP Samar Chapter could have been aware of its right to be
the sole and only remaining Chapter that should vie for the position of Governor because it is
only during that time that it became clear that it is the only remaining Chapter of IBP-EVR which
remains unrepresented in the IBP BOG. In fact, to my mind, IBP Samar Chapter, or any chapter
for that matter, could invoke this right as the sole candidate only when ALL of the other chapters
had their respective turns. I cannot subscribe to the position in the ponencia that IBP Samar
Chapter should have invoked its right under the rotation before the 2005-2007 term because at
that time, it is NOT yet apparent that IBP Samar Chapter is the sole and only remaining
Chapter that should vie for the position of Governor. It must be pointed out that before the 2005-
2007 term, IBP Samar Chapter is not the only unrepresented chapter. At that time, IBP Leyte
and Southern Leyte Chapters were yet to be seated as Governor of IBP-EVR.

On the contrary, the right of IBP Samar Chapter as the sole and only remaining Chapter that
should vie for the position of Governor for IBP-EVR became clear and definite only AFTER IBP
Leyte Chapter had its turn in 2007-2009 AND IBP Southern Leyte Chapter had its turn in 2011-
2013. Thus, it was timely for IBP Samar Chapter to invoke its right as the sole and only qualified
chapter who could vie for the position of Governor of IBP-EVR for term 2013-2015 because it
was only during this time that it became clear and apparent that it is the only Chapter
that remains unrepresented for the position of Governor of IBP-EVR.

Indeed, the list of Governors contains “aberrations” in the rotation cycle wherein Northern
Samar, Cebu City and Bohol Chapters already having served twice as governor. On this point,
the ponencia argues that the “aberrant developments,” wherein some Chapters already had two
(2) governors, “can only be justified under the ‘as much as possible’ qualifier.”

But it is also on this premise that these aberrations should not be taken against IBP Samar
Chapter because previous to the 2010 amendments, these are valid aberrations. During those
times, there is yet no established rule that a Chapter is considered to have lost or waived its
right in the rotation. Likewise, these “aberrations” should not be utilized to mean that IBP Samar
Chapter had already waived its right in the rotation cycle. This is considering the fact that during
those times, the rotation rule still admits the “as much as possible” exception, and it is only in
the Brewing Cases which was promulgated in 2010 that this Court had approved the
amendment of Section 39, Article V of the IBP By-Laws to include “waiver” as a justification for
non-compliance with the rotation rule.

This also means, at that time of the aberrations, it was not yet clear that IBP Samar Chapter
already had the exclusive right to be Governor because, at that time, IBP Leyte and IBP
Southern Leyte Chapters were still in line to vie for governor of IBP-EVR. As erstwhile stated, it
is only AFTER IBP Leyte Chapter had its turn in 2007-2009 and IBP Southern Leyte Chapter
had its turn in 2011-2013 that the right of IBP Samar Chapter became definite. Thus, it is only at
this time that IBP Samar Chapter could assert its right under the rotation.

As regards the third element, it must be noted that up to this point, it remains unclear how this
right under the rotation rule maybe waived or relinquished. Certainly, in the Brewing Cases, this
Court ruled that the “rotation rule” is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in
the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the IBP By-laws is
silent, not only on how and when the waiver should be made but most importantly, whether or
not the Chapter President or the Board of Directors are clothed with authority to waive the turn
of the Chapter in the rotation cycle in behalf of the chapter members. Lastly, there is no rule that
prescribes the mode of notification to the IBP Chapter concerned that it is already its turn to
assert its right to choose its Governor under the rotation system or else, its turn will be forfeited.

Consequently, considering that it remains unclear as to how the intended waiver should be
made, and as to who should make the waiver in behalf of the Chapter, it is also similarly unclear
that there was a clear and unequivocal intention on the part of IBP Samar Chapter and its
members to waive its right to the governorship. Respondent Opinion was not able to show that
IBP Samar Chapter made an express or implied waiver of its right to elect the Governor. Since
there was no proof adduced, mere allegations on the alleged waiver will not suffice. In the
absence of any proof or definite intention to relinquish the right, there could be no waiver.

In a similar vein, there is also no factual basis to presume conclusively, as viewed by

the ponencia, that those who have not nominated or had a governor on or before 2007
(i.e. Southern Leyte, Leyte and Samar), have waived their respective turns in the rotation.

As erstwhile stated, in 2007 what prevails is the “as much as possible” exception. This means
that the Chapters in the IBP-EVR elected their governor without any intention or indication that
their failure to nominate a candidate for governor constitutes a waiver of their right in the rotation
cycle. On the other hand, judging from the list of governors presented in the ponencia, there is
already an admission, and thus, it is undisputed, that IBP Samar Chapter, to which Atty.
Maglana belongs, had never been granted the opportunity to have a Governor for IBP-EVR.

To reiterate, the opportunity to be the sole and only Chapter to vie for the position of governor of
IBP-EVR became definite and apparent only after IBP Leyte Chapter had its turn in 2007-
2009 and IBP Southern Leyte Chapter had its turn in 2011-2013. Thus, it was timely for IBP
Samar Chapter to invoke this right for the 2013-2015 term. If IBP Samar Chapter failed to
invoke this right for the 2013-2015 term, then this is the only time that it could constitute as a
“waiver” under Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-laws because this is the exact instance when
the rotation cycle in IBP-EVR is about to end.

Nevertheless, the ponencia posits the view that the “citation of Article 6 of the Civil Code and its
application of a valid waiver of a right under civil law is misplaced” and then invokes the power
of this Court to promulgate rules affecting the IBP pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, as basis.

It must be emphasized, however, that there is no doubt on this Court’s authority over the IBP.
What is simply being established is that the amendments in Section 39 of the IBP By-laws do
not provide the parameters on the manner and circumstances over which a waiver is made.

In any case, I cannot subscribe to the position of the ponencia that Article 6 of the Civil Code is
not applicable. It is my understanding that when this Court included “waiver” as an exception to
the rotation by exclusion rule, this Court did not intend that it should have an interpretation
which is different from the generally established legal principles governing waivers.

It is also worth to note that, as it stands, the general rule is for the strict and mandatory
implementation of the rotation by exclusion rule. Thus, the burden of establishing proof that this
case is an exception or that there was a waiver on the part of IBP Samar Chapter, rests upon
respondent Atty. Opinion. In this regard, it is my considered view that Atty. Opinion was not able
to successfully substantiate his claim that IBP Samar Chapter waived its right under the rotation.

The ponencia also argues that the “rotation in the region cannot simply be held hostage
indefinitely by IBP Samar Chapter” and consider the same as an absurd situation.

On the contrary, IBP Samar Chapter does not appear to be holding on to this opportunity
“indefinitely.” As stated, it was only during the elections for Governor of IBP-EVR for the term
2013-2015 that it became clear and definite that it is the only Chapter that remains
unrepresented for the position of Governor of IBP-EVR. It was only during that time that IBP
Samar Chapter can consider itself as the sole and only qualified chapter who could vie for the
position of Governor of IBP-EVR for the term 2013-2015. IBP Samar Chapter invoked its right
because it was only during that time it was permissible for IBP Samar Chapter to do so.

What is clearly being emphasized here is that this Court should give primary consideration to
the rationale behind the rotation by exclusion rule, which is to give each and every Chapter the
opportunity to seat as governor in each rotation.

3. IBP Samar Chapter is the only qualified chapter to field a candidate for governor for
the 2013-2015 term.

As stated earlier, ALL of the other eight chapters in the IBP-EVR, except IBP Samar
Chapter, had already been represented and made their complete turns and terms as Governor
of IBP-EVR. Since IBP Samar Chapter is the sole and only remaining chapter that has yet to
take a seat as Governor of IBP-EVR, the inevitable conclusion is that, pursuant to the
mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule, it is the ONLY QUALIFIED Chapter to
field a candidate for the position of Governor of IBP-EVR for the term 2013-2015.

Conclusion

In sum, eight chapters of the IBP Eastern Visayas Region have been granted their opportunity
to be represented in the IBP-BOG and had already completed their respective turns and terms
as Governor. IBP Samar Chapter is the last chapter in the rotation, and, hence, the only
chapter left to field a candidate for Governor of the IBP Eastern Visayas.

In the absence of clear and unequivocal waiver, IBP-EVR should strictly comply with the rotation
by exclusion rule. It is only AFTER IBP Samar Chapter is given the opportunity to serve as
Governor would the rotation be deemed complete. To rule otherwise would be contrary to the
spirit of fair play and equal opportunity which is the very essence for this Court’s establishment
of the rotation by exclusion rule. If not accorded the right to choose its Governor in this rotation
cycle, the IBP Chapter may end up having its Governor after another eighteen (18) years. It will
thus remain unrepresented in the IBP BOG for forty (40) years since Bar Matter No. 491––a dire
situation unintended by the Constitution and By-laws of the IBP.

Recommendation

In addition, it must be observed that during IBP elections, the most aggressive among the
chapters in the region would already engage in early campaigning in the sense that the
prospective candidate would already secure the support and commitment of the majority of the
delegates even before the nomination for the governor is held. This is probably one of the
reasons why the elections in the IBP had some “aberrations” to the prejudice of some of the
Chapters who similarly deserve an opportunity, or probably have more right, to have a seat at
the IBP leadership but was less aggressive in the campaign.

To remedy the situation, I would like to respectfully recommend that Section 39, Article VI of the
IBP By-laws be amended to the effect that:

(1) This Court should establish a sequence in governorship in the sense that the end of each
rotation cycle would be clearly apparent and definite.

The IBP Region should adopt the pre-ordained sequence based on the alphabetical listing of
the chapters therein to avoid politicking in the IBP elections. This sequence must be strictly
followed wherein the IBP Chapters will know their respective turns to choose the IBP Governor.

For example, the sequence in IBP-EVR will be:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(a) Biliran
(b) Bohol
(c) Cebu City
(d) Cebu Province
(e) Eastern Samar
(f) Leyte
(g) Northern Samar
(h) Samar
(i) Southern Leyte
In accordance with the foregoing order, Biliran Chapter has the right to choose the governor for
the first term of a fresh rotation cycle and the second term shall belong to Bohol Chapter and so
on.

If for some reason (i.e. financial constraints, etc.) a chapter, say Bohol, waives its turn for the
second term, then Cebu City is given the right to choose the governor for the said term. The
turns of the remaining chapters shall be adjusted accordingly pursuant to the aforementioned
sequence. This means, that after the term of Cebu City Chapter, the turn of Cebu Province
should immediately follow, then of Eastern Samar and so on. After Southern Leyte Chapter has
availed of its turn, Bohol Chapter, as the one who had previously waived its turn in the rotation,
may reclaim its right as the last chapter in the rotation cycle. Otherwise, a new rotation shall
start.

(2) If a chapter opts to waive its turn in the rotation, the waiver should be reduced into writing
and no implied waiver should be allowed.

(3) No chapter in the region is given the right to elect a governor for two (2) or more terms in the
rotation.

In view of the foregoing, I vote to:

(1) GRANT the petition;

(2) Declare Atty. Opinion as DISQUALIFED to be seated as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas

Region for the 2013-2015 term and order him to immediately VACATE office; and

(3) PROCLAIM Atty. Maglana as the duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas Region
for the 2013-2015 term.
Endnotes:

1
 In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
October 6, 1989, 178 SCRA 398.
2
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
3
 Id. at 20.
4
 Id. at 41.
5
 Id. at 40.
6
 Id. at 42.
7
 Id. at 53.
8
 Id. at 52-53.
9
 Id. at 57.
10
 Id. at 64-70.
11
 Id. at 68.
12
 Id. at 70.
13
 Id. at 3-4.
14
 Id. at 4-6.
15
 Ponencia, p. 7.
16
 Id. at 12-13.
17
 Supra note 1.
18
 Introduced by the Special Committee created by this Court composed of Retired Justices
Carolina Griño-Aquino (Chairpeson), Bernardo P. Pardo and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
19
 As explained in this writer’s Dissenting Opinion in In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies
in the Election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC & A.C. No. 8292,
December 14, 2010, 638 SCRA 1.
20
 Id.
21
 Ponencia, p. 13.
22
Valderama v. Macalde, G.R. No. 165005, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 168, 182.
23
People v. Balderama, G.R. Nos. 149382-83, March 5, 2003, 398 SCRA 642, 648.
 A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN
PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an
inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique
(RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office,
represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The
letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request
for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It
was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein
Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter
dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October
12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of
the situation.5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,

2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in
an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the
latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation
to the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion
on Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent
laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he
had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue
in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong,
Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the
assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been
responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation 

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of
the Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the
purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo
as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration
of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that
the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She
rationalized her conclusions thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel
Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn
statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first
place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction
of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuela’s branch except for the names and dates?
Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and
merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made
this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought.
Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would
falsely implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
70921 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-
2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition as
his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment
within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation
of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the
respondent’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23 Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and
did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-
affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him
to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more
than an afterthought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that
declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged
decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was
rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the
sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately
exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in
this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the
Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity
and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for
them to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x
x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as
lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [their] clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny
the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended
from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary
authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR

SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this
decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL

PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated

against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 8.
2
 Id.
3
 Id. at 22.
4
 Id. at 23-28.
5
 Id. at 33-34.
6
 Id. at 12-13.
7
 Id. at 55.
8
 Id. at 56.
9
 Id. at 58.
10
 Id. at 8-11.
11
 Id. at 7.
12
 Id. at 6.
13
 Id. at 64-67.
14
 Id. at 65.
15
 Id. at 67.
16
 Id. at 72.
17
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 84-89.
18
 Id. at 87.
19
 Id.
20
 Id. at 82.
21
 Id. at 98.
22
 Section 12(b). If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record
of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
23
People v. Biago, G.R. No. 54411, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 411, 418.
24
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 62.
25
 Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial
Conduct, p. 62 (2001).
26
Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, A.C. No. 4073, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 6, 10.
27
Lizaso v. Amante, A.C. No. 2019, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 1, 10; citing In Re Vicente Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567 (1923).
28
Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527, 532.
29
Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699, citing Ronquillo v.
Cezar, A.C. No. 6288, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 1, 5-6.

A.C. No. 6052               December 11, 2003

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL

GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE
MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

DECISION

TlNGA, J.:

This is a Petition1 filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez,
mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera "from being elected
Governor of Eastern Mindanao" in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") Regional
Governors’ elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while
petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President,
respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.

The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") was set on April 26, 2003, a
month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so
set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one month before the
national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the
choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution2 No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset
the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in
Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter,
sent a letter3 dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of
April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of
Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month
prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-
convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political
practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing
IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as
expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No.
XV-2003-162.4

On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May
24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition5 dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1)
the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June
2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera "from being elected Regional Governor
for Eastern Mindanao Region."

The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent
portions of the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections
for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.

WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already
been completed.

WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the
petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of
IBP regional governor.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.6
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May
29, 2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as
those sought in their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners’ application, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or
persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for
the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.7

Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP
officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board
which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:

IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP
Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule.
The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern
Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western
Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the
first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.

From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall
be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the
Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to
avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.

Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent
EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had
two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in
turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will
automatically assume the post of IBP National President.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP
membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan
del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency.8 The transfer of IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao
for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.9

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor,
executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera
lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by
the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been
disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client’s funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the
position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24,
2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.10

After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful
Comment  11 on the Petition.

In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP,
including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is
purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and
administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners’ legal standing,
pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP
members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is
only an election protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee
can validly lodge an election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He
posits further that following the rotation rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and
Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for
the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not
thus qualified to be nominees.12

Meeting the petitioners’ contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership.13 He cites the last paragraph of
Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located.
In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on
any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the
transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted
provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no
case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair
and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for convenience
and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship.14
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the
Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law.
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing
law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law,
he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to
run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding
him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the
review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in
the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainant’s money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention held
on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply
because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the
Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate
their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park
Hotel.15

On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply16 to the Respectful Comment of respondent De

Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.17

In a Resolution18 dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the
IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed
a Manifestation19 dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in its Resolution dated 29
May 2003 that "it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has as yet
been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors."20

Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:

(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of
which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:

(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP
By-Laws; and

(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;

(3) whether the present Petition is premature;

(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not
premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern
Mindanao Region;

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De
Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the IBP.

The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including
the election of its officers.

The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section
13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded
provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution21 through all the years have been the sources of
this Court’s authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term "Bar" refers to the
"collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys."22 Pursuant to this
power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on
October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.23 Not long after, Republic Act No. 639724 was enacted
and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned "In the Matter
of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines," we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar
in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our
rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.

The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence
from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the
Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 7725 of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the
power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon
recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15,26 the Court is
authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section 4427 empowers
the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.

On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No.
491 entitled "In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines" the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The
results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the
principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-
Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well
as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the
irregularities in the elections, in order to "impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise
the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering."

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct
election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP
President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the
IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among
themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic
succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their common two-
year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall
be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of
Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and
establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.

In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against
him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify
candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election
cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two
days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to
consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the
Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the
election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.

Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the
position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP
By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a
candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the
Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who
shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The
decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to
the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the
Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the
House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-
tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less
than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names
of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board
within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were
distributed to all the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate
voted for only one nominee for Governor for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region
receiving the highest number of votes was declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32

In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court
deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The
Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following
provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for
each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The
position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the
choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the
pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.

The simplification of the process was in line with this Court’s vision of an Integrated Bar which is
non-political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal
profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress
of the Philippine society.34

The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition
has no firm ground to stand on.

Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-
Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be
nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following
the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from
Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.

Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners
are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees
can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As
claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from
Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election
for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule
enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis
Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at
the forthcoming election.

On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek
the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern
Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the
post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no
nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from
Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can
always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really
from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was originally a member
of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for
his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners
aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his
office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a
member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a
lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He
has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only
when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the
place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering one’s
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of
IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein,
thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its

membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on
any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the
transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less
than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan
del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty.
Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De
Vera’s transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records.
This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as
aforequoted. Note that De Vera’s transfer was made effective sometime between August 1,
2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers
were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP
By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the
last Saturday of February of every other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27,
2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Vera’s transfer valid as it was
done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to
occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.

We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided
in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be
elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP;37 2)
he is included in the voter’s list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3)
he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected,
unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government
service.40

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he
can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member’s standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so
long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the
disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment
of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction
imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder
law, is apparently referring to this Court’s Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published
Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of
court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his
remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are
the pertinent portions of the report, with De Vera’s statements written in italics.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed
by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder
Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of
Estrada.

"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices-
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most
likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or
vague," the group said.42

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

"People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard De
Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign
movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.
Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true.

"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty
must prevail. "43

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said

statements but denied to have uttered the same "to degrade the Court, to destroy public
confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute."44 He explained that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.45

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which
he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the

Court defines moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals."48 The determination of whether an act involves moral
turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation
of the statute.49

In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one’s opinion on a public interest issue
can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity.1âwphi1 Respondent De Vera
did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on
the Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative
case as evidence of respondent De Vera’s alleged immorality.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It
is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same.51 In this
case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Vera’s moral fitness to run for governor.

Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates
from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again
petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the
position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold
said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, pp. 3-11.

2 
Id. at 104.

3 
Id. at 105-108.

4 
Id. at 109-111.

5 
Id. at 112-121.

6 
Id. at 122.

7 
Id. at 1-2.

8 
Id. at 7.

9 
Ibid.

10 
Rollo, p. 9.

11 
Id. at 46-93.

12 
Id. at 60.

13 
Id. at 61-62.

14 
Id. at 66.

15 
Id. at 87.

16 
Id. at 150-169.
17 
Id. at 175-196.

18 
Id. at 173-174.

19 
Id. at 237-242.

20 
Id. at 238.

21 
Sec. 5(5) Art. X, 1973 Constitution: Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.

22 
In the matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 151 Phil. 132 (1973).

23 
Supreme Court Resolution dated October 5, 1970.

24 
An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefor.

25 
SEC. 77. Amendments. - These By-Laws may be amended, modified or repealed by the
Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

26 
SEC. 15. Supreme Court observer. – The Supreme Court may designate an official observer
at any election of the Integrated Bar, whether national or local.

27 
SEC. 44. Removal of Members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after proper
inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to
perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the majority of the remaining members, may
declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the remaining members of
the Board shall, by majority vote, elect a successor from among the Delegates coming from the
Region concerned to serve as Governor for the unexpired portion of the term.

28 
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to election. - The following acts and practices
relative to elections are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in
the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by
himself or through another person:

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the
biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the

advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of
food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to
any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised
to any person.

29 
Section 33(g). The House (of Delegates) shall elect the members of the Board of Governors at
the annual convention every other year.

30 
SEC. 39. Nomination and election of Governors. -

(a) Nominations. -

On the morning of the first day of the convention of the House of Delegates held for the election
of Governors, the Delegates from each Region shall choose, by secret plurality vote, not less
than two or more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. In no case
shall more than one nominee come from the same Chapter, nor may any person be nominated
unless he is a duly registered member of a Chapter within the Region.

The list of nominees shall be submitted on the same morning to the Chairman of the House,
who shall forthwith read them aloud. The names of all the nominees, arranged by Region and in
alphabetical order of surnames, shall be written on a blackboard or blackboards within the full
view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists are distributed to all the
Delegates by the secretariat of the House.

In no case shall any nomination or campaign speech be permitted.

31 
Section 39(5) Voting. - Voting for Governors shall take place on the afternoon of the first day
of the convention, and shall be by secret ballot. Official ballots shall be provided for the purpose.
No voting by proxy shall be allowed. Each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate shall vote
for only one nominee for Governor of each Region.

32 
Section 39 (7) Persons to be declared elected. - Elections shall be determined by plurality
vote. The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared
and certified elected by the Chairman. In case of a tie vote, the winner shall be determined by
lots drawn by the nominees concerned. The Secretary shall keep all the ballots and tally sheets
in a locked receptacle where they shall remain, subject to the further orders of the Board of
Governors.
33 
Section 4, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly non-
political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be
penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible
for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A
Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any
Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he
files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.

34 
Section 2, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Objectives and purposes.- The following are the general
objectives of the Integrated Bar: to elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively. The purposes of the Integrated Bar include, without being limited to, those specified
in the per curiam Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 9, 1973 ordaining the
integration of the Philippine Bar.

35 
Rollo, p. 125.

36 
Section 29-12. Rules governing elections.- The following rules shall govern elections:

(a) Date and place of elections. - Elections of Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year at such time and place as the Board shall designate,
which shall be stated in the notice to be sent to every member by personal delivery or by mail
not less than thirty days prior to the elections.

37 
Section 9. Officer defined.- The term "officer" as used in these By-Laws shall include, but not
necessarily be limited to, the following: President, Executive Vice President, Governors,
Secretary, Treasurer and other national officers of the Integrated Bar, officers and members of
the House of Delegates, Chapter officers and directors, commissioners, and members of all
national and local committees.

Only members in good standing may become officers, and, unless otherwise provided in
these By-Laws, no person who is not a member of the Integrated Bar may become an
officer.

Section 20. Members in good standing. - Every member who has paid all membership dues and
all authorized special assessments, plus surcharges owing thereon, and who is not under
suspension from the practice of law or from membership privileges, is a member in good
standing.

38 
Section 29-12.f Elibigility. - No member may be elected to any office whose name is not duly
included in the voters’ list, or who is disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar, or by these by-laws.

Section 29-12© Voters’ list. - Not earlier than twenty-five days nor later than fifteen days prior to
the elections, the Secretary shall submit to the Board of Officers a list of the names of all the
members entitled to vote. The voters’ list shall then remain closed and shall not be altered
except upon direction of the Board. However, it shall be open to inspection by all members, and
upon request, copies thereof shall be furnished to any member upon payment of actual cost.

Any member who is delinquent in the payment of dues or any assessment, including surcharges
owing, twenty-five days prior to the day of the elections, shall be excluded from the voters’ list.

39 
Sections 37 and 39, Article VI, IBP By-Laws.

40 
Section 4, Article 1, IBP By-Laws.

41 
A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, 29 July 2002, 385 SCRA 285.

42 
In Re; Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case
Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC, 29 July 2002, 385 SCRA 285, 287-
288.

43 
Id. at 288.

44 
Ibid.

45 
Supra, note 41, at 290.

46 
106 Phil. 727 (1959)

47 
G.R. No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA 126.

48 
Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 (1959).

49 
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1151 (1996) citing International Rice
Research Institute v. NLRC, GRNo. 97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760, and In Re: Victorio
Lanuevo, Administrative Case No. 1162, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 245.

50 
See Villaber v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA
126, Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1151 (1996) and Tak Ng v.
Republic of the Philippines,106 Phil. 727 (1959).

51 
Cortes v. CA, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003.

52 
Coronel v. Constantino, G.R. No. 121069, 7 February 2003.
 A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE

VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in
his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip)
and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were
done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature
affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin
to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by
Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading
to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that
the affidavits at hand were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing;
and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order
to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for
the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected
from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s

disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election
protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of
Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He
added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As
he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in
view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case.18 To
add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled “Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him
and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated
in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could
sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on
November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed
that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the
affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated

February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing
the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by
the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and
to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in
holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the
IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary
proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-hand observe
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on
the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he
had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation
in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is
that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a
mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya
v. Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended
the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in
court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same
here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation

in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia

Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further
administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,

concur.cralawlawlibrary

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-8.
2
 See Order dated December 6, 2007; id. at 200.
3
 Id. at 2.
4
 Id.
5
 Id. at 3.
6
 Id. at 241-242.
7
 Id. at 3.
8
 Id.
9
 Id. at 244.
10
 Id. at 171-185.
11
 See id. at 3-4.
12
 Id. at 4.
13
 Id. at 4-5.
14
 Id. at 5.
15
 Id. at 7.
16
 Dated May 6, 2008. Id. at 9-13.
17
 Id. at 9.
18
 See id. at 10-11.
19
 Id. at 16.
20
 Id. at 601-605. Signed by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.
21
 Id. at 605.
22
 Id. at 603-604.
23
 Id. at 604.
24
 Id. at 603-604.
25
 Id. at 600.Signed by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic.
26
 See Atty. De Vera’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 20, 2013; id. at 606-614.
27
 Id. at 637.
28
 See Samonte v. Atty. Abellana, A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014.
29
 Id.
30
 Id.
31
Rollo, p.610.
32
 Id. at 611.
33
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 19.
34
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 18, Rule 18.02.
35
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 19, Rule 19.03.
36
 A.C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 452.
37
 Id. at 481, citing Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, 517 Phil. 236, 241 (2006).
38
 Supra note 28.
39
 See Opposition/Comment (to Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration) dated April 15,
2013; rollo, p. 621.
40
 See Complaint where only the amount of P60,000.00 was definitively stated; id. at 2.
41
 See Pitcher v. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 13, 25-26.
42
Rollo, p. 31.
43
 See Samonte v. Atty. Abellana, supra note 28.
A.C. No. 8103               December 3, 2014

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,

BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the IBP Board of Governors
which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further,
he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.

It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008,
submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of
18 documents at the time he was out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The
notarized documents were as follows:

1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C. Macalinao and
Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;

2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L. Sese,
notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to Eduardo
Samson and Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;

4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;

5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez
Jorgensen, notarized on April 8, 2008;

6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and sons of
Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;

7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco and
Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;

8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan,
notarized on April 3, 2008;

9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao,

notarized on March 27, 2008;

10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and
Carlos Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;

11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps. Gilvert
and Johanna Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;

12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula,
notarized on April 2, 2008;

13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay and
Helen Zulueta, notarized on March 18, 2008;

14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on April 1,
2008;

15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development Corporation,
notarized on March 26, 2008;

16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and
Sps. Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;

17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to Elizabeth
Banzon and Sps. Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and

18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and Dominador M.
Manalansan notarized on March 14, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who
had information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the
Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who
caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see
respondent sign the documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the
documents cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed from the country on
March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the Certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.3

The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed
the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize
the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11,
2008 Letter was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement
of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and that any advice on
how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be welcome.

On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for appropriate action.5

This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter.
In his comment,7 dated 27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those
were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country. Upon his own
inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by his secretary and without his
knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the documents without realizing the
import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred
that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.

The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When
the case was called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent
appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that
his attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper,9 to
which he added that for 21 years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public
without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession and notarial
practice.

The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as
Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was
not verified, that most of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the
comment of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that
respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be strikingly similar to the signatures in
most of the attached documents which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were notarized while he was
abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of the import of
the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an
office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining
to his notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard
required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his
office secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s
commission as notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of
two (2) years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its
Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended
that by admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he
should be merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple
negligence which did not warrant such harsh penalty.

On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of
respondent stating:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a
mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby
affirmed.13

On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.

The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary
of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents
were notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country.
This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public"
refers to any person commissioned to perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s
secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not
authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his office
open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register
within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this
Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that
respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him
could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned
as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.

As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years
that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was
his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and
could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18
documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such
prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of
revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years is appropriate.

Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary
public not only damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should,
thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.15 Where
the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his
secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice
law. By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in
charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer
to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into
his office while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted
therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead,
they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded.

Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.

Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant

responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued
with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17

It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic
instruments would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take
lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance.

WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a
notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him
from the practice of law for three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Mcmher in lieu of Associate .Justice Arimo D. Brion, per Special Order No.
1888 dated November 28, 2014.

1
 Rollo. p. 78.

2
 Id. at 9-10.

3
 Id. at 10.
4
 Id. at 2.

5
 Id. at 1.

6
 Id. at 58.

7
 Id. at 59-60.

8
 Id. at 67.

9
 Id. at 72-74.

10
 Id. at 79-80.

11
 Id. at 78.

12
 Id. at 82-86.

13
 Id. at 90.

14
 Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana, 608 Phil. 727, 736 (2009).

15
 Agbulos v. Viray, A.C. No. 7350, February 18, 2013, 691 SCRA 1, 8.

16
 Ang v. Gupana, A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014.

17
 Agadan v. Kilaan. A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013, 709 SCRJ\ l, I 0.

18
 Talisic v. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014.

A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016

CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY.

WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA &
PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on February 11, 2005 by complainant

Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) –
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles
(Atty. Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty.
Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles, Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm),
charging them of various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter
alia, refusing to return the money given by complainant in exchange for legal services which
respondents failed to perform.
 The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of respondents to
handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In
his meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case would
cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining
P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the
case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and
filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four
(4) months from filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which was duly
received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw

From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler.
However, despite his constant prodding, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any
petition and instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to look for a
psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public
prosecutor; and (c) they were still deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that the
petition would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed without any
petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed since
they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's
petition.4chanrobleslaw

Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler asked for an additional
payment of P250,000.00 in order for them to continue working on the case. Hoping that his
petition would soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23, 2004, which
was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.5 However, to complainant's dismay, no appreciable
progress took place. When complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty.
Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft petition was already
submitted to the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized.6chanrobleslaw

In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text message from Atty. Cruz-
Angeles informing him that the National Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The
latter explained then that this development was favorable to complainant's case because,
instead of the proposed petition for annulment of marriage, they would just need to file a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. She also informed complainant that they would send
someone to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad,
Benguet (Civil Registrar) where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon complainant's
independent verification through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in the
Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records of his marriage was a
mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the petition.7chanrobleslaw

Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment, complainant went to
respondents' law office to terminate their engagement and to demand for a refund of the
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler refused to return the said amount, and to complainant's surprise, sent him two (2) billing
statements dated October 5, 20048 and October 10, 20049 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and
P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing statement included a fee for
"consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.10 In view of the foregoing, complainant
filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1426.
In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total of P350,000.00 from
complainant,12 but denied that she was remiss in her duties, explaining that the delay in the filing
of the petition for annulment of marriage was due to complainant's failure to give the current
address of Mutya and provide sufficient evidence to support the petition.13 Further, Atty. Cruz-
Angeles alleged that it was Atty. Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the petition.14 For his
part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action,
arguing too that complainant filed the present administrative complaint only to avoid payment of
attorney's fees.16chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that
they be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four (4) months. However,
Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any liability as his participation in the charges has not been
discussed, much less proven.18chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged the services of Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving
the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as evidenced by their failure to just even draft
complainant's petition for annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) long
months.19 Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, despite their preliminary
assessment that complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
still proceeded to collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they even billed
him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00.20 Thus, the Investigating Commissioner opined that the
amounts respondents had already collected and would still want to further collect from
complainant can hardly be spent for research in connection with the annulment case that was
not filed at all. Neither can they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler who did
nothing to serve complainant's cause.21chanrobleslaw

In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the
recommended penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cruz-Angeles
moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004, complainant secured the
services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for the purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya,
and in connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the aggregate sum of
P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the passage of more than five (5)
months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler failed to file the appropriate
pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; and worse, could not even show a finished
draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their client
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve
the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect
of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable,"25cralawred as in this case.

In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the CPR when they failed to return to complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing their
legal fees, viz. :
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand, x x x.
It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics."26chanrobleslaw

Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to complainant that the delay in the
filing of his petition for annulment was due to the fact that they were still looking for a "friendly"
court, judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much of a hindrance in achieving
success in the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2) billing statements dated October 5,
200427 and October 10, 2004,28 Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went to
various locations to look for a suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even paid various
amounts to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of Investigation to act as their
"consultants." Such misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing."29 Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of such standard when they
committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant.
Their acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they
also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to practice
law.30chanrobleslaw

As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not perform acts that would tend
to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can find a
"friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in complainant's annulment case. It
is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.31 This is the very thrust of
Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Hence,
lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as
such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.
[32]
chanrobleslaw

Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession" for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by
staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as
an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard
the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and
reputation of the judiciary.33 In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised the
integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national prosecutorial service, by insinuating
that they can influence a court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the
annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated
Canon 7 of the CPR, and hence, they should be held administratively liable therefor.

Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, jurisprudence provides that in
similar cases where lawyers neglected their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money
and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of misrepresentation and
deceit against their clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the Court suspended the lawyer for
a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal
services which he never performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera,  35 the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of two (2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to
return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b) misrepresentation that he was an
immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the Court
suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to file a petition for adoption on
behalf of complainants, return the money she received as legal fees, and for her commission of
deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already filed such petition when nothing was
actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case, not only did
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file complainant's petition for annulment of marriage and
return what the latter paid them as legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a
court, judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a favorable resolution of
such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary and the national prosecutorial service. Under
these circumstances, the Court individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler to
return the amount of P350,000.00 they received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note
that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve
around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil
in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client
in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."37 Hence, since Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as
part of their legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler are
found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, each
of them is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, effective
upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler
are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as the legal fees they received from
the latter in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance and be attached
to respondents' personal records as attorney.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
Reyes, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On leave.
Mendoza, J., On official leave.

Endnotes:

1
 Dated February 10, 2005. Rollo, pp. 2-11.
2
 Id. at 2-3. See Annex "A-l," id. at 12.
3
 Id. at 3.
4
 Id. at 4.
5
 Id. See Annex "A-2," id. at 12.
6
 Id.
7
 Id. at 5.
8
 See id. at 13-14.
9
 See id. at 15-16.
10
 Id. at 5, 7, and 13.
11
 See Answer/Counter-Affidavit dated June 30, 2005; id. at 55- 68.
12
 See id. at 58 and 61.
13
 See id. at 66.
14
 Id. at 62.
15
 See Answer/Counter-Affidavit dated July 5, 2005; id. at 72-74.
16
 Id. at 72.
17
 Id. at 203-207. Signed by Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.
18
 Id. at 207.
19
 See id. at 205-206.
20
 Id. at 206.
21
 Id. at 207.
22
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2013-105 signed by National Secretary Nasser
A. Marohomsalic; id. at 202 (including dorsal portion).
23
 See motion for reconsideration dated February 11, 2014; id. at 208-214.
24
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2015-482 signed by National
Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 228-229.
25
cralawred See Spouses Lopez v. Limos, A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016.
26
 See id.
27
 See rollo, pp. 13-14. The breakdown of expenses is as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Malaybalay:   
Representation P45,000.00  
  Counsel 50,000.00  
    
Antipolo:   
  Representation 5,000.00  
    
Manila:   
  Representation 5,000.00  
    
Cavite:   
  Representation 5,000.00  
    
Bataan:   
  Representation 5,000.00  
    
Pampanga:   
  Representation 5,000.00  
    
Research: 10,000.00  
    
Expenses:   
    
  Long distance/cellphones 7,500.00  
  Administrative 3,000.00  
      
  Fees:   
  Police 5,000.00  
  Witnesses (5) 5,000.00  
  Consultants (prosecutors) 45,000.00  
  Consultants (NBI) 2,500.00  
  Psychologists (initial) 5,000.00  
  Certifications 45,000.00  
  Address 5,000.00  
      
  TOTAL (approximate) P258,000.0  
0
28
 Id. at 15. the breakdown of expenses is as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Acceptance fees for law office P200,000.0  
0
    
Collaborating counsel (Malaybalay) 100,000.00  
    
Conference with collaborating counsel @ P2,500 per meeting 7,500.00  
    
Two meeting in Fort Bonifacio (two counsels) 10,000.00  
    
Research in the following places:   
  Samar     300.00  
  Cebu 300.00  
  Bohol 300.00  
  Basilan 300.00  
  Sulu 300.00  
      
  Total P324,000.0  
0
29
 See Spouses Lopez v. Limos, supra note 25.
30
 See id.
31
 See PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Lokin, A.C. No. 11139, April 19, 2016,
citing Baculi v. Battling, 674 Phil. 1, 8-9 (2011).
32
 See id.
33
 See id., citing Francia v. Abdon, A.C. No. 10031, July 23, 2014, 730 SCRA 341, 354-355.
34
 705 Phil. 321 (2013).
35
 A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 12.
36
 See supra note 25.
37
 See id., citing Pitcher v. Gagate, 719 Phil. 82, 94 (2013).

A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant, v. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene
O. Medina on December 10, 1999.2chanrobleslaw

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped
respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and
confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila
sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then
left.4chanrobleslaw
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's
car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene O. Medina, a provincial
board member of Surigao del Norte.6chanrobleslaw

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."7 Respondent's act

showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that
this act constituted gross misconduct.8chanrobleslaw

Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit,10 and a

letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League
of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation.12 Thus, respondent should
be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of
authority:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City,
committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.

The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver,
causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an
elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted
that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross
misconduct and abuse of authority.

Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors
League of Surigao del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of
different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14chanrobleslaw

In his Comment,15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident

happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school.16 He further alleged that
complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's
car.17 When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage, complainant approached
him in an unfriendly manner.18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself.19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move against his son and
himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should
wait for a traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic
officer who would prepare a sketch.21 No traffic officer was present during the
incident.22chanrobleslaw

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio
programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He
alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it
was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to complainant.24chanrobleslaw

Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial
Governor.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out
of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Washington, Surigao City.26 During the proceedings, respondent explained that he
pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed
tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to
check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed
to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his
car.29chanrobleslaw

Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27, 2006 of the
Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by
Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties.31chanrobleslaw

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.32chanrobleslaw

Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been
settled.34 Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why
the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was reset
to September 21, 2007.36chanrobleslaw

In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent

appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case ex-parte.38chanrobleslaw

In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension
of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty (60) days from notice
hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal
profession.40 (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a
slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1)
the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the
signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who
believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be
held administratively liable.43chanrobleslaw

On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the
Resolution44 adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's
recommendation, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O,
Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in the
original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008
Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the
Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.48 He stresses
complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that
this administrative case is politically motivated.49chanrobleslaw

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to
harass its officers with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power
against its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to
be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that his or her
acts are consistent with his or her oath.51chanrobleslaw

Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52chanrobleslaw

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of

evidence,53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the
other."54chanrobleslaw

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama—as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors also adopted—found that the slapping incident actually
occurred.55chanrobleslaw

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of
a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant
of respondent's plate number.58chanrobleslaw

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave

weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal
profession eroded"60 because of respondent's act of slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's
allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case,
the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures
only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to
respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers
who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance
of and harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a
character that disregards the human dignity of another. Respondent's question to complainant,
"Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to
abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that
is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers
are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers.62 This Court has the power to impose
disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private
capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court.63chanrobleslaw

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis.64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the
parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to
determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Ylaya
v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.66chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere
witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the
finding of administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings.67chanrobleslaw

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and
be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official business.
Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
2
 Id. at 121.
3
 Id.
4
 Id. at 3.
5
 Id. at 121.
6
 Id.
7
 Id. at 4.
8
 Id. at 5.
9
 Id. at 9.
10
 Id. at 10.
11
 Id. at 21-23.
12
 Id. at 21.
13
 Id. Complainant's name is spelled in his Affidavit is "Dionnie" (Id. at 7).
14
 Id. at 22-23.
15
 Id. at 43-45.
16
 Id.
17
 Id.
18
 Id.
19
 Id.
20
 Id.
21
 Id. at 43-44.
22
 Id. at 44.
23
 Id.
24
 Id.
25
cralawred Id.
26
 Id.
27
 Id.
28
 Id.
29
 Id.
30
 Id. at 49.
31
 Id. at 44 and 49.
32
 Id. at 52.
33
 Id. at 97, Order dated July 20, 2007.
34
 Id.
35
 Id.
36
 Id.
37
 Id. at 101, Integrated Bar of the Philippines Order.
38
 Id.
39
 Id. at 121-128.
40
 Id. at 128.
41
 Id. at 124.
42
 Id.
43
 Id. at 125.
44
 Id. at 120.
45
 Id.
46
 Id. at 139-142, Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2008.
47
 Id. at 153.
48
 Id. at 43, Comment.
49
 Id. at 44.
50
See Ferancullo v. Atty. Ferancullo, Jr., 538 Phil. 501, 511 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
51
Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., 678 Phil. 588, 599-600 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; In Re:
Atty. Felizardo M. De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127, 133 (1974) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, First
Division]; In Re: De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554, 554-555 and 558-559 (1939) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc,]; In Re: Atty. Eusebio Tionko, 43 Phil. 191, 191 and 194 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En
Banc,]; Acosta v. Serrano, 166 Phil. 257, 262 (1977) [Per J. Bernardo, Second Division].
52
Atty. Solidon v. Atty. Macalalad, 627 Phil. 284, 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
53
 Id.
54
Guevarra v. Eala, 555 Phil. 713, 725 (2007) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
55
Rollo, p. 124, Commissioner's Report.
56
 Id. at 9.
57
 Id. at 20.
58
 Id. at 4.
59
 Id. at 126.
60
 Id. at 127.
61
 Id.
62
Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].
63
Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., 392 Phil. 394, 402 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
64
Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390, 406 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
65
Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
66
 Id. at 407.
67
 Id.

A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony
J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and
Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on
behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above
his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s
affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified
the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an
affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo
and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence.
The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that
the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other
clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to

Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that
the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the
Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial
and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for
the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the

Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that
Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice
of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their
law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing
in the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9,
for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the
act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge
of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in
his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry
the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his
law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this
task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed
by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation
of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as
a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing
one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint
Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate.
Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Docketed as OMB-V-C-04-0445-I and OMB-V-A-04-0429-I.

2
 Docketed as OMB-V-C-05-0207-E.

3
 Docketed as OMB-V-A-05-0219-E.

4
 IBP Records (Vol. I), p. 14.

5
 Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1612.

6
 Sub-Office Report No. 0008-2005.

7
 IBP Records (Vol. III), pp. 4-6.

8
 Id. at 1.

9
 478 Phil. 378, 389 (2004).

10
 529 Phil. 876 (2006).

11
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, Section 3.
 [A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.

Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. — Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY. — Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering
evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had
no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the
court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court.
By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because
this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.
Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings of the parties.

Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants)
in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981,
while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When
complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was
unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying
to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of
making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment
was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation
at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her
and immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for
a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there
l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional
Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark
"bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of
intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a
member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the
first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial
proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive
personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R.
No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)

The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by
complainant’s own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not
entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper
words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to
observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt
with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015

 JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty.
Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public,
for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's
office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation
of lawyer-client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and
receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of
absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular
entries in his notarial registers.7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of
his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that
involved her husband and her parents-in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the
complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed
against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client,
Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests.9

Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same
administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was
not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno,
these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings.

In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the
March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this
document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten
name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide
claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his
admission to the Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to
simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better
cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the
irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire
him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an
associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was
Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should
not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his
pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.

In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in
his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions
respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection,
a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."19

However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively
liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the
evidence presented on this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized
the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt
of his notarial commission.20

Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was
indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only
hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The
retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.21 But despite this previous
attorney-client relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be
held liable for representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally
unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty.
Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and
abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22

For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty.
Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and
insulting language.23

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the
evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the
Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two
years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this
was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and
accordingly confirms them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties
identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to
show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his
admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as
notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR
number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information.
However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this
document never appeared in his notarial register and was never included in his notarial
report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his
notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details
as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on
May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to
his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial
commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such
as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide
could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his
notarial commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar
admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear
from the evidence before us.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial
registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had
been irregularly numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two
4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
Disinterested Persons
Petition for Issuance of
4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
Owner's Duplicate copy
Affidavit of Parental
4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Consent
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently
bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall
keep only one active notarial register at any given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of
simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule
VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial
register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial
register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally
administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is
vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform
it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to
address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to
allow the antedating of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several
active notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of
his clients requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers
and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to
receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His
flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and
excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."

Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32

Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno,
his former law firm's client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left
ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject
matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno
with the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family
pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this
only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged
mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption
as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case
and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan
engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record
shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he
acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition
against the representation of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings

The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the
following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or

behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used
the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his
opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the
whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid
for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a
clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as
regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words — a
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any
offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even
in his pleadings, must be dignified.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty

of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is
found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 493; issued on November 19, 2011.
2
 A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, July 6, 2004.
3
Rollo, pp. 3-9.
4
 The respondent was admitted to the Bar on May 2, 2002.
5
 The respondent received his notarial commission on May 9, 2002.
6
Rollo, pp. 3-4.
7
Id. at 4.
8
 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
9
Rollo, pp. 5-7.
10
 Id. at 5.
11
Id. at 509.
12
 Id. at 66-81.
13
 Id. at 67-68.
14
 Id. at 69.
15
 Id. at 71-72.
16
 Id.
17
 Id. at 494.
18
 Id. at 494-513.
19
 Id. at 508.
20
 Id. at 501-502.
21
 Id. at 503-504.
22
 Id. at 511-512.
23
 Id. at 512.
24
 Id. at 493.
25
 Id. at 514-523.
26
 Id. at 531-532.
27
Rollo, pp. 507-508.
28
 Section 1 (b), 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
29
 Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Notarial Practice Rules, a notary public is empowered to
perform the following notarial acts:

    1. acknowledgments;

    2. oaths and affirmations;

    3. jurats;

    4. signature witnessings:

    5. copy certifications; and

    6. any other act authorized by these Rules;

30
Maria v. Cortes, A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 87, 93.
31
 A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 76.
32
 Id. at 82.
33
 Id.
34
Rollo, p. 40.
35
 Id. at 509.
36
Saberon v. Larong, 574 Phil. 510, 517 (2008).
37
 Id.
 G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000.]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN
MATILDE M. TIONGCO, Petitioner, v. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA,
JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17, 1994 1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-
5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246, respectively, located
in Iloilo City. HCSEcI

The relevant facts are summarized as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint 2 before the
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B.
Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for
"annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of
adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous
owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his
name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them.
Petitioner and respondent Tiongco’s father were siblings, and both were among several heirs of
Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be
reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among the lawful heirs, and
that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.

To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be
annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546, 3 which covered
Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or
transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in the name of
Tiongco.

After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three separate
occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens. 4 All these
motions were denied. 5

On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision 6 dismissing petitioner’s
complaint and private respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner’s cause of
action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 7 on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco filed
a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis pendens 8 dated December 21, 1993; this was
denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994. 9 He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"
10 which was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994. 11 Displaying remarkable
tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration." 12 This time, however,
his arguments proved persuasive. In an Order 13 dated February 14, 1994, the respondent
judge ruled to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko v. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-
615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the
existence of a final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof" so
that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff’s appeal
and considering the finding of this Court that plaintiff’s action had already prescribed, which
finding is based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was registered
way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being reversed is quite remote if
not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco
based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the
ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the property who were alleged as formerly
paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant’s
ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much
less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was
declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at
all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small portion of subject lots consisting only a
total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens title
covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect
of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon further
review of the records, hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so
holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the
defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights,
if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This time, it was petitioner’s turn to seek reconsideration. 14 On March 4, 1994, the public
respondent issued an Order 15 reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the
notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.

Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration 16 against the Order dated
March 4, 1994. On March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this
petition, which is quoted hereunder:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had already
been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is not a
matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the appellate
court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-
5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct cancellation
of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which contains a total area
of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be
taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-
92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.

On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens. 17

Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari, alleging that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE
DOCUMENTS THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose
of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation. 18 The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result
of the litigation over said property. 19

Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, 21 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory
bases for a notice of lis pendens.

From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

a) An action to recover possession of real estate;

b) An action to quiet title thereto;

c) An action to remove clouds thereon;

d) An action for partition; andchanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof or the building thereon. 22

Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property
to put the property under the coverage of the rule. 23 It is not necessary for her to prove
ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pendens.

Whether as a matter of procedure 24 or substance, 25 the rule is that a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 26

The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.

Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto 27 that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma, 28 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . A last word. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter’s
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto
of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion
of the Appellate Court’s corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence
thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorari sought
against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no discernible special
and important reason for not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and guidance of
all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof . (Emphasis supplied)

Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy.

As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez, 29

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate
recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals, 30 Aleria v. Velez, 31 and
Tano v. Socrates. 32 Only the presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified a
disregard of the rule. 33

Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or
non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition
could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals 34 we ruled, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The notice of lis pendens — i.e., that real property is involved in an action — is ordinarily
recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an
incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is
intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they
so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of
such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered
by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal — like the
continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction — is not contingent
on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff’s appeal. It therefore had power to deal with
and resolve any incident in connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference
only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional
remedies. [Emphasis supplied]

Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and
would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of the
said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be incomplete
without a reference to the improper and unethical language employed by respondent Jose B.
Tiongco, who is also counsel for private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both
before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma,
"a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red, and
who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her
faulty grammar," 35 is impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive?" [T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the
readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco," 36 a retired police major described by respondent
Tiongco as Atty. Deguma’s "niño bonito," 37 "an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives
with plaintiff for being houseless" 38 who rents a place on the subject property sought to be
recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently an unmarried maiden of a certain age, is
variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready
to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard," 39 and a "horned spinster and man-hungry
virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and
injure defendant — if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior — the
deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections — who happens not to miss every
chance to laugh at her behind her back." 40 He claims that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the
Public Attorney’s Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that
"she happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over
her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no less than an IMDC
major — hoping to catch him by sheer brass and audacity." 41 In so doing, Atty. Deguma is
using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own benefit." 42 Respondent Tiongco predicts that
nothing good will come out of opposing counsel’s scheme since, quoting Voltaire, "outside of
virtue, ther’s (sic) no happiness." 43

Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal
darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he does
nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his reliance on the fool’s gold of gossip betrays
only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an object lesson
in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are
pertinent:chanrob1es virtua1 law library

CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL VOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
 x       x       x

Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before
the courts.

In Romero v. Valle, 44 we stated that a lawyer’s actuations," [a]lthough allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or
oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate language
invites the disciplinary authority of the court. 45 We are aghast at the facility with which
respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and her
counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, Et Al., 46 we dismissed as
totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner,
Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter’s superior at the Public Attorney’s Office, Atty.
Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience
in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui
auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.
47

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to

costs.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 27.

2. Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-38.

3. Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-40.

4. Annexes "D," "I" and "Q" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-46, 59-61 and 80, respectively.

5. Annexes "F," "K," "R" and "T" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 52, 67, 81-82 and 86, respectively.

6. Annex "U" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 87-97.

7. Annex "V" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 98.

8. Annex "W" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 99-101.

9. Annex "EE" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 144-146.

10. Annex "II" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 150-153.

11. Annex "JJ" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 156.

12. Annex "KK" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 157-165.

13. Annex "MM" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 171-172.

14. Annex "NN" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 173-182.

15. Annex "PP" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 185.

16. Annex "QQ" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 186-189; also Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, Annex "RR," pp. 190-195.

17. Rollo, pp. 202-205.

18. Tan v. Lantin, 142 SCRA 423, 425 (1986).

19. Villanueva v. Court of Appeal, 281 SCRA 298, 306 (1997); Yu v. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 509, 513 (1995),

20. Section 14. Notice of Lis Pendens. — In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in
his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the properly
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province
affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real
names.

21. Sec. 76. Notice of Lis Pendens. — No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet
title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other proceedings of
any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall
have any affect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein
the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to
the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.

22. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, supra. at 307; Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325, 330 (1990).

23. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, supra. at 311.

24. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13, Section 14.

Notices of Lis Pendens.

 x       x       x

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

25. PD 1529, Sec. 77.

Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.

26. Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 544, 549 (1998).

27. 156 SCRA 753, 766 (1987).

28. 172 SCRA 415, 423-424 (1989).

29. 217 SCRA 633, 651-652 (1993).

30. 301 SCRA 566, 569-570 (1999).

31. 298 SCRA 611, 618-619 (1998).

32. 278 SCRA 154, 172-174 (1997); see also Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 295
SCRA 27, 42 (1998).

33. See Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998) and Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, 292
SCRA 202 (1998)

34. 184 SCRA 325, 330-331 (1990).

35. Rollo, p. 214.

36. Rollo, pp. 220-221.

37. Rollo, p. 211.

38. Rollo, p. 112.

39. Rollo, p. 43.

40. Rollo, p. 44.

41. Rollo, p. 60.

42. Rollo, p. 48.

43. Rollo, p. 221.

44. 147 SCRA 197, 202 (1987), reiterated in People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 267 (1998).

45. E. PINEDA, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 92 (1995 ed.), citing Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA I (1970).

46. G.R. No. 133619, October 26, 1999.

47. "You title-tattlers, and those who listen to slander, by goodwill shall all be hanged — the
former by their tongues, the latter by their ears."

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.

GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto
"Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule
7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc.
(BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws2 and engaged in the
specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain
Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an
allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing
infection and making her ill in 2009.4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social
networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following
excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My
Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na
akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign
against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will
go down in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK
QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner
in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm)5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office
receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng
Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for
P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at
12:08pm)6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang,

histado ko na kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa
isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG

MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know
how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions....
(September 15 at 3:57pm)8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a
picket demonstration in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio
programs can kill the story when the next rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, 500
and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in front of the Belo
Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm)9

Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is
worth that much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo
trying to convince editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko na wala naman
akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung
gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect
your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa biktima
ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang
kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national
television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock
nevertheless by the fact that the much needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a
staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain permanently
disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE
FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)12

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be
taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng
Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)13
chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that
were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical
practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause,14 to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze
the operations of all her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her.
[So] far, good response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie
Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present
danger that surgeries like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by
[BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going wrong with the procedures
they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors,
they nearly killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on
patients. just recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in the
hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)17

Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in
Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set
already knows that she is not a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making
machines, dapat convert them into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the
vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am)19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all
too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has
become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be

gone for a week to a place where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles
if you want to find out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)21

Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO!
FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)22
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT
BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La
Salle-Ateneo lower batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU???
(September 23 at 1:50am)23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my
friends and comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends
already who have canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo Medical
Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at
2:12pm)24
chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened
complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof,25 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for
plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal
prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By October and
November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a
congressional inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery!
(September 22 at 11:31pm)26

Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo
after she gets convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its
criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt
augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms.
Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine
Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)28
chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar,
and disrespectful of women,29 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick
there nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm
sure marami kang 25-and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the
belo clinic there, can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August
10 at 12:23am)31

Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na
against me. to thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification
that i am so not like your type? at yung preferred ko lang
ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)32
chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort
money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his
Facebook post:33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko
lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34
chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire
public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort
the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter35 dated August 26, 2009,
complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense,36 respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-
guaranteed right to privacy,37 asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private
remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends
of which complainant was not a part.38 He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of
his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases
that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant.39 He denied that the remarks were vulgar
and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.40 He
likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand
letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case
for damages against her. 41 Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure
who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated,43 the parties were directed to file their
respective position papers.44 Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), set the case for clarificatory hearing.45 Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed
submitted for report/recommendation.46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation47 dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.48 It held
respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,49 Rule 8.01,50 and Rule 19.0151 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for having posted the above-quoted remarks on his Facebook
account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts,
considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the
IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of
Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign
against complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been established.52

In a Resolution53 dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,54 arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him
that would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases
filed against him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without prejudice, for
lack of jurisdiction.55

In a Resolution56 dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted
respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6) months
suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable based on the allegations of the verified
complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as
to the penalty imposed on respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly
vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In
defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on
his "private account"57 that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant
accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion
registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.58 Social media are web-based
platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content.
There are various classifications59 of social media platforms and one can be classified under the
"social networking sites" such as Facebook.60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x
x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and
photographs, with one another."61 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open
book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic
notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on
Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings.62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,63 the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg,
Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings,"
but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every
effort to protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof."64

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization
of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,
in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant,
which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer
evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to
protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive
evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto,
were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.66

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to
or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content
that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines
of privacy, in light of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook
friends.67
chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute
protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends.
The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook
friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."68 Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim
of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise
of his freedom of speech and expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute.69 While the freedom of expression and the right of
speech and of the press are among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution,
every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.70 As such, the constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and
BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and
reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio,
labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these
despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant.
He even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is
contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of
publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook
posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of
Professional Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it
in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of
an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and
rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is
exposed to criticism72 does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal
condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.73 In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls,
for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long
as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct
or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them."74 Accordingly, the
Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of

Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Dated October 25, 2009. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-12.
2
 Id. at 2.
3
 Id. at 3.
4
 Id.
5
 Id. at 13; emphases and italics supplied.
6
 Id. at 5 and 14; emphasis and italics supplied.
7
Id. at 15; emphasis and italics supplied.
8
 Id. at 16; emphases and italics supplied.
9
 Id. at 17; emphasis and italics supplied.
10
 Id. at 5 and 18; emphases and italics supplied.
11
 Id. at 19; emphases and italics supplied.
12
 Id. at 6 and 20; emphases and italics supplied.
13
 Id. at 21; emphases and italics supplied.
14
 Id. at 6.
15
 Id. at 22; emphasis and italics supplied.
16
 Id. at 23.
17
 Id. at 24.
18
 Id. at 25; emphasis and italic supplied.
19
 Id. at 26; emphasis and italics supplied.
20
 Id.; emphasis and italics supplied.
21
 Id. at 27; emphasis supplied.
22
 Id. at 28; emphasis supplied.
23
 Id.; emphasis and italics supplied
24
 Id. at 29; emphases supplied.
25
 Id. at 9.
26
 Id. at 30; emphasis supplied.
27
 Id. at 31; emphasis and italic supplied.
28
 Id. at 32; emphases supplied.
29
 Id. at 10.
30
 Id. at 33; italics supplied.
31
 Id. at 34; emphasis and italics supplied.
32
 Id. at 35; italics supplied.
33
 See id. at 10-11.
34
 Id. at 36; emphasis and italics supplied.
35
 Id. at 37-39.
36
 See Answer dated January 4, 2010; id. at 44-57.
37
 See id. at 44.
38
 See id. at 45-46.
39
 See id. at 55.
40
 Id. at 47-48.
41
 See id. at 49.
42
 Id. at 54.
43
 See Order dated January 28, 2011 issued by Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda; id. at 65-66.
44
 See Position Paper for complainant dated February 25, 2011 (id. at 67-88) and Respondent's
Position Paper dated February 28, 2011 (id. at 176-191 ).
45
 See Order dated April 13, 2011; id. at 213-214.
46
 See Order dated September 3, 2012; id. at 281.
47
 Signed by Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 329-331.
48
 Id. at 331.
49
 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
50
 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
51
 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
52
 Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 330-331.
53
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2014-637 issued by National Secretary
Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 328, including dorsal portion.
54
 Dated April 25, 2015. Id. at 332-343.
55
 See id. at 338-341.
56
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXII-2015-82 issued by Assistant National
Secretary Maria Angela N. Esquivel; id. at 366-367.
57
 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 44.
58
 Seth Fiegerman, Facebook is unstoppable, CNN Tech, July 27, 2016, available at <
money.cnn.com/2016/07/27/technology/facebook-earnings-high-expectations/ > (visited
November 10, 2016).
59
 Other classification of social media platforms are (1) blog and microblog sites
(Twitter,Tumblr); (2) content communities sites (YouTube, Instagram); (3) collaborative projects
(Wikipedia); (4 Virtual social worlds (Farmville); and (5) Virtual game-world (World of Warcraft).
See Government Social Research, Using social media for Social research: An introduction, May
2016, available at <
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524750/GSR_Soc
ial_Media_Research_Guidance_-_Using_social_media_for_social_research.pdf > (visited
October 28, 2016).
60
 Id.
61
H v. W, Case No. 12110142, In the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg, Republic of
South Africa, January 30, 2013. See also < http://www.saflii.org/za!cases/ZAGPJHC/2013/l.html
> (visited October 28, 2016).
62
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 117 (2014).
63
H v. W, supra note 61,
64
 Id., as cited in Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, 737
SCRA 92, 114.
65
Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, id. at 116.
66
 Id. at 118.
67
 Id. at 120-121, citations omitted.
68
 See id. at 121.
69
 See In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, 313 Phil 119, 163 (1995),
citing Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, 248 Phil 542, 579 (1988).
70
 Article 19 ofthe Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
chanrobleslaw
71
 See In Re Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT), per its First Vice-President, Mr. Vicente R. Samson, supra note 69, at 165.
72
 See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 183-185.
73
 See Habawel v. CTA, 672 Phil. 582, 596 (2011), citing In Re Alamcen v. Yaptinchay, G.R.
No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 580.
74
 Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 613 Phil. 352, 364-365 (2009).
 Adm. Case No. 6290 : July 14, 2004]

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-

TENORIO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a
former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the
latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself to
be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were
able to obtain a false marriage contract,1 which states that they were married on 10 February
1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila2 and the National Statistics Office
(NSO)3 prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of
marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel
Tenorio4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III.5 But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver
Tenorio6 and John Cedric Tenorio,7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely,
12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina
Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant
and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent
(1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar; (2) converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to the
filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24
January 2000 with the statement "Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's
illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of deceit,
she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12
February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil
Registry of Quezon City.8 Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman.

As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary,
it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the
pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department
of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of
Business Name.9 Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same
had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the
complainant with the words "Isang bala ka lang" on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant to
get even with her. She terminated complainant's employment after receiving numerous
complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of
processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise.
Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire
the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which
they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous
awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed
for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would submit a
Reply to respondent's Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The
parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as
the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.11

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office 12 where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a
Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card13 signed by the respondent as
Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that
respondent's husband even appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her
husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that
her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead
submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her
law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a
lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as
senior partners because they have investments in her law office.14

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February
1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not
registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and
authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the
place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.15

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda, the
complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly
realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of
facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by
the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of
cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and
Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior
partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr.," signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 - 20734, wherein
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the
provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack
of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the
respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San
Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be
dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and
adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,16 we declared:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed
accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case
by convincing evidence.17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof.
In Gerona v. Datingaling,18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 - A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding
one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law.19 Such acts constitute unauthorized
practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His wife,
the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal
profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners.
She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of
her law office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.20 That is a
blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the respondent
assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably,
the identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears the signature of the
respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.21

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's record as attorney in

this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, 19.

2
 Id., 9.

3
 Id., 10.

4
 Id., 5.

5
 Id., 6.

6
 Id., 7.

7
 Id., 8.

8
 Id., 36.
9
 Rollo, 37.

10
 Id., 38.

11
 Rollo, 130.

12
 Id., 104.

13
 Id., 106.

14
 TSN, 30 October 2000, 1-66.

15
 TSN, 30 October 2000, 1-66.

16
 Adm. Case No. 2884, 349 Phil. 7, 15-16 (1998).

17
 Adarne v. Aldaba, Adm. Case No. 801, 27 June 1978, 83 SCRA 734.

18
 Adm. Case No. 4801, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 148.

19
 See Ruben E. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 75 (1st ed. 1991)
(hereafter Agpalo).

20
 TSN, 30 October 2000, 52.

21
 Agpalo, 69, 78.
 A.C. No. 12415, March 05, 2019

JUSTICE FERNANDA LAMPAS-PERALTA, JUSTICE STEPHEN C. CRUZ, AND JUSTICE

RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO, COMPLAINANTS, v. ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a Joint Complaint-Affidavit1 for disbarment filed by Court of Appeals (CA) Associate

Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, Chairperson of the Sixth Division, Stephen C. Cruz, Senior
Member of the Fifth Division, and Ramon Paul L. Hernando, then Junior Member of the Fifth
Division, now a member of this Court (complainants), against Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
(respondent), a member of the bar, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission).

The Antecedents

On March 4, 2016, it came to the knowledge of complainants that a certain Maria Rossan De
Jesus (De Jesus) went to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court of the CA Fifth Division to
ascertain the veracity and authenticity of a Decision2 purportedly written by complainants in a
criminal case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Tirso Fajardo y Delos Trino," and docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 08005.

In the said decision, complainants allegedly ordered the acquittal of Tirso Fajardo (Fajardo),
cousin of De Jesus, for the crime of violation of Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165.3 The said decision was given to De Jesus by respondent, who was their counsel, to serve
as proof that Fajardo had been acquitted. Respondent is a law practitioner, who was admitted to
the bar on May 4, 2004 with Roll No. 49050. However, respondent informed De Jesus that the
promulgation of the said decision would supposedly depend on the payment of a large sum of
money to respondent.

Complainants checked the cases assigned to them and discovered that the said criminal case
of Fajardo was still in the completion stage and was assigned to former CA Associate Justice
Noel G. Tijam,4 who was then a member of the CA Fourth Division.5 This was affirmed by the
CA Clerk of Court's Certification.6

On March 9, 2016, complainants learned through a newspaper item and television news
program that on March 8, 2016, an entrapment operation was conducted by the members of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent, where she was caught red-handed
receiving marked money from Carlos Aquino (Aquino), a friend of Fajardo, for the issuance of
the aforementioned fake decision. Complainants also learned that the NBI filed a Criminal
Complaint7 against respondent and a certain Alex Rowales before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila for the crimes of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, and falsification
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The complaint stated that:

Complainants alleged that on December 16, 2015[,] [respondent] was engaged by MS.
RAYMUNDA FAJARDO to appeal the decision of the Makati RTC convicting her son TIRSO
DELOS TRINO FAJARDO for violation of R.A. [No.] 9165. From said date until March 2, 2016[,]
[respondent] allegedly repeatedly asked for money which eventually reached the total amount of
about one million pesos purportedly for legal fees and representation expenses. On March 2,
2016[,] Complainants, who are the cousin and best friend, respectively, of TIRSO FAJARDO,
met with [respondent] and one ALEX ROWALES whom [respondent] introduced as a Sheriff of
the Court of Appeals and who showed to them a purported DECISION of the Court of Appeals
dated February 19, 2016[,] acquitting TIRSO FAJARDO and they asked for [P]150,000.00 to
hasten the release of the purported decision and the eventual release of TIRSO FAJARDO.
Complainants first paid half of the demanded amount and verified the purported decision[,]
which they discovered to be fake. They then reported the matter to the NBI Anti-Fraud
Division[,] which then planned an entrapment operation.

On March 8, 2016 at about 12:15 o'clock in the afternoon, the undersigned Agents, together
with the Complainants, conducted an entrapment operation and proceeded to Jollibee
Restaurant, Kalaw Ave., Ermita, Manila[,] where Complainants and Subjects agreed to meet[,]
where Complainants are to deliver the balance of [P]75,000.00

As instructed, complainant DE JESUS occupied a table nearest the comer of Kalaw and Orosa
by the glass walls x x x. At about 12:30 pm[,] [respondent] arrived at the table with some food
and proceeded to eat while conversing with DE JESUS. After a few minutes, Complainant
AQUINO arrived and after conversing with [respondent], he handed the marked money
contained in a brown envelope to [respondent][,] who then received the envelope and placed it
[in front of her]. After conversing some more, Complainants and [respondent] stood up holding
the brown envelope with the marked money.

At this juncture, Subject was immediately arrested and the marked money was recovered. x x x8
Thus, complainants filed the present administrative complaint alleging that respondent should
be disbarred due to the following reasons: for representing herself as a lawyer who can
influence Justices of the Court of Appeals to secure the acquittal of an accused; for defrauding
the relatives of accused Fajardo to amass a large amount of money in the total amount of
P1,000,000.00; for utter show of disrespect to complainants, the Court, and the Judiciary as a
whole; and for committing the crimes of estafa and falsification.

Respondent did not submit any answer in spite of receipt of the order from the IBP Commission.
She also failed to appear at the mandatory conference despite due notice.9 Only complainants
submitted their Joint Position Paper10 dated July 27, 2016, to the IBP Commission.

IBP Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation11 dated September 26, 2016, the IBP Commission
recommended that respondent be disbarred as a lawyer for committing acts that were in
violation of her sworn duties as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code),
and for unreasonably involving the Justices in the incident to their damage and prejudice.

In its Resolution12 dated November 28, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted
the findings of fact and recommendation of the IBP Commission imposing a penalty of
disbarment against respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Commission and the recommendation of the IBP
Board.

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all
their dealings. Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best
of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and
to delay no man for money or malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers
with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship. 13

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.14 However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the bar, the Court have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily
prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence.15

The Lawyer's Oath requires every lawyer to "support the Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein" and to "do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court."16 To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to
respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires
respect and obedience to the law on the part of the public.17 Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code states:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
On the other hand, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 obliges every lawyer to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, to wit:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Further, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 mandates every lawyer to observe candor,
fairness, and good faith, viz.:

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

RULE 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

RULE 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

RULE 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

Respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code; Grave misconduct

The Court finds that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and several canons and rules of the
Code. She represented to De Jesus and Aquino that she could secure the acquittal of Fajardo
and even used the names of the Associate Justices to accomplish her ill motives.

Respondent also defrauded her clients by drafting a fake, spurious, and sham decision
regarding the purported acquittal of Fajardo. She placed the names of complainants in the fake
decision even though the criminal case of Fajardo was raffled in a different division and
assigned to a different Associate Justice. Glaringly, she discredited and disrespected members
of the judiciary by wrongfully involving complainants' names in her fraudulent scheme. She also
maliciously represented to her clients that she can influence Associate Justices of the CA to
ensure the acquittal of an accused.

Further, respondent exacted exorbitant fees from her clients, in the amount of P1,000,000.00
more or less, as evidenced by receipts she signed.18 In her ultimate desire to extort more money
from Fajardo's relatives, she presented the fake decision of acquittal and asserted that the
promulgation of the said decision would allegedly depend on the payment of a large sum of
money to respondent.
Through the operation of the NBI, respondent was arrested in an entrapment operation when
she received the marked money from Aquino for the purported decision of acquittal.
Respondent's arrest and modus operandi were even broadcasted in television and published in
the newspaper, causing further shame, disrepute, and disgrace to the legal profession.

Respondent was given an opportunity to controvert the allegations against her, however, she
neither filed her answer nor attended the mandatory conference in the IBP Commission.

Verily, the acts exhibited by respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath. Her acts are also contrary
to Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules 1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 because
respondent violated the laws, particularly Articles 172 and 315, par. 2 of the RPC, tarnished the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and committed falsehood and deceit against her
clients and the courts.

Respondent's acts also constitute grave misconduct. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.19 Corruption,
as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.20

Doubtless, respondent had a clear intent to violate the law when she fraudulently drafted a fake
decision of the CA, falsely including therein the names of complainants, and presenting it to her
clients for monetary consideration. These acts show respondent's wanton disregard of the law
and a patent propensity to trample upon the canons of the Code. Hence, respondent should
also be held administratively guilty for grave misconduct.

Proper penalty

The Court finds that complainants have established by substantial evidence that respondent: (1)
drafted a fake decision of the CA acquitting Fajardo; (2) falsely and shamelessly included the
names of complainants in the fake decision even though the criminal case was raffled to
another division and handled by a different Justice; (3) maliciously represented that she can
influence Associate Justices of the CA to acquit an accused; (4) fraudulently presented this fake
decision to her clients in exchange for a hefty monetary consideration; (5) exacted exorbitant
fees from her clients in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and (6) was caught red-handed by the
NBI operatives when she received the marked money from her client for the fake decision of the
CA. As discussed above, these acts constitute violations of the Lawyer's Oath, and Canons 1,
7, and 10, and Rules 1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and  10.03 of the Code. Respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct because her transgression showed her clear intent to violate the law
and disregard the Code.

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.21 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
In Taday v. Atty. Apoya, Jr.,22 the Court disbarred a lawyer for authoring a fake court decision,
which was considered a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. The lawyer therein even
delivered and misrepresented the fake decision to his client. The Court held that the lawyer
"committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] and deceitful conduct, and lessened the confidence
of the public in the legal system."23

In Billanes v. Atty. Latido,24 the Court also disbarred a lawyer for manufacturing a fake decision
in an annulment case. The lawyer therein violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code because
there existed substantial evidence that he procured the spurious decision, which caused great
prejudice to his client.

In fine, respondent's acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are both
disgraceful and dishonorable; these reveal a moral flaw that makes her unfit to practice law. She
has tarnished the image of the legal profession and has lessened the public faith in the
Judiciary. Instead of being an advocate of justice, she became a perpetrator of injustice. The
ultimate penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon respondent. Her name should be stricken
off immediately and without reservation in the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath,
Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules 1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Grave Misconduct. For reasons above stated, she
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately, without prejudice to the civil or criminal cases pending and/or to be filed
against her.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon's records. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J.
Reyes, Jr., and Carandang, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., No part. Spouse is a complainant.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., No part.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 5, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on March 25, 2019 at 8:57 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
  Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-9.
2
 Id. at 10-28.
3
 Also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
4
 He is also a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
5
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
6
 Id. at 31.
7
 Id. at 32-34.
8
 Id. at 33.
9
 Id. at 161.
10
 Id. at 92-100.
11
 Id. at 161-163.
12
 Id. at 159-160.
13
Luna v. Atty. Galarrita, 763 Phil. 175, 184 (2015).
14
Velasco v. Atty. Doroin, et al., 582 Phil. 1, 9 (2008).
15
Goopio v. Maglalang, A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018.
16
 See Lawyer's Oath.
17
Jimenez v. Atty. Francisco, 749 Phil. 551, 565 (2014).
18
Rollo, pp. 135-140.
19
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar, 685 Phil. 272, 286-287 (2012).
20
Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 608 (2011).
21
Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, 777 Phil. 1, 14 (2016).
22
 A.C. No. 11981, July 3, 2018.
23
 Id.
24
 A.C. No. 12066, August 28, 2018.

A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019

AMALIA R. CENIZA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The abandonment by an attorney of his legitimate family in order to cohabit with a married
woman constitutes gross immorality that wan-ants his disbarment.1

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the complainant's letter-complaint denouncing
the immoral conduct committed by her husband, a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.2 She submitted therewith her affidavit detailing the grounds for her denunciation.3

The complainant stated that she and the respondent were married on November 12, 1989 at the
Sacred Heart Parish in Cebu City; that in time they had two children, Marie Agnes (Agnes) and
Christopher Chuck;4 that on April 21, 2008, he told her that he would be attending a seminar in
Manila, but because she had some business to attend to in General Santos City, he seemingly
agreed to her request to forego with his trip to Manila, and that upon her return from General
Santos City on April 26, 2008, however, he had already moved out of their home, taking along
with him his car and personal belongings.

On May 23, 2008, the complainant went to the Mandaue City Hall where the respondent worked
as a legal officer in order to inquire about his situation. She learned from members of his staff
that they had suspected him of carrying on an extra-marital affair with one Anna Fe Flores
Binoya (Anna). On the next day, the complainant, accompanied by her daughter and a nephew,
went to the address provided by the staff to verify the information. They were able to meet
Anna's sister who informed them that she had moved out of their address; that Anna and her
second husband, Atty. Eliseo Ceniza, Jr., the herein respondent, had been living together in
Aldea Subdivision; and that in the evening of said date the complainant and her daughter
proceeded to the new address where they found and confronted the respondent, who simply
denied having committed any wrongdoing.

On July 9, 2008, the respondent commenced a civil action seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with the complainant,5 alleging her psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the
Family Code.

On August 11, 2008, the respondent visited the complainant at work and requested her to agree
to the nullification of their marriage. She refused and instead pleaded with him to avoid
displaying his paramour in public. Her pleas notwithstanding, he continued with the illicit
relationship.

On November 18, 2008, the complainant brought a complaint for immorality against the
respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB-V-A-10-0345-G).

On April 2, 2009, the complainant sent a letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo alleging therein
that her husband had abandoned her and their children in order to live with another woman.

On May 18, 2009, the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the President forwarded the
complainant's letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).6 In
due course, the OBC directed the respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

On October 26, 2009, the respondent filed his comment,7 wherein he denied having engaged in
immoral conduct and maintained that Anna had only been a business partner. He insisted that
he had moved in with his parents after leaving their family home; and that he had left the
complainant because her behavior had become unbearable.

In the meantime, on August 5, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its decision in OMB-
V-A-10-0345-G,8 in which it found the respondent guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for
having an extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which required that:

.... all public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with
patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.9

The Office of the Ombudsman disposed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding

respondent ELISEO B. CENIZA guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The said
respondent is hereby meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from the service for a period of SIX
(6) MONTHS without pay with a stern warning that subsequent violations of similar nature will
be dealt with a more severe penalty.10

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman.11
 Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 7, 2010, Commissioner Salvador Hababag of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), to which the complaint against the respondent had
been referred for investigation, submitted his findings and recommended the dismissal of the
complaint, opining that the respondent be cautioned to be more circumspect in his actuations to
avoid the impression of committing immorality.

Commissioner Hababag rendered the following observations, to wit:

The issue is whether or not respondent is guilty of immorality in his relationship with Anna Fe
Binoya.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.

To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency. (Emma T. Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes A.C. No.
6486 September 22, 2004).

Upon the other hand good moral character is a requirement not only upon one's application for
admission but it is rather a continuing requirement even after admission for the enjoyment of the
privilege to practice. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. (Boyong vs.
Oblema, 7 SCRA 859).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the

administrative suit be dismissed but with WARNING to the respondent to be more circumspect
in his actuation to avoid the impression of committing immorality.12

On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution No. XX-2013-148
adopting the recommendation of Commissioner Hababag,13 to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A,"
and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED. However, the Warning imposed against
respondent is hereby ordered deleted.

On February 26, 2014, the case was considered closed and terminated for failure of the
complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by petition for review.14

On June 4, 2014, however, the complainant transmitted a letter of appeal vis-à-vis the resolution
of February 26, 2014, attaching thereto her motion for reconsideration.14
Thereupon, the Court referred the case to the OBC for report and evaluation.

Upon the recommendation of the OBC,15 the Court set aside its resolution of February 26, 2014,
and required the respondent to comment on the complainant's motion for reconsideration. 16

On February 23, 2016, the Court promulgated a resolution referring the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.17

On March 1, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2017-889 denying
the motion for reconsideration.

Issue

Should the respondent be disciplined for the actions attributed to him by the complainant?

Ruling of the Court

We disagree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors for the dismissal of the
charge of immorality.

It appears to us that Commissioner Hababag utterly failed to conscientiously discharge his

responsibility as the factfinder; and that he also did not properly appreciate the facts in relation
to the relevant laws and the canons of ethics. All that he accomplished was to rehash the
principles of law that he believed were applicable, but without calibrating such principles to
whatever facts were found by him to be established. He did not even explain why the principles
were relevant to the case of the respondent. Such nonchalant discharge of the responsibility of
fact-finding was almost perfunctory, certainly lackluster, and bereft of the requisite enthusiasm.
What makes it worse for the timid, if not lethargic, recommendation was the unquestioning
affirmance by the IBP Board of Governors, which seemingly failed to even notice the glaring
inadequacy.

For sure, the finding of insufficient evidence against the respondent was unwarranted. He had
not even put forward anything of substance in his defense. He had been content with merely
denying the imputed wrongdoing, but his denial did not disprove the substantial evidence
adduced against him. He had been sufficiently shown to have abandoned his legitimate spouse
and family in order to live with a married woman.

The findings made by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case brought against
the respondent more than sufficed to show his immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up
to the legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In this regard, we adopt and reiterate the apt
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:

Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with Binoya. He insists that
complainant's accusation that he was having an affair with Binoya was purely speculative and
unsupported by evidence.

Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their daughter, Marie Agnes ("Marie"),
but also of two others, namely: Roberto Joseph Galvan ("Galvan") and Gabriel Jadraque
("Jadraque").

Marie declared, in part, that:

9. That we found out on May 24, that he had another woman named Anna Fe Flores Binoya,
and he was currently living with her in Block 11, Lot 27, Aldea Subd., Timpolok, Lapulapu City.

10. That I was there in Umapad dump site when I met Myrna Flores, Ann's mother, Ann and
Ann's daughter. She tried to deny her relationship with my father, but just a few minutes after, I
heard her three aunts tell us that she had a new husband. She identified the new husband as
Atty. Eliseo B. Ceniza, Jr.

Meanwhile, Galvan alleged that:

2. That I have been living at Aldea Buena Subdivision, Timpolok, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City since
February 2005;

3. That I regularly stroll in our subdivision on board my bicycle or motorcycle with my kids;

4. That on several occasions in the month of December 2008 and January 2009, I saw the black
Honda care (sic) with plate no. YDX 692 or sometimes the red Toyota Corolla care (sic) with
plate no. GEJ 877 belonging to ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR., parked in front of the house
located on Block 11 Lot 27 of Aldea Buena Subdivision;

5. That more particularly, I have seen these vehicles parked for long periods of time and in
some days overnight at the said place;

6. That on December 22, 2008 at around 8:00 PM, I personally saw ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA,
JR. taking dinner, half-naked, facing the table in the above-mentioned house together with a
woman whom I later identified as ANN FLORES from the picture that AMALIA R. CENIZA
showed me;

7. That I saw them again inside the house on December 23, 2008 at around nine o'clock in the
morning up to past twelve o'clock noontime;

Finally, Jadraque averred that:

That sometime on the first week of January 2009, Mrs. Amalia R[.] Ceniza approached me and
sought assistance to conduct a surveillance of her husband's activities.

That Mrs. Ceniza provided me information that her husband has a girlfriend who is residing at
blk 11, lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD. [,] Timpolok[,] Lapu-Lapu City Cebu, which she also
believed that her husband frequently slept there at night and most of the time uses their car a
RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877;

That on the nineth(sic) of January Mrs. Ceniza contacted me thru my mobile phone that the
classes of her daughter will end at 6:30 in the afternoon at Cebu Doctor's College at Mandaue
City and her husband will be the one to pick up and brought [her] home.

That at about 6:00 in the afternoon that day[,] I went ahead with a videocam with me in Blk 11,
Lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD.[,] Timpolok[,] Lapu-lapu City and strategically positioned myself
in order to observed(sic) the place and the activities of the people in the surroundings;

That few minutes after I saw a RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877 approaching the place
this time I remembered the car mentioned by Mrs. Ceniza that [was] frequently driven by her
husband, so I immediately turn[ed] on the video cam, and while the tape is running[,] I saw the
RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 parked in front of the house #27[,] at the same time[,] I
saw one lady [who] went out from the house and proceeded to the gate and unlocked it then
she went back inside the house;

That a moment after, one man went out from the driver aside of the RED TOYOTA with LTO
Plate # GEJ-877 wearing white T-shirt and proceeded to the house # 27, he opened the gate[,]
went inside, then he locked it and proceeded to the main door of the house where the lady who
unlocked the gate waited near the main door;

(sic) That later[,] I identify (sic) the man who went out form the RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate
GEJ-877 and proceeded to the house #27 as ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA JR.

Complainant likewise proffered photographs proving her claim that respondent frequents
Binoya's house, as well as, proofs that the place which her husband visits was indeed owned by
Binoya. Complainant also adduced evidence to the effect that facts of marriage appear in the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cebu City, between Binoya and a certain Ebrahaim Angeles
Yap who were married on 18 October 2002 at Al Khariah Mosque, San Nicolas, Mambaling,
Cebu City. The corresponding Certificate of Marriage was likewise submitted.

Vis-à-vis complainant's overwhelming allegations, respondent offered only self-serving denials.

It is elementary that denials are weak especially if unsupported by evidence. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility.

It bears stressing that aside from his general claim that complainant only wanted to destroy his
reputation and that the instant complaint is purely a vendetta on her part, respondent did not
even attempt to present countervailing evidence to substantiate his bare allegations.

No less than respondent's own daughter, Marie Agnes, spoke her piece about the nature of her
father's association with Binoya. His daughter is a budding teen-ager and has already attained a
certain level of maturity to understand the dynamics of the relationship of her parents.

Moreover, the photographs and declarations of Galvan and Jadraque negate respondent's
assertion that he merely visits Binoya as a business associate. His vehicles were seen in front
of Binoya's house for long periods of time and in some days, on overnight stays. He was also
seen in Binoya's house half-naked while having a meal. Under the prevailing circumstances,
these cannot be deemed as actuations of a business partner or the usual business meetings as
respondent insists.

It is true that complainant was unable to present photograph/s of respondent and Binoya
together. Still, from the foregoing, she has given several pieces of evidence which yield the
unmistakable conclusion that respondent and Binoya are having an illicit affair. Under the
present scheme of things, these circumstances meet the requirement of substantial evidence in
administrative proceedings. In the extant case, there is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that respondent and Binoya are
engaged in an illicit relationship.

We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a 'He said – She said' version.
However, complainant was able to build her case against respondent. As afore-discussed,
complainant presented evidence to support her claims. There were documentary evidence and
affidavits proving, to the best of her ability, her accusations against respondent."19

The CA upheld the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, observing as follows:20

Petitioner [Atty. Ceniza] maintains that the insinuations and accusations that he is having a
relationship with Anna Fe Binoya is unfounded and baseless. Petitioner claims that he had a
friendly relationship with the family of Anna Fe, and that they are far from being intimate.
Petitioner contends that public respondent based its findings purely on circumstantial evidence.
Petitioner emphasizes that not even a picture of him and Anna Fe was ever presented. Instead,
the circumstantial evidence relied upon by public respondent at most would only prove that
indeed the petitioner visited Anna Fe at her residence. A grave charge of disgraceful and
immoral conduct according to petitioner requires direct and competent evidence which is absent
in the extant case.

Petitioner's protestations fail to persuade. Evidence on record is awash of the immoral and
disgraceful conduct of petitioner. We find no reason therefore to disturb the findings of public
respondent that petitioner is guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.

xxxx

In the face of the evidence presented by private respondent, the bare denial and self-serving
statements of petitioner crumble. The positive and categorical assertions of private respondent
and the uncontradicted statements of the witnesses that they saw petitioner staying overnight at
Anna Fe's house on numerous occasions, have sufficiently established the administrative
liability of petitioner. They reasonably and logically lead to the conclusion that petitioner was
intimately and scandalously involved with Anna Fe. In fact, petitioner even admitted having
visited Anna Fe's home several times but claimed that Anna Fe is her distant relative and client.
If this was so, petitioner could have presented proof showing his business transaction with Anna
Fe. Also, petitioner's claim that Anna Fe is his distant blood relative is wanting of any evidence.
Nonetheless, if petitioner and Anna Fe are indeed relatives, this fact would not help prove
petitioner's innocence from the charge of immoral conduct. Rather, it would only make
petitioner's actions appear more scandalous and distasteful and would only tend to validate
petitioner's inclination to thoughtless indiscretions.

Also quite untenable is petitioner's protestation that the evidence presented would prove at most
his causal visits to his friend and relative Anna Fe. In his vain attempt for absolution, petitioner
pointed out that neither a single photograph of him and Anna Fe going out together was ever
presented nor even an allegation that they were seen holding hands or that they had a 'friendly
kiss, or beso-beso'.

It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with
another person of the opposite sex other than his or her spouse. In the context of and during
such an illicit affair, acts which are otherwise morally acceptable (such as having lunch or
dinner, working overtime or watching a movie together) become tainted with immorality when
done by a married man or woman with a person not his or her spouse. These otherwise
innocent acts (like petitioner's casual visits to Anna Fe's house and his overnight stays) are
deemed unclean because they are done in furtherance of and in connection with something
immoral.

Moreover, immorality is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.

The Court will not deviate from the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as fully affirmed by
the CA.

The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standards of morality because
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

There is no question that a married person's abandonment of his or her spouse in order to live
and cohabit with another constitutes immorality. The offense may even be criminal – either as
concubinage or as adultery Immoral conduct, or immorality, is that which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. As a basis of disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so
corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.21 That the illicit partner is himself or herself married compounds the
immorality.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The Court will
exercise its disciplining authority only if the case against the respondent is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of
disbarment, only a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the imposition of the harsh penalty
of disbarment. 22 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is,
as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means evidence that is
more convincing as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.23

Herein, the complainant presented clearly preponderant evidence showing that the respondent,
while being lawfully married to her, had maintained an illicit relationship with a married woman.
It is of no moment that she presented no direct evidence of the illicit relationship between him
and his mistress; or that her proof of his immorality was circumstantial. Direct evidence is that
evidence which proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn
on the part of the factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which indirectly proves a
fact in issue; the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial
evidence.24 The lack of direct evidence should not obstruct the adjudication of a dispute, for
circumstantial evidence may be available for the purpose. The Rules of Court has really made
no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a may be inferred.25 Thus, for the respondent to insist that the complainant did not
discharge her burden of proof because she did not adduce direct evidence of the immorality is
utterly fallacious. As the records amply indicated, the circumstantial evidence adduced herein
compelled the conclusion that he had abandoned the complainant and their children in order to
cohabit with his married mistress.

Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or morality of a member of the
Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he or she denies the charge, for he or she must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge. He or she must present proof that
he or she still maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of him or her at all
times.26 The respondent failed in this regard.

In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every lawyer, the respondent
should have desisted from the illicit relationship with his mistress, and should have avoided the
impression on the part of the public that he was defying the moral standards required of
him.27 His leaving his wife and family to cohabit with his married mistress definitely transgressed
the clearly-defined bounds of decency and morality. His transgression inflicted on his wife and
children a lot of suffering, including depression, as borne out by one child's attempt at suicide
out of despair for what he had caused to their family. These circumstances were more than
sufficient to establish the charge of gross immorality.

That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private life did not diminish the
gravity of his ethical violation. In Advincula v. Advincula,28 we have exhorted all lawyers to
always conduct themselves in a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that they are flouting the moral standards of the legal profession, thusly:

.... it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good
moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the
misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her
lack of moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.29 Every lawyer is expected to be
honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the laws in his private life
cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.30

In view of the foregoing, the respondent's immoral conduct violated  Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We now deal with the penalty to be imposed.

In Narag v. Narag,31 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for abandoning his family and
living with his paramour. In Dantes v. Dantes,32 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for
having maintained two illicit relationships, thereby not keeping up with the strict requirements of
law for the continued practice of the noble profession. In Bustamante-
Alejandro v. Alejandro,33 disbarment was also imposed on the respondent who had abandoned
his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, in Guevarra v.
Eala,34 disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a
married woman while he was also married.

By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the respondent showed that he did
not possess the requisite good moral character needed for the continued practice of law. He
deserves the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA,

JR. guilty of gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; DISBARS him from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this decision;
and ORDERS his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

Furnish a copy of this decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr.,  Hernando,
Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on June 18, 2019 at 10:55 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
2
 Id.
3
 Id. at 6.
4
 Id. at 6.
5
Rollo, pp. 24-29.
6
 Id. at 45.
7
 Id. at 110-117.
8
 Id. at 429-451.
9
 Id. at 449.
10
 Id. at 450.
11
 Id. at 499-514.
12
Rollo, p. 923.
13
 Id. at. 367.
14
 Id. at 371.
14
 Rollo, pp. 520-521.
15
 Id. at 478-490.
16
 Id. at 491.
17
 Id. at 517.
19
Rollo, pp. 443-448.
20
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB- SP No. 06367, May 12, 2015, pp. 509-512.
21
Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 237, 248.
22
Cawaling v. Menese, A.C. No. 9698, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 304, 313-314.
23
Castro v. Bigay, Jr., A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 274, 280.
24
 Gardner, Criminal Evidence, Principles, Cases and Readings, West Publishing Co., 1978 ed.,
p. 124.
25
 See People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 104497, January 18, 1995, 240 SCRA 191, 198-199;
citing Robinson v. State, 18 Md. App. 678, 308 A2d 734 (1973).
26
Fabie v. Real, A.C. No. 10574, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 388, 397.
27
Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 237, 248.
28
 Id. at 247-248.
29
Manaois v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5364, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 359, 363.
30
Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, A.C. No. 4256, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 532.
31
 A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451.
32
 A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582.
33
 A.C. No. 4256, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 533.
34
 A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I fully agree with the majority that respondent Atty. Eliseo B. Ceniza, Jr. should be disbarred. I
have in previous cases been of the opinion that immorality should not be a ground for
disbarment. Here, however, the Complaint was filed by his wife, Amalia R. Ceniza. Complainant
alleged that respondent "abandoned his family to cohabit with a married woman."1

In my dissent in Matudan v. Republic,2 a nullity of marriage case, I opined that the law should
"not [be] a burden that unreasonably interferes with individual choices of intimate
arrangements."3 I stated that “[t]he choice to stay in or leave a marriage is not for this Court, or
the State, to make."4 I maintain this position on marriage and the private relation of parties,
where the State generally does not interfere. However, this Court should act on complaints filed
by the intimate partners of misbehaving lawyers.

Morality may either be religious or secular.5 In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera,6 this Court ruled that
the determination of whether conduct is immoral must be measured by a secular standard.7 We
neither have the authority nor the competence to declare that certain acts violate religious
doctrine.8 Our mandate in disciplining lawyers concerns "only insofar as it involves conduct that
affects the public or its interest."9
In my separate opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala,10 I proposed these guidelines in
resolving disciplinary proceedings invoking immorality as a ground for disbarment:

If at all, any complaint for immorality should not be entertained except when it is

commenced by its victims. That is, the betrayed spouse, the paramour who has been misled,
or the children who have to live with the parent's scandalous indiscretions.

I accept that in some cases, especially where there is some form of violence against women
and children within the families affected, it would be difficult for the victims to come forward. It
should only be then that a third party's complaint may be entertained. The third party must show
that it acts for the benefit of the victims, not as a means to cause more harm on them.
Furthermore, the inability of the victims must be pleaded and proven.

In my separate opinion in Tuvillo v. Laron, I concurred with the dismissal of a judge for
immorality and gross misconduct based on the complaint of the parties directly affected — the
mistress and her husband. In Perfecto v. Esidera, this Court through my ponencia, did not
sanction a judge for immorality based on the complaint of a third person. She was suspended
for violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she knowingly contracted
a marriage before a solemnizing officer who had no license to do so. I remain consistent in my
view that immorality, as basis for administrative complaints, cannot be based on religious
grounds:

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral
conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce
the public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court
decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court's supervision. At best,
religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.

I appreciate the ponente's acknowledgment that "immorality only becomes a valid ground for

sanctioning members of the Judiciary when the questioned act challenges his or her capacity to
dispense justice." This affirms this Court's principle that our jurisdiction over acts of lawyers and
judges is confined to those that may affect the people's confidence in the Rule of Law. There
can be no immorality committed when there are no victims who complain. And even when they
do, it must be shown that they were directly damaged by the immoral acts and their rights
violated. A judge having children with women not his wife, in itself, does not affect his ability to
dispense justice. What it does is offend this country's predominantly religious
sensibilities.11 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)  

Accordingly, in my dissent in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo,12 where the complainant paramour did not

raise immorality, I disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the "arrangement" forged by the
lawyer, his wife, and the paramour was immoral. There was no victim wronged who complained
of immorality. The grounds for disbarment were anchored on allegations of physical and
psychological abuse. I opined that, by itself, the majority's finding that the children were living
with the lawyer and the paramour was not immoral:

I fail to see what scandalous circumstances were present here. The "arrangement" where
respondent's two (2) children stayed with complainant and respondent in their condominium
unit, as explicitly intended by the children's mother, is neither scandalous nor immoral. Save for
respondent's supposedly abusive behavior toward complainant, they were living in harmony.
There was no evidence of hostility between [the paramour] and the children's mother.

....

Thus, I cannot agree with the Investigating Commissioner's finding that "while respondent has
an 'arrangement' with his legal spouse with whom he has two children, who stays with him and
complainant, the same does not make the illicit relationship morally upright."

The Resolution, meanwhile, expressed that "this Court is appalled by respondent's brazen
attitude in admitting his sexual relationship with a woman, other than his wife, in full knowledge
and recognition of his minor daughters as if there was nothing unconventional about their
situation."

Deeming an amicable arrangement outside of marriage as immoral is a view that no longer

keeps in step with the times.13 (Citations omitted)

This case, however, is different.

Here, the complainants are parties directly affected by respondent's conduct: his wife, backed
by his daughter's testimony. Respondent's office staff in Mandaue City Hall reported his
indiscretions to complainant.14 Complainant had to beg respondent to keep his indiscretions
under wraps when he instituted a complaint for nullity of their marriage, but to no avail.15 Their
teenage16 daughter, Marie Agnes Ceniza, herself heard from the paramour's three (3) aunts that
her father was the paramour's "new husband."17 All these demonstrate respondent's
callousness, utter lack of consideration, and his sheer indifference to public opinion. This is
immoral conduct that is "so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the [r]ule of [l]aw."18

Furthermore, respondent's children wrote letters pleading for his affection. One (1) of them
attempted suicide due to depression over their family's suffering.19 Yet, despite the pain he has
caused his own family, respondent exhibited no remorse and insisted his innocence through
merely unsubstantiated denials.

In my separate opinion in Dagala, I proposed that:

The highest penalty should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are
repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on
existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law. The
negligence or utter lack of callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their
inability to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate relationships, or
their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock should be aggravating and considered
for the penalty to be imposed.20 (Emphasis in the original)

The findings show that not only is there a prima facie evidence that respondent violated the law;
the Office of the Ombudsman, based on the same facts, also convicted him for violating
Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,
and for committing disgraceful and immoral conduct.21

Respondent's lack of empathy and compassion is palpable. He has displayed no iota of human
understanding especially for those he should have loved and protected. I see no redeeming
character that will convince me that he deserves to be a lawyer who can do justice.

Respondent is unfit to be a member of the bar. He must be disbarred from the practice of law.  

ACCORDINGLY, I concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Ponencia, p. 1.
2
 799 Phil. 449 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
3
 J. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, 799 Phil. 449, 481 (2016) [Per J. Del
Castillo, Second Division].
4
 Id.
5
See Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
6
 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
7
 Id. at 398.
8
 Id. at 399.
9
 Id.
10
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 12 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
11
 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, July 25,
2017, 832 SCRA 12, 74-76 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
12
 A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
13
 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo, A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018
10 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
14
 Ponencia, p. 2.
15
 Id.
16
 Id. at 8.
17
 Id. at 6.
18
 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, A.M. No.
MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 12, 75 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
19
  Ponencia, p. 11.
20
  J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, A.M. No.
MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 12, 75-76 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
21
  Ponencia, p. 11.
 A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY.

DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19,
2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule
12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the IBP Board of Governors
denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.  On January 7, 1993, the Spouses
Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely
Mabanag8  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a
concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses
Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City
Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or
community street.9  The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal
counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. 
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the
Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had
expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The
CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent
motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious.  The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria,
Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent
before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof
for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the
court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He

claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No.
55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office.  As the partner in
charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the
pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling
lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally
took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander
at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for
President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant
Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other
delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were
sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In
retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases
against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others,
the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the
Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent
added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not
his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-
CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of
merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of
the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.14crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-
1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.  The Warning imposed against
respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16  The IBP Board of Governors noted that
respondent’s motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no
substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly
found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03,
and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file
a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely
instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases.  In fact, the person who called
the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome.”17crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.”  The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
alleged wrongdoing.  Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis
for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties
as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that
respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the
expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal
of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that
he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His
contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA
an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a
previous motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he
was not able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested
by him.”19  Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.  Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states
that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his
client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The
respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well
as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons
21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs.
Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.22  The
penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning
with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26  In the present case, we find too
harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six months.  Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of
suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of
respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively

liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month
effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, p. 216.
2
 Rule 12.03.—A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.
3
 Canon 12—A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
4
 Canon 17—A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
5
 Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
6
 Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
7
Rollo, p. 229.
8
 In his capacity as President of the Association and in his personal capacity.  Id. at 7.
9
 Id. at 8.
10
 Id. at 18-22.
11
 Id. at 24.
12
 Id. at 1-6.  Docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1969.
13
   Id. at 31-37.
14
 Id. at 138.
15
 Supra note 1. Signed by Tomas N. Prado, National Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
16
 Supra note 7.
17
Sebastian v. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 225 (2007), citing Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 349 Phil. 7, 15
(1998).
18
 467 Phil. 798, 822 (2004).
19
Rollo, p. 26.
20
 Rule 12.04.—A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.
21
 240 Phil. 769, 771-772 (1987).
22
Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., Adm. Case No. 3248, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 1, 14.
23
Vda. de Oribiana v. Atty. Gerio, 177 Phil. 543, 549 (1979).
24
Basas v. Atty. Icawat, 393 Phil. 304 (2000).
25
Spouses Rabanal v. Atty. Tugade, 432 Phil. 1064 (2002).cralawred
26
 Mariveles v. Mallari, Adm. Case No. 3294, February 17, 1993, 219 SCRA 44.
 [A.C. NO. 5624 : January 20, 2004]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.

FLORIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a
lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order.1 ςrνll

In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate

spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants
custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile,
there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before
the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C.
Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in

Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child
custody.2 Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received
any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.

In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully
take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation.

Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the
Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.3 In order to diffuse the tension, complainant
agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would
not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of
Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.

In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at
the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until
later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31,
a verified petition4 for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of
the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime,
complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January
18, 20025 from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to
surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys
oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and
outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to
him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.

After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.6 On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by
the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,7 which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay
City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have
to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined.
Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the
defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.8 Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

CANON 10.A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 -A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.9 The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.10 By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive
congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find
that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of
two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on
respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and TINGA, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, p. 1.

2
 Id., p. 14.

3
 Id., p. 9.

4
 Id., p. 10.

5
 Id., p. 13.

6
 IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report and Recommendation, p. 9.

7
 Rollo, p. 10.

8
 Muoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, 28 September 1973, 53 SCRA 190.

9
 Surigao Mineral v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072, 9 January 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen,
G.R. No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, G.R. No. L-36800, 21
October 1974, 60 SCRA 235; In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376 [1922]; Sulit v. Tiangco, G.R. No. L-
35555, 20 July 1982, 115 SCRA 207; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. NOS. L-79690-707, 7 October
1988, 166 SCRA 316.

10
 National Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610; People v. Taneo, G.R. No. 117683, 16 January
1998, 284 SCRA 251.
 [A.C. No. 1900 : June 13, 2012]

RODRIGO A. MOLINA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is the undated Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct
and recommending that he be reprimanded.cralaw

The Facts:

The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment[2] filed by Rodrigo A.

Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint
alleged, among others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de
Leon) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused
de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against
him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor;
that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent
of a Person in Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for
slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the
record, no case of slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon; that Atty. Magat
was very much aware of such fact as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on record of de
Leon from the very start of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magat’s  act of filing
the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal
of the confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise committed
willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2)
occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.

In his Answer,[3] Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was
concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges
was indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by
the court. He admitted his appearances in court while under suspension.  He explained that his
appearance in the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused was
sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9,
1978 hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony
be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance
and apology and promised that the same would not happen again.

The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[4] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the case to the
IBP for proper disposition.

In his Report and Recommendation[5] dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and
fined P50,000.00. It stated that:

This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have mistakenly been under the
impression that a case for physical injuries was filed against his client when there was no such
case filed. Respondent was either negligently reckless or he had mischievous intentions to
deceive the trial court. In any case, he committed a transgression for which he should be
punished.

However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he appeared as counsel
before a trial court on at least two (2) occasions notwithstanding the fact that he had been
suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in
his Answer, this Commission is not convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the
onset of the proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with the
disciplinary body. Yet, he proceeded to fight the charges against him.

Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions when he made those
appearances before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have so informed
the Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing could not
attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is
beyond doubt he trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.

If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of time with which this case
remains pending makes it difficult to impose a penalty of suspension on him. Under normal
circumstances, this Commission would not have thought twice of suspending respondent.
However, the acts committed by respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would
not be fair to now impose a suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all
likelihood, in the twilight of his career.

On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only to set an example to other
lawyers that suspension orders of the Supreme Court cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the
recommendation of the undersigned that respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) and that he be heavily reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.[6]

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution[7] adopting the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue
to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[8]

Atty. Magat’s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate intent
on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal
charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthful
statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical
injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court
that, indeed, a case was filed.

Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions despite
having been suspended from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an
attorney for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so. It provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. [Underlining supplied]

As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared before the
trial court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding Judge of his
plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the contrary, Atty.
Magat kept his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.cralaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, (Acting Chairperson),* Abad, Villarama, Jr.,**  and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
*
 Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012.
**
 Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special
Order  No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.
[1]
 Rollo, p. 231.
[2]
 Id. at 3-4.
[3]
 Id. at 20-21.
[4]
 Id. at 23.
[5]
 Id. at 232-236.
[6]
 Id. at 235-236.
[7]
 Id. at 231.
[8]
 Lijauco v. Terrado, 532 Phil. 1, 5 (2006).

A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against
respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave
misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23
June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real
Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that
the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with
a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted

three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s allegations against
respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However,
complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only
copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered
owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action,
because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a “Build Operate and
Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its
owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of
herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that
complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage
contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared
and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and
that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however,
reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized,
complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it.
Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily
gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the
document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized
in the principal’s place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2)
five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds
of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an
unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned
Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached
to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her
disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the
three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon
187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural requisites under
Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the
Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was
prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was
not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner
should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and
emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the
IBP’s findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio –
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.15

THE COURT’S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’
submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose
of some procedural matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the
respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasoned as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no
dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore,
is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly
for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible
in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth
records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in
the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the
other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a

supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading
only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said
that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her
charges against respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the
SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally
barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she
committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent
fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent
any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the
lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand
that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a
notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath
as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of
the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-15.
2
 Id. at 14-29.
3
 Id. at 30.
4
 Id. at 33-69.
5
 Id. at 142-196.
6
 Id. at 256-285; 286-356.
7
 Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
8
 Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
9
 Id. at 381.
10
 Id. at 365.
11
 Id. at 382-413.
12
 Id. at 495-572.
13
 SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. — (a) In the notary's presence, any person
may inspect an entry in the notarial register, during regular business hours, provided:

(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent
evidence of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the
notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the
principal in the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an
official investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access
to any entry or entries therein.
14
 Rollo, p. 575.
15
 Id. at 573-592.
16
 483 Phil. 546 (2004).
17
 Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating
thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or
other official proceedings to determine the identity of the child's parents or other circumstances
surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.
(2)Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two
months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the
court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
18
Tolentino v. Mendoza, supra note 16, at 557-558.
19
Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp., 496 Phil. 263 (2005).
20
Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.
21
Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, 541 Phil.
17 (2007).
22
 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
23
 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
24
 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
25
Rollo, p. 8; Annex “C” of the Affidavit-Complaint.
26
 Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632 (1978).
27
Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1 (2003).
28
 Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
29
Fulgencio v. Atty. Martin, 451 Phil. 275 (2003).
30
 See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 19; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013,
698 SCRA 1.
31
Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628 (2005).
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC               March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing
them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
(Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a
disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her
dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court
finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another
who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being
mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law
professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the
Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and
democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds,
they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession,
and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court
for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is
not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s
attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations
whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and
acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper
intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be
stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen),
for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in
the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases
against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly
be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young
aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor
glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit

the factual antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo)
in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010,
the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic)
assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited;
precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such
prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards,
including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if
fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens –
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to
jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in
G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the
grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and
Bagares asserted that:

I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision
were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized
parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on
the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the
Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one
of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his
work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged
plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry
in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday
with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-
court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that
are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-
Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations
until after the motion was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it
implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not
jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision
is available here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to
the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr.
Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question
of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and
humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on
rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v.
Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine
chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the
London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp.
27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed
Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the
appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your
esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by
this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the
Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The
matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on
the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also
appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites,
on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines
College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen
read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28 members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be
considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual
signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with
the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP
Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal
stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible
act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views
the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and
misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are
not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s

work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It
constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows
dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the
Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente
merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the
decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the
Decision has been promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the
absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they
came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the
spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a
reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable,
because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those
primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it
provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of
organizing and analyzing those primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal
and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources
all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is
a matter of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the
Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle
and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their
work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the
State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts
of the same article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud
by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State
liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role
of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage.
National courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the
petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second
World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But
instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court
decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to
injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to
take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the
Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot
accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members
of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in
a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the
significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times
of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its
own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily
includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its
own decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the
purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of
a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very
crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them
as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the
Philippine College of Law that:
 (1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does

violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance
to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of
Dean (1995-1999)
Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR

DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate Assistant Professor
Professor
 (SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his
sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of

Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-
mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the
section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter
shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of
my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as
this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an
appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s
cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my
book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been
widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory
chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’
concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of
international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have
been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am
concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work
without properly acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26,
2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that
Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the
names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three
days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full
roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy
of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the
same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme
Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous
copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty.
Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included
among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of
ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement,
having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under
consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established
fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s
explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the
Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.
It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza,
Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S.
Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua,
Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10)
days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative
matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed
the following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents,
excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to
the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul
Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the
"Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public
concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with
the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause
Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in
contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have
violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the
courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in
the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the
portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to
ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law and legal processes"
(under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special
interest and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because
these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our
law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity
Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted
and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21,
2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the
matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did
nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference
to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that
impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed

plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits

of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and
jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism
charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore
justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common
Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B.
Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging
that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal
article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho
Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human
Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge
that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution,
but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have
likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various
published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of
respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine
Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian

Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the

Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard
Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the
Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former
dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for
sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that
 they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their

position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be
performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law,
but also as citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of
free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67 In re:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement

was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher
learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which
provided that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic
freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to
encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of
study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and
credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students,
professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and
pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism
and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing
or relevance to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following
portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the
bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too
vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and
unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of
a case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common
Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and

officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

 2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their
"obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that
before final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including
especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that
connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted
and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts,
reports and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof.
Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein
she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the
findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring
Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the
best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part,
Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the
Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what
may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts
have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic
freedom of the University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine
how lessons shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’
constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and
imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public
interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by
registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the
circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision
was a topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic
year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources;
that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his
class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed
the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that
a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public
officers. He invited the attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente
Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American
Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor
entertained any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the
Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on
respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress
upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what constitutes plagiarism, Prof.
Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused
the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the
same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of
the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This
uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this
Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work
and to pass it off as one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have
been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could
have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his
explanation, he has faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will
rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation
to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law
Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:

 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of
Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty
members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable
Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

 "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which
reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the
notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in
the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was
also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law
on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

 "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which
presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law
that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual
signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their
printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight
(8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant
since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature
pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean
Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the
faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and
circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this
purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing
pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya
vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that
the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still
other faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring
Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they
would sign as soon as they could manage.
 2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to
reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed
draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name.
Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of
non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for
aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed
that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake
to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted
signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza
among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had
physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen
called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)"
signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice
Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza
had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at
that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the
United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and
so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had
also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that
time unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out
that this was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on
the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did
not exactly say that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to
leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate,
still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
 2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he
went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S.
This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received
from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time
the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival
from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time,
he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and
under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a
former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the
Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity
II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in
Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court
was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to
him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of
the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in
the reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that
38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the
Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the
main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature
pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential
nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its
signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the
Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and
more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not
an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in
an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or
Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the
Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their
desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation
of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting
the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition
with the hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en
banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the
required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or
motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative sanction for violation of
the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the
Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records,
evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of
the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he
first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the
same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by
this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the
Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the
dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch
argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make the intended
recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and
self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the
doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not
pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective
mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He
also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they
did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the
material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should
not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03?
 5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in
relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the
Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses
and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause
Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and
expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and
actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on
what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged
one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said
pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said
Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the
Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring
Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in
the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the
Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.
It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as
the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression
when it stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be
the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the
Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers
whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J.
Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his
second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to
the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power
in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we
should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of
which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard
the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these,
which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase
the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and
further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in
his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion
were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows
the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature
of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities
of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a
pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the
following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes
way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was
an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and
releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he
claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the
petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before
the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession."121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle
that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of
public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such
criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal
authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647,
652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are
to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting
language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same,
has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice,
and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have
their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental
right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the

decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well
founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if
it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so
many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose
favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition

of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an
administrative complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering
justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of
the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer
cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court
to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem
in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court
and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of
offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and
offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful,
offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in
Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs.
Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks
(Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under
his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct
for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the
occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair
attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice
of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a
pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement
presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and
how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any
previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors
can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the
courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar
discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case.
The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom
of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to
give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the
case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in
Cayetano v. Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of
law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance
that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the
development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the
demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to
avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective
regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law
professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and
13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic

freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of
their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure
motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so
unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in
public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This
doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and
Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to
the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public
statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to
the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas
was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the
same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women,
but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on
the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the
primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who
have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid
basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are
two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers
it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents
even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against
Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit,
they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure
for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing
on their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court
as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and
respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to
send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade
others to their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in
full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of
these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors
are the ones who would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously
took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to
the Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the
universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and
soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive
action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the
Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and
reported in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the
Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media
attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is
respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism
in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s
issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first
drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they
had issued the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the
ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this
Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that
the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court
then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to
prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into
account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof
that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common
Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals
whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost
sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of
civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on
legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of
this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part
well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence
that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good
intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which
need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse
from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts
a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the
facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed
and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention
constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court
is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers
it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases
supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their
claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due
respect to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of
justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who
showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward
account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his
agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010
Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on
whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing
to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of
the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to retract his
position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed
below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This
is all that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only
that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair.
We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true
import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof.
Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be
excused from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as
a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For
even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any nationality should be
aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not
be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for
submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true
and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at
the text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring
Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public
manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur
thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not
misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in
the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement
was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its
signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies
precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive
authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the
same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the
"importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the
matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did
not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11,
2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature
pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the
retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed
administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to
allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II.
Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the
signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD).
This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for
posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed
document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors.
In most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very
least a photocopy of the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation
why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on
August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to
this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of
vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of
documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose
to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on
the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his
explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza
agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors
had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to
this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary
to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that
a person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and
stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no
misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually
signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the
case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended to
sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in
his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the
professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before
transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to
secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then
Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures
before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither
parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather,
it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court
is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in
pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the
Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the

plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the
Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for
hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or
may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and
for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s
separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and
hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to
be accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs
largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance
therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding
and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in
the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme

Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the
same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral
to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is
only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11
of Rule 139-A will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases
supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the
Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any
formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also
inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination
of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.146 (Emphases
supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they
shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They
have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to
present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on
the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on
the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause
Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court
in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records
and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual
signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened
there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the
respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the
pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need
to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the
Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc.,
of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of
Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within
the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be
in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September
2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October
12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply
reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally
agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same
on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply
let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or
evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective
compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on
being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their
stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-
necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they
have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence
presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views
on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and
vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal
profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the
Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under
established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath,
as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good
fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds
his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota,
Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te,
Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio
G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio
M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent
law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or
to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be
more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean
and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court
and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 See Dissenting Opinion Please see Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I certify the Mr. Justice Brion left his

concurring vote DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Pls see Separate Opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I dissent and reserve the right to issue a Separate Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

** No part.

1
 Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante
B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A.
Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina
D. Lucenario; rollo, pp. 24-25.
2
 Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court; rollo, pp. 4-9.

3
 Counsel of record for the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) is the Roque &
Butuyan Law Offices.

4
 Malaya Lolas’ Motion for Reconsideration dated May 31, 2010, p. 1.

5
 Id. at 8.

6
 The contents of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration were posted on Atty.
Roque's blog on July 18, 2010, the day before its filing.
See http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-
supreme-court/ (last accessed on January 20, 2011).

7
Malaya Lolas’ Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, p. 8.

8
 Id. at 36. (Emphasis supplied.)

9
 Which appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 2009.

10
 Cambridge University Press, 2005.

11
 Published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006.

12
 See Annex 4 of the 35 respondents’ Common Compliance filed on November 19,
2010. The article’s time of posting was indicated as 7:00 a.m.; rollo, p. 304.

13
 The article was posted on July 19, 2010 at 12:02 a.m.
See http://www.gmanews.tv/story/196407/sc-justice-plagiarized-parts-of-ruling-on-
comfort-women (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).

14
 See http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/insideOpinion.htm?
f=2010/july/22/harryroque.isx&d=2010/july/22 (Last accessed January 24, 2011).

15
 The link indicated in Julian Ku’s blog entry was not a newspaper report but the
Newsbreak article posted in GMA News TV’s website.

16
 Id.

17
 Prof. Criddle’s response was posted on July 19, 2010 at 2:44 EST. See link below:

http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-bedevils-philippines-
supreme-court-justice/ (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).

18
 This letter was subsequently published in the Philippine Star as shown by Annex 7 of
the 35 respondents’ Common Compliance filed on November 19, 2010; rollo, pp. 309-
310.
19
 Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares, through the Center for International Law, have
collaborated in the past with the SEAMLDI. The Center for International Law, which has
Atty. Roque as Chairman and Atty. Bagares as Executive Director, hosted the 2nd South
East Asia Media Legal Defense Conference held in October 2009 in Cebu City.
See http://www.roquebutuyan.com/centerlaw/index.html and http://jmsc.asia/seasiamedi
adefense2009/program/ (Both last accessed on January 20, 2011).

20
 http://www.scribd.com/doc/39856111/Letter-to-Republic-of-the-Philippines-Supreme-
Court-Ellis (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).

21
 Per Curiam Decision, In the Matter of Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate
Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.

22
 http://www.newsbreak.ph/2010/08/09/restoring-integrity/ (Last accessed on January
24, 2011).

23
 http://harryroque.com/2010/08/09/restoring-integritya-statement-by-the-faculty-of/ (Las
t accessed on January 20, 2011).

24
 http://www.gmanews.tv/story/198182/resignation-of-sc-justice-in-plagiarism-issue-
sought (Last accessed on January 20, 2011).

25
 http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/faculties-hit-plagiarized-ruling (Last accessed on
January 20, 2011).

26
 See paragraph 2.9, Dean Leonen Compliance dated November 19, 2010; rollo, p. 327.

27
The date of posting of the Statement is not indicated on the UP Law website.
See http://law.upd.edu.ph/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=166:restoring-integrity-a-statement-by-the-faculty-
of-the-up-college-of-law&catid=52:faculty-news&Itemid=369 (Last accessed on January
20, 2011).

28
 Although the Dean’s letter indicated that 38 faculty members signed the statement, an
examination of the attachment showed that the number of purported signatories was
only 37.

29
 Rollo, pp. 4-9.

30
 This was received by the Court on August 20, 2010. It was also reported on
Newsbreak that same day. See (http://www.newsbreak.ph/2010/08/20/third-author-
plagiarized-by-sc-justice-complains/).

31
 See Annex 2 of the 35 respondents’ Compliance dated November 19, 2010. A full-
color PDF replica of Prof. Tams’ letter was also linked on Atty. Roque’s blog entry dated
August 22, 2010. See blog entry here - http://harryroque.com/2010/08/22/third-author-
plagiarized-by-sc-justice- complains-from-newsbreak/ (last accessed on January 20,
2011) and the letter here - http://harryroque.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/tams-letter-to-
supreme-court.pdf (last accessed on January 21, 2011).
32
 Per Curiam Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010.

33
 Id.

34
 Resolution dated October 19, 2010; rollo, pp. 23-29.

35
 Id. at 26-27.

36
 The Show Cause Resolution inadvertently referred to Canon 10 but should refer to
Canon 1.

37
 Show Cause Resolution; rollo, pp. 27-28.

38
 Id. at 28.

39
 Common Compliance; rollo, p. 201.

40
 Id.

41
 Id. at 201-202. (Emphases supplied.)

42
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1.

43
 Id., Canon 11.

44
 Id., Canon 13.

45
 Common Compliance; rollo, p. 203.

46
 Id. at 204.

47
 Id. at 205.

48
 Id. at 208.

49
 Id at 208-209.

50
 Respondents were referring to the article by Donna Pazzibugan entitled "High Court
Not Probing ‘Plagiarism,’" which according to footnote 28 of the Common Compliance
may be accessed at
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/2010072182283/High-court-
not-probing-plagiarism> as of November 12, 2010.

51
 Common Compliance; rollo, p. 209.

52
 372 Phil. 287 (1999).
53
 According to his letter, Atty. Payoyo is a former UP Law Professor, former chief editor
of the Philippine Law Journal and a recipient of the Court’s centennial award in
international law.

54
 G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

55
 Common Compliance; rollo, p. 211.

56
 Annex 4; id. at 304-306.

57
 Annex 5; id. at 307.

58
 Annex 6; id. at 308.

59
 Annex 7; id. at 309-310.

60
 Annex 8; id. at 311.

61
 Annex 9; id. at 312.

62
 Annexes 10 and 11; id. at 313-314.

63
 Annexes 12, 13 and 14; id. at 315-317.

64
 Annex 15; id. at 318-319.

65
 Annex 16; id. at 320.

66
 Id. at 215.

67
 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

68
 G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

69
 137 Phil. 471 (1969).

70
 160-A Phil. 929 (1975).

71
 Common Compliance; rollo, p. 217.

72
 61 Phil 724 (1935).

73
 Id. at 733-734, cited in the Common Compliance; rollo, p. 219.

74
 Common Compliance; rollo, pp. 219-220.

75
 Bautista Compliance; id. at 179. (Emphasis supplied.)
76
 Id. at 180. (Emphasis supplied.)

77
 Mercado v. AMA Computer College–Parañaque City, Inc., G.R. No. 183572, April 13,
2010; Morales v. Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161172,
December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 227; University of the Philippines Board of Regents v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 49; Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine v. University of
the Philippines Board of Regents, G.R. No. 152309, Resolution, September 18, 2002.

78
 Bautista Compliance; rollo, p. 185; citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza,
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.

79
 See Vasquez Compliance; rollo, p. 428.

80
 82 Phil. 595 (1949).

81
 Supra note 68.

82
 AmJur 2d §52.

83
 Vasquez Compliance; rollo, p. 430.

84
 Id. at 431.

85
 Id. at 430.

86
 Id.

87
 Dean Leonen Compliance; rollo, pp. 324-325.

88
 Id. at 325-326.

89
 Id. at 326.

90
 Id., in Footnote 2.

91
 Id. at 326-327.

92
 Id. at 327.

93
 Id., in Footnote 3.

94
 Id. at 331-332.

95
 Id. at 332.

96
 Id. at 328, in footnote 4.

97
 Id. at 334, in footnote 7.
98
 Id. at 335.

99
 Id. at 335-336.

100
 Id. at 338.

101
 480 Phil. 652 (2004).

102
 Dean Leonen Compliance; rollo, p. 338.

103
 Lynch Manifestation; rollo, p. 188; citing New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254
(1964) quoted with approval by the Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 145 Phil. 219
(1970).

104
 Id.

105
 G.R. No. 95445, August 6, 1991, 200 SCRA 323.

106
 Quoted by Prof. Lynch from the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gutierrez, Jr. in the
Manila Public School Teachers Association case (id. at 338).

107
 Quoted by Prof. Lynch from the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cruz in the Manila
Public School Teachers Association case (id. at 343).

108
 Supra note 69.

109
 Lynch Manifestation; rollo, p. 189.

110
 Id.

111
 Show Cause Resolution; rollo, p. 25.

112
 Id. at 26.

113
 To date, said motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision is still pending
resolution by the Court.

114
 Show Cause Resolution; rollo, pp. 25-26.

115
 Id. at 26-27.

116
 Supra note 72.

117
 Id. at 726.

118
 Id. at 727-728.

119
 Id. at 728.
120
 Supra note 68.

121
 Id. at 564-565.

122
 Id. at 580-582.

123
 Supra note 80.

124
 Id. at 599-602.

125
 329 Phil. 270 (1996).

126
 Id. at 276-279.

127
 A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.

128
 Id. at 367-368.

129
 Supra note 69.

130
 Id. at 494.

131
 248 Phil. 542 (1988).

132
 Id. at 579.

133
 Prof. Juan-Bautista and Prof. Lynch.

134
 G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214, where the Court ruled
that:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (Citing 111 ALR 23.)

135
 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

136
 Lynch Manifestation; rollo, p. 188.

137
 In the case of members of the Bar.

138
 In the case of members of the Bar and/or non-lawyers.

139
 Salcedo v. Hernandez, supra note 72 at 729-730.
 140
 Dean Leonen Compliance; rollo, p. 336.

141
 Bautista Complaince; rollo, p. 179.

142
 Placido v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 180888, September 18,
2009, 600 SCRA 697, 704-705.

143
 A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, citing In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen, supra note 68.

144
 Id. at 453.

145
 A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 378.

146
 Id. at 396-398.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I find the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars1 satisfactory and therefore see no need to
admonish or warn them2 for supposed use of disrespectful language in their
statement3 commenting on a public issue involving the official conduct of a member of this
Court. The majority’s action impermissibly expands the Court’s administrative powers4 and,
more importantly, abridges constitutionally protected speech on public conduct guaranteed to
all, including members of the bar.

First. The matter of Justice Mariano del Castillo’s reported misuse and non-attribution of
sources in his ponencia in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary5 is an issue of public concern. A day
before the Vinuya petitioners’ counsels filed their supplemental motion for reconsideration on 19
July 2010 raising these allegations, a national TV network carried a parallel story online.6 On the
day the pleading was filed, another national TV network7 and an online news magazine,8 carried
the same story. Soon, one of the authors allegedly plagiarized commented that the work he and
a co-author wrote was misrepresented in Vinuya.9 Justice del Castillo himself widened the
scope of publicity by submitting his official response to the allegations to a national daily which
published his comment in full.10 Justice del Castillo’s defenses of good faith and non-
liability11 echoed an earlier statement made by the Chief of the Court’s Public Information
Office.12 These unfolding events generated an all-important public issue affecting no less than
the integrity of this Court’s decision-making – its core constitutional function – thus inexorably
inviting public comment.

Along with other sectors, the law faculty of the University of the Philippines (UP), which counts
among its ranks some of this country’s legal experts,13 responded by issuing a
statement,14 bewailing what the professors see as the Court’s indifference to the perceived
dishonesty in the crafting of the Vinuya ponencia and its aggravating effect on
the Vinuya petitioners’ cause, refuting Justice del Castillo’s defenses, underscoring the
seriousness of the issue, and calling for the adoption of individual and institutional remedial
measures.15 This is prime political speech critical of conduct of public officials and institution,
delivered in public forum. Under the scheme of our constitutional values, this species of speech
enjoys the highest protection,16 rooted on the deeply-held notion that "the interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs."17 Indeed,
preceding western jurisprudence by nearly five decades, this Court, in the first score of the last
century, identified the specific right to criticize official conduct as protected speech, branding
attempts by courts to muzzle criticism as "tyranny of the basest sort."18

Second. In testing whether speech critical of judges and judicial processes falls outside the
ambit of constitutionally protected expression, spilling into the territory of sanctionable
utterances, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test.19 Under this analytical
framework, an utterance is constitutionally protected unless "the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance [is] ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’"20

It appears that the evil consequences the UP law faculty statement will supposedly spawn are
(1) the slurring of this Court’s dignity and (2) the impairment of its judicial independence vis-à-
vis the resolution of the plagiarism complaint in Vinuya. Both are absent here. On the matter of
institutional degradation, the 12-paragraph, 1,553-word statement of the UP law faculty, taken
as a whole, does not exhibit that "irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even
destroy the courts and their members" typical of unprotected judicial criticism.21 On the contrary,
the statement, taken as a whole, seeks to uphold the bedrock democratic value of keeping
judicial processes free of any taint of dishonesty or misrepresentation. Thus, the UP law faculty
statement is far removed from speech the Court has rightly sanctioned for proffering no useful
social value, solely crafted to vilify its members and threaten its very existence.22

On the alleged danger of impairment of this Court’s judicial independence in resolving the
plagiarism charge in Vinuya, this too, did not come to pass. In the Resolution of 8 February
2011 in A.M. No. 10-17-17-SC,23 the Court denied reconsideration to its earlier ruling finding no
merit in the Vinuya petitioners’ claim of plagiarism. Not a single word in the 8 February 2011
Resolution hints that the UP law faculty statement pressured, much less threatened, this Court
to decide the motion for reconsideration for the Vinuya petitioners. Thus, the 8 February 2011
Resolution gives the lie to the conclusion that the UP law faculty statement posed any danger,
much less one that is "extremely serious," to the Court’s independence.

Third. The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members
is valid only if the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts separately scrutinized to
isolate and highlight perceived offensive phrases and words. This approach defies common
sense and departs from this Court’s established practice in scrutinizing speech critical of the
judiciary. People v. Godoy24 instructs that speech critical of judges must be "read with contextual
care," making sure that disparaging statements are not "taken out of context."25 Using this
approach, and applying the clear and present danger test, the Court in Godoy cleared a
columnist and a publisher of liability despite the presence in the assailed news article of
derogatory yet isolated statements about a judge. We can do no less to the statement of the
members of the UP law faculty, who, after all, were impelled by nothing but their sense of
professional obligation to "speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital
interest to them."26
On the supposed unpleasant tone of the statement, critical speech, by its nature, is caustic and
biting. It is for this same reason, however, that it enjoys special constitutional protection. "The
constitution does not apply only to sober, carefully reasoned discussion. There may be at least
some value in permitting cranky, obstreperous, defiant conduct by lawyers on the ground that it
encourages a public culture of skepticism, anti-authoritarianism, pluralism, and openness. It is
important to remember that the social function of lawyers is not only to preserve order, but also
to permit challenges to the status quo."27

Supreme Court Justices, as public officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are
entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other public officials and institutions. 28 The
members of this Court are sustained by the people’s resources and our actions are always
subject to their accounting.29 Thus, instead of shielding ourselves with a virtual lese-
majeste rule, wholly incompatible with the Constitution’s vision of public office as a "public
trust,"30 we should heed our own near century-old counsel: a clear conscience, not muzzled
critics, is the balm for wounds caused by a "hostile and unjust accusation" on official conduct.31

Fourth. The academic bar, which the UP law faculty represents, is the judiciary’s partner in a
perpetual intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions. It
serves the interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to
the academics’ criticism. Instead of heeding the UP law faculty’s call for the Court to "ensur[e]
that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question," the majority dismisses their suggestion as useless calumny and
brands their constitutionally protected speech as "unbecoming of lawyers and law professors."
The Constitution, logic, common sense and a humble awareness of this Court’s role in the
larger project of dispensing justice in a democracy revolt against such response.

Accordingly, I vote to consider respondents’ explanation in their common and individual

Compliance as satisfactory and to consider this matter closed and terminated.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 All belonging to the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law including
the incumbent dean, four former deans, members of the regular faculty and instructors.
Professor Owen Lynch, a visiting professor and a member of the Minnesota bar, filed a
manifestation joining causes with the respondents.

2
 The majority excludes from their finding Atty. Raul T. Vasquez whose Compliance they
find satisfactory.

3
 "Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The University Of The Philippines College Of Law
On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In The Supreme Court."
4
 In the Resolution of 19 October 2010, 37 professors were required to show cause why
no disciplinary sanction should be imposed on them for violating the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Canon 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

Canon 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.

Today’s Resolution admonishes the incumbent dean, Marvic MV.F. Leonen, and
warns 35 other professors for "speech and conduct unbecoming of lawyers and
law professors."

Significantly, the 37 academics did not counsel or abet activities of any sort and
none of them is counsel to any of the parties in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary,
thus Rule 1.02 and Canon 13 are irrelevant. Rule 11.05 is similarly inapplicable
because none of the professors authored any of the materials used
in Vinuya hence, their grievance to the purported plagiarism and
misrepresentation is not specific and personal to cloak them with legal
personality to institute a complaint against Justice Mariano del Castillo. On the
other hand, Canon 1 and Canon 11, accommodate and do not trump the
constitutional guarantee of free speech.

5
 G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010.

6
 The news article "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women" by Aries C.
Rufo and Purple S. Romero appeared in the website of ABS-CBN on 18 July 2010
(see http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/07/18/10/sc-justice-plagiarized-parts-ruling-
comfort-women).

7
 GMA-7 (see http://www.gmanews.tv/story/196407/sc-justice-plagiarized-parts-of-ruling-
on-comfort-women)

8
 Newsbreak (see http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=7981&Itemid=88889005.)

9
 Commenting on a blog entry on the news stories ABS-CBN, GMA-7 and Newsbreak
carried, Professor Evan Criddle, co-author of the article A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 331 (2009), stated: "Speaking for myself, the most troubling
aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against
crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our
article emphatically asserts the opposite."
(see http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-bedevils-
philippines-supreme-court-justice/). The two other authors, Christian J. Tams and Mark
Ellis, whose works were reportedly misused in the Court’s ruling in Vinuya, had since
filed formal complaints with the Court.

10
 Justice del Castillo’s comment appeared in The Philippine Star’s "Letters to the Editor"
section on 30 July 2010 captioned "The Del Castillo Ponencia in Vinuya By Mariano C.
Del Castillo, Associate Justice" (see http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=598044&publicationSubCategoryId=135).

11
 Justice del Castillo wrote:

It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources,
whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate
another’s work as our own. x x x x

xxxx

Incidentally, it was stated in the Newsbreak article posted by Aries C. Rufo and
Purple S. Romero on July 19, 2010 that "x x x there is no rule or provision in the
judiciary against copying from other’s work and passing these off as original
material." Dean Pacifico Agabin concurred with this observation when he
"pointed out, ‘It is not prohibited under the Code of Judicial Ethics, or any
statutes. It is just a matter of delicadeza… It bears on the honesty of the judge to
give credit where credit is due."

Finally, Section 184(k) of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines) provides that "any use made of a work for the purpose of any
judicial proceedings x x x" shall not constitute infringement of copyright.

12
 Who informed the public: "You can’t expect all justices in the Supreme Court to be
familiar with all these journals." (see
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100721-282283/High-court-
not-probing-plagiarism).

13
 Dean Pacifico Agabin, an alumnus of Yale Law School, is an authority in constitutional
law, author of numerous scholarly publications and active appellate litigator who
frequently appeared before the Court to argue landmark public law cases. Dean Merlin
Magallona is a recognized expert in international law, a published scholar and former
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs. Professor Tristan Catindig, a Harvard Law School
alumnus, is a commercial law expert and author of numerous publications on the
subject.

14
 The respondents claim that they spoke in their capacity as lawyers, law professors and
citizens (Common Compliance, pp. 2, 16).
15
 Summed in the penultimate paragraph of their statement:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct
and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and
to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position,
without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which
it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance
to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

16
 Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441, 538,
Carpio, J., concurring.

17
 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 740 (1918). Jurisprudence privileges this right
by requiring the very high quantum of proof of actual malice to establish liability for
libelous comment on public conduct (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 238
(1999); Flor v. People, G.R. No. 139987, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 440).

18
 The relevant passage reads:

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same
as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the
basest sort. x x x x (United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 (1918)).

It was only in 1964 that the United States Supreme Court enunciated a
comparable doctrine, with refinements (see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 [1964]).

19
 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977
(1995); In re Almacen, No. L-27654, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
 20
 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957).

21
 See e.g. Column of Ramon Tulfo in the Philippine Daily Inquirer Issues of 13 and 16
October 1989, A.M. No. 90-4-1545-0, 17 April 1990 (Resolution).

22
 In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949). See also Column of Ramon Tulfo in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer Issues of 13 and 16 October 1989, id.

23
 In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo.

24
 People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995).

25
 We held:

On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are

contumacious in nature, we are inclined, based on an overall perusal and
objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative. We have read
and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced that what is
involved here is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have
been taken out of context. If the statements claimed to be contum[acious] had
been read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for this
contempt proceeding. Id. at 994 (emphasis supplied).

26
 Common Compliance, p. 2.

27
 W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech For Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 305, 440
(2001).

28
 In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado A.P.
Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-
09-13-SC, 8 August 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 489, Carpio, J., dissenting.

29
 The Constitution provides that "[P]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people x x x x" (Article XI, Section 1).

30
 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1.

31
 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 (1918).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position
that, in the first place, there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative
case, in view of (1) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, anchored on
an irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely
describing the subject Statement of the UP Law Faculty that could taint the disciplinary action,
and (2) the Court’s conventionally permissive attitude toward the "expression of belief" or
"manner of criticism" coming from legal academics, lawyer-columnists, and civic circles, in a
number of high-profile cases, most notably at the height of the "CJ Appointment Issue" during
which time the motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision was similarly pending.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

The history of the Supreme Court shows that the times when it emerged with strength from
tempests of public criticism were those times when it valued constitutional democracy and its
own institutional integrity. Indeed, dangers from pressure and threat presented by what is
usually constitutionally deemed as free speech can arise only when the Court allows itself to be
so threatened. It is unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its core of independence can be
shaken by a twelve-paragraph, two-page commentary from academia. By issuing the Show
Cause Order, and affirming it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in the precarious
position of shackling free speech and expression. The Court, which has the greater duty of
restraint and sobriety, but which appears to the public to have failed to transcend its instinct for
self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt, gains nothing by punishing those who, to its
mind, also lacked such restraint.

I join the dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Martin S.
Villarama. To be taken together with this Opinion is my earlier Dissenting Opinion dated 19
October 2010. The effect and intent of the "Restoring Integrity" Statement must be examined in
the context of what this Court has done to contribute to the controversy as well as the reception
by the public of the pronouncements of this Court on the plagiarism charges in connection with
the Decision in G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya, et al v. Executive Secretary, promulgated on 28 April
2010.

A few days after the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) filed a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration of the Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information
Office informed the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism
charges against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion. He stated further that:
"You can’t expect all justices in the Supreme Court to be familiar with all these journal
articles."1 Justice del Castillo defended himself by submitting his official statement to the
Philippine Star, which published it on 30 July 2010. In the meantime, Dr. Mark Ellis, one of
several authors whose works was allegedly plagiarized, sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 to the
Court, expressing concern about the alleged plagiarism of his work and the misreading of the
arguments therein "for cross purposes."

On 31 July 2010, the Daily Tribune, the Manila Standard, and other newspapers of national
circulation reported that Senator Francis Pangilinan, a member of the bar, demanded the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo in order to "spare the judiciary from embarrassment and
harm." On 25 July 2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer discussed the plagiarism issue in their
editorial entitled "Supreme Theft." On 5 August 2010, another member of the bar wrote about
plagiarism in his column entitled "What’s in a Name?" published in the Business Mirror.2 On 8
August 2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban’s
opinion, to the effect that the issue "seeps to the very integrity of the Court." That same opinion
also raised the question of whether the justices who concurred in the Vinuya ponencia were
qualified to sit as members of the Ethics Committee.

Dean Marvic M.V. F. Leonen of the University of the Philippines College of Law transmitted to
the Court a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty Of The
University Of The Philippines College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And
Misrepresentation In The Supreme Court," the cover letter of which was dated 11 August 2010.
Shortly thereafter, several schools published their own declarations on the matter.

A week after the UP Law Faculty’s statement was transmitted to the Court, Professor Christian
Tams expressed his own views. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice3, Professor Tams
said: "…I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly
has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your
Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it."
Other authors soon followed suit, articulating their own dismay at the use of their original works,
through internet blogs, comments and other public fora.4

Thus, the negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot be attributed
solely to the UP Law Faculty. That the Court was put in the spotlight and garnered unwanted
attention was caused by a myriad of factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillo’s
own published defense entitled "The Del Castillo ponencia in Vinuya" pending the resolution of
the complaint against him by the Ethics Committee, and the categorical statement made by the
Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no
plans of investigating the plagiarism charges. These twin acts attracted negative reaction, much
of which came from the legal profession and the academe. The issue itself – alleged plagiarism
in a judicial decision, including the alleged use of plagiarized materials to achieve a result
opposite to the theses of the said materials – resonated in the public’s consciousness and
stirred a natural desire in the citizenry to raise calls to save an important public institution,
namely, the judiciary. The responses published by different sectors constituted nothing more
than an exercise of free speech – critical commentary calling a public official to task in the
exercise of his functions.

The respondents herein, who were not parties to any pending case at the time, forwarded the
"Restoring Integrity" Statement as a public expression of the faculty’s stand regarding the
plagiarism issue. Such an open communication of ideas from the citizenry is an everyday
occurrence – as evidenced by dozens of letters of appeals for justice received regularly by this
Court from a myriad of people, and the placards displayed along Padre Faura Street every
Tuesday. The commentators and participants in the public discussions on the Vinuya Decision,
both on the Internet and in traditional media, included legal experts and other members of the
bar, with even a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court numbered among them. Yet only
members of the UP Law Faculty were deemed to be the cause for the majority’s trepidation that
the Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence was being undermined. The Show Cause Order
went so far as to hold the respondent faculty members responsible for threatening the
independence of the judiciary.

Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
authority over members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the proceeding as
one for indirect contempt, the due process requirements of which are strictly provided for under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The majority attempts to skirt the issue regarding the non-
observance of due process by insisting that the present case is not an exercise of the Court’s
contempt powers, but rather is anchored on the Court’s disciplinary powers. Whatever
designation the majority may find convenient to formally characterize this proceeding, however,
the pretext is negated by the disposition in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its
supporting rationale.

The majority directed respondents to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy
of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar. Yet the substance
therein demonstrates that the present proceeding is one for indirect contempt, particularly in the
following portions:

We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon
the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or
tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.5

x x x           x x x          x x x

Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary.6

x x x           x x x          x x x

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for
reconsideration.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The jurisprudence adverted to by the majority dwell on contempt, foremost of which is In re

Kelly, one of the first and leading cases discussing contempt. Citing Ex Parte Terry, the
Supreme Court in that case held that acts punishable as contempt are those "…tending to
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority."8 Significantly, before he
was cited for contempt, Respondent Amzi B. Kelly was first given the opportunity to appear
before the Court, submit a written Answer, and present his oral argument.

The footnote citation in Footnote 4 of the 19 October 2010 Resolution, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC,
refers to "In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007," a case for indirect contempt
lodged against the publisher of a national daily.
In this case, the Court not only gave respondent a chance to explain himself, but also created
an Investigating Committee regarding the subject matter of the alleged contemptible act:

From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and
gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.

The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Dañguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a
preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which
served as their testimonies on direct examination. They were then later cross-examined on
various dates: respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Dañguilan-Vitug on January 17,
2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the
Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24,
2008, respectively.9

This approach of using jurisprudence on contempt to justify adverse findings against herein
respondents is continued in the current Decision. The majority cites the 1935 case Salcedo v.
Hernandez10 which identified the proceedings specifically as contempt, even though the
respondent was a member of the bar. The 1949 case of In Re Vicente Sotto11, from which the
majority quotes heavily – and which the majority states is "still good law" – is explicitly identified
as a proceeding for contempt of court. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, the Court
issued a Resolution "to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days
from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions…"12 only after a Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed by the petitioner.
Even as the Court discussed its exercise of both its contempt powers and disciplinary powers
over the respondent attorney in the said case, it still gave him ample time and opportunity to
defend himself by allowing him to file an Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition, a
Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, a Motion to Transfer Administrative
Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and an Urgent Motion for Additional
Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam.

The case of In Re Almacen13, also cited in the current Decision, was in the nature of a contempt
proceeding even as it adverted to duties of members of the bar, as can be gleaned from the
following:

So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a
pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep
the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now
called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal.

Atty. Almacen filed with the Court a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title," after his
clients had lost the right to file an appeal before the Court due to his own inadvertence. And yet,
the Court still gave him the "ampliest [sic] latitude" for his defense, giving him an opportunity to
file a written explanation and to be heard in oral argument.

All of the above negate the claim that this is not a contempt proceeding but purely an
administrative one.

The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the
proceeding. The allegation and conclusion that the faculty members purportedly "undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence," make it clear that the true nature of the action is
one for indirect contempt. The discussion in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 hinged on the
tribunal’s need for self-preservation and independence, in view of the "institutional attacks" and
"outside interference" with its functions – charges which more appropriately fall under its
contempt authority, rather than the authority to determine fitness of entering and maintaining
membership in the bar.

The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by
the respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly
demonstrated that the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the
Order states: "The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay
ahead." Page four (4) makes the conclusion that: "The publication of a statement…was totally
unnecessary, uncalled for, and a rash act of misplaced vigilance."

The Order also violated respondents’ right to due process because it never afforded them the
categorical requirements of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect Contempt as laid
out in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court demand strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which
may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a
person to appear and explain his conduct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to
appear and explain his conduct.14

The essence of a court’s contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the violation
of lawful court orders and for maintaining decorum during proceedings, as an essential auxiliary
to the due administration of justice.15 It is not an all-encompassing tool to silence criticism.
Courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill.16 It must be
wielded on the preservative, rather than on the vindictive, principle.17 So careful is the approach
ordinarily taken by the Court in cases of contempt that it places a premium on the conduct of a
hearing, to such a point that it administratively sanctioned a lower court judge for issuing a
Show Cause Order sua sponte and finding the respondent guilty of criminal contempt without
the benefit of a hearing. In the case of Castaños v. Judge Escaño, Jr.,18 the Court held:

It is an oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to
preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges,
however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint,
and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not
for retaliation or vindication.

It is true that, in the case at bench, respondent judge, after having received a copy of Agapito's
affidavit in connection with the petitioner's administrative charges against him, directed Agapito
to show cause within three days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of court…
but, without the benefit of hearing required in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,
respondent judge, in an Order, dated February 22, 1993, sentenced Agapito guilty for contempt
of court on account of the allegations he made in his affidavit, dated November 18, 1992. Such
failure to afford Agapito the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves
administrative sanction.

In finding Judge Escaño, Jr. guilty of grave abuse of judicial authority, the Court stated:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's
dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-
litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their
grasp of legal principles. Moreover, witnesses against erring judges cannot come out in the
open to help the Judiciary in disrobing its inept members if we allow judges to abuse their
judicial discretion, more particularly with respect to the exercise of their contempt powers.

As Justice Carpio Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010,
this action of the Court is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:

"…the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order
that initiates what would become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more
than meets the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows
its true colors and presents itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without
proper recourse left to the parties."19

Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting Opinion to the current Decision her
belief that this proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:

"Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my
position that there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in
view of (i) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, which was anchored
on an irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely
describing the subject Statement, that could taint the disciplinary action."

The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be
exercised solely towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed
carefully against the substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom.
In this critical balancing act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness
and clarity of reasoning, and must not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of
temper.

Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it,
both as an important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for vindication
of felt injustice. Judicial legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in
decision-making rightly generates public acceptance of such decisions, which makes them truly
binding. William Howard Taft, who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming the
President of the United States, understood the weight of public evaluation in this wise: "If the
law is but the essence of common sense, the protest of many average men may evidence a
defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest reasoning and profoundest learning."20

We who occupy this august chamber are right not because our word is accorded legal finality on
matters that are before us. We are right only when we have been proven right. There must
always reside, in the recesses of our minds, the clear distinction between what is merely legal
and what is legitimate. Legitimacy is a "tenuous commodity, particularly for unelected
judges,"21 and it can only be maintained by a sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the
retention of the moral authority of individual judges. This required characteristic of the Court is
diminished when its members do not act through the rational strength of their decisions, but are
instead perceived to have done so in the misunderstanding of the Court’s disciplinary powers.

"To maintain not only its stature, but also, more importantly, its independence, the judiciary must
adhere to the discipline of judicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in the language of the
documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the strength of the judiciary's independence
depends not only on the constitutional framework, but also on the extent to which the judiciary
acknowledges its responsibility to decide ‘according to law’…"22

Furthermore, as one American Federal Supreme Court decision said:

"Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion
concerning the competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and
debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the
functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by
subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability."23

The Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes the standards for a judicial response to free speech
which, highly-charged though it may be, is necessarily protected. Rule 3.04 in particular states
that: "A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should
avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts
instead of the courts for the litigants." The Supreme Court has itself, on occasion, demanded of
lower court judges that they be "dignified in demeanor and refined in speech, [and] exhibit that
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint…"24

Nothing can be gained from the Court’s exercise of a heavy hand in a matter which has
originated from the Court itself. On the contrary, there is much to lose in imposing penalties on
the outspoken merely because the outspoken have earned the ire of the Court’s members.

They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged. By occupying an exalted seat in the
judiciary, judges in effect undertake to embrace a profession and lead lives that demand
stringent ethical norms.25 In his dealings with the public, a judge must exhibit great self-restraint;
he should be the last person to be perceived as a tyrant holding imperious sway over his
domain,26 and must demonstrate to the public that in the discharge of his judicial role, he
"possess[es] the virtue of gravitas. He should be…dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and
virtuous in character…[H]e must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint… a judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason."27

In my view of a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate moral

authority and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times. It has often been said that the rule of law
requires an independent judiciary that fairly, impartially and promptly applies the law to cases
before it. The rule of law requires a judiciary that is not beholden to any political power or private
interests, whose only loyalty is to the people and to the Constitution that the people have
ordained as their fundamental governing precept. It requires integrity, independence and probity
of each individual judge. To be independent, the judiciary must always remember that it will lose
public support and in a certain sense, its legitimacy, if it does not demonstrate its integrity in its
judicial decisions. It must show a keen nose for the fundamental importance of upholding right
over wrong.
To maintain a life of intellectual integrity, those of us in the judiciary must be buffeted by the
winds of healthful criticism. Direct and informed criticism of judicial decisions strengthens
accountability. As Taft is noted for writing: "[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in their
decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of
theirs is to be subject to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid
criticism .... In the case of judges having a life tenure, indeed, their very independence makes
the right freely to comment on their decisions of greater importance, because it is the only
practical and available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to the
reasonable demands of those they serve."28

This is where academic freedom, when exercised in appropriate measure, is most helpful.
Milton encapsulates free speech as simply the right to "argue freely according to
conscience."29 The value of academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the
right to freedom of expression, lies in the ability of the common man, aided by the expertise
available in the academe, to hold a magistrate accountable in the exercise of his official
functions, foremost of which is the issuance of written decisions. Paragraph 23 of the United
Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers30 states:

Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters
concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human
rights and to join or form local, national or international organizations and attend their meetings,
without suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in
a lawful organization…

The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers "have been formulated to assist Member States in
their task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers," and these "should be respected
and taken into account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and
practice and should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as
judges, prosecutors, members of the executive and legislature, and the public in general." Thus,
faced with the duty of balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has now been
expressly recognized in the international arena, against this Court’s desire to preserve its
exalted role in society by disciplining for offensive language, this Court must examine whether it
has already encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference with the basic rights of
individuals. The realm of public opinion is where the academe, especially our schools and
universities, plays a most crucial role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly legitimizing
its acts, but by constantly reminding the judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally. The
academe is not to be an applause machine for the judiciary; it is to help guide the judiciary by
illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take, by alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent
decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence.

In this regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe Haddon writes: "[t]he value and
preservation of academic freedom depend on an academic environment that nurtures, not
silences, diverse views. The law school faculty has a special responsibility to maintain a
nurturing environment for diverse views because of the importance of the marketplace of ideas
in our teaching and the value we theoretically place on the role of persuasive discourse in the
quest for knowledge. Faculty autonomy takes on significance because it can protect freedom of
inquiry."31 In a certain sense, therefore, because the law faculty can discharge a most
meaningful role in keeping the judiciary honest, there must be recognition given to the special
role of the law faculty in upholding judicial independence.
The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure by the
legal academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial decisions rise up to the
definition of just and well-reasoned decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms
of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. If we have a legal academe that is slothful, that is not
self-disciplined, that covets the closeness to the powers-that-be which an unprofessional
relationship with the judicial leadership can bring, then this refining role of the legal academe is
lost. The legal academe is the preserver of the noble standards of legal reasoning and legal
scholarship. It must itself demonstrate strength and independence and not be punished when
doing so.

Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this country must always be ready to hold
themselves accountable to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the judiciary
has limits to its usefulness and these times do not call for the unbroken observance of such
deference as much as they call for a public demonstration of honesty in all its forms.

I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a
warning to the thirty-five faculty members in connection with the "Restoring Integrity" Statement.
I find the Common Compliance of the thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as
well as the Compliance submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista on 18 November
2010 and by Professor Raul Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find the
separate Compliance of Dean Leonen dated 18 November 2010 and of Professor Owen J.
Lynch dated 19 November 2010 similarly satisfactory, and vote to consider this matter closed
and terminated.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 The news item is also available on the publication’s website at
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirer headlines/nation/view/20100721-282283/High-court-
not-probing-plagiarism.

2
 Atty. Adrian S. Cristobal, Jr., Plagiarism, in What’s in a Name?, Business Mirror, 5
August 2010.

3
 Dated 18 August 2010.

4
 Evan Criddle, who co-authored the article, "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," with
Evan Fox-Decent, wrote a comment in reply to a post written about the issue in a legal
blog. The blog entry to which Criddle commented is the Opinio Juris entry entitled
"International Law Plagiarism Charge Bedevils Philippines Supreme Court Justice",
located at <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-
bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-justice/>; Criddle’s comment was made on 19 July
2010 at 2:44 pm EST.

5
 From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.
6
 From page four of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010. The footnote points to a case
docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC.

7
 From page five of the Resolution dated 19 October 2010.

8
 35 Phil 944, 951 (1916)

9
 A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, 8 August 2008, 561 SCRA 395.

10
 61 Phil 724, G.R. No. 42992, 8 August 1935.

11
 82 Phil. 595, 21 January 1949.

12
 248 Phil. 542, 7 October 1988.

13
 G.R. No. L-27654. 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

14
 Pacuribot v. Judge Lim, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-97-1382, 17 July 1997.

15
 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 45.

16
 Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. CA, G.R. Nos. 135180-81, 16 August
2000, 338 SCRA 282, 299, citing Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 313 SCRA 739 [1999], citing Dee
v. SEC, 199 SCRA 238 (1991).

17
 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; Peo. v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265.

18
 A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 12 December 1995.

19
 Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October
2010, at 2.

20
 William Howard Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Am. L. Rev. 641, 642
(1895)

21
 Michael Abramowicz and Thomas Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decision-
Making, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 965 (2009) at 983

22
 Thomas Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46
Vill. L. Rev. 745

23
 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976)

24
 Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, 19 June 2008, 555 SCRA 217, 235.

25
 Ariosa v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-92-798, 15 November 2000.

26
 Torcende v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238, 24 January 2003.
 27
 Juan de la Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA
218, 227-229.

28
 Supra note 19.

29
 In Areopagitica, John Milton’s philosophical defense of free speech, cited by Justice
Isagani Cruz (Dissenting Opinion), National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653,
5 March 1992, 207 SCRA 1.

30
 Adopted by the Eight United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.

31
 Phoebe Haddon, Academic Freedom and Governance: A Call for Increased Dialogue
and Diversity, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1561

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This treats of respondents’ compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October 19, 2010,
which required respondents, who are professors of the University of the Philippines College of
Law, to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar for having
published a Statement entitled, "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" which appeared to contain statements that were disrespectful to the Court. The
Court’s directive reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal,
Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo
A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan
P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo
Noel S Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 11, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10,
Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during
the pendency of G.R. No. 162330, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before
the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a
dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled
"Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court." x x x

In their Compliance, 35 of the respondents, excluding Professors Owen J. Lynch and Raul V.
Vasquez, take common defense that the statements contained in Restoring Integrity were mere
expressions of their opinion, dispensed in accordance with their duties as members of the bar
and as professors of law. They aver that they acted with the purest intentions, guided by their
duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the Court, and deny that it was their intention to
malign the Court as an institution for its decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.2 They claim
that any reference to Vinuya in their statement was made only to establish and accent the grave
consequences of the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation allegedly committed by
one of the Court’s members. Indeed, they claim that the Statement was intended "to defend the
integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court" and ensure continued confidence in the
legal system and the Judiciary by calling on the Court to take constructive action in the face of
the damaging allegations. They also add that the Statement was meant to address what they
perceived as indifference on the part of the Court owing to certain statements reportedly made
by Supreme Court Administrator and spokesperson, Atty. Jose Midas P. Marquez (that Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona would not take any action on the charges) and their reading of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo’s letter replying to the allegations.

Respondents affirm their loyalty and respect for the Court and claim that as professors of law,
they have a special interest in guarding against plagiarism and misrepresentation to ensure
intellectual honesty among their students. They allegedly released the Statement in support of
"efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law
students and assist in disseminating information regarding law and jurisprudence." Citing similar
commentaries on the issue, they likewise invoke freedom of speech and academic freedom to
justify the publication of their stand on the matter.

Finally, respondents argue that the Resolution amounted to a prejudgment of their liability for
contempt and breach of Canons 1, 11, 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, they invoke their right to due process and plead for an opportunity to
present evidence relative to the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC entitled In the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.

Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista, in her separate Compliance and Reservation, reiterates the
above reservation of her right to due process and request for hearing. She likewise supplements
the above submissions with additional arguments in support of her assertion that she signed the
Statement in the exercise of her freedom of expression.

As to Prof. Owen J. Lynch, Prof. Lynch filed a Manifestation invoking freedom of expression and
asserting that the statement did not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent. He also manifests that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar
as he is an American citizen who is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota.

Prof. Raul V. Vasquez, for his part, likewise submits that he never had any intention of
maligning the Court and alleges that he signed the Statement as he was fundamentally in
agreement with its contents. He further states that he might have been remiss in correctly
assessing the effects of the language employed in the Statement and says that he could have
been more careful.

As regards the charge of violating Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting to
the Court a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement that was not a true and faithful
reproduction thereof, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen submitted the following explanations.

Dean Leonen denies misrepresenting the contents of the Statement or which faculty members
signed and/or signified their intention to sign the same. He avers that there are actually three
versions of the Statement, all with the same contents, but with different signature pages. Two
versions were submitted to the Court: one with the signature pages containing the full roster of
faculty members and the actual signatures of the signatories (which version he calls Restoring
Integrity I) and the other with the retyped signature page containing just the names of the
members who signed, with the notation "(SGD.)" beside their names. This second version he
referred to as Restoring Integrity II. According to him, these two copies arose because after the
original version containing the full roster of faculty members was circulated for signature, he had
the signature pages re-typed to eliminate the blanks prior to posting in the bulletin board. (He
alleges that the practice of re-typing the signature pages was meant to ensure the integrity of
the public issuance as posting the Statement with blanks would open it to vandalism.)

When the re-typed signature page was presented to him by his staff, he noticed that the name
of retired Justice Vicente V. Mendoza was indicated as a signatory even though the latter did
not sign the Statement. He asked his administrative staff about the inclusion and the latter
claimed that she spoke to Justice Mendoza on the phone before the latter flew for the United
States. According to his staff, Justice Mendoza allegedly authorized him to sign on behalf of
Justice Mendoza since the latter agrees with the contents of the Statement but was just unable
to personally affix his signature because he was leaving for the United States the following
week. Dean Leonen claims that he did not have any reason to disbelieve his staff because there
were indeed other faculty members who authorized him to sign the Statement for them. Thus,
he placed full faith and confidence in his staff’s claim and allowed the inclusion of Justice
Mendoza’s name as one of the signatories in Restoring Integrity II which he later submitted to
the Court. Because of this information, also, he believed that the total number of signatories to
the Statement was already 38.

Dean Leonen adds that in September 2010, he received a call from Justice Mendoza, who said
that he will no longer sign the statement "considering that it had already become controversial
and that he did not wish to unduly aggravate the situation." On October 21, 2010, after receiving
a copy of this Court’s Show Cause Resolution, he met with his staff and reviewed what had
transpired in connection with their efforts to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It was then
that he learned that while Justice Mendoza initially agreed to sign the statement, Justice
Mendoza did not exactly authorize him to sign for the latter. Rather, Justice Mendoza merely
inquired "if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was leaving for the United
States." He then realized the full import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in
September.

As regards the omission of the name of Atty. Miguel R. Armovit in the re-typed signature pages
of Restoring Integrity II, Dean Leonen explains that the omission was due simply to
inadvertence.
After a careful study of the respondents’ submissions, I respectfully submit that the above
submissions are SATISFACTORY in view of respondents’ claim of good faith and the fact that a
re-examination of the Statement indeed admits of such claim. Consistent with respondents’
claims, the tenor of the Statement was to call the Court’s attention to the grave allegations and
its effects on the integrity and credibility of the Court and the Judiciary. Indeed, the general
wording of the Statement and its ending paragraphs lend support to respondents’ averments
that the Statement was prompted by the sincere and honest desire to protect the integrity and
credibility of the Judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Given such submissions, I am willing
to afford respondents the benefit of the doubt as to their intentions concerning the forceful
language employed in certain portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement. This is especially so
considering that the subject statements present no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent as to take it out of the protective mantle of the freedom
of speech and expression under the Bill of Rights. A reading of the Statement, with particular
focus on its final paragraphs, will not leave the reader with feelings of contempt for the Court but
only a feeling that the Court must champion the cause of integrity. Furthermore, it should be
noted that our society has developed to the point where critical analysis of information is not in
short supply. The public is nowadays not only more well informed, but it has access to
information with which citizens could make their own independent assessment of pending
issues of public concern, including the fitness and integrity of the members of this Court to
render fair and impartial judgment on the cases before them. However, given the fact that some
isolated portions of the statement were arguably disrespectful, respondents should be reminded
to be more circumspect in their future statements.

As regards Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his explanation is sufficient to exonerate him
from the charge of violation of Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. While it appears that Dean Leonen mistakenly relied on hearsay
information that Justice Mendoza had authorized him to indicate Justice Mendoza as a
signatory to the Statement, still, Dean Leonen’s lapses appear more the result of
overzealousness rather than bad faith or a deliberate intent to do falsehood or to mislead the
Court. Indeed, under the circumstances as they appeared to him, and considering that there
were other professors who had authorized him to indicate them as signatories,3 it was not all too
remiss on his part to indicate Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement upon the
information given to him by his administrative staff. That he acted upon the wrong information
given to him, though telling of some degree of carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence
that is tantamount to bad faith. Hence, there being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there is
no ground to find him liable under Canon 10 and Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Similarly, there is no cogent reason to hold him liable for violation of Rule 10.03 as it likewise
does not appear that Dean Leonen violated any rule of procedure or misused any procedural
rule to defeat the ends of justice. The submission of the Statement to the Court, it should be
noted, was ad hoc.

I therefore vote to NOTE and CONSIDER the explanations submitted by respondents in their

Compliance/s SATISFACTORY with a REMINDER that they be more circumspect in their future
statements considering that the Court also has its own sensibilities.

I also vote to consider this administrative matter CLOSED and TERMINATED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 The Show Cause Resolution inadvertently mentioned Canon 10.

2
 G.R. No. 162230, April 8, 2010.

3
 Footnote 3 of the Compliance of Dean Leonen, p. 5.

[A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC. July 29, 2002.]

IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE

PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA.

DECISION
 KAPUNAN, J.:

On December 11, 2001, the Court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent
Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for
uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) 1 which was then pending
resolution:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty.
Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before the
Court. The statements are italicized for ready identification:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed
by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder
Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of
Estrada.

"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices —
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May — will
most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or
vague," the group said.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

x       x       x

"People are getting dangerously passionate . . . emotionally charged." said lawyer Leonard de
Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign
movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.

x       x       x

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true.

"People wouldn’t just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty
must prevail."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt of
court.

SO ORDERED. 2

In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that
he "suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and
reports" that "the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law" to
protect the credibility of the Court. 3 He explained therein:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(4) In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of the Honorable Members who were
being unfairly dragged and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side of the issue,
was being viciously attacked. To remain silent at this time when the Honorable Court was under
siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to influence the Court in their decision would
and could lend credence to these reports coming from anonymous sources. 4

Respondent admitted further to "having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estrada’s lawyers to declare the
plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness" because he and his group were
"greatly disturbed" by such rumors. 5

Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the
people were "getting dangerously passionate . . . emotionally charged," pending the Court’s
resolution on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder
Law, respondent claimed that such statement was "factually accurate." 6 He also argued that he
was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said
that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger mass
actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II." 7

Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that "the people, wouldn’t just swallow
any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong" as an expression of his opinion and as
"historically correct," citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people
power in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of
pressure from the people who gathered at EDSA to demand that the impeachment process be
stopped for being a farce, and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate
of the Filipino people. 8

While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made
the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. 9

After a careful consideration of respondent’s arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of
wrongs for the violation of said rights 10 must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of
outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of
democracy, as well as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts
and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration
of justice. 11

Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable
for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of
the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. 12

Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements — asking the Court to dispel rumors
that it would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as
such was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the people — as utterances protected
by his right to freedom of speech.

Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court’s integrity and authority, and
interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as
the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. 13

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. 14 It is
a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every
extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them. 15 The Court has
previously held that —

. . . As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of
the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary . . . This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to
an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will
act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. 16

In People v. Godoy, 17 this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the
proceedings and decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his
opinions on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which
they perform the important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade
the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught
its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of
speech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-
being in society by obstructing the course of justice. 18

Clearly, respondent’s utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as
falling within the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not
fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to force the
Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such
statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole,
tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the
impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of
the parties to have their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public
clamor and other extraneous influences. 19

It is respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts
and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice 20 and in the Supreme Court as
the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondent’s utterances as quoted above, while the
case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his
protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on
the Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. G.R. No. 148560 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan [3rd Division] and People of the
Philippines).

2. SC En Banc Resolution dated December 11, 2002.,

3. Answer, p. 2.

4. Id., at 2-3.

5. Id., at 3.

6. Id., at 5.
7. Id., at 6-7.

8. Id., at 7-8.

9. Id., at 10.

10. See Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).

11. Weston v. Commonwealth, 77 SE 2d 405, 409 (1953).

12. People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, 77 (1995).

13. Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, 166 SCRA 316, 354 (1988).

14. Id., at 95.

15. Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542, 547 (1987), citing In re Stolen, 216 NW
127.

16. In re: Sotto, 82 Phil 595, 602-603 (1949).

17. Supra.

18. Supra, at 95, citing State v. Morril, 16 Ark 384.

19. See Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez, supra.

20. In re Sotto, supra, at 602.

 A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015

JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON, Complainants, v. ATTY. ARTURO B.

CEFRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be
present.  Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. 
Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and sister-in-
law.1  Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of
land located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
69244.2cralawred

Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and Juanita.  He
was admitted to the bar in 1996.  He practices law and provides services as notary public in the
Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan.3cralawred

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale4 over a land covered by
TCT No. 69244.  The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita
Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while
the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee.5cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified.  They alleged that they
did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.  Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra.6  The
National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and
Juanita’s signatures were forged.7  This is contrary to Atty. Cefra’s acknowledgment over the
document, which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Munici[pa]lity of Sison, personally appeared
JOHNNY ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and
JUANITA ANUDON, who exhibited to me their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-
indicated, known to me and known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed of
Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is their free act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists of two
pages and have [sic] been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on each and
every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN8cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was physically
impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale.  Johnny and Benita were in the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.9cralawred

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy
and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and
Paran.10cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint11 with this court on
August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer and notary public.

In the Resolution12 dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to comment on the
administrative complaint.  Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for Extension of Time,13 which this
court granted.14  Despite the allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this
court’s order to file a Comment.  This court fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12,
200315 and November 17, 2003.16  In both Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his
Comment.17cralawred

Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest and
commitment.18  Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his
residence on January 14, 2007.19cralawred

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment20 on January 15, 2008.

In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 69244.  He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmy’s wife Helen
Anudon went to his residence to consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT
No. 69244 to Paran.21  Atty. Cefra claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the documents
for the sale, which included the deed of sale and the acknowledgment receipts for
payment.22cralawred

On August 13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed of
Absolute Sale to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon (Loejan)
to have the document signed.23  Viola Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty. Cefra that they
witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document.24  Loejan affixed the signatures for
his father, Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita.25cralawred

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita
“with the full knowledge and permission of the three[.]”26  He allowed this on the basis of his
belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of
his mother’s leg.27  It clearly appeared that Loejan forged the three (3) signatures.  Loejan did
not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his father, uncle, and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he “notarized the questioned document in good faith, trusting in
[complainants’] words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping them out legally
and financially[.]”28cralawred

After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.29cralawred

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared without any
counsel and manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public Attorney’s Office.30  She
also informed the Investigating Commissioner that her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already
passed away.31  The mandatory conference was held on February 20, 2009.32  On the same
day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an Order33 terminating the mandatory conference
and requiring the parties to submit their respective Position Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law.34  In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,35 which requires that “[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”

Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s notarial
commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary public for two
(2) years.  The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six (6) months.36cralawred

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-24937 dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.38  However, they recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be
modifed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual Disqualification from re-
appointment as Notary Public.39  (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary
Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 asking the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
temper the recommended penalty against him.41  In Resolution No. XXI-2014-9342 dated March
21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its
original penalty against Atty. Cefra:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial
practice, if presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice
SUSPENDED for two (2) years.43  (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no longer filed
a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.44cralawred

We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating Commissioner.  Respondent Atty.
Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility in
notarizing a document without requiring the presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this
court previously explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.  Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument.  Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires
preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing
upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45  (Citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.46  This law refers specifically to the
acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and documents.  Section 1(a) of this law
states that an acknowledgment “shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.”

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to
appear in person before the notary public.  Rule II, Section 1 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete
instrument or document;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that
he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he
acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. 
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.— . . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document—

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.cralawlawlibrary

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document
voluntarily affixes his or her signature.  Without physical presence, the notary public will not be
able to properly execute his or her duty under the law.  In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons
Officials,47 we stated that “[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before
the notary public[.]”48  Furthermore, this court pronounced that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very
same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public.  The affiants should be
present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify
the genuineness of their signature.  Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or
spurious document.  In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for
notarization be signed in their presence.  Their function is, among others, to guard against
illegal deeds.49  (Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the
true agreement between the parties.  Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the
integrity of notarized documents.  It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing
in the document are the same parties who executed it.  This cannot be achieved if the parties
are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land.  Even if this is true, Jimmy
and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization.  The
Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely
informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document.  Atty. Cefra should have exercised
vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the
document submitted by the vendee for notarization.  In addition, the possibility of forgery
became real.

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v.

Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the
presence of the parties.  In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents
even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. 
In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of
another despite lack of authorization.54  In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of
disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent-lawyer notarized 22

public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56  This court
suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually
disqualified her from being a notary public.57cralawred

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  This canon requires “[a] lawyer
[to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.”  He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. 
As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the
Complaint lodged against him.  Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested
by the National Bureau of Investigation.  Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15,
2008, more than seven years after this court’s order.  Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect
for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts[.]”

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, “wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court” constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.  Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not
explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in 2008.  Clearly, his disobedience was
willful and inexcusable.  Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction.

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this
court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61  The
lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National
Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62  Likewise, she complied with the order to comment
through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63  This court
found that the lawyer’s “conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate
refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it
also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.’”64cralawred

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into
account all his acts of misconduct.

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to
comply with an order from this court.  Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any,
and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. 
Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any
further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney.  Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, p. 84.
2
 Id. at 1.
3
 Id.
4
 Id. at 5–6.
5
 Id. at 5.
6
 Id. at 2.
7
 Id. at 11.
8
 Id. at 6.
9
 Id. at 3.
10
 Id. at 13.
11
 Id. at 1–4.
12
 Id. at 14.
13
 Id. at 16–17, 26–27, and 36–37.
14
 Id. at 30 and 39.
15
 Id. at 45.
16
 Id. at 50.
17
 Id. at 45 and 50.
18
 Id. at 52–54.
19
 Id. at 60.
20
 Id. at 67–72.
21
 Id. at 67–68.
22
 Id. at 68.
23
 Id. at 69.
24
 Id.
25
 Id. at 70.
26
 Id.
27
 Id.
28
 Id.
29
 Id. at 79.
30
 Id. at 84.
31
 Id.
32
 Id. at 107.
33
 Id.
34
 Id. at 119–120.
35
 Id.
36
 Id. at 120–121.
37
 Id. at 116–117.
38
 Id. at 116.
39
 Id.
40
 Id. at 122–123.
41
 Id. at 123.
42
 Id. at 128.
43
 Id.
44
 Id. at 135.
45
Angeles v. Atty. Ibañez, 596 Phil. 99, 109–110 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
46
 An Act Providing for the Acknowledgment and Authentication of Instruments and Documents
without the Philippine Islands.
47
 312 Phil. 100 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
48
 Id. at 105.
49
Spouses Domingo v. Reed, 513 Phil. 339, 350 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
50
 A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 20 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
51
 A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011, 659 SCRA 130 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
52
 587 Phil. 658 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc].
53
 517 Phil. 236 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
54
 Id. at 238.
55
 A.C. No. 6470, July 8, 2014 [Per C.J. Sereno, En Banc].
56
 Id. at 1–3.
57
 Id. at 8.
58
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 11—A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
59
 Rules of Court, Rule 138, sec. 27, par. (1):

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do.  The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
60
 559 Phil. 211 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
61
 Id. at 224 and 227.
62
 Id. at 223.
63
 Id.
64
 Id. at 224.
A.C. No. 5332               July 29, 2003

JOHNNY K.H. UY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. REYNALDO C. DEPASUCAT, WILLIAM O. SU, and CELSO DE LAS
ALAS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint filed by Johnny K.H. Uy against respondents lawyers,

Reynaldo C. Depasucat, William O. Su and Celso delas Alas, for gross misconduct.

Complainant Uy together with UBS Marketing Corporation (UBS) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City (Branch 43) an action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of
titles and recovery of ownership and possession, with damages against SK Realty, Inc. and
Uy’s sisters, Ban Hua U. Flores and Ban Ha U. Chua, together with their children, namely:
Leonardo U. Flores, Gloria U. Chan, Lily Uy, Lilian Uy, Lilen Uy, Stephanie Chua, Melody Chua,
Wee Kiat Y. Tan, Theresa Regalado and Yolanda Kilayko, all clients of herein respondents.
Upon filing of the said case, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9051, complainant Uy and UBS
caused the annotation of the notice of lis pendens at the back of the certificates of title of
defendant SK Realty with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City. Subsequently, in a resolution
dated November 9, 1995, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping.
Defendants moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens which the trial court granted
in a resolution dated December 8, 1995.1

Complainants Uy and UBS filed their appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 57171. After the parties had filed their respective briefs with the Court of
Appeals and before the latter’s resolution submitting the case for decision was released on
March 10, 1999, respondents filed a pleading dated March 1, 1999, entitled, "Manifestation of
Usurpation of Authority of the Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed Briber of Judges"
which contains the following statement:

10. That, Plaintiff-Appellant Johnny KH Uy had, in fact, confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of
judges, after the judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped
conversations – both actual and by telephone, copies of the decision of the court -

a. in case no. A.M. No. RTJ-92-863, against the Hon. Judge Renato Abastillas, hereto
attached as Annex "C", and also

b. in case no. A.M. RTJ-92-880, against the Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, hereto
attached as Annex "D".2

In the instant administrative complaint, Uy alleges: Respondents, as members of the Bar are
sworn not to do falsehood or consent to the doing of any in court, nor should they mislead the
appellate court by their false, malicious and libelous imputations against him. Respondents’
filing of the subject Manifestation was for the purpose of putting him in a bad light so as to
obtain a favorable judgment for their clients. Respondents without any provocation, reason and
justification and completely unmindful of his honor and feelings submitted such Manifestation
and furnished copies of the same to persons not even parties to the case. The subject
Manifestation contains groundless and false imputations which are totally immaterial, irrelevant
and impertinent to the appealed case.

In their joint supplemental verified comment with counter motion to cite petitioner for contempt of
court, respondents Su and Depasucat contend: Uy’s admission that he negotiated for a
favorable outcome of a criminal case formed part of the decision in Lee vs. Abastillas, docketed
as Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 which led to the dismissal of Judge Abastillas from the service.
The bribery imputation is true. The "bribe and tell scenario" covered by the said Manifestation
was already of public knowledge as it already formed part of the said administrative decision.
There was no indiscriminate distribution of such Manifestation to strangers just to malign the
complainant. Assuming that the allegations in the Manifestation had painted complainant in a
bad light, the same is considered as an absolute privileged communication. The Manifestation is
relevant as it was filed primarily in response to the extra-judicial, illegal and improper attempt of
Uy to reinstate a lis pendens. Uy had tried so many times to annotate a lis pendens on the
subject properties and filed so many cases involving the same properties and therefore, all his
mischiefs are relevant and material to the appealed case.

In his Comment, respondent delas Alas contends: He appeared as counsel of Uy’s siblings in
other cases. He signed the Manifestation as a collaborating counsel after he had read the
transcript of the proceeding where Uy admitted having bribed Judge Abastillas. He is convinced
that Uy does not hesitate to corrupt or destroy the character of persons to suit his needs, thus
he must be exposed. Uy has predilections to file cases against opposing lawyers and to seek
inhibition of judges and justices whenever adverse rulings were rendered against him, thus, his
active participation in bribing a judge is not totally immaterial and irrelevant to the appealed
case.

Acting on the pleadings of the parties, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.3

On April 6, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through Investigating Commissioner
Julio C. Elamparo, submitted its report, to wit:

Accordingly, the issue may be simply stated as follows: Should the respondents be disciplined
for having authored and filed the said manifestation.

....

The undersigned commissioner fully agrees with the respondents that the allegations in their
manifestation with respect to the fact that the complainant is a briber of judges are true and
correct. In fact, records show that complainant’s former counsel has been disbarred by the
Supreme Court because of the bribing incident referred to in the said manifestation. It cannot
therefore be said that the respondents did falsehood or misled the Court of Appeals when they
filed their manifestation.

Does the privilege of filing of a pleading with correct and truthful allegations carries with it the
license to use abusive, offensive, menacing or otherwise improper language?

In this jurisdiction, it cannot be doubted that communications either written or oral made in the
course of judicial proceeding are classified as absolutely privilege communications. However,
this doctrine applies only in such cases where the statement is relevant or pertinent or material
to the case. In this respect, respondents failed to convincingly demonstrate the materiality or
relevance of such statement like "… Johnny Kh Uy has a track record of making a mockery of
our judicial system …had, in fact confessed to "Bribery and Telling On" of judges, after the
judges allegedly refused to give in to their "demands", by using illegally taped conversation both
actual and/or by telephone…" in the appealed case involving recovery of property and
cancellation of title. Furthermore, if such fact is relevant, why did the respondents make such
fact known to the Court of Appeals only when the appealed case has already been submitted for
decision. Respondents’ timing makes their claim of good intention a doubtful claim. It seems
that the real intention is to influence the Court of Appeals in an improper way.

It cannot be doubted that as an advocate, a lawyer has the right to be zealous in the
prosecution or defense of his client’s cause. In fact, it is incumbent upon him to point out errors,
arbitrariness or injustices. He is allowed sufficient latitude of remark in furtherance of the causes
he advocates for his client. But in the exercise of this right, it is incumbent upon him to act with
justice and to give everyone his due.

It is settled that a lawyer who uses abusive or abrasive language shows disrespect to the court
and disgraces the Bar. He then invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power as
respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the respondents, for having used offensive and
abusive language in their "MANIFESTATION OF USURPATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS FROM A SELF-CONFESSED BRIBER OF JUDGES" which has
no relevance in the factual and legal issues then pending resolution before the Court of Appeals
be warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.4

On June 29, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.5

We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondents have used offensive and abusive
language but instead of mere admonition respondents should be reprimanded.

The statement made by respondents that complainant Uy had bribed a judge in A.M. No. RTJ
92-863 was duly proven. Uy who appeared as witness in the said administrative case filed
against Judge Renato Abastillas of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (Branch
50),6 testified that he gave money to the Judge in consideration of the dismissal of a case in
which he had an interest. This admission was lifted from the transcript of the stenographic notes
of the proceedings therein submitted by the respondents and quoted in the Abastillas decision
which was promulgated in 1994.

However, we find nothing on record that supports the statement of the respondents that Uy had
also bribed a judge in Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs. Katalbas-Moscardon,
docketed as AM RTJ 92-880 which we have decided in 1995.7 Notably, in their joint affidavit filed
before the Commission, respondents Depasucat and Su stated that "the pattern of corruption
and illegal wire tapping was repeated by the complainant’s disbarred lawyer Enrique S. Chua, in
A.M. RTJ-92-880, in re Hon. Judge Bethel K. Moscardon, thus institutionalizing the malevolent
practice". However, there was nothing that showed Uy’s participation therein. In fact, a reading
of the court’s decision in the Moscardon case revealed that it was Atty. Enrique Chua, the
lawyer of Uy, who was involved in the said case as a witness in the corruption of Judge
Moscardon and the name of Uy was never mentioned at all. Moreover, during the hearing, the
investigating commissioner took note that there was no copy of the transcript of the
stenographic notes of A.M. RTJ 92-880 presented. Respondents were not able to substantiate
their statement that Uy was involved in two bribing incidents to be branded as "briber of judges".
Respondents have partly made a false imputation against Uy. Half-truths are equally if not more
pernicious than outright lies.

Uy claims that assuming arguendo that he had bribed a judge, the same is irrelevant and
impertinent to the appealed case where the subject Manifestation was filed. On the other hand,
respondents contend that the filing of the subject Manifestation was not attended by malice; that
it falls under the protective mantle of an absolute privileged communication.

The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged has been enunciated in a long line of cases.8 Said
doctrine rests upon public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice,
though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed
and malignant slanderer.9 The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the
promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages.10 Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold,11 and for the felicity of their clients, they
may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase.12 However, such remarks or comments should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety.13

We have stated the test of relevancy, thus:

xxx. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters
privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privileged does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial xxx14

Applying the above rule to the subject Manifestation, we find that the statement that Uy is a
briber of judges is not relevant to the issues presented before the appellate court. Although Uy
was shown to have admitted bribing a judge, the incident did not happen in the case appealed
to the Court of Appeals where the assailed Manifestation was filed. It was not at all pertinent to
Uy’s action for reconveyance of real property, cancellation of titles and recovery of ownership
and possession, with damages. Moreover, if respondents truly believe in the relevancy of the
bribing incident to the appealed case, they could have stated the same in their pleading filed in
the trial court in 1995 or in their appellees’ brief filed before the appellate court considering that
the Abastillas case had already been decided in 1994.

Respondents claim that the subject Manifestation was filed primarily in response to the extra-
judicial, illegal and improper attempt of the complainant to reinstate a cancelled lis pendens
which is subject of the appealed case. While the notice to annotate a cancelled lis pendens was
filed by Uy’s counsel with the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on October 26, 1998, the same
was denied by the Register of Deeds on January 25, 1999 for the reason that the cancelled
notice of lis pendens can only be re-annotated by a court order. Undoubtedly, the action taken
by Uy was improper since the propriety of the cancellation of the notice was one of the issues
raised by Uy before the appellate court. Thus, respondents who had knowledge of the same
have the duty to inform the appellate court, which respondents have done by filing the subject
Manifestation. However, respondents went overboard by further stating in the Manifestation that
complainant "had in fact confessed to Bribery and Telling On of judges, after the judges
allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using illegally taped conversations-both actual
and/or by telephone". It belied their good intention and exceeded the bounds of propriety, hence
not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends
the court before which it is made.15 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.16 It must be remembered that the language
vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.17 It has been said that a lawyer’s language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.18

It is the duty of the respondents as members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.19

The IBP aptly observed that the Manifestation was filed only after the appealed case had
already been submitted for decision which made respondents’ claim of good intention in filing
the same a doubtful claim. While the records show that the subject Manifestation was filed with
the Court of Appeals on March 1, 1999 and the appellate court’s resolution submitting the case
for decision was dated March 10, 1999, we agree with the IBP’s conclusion that the filing of the
Manifestation was a clear attempt on the part of the respondents to influence the mind of the
court against complainant Uy and to decide the appeal in favor of their clients.

We find respondents to be at fault and therefore they should be reprimanded for having done
so.1âwphi1 A higher penalty is not called for considering that it is clear that respondents were
merely over-zealous in ensuring the victory of their clients and, that they honestly thought,
although erroneously, that by branding complainant as a "briber of judges", they were justifying
their allegation in the Manifestation that complainant "has a track record of making a mockery of
our judicial system".

In their Comment, respondents Su and Depasucat pray that complainant be cited for contempt
of court for denying under oath that he is a confessed briber of judges and of accusing
respondents of indiscriminately furnishing copies of the subject Manifestation to strangers in the
appealed case.

We find nothing contemptuous on Uy’s desire to protect his honor from what he perceived to be
defamatory imputation against him since it is within his right to do so. While he may have denied
the established fact that he bribed Judge Abastillas, however, his denial as to the other bribing
incident was proven to be true since respondents failed to substantiate the same. Furthermore,
although Uy failed to prove his allegation that respondents indiscriminately furnished copies of
the subject Manifestation to strangers to the appealed case, the same is not grave enough so
as to warrant the exercise of contempt powers of the Court. There was no sufficient showing of
bad faith in Uy’s filing of the present administrative complaint against respondents.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the respondents are hereby REPRIMANDED for
MISCONDUCT in using offensive and abusive language in their Manifestation and WARNED
that a repetition of the same in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The motion of respondents to cite complainant in contempt is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), J., no part.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, volume II, p. 78.

2 
Rollo, Volume I, pp. 6-7.

3 
Resolution dated April 4, 2001; Rollo, Volume I, p. 141.
4 
Rollo, Volume I, pp. 147-148.

5 
Rollo, Volume I, p. 144.

6 
Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno, complainants, vs. Judge Renato Abastillas,
respondent and Judge Renato Abastillas, complainant, vs. Atty. Enrique S. Chua,
respondent, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and A.C. No. 3815; 234 SCRA 29.

7 
247 SCRA 145.

8 
People vs. Sesbreno, 130 SCRA 465 citing US vs. Salera 32 Phil. 365.

9 
Id., citing People vs. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947.

10 
People vs. Malit 114 SCRA 348 citing Sison vs. David, 1 SCRA 60.

11 
Gutierrez vs. Abila, 111 SCRA 658 citing Dorado vs. Pilar, 104 Phil 743.

12 
Dorado vs. Pilar, supra at p. 748.

13 
Gutierrez vs. Abila, supra.

14 
Tolentino vs. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396, 400 citing Ruling Case Law, vol. 17, p. 336,
quoted with approval in Smith Bell & Co. vs. Ellis, 48 Phil 475, 481-482.

15 
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 18.

16 
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

17 
Gutierrez vs. Abila, supra, citing Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441.

18 
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, supra citing 5 Martin, op. cit., p.97.

19 
Id., citing Section 20 (f), Rule 138, Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 159374               July 12, 2007

FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of
the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair.
Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally
charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born
on December 12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took
their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her
and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before
the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed
that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however,
had a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to
take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at
night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected
her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of
the Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there.
He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of
RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and
drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing
him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by
the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their
personal problems.4

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court
in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

x x x           x x x          x x x

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

x x x           x x x          x x x

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody
of minors.

x x x           x x x          x x x

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.8 (emphases supplied)

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of
its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the
merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will
result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in
obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs
are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not
have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].10

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs
of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA
8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is
merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by
the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On leave)
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(No part)
CANCIO C. GARCIA**
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.
** No part.

1
 Both parties accused each other’s parents of constant meddling in their family life.

2
 Rollo, pp. 44-56.

3
 Id.

4
 Id., pp. 37-43.

5
 First Division.

6
 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices
Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis
(retired) concurring. Rollo, pp. 19-26.

7
 G.R. No. 154598, 16 August 2004, 436 SCRA 550.

8
 Id.

9
 Id.

10
 Id.

11
 Section 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court.
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J               February 13, 2009
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-121-CA-J]

GENARO SANTIAGO III, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the Thirteenth [13th] Division, Court of
Appeals, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By Ist Indorsement1 dated January 3, 2008, the Court Administrator referred to this Court’s Clerk
of Court for appropriate action the verified Complaint dated December 27, 2007,2 with
enclosures, of Genaro Santiago III (complainant) against Court of Appeals Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and gross
incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged unjust judgment in CA-GR CV No.
84167, "Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the Philippines," which was promulgated on
December 3, 2007.3

The antecedent facts of the case follow:

Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City a Petition for
Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of
Pantaleona Santiago and Blas Fajardo.

By Decision of September 2, 2004, Branch 220 of the Quezon City RTC granted the
petition.4 The Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-GR CV No. 84167.

The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison (Justice Gonzales-Sison) of the
appellate court’s Thirteenth Division of which respondent was Chairperson. Completing the
composition of the Division (of three) was Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso).

On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report,5 which was used as basis for
the Division’s consultation and deliberation.6 By letter of July 18, 2007 addressed to Justices
Gonzales-Sison and Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent from the Report.7 Justice
Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letter of
July 19, 2007, to take a second look at respondent’s Dissenting Opinion,8 as "the reasons
[Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be ignored by plain technicality."9

In view of his dissent, respondent requested on August 23, 2007 the Raffle Committee of the
Court of Appeals to designate two associate justices to complete the composition of a Special
Division of five.10 The Raffle Committee, by Special Order dated August 24, 2007, designated
Justices Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz) and Lucas P. Bersamin (Justice Bersamin) as
additional members of the Special Division.11

Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondent’s Dissenting Opinion.12 Justice
Bersamin expressed his concurrence with the Report of Justice Gonzales–Sison,13 while Justice
Cruz expressed his concurrence with respondent’s Dissenting Opinion.14lawphil.net

Respondent’s Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of the Special Division and
the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison with which Justice Bersamin concurred became
the Dissenting Opinion.

The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set aside the September 2, 2004 Decision of
the Quezon City RTC. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was received by
the appellate court on December 20, 2007.15 On December 27, 2008, complainant filed the
present complaint.

On January 9, 2008, complainant filed a Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition [of
respondent] pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 13716 on the ground that he (complainant)
had filed this administrative complaint against respondent. The appellate court denied the
motion by Resolution of April 20, 2008.17

In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter alia, that:

xxxx

. . . despite the overwhelming evidence of complainant, all corroborated by several government

agencies like the original duplicate certificate of OCT No. 56, certified copy of Decree No. 1275,
PC Crime Laboratory report, Bureau of Lands record, tracing cloth of survey plan, blue print
plan, certified technical description – all approved by the Bureau of Lands, among others and
adduced and offered in evidence during trial, Associate Justice Enriquez deliberately twisted the
law and existing jurisprudence to grant the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant. For
this reason, this administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS
INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against respondent Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
No one is above the law.18 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of January 22, 2008,19 respondent filed his
Comment,20 branding the complaint as "a mere nuisance," a "dirty tactic" in order to harass him
for the purpose of making him inhibit from handling the case the decision on which was pending
consideration. He denies any irregularities attendant to his arrival at the Decision which, he
maintains, has factual and legal basis and is not contrary to law and jurisprudence.

At any rate, respondent contends that the administrative complaint was filed prematurely
considering that complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision was pending, and that
assuming that the Decision was indeed unjust and contrary to law, then Justices Cruz and
Veloso, who concurred in his ponencia, should also be charged.

Finally, and at all events, respondent contends that the administrative complaint is not the
proper forum for the determination of whether the Decision is erroneous or contrary to law and
jurisprudence.

In compliance with the directive of the Court,21 complainant filed a Reply dated 20, 2008 to
respondent’s Comment22 in which he contends that the cases cited by respondent to support the
Decision are not applicable.

The complaint is bereft of merit.

That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and the appreciation of evidence and
facts is erroneous, do not necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a
judge, unless the Decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to
cause injustice.23

The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge,
but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. An
administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed
order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty…

The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, unless
he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error
or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable…The failure
to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily
render a judge administratively liable.24 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in support of the Decision and his
appreciation of the facts and evidence were erroneous, since there is no showing that the
Decision, reconsideration of which was still pending at the time the present complaint was filed,
is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to cause
injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.

The principle of "judicial immunity" insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from
being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in
good faith.25 To hold otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice could be infallible in his
judgment.26

. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in the
exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v.
Johnson, " … it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon
his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This concept
of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the
integrity and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies
to all grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who
sits as a court.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of charges against a single member
of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by
respondent in his individual capacity. It was a product of the consultations and deliberations by
the Special Division of five. Consider the following pronouncement in Bautista v. Abdulwahid:28

It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by
Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate
court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. 29 (Underscoring supplied)

In fine, while this Court will not shirk from its responsibility to discipline members of the bench if
they err, it too will not hesitate to shield them if they are charged with unmeritorious charges that
only serve to disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 1.

2
 Id. at 2-9.

3
 Id. at 10-20. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Vicente S.E. Veloso. Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Marlene
Gonzales-Sison dissented, with the latter writing a dissenting opinion.

4
 Decision, rollo, pp. 46-55.

5
 Id. at 58-74.

6
 Id. at 56.

7
 Id. at 92-93.

8
 Id. at 97-102.

9
 Id. at 94.

10
 Id. at 95.

11
 Id. at 96.

12
 Id. at 103.

13
 Id. at 104.

14
 Id. at 107-110.
15
 Id. at 123-135.

16
 Id. at 136-141.

17
 Id. at 142-144. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with the concurrence of
Justices Edgardo P. Cruz, Lucas P. Bersamin, Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene
Gonzales-Sison.

18
 Id. at 8

19
 Id. at 23.

20
 Id. at 36-45.

21
 Id. at 145.

22
 Id. at 152-155.

23
 Cortes v. Sandiganbayan, 467 Phil. 155 (2004).

24
 Id. at 162-163 (2004).

25
 Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Cosico, 434 Phil. 753, 762 (2002).

26
 Fernandez v. Verzola, A.M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 369, 373.

27
 Pabalan v. Guevarra, A.M. No. 333-CJ, November 24, 1976, 74 SCRA 53, 58.

28
 A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 428.

29
 Id. at 435-436. Vide Rondina v. Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-05-43, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA
1, 12; Cortes v. Sandiganbayan, 467 Phil. 155, 162.
 [A.C. No. 5474. August 28, 2003.]

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is a certain level
of competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards of a lawyer’s conduct
set in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of professionalism,
the lawyer charged in this case virtually abandoned his client’s cause.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin against respondent
Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latter’s failure to formally offer
the documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to
represent him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand
Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid
contract price for the repair of the house of the defendants in the case. 1 The case went its
course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed
to file his formal offer of exhibits. 2 Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order the full text of which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the
defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not
formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the Court.

Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension period of TEN
(10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty.
Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days within which to
comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the
hearing of this case for the presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.

On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr.,
counsel for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the
plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of
TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the
continuation of the hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the
defendant.cralaw : red

Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not
complied with the submission of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the
part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the
oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the
records and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further
motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of
the plaintiff to further prosecute this case.

Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation
of evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 o’clock
in the morning. 3

The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file a verified Affidavit-
Complaint 4 dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court, wherein he
also alleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he
already terminated the services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to
return the originals of the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent finally
handed over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the
complainant’s wife.

In a Resolution 5 dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent to comment on
the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2)
extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the
respondent’s comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 6

Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. 7 Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by the
complainant, are undisputed.

Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
found the respondent liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely. The salient portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March
4, 2003 of the Investigating Commissioner are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Complainant’s contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiff’s Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001
and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10 of
complainant’s Affidavit) reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to file the
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the
prejudice of respondent’s client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed to offer any
explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of
time given him by the trial court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondent’s
obligation to complainant as the latter’s counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, and respondent’s dereliction of this duty has prejudiced
the interests of respondent’s client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondent’s
obligation to take all measures to protect the interests of his client in accordance with Canon
(sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility but it was respondent’s negligence or
omission which has caused damage to such interests. 8

In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondent’s disregard of the resolution of this
Court directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failing
to file his answer when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier
conduct belies impudence and lack of respect for the authority of this Court.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties
as counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial court several extensions of time: first,
an extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second,
another extension of ten (10) days from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing
and the court noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must
also be emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8,
2001 and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001
until May 7, 2001 when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore,
respondent had three (3) months and nine (9) days within which to file the formal offer of
exhibits. 9 The respondent did not bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or
extenuation of his inaction.

Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every
member of the liar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CANON 12 — A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so.

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

x       x       x

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

x       x       x

CANON 19 — A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

It is indeed dismaying to note the respondent’s patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He
committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to
give entire devotion to his client’s cause. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of
exhibits among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case,
his failure constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the
respondent’s mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his client’s
interest, adversely affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded
the public’s trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level
best and to observe full fidelity to the courts and his clients. 10 This means that in relation to his
duty to his clients he should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in
representation of their causes.

We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat, 11 to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."cralaw virtua1aw library

As we reiterated in Aromin, Et. Al. v. Boncavil, A.C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor
to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 12

This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. 13 Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee
or free. 14 Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the
profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is
both unprofessional and unethical.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months. We find the recommended penalty commensurate with the offense committed.

In Aromin v. Boncavil, 15 this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a
written offer of evidence despite the trial court’s directive.

The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this
Court held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon 16 constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the
respondents in the cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones, 17 Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan, 18
Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal 19 for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that
the repetition of a similar violation will be even more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Vide: Complaint dated Nov. 19, 1998, Rollo, pp. 8–11.

2. Vide: Orders dated Feb. 26, 2001, March 30, 2001, and May 7, 2001, Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29–
30, respectively.

3. Rollo, pp. 29–30.

4. Id., at pp. 1–7.

5. Id., at p. 38.

6. Resolution dated Aug. 7, 2002, Rollo, p. 47.

7. Footnote text not found in the original.

8. Id., at pp. 5–7.

9. Vide: Orders dated Feb. 26, 2001, March 30, 2001, and May 7, 2001, supra.

10. Attorney’s Oath; Form 28, Appendix of Forms, Rules of Court.

11. Basas v. Icawat, A.C. No. 4282, August 24, 2000, 338 SCRA 648.

12. Id. at 651.

13. Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419 (2001).

14. In Re: Atty. David Briones, 415 Phil. 203 (2001).

15. Aromin V. Boncavil, A.C. No. 5135; September 22, 1999, 315 SCRA 1.

16. 337 Phil. 555 (1997).

17. 415 Phil. 203 (2001).

18. A.C. 5558, March 7, 2002.

19. A.C. No. 1372, June 27, 2002.

A.C. No. 4549               December 2, 2013

NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION FELIPE-

DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A.
Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we required
respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16, 1996.3 On
August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of Tme To File
Comment.4 He requested for additional period of 30 days within which to file his comment citing
numerous professional commitments. We granted said request in our October 2, 1996
Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment. Thus on January 29,
1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative Case For Resolution
Without Comment Of Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his right
to file comment.

On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.7

The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-Palma

who set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8

The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next hearing
was set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel.11

Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing,
complainants moved to calendar the case.12

The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on
January 12, 1999.13

During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their
Position Paper.1âwphi1 Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14

Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16

It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation.17

In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the Petition; he
then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no discussion was made
regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated
November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City while respondent is the counsel for the defendants therein; that respondent committed
dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the
parties therein are strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants are half-brothers
and half-sisters of complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before
Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that
respondent introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No.
A-95-22906; and that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No.
A-95-22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-
15656-A. Next, complainants averred that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading
captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that
said pleading is not in accordance with the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the
proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to the said
pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent violated his duty
as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of
₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine, complainants charged
respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-
95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified
Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in
order to determine whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the
issue of whether the complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 being half-brothers and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on
the authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in
Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed
was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly,
these prerequisites cannot be accomplished in this administrative case. The resolution of
whether the parties are related to each other appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of
Documents and Damages. The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate children of the
late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein, as represented by the
respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the issue of filiation must
be settled in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case. The same is true with
regard to the issue of authenticity of the Marriage Certificate which was submitted in evidence
as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.

Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed
against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667
pending before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement that they
are strangers to each other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the defendants
in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed
as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate.
Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by the respondent. In fine, these issues are
proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. We held in Anacta v.
Resurreccion18 that -

x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of
the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the
matter involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court's disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal
liablity, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the
matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the
purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19

Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain
as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this
instance, however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of
his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going
through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter
of prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the
case is pending, the Court deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the
filing of another one, depending on the final outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the
above pronouncements, the Petition filed by complainants must be dismissed without prejudice.
However, we cannot end our discussion here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt
of our directive, respondent did not file his comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as
ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.

Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His
conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders
and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that
a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of
the Court in administrative cases against lawyers.22

Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the infraction
committed by the respondent.23

ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to give

due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that
commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246
dated November 19, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549
is DISMISSED without prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal
records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO D. CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-8. Filed by Nestor V. Felipe, Alberto V. Felipe, Aurora Felipe-Orante,
Asuncion Felipe-Domingo, Milagros Felipe Cabigting and Rodolfo V. Felipe.

2
 Id. at 44.

3
 See RegistryReturn Receipt, id (aatched to the dorsal portion).

4
 Id. at 49-50.

5
 Id. at 51.

6
 Id. at 53-54.

7
 Id. at 70.

8
 IBP records (attached to the rollo ), p. 1.

9
 Id. at 3.

10
 Id.

11
 Id. at 4-5.

12
 Id. at 6-8.

13
 Id. at 9.

14
 Id. at 11.

15
 Id. at 12-25.

16
 Id. at 12.

17
 Id., unpaginated.

18
 A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA 352.

19
 Id. at 365-366.

20
 A.C. No. 7861, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 188.

21
 Id. at 199.

22
 Sibulo v. Ilagan , 486 Phil. 197, 203-204 (2004).
 23
 In Sibulo v. Ilagan, id. at 204-205, the Court also reprimanded the therein respondent
ratiocinating in this wise: Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the
administrative charge against him and is being taken to task for his intransigence and
lack of respect, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension would not be warranted
under the circumstances. In previously decided cases where a respondent lawyer was
likewise found to have ignored lawful orders of this Court, suspension was imposed only
where the respondent was also found guilty of violating his duties as a lawyer, such as
the duty to observe good faith and fairness in dealing with his client, or to serve his client
with diligence and competence. To the Court's mind, a reprimand and a warning are
sufficient sanctions for respondent's disrespectful actuations directed against the Court
and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions in the present case would be more
consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is "not so much to
punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the
judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court."

[G.R. No. 151081. September 11, 2003.]

TOP RATE CONSTRUCTION & GENERAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. PAXTON

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND BAIKAL REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.

RESOLUTION
 BELLOSILLO, J.:

FORUM SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related
causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action. 1 It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets. 2 What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party
who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in
which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action. 3

In the instant case, we probe what is perceived to be a blatant demonstration of forum

shopping, outrageous abuse of judicial process and gross disrespect for the authority of this
Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

For a flashback on the factual backdrop of this case: Five (5) civil actions involving the
ownership of Lots Nos. 5763 and 5765 — New situated in Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite, were
jointly tried by RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite. 4 One of the complaints was filed by respondent
Paxton Development Corporation against petitioner Top Rate Construction and General
Services, Inc., and against respondent Baikal Realty Corporation and the Register of Deeds of
Cavite, for declaration of nullity of the Torrens Title for Lots Nos. 5763-A and 5763-B as part and
parcel of Lot No. 5763, docketed as Civil Case No. 1124-95, with prayer for damages. TOP
RATE was represented in this civil case by the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L.
Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 13 March 1998 the trial court rendered a joint Decision on the five (5) civil actions, which
included Civil Case No. 1124-95 —

. . . declaring Paxton Development Corporation’s TCT No. T-557274 which covers and
describes Lot No. 5763 (5763-A and 5763-B) and TCT No. T-559147 which covers and
describes Lot No. 5765-New as the lawful and valid certificates of title evidencing the lawful
ownership of Paxton Development Corporation over said lots and improvements thereon . . .
declaring Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc.’s TCT No. T-147755 for Lot 5763-A
and TCT No. T-147756 for Lot 5763-B as null and void and of no force and effect . . . directing
Top Rate . . . to peacefully surrender possession of these lots to Paxton, in the event that they
are in possession of said lots . . . directing the Register of Deeds for the province of Cavite to
cancel the aforementioned titles of Top Rate . . . 5

TOP RATE and the other parties in the five (5) civil cases, Baikal Realty Corporation and Hi-
Tone Marketing Corporation, filed their respective notices of appeal from the Joint Decision, 6
docketed as CA-G.R. No. CV-60656. TOP RATE was represented in the appeal by the Gana
Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and/or Elmer E. Manlangit.

On 21 May 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on the various appeals affirming
in toto the Joint Decision of the trial court. 7
On 28 June 2001 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision where it was
represented by the Gana Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit. 8 In due time, the other party-appellants followed suit. 9 Despite notice PAXTON did
not file its Comment, 10 while BAIKAL as one of the appellants moved on 27 November 2001
for the early resolution of the pending motions for reconsideration. 11

On 14 December 2001 the appellate court promulgated a Resolution denying all motions for
reconsideration. 12

On 26 December 2001 TOP RATE through a Manifestation informed the Court of Appeals that it
filed on 21 December 2001 by registered mail a Manifestation and Motion of even date which
was attached as annex thereof. 13 The Manifestation and Motion prayed —

. . . 2. That due to compelling reasons, the Resolution dated December 14, 2001 be RECALLED
and SET ASIDE . . . 4. That thereafter, this Honorable Court squarely resolve on the merits the
issues raised by Toprate, Baikal and Hi-Tone in their separate Motions for Reconsideration; and
5. That the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Toprate and the reliefs prayed for therein be
granted.

The Manifestation and Motion was signed and filed in behalf of TOP RATE by the same counsel
of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E.
Manlangit. 14 Incidentally, on 14 January 2002 the Court of Appeals received the Manifestation
and Motion from the postal service. 15

On 7 January 2002, despite the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 pending with
the Court of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review from the adverse CA Decision and Resolution. The motion was signed by
TOP RATE’s counsel of record Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L.
Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit. 16 Furthermore, the motion contained a
"Verification/Certification" under oath executed by one Alfredo S. Hocson, President of TOP
RATE, that —

. . . I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court within five days from notice
thereof.

It may be observed that the Verification/Certification did not mention the pending Manifestation
and Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals.

Earlier, the other appellants BAIKAL and HI-TONE filed before this Court their respective
motions for extension of time to file a petition for review of the adverse CA Decision and
Resolution. 17

On 30 January 2002 this Court denied TOP RATE’s motion for extension of time to file petition
for review "for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the Court of Appeals . . . ." 18 Also in
separate Resolutions of even date, this Court denied the motions for extension of time to file
petition for review separately filed by BAIKAL and HI-TONE on the identical ground — "for lack
of showing that petitioner has not lost the fifteen (15) — day reglementary period to appeal . . . it
appearing that the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed judgment is not
stated in the motion." 19

On 4 February 2002, regardless of the denial of its motion for extension of time to file petition for
review, and the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 still to be resolved by the Court
of Appeals, TOP RATE filed with this Court its Petition for Review assailing the CA Decision of
21 May 2001 and Resolution of 14 December 2001, and praying that —

. . . the Decision dated May 21, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 be set
aside and a new one issued . . . confirming TOP RATE’s lawful ownership of Lots 5763-A and
5763-B, Imus Estate, as well as the validity and authenticity, of its TCT Nos. T-147755 (Lot
5763-A) & T-147756 (Lot 5763-B), both issued by the Cavite Register of Deeds . . . Declaring as
absolutely null and void and no force and effect Paxton’s TCT No. 557274 (Lot 5763), Serapio
Cuenca’s 1995 TCT 541994 (Lot 5763), and Baikal’s TCT 542566 (Lot 5763-B) . . . Awarding
TOP RATE the damages as prayed for in the Answer. 20

The Petition for Review dated 4 February 2002 was signed by the same law office of Gana &
Manlangit through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit. 21 The petition included
a "Secretary’s Certificate" executed by TOP RATE Corporate Secretary Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana
stating thus —

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation elevate to the Supreme Court the
adverse resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 60656 entitled "Paxton
Development Corporation v. Top Rate Const. & General Services, Inc., Et Al.," and "Hi-Tone
Marketing Corp. v. The Estate and/or Heirs of Serapio Cuenca, Et. Al." and that its President,
Arch. Alfredo S. Hocson be authorized to represent the Corporation and sign the Petition for
Review on Certiorari and all the pleadings to be filed therein. 22

The petition also contained a Verification/Certification signed under oath by TOP RATE
President Alfredo S. Hocson declaring in relevant parts —

. . . I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; to the best of my knowledge no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if I
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, I undertake to report this fact to this Honorable Court within five days from notice
thereof. 23

For the second time, TOP RATE’s Verification/Certification did not state that its Manifestation
and Motion dated 21 December 2001 was then still pending with the Court of
Appeals.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 18 February 2002 BAIKAL filed with this Court a Manifestation and Motion alleging that it
"opts to wait for whatever decision the . . . Court of Appeals may render in the . . . Manifestation
and Motion filed [with the Court of Appeals] by Top Rate Construction and General Services,
without prejudice, however, to such remedies as may be available to [Baikal Realty Corporation]
in case of an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals."cralaw virtua1aw library

On 6 March 2002 this Court resolved to deny TOP RATE’s Petition for Review "for petitioner’s
failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002." 24

On 15 March 2002 TOP RATE moved for reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution of 30
January 2002 "by granting Top Rate’s timely filed motion for extension of time, and requiring the
respondent PAXTON to comment on the timely filed Petition for Review on Certiorari." 25 The
motion, which was signed again by the same Gana and Manlangit Law Office through Attys.
Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit, did not mention the Manifestation and Motion of
21 December 2001 awaiting decision in the Court of Appeals. 26

Surprisingly, on 3 April 2002, TOP RATE filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review on Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 contending that the filing of its petition before this
Court was "premature." For the first time, TOP RATE bared to this Court the existence of its
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 pending in the Court of Appeals which had
allegedly superseded its Petition for Review filed with this Court as the Manifestation and Motion
was taken up by a Division of Five of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., with Associate
Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Mariano C. del Castillo as additional members. 27 The
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari prayed for the
withdrawal of TOP RATE’s petition for review without prejudice to its refiling in the future if
warranted.

On 24 April 2002 this Court denied with finality TOP RATE’s motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 30 January 2002, and noted without action its Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. It also appears that the denial of the motions for extension
of time to file petition for review separately filed by BAIKAL, and HI-TONE had become final and
executory. 28

Meanwhile, on 22 April 2002 the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals resolved to defer action
on the Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 "until after the Supreme Court has
acted on [Top Rate’s] ‘Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari.’"
29

On 31 May 2002, apparently in response to the abovementioned Resolution of the Court of

Appeals, TOP RATE filed with the appellate court a Manifestation informing the Division of Five
that it may now proceed to resolve TOP RATE’s Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December
2001 in light of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 24 April 2002 which "noted without
action" its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari of 2 April
2002. 30 The Manifestation was signed by TOP RATE’s lawyer of record Gana & Manlangit Law
Office through the same lawyers Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit. 31

On 3 May 2002 this Court made an entry of judgment for its Resolution of 6 March 2002
denying TOP RATE’s Petition for Review on Certiorari. 32

On 2 August 2002, notwithstanding the previous denial with finality of TOP RATE’s motion for
extension of time to file petition for review and its Petition for Review itself, the Division of Five
of the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision granting the appeal of TOP RATE
and modifying the joint Decision of RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, thus —

(1) TOPRATE is hereby declared to be the true and lawful owners (sic) of Lots 5763-A and
5763-B, and the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 147755 for Lot No. 5763-A, and 147756 for
Lot No. 5763-B, issued in the name of defendant-appellant TOPRATE, are hereby proclaimed to
be valid and lawfully issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite; and (2) The Cavite Register of
Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel PAXTON’s Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-557274 for
Lot 5763 of the Imus Estate, and any and all titles issued covering the subject properties, for
being spurious and void, and of no force and effect (underscoring and emphasis in the original).
33

Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos penned a Dissenting Opinion averring that the
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 December 2001 of TOP RATE should have been dismissed
since it was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Sec. 2, Rule 52, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. 34

On 23 August 2002 PAXTON filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended Decision. 35
This was followed on 13 September 2002 by a Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by
BAIKAL. 36

On 22 October 2002 the Court of Appeals received a Letter of Transmittal from the Judicial
Records Office of this Court directing the Clerk of Court of the appellate court to "return the
records of [the instant case] to the . . . court of origin and to submit to this Court proof of such
remand, both within five (5) days from notice hereof." 37

On 8 November 2002 TOP RATE filed with this Court an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment through the same Gana & Manlangit Law Office as represented by Attys. Luis Ma. Gil
L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit. 38

On 9 December 2002 this Court denied TOP RATE’s Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
and required TOP RATE and its counsel to show cause why they should not be held liable for
forum shopping within five (5) days from notice. 39

On 27 January 2003 TOP RATE represented by its President Alfredo S. Hocson and its lawyer
Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit filed
their Compliance asserting that they had no intention to commit the "abhorrent and detestable
practice of forum shopping;" assuming that there was forum shopping, they did so neither
willfully nor deliberately but solely to protect the interest of TOP RATE as shown by the filing of
the Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 2 April 2002 as
soon it was certain that their Petition for Review on Certiorari was premature; the Manifestation
and Motion dated 21 December 2001 filed with the Court of Appeals could have been denied as
a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, and with such denial TOP RATE would have
also lost its period to file an appeal by certiorari to this Court; and, finally, neither litis pendentia
nor res judicata would have arisen in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still review
the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals on their Manifestation and Motion
dated 21 December 2001. 40

On 4 February 2003 TOP RATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution dated 9
December 2002, praying that its motion to recall entry of judgment be granted.

In the meantime, on 27 March 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution directing its
Clerk of Court to "return the records of this case to the court of origin," without however making
any ruling on what the "court of origin" would be executing as the final and executory decision,
nor any statement on the status of PAXTON’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Amended
Decision. 41 This Resolution seems to be a belated response to the Letter of Transmittal
coming from the Judicial Records Office of this Court directing the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals to return the records of the instant case to the trial court.

On 3 April 2003 PAXTON filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the 27 March 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals purportedly setting aside. its Amended Decision of 2 August
2002, although nothing in that Resolution validated PAXTON’s submission.

On 6 May 2003 PAXTON filed another Manifestation with this Court alleging that TOP RATE
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution with RTC-Br. 21 of Imus, Cavite, which was signed
this time by a certain Atty. Carmelo M. Mendoza in behalf of TOP RATE.

On 16 June 2003 this Court issued a Resolution denying with finality TOP RATE’s motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of 9 December 2002 which in turn denied petitioner’s urgent
motion to recall entry of judgment, and further requiring TOP RATE to comment on the twin
Manifestations of PAXTON.

In its Comment dated 18 July 2003, TOP RATE asserted that nowhere was it stated in the 27
March 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that the appellate court was invalidating its
Amended Decision of 2 August 2002, and that since the filing of its Petition for Review with this
Court was premature, the subsequent dismissal thereof did not set aside the Amended
Decision, which allegedly stands as the decision to be executed by the trial court.

The issues to be resolved herein are: (a) whether Top Rate Construction and General Services,
Inc., and its counsel Gana & Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and
Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of forum shopping, and whether such transgression is willful and
deliberate; (b) whether Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are administratively
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and, (c) whether the Amended
Decision of 2 August 2002 may be reversed and set aside in the instant proceedings for being
void on its face.

We have no doubt that Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. and its lawyer Gana &
Manlangit Law Office through Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit are guilty of
forum shopping. Although TOP RATE as principal party executed the several certifications of
non-forum shopping, Attys. Gana and. Manlangit cannot deny responsibility therefor since Atty.
Manlangit notarized the certifications and both of them definitely knew the relevant case status
after having invariably acted as counsel of TOP RATE before the trial court, the Court of
Appeals and this Court.

Clearly, in seeking to reverse the 13 March 1998 Joint Decision of the trial court and the 21 May
2001 Decision of the appellate court and to perfect ownership of Lots 5763-A and 5763-B upon
similar causes and the same reliefs, TOP RATE and its lawyers committed forum shopping
when they resorted simultaneously to both this Court by means of their Petition for Review
on Certiorari and the Court of Appeals through their Manifestation and Motion dated 21
December 2001. This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result of their twin devious
strategies, and shows not only their lack of faith in this Court in its evenhanded administration of
law but also their expression of disrespect if not ridicule for our judicial process and orderly
procedure.
Furthermore, while TOP RATE and its counsel moved to withdraw their Petition for Review for
whatever such maneuver was worth, they did so only after they had been rebuffed in this Court.
In doing so, they themselves proved that their coordinated actions were carried out purposely to
increase their chances of securing a favorable decision. As has been held, a party is said to
have sought to improve his odds of obtaining a sympathetic decision or action where after an
unfavorable decision has been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before
the courts, he seeks to abandon the adverse proceeding and concentrate his attention on the
remaining case. 42

The instant case is similar to E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority. 43 In E. Razon, Inc.,
petitioners after filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order in the Supreme Court filed an hour later a similar petition before the Regional
Trial Court and, having been assured of a favorable action by the latter court, then sought the
withdrawal of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forum shopping, the
Court holding that" (t)he acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of
malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes." 44

What aggravates the transgression perpetrated by TOP RATE and its lawyers is that they
deceived the highest court of the land. In all the certificates of non-forum shopping they
presented to this Court, they did not reveal the existence of their Manifestation and Motion
dated 21 December 2001 which they claimed was still pending before the Court of Appeals.
They divulged this "secret" only after their motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review and their Petition for Review on Certiorari were denied by this Court, and only after they
had filed their motion for reconsideration of such denials.

If TOP RATE and its counsel genuinely believed that their recourse to this Court was
"premature," why then did they still ask for a reconsideration of the Resolutions denying their
motion for extension and Petition for Review? Evidently they were venturing on two (2) fronts,
and presumably simply" ‘awaiting" auspicious word or two on their Manifestation and Motion of
21 December 2001 before finally disclosing their "real intent." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Worse, in their attempt to extricate themselves from the prejudicial Resolutions of this Court,
TOP RATE and its counsel had the temerity to ask for the withdrawal of their Petition for
Review, again on the insolent assertion that their resort to this Court was "premature." For the
record, it took them four (4) months from 21 December 2001 when they filed their Manifestation
and Motion up to 3 April 2002 when they submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review on Certiorari, to concoct the theory of "prematurity!"

To be sure, there is no merit in the claim that the Petition for Review initiated by TOP RATE and
its lawyers was "premature." TOP RATE and its lawyers are estopped from claiming that this
initiatory pleading was "premature" for it was their unwavering representation before this Court
that the Court of Appeals had already rendered a final and appealable decision when they filed
their motion for extension of time and ultimately their Petition for Review. The filing of such
petition presupposes the finality of the judgment subject of appeal.

In any event, Sec. 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (which is a restatement
of Sec. 8, Rule 9, of the old Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals) explicitly provides
that" (n)o motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has
previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension
of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for
reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned." Verily, although a motion
for reconsideration is still before the Court of Appeals, the motion is deemed vacated once the
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked.

The lawyers of TOP RATE are not excused from engaging in forum shopping for the reason that
their client’s interests were then paramount. On the contrary, this assertion coming as it does
from their Compliance of 25 January 2003 in reply to our show cause order, very well confirms
the identical causes and their reliefs of their Petition for Review on Certiorari and Manifestation
and Motion dated 21 December 2001 as both were calculated to quash the adverse decisions of
the Court of Appeals.

It bears stressing that a lawyer truly worth his oath pledges allegiance not only to his clients but
also to society, the legal profession and the courts, for the client’s cause is not all encompassing
nor perpetually overriding. Moreover, if their purpose in filing the Petition for Review even while
the Manifestation and Motion was pending with the Court of Appeals is to protect some
entitlements of TOP RATE, are they implying that the Supreme Court is incapable of defending
such asserted right? But the court a quo can? We certainly cannot unfold our compassionate
mantle in this instance, and instead, we must lay our disciplinary hand to strike down the
reprehensible ploy employed by TOP RATE and Attys. Gana and Manlangit.

TOP RATE and its lawyers cannot rectify their forum shopping by arguing that litis pendentia
and res judicata would not have arisen in the instant case since the Supreme Court may still
review the pertinent decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals on their Manifestation and
Motion dated 21 December 2001.

This argument is patently misplaced. For precisely, the concurrent pleadings of TOP RATE and
its lawyers exhibit the element of litis pendentia and res judicata alleged by them to be absent,
i.e., the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in any event and
regardless of which party is successful, since the action of this Court on the Petition for Review
will surely bind the other pending action on the same cause in the court a quo. Moreover, how
can this Court still resolve on appeal such "subsequent" decision when it has already decided
with finality the same cause upon which the "later" decision was supposedly based? The
purported review by this Court of the "ensuing" decision would have been barred by res
judicata. Incidentally, in Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission 45 where forum
shopping was detected, the infringing cases were filed with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court.

We also rule that the forum shopping pulled off by TOP RATE and its lawyers is willful and
deliberate. As reflected in the "Secretary’s Certificate" authorizing the President of TOP RATE
to file the necessary pleadings in court to question the adverse decisions of the Court of
Appeals, Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana as TOP RATE Corporate Secretary attested to the collective
desire to file the Petition for Review even while the Manifestation and Motion of 21 December
2001 was still pending with the Court of Appeals.

In addition, the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals which prayed for the
same reliefs as the Petition for Review before this Court was deemed filed as early as 21
December 2001, yet its existence was disclosed to this Court only on 3 April 2002 when TOP
RATE and its lawyers submitted their Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review
on Certiorari. What is more, this underhanded sense of honesty was triggered only after the
adverse Resolutions of this Court were promulgated. Prior to this confession, TOP RATE as
abetted by its lawyers executed certificates of non-forum shopping in its motion for extension of
time to file petition for review and its Petition for Review itself, which contained no reference to
the filing or pendency of the Manifestation and Motion filed with the Court of Appeals. In fact,
even as TOP RATE moved to reconsider the denial, of its motion for time and Petition for
Review, there was no mention whatsoever of its existence.

We also keenly observe how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit instigated the
Court of Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001, thereby
consummate and realize the fruits of their forum shopping, when they nonchalantly alleged in
one of their Manifestations before the Court of Appeals that the appellate court may already
proceed to resolve TOP RATE’s Manifestation and Motion despite their knowledge that their
Petition for Review had been denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition
was not granted.

Obviously, under the foregoing state of facts, forum shopping was crafted willfully and
deliberately with the sole objective of endorsing whichever proceeding would yield favorable
consequences to TOP RATE’s interests.

On the second issue, we hold that Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the
Gana and Manlangit Law Office, counsel of record of TOP RATE, are administratively liable for
grotesque violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In arriving at this conclusion, we
strongly note how Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit prompted the Court of
Appeals to rule on their Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001 and thereby complete
the process of forum shopping, despite their knowledge that their Petition for Review had been
denied with finality and that their motion to withdraw such petition was not granted.

Under Sec, 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, willful and deliberate forum
shopping constitutes direct contempt of court and a cause for administrative sanctions, which
may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum shopping is found. 46

The lawyers of record of TOP RATE, as all other lawyers, should be reminded that their primary
duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration thereof contravenes their oath of office.

"A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, promote respect for law and
legal processes; 47 shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening the confidence in the legal system, 48 shall observe the rules of procedure and not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice, 49 shall not file multiple actions arising from the same
cause, 50 shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness;
51 shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law; 52 and, shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client . . ." 53

This Court has time and again warned counsel of litigants not to abuse court processes,
especially not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. Regrettably,
TOP RATE’s counsel of record failed to, internalize and observe with due regard the honorable
tenets of the legal profession and the noble mission of our courts of justice.

In previous cases 54 the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in forum
shopping ranged from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law. In the instant
case, the suspension of Attys. Gana and Manlangit from the practice of law for six (6) months
from finality of this Resolution should make them realize the seriousness of the consequences
and implications of their abuse of judicial process and disrespect for judicial authority.

Finally, on the third issue, this Court has no choice but to reverse and set aside the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 2 August 2002 for being void on its face. To be
sure, the instant proceeding is a collateral attack on such decision since the issue of its validity
is involved in this action only as a mere incident. 55 Of course, this attack is proper only when
the assailed judgment is null on its face, as where it is patent that the court which rendered the
judgment in question has no jurisdiction. 56 Parenthetically, forum shopping is consummated
although the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action. 57

In Macabingkil v. People’s Homesite and Development Corporation 58 we held that a collateral

attack is proper against a challenged judgment which is void upon its face or where the nullity of
the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. The nullity must be shown from the
averments of the questioned decision or the documents in the record itself, and not upon mere
errors of judgment but on the ground that the court had no power or authority to grant the relief
or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties or both. 59 A proceeding for contempt of
court is an appropriate collateral vehicle for declaring a judgment void, provided that the
aforementioned requisites for such action are present. 60

When the Division of Five of the Court of Appeals promulgated the Amended Decision of 2
August 2002, TOP RATE had already filed with this Court its motion for extension of time to file
petition for review and thereafter its Petition for Review. What is worse, even before the
Amended Decision was handed down, this Court had already denied TOP RATE’s motion for
extension of time to file petition for review "for lack of service of a copy of the motion on the
Court of Appeals . . .;" thereafter denied its Petition for Review "for petitioner’s failure to take the
appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45
in relation to Section 5 (a), Rule 56, in view of the denial of petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file petition in the resolution of 30 January 2002;" and, denied with finality TOP RATE’s
motion for reconsideration of the adverse Resolutions, as well as noted without action its
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court of Appeals has lost jurisdiction to rule on the
Manifestation and Motion of 21 December 2001. As earlier mentioned, Sec. 15 of the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals bluntly affirms that "no motion for reconsideration or
rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition
for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or
motion is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be
deemed abandoned." As the jurisdiction of this Court had been summoned, it was too late in the
day for the appellate court to act upon the Manifestation and Motion and enter a new decision
on the merits.

Our ruling in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals 61 is instructive. In that case, the
trial court granted plaintiff a writ of preliminary injunction against defendants, which the latter
challenged before the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the immediate lifting thereof. While the certiorari petition to review the writ was still pending in
the appellate court, defendants filed in the trial court a joint petition to dissolve the writ, offering
to post a counterbond for that purpose. As prayed for, the trial court dissolved the writ and
denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals upon being
apprised of the trial court’s action dismissed the petition for certiorari for having become moot
and academic.
The issue in Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. was whether the trial court continued to have control
of the writ of preliminary injunction even after the same had been raised to the Court of Appeals
for review. This Court ineluctably ruled —

The answer is no. After the LRTA and Phoenix had elevated the writ of preliminary injunction to
the Court of Appeals for determination of the propriety of its issuance . . . the trial court
(notwithstanding the absence of a temporary restraining order from the appellate court) could
not interfere with or preempt the action or decision of the Court of Appeals on the writ . . . whose
annulment was sought therein by Phoenix and the LRTA. In petitioning the trial court to lift the
writ . . . Phoenix and the LRTA engaged in forum-shopping. After the question of whether the
writ . . . should be annulled or continued had been elevated to the Court of Appeals for
determination, the trial court lost jurisdiction or authority to act on the same matter . . . They
improperly tried to moot their own petition in the Court of Appeals — a clear case of trifling with
the proceedings in the appellate court or of disrespect for said court . . . Judicial courtesy
behooved the trial court to keep its hands off the writ . . . and defer to the better judgment of the
Court of Appeals the determination of whether the writ should be continued or discontinued . . .
The private respondents’ application to the trial court for the dissolution of the writ . . . that was
pending review in the Court of Appeals was a form of forum shopping which this Court views
with extreme disapproval. The lower court’s proceeding being void for lack of jurisdiction, the
writ of preliminary injunction should be reinstated, and the petition to annul the writ . . . should
be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping . . . 62

The absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo is manifest not only from the
voluminous rollo compiled by the Court of Appeals but also from the four corners of the
Amended Decision. From the case record, we will find copies of TOP RATE’S’ motion for
extension of time to file petition for review, its Petition for Review, the adverse Resolutions of
this Court denying the motion for extension of time to file petition for review and the Petition for
Review itself. The case record also informs us of the denial with finality of TOP RATE’s motion
for reconsideration of the unfavorable Resolutions of this Court as well as the noting without
action of its Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition dated 2 April 2002. From these
circumstances alone, we can clearly infer lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
promulgate the Amended Decision.

Moreover, in the 22 April 2002 Resolution of the Division of Five; action on the Manifestation
and Motion dated 21 December 2001 was deferred "until after the Supreme Court has acted on
[Top Rate’s] ‘Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review on Certiorari." 63 This
implies that the appellate court was well aware that TOP RATE had summoned the authority of
this Court. Finally, in the Dissenting Opinion which forms an integral part of the Amended
Decision, there are unmistakable references to the Petition for Review which was filed with this
Court while the Manifestation and Motion was still pending in the Court of Appeals —

On April 24, 2002 this Court deferred action on appellant TOP RATE’s Manifestation and Motion
dated December 21, 2001 . . . due to the pendency in the Supreme Court of TOP RATE’s
Motion to Withdraw the Petition for’ Review on Certiorari it earlier filed therein . . . On June 7,
2002 this Division received a copy of the Supreme Court’s Resolution dismissing with finality
TOP RATE’s Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution dismissing TOP RATE’s Petition for
Review . . .

Undoubtedly, we can nullify the Amended Decision in the instant case since the dearth of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule upon the Manifestation and Motion can be plainly
discerned not only from the case record but also from the text of the assailed decision itself.

WHEREFORE, we Resolve to (a) REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision of 2
August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-60656 and REINSTATE its Decision of
21 May 2001 (affirming in toto the Joint Decision of 13 March 1998 of the RTC-Br. 21, Imus,
Cavite); (b) DECLARE Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit of the Gana and
Manlangit Law Office as well as its client Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., in
CONTEMPT of this Court and DIRECT Atty. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana, Atty. Elmer E. Manlangit and
Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc., to each pay a fine of P10,000.00 within five
(5) days from finality of this Resolution; and, (c) SUSPEND from the practice of law Attys. Luis
Ma. Gil L. Gana and Elmer E. Manlangit for six (6) months effective from finality of this
Resolution, with warning that any future violation of their duties as lawyers will be dealt with
more severely.

Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. shall PAY double costs in this instance.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the Bar records of Attys. Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana and
Elmer E. Manlangit, and served upon the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite, the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper
dissemination among its chapters all over the country, and for whatever appropriate action they
may deem proper to take under the premises.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 155618, 26 March 2003; Young v. Keng Seng,
G.R. No. 143464, 5 March 2003; Executive Secretary v. Gordon, 359 Phil. 266 (1998).

2. Ibid.

3. Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88705, 11 June 1992, 209 SCRA
738; Villanueva v. Adre, G.R. No. 80863, 27 April 1989, 172 SCRA 876.

4. The civil cases were docketed as Civil Case No. 1124-95 for Declaration of Nullity of Torrens
Title with Damages, "Paxton Development Corporation v. Top Rate Construction and General
Services, Inc., Baikal Realty Corporation and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite;"
Civil Case No. 1125-95 for Declaration of Nullity of Torrens Title with Damages and Preliminary
Injunction, "Paxton Development Corporation v. Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation, Baikal Realty
Corporation and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite," Civil Case No. 1134-95 for
Cancellation of Title with Damages, "Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. The Estate and/or the
Heirs of Serapio Cuenca, represented by Francisco Cuenca, Paxton Development Corporation,
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., in his capacity as Director of Lands Management Bureau, and the
Register of Deeds of Cavite;" Civil Case No. 1224-95 for Annulment of Titles and Quieting of
Titles, "Baikal Realty Corporation v. Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation, Paxton Development
Corporation, Top Rate Construction and General Services, Inc. and Register of Deeds of
Cavite," and, Civil Case No. 1286-96 for Declaration of Nullity of T.C.T. No. 11258 of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite and Damages, "Paxton Development Corporation v. Hi-Tone
Marketing Corporation and the Register of Deeds for Cavite;" CA Rollo, pp. 7–8.

5. Penned by Judge Roy S. del Rosario, RTC-Br. 21, Imus, Cavite; CA Rollo, pp. 70, 77.

6. CA Rollo, pp. 81, 91.

7. Penned by Associate justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate

Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole of the Second Division; CA Rollo, pp.
477–494.

8. CA Rollo, pp. 522–536.

9. Id., pp. 537–545, 548–559.

10. Id., p. 560.

11. Id., p. 575.

12. Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate

Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division; CA
Rollo, pp. 578–580.

13. CA Rollo, pp. 581–588.

14. Id., p. 587.

15. Id., pp. 602–608.

16. Rollo, pp. 3–6.

17. CA Rollo, pp. 590–592, 594–597.

18. Rollo, p. 7.

19. CA Rollo, pp. 914, 915.

20. Id., pp. 613–692; Rollo, pp. 9–83.

21. Ibid.

22. Rollo, p. 43.

23. Id., p. 41.

24. Id., p. 84.

25. Id., pp. 86–93.

26. Id., p. 91.

27. Id., pp. 94–98.

28. CA Rollo, pp. 1089–1090, 1115.

29. Promulgated by the Division of Five composed of Associate Justice Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos as Chairman with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, Mercedes Gozo-
Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo, as members, CA Rollo, p. 922.

30. CA Rollo, pp. 927–928.

31. Id., p. 928.

32. Rollo, p. 111.

33. Penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and concurred in by Associate justices
Teodoro P. Regina and Mariano C. del Castillo; CA Rollo, pp. 943–964, 959.

34. Concurred in by Associate justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, CA Rollo, pp. 965–968.

35. CA Rollo, pp. 975–992.

36. Id. pp. 1002–1011.

37. Id., p. 1035.

38. Rollo, pp. 116–154.

39. Id., p. 166.

40. Id., p. 181.

41. Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino and concurred in by Associate Justices
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, Rodrigo V. Cosico and Mercedes Gozo
Dadole; CA Rollo, pp. 1132–1137.

42. Executive Secretary v. Gordon, supra.

43. Resolution in G.R. No. 75197, 31 July 1986 (unrep.).

44. Ibid.

45. G.R. Nos. 89095 and 89555,6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 146.

46. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Electrification Administration, G.R. No. 93924,
23 January 1991, 193 SCRA 250; Villanueva v. Adre, supra; Vda. de Tolentino v. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 61756, 19 April 1989, 172 SCRA 555; Resolution in E. Razon, Inc. v. Philippine Ports
Authority, supra.

47. Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility.

48. Id., Canon 1.02.

49. Id., Canon 10.03.

50. Id., Canon 12.02.

51. Id., Canon 15.07.

52. Id., Canon 19.

53. Id., Canon 19.01.

54. See Note 46.

55. Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93687, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 705.

56. Ibid.

57. Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra; Villanueva v. Adre, supra.

58. No. L-29080, 17 August 1976, 72 SCRA 326.

59. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 59979, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 143.

60. See e.g. People v. Pareja, supra; Montinola v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 36155, 26 October 1989,
178 SCRA 677.

61. See Note 41.

62. Id., pp. 745–747.

63. Promulgated by the Division of Five composed of Associate Justice Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos as Chairman with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, Mercedes Gozo-
Dadole, Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo, as members; CA Rollo, p. 922.
G.R. No. 127495               December 22, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NOLITO BORAS Y DOE, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

For allegedly raping a six year-old girl, Nolito Boras was convicted of statutory rape by the
Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Hence, this appeal questioning his
conviction.

On December 13, 1991, while Melanie Medalla’s parents were sleeping in their house at
Barangay Bahay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, she remained downstairs playing alone. At around
9 o’clock in the morning of that day, Nolito Boras, herein accused-appellant, went to her and
invited her to go with him. Since she is familiar with the accused-appellant as neighbor, she was
cajoled to go with him. When they arrived at a guava tree near the coconut plantation, which is
about 15 meters from her house, accused-appellant told her "magkitoan"1 which means "we will
have sex." Obeying the instruction of accused-appellant, she removed her panty. Thereafter,
she was placed "on top and in-between accused-appellant’s legs"2 who then inserted his penis
into her vagina. While accused-appellant was satisfying his salacious desire, Cirilo Guirela, the
victim’s uncle arrived. When she saw her uncle Cirilo, she ran away. Thereafter, Cirilo told
Jesus Amenia, brother-in-law of accused-appellant, that the latter raped his niece. Jesus
Amenia got angry with the accused-appellant then proceeded home with the latter.

On December 14, 1991, Cirilo reported the matter to the Barangay Captain3 and was advised to
report the incident to the police authority of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.4 The police advised the
examination of the victim at the Libmanan District Hospital.

On December 15, 1991, Dr. Cynthia S. Algery of Libmanan District Hospital examined the six-
year-old victim. The examination revealed hymenal laceration at 3 o’clock caused by any organ
which is inserted into the vagina, like a penis, and hypremia of the introitus (redness found at
the entrance of the vagina).5 While being examined, the doctor asked the victim what happened
and the victim described the person who raped her.6

On February 12, 1992, an information for the crime of rape was filed against Nolito Boras y Doe
alleging-

"That on or about the 13th day of December 1991, at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, at Brgy.
Bahay, Municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with violence
and force, intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Melanie Medalla, a six (6) years old (sic),
against her will and the offended party suffered damages.

"ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."7

Upon arraignment on May 18, 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, on December 22, 1992, counsel for the accused–appellant manifested in court that
he noticed something strange with the accused-appellant and asked that the latter be examined
by a psychiatrist to determine his mental fitness. The trial court advised the counsel to file a
formal motion for the examination of the accused. Thereafter trial ensued.

On June 16, 1993, the defense presented accused-appellant. When asked about his personal
circumstances, he answered that his name is Diosdado Macapagal;8 that he does not know the
name of his father and his mother; that he does not know whether he has a brother and sister;
that he does not know Tinagis Penal Farm where he is presently confined; that he does not
know how he was able to come to court and who escorted him. On such note, the trial court
issued an Order setting forth the foregoing declarations, with further pronouncement that
accused-appellant in all appearances seems to be normal but is feigning insanity. Thus, the
Provincial Warden of Tinagis Penal Farm was directed to bring accused-appellant to Don
Susano Rodriguez Mental Hospital at Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur for necessary physical and
mental examination and observation in order to determine whether he is insane or not, and
whether he has the necessary faculties to undergo trial. The Chief of Susano Rodriguez Mental
Hospital was directed to admit and conduct the necessary examination and submit a written
report to the trial court on the mental condition of the accused within 15 days after the last
examination/treatment. Pending the submission of the report, the hearing was suspended. After
the issuance of the aforementioned Order, accused-appellant rendered two songs, one after
another, after the trial court requested him.9

On May 2, 1995, the Bicol Regional Hospital - Department of Psychiatry submitted its report on
the mental status of Nolito Boras remarking that accused-appellant was "coherent and relevant"
and that he was "free of psychotic signs and symptoms." The remarks further stated that
accused-appellant knows the case filed against him and that his anxiety or apprehension was
due to fears of being incarcerated in jail.10

After trial, judgment was rendered convicting accused-appellant, thus -

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds and so holds that the accused Nolito
Boras is found guilty of the offense of statutory rape of Melanie Medalla, a six (6) year old girl at
the time of the rape and, therefore, sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and is ordered to pay Melanie Medalla the amount of P50,000.00 for indemnity. No
pronouncement as to cost.

"SO ORDERED."11

Accused-appellant now appeals questioning his conviction for rape, assigning as error the
admission of Exhibit "B", which is a photocopy of the certificate of livebirth of the victim.

Initially, to avoid criminal liability, accused-appellant feigned insanity. To bolster such imagined
dementia, accused-appellant offered his father’s testimony declaring that accused-appellant
was afflicted with a mental defect since childhood. As observed by the trial court, accused-
appellant is normal. In this regard, the trial court’s observation of the demeanor and deportment
of witnesses, as a rule, will not be interfered with, considering that the behavior, gesture,
inflection of voice and manner of responding to questions propounded to witnesses are best
available to the trial court. It is not appropriate to calibrate anew such observations on the basis
alone of the cold transcript of stenographic notes unless such findings are clearly shown to be
arbitrary. In fact, the trial court was not remiss in its duty in determining the mental capacity of
accused-appellant when it ordered accused-appellant’s confinement in a hospital for medical
and psychiatric evaluation which examination revealed that accused-appellant is "sane and
coherent." The foregoing steps clearly demonstrate that the judge had sufficiently and
effectively satisfied the two components of "insanity test" that will effectively guarantee accused-
appellant’s right to a fair trial, which are: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to
provide counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.12

Accused-appellant was convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code13 which provides
that rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age, thus-

"Article 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

"x x x x x x x x x"

In statutory rape, there are two elements that must be established prior to conviction of this
crime, namely: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman
is below twelve years of age.14

As to the first element, accused-appellant denied having sexual contact with the victim and
challenges the latter’s credibility. After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find the
victim’s testimony credible. From the victim’s narration, it was clear that there was sexual
intercourse. The victim even demonstrated in court how she was raped by the accused-
appellant in squatting position by holding her hips.15 She narrated that she felt pain and when
she was crying, accused-appellant stopped thrusting his organ. She declared that she was not
able to shout because during the sexual contact, accused-appellant was covering her
mouth.16 Her credible testimony alone suffices to establish accused-appellant’s guilt.17 In rape,
mere touching by the male’s organ, or instrument of sex, of the labia of the pudendum of the
female’s private part is sufficient to consummate rape.18 But when the victim is below 12 years
old, sexual contact of the male’s sex organ with the woman’s private part consummates rape
and it is not required to prove force, intimidation, or consent.19 The victim’s declarations were
corroborated by the testimony of her uncle who witnessed the bestial act. Such testimonies
were further supported by the medical findings of Dr. Algery who examined the victim two days
after the incident. The medical report shows that there was penetration by the male organ into
her genitalia.

The victim even testified to other occasions of rape committed against her by accused-appellant
prior to December 13, 1991.20 However, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for the alleged
rapes committed other than the one charged in the information. A rule to the contrary will violate
accused-appellant’s constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.21 Such other alleged rapes committed which are not alleged in the
information may be taken only as proof of specific intent or knowledge, plan, system or
scheme.22

Anent the second element as to the age of the victim when the crime was committed, accused-
appellant questions the admission of the photocopy of the birth certificate of the child invoking
Section 3, Rule 130. Accused-appellant argues that the failure of the prosecution to prove the
circumstances that will warrant the admission in evidence of the said photocopy, renders the
same inadmissible and he cannot be convicted of statutory rape since the age of the victim was
not proven with reasonable certainty. It is clear from the records that complainant Melanie
Medalla was born on October 23, 1985.23 Besides, under Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. In
the case at bar, the photocopy of the birth certificate was formally offered in evidence and
marked as Exhibit "B". It was offered to prove (a) the fact of birth of the victim, and (b) the fact
that the victim was below twelve years old when she was ravished on December 13, 1991. The
defense objected to the purpose for which Exhibit "B" was being offered,24 but did not object to
the presentation of the photocopied birth certificate which is merely treated as a secondary
evidence. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this
secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence,25 and the same is deemed admitted
and the other party is bound thereby. Even so, if the evidence objected to was not received, it
would not have varied the conclusion arrived at by the court as to the correct age of the victim
considering that the victim and her mother testified as to her age.26 The testimony of the mother
as to the age of her child is admissible in evidence for who else would be in the best position to
know when she delivered the child. Besides, the court could very well assess whether or not the
victim is below twelve years old by simply looking at her physique and built.

It must be stressed that in dealing with rape cases of children, especially those below twelve
years of age, due care must be observed by the trial court in handling the victim. In fact, more
often than not, the grueling experience in the trial court in the course of direct and cross-
examination is more traumatic than the fact of rape itself. On such occasions, mishandling of
victims lead to psychological imbalances which, if not properly treated by medical experts will
lead to an abnormal behavioral response against the idea of sex itself and disturbed interaction
with the opposite sex or of the same sex. The frightful experience of rape committed to children
who are bereft of "mundane wiles"27 necessitates the highest degree of tact, patience and
diplomacy. No woman, especially a child of tender years would exactly remember step-by-step
the sexual intercourse in the hands of the maniacal beast. It is enough that the child was able to
explain in her own way that there was sexual intercourse. By subjecting her into explaining
whether she was forced or intimidated is excessive. For proof of force and intimidation is
unnecessary in statutory rape. Considering that there is a medical report substantiating the
allegations made by the victim, the manner of examination of the victim must be tempered.
Especially in this case, since the child is only six years old who remains uncorrupted. In rape,
mere touching of male’s organ to the pudendum of female’s organ is enough to consummate
the crime. Whether the organ was fully erect or not, to a child of six years of age, slight
penetration consummates rape. Thus, asking questions like-

"Q: Did you have any opportunity at that time when you were raped to hold the penis of Nolito
Boras?

"A: No, Sir.

"Q: At the time, when you were raped by Nolito Boras, was his penis hard or soft?

"A: Hard, sir"28

and

"Q: Did you see your Uncle Cerilo Guirela after the accused Nolito Boras stop pushing and
pulling his penis to your vagina or while he was still in the process of pushing and pulling his
penis to your vagina?

"A: Nolito Boras was not yet finished pushing and pulling his penis to my vagina."29 are
unnecessary, uncalled for and excessive queries.1âwphi1 Imputation of rape against a neighbor
cannot be concocted with ease for malicious reasons by parents of a six-year-old child because
it would cause more harm than good. Aside from the traumatic experience of rape, the victim’s
story of defloration must withstand not only the examination in court but also the medical
examination of the victim’s private parts by a licensed physician.

Lastly, at the time of the commission of rape on December 13, 1991, the victim was only six (6)
years old. Statutory rape committed in 1991 is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The present
law provides that when the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years of
age, death penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the retroactive application30 of the law will
be unfavorable to accused-appellant, the latter is fortunate enough to be meted only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Had it been committed after the enactment of the new law, this Court will
not hesitate to impose the penalty of death. The award of P50,000.00 representing civil
indemnity is proper. In addition thereto, accused-appellant shall pay P50,000.0031 representing
moral damages without necessity of proof other than the fact of rape plus P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, abuse of confidence should be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance. The victim trusted accused-appellant in going with him upon the
latter’s invitation on account of her familiarity with him as their neighbor.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment convicting accused-appellant of statutory rape is

hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages IN ADDITION to the
P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
TSN, p. 15, December 22, 1992.

2 
RTC Decision, p.1; Rollo, p. 125.

3 
TSN, p. 20, June 23, 1992.

4 
Ibid., pp.12-15.

5 
Records, Exhibit "A" p. 4; TSN, p. 4, October 12, 1992

6 
TSN, p. 5, October 12, 1992.

7 
Rollo, p. 8; Records, p. 1.

8 
Namesake of former Philippine President.

9 
TSN, pp. 3-5, June 16, 1993.

10 
Records, pp. 86-87.

11 
Rollo, p. 23.

12 
People vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, en banc, June 19, 2000.

13 
Now Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to Republic Act 8353,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

14 
People vs. Andres, 253 SCRA 751 at p. 755 [1996].

15 
TSN, pp. 5-6, December 22, 1992.

16 
Ibid.

17 
See People vs. Antido 278 SCRA 425, at p. 440 [1997].

18 
People vs. Mahinay 302 SCRA 455, at p. 479 [1999].

19 
People vs. Lagrosa, Jr. 230 SCRA 298, at p. 305 [1994].
 20 
TSN, p. 9, December 22, 1992.

21 
Article III Section 1 in relation to Section 14(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution.

22 
See People vs. Antido 278 SCRA 425, p. 453 [1997].

23 
Records, Exhibit "B", p. 5.

24 
TSN p. 3, March 19, 1993.

25 
See Heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 298 SCRA 172 [1998].

26 
TSN, p. 8, December 22, 1992; TSN, p. 10, March 18, 1991.

27 
People vs. Lagrosa, Jr. 230 SCRA 298, p. 306 [1994].

28 
TSN, p. 6, December 22, 1992.

29 
TSN, p. 7, December 22, 1992.

30 
Article 22, Revised Penal Code. Retroactive effect of penal laws.- Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.

31 
See People vs. Batoon, 317 SCRA 545 [1999].

A.C. No. 8124, March 19, 2019

ATTY. FERDINAND S. AGUSTIN, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. DOMINGO C. LAENO, ATTY.

ROMEO R. ROBISO, ATTY. REGINALDO D. BERGADO, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondents Attys. Domingo C. Laeno, Romeo
R. Robiso and Reginaldo D. Bergado.

Atty. Laeno and the mother of complainant Atty. Ferdinand S. Agustin, Marcelina Agustin,
agreed to the sale of a house and lot registered under E.M. Laeno and Associates for
P6,500,000.00. In the agreement to sell and the completion of the sale thereof, Marcelina was
represented by her daughter Perpetua. After the property was transferred in the name of
Marcelina, Perpetua entered into a rental agreement with Atty. Laeno at P20,000.00 per month
over the same property.1

Later, Atty. Laeno started to miss rental payments and when asked, refused to vacate the
premises. After Marcelina through her son Atty. Agustin instituted an ejectment case against
Atty. Laeno, it was discovered that the sale of the above-mentioned property was covered by
two (2) Deeds of Absolute Sale executed and signed by Atty. Laeno and both were notarized by
Atty. Bergado. None of these documents reflected the true consideration of the property. One
said it was for P2,000,000.00 and the other said it was for P2,500,000.00. The Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is convinced that the undervalued
consideration in the two deeds is to avoid payment of the proper taxes. Moreover, Atty. Laeno
offered one of these bogus deeds as evidence before the Supreme Court. The Commissioner
also noted that the other respondent, Atty. Bergado, all owed the said two deeds to be notarized
although both refer to one and the same property; notarized at the same date since both
documents bear the same notarial document number as Doc. 138; Page No. 28; Book VII,
Series of 2002.2

In the ejectment case, Atty. Laeno denied dealing with MarceJina and recognized only Perpetua
as the beneficial and absolute owner of the subject property. He further claimed that there is an
unpaid balance of P1,500,000.00. According to the Commissioner, Atty. Laeno made it appear
that Perpetua's loan with the wife of Atty. Laeno was connected with the consideration of the
sale on the subject property as the unpaid portion.3

Furthermore, a certain Carolina Nielsen through Atty. Bergado filed a civil case against
Perpetua, and several court orders in the case were annotated on Marcelina's title. There is also
the case for the rescission of the sale to Marcelina where respondent Atty. Robiso was the
counsel of Atty. Laeno.4
 
In his evaluation, report and recommendation, The Investigating IBP Commissioner absolved
Atty. Robiso from any administrative liability. The Commissioner, however, found Atty. Laeno
guilty of misconduct for executing two (2) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering one (1) property and
one (1) transaction; instituting several suits as a ploy to avoid being evicted from the property
despite a final adjudication in the ejectment suit; and knowingly introducing a bogus deed of
sale as evidence. Similarly, Atty. Bergado is guilty of affixing his seal as a notary on the two (2)
Deeds of Sale covering one and the same property, and of assisting in causing several
annotations on Marcelina's property although the latter was never a party to the case.

The IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), in affirming the findings of the Investigating IBP
Commissioner, issued RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-464 on April 16, 2013.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the and the applicable laws and
rules and for violation of Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 10, and Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Domingo C. Laeno is her by SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two years. For violation of the notarial law and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty Reginaldo D. Bergado's notarial commission is hereby REVOKED
immediately if presently commissioned. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years. For insufficiency of evidence, the case
against Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is hereby DISMISSED.5 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
We agree with the IBP-Board of Governors' report and recommendation with regard to Atty.
Laeno. We must, however, modify the penalty imposed against him by increasing the penalty to
five (5) years.
 
Atty. Laeno's acts of (i) executing two deeds of sale that covered one single property, (ii)
indicating an undervalued consideration contrary to what was agreed on by the contracting
parties, and (iii) offering one of these bogus deeds as evidence before the Court is exactly what
is proscribed under the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession x x
x.

xxxx

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Next, Atty. Laeno's resort to several suits against Marcelina and Perpetua to avoid eviction or
cause the delay in the execution of an unfavorable judgment in an ejectment suit is likewise
contrary to Canon 12.
Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
Certainly, he had a duty as an officer of the court to abide by the judgment rendered even if it
was unfavorable to him. Therefore, a five (5) year suspension is appropriate to penalize his
reprehensible transgressions. In Lazareto v. Atty. Acorda,6 We said:
[T]he ethics of the legal profession rightly en joins every lawyer to act with the highest standards
of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of his practice of law. x x x.7 (Citations
omitted)
As regards to Atty. Bergado, it has come to the Court's attention that he is dead. A copy of his
death certificate dated November 22, 2008 was attached as Exhibit 2 in the position paper of
Atty. Laeno submitted on March 24, 2010,8 but was overlooked by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Domingo C. Laeno is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five
(5) years. For insufficiency of Evidence, the case against Atty. Romeo R. Robiso is
hereby DISMISSED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to append a copy of this Resolution to respondent's record as member of
the Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 
Bersamin, C. J., on official business.
Carpio,*Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr.,
Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 19, 2019 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on May 3, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
  Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2644 dated March 15, 2019.
1
Rollo, p. 587.
2
 Id . at 77 and 85.
3
 Id. at 588-589.
4
 Id. at 589.
5
 Id. at 585-586.
6
 A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015.
7
 Id.
8
Rollo, pp. 395 and 406.
 A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.

Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public
Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners,
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that
he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito
Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006,
during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees
with pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she
was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the
following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal
sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang
ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang
bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae
na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon."3

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should
prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their
cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of
stenographic notes.4

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his
capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter was
assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy
Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s criminal case for rape, which was pending before the RTC,
Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file
the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.

(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and alleged that the
respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.

(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and
discredited Areola.5

In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of
the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also
filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail
warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained. These actuations show that
Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his
demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his
co-detainees as one.8 She alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola
were not proper.

After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part.
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective
position papers.9

On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he must,
however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found
no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areola’s co-detainees
as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:

There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the
inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to
file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by the act/s being complained
of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove the said charges. Hence,
it is simply hearsay in nature.11

Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their
relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be
granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner,
this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and
lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP
Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B,
Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola
has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-
detainees.

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against
Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint
on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that
no document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.
They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-
detainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s
statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated
this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the
pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO clients of Atty.
Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no
matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice
and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put
to good use by cooperating with the PAO instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers
and other government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more
intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply19 , he
made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20 . He also called
the PAO as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While
Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant number of
cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his knowledge to work with the
PAO instead of maligning it.

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and
plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to
one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza?that she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo
si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it
appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and
crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule
15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.23

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as
excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of
a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great
caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court
notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice.
While her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in
the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the
respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among
other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable
penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her
being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by
Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to
Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of
giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-10.

2
 Id. at 3.

3
 Id. at 4.

4
 Id.

5
 Id. at 5-9.

6
 Id. at 33-39.

7
 Id. at 33.

8
 Id. at 35.

9
 Id. at 145.

10
 Id. at 141-150.

11
 Id. at 148.

12
 Id. at 149.

13
 Id. at 150.

14
 Id. at 140.

15
 Id. at 158-160.

16
 Id. at 165.

17
 Rule 139-B, Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.–
 xxx

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

xxx

18
 Rollo, p. 147.

19
 Id. at 48-57.

20
 Id. at 55.

21
 Id. at 4.

22
 Ala v. Judge Peras, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2283, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 193, 214.

23
 Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol v. Florido, A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA
182, 187.

24
 Buado v. Layag, 479 Phil. 808, 817 (2004); Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341
(2004).

25
 Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez, 544 Phil. 447, 463 (2007).

26
 Rollo, p. 159.
A.C. No. 9395               November 12, 2014

DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint1 filed by Daria O.
Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Benguet
Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent).

Antecedents

Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased from
Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building spaGe located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where she
operated the bar.

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal3 from Davis & Sabling Law Office signed
by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually
resulted in the signing by the complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer
Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease.
Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac went to complainant's music
bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the
operation of the bar. Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed
Amarillo Music Bar.

Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis &
Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in
force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed,
on behalf of the latter, an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.5

In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a business

partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is the sole proprietress
of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his partner, who initiated the proposal
and was in fact the one who was able to convince complainant to accept the law office as her
retainer. Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information
regarding the business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent
admitted though having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took
advantage of the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.
Thus:

3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW
OFFICE as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent in
several cases;

3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in his
office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing the latter
that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventory of all items at the
former Nashville Country Music Lounge;

3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventory [to which] the latter
x xx responded x xx that she entered into a lease contract with the present administrator
of the building, Benjie Pinlac;

3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE for
further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later informed that the
business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for seven
days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place to Novie Balageo which the
latter readily accepted;

3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Balageo in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as partner of
Novie Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;

3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and
Benjie Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage of
the retainership contract between the DA VIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and]
 Complainant as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related by
complainant to Atty. Sabling regarding the former' s business;

3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was xx x informed by Novie Balageo
and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent [was unaware
of];

3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it
prudent] to xx x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed his
Motion to Withdraw As Counsel. x x x

3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
[Complaint's] subject matter. x x x7

On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and

Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of
information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of
another person. He recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for a
period of one year.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of the respondent, it
reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension considering that there is no proof that
respondent actually handled any previous legal matters involving complainant.10

Our Ruling

It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with
respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo
of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented
and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said
Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
appearance for Balageo.

Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 It provides:

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client."11 The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.12 In Quiambao v. Atty.
Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.14
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is
actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between
Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement.
We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr.,16 this
Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged
the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermines the integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage
of any information acquired by his law finn in the course of its professional dealings with the
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the
complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot
represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting
interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have
simply advised both complainant and Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.

The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or suspension from
the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.17 We thus adopt the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Acting Chief Justice

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Per Special Order No. 1860 dated November 4, 2014.

1
 Rollo, pp. 3-5.

2
 The Complaint was subsequently referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

3
 Rollo, pp. 6-7.

4
 Id.at8-10.

5
 Id. at 94-101.

6
 Id. at 46-51.

7
 Id. at 48-49.

8
 Id. at 142-145.

9
 See Notice of Resolution, id. at 141.

10
 Resolution dated January 15, 2012, id. at 161.

11
 Nuique v. Sedillo, A. C. No. 9906, July 29, 2013, 702 SCRA 317, 325.

12
 Orola v. Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013, 705 SCRA 350, 358-359.

13
 505 Phil. 126 (2005).

14
 Id. at 133.

15
 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949).

16
 515 Phil. 296, 306 (2006).

17
 Nuque v. Sedillo, supra note 11 at 328.
A.C. No. 9976               June 25, 2014
[Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2539]

ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This refers to the complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Almira C. Foronda (complainant) against Atty. Jose
L. Alvarez, Jr. (respondent) for the following alleged infractions:
 (1) Fraud and deceit in luring [the complainant] in transacting business with [the
respondent]; (2) Dishonesty and misrepresentation when [the respondent] misinformed
[the complainant] that [her] annulment case was already filed when in fact it was not;

(3) Issuing unfunded checks as payment for [the respondent's] obligations to [the
complainant];

(4) Violation of Canon 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities when [the
respondent] represented to [the complainant] that he know[s] of court personnel who will
help facilitate [the complainant’s] annulment case;

(5) Violation of Canons 16.01 and 16.03 for failure to return [the complainant’s] money
despite numerous demands; and

(6) Violation of Canon 18.04 when [the respondent] misinformed [the complainant]
regarding the status of [her] annulment case.2

Facts

The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the
Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. The respondent was referred
to her and the complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of ₱195,000.00 to be paid as
follows: 50% or ₱100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; 25% or ₱50,000.00 on or before
June 10, 2008; and 25% or ₱45,000.00 before the filing of the case.3 The complainant paid the
amounts as agreed. The amount of ₱45,000.00 was even paid on June 10, 2008,4 after being
informed by the respondent that the petition for the annulment of marriage was ready for filing.

The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he received the
full payment of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the complainant
inquired about the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that her petition
was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a decision by the court was already
forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country in May 2009, the respondent told
her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized for the delay. Eventually, the
complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out that it was filed only on July 16,
2009.5

The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed the contract of
service with the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were going to
discuss her case, she agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent invited her to be an
investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law.6 The respondent
encouraged her to invest ₱200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per
month.

The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue personal and
post-dated checks in her favor dated the 10th of each month starting July 2008 until June
10,2009, representing the five percent (5%) interest that the complainant’s money shall earn.
Thus, the complainant gave ₱200,000.00 to the respondent upon the security of thirteen (13)
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks. Eleven (11) of said checks were for ₱8,000.00
each. The other two (2) checks dated June 8, 2009 and June 10, 2009 were for ₱100,000.00
and ₱108,000.00, respectively.7
According to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored the
first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
When she brought the matter to the respondent, he promised to pay her in cash. He actually
paid her certain amounts as interest through her representative. Nevertheless, the respondent
failed to pay the entire obligation as promised. Thereafter, the respondent issued eight (8)
Banco de Oro (BDO)checks as replacement for the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the
BDO checks were likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.8

In his Answer,9 the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July 2009
but this was not due to his own fault. The delay was caused by the complainant herself who
allegedly instructed him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were
discussing a possible reconciliation.10 He further claimed that he filed the petition on July 16,
2009 after negotiations with the complainant’s husband apparently failed.11

The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner in a lending
business and clarified that the said business was being managed by a friend. He further stated
that he was also involved in the said business as a partner.12

The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued were honored by the
drawee-bank. He stated that prior to the presentment and dishonor of the rest of the UCPB
checks, he advised the complainant that the third check should not be deposited just yet due to
losses in their lending business caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their
obligations.13 Apart from the foregoing, the respondent denied most of the allegations in the
complaint, including the dishonor of the BDO checks, for lack of sufficient information to form a
belief as to the truth thereof.14

By way of special and affirmative defense, the respondent asserted the following: that it was the
complainant who owed him notarial fee amounting to 80,000.00 as he notarized a deed of
conditional sale executed between her and a certain Rosalina A. Ruiz over a real property worth
4,000,000.00;15 and that the contract he executed with the complainant was a mere contract of
loan. Being a contract of loan, he cannot be held guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (B.P. Blg. 22) since the checks he issued were to serve only as security for it.16

The parties were called to a mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD on January 18, 2010 by
the Investigating Commissioner.17 Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their
respective position paper.

In an undated Report,18 the Investigating Commissioner made the following factual findings:

From the foregoing, it appears that the following facts are not disputed. The complainant is an
overseas Filipino worker based in Dubai. During her vacation in the Philippines in May 2008,
she contracted the services of respondent to file a petition for the annulment of her marriage for
an agreed packaged fee of [P]195,000.00 which she paid in full by June 2008. Respondent,
however, filed the petition for the annulment of her marriage only in July 2009. In the meantime,
more specifically in June 2008, respondent obtained [P]200,000.00 from complainant with the
promise to pay the same with interestat 4% per month starting July 2008 until June 2009.
Respondent issued complainant eleven (11) checks for [P]8,000.00 each postdated checks
monthly from 10 July 2008 until 10 May 2009 plus a check for [P]108,000.00 payable on 10
June 2009 and another check for [P]100,000.00 payable on 8 June 2009. When presented for
payment, the first two (2) checks were good but the rest of the checks were dishonored for
being drawn against a closed account. When complainant demanded payment, respondent
issued to her eight (8) new replacement postdated checks dated 25th of every month from June
2009 to January 2010. All of the replacement checks, however, were likewise dishonored for
being drawn against a closed account. When respondent was unable to pay respondent,
complainant filed a criminal complaint against him for violation of BP 22 before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. The criminal complaint was eventually dismissed after
complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain amount by
respondent.19

The Investigating Commissioner found that there was basis to hold the respondent liable, to wit:
1. Respondent Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is guilty of delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of the
marriage of complainant for almost a year. Initially, in his Answer, he claims that the delay was
due to the instruction of complainant to hold in abeyance the filing of the petition as she and her
husband discussed possible reconciliation. In his Position Paper, he claims that the delay was
due to the failure of the complainant to submit to an interview by the psychologist and the time it
took him to research on the guidelines on the matter. Finally, in his Supplemental Affidavit, he
admits the delay and apologizes for it. For delaying in filing the petition for complainant,
respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which pertinent read:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE[.]

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and the negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxxx

2. Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied
to her about the delay in the filing of the petition are very detailed. While denying he
misrepresented to complainant that the petition has been filed when it was not, respondent did
not care to refute also in detail the allegations of complainant. In his Answer, he simply denied
the same for the reason [that] he has no sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth
thereof. It should be noted, however, that the allegations pertains [sic] to things respondent said
and did[,] and are therefore[,] matters which he knew or should have known. His denial is
therefore tantamount to an admission. In doing so, respondent is guilty of violating not only
Canon 15 but also Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

xxxx
3. Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to
pay the same. This is admitted by respondent. Rule 16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his client and his
client’s interest was not fully protected. In fact, respondent repeatedly failed to comply with his
promise to pay complainant. The fact that he subsequently paid complainant more than the
amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed by her against him
hardly serves to mitigate his liability. x x x.

4. He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for payment. This is
admitted by respondent. x x x.20

The Investigating Commissioner, thereby, recommended the penalty of two years suspension
from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a heavier
penalty.21

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It directed the
suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for one year with warning that repetition
of the similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.22

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that "[a] lawyer, by taking the lawyer’s oath, becomes a
guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of
justice."23 He can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.24 For of all classes and professions, it
is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.25

"Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession."26 Therefore, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine the full extent of the
respondent’s liability, and to impose the proper penalty therefor.

It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the respondent.
She expected the immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full
payment of attorney’s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the respondent filed the said petition
only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave out different reasons for the delay in an attempt to
exculpate himself. At the end, the respondent admitted the delay and apologized for it. It cannot
be gainsaid that the complainant through her agent was diligent in following up the petition. The
different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of candor in his dealings with
the complainant.

"Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."27 "[H]e is required by
the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion."28 "A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession."29
Anent the ₱200,000.00 which was received by the respondent from the complainant, the
respondent argued that it was a loan and not really meant to be the latter’s investment in any
money-lending business. At any rate, the respondent issued 13 UCPB checks to serve as
security for the alleged loan; among which, only two of said checks were honored by the
drawee-bank while the rest were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.
By reason of said dishonor, the respondent paid certain amounts in cash to the complainant as
interest to the said loan. Ultimately, the respondent issued eight BDO checks as replacement for
the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were also dishonored due to the
same reason – they were drawn against a closed account.

The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."30 "[T]he issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action."31

It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the
issuance of worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far
as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The relationship of an
attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be honest and
truthful when dealing with his client."32

All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons 15,33 17,34 Rule
18.04,35 and Rule 16.0436 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable
under Rule 1.0137 thereof pursuant to our ruling in Co v. Atty. Bernardino.38

The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "[d]isbarment,

jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring
person."39

"The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an attorney’s

misconduct has always moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost caution and
deliberate circumspection."40 While the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to
impose a less severe punishment if through it the end desired of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.41

In Baldado v. Mejica,42 the Court found Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica guilty of violating Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in protecting the interest of his client,
and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of three months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1
In Solidon v. Macalalad,43 the Court imposed on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) the
penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law for violations of Rule16.01 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In said case, Atty. Macalalad failed to file the
required petition and did not account for the money he received, as attorney’s fee, from the
complainant.

In Junio v. Atty. Grupo,44 Atty. Salvador M. Grupo was found guilty of violating Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for borrowing money from his client and was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one month.

In Wong v. Atty. Moya II,45 Atty. Salvador N. Moya II was ordered suspended from the practice
of law for two years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts,
he also had seriously breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP orders in the course of its proceedings.

Further, in Wilkie v. Atty. Limos,46 the Court held, to wit:

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he
was convicted in the criminal case filed against him.

In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-
year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-
lawyer in Rangwani v. Dinohaving been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks
in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant. But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, we meted out only a six-month suspension to
Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro for having issued several checks to the complainants in payment
of a pre-existing debt without sufficient funds, justifying the imposition of a lighter penalty on the
ground of the respondent’s payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant, unlike in the
aforementioned Lao and Rangwani cases where there was no showing of any restitution on the
part of the respondents.47 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

In the instant case, the Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges filed
against the respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant.48 The Court also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP-CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as
evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the complainant's counsel. Therein, it was
acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of ₱650,000.00 in payment for the: (1)
₱200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the complainant; (2) ₱195,000.00
for the attorney's fees he received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and expenses that the
complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed against the respondent including the
instant complaint with the IBP.49 Unlike in Solidon where the respondent failed to file the
required petition and did not account for the money he received, the respondent was able to file,
albeit belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the money he received
as attorney's fee in spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition
and in filing the same - not to mention the cost he incurred for the purpose.50

In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the Court finds
that the penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is commensurate, with a stem
warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act,
shall merit a heavier penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS
from the practice of law with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the offenses involved in
this case or a commission of similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. 's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-19.

2
 Id. at 2.

3
 Id. at 20.

4
 Id. at 5.

5
 Id. at 53-61.

6
 Id. at 3-4.

7
 Id. at 4-5.

8
 Id. at 6-8, 12-13.

9
 Id. at 82-88.
10
 Id. at 83.

11
 Id. at 85.

12
 Id. at 83.

13
 Id. at 84.

14
 Id. at 85.

15
 Id. at 85-86.

16
 Id. at 86.

17
 Id. at 101.

18
 Id. at 183-189.

19
 Id. at 187.

20
 Id. at 187-188.

21
 Id. at 188-189.

22
 Id. at 182.

23
 Manzano v. Atty. Soriano, 602 Phil. 419, 426-427 (2009).

24
 de Chavez-Blanco v. Atty. Lumasag, Jr., 603 Phil. 59, 65 (2009).

25
 Lorenzana v. Atty. Fajardo, 500 Phil. 382, 388 (2005).

26
 Arma v. Atty. Montevilla, 581 Phil. 1, 8 (2008).

27
 Baldado v. Mejica, A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 1, 13.

28
 Cerdan v. Gomez, A.C. No. 9154, March 19, 2012, 668 SCRA 394, 402.

29
 Baldado v. Mejica, supra note 27.

30
 Co v. Atty. Bernardino, 349 Phil. 16, 23 (1998).

31
 Wong v. Atty. Moya II, 590 Phil. 279, 289 (2008).

32
 Overgaard v. Atty. Valdez, 588 Phil. 422, 431 (2008).

33
 CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR AND FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
34
 CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

35
 Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

36
 Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.

37
 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.

38
 349 Phil. 16 (1998).

39
 Anacta v. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012, 678 SCRA 352, 365.

40
 Seares, Jr. v. Gonzales-Alzate, A.C. No. 9058, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 397,
402.

41
 Arma v. Atty. Montevilla, supra note 26.

42
 A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 1.

43
 A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 472.

44
 423 Phil. 808 (2001).

45
 590 Phil. 279 (2008).

46
 591 Phil. 1 (2008).

47
 Id. at 10-11.

48
 Rollo,p.135.

49
 Id. at 137.

50
 Id.
 A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN

OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN
OROLA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador
Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad
Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar)
and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the
son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw library

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were
represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of
Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F.
Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other
heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and
(c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of  Emilio, the initially appointed
administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order5  dated
September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an
Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the
Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his
clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving
spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s
appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered
his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose
such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as
required under the Rules.10cralaw virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never
appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the
records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while
the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only
accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record
could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances
thereat were free of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he
consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he
had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that
no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any
instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of
a mediator, rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the
parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In support of his
assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his
limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for
Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found
guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case
show that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express
conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was
already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the
Code.20cralaw virtualaw library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section
20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not
acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.”21 Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment
too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22cralaw
virtualaw library
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report
in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-

1725 dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but
reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court
explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.  In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.”
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.

Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed
by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof,
the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to
represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in
violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated
in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties
in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to
the latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and in
behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any
credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable
or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator
than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render
the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all
concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in
his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the
Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written consent before
consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in
settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s
violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from
severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of
any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it
contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates that “[t]he
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the reasons on which it is based.”34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the
Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to
announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is
akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down
a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35cralaw virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following
factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent
merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during
the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s unavailability; third, it is likewise
undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside
from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth,
complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of
Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous
employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent
engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel
therein who represented parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing

conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-7.cralawnad
2
 Id. at 1.cralawnad
3
 Id.cralawnad
4
 See id. at 40.cralawnad
5
 Id. at 10-16. Penned by Presiding Judge Charlito F. Fantilanan.cralawnad
6
 Id. at 17-22.cralawnad
7
 Id. at 3.cralawnad
8
 Id. at 4.cralawnad
9
 Id. at 2-3.cralawnad
10
 Id. at 3.cralawnad
11
 Id. at 39.cralawnad
12
 Id.cralawnad
13
 Id. at 40-41.cralawnad
14
 Id. at 40.cralawnad
15
 Id. at 39-41.cralawnad
16
 Id. at 42.cralawnad
17
 Id. at 47.cralawnad
18
 Id. at 50.cralawnad
19
 Id. at 246-257.cralawnad
20
 Id. at 254-255.cralawnad
21
 Id. at 254.cralawnad
22
 Id. at 257.cralawnad
23
 Id. at 245.cralawnad
24
 Id. at 258-262. Dated April 20, 2009.cralawnad
25
 Id. at 276.cralawnad
26
Quiambao v. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708,  August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 1, 9-10. (Citation omitted)
27
 Id. at 10.cralawnad
28
 A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 220.cralawnad
29
 Id. at 223.cralawnad
30
Palm v. Iledan, Jr., A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 12, 20.cralawnad
31
Heirs of Falame v. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 1, 12-13.cralawnad
32
 Rule 15.04 - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.cralawnad
33
Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 494, 513.cralawnad
34
 SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.cralawnad
35
Quiambao v. Bamba, supra note 26, at 15-16.cralawnad
36
 See A.C. No. 6554, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 634, 647.

[A.C. No. 5831. January 13, 2003.]

CESAR A. ESPIRITU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO IV, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on May
8, 2001 by complainant Cesar A. Espiritu against Atty. Juan Cabredo IV for failure to fulfill a
fiduciary obligation to a client.

The complaint alleges the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On November 5, 1999, the BPI Family Savings Bank Inc. (BPI-FSB) filed two complaints for
replevin and damages against Esphar Medical Center (Esphar) Inc. and its president Cesar
Espiritu and a certain John Doe. In the first complaint, the BPI-FSB alleged that, on July 14,
1997, Esphar, Cesar Espiritu, and a certain John Doe executed in favor of Gencars, Inc.
(Gencars) a promissory note in which they obligated themselves jointly and severally to pay the
latter P511,956 in monthly installments pursuant to a schedule they had agreed upon. It was
provided that failure on the part of the makers to pay any installment when due shall make
subsequent installments and the balance of the obligation immediately due and demandable.
The promissory note was secured by a chattel mortgage on an Isuzu "Close Van" (1997 model)
and registered with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission. On July
14, 1997, Gencars executed a deed of assignment in favor of the BPI-FSB, assigning to the
latter all of its rights, title and interest in the promissory note secured by the chattel mortgage. In
1999, Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe failed to pay installments for three consecutive months, for
which reason demands were made on the three to pay the entire balance of P186,806.28, with
accrued interest at the rate of 36% per annum or to give to BPI-FSB the possession of the Isuzu
van in order to foreclose the mortgage. As the three failed to comply with the demands, the BPI-
FSB brought suit for replevin and damages against them. 1

The second complaint alleged similar facts involving Citimotors, Inc. as the payee of another
promissory note in which Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe, as makers, obligated themselves
solidarily to pay the former P674,640.00 in monthly installments. The promissory note was
secured by a chattel mortgage on a Mitsubishi L-300 "Exceed Montone Van" (1997 model),
which BPI-FSB, as holder of the said promissory note, sought to foreclose due to the makers’
failure to comply with its terms and conditions. 2

On December 10, 1999, Espiritu engaged the services of Atty. Juan Cabredo IV, herein
respondent, to represent him in the two civil cases. On same day, Cabredo’s secretary, Rose
Tria, picked up copies of the complaints from Espiritu’s office and, on December 14, 1999, his
representative Reynaldo Nuñez received from Esphar P16,000.00 for use as filing and
acceptance fees. While the cases were pending in court, Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit
money and update payments to BPI-FSB through the trial court. Accordingly, on December 28,
1999 and again January 28, 2000, Esphar’s representative, Maritess Alejandrino, delivered a
total of P51,161.00 to Atty. Cabredo’s office. Later on, when Atty. Cabredo failed to appear at a
hearing of the civil cases, the management of Esphar found out that he did not deliver the sum
of P51,161.00 to the court or BPI-FSB. The management of Esphar then agreed to settle the
cases amicably. For this reason, a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the parties, and the cases
were dismissed on May 15, 2000. Thereafter, on May 8, 2001, Espiritu filed a complaint against
Atty. Cabredo for fraud. 3

In his answer dated June 6, 2001, respondent Cabredo admitted that his secretary, Rose Tria,
had indeed received P51,161.00 from Esphar, but claimed that Tria failed to inform him about it.
It was only when he read Esphar’s first demand letter dated March 21, 2000 that he learned for
the first time about the receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to get
complainant’s demand letters of March 24, 2000 and January 5, 2001 because of lapses on the
part of his staff. He thus shifted the blame on his staff.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

7. It is quite unfortunate that this incident happened all thru the fault of the law firm personnel. In
spite of respondent’s candid, honest and sincere desire to faithfully and religiously serve good
clients, [his efforts have been] rendered inutile by lapses of his staff;

8. Respondent believes that complainant Cesar A. Espiritu would not have resorted to this
present action had the firm personnel been vigilant enough to inform respondent of this matter.

Respondent said he was willing to reimburse complainant to show his good faith and "to erase
the suspicion that respondent intentionally spent the amount for his own use and benefit." 4

Acting on the complaint, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline scheduled a hearing on September 24, 2001. However, the hearing had to be
rescheduled three times — on November 14, 2001, December 14, 2001, and January 18, 2002
— because of respondent’s failure to appear despite due notice to him. In orders dated
November 14, 2001 5 and December 14, 2001, 6 respondent was warned that the investigator
would proceed with the case if he failed to appear again in subsequent hearings. Finally, in the
order dated January 18, 2002, Investigating Commissioner Wilfred Reyes ordered:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Considering that this is the fifth (5th) time that the respondent has failed to appear despite
notice, the undersigned Commissioner has no option but to decide the case on the basis of the
pleadings submitted. It must be noted that despite receipt of the Orders of the Commission, the
respondent Atty. Juan Cabredo IV has failed to appear before the Commission on Bar
Discipline.

This case is deemed submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. 7

On February 13, 2002, Commissioner Reyes submitted his report and recommendation. He
found respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for three months and
ordered to return the amount of P51,161.00 to Esphar. 8 In a resolution dated August 3, 2002,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the investigating
commissioner. 9

Except for the penalty, we find the recommendation is well taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of
fidelity and good faith. 10 Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very
scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported by the latter and account any circumstances, be commingled with his own or
be used by him. 11

In this case, respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his secretary on the
amount of P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the first demand letter of the
company, which stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

March 21, 2000

JUDGE JUAN CABREDO

Cubao, Quezon City

Dear Judge Cabredo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Due to your failure to make an interbank deposit as what we have agreed upon yesterday,
March 20, 2000, we are sending bearer, MRS. MARITESS ALEJANDRINO, to collect the
amount of P51,161.00 representing payment intended for BPI FAMILY BANK which was our
coursed through your office per your instruction.

We are hoping that you will not fail to return the money through bearer thereof. Her specimen
signature is shown below for identification purposes.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

ESPHAR MEDICAL CENTER, INC.

(signed)

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Specimen Signature of:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(signed)

MARITESS ALEJANDRINO

However, even after receiving this notice and two other demand letters, respondent never
returned the money of complainant nor paid it to the bank. Indeed, it is improbable that
respondent’s secretary failed to inform complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum
of money. In failing to account for the money of his client, respondent violated not only the Code
of Professional Responsibility but also his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. 12 Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they must also appear to be so.
This way, the people’s faith in the justice system would remain unshaken. 13

It appears that respondent, while now a practicing lawyer, was a former judge. 14 Thus, he
should have known the ethical precepts guiding lawyers who handle money given to them in
trust by their clients and the necessary consequences thereof. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides,

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. — A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis
supplied.]

From the evidence presented by complainant, which respondent failed to rebut, it is clear that
the breach of trust committed by respondent amounted to deceit, as well as a violation of his
oath, for which he should be penalized with either disbarment or suspension. While we agree
with the findings of the investigating commissioner, we find the recommended penalty of
suspension for three months to be too light. In Reyes v. Maglaya 15 a lawyer was suspended
for one year for failing to return P1,500.00 belonging to his client despite numerous demands. In
Castillo v. Taguines, 16 a lawyer failed to deliver to his client P500.00, representing the
monetary settlement of a civil suit despite demands. To make matters worse, he fooled the
client by issuing a bouncing check. He was suspended for one year.

For his failure to account for P51,161.00 received from his client and to restitute it without any
reason, respondent should be suspended for one year.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Cabredo IV is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year and ORDERED
to immediately return to Esphar Medical Center, Inc. the sum of P51,161.00, with WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of the
Decision be entered in his record as an attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Annex A of the Complaint; Rollo, pp. 4–12.

2. Annex B of the Complaint; id., pp. 13–21.

3. Complaint; Rollo, pp. 1–2.

4. Answer; Rollo, pp. 36–37.

5. Id., p. 56.

6. Id., p. 58.

7. Id., p. 61.

8. Report and Recommendation of Cmr. Wilfredo Reyes, pp. 4–5; Rollo, pp. 67–68.

9. Resolution No. XV-2002-411, CBD Case No. 01-833, Cesar A. Espiritu v. Atty. Juan
Cabredo, IV; Rollo, p. 63.

10. Angeles v. Uy, 330 SCRA 6 (2000).

11. Marquez v. Meneses, 321 SCRA 1 (1999), citing Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.

12. Rule 138, RULES OF COURT.

13. See Angeles v. Uy, 330 SCRA 6 (2000).

14. Annex H of Complaint; Rollo, pp. 27, 32–33. Complainant refers to respondent as "Judge
Juan Cabredo IV" in a letter to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and in two demand letters.

15. 243 SCRA 214 (1995).

16. 254 SCRA 554 (1996).

A.C. No. 10240               November 25, 2014

[Formerly CBD No. 11-3241]
ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated November 24, 2011 for disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Nicolas C. Torres (Atty. Torres) filed by Estrella R. Sanchez (Sanchez) with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-
3241, now A.C. No. 10240, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and non-
payment of debt.

In her complaint, Sanchez claimed that she is a friend and close acquaintance of Atty. Torres.
That in 2007, Atty. Torres asked Sanchez to lend him money in the amount of Two Million Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), and convinced her that he will pay the said amount
within a period of one (1) month, plus interest. On November 8, 2007, persuaded by Atty.
Torres' promise that he will pay immediately, Sanchez was convinced and handed him the cash
amounting to Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), which Sanchez
withdrew from the bank in Atty. Torres' presence. To bolster Sanchez's trust and confidence,
Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied Bank checks with check nos. 0109386 and 0109387, under
Account No. 001941-01285-8, both dated November 8, 2007, amounting to ₱1,200,000.00 and
₱1,000,000.00, respectively, or in the total amount of ₱2,200,000.002

However, after one (1) month,Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised. When
Sanchez called Atty. Torres over the phone, she was told that she could again deposit the
check and assured her that the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment.

On May 2, 2008, Sanchez deposited the said checks to her account, but the same were
returned due to "ACCOUNT CLOSED."

Despite repeated demands for the last three (3) years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay his obligation
since then, and thus, complainant sought legal assistance. As a consequence, formal demand
letters were sent by the complainant's lawyer which respondent received on August 14,
20083 and November 17, 2008,4 respectively, and the same proved futile as Atty. Torres failed
and refused to pay his obligation. Nonetheless, Atty. Torres, in his letter dated May 9,
2009,5 promised to pay anew the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash on or before May 15, 2009
as replacement for the two checks he previously issued. But no payment whatsoever was
made. Hence, the instant complaint filed on November 28, 2011.

On November 28, 2011, the IBP–Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required Atty. Torres to
file an answer.6

On December 29, 2011, Atty. Torres moved for extension of time to file an answer. He alleged
that his bookkeeper was on a holiday leave and that the receipts of payments and audit report
were in the custody of the bookkeeper which will be available only in the 1st week of January
2012.7 However, in an Order8 dated March 2, 2012, the IBP-CBD noted that Atty. Torres had yet
to file his Answer to the complaint even after the expiration of the extension period earlier
granted; thus, a final extension was given anew and the case was set for mandatory
conference. Despite sufficient time for respondent Atty. Torres tofile his answer, he failed to do
so. Worse, he even failed to appear in the scheduled mandatory conference despite due notice.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation9 dated June 15, 2012, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Torres
guilty of willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failure to pay just debt and for issuing
checks without sufficient funds. It recommended that Atty. Torres be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law for at least two (2) years.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Torres was ordered suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years, and further ordered to return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to
Sanchez, with legal interest.10

On August 5, 2013, respondent, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Extension
of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration.11 He claimed that he had proof of receipts to show
that he had already paid his obligation to Sanchez.12

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice to comply with the
said Resolution, no motion for reconsideration was filed. Hence, in a Resolution dated January
21, 2014, the Court resolved to note the Report dated December 13, 2013, stating that records
of the OBC showed that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either
party as of November 22, 2013.

RULING

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD and the IBP-Board of Governors.

In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. Sanchez was able to
discharge her burden of proving that she loaned ₱2,200,000.00 to Atty. Torres as evidenced by
the subject bank checks. Furthermore, backed by Atty. Torres' admission in his letter dated May
9, 2009, his promise to pay the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash, as replacement for the two
checks he previously issued, is more than sufficient to establish a valid obligation of Atty. Torres
to Sanchez. Atty. Torres’ admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same
leave no room for interpretation. Likewise, other than his belated and empty claims of payment,
Atty. Torres failed to discharge his burden of proving that he had indeed paid his obligation to
Sanchez.

In Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro,13 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay justdebts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They
must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states: Canon 1— A lawyer shall upholdthe constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We also note Atty. Torres' conduct in the course of the proceedings where he repeatedly asked
for extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration, which he failed to
submit, and his failure to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP do not speak well of his
standing as a lawyer. In Ngayan v. Tugade,14 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the
complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court."

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,15 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-
year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposedon the respondent-
lawyer in Rangwani v. Atty. Dino,16 having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad
checks in payment of a piece of property, the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.

Following the penalty imposed in a similar situation in A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio,17 we
deem it proper to adopt the penalty of two (2) years suspension in light of the amount involved
and the brazen disregard by Atty. Torres of the Orders of the IBP-CBDon the filing of an answer
and appearance in the hearing. We cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s recommendation
ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to complainant. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern isthe determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial
actions which the parties may choose to file against each other.18

However, we note that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres,19 the Court
had already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In view of the foregoing, we can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or disbarment
against Atty. Torres, considering that he has already been previously disbarred. We do not have
double or multiple disbarments in our laws or jurisprudence.20 Nevertheless, considering that the
issues and the infraction committed are different from his previous infraction, we deem it proper
to resolve the instant case and give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in
respondent's personal file in the Bar Confidant's Office.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-202 dated March 20, 2013 of the IBP, which found
respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and of violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, considering that
respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal r.ecord of Atty. Torres as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country,
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE On leave

CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On official leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave .

** On official leave.

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-10.

2
 Id. at 5.

3
 Id. at 7.
4
 Id. at 9.

5
 Id. at 10.

6
 Id. at 11.

7
 Id. at 12-13.

8
 Id. at 14.

9
 Id. at 21-26.

10
 Id. at 20.

11
 Id. at 27-29.

12
 Id. at 27-28.

13
 480 Phil. 661, 691 (2004).

14
 A.C. No. 2490, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 779, 784.

15
 453 Phil. 115, 120-121 (2003), citing the case of Co v. Bernardino, 349 Phil. 16, 23
(1998).

16
 486 Phil. 8 (2004).

17
 A.C. No. 8390 (formerly CBD 06-1641), July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 616.

18
 Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 700.

19
 A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014.

20
 Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 684, 689.
 A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014

SPOUSES NICASIO AND DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ISAGANI A.

MENDOZA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
(complainants) against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent).1  This case involves a
determination of whether respondent violated his duty to hold in trust all moneys and properties
of the client; his duty to account for all funds and property collected or received for or from the
client; and his duty to deliver the funds and property of the client when due or upon demand
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts are summarized as follows:

On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate
the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Complainants then gave respondent a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of transfer taxes.3 
They also gave respondent a check for ?13,800.00 for respondent’s professional
fee.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-

ups.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title.6  However,
respondent still failed to produce the title.

Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay.7 Respondent refused to return

the amount complainants gave for the transfer taxes.8  Complainants were then issued a
certificate to file action.9  They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money intended for
the transfer taxes.10  Respondent still did not return the money.

On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants.  He promised to settle the
transfer of the land title.11  However, respondent reneged on this promise.12  Complainants were
then forced to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to
secure the transfer of the title to the property in their names.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent contested the allegations of complainants.  According to him, it was complainants

who caused the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names.  Complainants
were not able to furnish respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the deed
of extrajudicial petition; (b) affidavit of publication with the clippings of the published item in a
newspaper of general circulation; and (c) a barangay certificate from the barangay where the
property is located as required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of P13,800.00
despite all the work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property.  These
involved “being-pulled from the office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the
transaction [with the sellers]; going twice to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch
24, to expedite the . . . issuance of a [n]ew owner’s duplicate copy of the title; going twice to the
office of the Register of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make verification and submit the court
[o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation and notarization of the Deed of Absolute
Sale.”15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from
complainants for the services he rendered in various cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas, for Forcible
Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Santa Rosa,
Laguna. This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for alleged lack of jurisdiction,
the issue of possession being intertwined with that of ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for Accion
Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro
et al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was assigned to the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and in behalf of herein
complainant, submitted an [a]nswer and [o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of the
injunction, which was favorably acted upon. Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the
Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro et
al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they [filed]
against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable source, was
discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was amicably settled.16

Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to prove his worth as a lawyer by
doing away with the requirements and expediting the cancellation of the Marcaidas’
title.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.18  The parties were then called to a mandatory
conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.19  They were required to submit their
position papers.20  Respondent did not submit his position paper.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his
findings and recommendation.  The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated
Canon 16, Rules 16.0122 and 16.0323 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed
despite respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of complainants.24 
Complainants had to obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their
names.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants.26  Complainant Nicasio
San Pedro’s affidavit of desistance is immaterial.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of “censure and warning,”
hence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary

sanction of CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with the admonition that he be
extremely careful of his acts to forego severe penalty in the future.28

In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.  It
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and for Respondent’s violation of Canon 16, [Rule] 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to effect the transfer of property despite
encashment of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to Return the amount of Sixty Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (P68,250.00) Pesos to complainants within thirty days from
receipt of notice.29 (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring in the original)

On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration.30  The IBP Board of
Governors denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June
22, 2013:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no

cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.31 (Emphasis and italics in the
original)

On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution
No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors; and (c) IBP’s letter dated
October 7, 2013 transmitting the documents pertaining to the
case.32chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the manifestation and motion dated October 25, 2013, respondent requested for a formal
hearing, reasoning that he “wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to]
cross[-]examine them and that of their witness.”33  The manifestation and motion was denied by
this court in the resolution dated September 22, 2014.34chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.

After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to
adopt and approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP
Board of Governors.

It has been said that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality.  Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms
and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.”35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 25.  Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains
in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt
as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
clear:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . .
[w]hen a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for
filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he
must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the
money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by the client.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’
name.  He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty.  However, after
three (3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the
task given to him and even refused to return the money.  Complainants’ alleged failure to
provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable.  A valid retaining lien has the
following elements:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur:
(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers;
and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general
lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the course
of his employment.37

Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien.  He did not present
evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees.  The enumeration of cases he worked on
for complainants remains unsubstantiated.  When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or
properties.38chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien,
he cannot appropriate for himself his client’s funds without the proper accounting and notice to
the client.  The rule is that when there is “a disagreement, or when the client disputes the
amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees. . . .”39chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro’s affidavit of desistance dated March
14, 2008, both complainants signed their comment to respondent’s motion for reconsideration
and prayed that the motion be dismissed for lack of
merit.40chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months.  He is also ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of ?68,250.00
with 6% legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent is
further DIRECTED to submit to this court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from
payment.  Let a copy of this resolution be entered in respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza’s
personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1888 dated November 28, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 1–3.
2
 Id. at 1. IBP Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation dated July 8, 2008, p.
2.
3
 Id.
4
 Id. at 2.
5
 Id.
6
 Id.
7
 Id.
8
 Id.
9
 Id.
10
 Id.
11
 Id.
12
 Id.
13
 Id.
14
 Id. at 20.
15
 Id. at 19.
16
 Id. at 21–22.
17
 Id. at 20.
18
 Id. at 15–16.
19
 Id. at 29.
20
 Id. at 31. IBP Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation dated July 8, 2008, p.
2.
21
 Id.
22
 Canon 16, Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
23
 Canon 16, Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he
has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
24
Rollo, pp. 40–41. IBP Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation dated July 8,
2008, pp. 4–5.
25
 Id.
26
 Id. at 41. IBP Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation dated July 8, 2008, p.
5.
27
 Id.
28
 Id.
29
 Id. at 54.
30
 Id. at 42-44.
31
 Id. at 52.
32
 Id. at 60.
33
 Id. at 64.
34
 Id. at 68.
35
Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 529, 535 [Per J. Abad,
Second Division], citing Garcia v. Bala, 512 Phil. 487, 490 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
36
Belleza v. Macasa, 611 Phil. 179, 190 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
37
 Miranda v. Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011, 658 SCRA 197, 205 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division], citing Ampil v. Hon. Agrava, 145 Phil. 297, 303 (1970) [Per J. Teehankee, En
Banc].
38
 See Miranda v. Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011, 658 SCRA 197 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division].
39
J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, 375 Phil. 766, 773 [Per J.
Vitug, Third Division].
40
Rollo, pp. 47-48.

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days
from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the
status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the
Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only
on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed
his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be
reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the
morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8,
2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her
legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal
services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to
the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a
loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having
trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount
of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the
high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the
service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the
fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent
was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When
asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to
handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the
trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were
not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point
of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.”16 Complainant
obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount
of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of
P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant
prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance.
Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally
checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was
not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him
to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to
include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the
defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a
message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon
reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included.
On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was
also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998
to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise
admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered
the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction
was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in
the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed
with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant
who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said
that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in
the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that
another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the
nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the

receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in
the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations
long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was
never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found

respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to
return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting
to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a
motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG
that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a
corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration
but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1)
year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies
the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The
Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to
the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be
incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee,
when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only
expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith
expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes
on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.”28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should
be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts
from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the
excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the
case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that
he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme
penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be
used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust
but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their
utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his
claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The
absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of
the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent
was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that
he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the
rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out
of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.
Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients
are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is
a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court
cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was
the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity
of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof
were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made
exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent
that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the
validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully
that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with
each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient
punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant
in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer
to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each
other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative
cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla
but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately
related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable
for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against
him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in

violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of
P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Peralta, J., no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 192-193.
2
 Id. at 5-9.
3
 Id. at 9.
4
 Id. at 35.
5
 Id. at 43.
6
 Id. at 45-49.
7
 Atty. Loreto C. Ata, Commissioner, Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
8
Rollo, pp. 44.
9
 Id. at 110-120.
10
 Id.
11
 Id. at 11.
12
 Id. at 12-13.
13
 Id. at 14.
14
 Id. at 15.
15
 Id. at 16.
16
 Id. at 29.
17
 Id. at 31.
18
 Id. at 31-32.
19
 Id. at 101.
20
 Id. at 33.
21
 Id. at 45-49.
22
 Id. at 86-97.
23
 Id. at 136-139.
24
 Id. at 145-161.
25
 Id. at 162-165.
26
 Id. at 168-179.
27
Navarro v. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014, citing Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No.
8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699.
28
Belleza v. Macasa, 611 Phil. 179, 190 (2009).
29
Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing, A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012, 678 SCRA 68.
30
Belleza v. Macasa, supra note 28, at 191.
31
Freeman v. Reyes, A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 48, 63.
32
Yuhico v. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 684, 688.
33
Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 76, 81.
34
Tiania v. Ocampo, A.C. No. 2285, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 472, citing Hilado v. David, 84
Phil. 576, 579 (1949).
35
Catu v. Rellosa, 569 Phil. 539, 550 (2008).
36
Barcenas v. Alvero, A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 11.
37
Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio, 520 Phil. 538, 552 (2006).
38
Pacana, Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez, 611 Phil. 399, 410 (2009).
39
 A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 1.
40
Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).
41
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, 429 Phil. 47, 54 (2002).
42
Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, 523 Phil. 17, 19 (2006).
43
Suzuki v. Tiamson, 508 Phil. 130, 142 (2005).
44
 Id.

A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014

CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. NICOLAS C.

TORRES, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court’s resolution is the Complaint1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by complainant CF
Sharp Crew Management Incorporated (complainant) against respondent Nicolas C. Torres
(respondent), charging him with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in
overseas maritime employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by
profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its legal
counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases and medical-related
claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various principals. Among the cases
respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were the claims of seafarers
Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and
Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).3cralawlawlibrary

In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request, complainant issued
checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00, and
P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and
instead, had them deposited at International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch,
under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect to Sampani, complainant also discovered
that he only received the amounts of P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out
of the requested amount of P652,013.20, through checks not issued by
complainant.6cralawlawlibrary

On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order7 requiring respondent
to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did respondent appear in the mandatory
conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he file his position paper.8cralawlawlibrary

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating Commissioner

found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and accordingly recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.10cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was issued
checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and Chua on the
pretense that the requested amounts represented what was lawfully due them.11 However,
instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he deposited the same at the
International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-
1,12 except for the check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to Delgado.13cralawlawlibrary

Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)14 on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an answer
because complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-bailable criminal cases
against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell and, thus, his inability to comply
with the IBP’s directives.15cralawlawlibrary

On the merits of the complaint, respondent maintained that the seafarers’ claims had long been
settled and that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were already in actual
custody and possession of the complainant.16 He further contended that he only signed the
dorsal portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their genuineness17 and that he could not
have encashed them as they were all payable to a particular payee.18 Lastly, respondent
claimed that when he resigned in August 2008, complainant forced him to sign promissory notes
to reimburse certain amounts which had not been accounted for by the latter in exchange for his
clearance documents.19 But before he was able to settle the promissory notes, he was already
arrested in connection with the criminal cases filed by complainant against
him.20cralawlawlibrary

In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification, increasing the
recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years, and ordering
respondent to return the full amount of money he received from complainant which is legally due
to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution23 dated March 8, 2014.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in its
report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.

It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.24 The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client.25 This is the standard laid down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon
16 of the CPR, which read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.26cralawlawlibrary

In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had duly
proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed
respondent’s modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for
the purpose of settling seafarers’ claims against the complainant’s various principals, only to
have such checks (except for the check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to Delgado)
deposited to an unauthorized bank account, particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe,
Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-settled that “when a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he
does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to his client.”27 This, respondent failed to do.

Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s interests which he is
duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR
which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.” Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice
law.29cralawlawlibrary

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty
recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers
misappropriated their clients’ money, the Court imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of
disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,30 the Court
disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his client’s money intended for securing a certificate of
title on the latter’s behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v. Reyes,31 the same penalty was imposed upon
the lawyer who misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her client’s deceased husband.

As already discussed, respondent’s conduct of misappropriating complainant’s money has

made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral bar
when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts.32 As a member of
the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.33 Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Court to withdraw the same,34 as in this case. In view of the foregoing,
respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.

Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBP’s recommendation regarding the return of the
settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among others, that it
was not specifically prayed for in the latter’s administrative complaint and that the civil liability of
respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing cases involving the same parties.

WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent’s record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-12.
2
 Id. at 2.
3
 Id. at 3-4 and 99-100.
4
 The amounts are the Philippine Peso equivalent of the following amounts claimed by the
seafarers: (a) US$10,000.00 corresponding to the P524,000.00 check issued to Mangi; (b)
US$12,443.00 corresponding to the P652,013.20 check issued to Sampani; (c) US$5,000.00
corresponding to the P145,650.00 and P97,100.00 checks issued to Delgado; and (d)
US$5,972.00 corresponding to the P296,808.40 check issued to Chua. (See id. at 4-11 and
100-103.)
5
 See id. at 5-11 and 100-103.
6
 Id. at 7 and 101-102.
7
 Id. at 33. Issued by Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal.
8
 See Order dated March 20, 2009; id. at 40.
9
 Id. at 99-105. Penned by Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag.
10
 Id. at 105.
11
 Id. at 104.
12
 Id.
13
 Id. at 103.
14
 Dated March 21, 2010. (Id. at 69-77.)
15
 See id. at 69-72.
16
 Id. at 72.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 73.
19
 Id. at 74.
20
 Id. at 74-75.
21
 See Notice of Resolution signed by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 98.
22
 Dated April 8, 2013. (Id. at 106-116.)
23
 See Notice of Resolution; id. at 175.
24
Bayonla v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 490, 499.
25
 See Navarro v. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014, citing Belleza v. Macasa, A.C. No.
7815, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 549, 561.
26
Adrimisin v. Javier, 532 Phil. 639, 645-646 (2006).
27
Celaje v. Soriano, 561 Phil. 341, 347 (2007).
28
 See Garcia v. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003).
29
 See Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre, 496 Phil. 799, 812 (2005).
30
 A.C. No. 8380, November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 93.
31
 A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 48.
32
Hernandez v. Go, 490 Phil. 420, 427 (2005).
33
 Id.
34
 Id. at 427-428.
A.C. No. 8085               December 1, 2014

FELIPE LAYOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Sumbong1 dated November 26, 2008 filed by complainant Felipe
Layos (complainant), charging respondent Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva (respondent) of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for neglecting the interests
of his client.

The Facts

In the Sumbong, it was alleged that respondent is complainant's counsel of record in Criminal
Case No. 7367-B pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC),
wherein the former's constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC's
issuance of an Order2 dated June 26, 2003 (June26, 2003 Order) waiving the defense’s right to
cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the issuance of such order, respondent remained
absent and thus, complainant was only able to move for reconsideration,3 thru respondent, only
four (4) years later, or on April 21, 2007, which was denied in an Order4 dated June 21, 2007.
Aggrieved, complainant, also thru respondent, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101274.5

In a Decision6 dated November 6, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition on the merits. The CA
likewise chastised respondent for his "lack of candidness and fervor on [his part] to champion
the cause" of his client, considering that, inter alia: (a) respondent never bothered to know the
outcome of the hearings where he was absent from; (b) it took respondent a long amount of
time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s June 26, 2003 Order; and (c) respondent never
questioned the appearances of other lawyers as complainant’s counsel during his
absence.7 Citing as basis such disquisition by the CA, complainant filed the instant
administrative case against respondent.

In his Comment8 dated March 30, 2009, respondent denied being remiss in his duty as
complainant’s counsel. He averred that during the hearing on April 4, 2002 where the criminal
case was supposed to be amicably settled, his car broke down and thus, he was unable to
attend the hearing. After his car was fixed, he decided to go back to his office and asked his
secretary to call complainant to know what happened in the said hearing. However, respondent
was unable to contact complainant and that he never heard from the latter for a long time.
Respondent claimed that he no longer received any notices from the RTC, and thus, he
assumed that the amicable settlement pushed through and that the case was dismissed
already.9
Further, respondent maintained that it was only sometime before November 15, 2005 when he
receiveda notice of hearing from the RTC.10 Pursuant to the same, he went to the RTC and
found out about the June 26, 2003 Order and that other lawyers were appearing for
complainant.11 After the hearing, respondent approached the RTC personnel in order to get a
copy of the June 26, 2003 Order but was unable to do so due to lack of manpower in the RTC.
Thus, he relied on the RTC personnel’s word that they would mail him a copy of such Order, but
theywere unable to do so. Hence, he was only able to move for reconsideration of the June 26,
2003 Order on April 21, 2007 upon securing a copy of the same on April 4, 2006.12

Finally, respondent averred thathe had a hard time locating complainant who was not at his
home address and was staying at his workplace in Carmona, Cavite. According to respondent,
this caused him to advance the filing fees and other expenses of complainant’s cases, not to
mention that the latter has failed to pay the agreed appearance fees and attorney’s fees due
him.13

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated February 4, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.15 Citing the CA Decision dated November 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101274, the IBP
Commissioner found that respondent failed in his duty as counsel to serve complainant’s
interests with competence and diligence by neglecting the latter’s criminal case which was
pending before the RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board) unanimously adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, and hence, upheld respondent’s recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for negligence in the performance of his legal
duty to complainant.

Respondent moved for reconsideration18 which was, however, denied by the IBP Board in a
Resolution19 dated May 2, 2014. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal20 as well as a
Petition for Review on Certiorari21 before the Court.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for the acts complained of.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to
serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast
of all the developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is
crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. x x x x

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding
and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the
dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must
constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his
client. As such, the lawyeris expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a clientwho deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.22

In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble,
respondent no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that the
same was already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew
that the case was still on-going, he attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered
the RTC’s issuance of the June 26, 2003 Order which is prejudicial to complainant’s cause.
Despite such alarming developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to
further the interests of his client.1âwphi1 Instead, he passively relied on the representations of
the court employees that they would send him a copy of the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he
finally secured a copy on April 4, 2006, it still took him over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to
move the RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the
motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the detriment of complainant.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.23

While the Court agrees that respondent should be held administratively liable for the foregoing
acts and thus, must be suspended from the practice of law, it nevertheless deems that the IBP’s
recommended period of suspension of six (6) months is too harsh a penalty, given the
complainant’s seeming disinterest in the developments of his own case. This is evidenced by
complainant not communicating with respondent, getting other lawyers referred to him by his
friends despite having a counsel of record, and being indifferent despite being informed of a
standing warrant of arrest against him.24 In Venterez v. Atty. Cosme,25 a case involving a lawyer
who committed culpable negligence in handling his clients’ case, the Court reduced his period of
suspension from six (6) months to three (3) months after considering the surrounding
circumstances of the case.26 Similarly, in Somosot v. Atty. Lara27 which also involved a lawyer
who was remiss in his duties as counsel, the Court also reducedthe period of his suspension
from six (6) months to three (3) months, inlight of his client’s contributory faults.28 In view of the
foregoing, the Court finds that respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months would be commensurate penalty to the acts complained of.
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the
prosecution or defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction.
At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict
compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.29

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva is found administratively liable for violation
of Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1892 dated November 28, 2014.

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-3.

2
 Id. at 207. Penned byJudge Damaso A. Herrera.

3
 See Motion to Set Aside Order Dated June 26, 2003 dated April 17, 2007; id. at 213-221.
4
 Id. at 244. Penned by Presiding Judge Marino E. Rubia.

5
 See id. at 1.

6
 Id. at 5-17. Penned by Associate Justice Andres P. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Jose C.
Mendoza (now a member of the Court) and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring.

7
 See id. at 15-16.

8
 Id. at 26-57.

9
 See id. at 30-31.

10
 Id. at 31.

11
 See id. at 31-33.

12
 See id. at 33-36.

13
 Id. at 36-38.

14
 Id. at 489-502. Signed by Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag.

15
 Id. at 502.

16
 See id. at 500-502.

17
 See Notice of Resolution signed by National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 488.

18
 See Motion for Reconsideration dated May 31, 2013; id. at 503-508.

19
 See Notice of Resolution; id. at 522.

20
 Dated September 23, 2014. (Id. at 539-542.)

21
 Id. at 543-582.

22
 See Tan v. Diamante, A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014; citations omitted.

23
 Id., citingPineda v. Atty. Macapagal, 512 Phil. 668, 672 (2005).

24
 See rollo, pp. 36-38, 330-333, and 499-500.

25
 561 Phil. 479 (2007).

26
 Id. at 490-491.

27
 597 Phil. 149 (2009)
28
 Id. at 167-168.

29
 Balatbat v. Atty. Arias. 549 Phil. 517, 526-527 (2007); citations omitted.

A.C. No. 9091               December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD

A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.1 n 4
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid ₱35,000.000 for all the
lots that would be sold in the subdivision.2 For that purpose, they executed a Pecial Power of
Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land and to
sign those agreements on their behalf.3

Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to
accout for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that he had sold a number
of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were
complainants invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.5

Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously
executed in his favor.6

Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of ₱10,000,000, but the
latter again failed to pay them.7

Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting
them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8

Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against
Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal
services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to
respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract,
complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In
preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in
the possession of Fevidal.10

A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim to
the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11

The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the
adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced
complainants to agree to another settlement.12

Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July
2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles, and
damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October
2006.13

Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the
services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June
2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.14

Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging
that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the
intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s
Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.16

When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration.18

After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the
former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent
through a Complaint20 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November
2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste
the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal
problems" brought about by respondent.21

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01,22 1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27 and 20.0428 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation29 of the investigating commissioner. It suspended
respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous
agreement.30

On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this Court
noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondent’s
second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons
cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the instant
complaint against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to
recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of ₱10,000,000 – a measly amount
compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants
the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest
of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.31

Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the
circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only
because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants that they
were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather than at
that of respondent. He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the
adverse claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between
complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received
various amounts as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,32 they could not
spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more below.
As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of
complainants, we note the latter’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which
they admitted that they could not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a
settlement.33

Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their
property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to
protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of
the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered
in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of
counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v.
KFPI,34 we granted counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated
his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent
had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and
severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether
respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which
the lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is subject
to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge remain
reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually rendered, but to maintain
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well.35

In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services.36

That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for
disciplinary action.1âwphi1 Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault.
Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the
nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the
expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have
a part of the thing in dispute.37

Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39

They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. A reading of the
contract for legal services40 shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense
for the docket fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of
complainants’ adverse claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal
matter they are handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the
advances be subject to reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer
acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal
services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondents shall be subject to
reimbursement by complainants.

In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he
admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to
complainants.42

Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests
with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this
case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a
lawyer must always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the
profession.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation
expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of reimbursement
and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severly.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 3-4.

2
 Id. at 5-6

3
 Id. at 6-7.

4
 Rollo, (Vol.11), p. 127

5
 Id.

6
 Id. at 126.

7
 Id. at 263.

8
 Rollo (Vol. I), p. 7.

9
 Id. at 25.

10
 Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 102-105.

11
 Id. at 7-8.

12
 Id. at 264.

13
 Id. at 8-9.

14
 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 11-13.

15
 Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 187-191.

16
 Id. at 197-203.

17
 Id. at 209.

18
 Id. at 212-222.

19
 Id. at 237-238.

20
 Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 1-18.

21
 Id. at 2.

22
 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

23
 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.
24
 A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.

25
 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.

26
 A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the
case.

27
 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.

28
 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort
to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

29
 Rollo (Vol. IV), pp. 2-12.

30
 Id. at 1.

31
 Manzano v. Soriano, A.C. No. 8051, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 1.

32
 Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 90-101.

33
 Id. at 264.

34
 G.R. No. 183952, 9 September 2013.

35
 Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, 9 July 2010, 624 SCRA 623.

36
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 24.

37
 Bautista v. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266, 281 (1990).

38
 Id.

39
 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409(1).

40
 KAMI, na nakalagda sa ilalim nito ay hinihirang and tanggapan ng BAÑEZ, BAÑEZ &
ASSOCIATES upang siyang humawak sa lahat ng kaso na aming isasampa laban kay Gerry R.
Fevidal at iba pang kasama nito, hinggil sa mga parsela ng lupa na matatagpuan sa Bo. Pinulot,
Hermosa, Bataan, na paw[a]ng pag-aari ni Dominador Alejo, ayon sa mga sumusunod na
alituntunin:

1. Na kami ay hindi magbabayad ng acceptance fee;

2. Na kami ay hindi magbabayad ng appearance fee tuwing may hearing;

3. Na paghahatian namin ng aming abogado ang magagastos bilang docket fee o bayad sa
husgado sa pagsasampa ng kaso;

4. Na aming babayaran ang aming nasabing abogado ng katumbas ng 50% ng anumang

marerecover o mababawi namin sa mga ari-ariang nakasaad sa Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate na isinagawa noong Abril 12, 1986, gaya Ng mga sumusunod:

[1] TCT No. T-18653 [79,885 sq.m.];

[2] TCT No. T-21447 [80,555 sq.m.] at [3] 38847 [35,380 sq.m.], at ito ay matapos bawasin ang
10% ng anumang marerecover bilang parte ni Luzviminda Andrade;

5. Ang anumang bayarin sa buwis para sa nasabing mga parsela ng lupa ay aming sasagutin.

41
 Supra note 38.

42
 Rollo (Vol. IV), p. 33.

A.C. No. 7965               November 13, 2013

AZUCENA SEGOVIA-RIBAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BARTOLOME C. LAWSIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Azucena Segovia-Ribaya

(complainant) against Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin (respondent), the antecedents of which are
detailed as follows:

The Facts
On November 18, 2005, the parties entered into a retainership agreement2 (retainer) whereby
respondent undertook to, inter alia process the registration and eventually deliver, within a
period of six (6 ) months,3 the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in
favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. In
connection therewith, respondent received from complainant the amounts of ₱15,000.00 and
₱39,000.004 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively.

Notwithstanding the expenditure of the ₱39,000.00 given for registration expenses (subject
amount) and the lapse of more than three (3) years from the retainer’s date, complainant
alleged that respondent, without proper explanation, failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the
subject land and deliver to complainant the certificate of title over the same. As complainant was
tired of respondent’s excuses, she finally decided to just withdraw the subject amount from
respondent. For such purpose, she confronted the latter at his office and also subsequently sent
him two (2) demand letters,5 but all to no avail.6 Hence, complainant was prompted to file the
instant administrative complaint.

In his Comment,7 respondent admitted that he indeed received the subject amount from
complainant but averred that after receiving the same, the latter’s brother, Erlindo, asked to be
reimbursed the amount of ₱7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land
surveyor.8 Respondent likewise alleged that he later found out that he could not perform his
undertaking under the retainer because the ownership of the subject land was still under
litigation.9 Finally, respondent stated that he wanted to return the balance of the subject amount
to complainant after deducting what Erlindo took from him, but was only prevented to do so
because he was maligned by complainant when she went to his office and there, shouted and
called him names in the presence of his staff.10

In the Court’s Resolutions dated December 17, 200811 and March 2, 2009,12 the case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. After both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference, IBP
Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag (Investigating Commissioner) required
the parties to submit their respective position papers.13 Complainant filed her position paper14 on
October 8, 2009, while respondent failed to do so.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On November 6, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and

Recommendation,15 finding respondent to have violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) for his failure to properly account for the money
entrusted to him without any adequate explanation why he could not return the same. The
Investigating Commissioner found that respondent’s acts demonstrated his "lack of candor,
fairness, and loyalty to his client, who entrusted him with money and documents for the
registration of the subject land."16 The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that
respondent’s failure to return the subject amount, despite being given "adequate time to
return"17 the same, "not to mention the repeated x x x demands made upon him,"18 constitutes
"gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even misappropriation of money"19 in violation of the
above-stated rules. In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.20
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification, ordering the
return of the amount of ₱31,500.00,22 with legal interest and within thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice, to complainant.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent respondent’s administrative
liability but deems it proper to: (a) extend the recommended period of suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year; and (b) delete the recommended order for
the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00.

Anent respondent’s administrative liability, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s
failure to properly account for and duly return his client’s money despite due demand is
tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively
read as follows:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant
to cover for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his
client’s act of confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. With the
fact of receipt being established, it was then respondent’s obligation to return the money
entrusted to him by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that complainant’s purported act
of "maligning" respondent does not justify the latter’s failure to properly account for and return
his client’s money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially
imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable
efforts towards its faithful compliance. In this case, despite that singular encounter, respondent
had thereafter all the opportunity to return the subject amount but still failed to do so. Besides,
the obligatory force of said duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional
frustrations of the lawyer’s client, especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the
lawyer’s work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal with his client with professional maturity and commit
himself towards the objective fulfillment of his responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the
correct course of action is for the lawyer to properly account for his affairs as well as to ensure
the smooth turn-over of the case to another lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien
exception23 under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the lawyer should not withhold the
property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such exception or any other
justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed to perform his duties under Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his administrative liability.

The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the IBP’s recommended period of suspension
from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to
exercise due diligence in handling his client’s cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court observes that respondent did not only
accomplish his undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate
explanation for such non-performance despite the protracted length of time given for him to do
so. As such omissions equally showcase respondent’s non-compliance with the standard of
proficiency required of a lawyer as embodied in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt to
extend the period of his suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year
similar to the penalty imposed in the case of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.24

As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive
for the return of the amount of ₱31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
The same amount was given by complainant to respondent to cover for registration expenses;
hence, its return partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with
during an administrative-disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,25 the Court recently
held that its "findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the
liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should be threshed
out in a proper proceeding of such nature." This pronouncement the Court applies to this case
and thus, renders a disposition solely on respondent’s administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01
and 16.03, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Resolution with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 2. Dated July 21, 2008.

2
 Id. at 6.

3
 Id. at 6 and 73.

4
 While complainant asserted and the retainer indicates that the amount received for the
purpose of registration expenses was ₱39,500.00, respondent admitted having received the
amount of ₱39,000.00 only. (See respondent’s Comment dated October 27, 2008, id. at 16.)

5
 Id. at 11 and 12. The two (2) demand letters were dated June 21, 2007 and July 2, 2007,
respectively.

6
 Id. at 73-74.

7
 Id. at 16-19.

8
 Id. at 16.

9
 Id. at 17.

10
 Id. See also id. at 74-75.

11
 Id. at 30.

12
 Id. at 43 and 44.

13
 Id. at 51. Order dated September 11, 2009.

14
 Id. at 52-61.
15
 Id. at 72-78.

16
 Id. at 76.

17
 Id.

18
 Id.

19
 Id. at 77.

20
 Id. at 78.

21
 Id. at 71. IBP Resolution No. XX-2012-629.

22
 The balance from the amount respondent admittedly received from complainant, i.e.,
₱39,000.00, minus the amount of ₱7,500.00, which the former purportedly reimbursed to the
latter’s brother, Erlindo.

23
 "An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining a lien and the other charging lien.
The retaining lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his
client which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have
been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The charging lien is the right
which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his client. Under this rule, this
lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but not before, notice
of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party." (Caiña v. Hon.
Victoriano, 105 Phil. 194, 196 [1959]; citations omitted)

24
 The Court, in view of the lawyer’s admission of his failure to act on his client’s case as well as
to account and return the funds entrusted to him, found the latter to have violated Rules 16.01
and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code and accordingly,
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year. (See A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012,
669 SCRA 462.)

25
 As noted in this case, "an example of a liability which has an intrinsic link to the professional
engagement would be a lawyer's acceptance fees." (A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.)

A.C. No. 10568               January 13, 2015

[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2753]

MARILEN G. SOLIMAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DITAS LERIOS-AMBOY, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is an administrative complaint1 filed by Marilen G. Soliman (Soliman) against Atty. Ditas

Lerios-Amboy (Atty. Amboy) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In her complaint, Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy on May 27,
2007 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer Agreement between
the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy ₱50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latter’s
engagement, Soliman paid her ₱25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer
institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were amenable to the
partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the issuance of the titles to the said
property from the coowners to the individual owners; the ₱25,000.00 already paid to her was
then treated as payment for her professional services.2

In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy ₱16,700.00 as payment for the transfer tax. In
the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman that there was a delay in the issuance of
the titles to the property because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain
documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the Register of Deeds (RD) can
help expedite the issuance of the titles for a fee of ₱80,000.00. On June 17, 2009, Atty. Amboy
told Soliman that her contact in the RD agreed to reduce the amount to ₱50,000.00.3

Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of ₱8,900.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as
payment for the real property tax for the year 2009. Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount
of ₱50,000.00 to Atty. Amboy’s bank account as payment for the latter’s contact in the RD.4

On October 16, 2009, Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property
werethen only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However, Atty. Amboy failed to
deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman and her co-owners to the subject
property.5 On January 6, 2010, Atty. Amboy’s secretary informed Soliman that their contact in
the RD was asking for an additional ₱10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said certificates of
title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty. Amboy’s
secretary.6 Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for any update on the release of the
said titles, but the latter was not responding to her queries. On July 7, 2010, Soliman and Atty.
Amboy’s secretary went to the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman
asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00as payment for the release of the said titles.
Atty. Marasigan denied having received any amount to facilitate the release of the titles and
claimed that the reason why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file
certain documents.7

Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the pertinent documents
she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the property or give back the ₱50,000.00 that
was already paid to her.8

For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement with Soliman, but denied
having received any amount from the latter pursuant to the said agreement. She claimed that
the retainer agreement was not implemented since the partition case was not instituted. She
claimed that she merely undertook to research, gather and collate all documents required in the
partition and in the transfer of the titles from the co-owners to the individual owners. She denied
having failed to submit the relevant documents to the RD which caused the delay in the
processing of the said titles. She likewise denied having asked Soliman for ₱50,000.00 to
facilitate the release of the said titles.9

On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and
Recommendation,10 which recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of
law for six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due diligence in dealing with Soliman.
It also opined that she failed to inform the latter of the status of the proceedings for the issuance
of the said titles.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,11 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, albeit with the modification
that the period of Atty. Amboy’s suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6)
months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire amount she received from
Soliman.

Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration12 of the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, but it was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution13 dated March 21, 2014.

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his clientand that he should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.14 A lawyer is
mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence;to never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him; and to keep his client informed of the status of his case and respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.15

The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after receiving ₱25,000.00 as
payment for her professional services, failed to submit material documents relative to the
issuance of separate certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of title.

To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal act when she asked
from Soliman the amount of ₱50,000.00 to be paid to her "contact" inside the office of the RD in
order to facilitate the release of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the
payment of ₱50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said certificates of title.
Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for
an additional ₱10,000.00 from Soliman.

Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence by a counsel in dealing with a
client.1âwphi1 Atty. Amboy’s acts undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold
and defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to respectthe law and legal
processes.

The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the amount of ₱50,000.00
which she paid inorder to facilitate the release of the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon
inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from
Atty. Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor was made following
her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that a
lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client upon demand. It is settled that the
unjustified withholding of money belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action.16 "A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."17

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy is found

GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to return
to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) she received
from the latter, plus legal interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully
paid. The respondent is further DIRECTED to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her
compliance within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE (On Leave)

CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA. JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On Leave.

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-10.

2
 Id. at 2.

3
 Id. at 3.

4
 Id.

5
 Id. at 4.

6
 Id.

7
 Id. at 5-9.

8
 Id. at 9-10.

9
 Id. at 106-114.

10
 Id. at 135-145.

11
 Id. at 134.

12
 Id. at 146-153.

13
 Id. at 175.
14
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 17.

15
 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04.

16
 See Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490, 494 (2003).

17
 Adrimisin v. Atty. Javier, 532 Phil. 639, 645-646 (2006).

A.C. No. 12063, January 08, 2019

 EVERDINA C. ANGELES, Complainant, v. ATTY. WILFREDO B. LINA-AC, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

The practice of law is a privilege, and lawyers who fail to meet the strict standards of legal
proficiency, morality, and integrity will have their names stricken out of the Roll of Attomeys.1

This resolves the Administrative Complaint2 filed by Everdina C. Angeles (Angeles) against Atty.
Wilfredo B. Lina-ac (Atty. Lina-ac) for his negligence in performing his duties as legal counsel,
and for committing a fraudulent act to cover up his negligence.

Sometime in February 2010, Angeles engaged the services of Atty. Lina-ac to file a petition for
the nullity of her marriage with her husband. She paid him his professional fee in several
tranches, for a total of P50,000.00, which was paid by May 2010.3

Angeles repeatedly followed up with Atty. Lina-ac on the status of her case. In October
2010,4 he sent her a copy of a Complaint,5 which bore the "received" stamp of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 11, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. The complaint was supposedly docketed as Civil
Case No. 10-3-

Angeles brought up an error in the Complaint with Atty. Lina-ac, who promised to rectify it.
Months passed, yet her counsel failed to provide her a copy of the corrected Complaint, despite
her repeated follow-ups. Fed up with his excuses, Angeles verbally asked Atty. Lina-ac in the
second week of May 2011 to return the P50,000.00 she paid him.6

On May 25, 2011, Angeles went to the Regional Trial Court to inquire about her case status,
and was shocked to discover that there was no pending petition for the nullity of her marriage,
and that the stamp used in the Complaint provided by Atty. Lina-ac was not official.7 The
Regional Trial Court certified8 that there was no Civil Case No. 10-3-35 pending in its docket.

Angeles confronted Atty. Lina-ac about this, to which he admitted that he never filed her
Complaint. He also promised to return the money she paid him.9

Despite their agreement to sever their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lina-ac on June 16,
2011 filed a Complaint10 before the Regional Trial Court for the nullity of Angeles' marriage. It
was docketed as Civil Case No. II-06-79.

In its June 27, 2011 Order,11 the Regional Trial Court directed Angeles to file the necessary
motion to serve summons on her husband through publication. 12

On June 29, 2011, Angeles sent Atty. Lina-ac a Demand Letter13 for the immediate return
of'P110,000.00, representing all the money she paid him for the two (2) cases he was handling.
She expressed her dismay at how he swindled her and deliberately went against their
agreement by filing the second Complaint without her consent. She then informed him that she
would file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases against him.14

On July 6, 2011, Atty. Lina-ac sent Angeles a copy of the June 27,2011 Order, and asked her to
submit an affidavit with information on her husband's whereabouts.15 He then filed a Motion for
Extension of Time16 to file the motion for service of summons through publication, which the
Regional Trial Comi granted in its July 22, 2011 Order.17

Angeles did not provide Atty. Lina-ac the requested affidavit; yet, on August 4, 2011, Atty. Lina-
ac still filed a Motion with Leave of Court for Service of Summons through Publication. 18

In its August 10, 2011 Order,19 the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion for failure to attach
Angeles' affidavit. Atty. Lina-ac then provided Angeles a copy of it.20

In its September 6, 2011 Order,21 the Regional Trial Court dismissed the second Complaint for
Angeles' failure to comply with the requirements of filing the Motion. Again, Atty. Lina-ac
provided Angeles a copy of the Order.22

On May 17, 2012, Angeles filed before the Provincial Prosecutor a Complaint23 for estafa
against Atty. Lina-ac, and forwarded the same Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Misamis Oriental Chapter.24

On May 30, 2012, Angeles sent Atty. Lina-ac another Demand Letter25 for the return of her
money, and threatened to file a disbarment proceeding against him.

On July 9, 2012, Atty. Lina-ac filed his Comment26 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Misamis Oriental Chapter. He denied defrauding Angeles and claimed that he did not know who
placed the fake stamp on the first Complaint. He further claimed that the first Complaint was just
a draft, and that Angeles' sister-in-law requested for copy of it.27

Atty. Lina-ac also pointed out that he filed a petition for the nullity of Angeles' marriage, and that
the petition was dismissed because Angeles failed to provide the necessary affidavit for the
summons on her husband to be served through publication.28

On April 26, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner directed both parties to attend a mandatory
conference on July 25, 2013 at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Building in Pasig
City.29 Atty. Lina-ac, who was 72 years old,30 moved for the postponement31 of the mandatory
conference because his condition of Type 2 Diabetes made it difficult for him to travel from
Bukidnon to Pasig City.

The Investigating Commissioner canceled32 the scheduled mandatory conference and reset33 it

to August 29,2013. Atty. Lina-ac moved34 to transfer the venue of the mandatory conference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Misamis Oriental/Cagayan De Oro chapter because of his
ailment.

The mandatory conference was reset one last time. When both parties still failed to appear, the
Investigating Commissioner terminated the mandatory conference, denied Atty. Lina-ac's
motions to transfer venue, and directed the parties to submit their position papers.35

In his Position Paper,36 Atty. Lina-ac denied that he swindled Angeles and emphasized that he
fulfilled his duties as her counsel. On the other hand, Angeles failed to file her position paper.37

On January 29, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended38 that Atty. Lina-ac be

suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for his negligence and deceitful conduct.

In its September 27, 2014 Resolution,39 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors modified the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation by increasing the
penalty of suspension to two (2) years and ordering Atty. Lina-ac to return P50,000.00 to
Angeles:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex " A ", and considering that
Respondent was remiss of his obligation and even deceived Complainant in violation of Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Wilfreda B. Linaac is
hereby SUSPENDED from tlte practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to
Complainant tlte amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.40 (Emphasis in the
original)
On April 29 2015, Atty. Lina-ac moved for reconsideration41 of the Resolution against him.

In its June 17, 2017 Resolution, the Board of Governors partially granted42 Atty. Lina-ac's Motion
and downgraded the penalty of suspension to reprimand, in recognition of his belated filing of
the petition for annulment.

This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.

Upon pursuing his client's cause, respondent Atty. Lina-ac became duty bound to protect
complainant Angeles' interests. The degree of service expected of him as an advocate was his
"entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability[.]"43 The high degree of service required
of a lawyer is brought about by the lawyer's fiduciary duty toward the client, with their
relationship marked "with utmost trust and confidence."44

The Code of Professional Responsibility likewise imposes an exacting standard and requires
lawyers to serve their clients with competence, fidelity, and diligence:
CANON 17 -A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 -A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Respondent fell short of the standard required of him as complainant's legal counsel when he
failed to serve her with competence and diligence.

Complainant engaged respondent's services to secure a declaration nullifying her marriage with
her husband. However, despite complainant's considerable efforts at coming up with the cash
for respondent's professional fees, respondent did not reciprocate with similar diligence toward
her case. Further, instead of filing an actual petition for the nullity of complainant's marriage, he
attempted to hoodwink complainant by fmnishing her a copy of a Complaint with a fraudulent
received stamp from the Regional Trial Court. As the Investigating Commissioner found:
A painstaking review of the case shows that respondent was negligent enough in his obligation
as counsel despite having received the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000) PESOS from
the complainant. He was remised (sic) in his obligation when he failed to file the petition for
annulment of marriage despite the lapse of reasonable period of time. Worse, he deceived
complainant by showing a copy of the petition with a stamp of the court in order to make her
believe that it was already filed when in truth, there was no such case filed by him. His belated
filing of the petition in (sic) June 27, 2011 will not exculpate him from any administrative liability
under Rule 18.03 of the CPR which states: "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent's deceitful conduct violates Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides, "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] or deceitful
conduct."

Worse, even after their attorney-client relationship was severed, respondent filed a second
Complaint in a blatant attempt to cover up his earlier negligence and thwart complainant's
efforts to recover the money she paid him. Respondent's repeated duplicity toward complainant
reflects his lack of integrity, and is a clear violation of the oath he took before becoming a
lawyer, as correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner:
Very clearly, respondent violated his oath as he was not forthright and honest in his dealings
with the complainant. He engaged in deceitful conduct by presenting a bogus complaint
allegedly bearing the stamp ofthe court. Consequently, he must bear the consequence of his
own wrongdoing.46
Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano47 emphasized the exacting standards expected of law
practitioners:
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing. They must perform
their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts[,] and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an eiTing
lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.48 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court expects an officer of the court to strictly adhere to the "rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality[,] and faithful compliance with the rules of
the legal profession[.]"49 Undoubtedly, respondent lacks the essential requirements of "probity
and moral fiber,"50 which are needed for his continued membership in the legal profession.51

Nonetheless, this Court takes judicial notice that respondent will be about 78 years old by the
time this Resolution is promulgated. In light of his advanced age, this Court deems it proper to
temper justice with mercy and mete out a penalty of two (2) years of suspension instead of the
ultimate penalty of disbarment. Ours is a court oflaw, but it is our humane compassion that
strengthens us as an institution and cloaks us "with a mantle of respect and legitimacy."52

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfreda B. Lina-ac is SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for two (2) years. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Everdina C. Angeles the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.53 He is likewise DIRECTED to submit
to this Court proof of payment of the amount within ten (10) days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: (I) the Office of the Court Administrator, to
disseminate it to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (2) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (3) the Office of the Bar Confidant, to append it to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Acting C.J., Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J.
Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang, JJ., concur.
Bersamin C.J.,* On official business.
A. Reyes, Jr.,** On leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on January 8. 2019 a Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on February 15, 2019 at 9:40 a.m.

 
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
 On official business.
**
 On leave.
1
Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano, 685 Phil. 687, 693 (2012) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Third
Division].
2
Rollo, pp. 3-4. Id .
3
 Id. at 3.
4
 Id
5
 Id. at 8-10.
6
 Id. at 3-4.
7
 Id. at 4.
8
 Id. at 7.
9
 Id. at 6.
10
 Id. at 21-22.
11
 Id. at 13.
12
 ld.
13
 ld. at 6.
14
 Id.
15
 Id. at 30.
16
 ld. at 31.
17
 Id. at 32.
18
 ld. at 33.
19
 Id. at 34.
20
 Id. at 35.
21
 Id. at 36.
22
 Id. at 37.
23
 Id. at 3-4.
24
 Id . at 2.
25
 Id . at 5.
26
 Id. at 17-19.
27
 Id. at 19.
28
 Id. at 17-18.
29
 Id . at 39.
30
 Id . at 43.
31
 Id. at 42-43.
32
 Id. at 41.
33
 Id . at 46.
34
 Id. at 47-48.
35
 Id. at 53.
36
 Id. at 54-56.
37
 Id. at 79.
38
 Id. at 79-80.
39
 Id. at 78. The Resolution was docketed as Resolution No. XXI-2014-586 in CBD Case No. 12-
3662.
40
 Id.
41
 Id. at 81-82.
42
 Id. at 86.
43
 CANONS Of PROfESSIONAL ETHICS, no. 15.
44
Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Atty. Cabanes, Jr., 713 Phil. 530, 537 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe Second Division].
45
Rollo, p. 80.
46
 Id. at 80.
47
 685 Phil. 687 (2012) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Third Division].
48
 Id. at 693.
49
Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, 558 Phil. 398, 402 (2007) [Per J. Naehura, En Bane].
50
Plumptre v. Atty. Rivera, 792 Phil. 626, 632 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Bane].
51
 Id .
52
 J . Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narag v. Atty. Narag, 730 Phil. 1, 7 (2014) [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
53
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
 A.C. No. 12401, March 12, 2019

NELITA S. SALAZAR, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. FELINO R. QUIAMBAO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by Nelita S. Salazar (complainant) against Atty. Felino R.

Quiambao2 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and his professional duty as a notary public.

According to complainant, sometime in 2005, she entered into contracts of sale involving two (2)
parcels of land located at Sitio Ulong Tubig, Brgy. Mabuhay, Carmona, Cavite. The subject
lands were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) CLOA Title No. 436, previously owned
by Lorenzo Diaz (Diaz); and TCT CLOA Title No. 444, previously owned by Domingo Urisantos,
as represented by his attorney-in-fact, Danilo Urisantos (Urisantos).

The sale of the subject lands was witnessed and assisted by respondent, who represented
himself as a notary public. The sale was executed in respondent's law office located at Brgy. 2,
Poblacion, San Jose St., Carmona, Cavite. Complainant, Diaz and Urisantos agreed to engage
the services of respondent to facilitate, notarize, process the sale and transfer of titles of the
subject properties to complainant. Thus, they entrusted the owner's duplicate copies of the two
(2) titles, tax declarations, deeds of absolute sale, and other relevant documents to respondent.

On July 63 and 13, 2006, complainant personally gave respondent the amount of P170,000.00
as payment for the processing, transfer of titles, and other related fees, including the
professional fees of respondent. The payments were evidenced by Receipts4 signed by
respondent.

According to complainant, on the same day of July 6, 2006, Urisantos also gave respondent the
amount of P271,748.35 for payment of the capital gains tax of the properties so that these can
be transferred under complainant's name.

After eight (8) years, complainant had not received any document processed by respondent.
From the time that the original documents and payments were tendered to respondent, the latter
had not performed any legal service for complainant.

Complainant attempted to follow-up the transfer of her lands but respondent was always out of
reach. She went to respondent's office several times but all efforts were futile. On July 7, 2014,
complainant sent a Demand Letter5 to respondent reminding him of his legal undertaking but it
was unheeded.

Desperate and disappointed with respondent, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite to determine whether the titles of the subject properties were already transferred to her
name. To her dismay, complainant discovered that the subject properties were still registered
with the previous owners.6

On July 22, 2014, complainant sent respondent a Final Demand Letter7 to surrender all the
documents and to return the payments made. However, in spite of several opportunities given to
respondent, he still filed to comply. On September 1, 2014, complainant also sought assistance
from the IBP of Imus, Cavite over the conduct of respondent.

Hence, this instant complaint for disbarment alleging that respondent committed malicious
breach of his professional duty to notarize the two contracts of sale within a reasonable period
of time; and inexcusable negligence to register the sales over a period of eight (8) years without
any justifiable reason.

In spite of the due notice given by the IBP Commission, however, respondent neither filed his
answer nor his position paper. He also did not attend the mandatory conference before the IBP
Commission. Only complainant attended the said conference and filed her position paper
alleging that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath, and Canons 16, 17, and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).

Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation8 dated March 24, 2017, the IBP Commission found that
respondent indeed received several payments from complainant for the transfer of the subject
properties but the former failed to comply with his terms of legal services engagement, violating
his sworn duties as a lawyer. It also found that complainant sent respondent several demand
letters but these were unheeded; complainant even sought assistance from the IBP of Imus,
Cavite and the Punong Barangay of Carmona, Cavite to reach out to respondent, but to no
avail. The IBP Commission found that these acts violated Canons 16, 17, and 18 of the Code
and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) year.

In its Resolution9 dated May 3, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted with
modification the penalty recommended against respondent of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of (3) years; to return the amount of P170,000.00 to complainant; and to pay a
fine of P10,000.00 for disobeying the order of the IBP Commission.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Commission and the recommendations of the IBP
Board.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession, and regular payment of membership
fees to the IBP are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Beyond question, any breach by a lawyer of any of
these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients
must repose in him, and renders him unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional
privilege. Both disbarment and suspension demonstrably operationalize this intent to protect the
courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part
of the esteemed and noble profession.10
Recent jurisprudence states that the proper evidentiary threshold in disciplinary or disbarment
cases is substantial evidence.11 It is defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."12 In Billanes v. Latido,13 the
Court explained:
[T]he evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence -
is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending [to
these types] of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor."14
The Lawyer's Oath requires every lawyer to "delay no man for money or malice" and to act
"according to the best of [his or her] know edge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to [his or her] clients."15 A lawyer is duty-bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion. This is
because a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.16

Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02, and 16.03 of the Code require that a lawyer must duly account
all the moneys and properties of his client, to wit:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his profession.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, Canons 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code require that a lawyer exercise
fidelity, competence and diligence when dealing with his or her client, viz.:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code

In this case, respondent received the total amount of P170,000.00 from complainant for the
processing, transfer of titles, and other related fees, including his professional fees, for the
subject properties. Evidently, complainant gave respondent such amount to facilitate the
transfer of titles of the subject properties under her name. Complainant, Diaz and Urisantos
even gave respondent the owner's duplicate copies of the TCT of the two (2) subject properties,
tax declarations, and duly signed deeds of absolute sale for the transfer of the said properties.

Since payments were tendered by complainant on July 6 and 13, 2006, until filing her instant
complaint, or after a period of eight (8) years, respondent was remiss in his obligation of
transferring the titles of the subject properties to complainant. It was not even confirmed
whether respondent actually notarized the deeds of absolute sale for the subject properties.
Complainant went to respondent's office several times to follow up the transfer of the titles but
the latter was always unavailable.

Due to respondent's inaction, on July 2, 2014, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite to verify the status of the lands only to discover that the subject properties remained
under the name of the previous owners. Demand letters dated July 7, 2014 and July 22, 2014,
respectively, were sent to respondent requiring the return of the original documents, as well as
the amount of P170,000.00, but these were unheeded. Complainant even sought the assistance
of the IBP of Imus, Cavite, where respondent is a member, and the Office of the Punong
Barangay of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, but to no avail.

Respondent was given an opportunity to controvert the allegations against him. However, he
neither filed  his answer nor attended the mandatory conference of the IBP Commission. Verily,
respondent's acts and omissions violated the Lawyer's Oath because he delayed the case of his
client for a period of eight (8) years without any justifiable reason.

He also violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02, and 16.03 of the Code because he received a
substantial amount of money from his client, in the total sum of P170,000.00, to facilitate the
transfer of the subject rop9rties. However, he failed to comply with his obligation. Further, he
could not explain where the money went. Manifestly, respondent utterly failed to account and
safe-keep the hard-earned money of his client.

Respondent's acts and omissions further violated Canons 17 and 18, and Rule 18.03 of the
Code because he failed to observe his duty to his client. Complainant, Diaz, and Urisantos
engaged the services of respondent to facilitate, notarize, and process the sale and transfer of
the titles of the subject properties to complainant. They even entrusted the important relevant
documents to respondent. However, after a long period of time, respondent failed to comply with
his duty because the titles were still under the name of the previous owners. When complainant
sought the return of the important documents and the payments tendered, respondent simply
ignored her pleas. These acts and omissions show respondent's wanton disregard and
indifference to his client's cause.

Proper penalty

The Court finds that complainant established with substantial evidence that respondent: (1) was
engaged by complainant, Diaz and Urisantos to facilitate the transfer of the titles of the subject
properties to complainant, which obligation, after eight years, respondent still failed to comply
with; (2) respondent received the amount of P170,000.00 from complainant for the processing,
transfer of title, and other related fees, including his professional fees, but he reneged on his
obligation and failed to return the same to complainant; and (3) he received the owner's
duplicate copy of the two titles, tax declarations, deeds of absolute sale, and other relevant
documents from complainant but failed to process the title or return such documents to his
client. As discussed above, these acts and omissions violate the Lawyer's Oath, Canons 16, 17,
18, and Rules 16.01, 16.02, 16.03, and 18.03 of the Code.

In United Coconut Planters Bank v. Atty. Noel,17 the lawyer therein violated Canons 17, 18, and
Rule 18.03 of the Code because he failed to file several pleadings and a motion for his client,
resulting to an adverse judgment for his client. By committing inexcusable negligence, the Court
suspended him for three (3) years from the practice of law.

In Ramiscal, et al. v. Atty. Orro,18 the lawyer violated Canons 17, 18, and Rules 18.03, and
18.04 of the Code because he received P7,000.00 from his clients to file a motion for
reconsideration but he did not file said motion. He also failed to regularly update his clients on
the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the
proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. The Court suspended the lawyer
therein for two (2) years from the practice of law.

Similarly, in Pitcher v. Atty. Gagate,19 the lawyer violated Canons 17, 18, 19, and Rules 18.03,
and 19.01 of the Code because he abandoned his clients during the pendency of the grave
coercion case against them even though he received P150,000.00 as his acceptance fee. For
committing gross negligence, the Court suspended the lawyer therein for a period of three (3)
years from the practice of law.

Verily, for failing to comply with his obligations and his failure to return the money and important
documents of his client, respondent is meted the penalty of suspension of three (3) years from
the practice of law with a stern warning that repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
even more severely.

Further, respondent is ordered to return the amount of P170,000.00 to complainant, which he

received in his professional capacity for transfer of the titles, as well as the relevant documents
given to him by his client. Disciplinary proceedings revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer's administrative liability, which must include those intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.20 Respondent must return the aforesaid amount to complainant with
interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from their respective date of receipt
until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.21

Disobedience to the IBP

Finally, the Court finds that respondent disobeyed the orders of the IBP Commission. Even
though he was duly notified, respondent failed to answer the complaint filed against him with the
IBP Commission. He also did not attend the mandatory conference held on June 29, 2015
despite due notice. Respondent was even given a period of fifteen (15) days o file his position
paper but he did not comply. Respondent's failure to follow the orders of the IBP without
justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.22

It must be underscored that respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of
the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the
members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
IBP to answer comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct
revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby
exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. He should
always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of
the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it
the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general.23

For his disobedience of the orders of the IBP Commission, respondent must pay a fine of
P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Felino R. Quiambao is GUILTY of violating Canons 16, 17, 18, and Rules
16.01, 16.02, 16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He
is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.

Further, Atty. Felino R. Quiambao is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Nelita S.

Salazar the amount of P170,000.00, with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned
from the respective date of receipt until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full payment, intended as payment for the processing, transfer of title, and
other related fees, including his professional fees, as well as all relevant legal documents of the
subject properties, within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.

Atty. Felino R. Quiambao is also hereby meted a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 for
disobedience to the orders of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission on Bar
Discipline. Failure to comply with the foregoing directives will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
Atty. Felino R. Quiambao's records. Copies shall likewise be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, A.
Reyes, Jr., J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 12, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office
on May 3, 2019 at 1:50 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
   Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-5.
2
 Also referred to as "Atty. Felino R. Quiambao III" which appears in Complaint-Affidavit (id. at 2-
5); Acknowledgment Receipt dated July 5, 2006 (id. at 6 and 80); Acknowledgment Receipt
dated July 13, 2006 (id. at 7 and 81); Letter dated July 7, 2014 (id. at 8-9 and 75-76); Letter
dated July 22, 2014 (id. at 19-20 and 77-78); and Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman,
(id. at 79-80).
3
 However, in rollo, p. 6, it stated that the date of the first payment is July 5, 2006.
4
 Id. at 6-7.
5
 Id. at 8-9.
6
 Id. at 11-18.
7
 Id. at 19-20.
8
 Id. at 87-92.
9
 Id. at 85-86.
10
Goopio v. Atty. Maglalang, A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018.
11
Canillo v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. Nos. 9899, 9900, 9903-9905, 9901 & 9902, September 4, 20
18; Billanes v. Atty. Latido, A.C. No. 12066, August 28, 2018; Dimayuga v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No.
8854, July 3, 2018; Zarcilla, et al. v. Atty. Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018.
12
Peña v. Atty. Paterno, 710 Phil. 582, 593 (2013).
13
 Supra note 11.
14
 Id., citing Reyes v. Atty. Nieva, 794 Phil. 360, 379-380 (2016).
15
 See Lawyer's Oath.
16
 See Vda. de Dominguez v. Atty. Agleron, Sr., 728 Phil. 541, 544 (2014).
17
 A.C. No. 3951, June 19, 2018.
18
 781 Phil. 318 (2016).
19
 719 Phil. 82 (2013).
20
Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, 777 Phil. 1, 15 (2016).
21
 See Chua v. Atty. Jimenez, 801 Phil. 1, 12 (2016).
22
Ojales v. Atty. Villahermosa, III, A.C. No. 10243, October 2, 2017, 841 SCRA 292, 299.
23
Ramiscal, et al. v. Atty. Orro, supra note 18, at 324.

[G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000.]

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., Petitioner, v. FASGI ENTERPRISES,

INC., Respondent.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation organized and

existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America,
entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated
("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian
corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the
United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant to the contract, PAWI
shipped to FASGI a total of eight thousand five hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels, with an FOB
value of US$216,444.30 at the time of shipment, the first batch arriving in two containers and
the second in three containers. Thereabouts, FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels.
Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with
stated requirements, viz;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"A. contrary to the terms of the Distributorship Agreement and in violation of U.S. law, the
country of origin (the Philippines) was not stamped on the wheels;

"B. the wheels did not have weight load limits stamped on them as required to avoid mounting
on excessively heavy vehicles, resulting in risk of damage or bodily injury to consumers arising
from possible shattering of the wheels;

"C many of the wheels did not have an indication as to which models of automobile they would
fit;

"D. many of the wheels did not fit the model automobiles for which they were purportedly
designed;

"E. some of the wheels did not fit any model automobile in use in the United States;

"F. most of the boxes in which the wheels were packed indicated that the wheels were approved
by the Specialty Equipment Manufacturer’s Association (hereafter, SEMA’); in fact no SEMA
approval has been obtained and this indication was therefore false and could result in fraud
upon retail customers purchasing the wheels." 1

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of
contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. In January 1980, during the pendency of the
case, the parties entered into a settlement, entitled "Transaction" with the corresponding Italian
translation "Convenzione Transsativa," where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would
accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price of
US$268,750.00 via four (4) irrevocable letters of credit ("LC"). The rescission of the contract of
distributorship was to be effected within the period starting January up until April 1980. 2

In a telex message, dated 02 March 1980, PAWI president Romeo Rojas expressed the
company’s inability to comply with the foregoing agreement and proposed a revised schedule of
payment. The message, in part read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are most anxious in fulfilling all our obligations under compromise agreement executed by
our Mr. Giancarlo Dallera and your Van Curen. We have tried our best to comply with our
commitments, however, because of the situation as mentioned in the foregoing and currency
regulations and restrictions imposed by our government on the outflow of foreign currency from
our country, we are constrained to request for a revised schedule of shipment and opening of
LCS.

"After consulting with our bank and government monetary agencies and on the assumption that
we submit the required pro-forma invoices we can open the letters of credit in your favor under
the following schedule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A) First L/C — it will be issued in April 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"B) Second L/C — it will be issued in June 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"C) Third L/C — it will be issued in August 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"D) Fourth L/C — it will be issued in November 1980 payable 90 days thereafter

"We understand your situation regarding the lease of your warehouse. For this reason, we are
willing to defray the extra storage charges resulting from this new schedule. If you cannot renew
the lease [of] your present warehouse, perhaps you can arrange to transfer to another
warehouse and storage charges transfer thereon will be for our account. We hope you
understand our position. The delay and the revised schedules were caused by circumstances
totally beyond our control." 3

On 21 April 1980, again through a telex message, PAWI informed FASGI that it was impossible
to open a letter of credit on or before April 1980 but assured that it would do its best to comply
with the suggested schedule of payments. 4 In its telex reply of 29 April 1980, FASGI insisted
that PAWI should meet the terms of the proposed schedule of payments, specifically its
undertaking to open the first LC within April of 1980, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened
by April 30, 1980, then . . . [it would] immediately take all necessary legal action to protect [its]
position." 5

Despite its assurances, and FASGI’s insistence, PAWI failed to open the first LC in April 1980
allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and restrictions," prompting FASGI to pursue its
complaint for damages against PAWI before the California district court. Pre-trial conference
was held on 24 November 1980. In the interim, the parties, realizing the protracted process of
litigation, resolved to enter into another arrangement, this time entitled "Supplemental
Settlement Agreement," on 26 November 1980. In substance, the covenant provided that
FASGI would deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC opened and paid by
PAWI:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. Agreement

"3.1 Sellers agree to pay FASGI Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty and
00/100 Dollars ($268,750.00), plus interest and storage costs as described below. Sellers shall
pay such amount by delivering to FASGI the following four (4) irrevocable letters of credit,
confirmed by Crocker Bank, Main Branch, Fresno, California, as set forth
below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(i) on or before June 30, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-Five
Thousand, Three Hundred Sixty-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($65,369.00), (b) plus interest on that
amount at the annual rate of 16.25% from January 1, 1980 until July 31, 1980, (c) plus Two
Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and 00/100 ($2,940.00) and (d) with interest on that sum
at the annual rate of 16.25% from May 1, 1980 to July 31, 1980, payable on or after August 31,
1980;

"(ii) on or before September 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,940.00), plus (c) interest at
an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, and
on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, payable ninety days
after the date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit;

"(iii) on or before November 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars ($2,490.00), plus (c) interest at
an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, and
on the amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, payable ninety days
after the date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit;

"(iv) on or before January 1, 1981, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a) Sixty-
Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($67,793.67)
plus (b) Five Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighty and 00/100 Dollars ($5,880.00), plus (c) interest
at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to
time, plus two percent on the amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, and on the
amount set forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the date
of the bill of lading under the letter of credit." 6

Anent the wheels still in the custody of FASGI, the supplemental settlement agreement provided
that —chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"3.4 (a) Upon execution of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement, the obligations of FASGI
to store or maintain the Containers and Wheels shall be limited to (i) storing the Wheels and
Containers in their present warehouse location and (ii) maintaining in effect FASGI’s current
insurance in favor of FASGI, insuring against usual commercial risks for such storage in the
principal amount of the Letters of Credit described in Paragraph 3.1. FASGI shall bear no
liability, responsibility or risk for uninsurable risks or casualties to the Containers or Wheels.

"x       x       x

"(e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are delayed past
such date pursuant to the penultimate Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and after such later
date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the Containers or
Wheels." 7

The deal allowed FASGI to enter before the California court the foregoing stipulations in the
event of the failure of PAWI to make good the scheduled payments; thus —

"3.5 Concurrently with execution and delivery hereof, the parties have executed and delivered a
Mutual Release (the ‘Mutual Release’), and a Stipulation for Judgment (the ‘Stipulation for
Judgment’) with respect to the Action. In the event of breach of this Supplemental Settlement
Agreement by Sellers, FASGI shall have the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of
Judgment pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment in the full amount thereof, less credit for any
payments made by Sellers pursuant to this Supplemental Settlement Agreement. FASGI shall
have the right thereafter to enforce the Judgment against PAWI and FPS in the United States
and in any other country where assets of FPS or PAWI may be located, and FPS and PAWI
hereby waive all defenses in any such country to execution or enforcement of the Judgment by
FASGI. Specifically, FPS and PAWI each consent to the jurisdiction of the Italian and Philippine
courts in any action brought by FASGI to seek a judgment in those countries based upon a
Judgment against FPS or PAWI in the Action." 8

In accordance with the aforementioned paragraph 3.5 of the agreement, the parties made the
following stipulation before the California court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned parties hereto, having entered into a Supplemental Settlement Agreement in
this action,

"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between plaintiff FASGI Enterprises, Inc. (’FASGI’) and
defendants Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc., (’PAWI’), and each of them, that judgment may
be entered in favor of plaintiff FASGI and against PAWI, in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty
Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty And 01/100ths Dollars ($283,480.01).

"Plaintiff FASGI shall also be entitled to its costs of suit, and to reasonable attorneys’ fees as
determined by the Court added to the above judgment amount." 9

The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the motion for the entry of
judgment, was executed by FASGI president Elena Buholzer and PAWI counsel Mr. Thomas
Ready.

PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the supplemental settlement
agreement. While it opened the first LC on 19 June 1980, it, however, only paid on it nine (9)
months after, or on 20 March 1981, when the letters of credit by then were supposed to have all
been already posted. This lapse, notwithstanding, FASGI promptly shipped to PAWI the first
container of wheels. Again, despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI
readily delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in opening and paying the
third and the fourth LCs, scheduled to be opened on or before, respectively, 01 September 1980
and 01 November 1980, and each to be paid ninety (90) days after the date of the bill of lading
under the LC. As so expressed in their affidavits, FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI
president Elena Buholzer were more inclined to believe that PAWl’s failure to pay was due not
to any restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its inability to pay. These doubts
were based on the telex message of PAWI president Romeo Rojas who attached a copy of a
communication from the Central Bank notifying PAWI of the bank’s approval of PAWI’s request
to open LCs to cover payment for the re-importation of the wheels. The communication having
been sent to FASGI before the supplemental settlement agreement was executed, FASGI
speculated that at the time PAWI subsequently entered into the supplemental settlement
agreement, its request to open LCs had already been approved by the Central Bank. Irked by
PAWI’s persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of
California the following stipulation for judgment against PAWI.

"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. in the Courtroom of the Honorable
Laughlin E. Waters of the above court, plaintiff FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. (hereinafter
‘FASGI’) will move the Court for entry of Judgment against defendant PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM
WHEELS, INC. (hereinafter ‘PAWI’), pursuant to the Stipulation for Judgment filed concurrently
herewith, executed on behalf of FASGI and PAWI by their respective attorneys, acting as their
authorized agents.

"Judgment will be sought in the total amount of P252,850.60, including principal and interest
accrued through May 17, 1982, plus the sum of $17,500.00 as reasonable attorneys’ fees for
plaintiff in prosecuting this action.

"The Motion will be made under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to
and based upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the Supplemental Settlement Agreement filed
herein on or about November 21, 1980, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
Affidavits of Elena Buholzer, Franck G. Ker and Stan Cornwell all filed herewith, and upon all
the records, files and pleadings in this action.

"The Motion is made on the grounds that defendant PAWI has breached its obligations as set
forth in the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, and that the Supplemental Settlement
Agreement expressly permits FASGI to enter the Stipulation for Judgment in the event that
PAWI has not performed under the Supplemental Settlement Agreement." 10

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. A certificate of finality of

judgment was issued, on 07 September 1982, by the US District Judge of the District Court for
the Central District of California. PAWI, by this time, was approximately twenty (20) months in
arrears in its obligation under the supplemental settlement agreement.

Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a
complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" in February 1983, before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order of 11
September 1990, dismissed the case, thereby denying the enforcement of the foreign judgment
within Philippine jurisdiction, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and
clear mistake of law and fact. 11 The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by
PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI
the third and fourth containers of wheels. 12 This situation, the trial court maintained, amounted
to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the trial court said, the supplemental
settlement agreement and the subsequent motion for entry of judgment upon which the
California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr.
Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization.

FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. In a decision, 13 dated
30 July 1997, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the full
enforcement of the California judgment.

Hence this appeal.

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; 14 however, the rules of
comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. 15

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as
the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court
of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a
prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment. 16 A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings
and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders — The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Soorajmull Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc., 17 one of the early Philippine
cases on the enforcement of foreign judgments, this Court has ruled that a judgment for a sum
of money rendered in a foreign court is presumptive evidence of a right between the parties and
their successors in-interest by subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a
Philippine court, such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. In Northwest Orient Airlines,
Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 18 the Court has said that a party attacking a foreign judgment is
tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this
jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action or
subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best
serve his client’s interest. 19

In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the parties, including
Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1980. The agreement was lodged in the California case on
26 November 1980 or two (2) days after the pre-trial conference held on 24 November 1980. If
Mr. Ready was indeed not authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement
agreement, PAWI could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement.
Instead, more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement,
particularly on 09 October 1981, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a communication to
Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. Ready’s supposed lack of authority. On the
contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance
for the impending delay in the opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in
the agreement.

It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the
judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not afterwards be
heard to complain about it. 20

Nor could PAWI claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from possibly paying
FASGI substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy litigation expenses normally
generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the agreement was afforded time to reimburse
FASGI the price it had paid for the defective wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to
enjoy the benefits of the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms
thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.

PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready’s authority to sign on its behalf the Supplemental Settlement
Agreement but denounced likewise his authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before
the California court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had by then already terminated the
former’s services. For his part, Mr. Ready admitted that while he did receive a request from
Manuel Singson of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately
came too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American Judicial
Procedures when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel would not be
permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the time the stipulation for
judgment was entered into on 26 April 1982 until the certificate of finality of judgment was
issued by the California court on 07 September 1982, no notification was issued by PAWI to
FASGI regarding its termination of Mr. Ready’s services. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by
Mr. Ready who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue
before the forum which issued the judgment in line with the principle of international comity that
a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so
assuming the power of passing judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the
evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal. 21

Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic,
i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered,
22 or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against
whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case
or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of
action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already adjudged, and
it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. 23

Even while the US judgment was against both FPS and PAWI, FASGI had every right to seek
enforcement of the judgment solely against PAWI or, for that matter, only against FPS. FASGI,
in its complaint, explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"17. There exists, and at all times relevant herein there existed, a unity of interest and
ownership between defendant PAWI and defendant FPS, in that they are owned and controlled
by the same shareholders and managers, such that any individuality and separateness between
these defendants has ceased, if it ever existed, and defendant FPS is the alter ego of defendant
PAWI. The two entities are used interchangeably by their shareholders and managers, and
plaintiff has found it impossible to ascertain with which entity it is dealing at any one time.
Adherence to the fiction of separate existence of these defendant corporations would permit an
abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote injustice against this plaintiff because
assets can easily be shifted between the two companies thereby frustrating plaintiff’s attempts
to collect on any judgment rendered by this Court." 24

Paragraph 14 of the Supplemental Settlement Agreement fixed the liability of PAWI and FPS to
be "joint and several" or solidary. The enforcement of the judgment against PAWI alone would
not, of course, preclude it from pursuing and recovering whatever contributory liability FPS
might have pursuant to their own agreement.

PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return the second and the third
containers of defective wheels before it could be required to return to FASGI the purchase price
therefor, 25 relying on their original agreement (the "Transaction"). 26 Unfortunately, PAWI
defaulted on its covenants thereunder that thereby occasioned the subsequent execution of the
supplemental settlement agreement. This time the parties agreed, under paragraph 3.4(e) 27
thereof, that any further default by PAWI would release FASGI from any obligation to maintain,
store or deliver the rejected wheels. The supplemental settlement agreement evidently
superseded, at the very least on this point, the previous arrangements made by the parties.

PAWI cannot, by this petition for review, seek refuge over a business dealing and decision gone
awry. Neither do the courts function to relieve a party from the effects of an unwise or
unfavorable contract freely entered into. As has so aptly been explained by the appellate court,
the over-all picture might, indeed, appear to be onerous to PAWI but it should bear emphasis
that the settlement which has become the basis for the foreign judgment has not been the start
of a business venture but the end of a failed one, and each party, naturally, has had to negotiate
from either position of strength or weakness depending on its own perception of who might have
to bear the blame for the failure and the consequence of loss. 28chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Altogether, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in its appealed
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Complaint for Damages filed by FASGI before the US District Court for the Central District of
California, Case No. 79-03661-HP, entitled "FASGI Enterprises v. PAWI and FPS, filed on 21
September 1979." (Rollo, p. 68).

2. Pertinent provisions of the "Transaction" executed between the parties

include:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2) FPS and PAWI accept the return to them of the products supplied to FASGI, at the forfeit
global price of USA$268,750 and more precisely $13,273 for the wheels and bolts supplied by
FPS and to be returned to them, and $253,477 for wheels and caps supplied by PAWI and to be
returned to them.

"3) FASGI therefore agrees to return to PAWI not less than 8,100 wheels plus relative caps, still
in their original packing; agrees to return to FPS the 120 wheels and bolts received;

"4) PAWI reserves the right, recognized by FASGI, to take back the materials supplied — four
containers — either in one lot or in four separate lots, respectively by January, February, March
and April 1980. In case PAWI should opt for the second alternative, It must pay to FASGI the
sum of US$6,000 for storage and custody, provided the withdrawal takes place not later than
the 30th of April, 1980.

"x       x       x

"6) In case all the goods are returned in one lot by January 1980, in payment of the same and
before their shipment from Fresno, PAWI will issue four Letters of Credit, irrevocable, each one
of the same amount, payable at 90-120-150-180 days from the date of the invoice that FASGI
will issue for the goods returned.

"If on the other hand the goods are returned in four lots, the four Letters of Credit, increased
each one by $1,500 covering the amount referred to point 4), will be issued at 90 days from the
date of each shipment, which must be in January, February, March, April 1980.

"However, in both cases, each Letter of Credit must include also the USA current interests
retroactive from the first January 1980 to the each Letter of Credit maturity, in addition to the
fixed amount. Above interests will be calculated on the base of USA current ‘prime rate’,
increased by two points.

‘The Letters of Credit must be accepted and confirmed by Crocker Bank of Fresno, California.

"7) The same method of payment will apply to FPS goods, and precisely Letter of Credit as
above confirmed with expiry 60 days from shipment date and relative interests from the first
January 1980.

"8) FASGI will issue the appropriate invoices for goods returning with interest calculated from
the first January 1980 on the base of USA current rate and precisely the ‘prime rate’ increased
by two points.

9) The judicial proceedings initiated by FASGI ENTERPRISES before the Los Angeles Court
will be abandoned with compensatory costs. The Parties undertake to sign any documents
necessary to formalize the renunciation of any legal action.

"x       x       x

"11) With the issue of the aforesaid Letters of Credit accepted as above and of the payments
having taken place and the return of the wheels as stated above having been carried out, any
and every reason or claim between the Parties, relative to the agreement of exclusive sale as
given in point 1) of the PREMISE, the summons brought before the Los Angeles Court will be
resolved, settled and concluded." (Rollo, pp. 100 101).

3. Rollo, pp. 106.

4. Rollo, p. 107.

5. Rollo, p. 109.

6. Rollo, pp. 88-90.

7. Rollo, pp. 91-92.

8. Rollo, p. 93.

9. Rollo, pp. 113-114.

10. Rollo, pp. 117-118.

11. Rollo, pp. 237-244.

12. Ibid.

13. Penned by Justice Emeterio C. Cui, concurred by Justice Corona Ibay Somera and Justice
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

14. Cuculu v. Louisiana Ins. Co. (La) Mart NS 464.

15. Ibid.

16. Private International Law, Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore, Manila, Philippines, 1995
Edition, p. 543.

17. 33 SCRA 46.

18. 241 SCRA 192.

19. Caballero v. Deiparine, 60 SCRA 136; Acenas v. Sison, 8 SCRA 711.

20. Dungo v. Lopena, 116 Phil. 1305.

21. Salonga, supra., at 558.

22. Labayen v. Talisay-Silay Milling, Co., 40 O.G., 2nd Supp. No. 3, p. 109.

23. Salonga, supra.

24. Rollo, p. 71.

25. See Petition for Review on Certiorari, G.R No. 137378, pp. 14-15.

26. "Transaction", supra.

27. (e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are delayed
past such date pursuant to the penultimate paragraph of Paragraph 3.1, in which case from and
after such later date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or deliver any of the
containers or wheels.

28. Decision, Court of Appeals, 30 July 1997, Rollo, p. 53.

A.C. No. 2736             May 27, 1991

LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION represented by Mr. SOLOMON U. LORENZANA, JR.,

as its President and General Manager, and/or Mrs. ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, as its Vice-
President, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA, respondent.

Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. for petitioners.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged1 on two counts, to
wit:

1. Negligence and

2. Betrayal of his former client's confidences.

A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation LFC,
hereinafter), and received by the Court on February 25, 1985.2

The Court, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

After proper proceedings, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation," dated February 21, 1990 and received by the Court on February 26, 1990.

From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as
follows:
Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client's
confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge of negligence:

Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981
as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later (tsn. pp. 6-7,
Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against complainant before the Ministry (now Department)
of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with
the requirement that position papers be submitted (Exh. G).

During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset to
June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date
respondent failed to appear for the second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor
Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 28, 1983. Respondent received on
June 23, 1983 the Order for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).

In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting
the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a conflicting schedule,
respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead of
filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the
Labor Arbiter to move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985). Respondent's
telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June
28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's complaint
and affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper.

After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay
Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis of Hanopol's evidence alone.

Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
on August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4). The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings. The case was set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein
attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The Labor Arbiter set two more dates for
hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).

In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to
resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty. Rogelio Udarbe to take his
place on July 16, 1984, the effective date of his resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the
cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn. pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).

During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one appeared
for complainant.1avvphi1 So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed a "Manifestation and Motion"
praying that the earlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5).

On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC vice Atty. Udarbe and
he immediately came across the abovementioned "Manifestation and Motion". On September 5,
1984, he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this up
with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7). However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his
earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby
prompting Atty. Loy to appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, the
NLRC ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's confidences,
the following facts appear on record:

While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes,
issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to its employee, Roberto San Juan,
requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated
cash advances. Another memorandum dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by
complainant's internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant's president,
summing up San Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was
furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). The executive committee, to which
respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On account of the
gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under preventive suspension, per his letter
to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).

On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand
letter to San Juan requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he failed
to pay the amount demanded, a complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned and sought the assistance of respondent
in the preparation of his counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov. 5, 1985). Respondent
prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his
counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985).3

x x x           x x x          x x x

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol
case which resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter,
the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen
him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second
hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not.4

It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by the
Constancia5 setting the case for hearing. The Constancia clearly states: "By agreement of the
parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled."6 Since it was signed
by both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent's
explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory.

With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent
justified his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told
his secretary to call up the Office of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case
postponed.7 The Solicitor General avers:

. . . It is submitted that respondent's actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it

turned out, the telephone request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby
constraining him to declare complainant in default and render judgment against it.8

In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able
to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of
negligence should be considered moot and academic already.9 We find this submission not
meritorious. Instead, we agree ,with the position of the Solicitor General:

Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter
cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the
two scheduled hearings and filed the required position paper, then at least, there would have
been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of
complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-
counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he
had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier (Exh.
7).10

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility:11

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed
complainant LFC's confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of
Professional Ethics, to wit:

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's
employment, and extends as well to his employee's and neither of them should accept
employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for
the private advantages of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though there
are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when
he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his
new client.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the appropriate Canon now is:

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the
preparation of the counter-affidavit,12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of
estafa filed against San Juan by LFC As a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the
San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent
investigated this same charge of estafa while he was still the lawyer of the complainant and San
Juan still likewise an employee of LFC

Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of the Office of the Solicitor General:
. . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the
counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, who had his
(respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will
delete his name and signature thereon; that he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit
to Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him;
and that San Juan filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name
and signature still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).

It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is

incredible.1âwphi1 His foregoing testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . .
13

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his
former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to
permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under
the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of
negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former
client's confidences, in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Let this Decision be entered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof
furnished to all courts and IBP chapters.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, 1.

2
 Rollo, 1.

* Should be 1983.

3
 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General, 1-6.

4
 Rollo, 3.

5
 Id., 20.

6
 Id.
7
 Id., 15.

8
 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General, 7.

9
 Comment of the Respondent, 9-10; Rollo, 40-41.

10
 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General, 8.

11
 Promulgated by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on June 21, 1988.

12
 Rollo, 23.

13
 Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General, 8-9.

14
 San Jose vs. Cruz, 57 Phil. 794.

A.C. No. 6664               July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be suspended from
the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so warrant.

Antecedents

Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty.
Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest
of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest.

Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing Business (ICS
Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by Sison. The other officers were
Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio, Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.

Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the criminal
prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the
demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of the money subject of their
complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and swore to on July
26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit charging Sison and the other corporate officials
of ICS Corporation with several counts of estafa1was presented to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally
charged Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96 (RTC), in Quezon City.2

In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility
of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and
that they could settle the cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to
them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for
their desistance. They acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in
turn they received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3

Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a deed of
absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It took some period of
negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter delivered to them on November 27,
2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them
that whether or not the title of the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect
would no longer be his responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he
had already accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable
settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.4

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the Registry of Deeds
and the Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to learn that they could not
liquidate the property because it was no longer registered under the name of ICS Corporation
but was already under the name of Bank Wise Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as
their counsel with ICS Corporation.

Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote to him on
September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to settle the issues with
Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all.6

During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group.
This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out later on, however,
that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in Quezon City involving the same pyramiding
scam that she and her ICS Corporation had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty.
Era’s legal representation of Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the
proceedings in the criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and
Branch 220 of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of
Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in said courts.8 They also submitted a
certification issued on November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had visited Sison, an inmate in
the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City as borne out by the
blotter logbook of that unit.9
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents, and
praying for Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and
respect reposed in him as their counsel.10

Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within 10 days from
notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file the comment to
supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his comment.11 The Court granted his
request and allowed him an extension totaling 40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended
period, he did not file his comment.

On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against Atty. Era.12

By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to submit his comment.

In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar
Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the compromise
settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and her ICS Corporation,
on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship between him and Samson and his
group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison
by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon City only for purposes of her arraignment.

On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15

In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007,16 the Investigating Commissioner of

the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence,
and for failing to champion his clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. Era’s claim
that his legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had terminated on April 23, 2003
upon the execution of the compromise settlement of the criminal cases; that he even admitted
during the mandatory conference that there was no formal termination of his legal
services;17 that his professional obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not
end upon execution of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it
that the settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to appear in
behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of
law for six months, viz:

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with competence and diligence and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe
penalty.18
In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be suspended from the practice of law for two
years.

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20 denying
Atty. Era’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195.

The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21

On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the manifestation, and
denied the motion for its lack of merit.23

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by accepting the responsibility
of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in which he had undertaken to represent
Samson and his group, notwithstanding that Sison was the very same person whom Samson
and his group had accused with Atty. Era’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters
and the complaint-affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against
Sison and the others in the RTC in Quezon City.

Atty. Era’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his group
entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed
to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases
until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate
that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was
still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and
excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.24

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice.26

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.28

The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:

x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided
loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client can trust. Instilling such
confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x.

Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest undermines the independence of the
lawyer’s professional judgment or inhibits a lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the
client’s behalf, the client’s expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised.

Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
xxx.1âwphi1 Preventing use of confidential client information against the interests of the client,
either to benefit the lawyer’s personal interest, in aid of some other client, or to foster an
assumed public purpose is facilitated through conflicts rules that reduce the opportunity for such
abuse.

Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a
client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx.

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on
both sides of the litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary
argumentation x x x.29

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same
or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.31 Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge
and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and
guarded with care.1âwphi1 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
administration of justice.32 The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.33
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group,
the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that
the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences
acquired in the previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself.35 The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death
of the client.36

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them
of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either
to outrightly decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice
Sison to engage another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer
the proper sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision,
with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO 0. ERA and
entered m his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE (On Leave)

 CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1
 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 9-11.

2
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 4.

3
 Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 97-99.

4
 Id. at 2

5
 Id. at 96.

6
 Id. at 16.

7
 Id. at 65-71.

8
 Id. at 23-30.

9
 Id. at 18-30.

10
 Id. at 1-3.

11
 Id. at 32-37.
12
 Id. at 62-63.

13
 Id. at 79.

14
 Id. at 80-82.

15
 Id. at 117.

16
 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 2-15.

17
 Id. at 9.

18
 Id. at 15.

19
 Id. at 1.

20
 Id. at 49.

21
 Section 12(b). If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record
of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

22
 Temporary rollo, pp. 2-14.

23
 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 67-68.

24
 The Civil Code states in Article 2034 that: "There may be a compromise upon the civil liability
arising from an offense; but such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty. (1813)."

25
 Agpalo, R., Legal Ethics, 1989, 4th Edition, p. 157.

26
 Reyes v. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 87, 90.

27
 A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 220.

28
 Id. at 223.

29
 Law Governing Lawyers, Restatement of the Law Third, Volume 2, 2000 Edition, American
Law Institute, Washington D.C., §121.

30
 Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame v. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 1, 13.

31
 Kauffman, K. D., Legal Ethics, Delmar Learning, 2004, pp. 174-175, 207.

32
 Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 579 (1949) cited in Quiambao v. Bamba, A.C. No. 6708, August
25, 2005, 468 SCRA 1, 9-10.
33
 Perez v. De la Torre, A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 547, 551.

34
 Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1991, 1st Edition, p. 167, citing
Nombrado v. Hernandez, Adm. Case No. 555, November 25, 1968, 26 SCRA 13, Natam v.
Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952), San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792 (1933) and Hilado v. David, 84 Phil.
569 (1949).

35
 Id. at 199, citing Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 67 L. ed. 802 (1923).

36
 Bun Siong Yao v. Aurelio, A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 553, 560.

Adm. Case No. 6475               January 30, 2013

FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya (complainant)

against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly deceived the complainant and her
late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.

After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court referred the
complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, evaluation and recommendation.

The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632 and 162633 located
at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition of these properties, TCT
No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings filed by the City
Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former
registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902.
The RTC already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit
₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property.2

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation
case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant
alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of
the property, but he left blank the space for the name of the buyer and for the amount of
consideration. The respondent further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the
City Government when the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles.3 The respondent then
fraudulently – without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their understanding –
converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4,
2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia Carlos So for ₱200,000.00.5

The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the ₱200,000.00 purchase price or
that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when they stood to get at least
₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation.6

The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his uncle and his aunt,
respectively.7

The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint.8

The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just Compensation9 caused her
to file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious" disbarment case.10 He claimed that the sale was
their voluntary transaction and that he "simply ratified the document."11 He also claimed that
Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on
July 10, 2000; that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold
his share to Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.12
The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to execute any
"preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government.13 He also denied that the Deed of
Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it.14 That he filed for the spouses Ylaya and
Reynold an opposition to the just compensation the RTC fixed proved that there was no
agreement to use the document for the expropriation case.15 He also argued that it was clear
from the document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because
there were spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship,16 and he was even
constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because the
complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowing them from
his office.17 Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial Practice.18

On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated
August 24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint.19

On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006.20

On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit21 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated April 19, 2000;23 and the Deed of Absolute
Sale notarized in 2001.24 The respondent submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to
his Motion for Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25

The IBP’s Findings

In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner Anna
Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon
16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.27

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted the IBP Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty imposed to two (2) years
suspension and a warning:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
(2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from
practice of law for two (2) years with a Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. [emphases supplied]

On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21, 2008,
attaching, among others, a copy of the complainant’s Affidavit dated February 27, 2008,
admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Laurentino and Reynold; and the Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the
complainant dated November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case.29

On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme Court, requesting
that the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for Reconsideration.30

By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,31 the IBP Board of Governors denied
the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise any new substantial matter or
any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
302.32

On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing the IBP’s
findings, as follows:33

a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal hearing
thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he was not able to cross-examine
her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer corroborative proof to
prove her bare allegations;

b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents (MOA and
2 other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by the respondent;

c) In totally ignoring the complainant’s Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;

d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya of

the subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-
ownership of Ylaya and So; and

e) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to the

notarial rules.

The Issues

From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:

(1) whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process; and

(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

The Court’s Ruling

We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP
Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. We
likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting
interests without the written consent of the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on
conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

a. Due process violation

The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the
total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one’s day in court. As a rule, no denial of due
process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his
case;35 what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was not given
the "amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness complainant, to object
to the admissibility of documents or present controverting evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its
conclusion without requiring the complainant to adduce evidence in a formal hearing and
despite the absence of corroborative proof. He insists that these defects rendered the
complainant’s allegations as hearsay, and the IBP’s report, recommendation or resolution null
and void.

Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the complainant when
she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on October 6, 2005,37 the records
reveal that the respondent fully participated during the entire proceedings and submitted
numerous pleadings, including evidence, before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion
for reconsideration supported by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and
ruled upon in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.38

In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma,39 we held that due process, as
applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain one’s side. In Samalio v.
Court of Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process
takes place. The requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.

Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, 41 we held that "due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding.
Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or
oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows
a certain degree of latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to resolve a case
based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties."42

In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient ground
to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent was heard
through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony
during the October 6, 2005 mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony
were received and considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and
recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Board’s Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party
who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this
case, the requirement of the law was afforded to the respondent."43

We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated August 24,
2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further hearings. The motion,
filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on October 6, 2005, significantly did not
contain any statement regarding a denial of due process. In effect, the respondent himself
waived his cross-examination of the complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to
resolve the case based on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote his own
submission:

1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;

2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments
denying all the allegations in the complaint;

3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the
respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date, the
complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived her right to
file the same;

4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses and
counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is most respectfully
prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered dismissed for lack of
merit without further hearing;

5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same property,
and such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified Complaint as
shown in the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright dismissal of this case is
warranted, hence, this motion; and

6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case.44 (underscore ours; italics

supplied)

Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:

No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator’s Report shall
be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole
record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which
event the

Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation
of the entire proceedings.

In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors – the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30245 dated December 14,
2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings, but modifying the penalty; the second review
resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010,46 denying the respondent’s
motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or
miscarriage of justice warranting a remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.

We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they are
neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers,47 not the trial of an action or a suit.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. [emphases
deleted]

The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not
mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.

From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary
proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative
evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due investigation,
the IBP

Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to warrant the
exercise of its disciplinary powers.

b. Merits of the Complaint

"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight
than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief compared to the presented contrary evidence.

Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether preponderance of
evidence exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, and
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d)
the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.50 By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.51

The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:

The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, finds that
the charges of the complainant against the respondent are worthy of belief based on the
following:

First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of spouses Ylanas
(sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas
(sic) is hard to believe despite the presentation of the Memorandum of Agreement.

It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document are put in
issue, the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale between Felix
Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties is only Laurentino L.
Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that Reynold So was likewise a
buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former paid half of the purchase price.

Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer at that and
who allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the inclusion of his name in
the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title subsequently issued.

The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So produced by the
respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission considering that the Memorandum of
Agreement was executed more than a month AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano
and the Ylayas was notarized. This is not to mention the fact that the complainant denied ever
having executed the Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the signatories in the
said Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the
complainant and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other documents.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid, thereby
making Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the subject properties (Please
see Annex "B" of respondent’s Comment), this Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino
Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for ₱200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the
purchase thereof is already ₱225,000.00 and he was expecting to receive ₱7,000,000.00, more
or less. That would mean that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, the
₱7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided among them at ₱3,500,000.00 each, far above the
₱200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-signed Deed of Sale.

As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error
in notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between his uncle Reynold
So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which
provides as follows:

"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

(a) x x x.

(b) x x x.
 (c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."

The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the aforementioned Rule
becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the
seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the respondent’s Supplemental Position Paper) is
misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in
the contract entered into.

Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle was not a
principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the respondent still violated the
Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya
and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in
the said Memorandum of Agreement.52

The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioner’s findings are contrary to the presented
evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold acknowledging the
existence of a co-ownership;53 to the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 where she stated that the
parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the
disbarment complaint arose from a misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper
appreciation of facts;54 to her Affidavit dated February 27, 200855 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000;56 and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001.57

In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this administrative
complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points to Atty. Robert Peneyra,
the complainant’s counsel in this administrative case, as the hand behind the
complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra harbors ill-will against him and his
family after his father filed several administrative cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which
resulted in the imposition of a warning and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.59

Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-ownership
between him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of the property to Reynold
because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of money to pay for his medical bills;
that Laurentino agreed to the price of ₱200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his
investment when he and Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was
with the agreement and consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of Sale.60

After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and find the
evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1)
the evidence against the respondent fails to show the alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he
has taken to mislead the complainant and her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale"
and the conversion into a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and
(2) no prohibition exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties
interested is the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at that
time the respondent notarized the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the respondent is
liable for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of a co-ownership between
Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of the complainant and of her husband
on the MOA "are not the same with their signatures in other documents."62

We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some questions
regarding the respondent’s legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing constituting clear
evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud and deceit. His failure to prove the existence
of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and that the respondent was responsible for creating
these spurious documents. We are further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA,
the IBP Commissioner failed to specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylaya’s
signatures in the MOA and what documents were used in comparison.

Apart from her allegations, the complainant’s pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos. 162632
and 162633;63 her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902 dated May 17,
2000;64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000 fixing the price of just
compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001;66 the spouses Ylaya’s Verified
Manifestation dated September 2, 2002, filed with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the
Motion to Deposit Just Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and
manifesting the sale between Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutor’s Subpoena
to the complainant in connection with the respondent’s complaint for libel;68 the respondent’s
complaint for libel against the complainant dated August 27, 2003;69 the complainant’s Counter
Affidavit dated March 26, 2004 against the charge of libel;70 and the respondent’s letter to the
Provincial Attorney of Palawan dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding
the actual attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar.71

We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts constituting
deceit or fraud on the respondent’s part. The documents by themselves are neutral and, at the
most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between the respondent and the
complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by
evidence the specific acts constituting these allegations.72

We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant; the
Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes her case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence.73 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other
party. When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on
the preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the
party carrying the burden of proof.74

In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do not show
the respondent’s deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence of such proof, the
complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.

We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with
Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s uncle because Reynold is
married to the respondent’s maternal aunt.75 However, this is of no moment as the respondent
cannot be held liable for violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 200176 and the MOA dated April 19, 200077 were notarized
by the respondent prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial
law in force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing
documents where the parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by
affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC.

c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule
15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned,
particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust
his client’s properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted
to him.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]

The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer’s
duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting interests. He is duty bound to decline
professional employment, no matter how attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance
involves a violation of the proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of
professional conduct. Thus, a lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has
given professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept employment
from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former client. It is his duty to
decline employment in any of these and similar circumstances in view of the rule prohibiting
representation of conflicting interests.78

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other, or
that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated."79 The sole exception is
provided in Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – if there is a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show
that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent
admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point
during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in
the same proceedings,81 asserting Reynold’s ownership over the property against all other
claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya.82

We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give
the respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case
that the respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of his
former client, the complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The
respondent admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by
Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over
the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she borrowed them from his office.84 Reynold
confirms that the TCTs were taken by the complainant from the respondent’s law office.85

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original
TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could result in damage – should merit a
finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the
complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or
present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the respondent
liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in
caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.

We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal
matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondent’s admission that he represented the
complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion
for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion for the
spouses Ylaya. The complainant herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file
the Motion for Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include
the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.87

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to
carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an
exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.88

In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation
of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent
clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file
the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we
find that there was want of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the
respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

d. The Complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the
Case and her Affidavit

We are aware of the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To
Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 200690 and her Affidavit91 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6,
2000.92 The complainant explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in
Civil Case No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a
"misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts";93 she erroneously
accused the respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after being enlightened, she is
convinced that he has no personal or pecuniary interests over the properties in Civil Case No.
2902; that such misunderstanding was due to her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late
husband during his lifetime.94 The complainant now pleads for the respondent’s forgiveness,
stating that he has been her and her late husband’s lawyer for over a decade and affirms her
trust and confidence in him.95 We take note that under their Compromise Agreement dated
November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case,96 the complainant and Reynold equally share the
just compensation, which have since increased to ₱10,000,000.00.

While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to Dismiss the
Case and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete exoneration is not the
necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit are immaterial for purposes of the
present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation
shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."

In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the respondent therein

for taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title of their property to his name. In
Bautista v. Bernabe,98 we revoked the lawyer’s notarial commission, disqualified him from
reappointment as a notary public for two years, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one year for notarizing a document without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him.
In this cited case, we said:

Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put
an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.99

In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainant’s desistance or

withdrawal does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the present case
where pecuniary consideration has been given to the complainant as a consideration for her
desistance. We note in this regard that she would receive ₱5,000,000.00, or half of the just
compensation under the Compromise Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges
against the respondent.101 From this perspective, we consider the complainant’s desistance to
be suspect; it is not grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any actual
misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the complainant is now amenable to the
position of the respondent and/or Reynold.

e. Procedural aspect

We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court. Section 12, Rule
139-B is clear on this point that:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –

 xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.1âwphi1

The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.102 It
exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not relinquish its duty to form
its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations imposing the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law or disbarment are always subject to this Court’s review and approval.

The Penalty

In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months from the
practice of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon
16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Josefina M. Aniñon v. Atty.
Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.,104 we suspended the respondent therein from the practice of law for
one (1) year, for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under the circumstances, we find a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate
sanction against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated

December 14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board
of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-6.

2
 Id. at 2-4, 169.

3
 Id. at 3-4.

4
 Id. at 4-5; Annexes E and E-1 of the Complaint, id. at 16-17.

5
 Id. at 4-5.

6
 Id. at 4.

7
 Ibid.

8
 Id. at 36-41.

9
 Id. at 36.

10
 Id. at 40.

11
 Id. at 36.

12
 Id. at 36-37.

13
 Id. at 38.

14
 Id. at 38-39.

15
 Id. at 38, 40-41.

16
 Id. at 38.

17
 Id. at 39, 254, 282-288.

18
 Id. at 38.

19
 Id. at 291-292.

20
 Id. at 296-297.

21
 Id. at 326-328.

22
 Id. at 53-54, 326-328.

23
 Id. at 55-56, 326-328.
24
 Id. at 16-17, 326-328.

25
 Id. at 313-325, 326-328.

26
 Id. at 305-312.

27
 Id. at 312.

28
 Id. at 303-304.

29
 Id. at 313-325.

30
 Id. at 416-418.

31
 See rollo, page number not assigned.

32
 Ibid.

33
 Ibid; Petition for Review, p. 11.

34
 Supra note 26.

35
 Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 108625,
March 11, 1996, 254 SCRA 565, 574.

36
 See rollo, page number not assigned; Petition for Review, p. 14.

37
 Rollo, pp. 254- 290; TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6, 2005.

38
 Supra note 31.

39
 Supra note 35, at 574.

40
 G.R. No. 140079, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 473.

41
 G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 494.

42
 Id. at 502.

43
 Id. at 503.

44
 Supra note 19.

45
 Supra note 28.

46
 Supra note 31.

47
 Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 453.
48
 Garrido v. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 508, 516.

49
 Solidon v. Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 472, 476.

50
 Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 371.

51
 Id. at 371, citing In Re: De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127 (1974); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68
Phil. 554 (1939); In Re: Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); and Acosta v. Serrano, 166 Phil.
257 (1977).

52
 Rollo, pp. 310-311.

53
 Id. at 55-56.

54
 Id. at 296-297.

55
 Id. at 326-328.

56
 Id. at 53-54, 326-328.

57
 Id. at 16-17, 326-328.

58
 Id. at 254-290; see TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6, 2005.

59
 Id. at 416-417; see Respondent’s Manifestation dated August 26, 2008.

60
 Id. at 44, 47-48.

61
 Id. at 310-311.

62
 Id. at 311.

63
 Id. at 8-12.

64
 Id. at 12-13.

65
 Id. at 14-15.

66
 Id. at 16-17.

67
 Id. at 18-20.

68
 Id. at 21.

69
 Id. at 22-24.

70
 Id. at 25-31.
71
 Id. at 32.

72
 Arienda v. Aguila, A.C. No. 5637, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 282, 286-287.

73
 Id. at 287.

74
 Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., supra note 50, at 372.

75
 Id. at 89-90, 242.

76
 Id. at 16-17.

77
 Id. at 55-56.

78
 Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics (1989), p. 150.

79
 Josefina M. Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012.

80
 Rollo, pp. 254, 282-285, 349-351; see TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6,
2005; RTC Decision dated October 4, 2006 in Civil Case No. 2902.

81
 Rollo, pp. 254, 282-285, 349-351; see TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6,
2005, RTC Decision dated October 4, 2006 in Civil Case No. 2902.

82
 Id. at 349-351; see RTC Decision dated October 4, 2006 in Civil Case No. 2902.

83
 Id. at 282-285, 288.

84
 Id. at 39.

85
 Id. at 48; see Reynold’s Affidavit dated October 11, 2004.

86
 Id. at 287-288; see TSN of Mandatory Conference, October 6, 2006.

87
 Id. at 169, 185, 191, 282 -285, 288, 349-351; see Complainant’s Position Paper, TSN
of Mandatory Conference on October 6, 2005, Opposition (to the Order dated November
6, 2000) and Motion to Inhibit in Civil Case No. 2902, and the RTC Decision dated
October 4, 2006 in Civil Case No. 2902.

88
 Solidon v. Macalalad, supra note 49, at 476.

89
 Adm. Case No. 5458, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 410, 418-419.

90
 Supra note 20.

91
 Supra note 21.

92
 Rollo, pp. 53-54, 326-328; the Deed of Sale is dated January 28, 2000.
 93
 Id. at 296.

94
 Ibid.

95
 Ibid.

96
 Id. at 313-360.

97
 A.C. No. 7181, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 113, 128.

98
 A.C. No. 6963, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 1.

99
 Id. at 8.

100
 Rollo, pp. 327, 331.

101
 Id. at 332.

102
 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5.

103
 Supra note 49, at 480.

104
 Supra note 79.

A.C. No. 11334, January 07, 2019

JOCELYN SORENSEN, Complainant, v. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, Respondent.

A.C. NO. 11335, January 07, 2019

JOCELYN SORENSEN, Complainant, v. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

These consolidated administrative cases stemmed from the continuous negligence of

respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon to handle the legal matters entrusted to him by his client and
herein complainant, Jocelyn Sorensen, or to atleast inform complainant of the progress of the
cases. This is in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

Complainant Jocelyn Sorensen alleges that she first engaged the legal services of respondent
Atty. Florito T. Pozon in 1995 for the reconstitution of the title of Lot No. 6662 in Pangan-an,
Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000.00).

In 1996, complainant again engaged respondent's services to file a petition for the issuance of a
new owner's copy of the title of Lot No. 6659 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

In 2000, complainant engaged respondent's services for a third time to secure the title of Lot
No. 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP
15,000.00).

In 2003, complainant engaged respondent as her counsel for the last time to secure the title of
Lot No. 2393-M in Yati, Liloan, Cebu for the sum of Twenty-Four Thousand Pesos (PhP
24,000.00).

In 2011, complainant filed a verified Complaint1 against respondent, docketed as CBD Case No.
11-3151 and CBD Case No. 11-3182, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (Commission) for respondent's alleged neglect to handle complainant's cases or
to at least inform complainant of the progress of the cases, in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Complaint alleged that despite complainant's
payment amounting to Seventy-Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 72,000.00), the above mentioned
cases have yet to be concluded.

To support her allegations, complainant attached cop1es of the following to her complaint:
(1) Annex A - copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 2,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 and PhP
3,000.00 for Lot No. 6659 dated 4 November 1996;

(2) Annex B - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 5,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 dated
15 November 1995;

(3) Annex C - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 3,000.00 dated 17 March 1999;

(4) Annex D - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 3,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 dated
17 March 1999;

(5) Annex E- a copy of a check amounting to PhP 5,000.00 dated 27 October 2001;

(6) Annex F-a copy of a check amounting to PhP 40,000.00 for Lot Nos. 6651 and 6659 dated
22 January 2003; and

(7) Annex G- a copy of a check amounting to PhP 6,000.00 dated 7 May 2000.
In his Answer,2 respondent admitted that he was the legal counsel for complainant's lots in
Cebu. For the 1995 case covering Lot No. 6662, respondent alleged that the acceptance fee of
Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000.00) was made in several installments. Respondent alleged
that the 1996 case turned out to be a difficult case because an aggrieved party appeared and
filed a criminal action against complainant including respondent. The case was settled amicably
and complainant decided to forego the case.

For the 1996 case covering Lot No. 6659, respondent alleged that he only received a partial
payment of Three Thousand Pesos (PhP 3,000.00) out of the agreed upon acceptance fee of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

For the 2000 case covering Lot No. 6651, respondent alleged that he had already gone to the
City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City and to the Revenue Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in Banilad, Cebu City to handle the matter. Respondent averred that the delay was
due to complainant's refusal to shoulder respondent's travel costs to the Land Registration
Office in Quezon City. Similar to the second case, complainant failed to present any witness to
prove the circumstance of loss of the owner's copy of the title. -

Lastly, for the 2003 case, respondent alleged that the delay was again due to complainant's
failure to present any witness to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest possessed the lot
since 1940 or prior thereto.

The Commission ruled that "[e]ven if the complainant did in fact fail to provide witnesses, it was
the duty of the respondent as her counsel to communicate the importance and necessity of
getting witnesses to advance their cause."3 The Commission faulted respondent for allowing
eight years to pass without addressing complainant's cases. Furthermore, even without the
presentation of witnesses, respondent was able to secure a favorable decision from the
Regional Trial Court ofLapu-Lapu City in the 1996 case involving Lot No. 6659 in Pangan-an,
Lapu-Lapu City.

Thus, respondent averred that what remains unresolved are the legal matters involving Lot No.
6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City, and Lot No. 2393-M in Liloan, Cebu.

The Reports and Recommendations of the Commission on

Bar Discipline

On two separate instances, the Commission submitted two Reports and Recommendations to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On 18 June 2013, the Commission, through Commissioner Leo B. Malagar, submitted a Report
and Recommendation4 for CBD Case No. 11-

3151. The Commission stated:

Clearly, the respondent is guilty of neglecting the complainant's legal matter which was
entrusted to him in 1995, and such negligence in connection with the above-mentioned
transactions renders respondent liable. Moreover, respondent failed to keep the complainant
who was his client informed of the status of the transactions and he likewise failed to respond
within a reasonable time to his client's request for information.

In view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be

ADMONISHED considering that the complainant has not been materially prejudiced from
respondent's omissions. Moreover, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be
ORDERED TO RETURN the full amount of PhP 72,000.00 which the complainant has paid to
the respondent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.5
On 2 February 2015, Commissioner Hannibal Augustus B. Bobis of the Commission on Bar
Discipline likewise submitted a similar Report and Recommendation6 for CBD Case No. 11-
3182. The Commission stated:
The respondent should be penalized for the acts alleged in the complaint. Although there are no
more issues concerning Lots 6662 and 6659 both located in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City, there
are remaining issues involving Lot 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City and Lot 2393-M in
Liloan, Cebu. Admittedly, respondent started work on these lots some time in the years 2000
and 2003, respectively. Thus, by the time the complainant filed her complaint in September
2011, there has already been a lapse of eight (8) years since its inception.

xxxx

As for the reimbursement of the sum of PhP 72,000.00, only a partial amount shall be returned
to the complainant.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended for three
(3) months and that he should return the amount of twenty one thousand pesos (PhP
21,000.00) to the [complainant].

Respectfully submitted.7
The Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines

On 5 June 2015, a Resolution8 was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, modifying the Reports and Recommendations of the Commission:
xxxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioners in the above-
entitled cases, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", considering applicable laws
and Respondent's [guilt for] violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, Respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year. Moreover, he is Ordered to Return the amount of
Twenty One Thousand (P21,000.00) Pesos.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Board of Governors consolidated the above-entitled cases as
they involved the same parties and raised similar Issues.
The Issue

Whether or not respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon is guilty of neglecting the legal matters
entrusted to him by his client and herein complainant, Jocelyn Sorensen.

The Ruling of the Court

We adopt the ruling of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that
he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill, and ability to handle the case. Thus, a
lawyer's duty to safeguard the interests of his client commences from his retainer, the time the
lawyer accepts money from a client, until his effective release from the case, the time the legal
matter in litigation is finally disposed of.9

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent neglected the legal matters entrusted to him by
complainant. Respondent even failed to at least inform complainant of the progress of the
cases. Respondent's inaction is clearly in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Rules state:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 -A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
With regard to the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer, sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts is required. This Court has consistently meted out the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law to lawyers who neglect their client's affairs and, at the same
time, fail to return the latter's money and/or property despite demand.10

Considering respondent's lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the practice of
law for one year is sufficient for respondent's misconduct.

The case of Meneses v. Atty. Macalino11 further emphasized that when a lawyer receives
money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.

Conversely, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must
immediately return the money to the client.

In the present case, respondent failed to safeguard complainant's interests after the retainer
commenced. Respondent's mere acceptance of the money from the client without fulfilling his
duties as a lawyer is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. Respondent's actions constitute
a clear violation of the trust reposed in him by complainant.

Complainant alleged that respondent received PhP 72,000.00 for filing fees. However, we agree
with the Resolution of the Board of Governors that only PhP 21,000.00 shall be returned to the
complainant for failing to fulfill his duties as a lawyer. The return of only the partial amount of
PhP 21,000.00 was explained in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission in CBD
Case No. 11-3182. The Commission explained:
The March 17, 1999 acknowledgement receipt with the amount of three thousand pesos (PhP
3,000.00) cannot be used against the respondent as he did not receive it personally. Likewise,
the October 27, 2001 check in the amount of five thousand pesos (PhP 5,000.00) is not
evidence that respondent received the said amount as it is a "pay to cash" check.

The aggregate amount of ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000.00) represented in the July 4, 1996
acknowledgement receipt, the November 15, 1995 acknowledgement receipt, and the March
17, 1999 acknowledgement receipt were all specified to be for the services rendered by the
respondent for Lot 6662 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City which had already been resolved. Thus,
respondent had already worked for this amount.

Legal services were likewise concluded for the titling of Lot 6659 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City.
Thus, complainant is not entitled to the reimbursement of the agreed upon legal fee of fifteen
thousand pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

Nonetheless, complainant should be reimbursed for the agreed legal fee of fifteen thousand
pesos (PhP 15,000.00) to secure the title to Lot 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City. The
remaining balance shall be considered as spent for the expenses incurred by the respondent as
this amount was beyond the agreed upon legal fee as stated in the position paper of the
complainant.

For the agreed fee to secure the title to Lot 2393-M in Yati, Liloan, Cebu, the complainant was
only able to prove that respondent received the amount of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000.00).
Thus, the said amount shall likewise be reimbursed to her.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent x x x should return the
amount of twenty one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000.00) to the [complainant].12
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon GUILTY of violating Rules
18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year effective immediately upon
receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely in the future. Respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainant Jocelyn Sorensen the amount of PhP 21,000.00 with interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid for the unresolved legal
matters involving Lot No. 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City and Lot No. 2393-M in Liloan,
Cebu. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten (10) days from
payment.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,* JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2630 dated 18 December 2018.
1
Rollo (A.C. No. 11334), pp. 3-4 and Rollo, (A.C. No. 11335), pp. 2-A-3.
2
Rollo (A.C. No. 11334), pp. 37-40.
3
 Id. at 117.
4
 Id. at 120-123.
5
 Id. at 122-123.
6
 Td. at 114-119.
7
 Id. at 116, 118-119.
8
 Id. at 112-113.
9
Segovia v. Atty. Javier, A.C. No. 10244, 12 March 2018.
10
Andrada v. Atty Cera, 764 Phil. 346 (2015); Maglente v. Atty. Agcaoili, Jr., 756 Phil. 116
(2015); Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Lawsin, 721 Phil. 44 (2013).
11
 518 Phil. 378,385 (2006).
12
Rollo (A.C. No. 11334), pp. 118-119.

[A.C. NO. 4401 : January 29, 2004]

BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. BALMES L.

OCAMPOS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On January 25, 1995, complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia lodged a complaint1 against her
former counsel, respondent Atty. Balmes L. Ocampos, whose legal services she, together with
her aunts Toribia Garban de Detalla and Rosenda Garban vda. de Denore as co-plaintiffs,
engaged in Civil Case No. 91-39 before Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamis City
(for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land).

An adverse decision2 having been rendered against the plaintiffs in above-mentioned civil case
on September 7, 1992, Atty. Ocampos filed a notice of appeal3 at the behest of the former.4 ςrνll

The Court of Appeals gave the plaintiffs-appellants 45 days from notice to file their brief5 but
before the lapse of the period, their counsel Atty. Ocampos, upon motion,6 was granted a 90-
day extension of time to file the brief. The extended period lapsed, without, however, any
appellants brief being filed, prompting the appellate court to dismiss the appeal.7 The dismissal
of the appeal was not challenged.8 ςrνll

Thus spawned the present complaint against Atty. Ocampos.

In his Comment9 filed on August 29, 1995, the then 73-year old respondent claimed that he
merely agreed to handle the case gratis et amore upon the request of a friend who is
incidentally the son-in-law of herein complainant and Clerk of Court of one of the city courts in
Ozamis City. And he explained that he appeared only at the later part of the proceedings when
defendants were already presenting their evidence, he adding that when the decision of the trial
court was promulgated, the plaintiffs principal counsel, Atty. Placidtrank Osorio, was out of town,
hence, he was requested by the plaintiffs to appeal the decision before the Court of
Appeals.10 ςrνll

Respondent additionally claimed that he was constrained to ask for extension of time within
which to file appellants brief due to pressure of work and gastrointestinal illness, and that he had
in fact made arrangements with herein complainant to ask Atty. Osorio to, in his stead, prepare
the brief.11 ςrνll

Finally, Atty. Ocampos claimed that based on the evidence presented before the trial court, the
possibility that the decision of the trial court would be reversed was remote, hence, no serious
or irreparable damage could have been caused by the dismissal of the appeal.12 ςrνll

The complaint was referred by this Court on September 20, 1995 to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and [recommendation].13 Upon motion of complainant, venue
of the investigation was transferred to Ozamis City, all the parties being residents thereof.14 ςrνll

In her Position Paper15 submitted on June 9, 1998,16 complainant reiterated her charge in her

complaint, she contending that respondent violated his duty to inform her of his failure to file
appellants brief and of the dismissal of the appeal. Worse, complainant went on, respondent
denied such dismissal when she asked him about the status of the appeal.17 ςrνll

Despite the grant of respondents motion for extension of time to submit his position paper,18 he
failed to submit one.19 ςrνll

The committee created for the purpose of investigating the case in Ozamis City thereupon
recommended that the case be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and records on file.20 ςrνll
Investigating Commissioner Victoria G. de los Reyes, in her Report and
Recommendation21 dated August 29, 2003, faulted respondent for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 18.0122 and Rule 18.03 x x x, and recommended
the imposition of the penalty of suspension for six months, she observing as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

It is worthwhile to mention here that in the case of In re Santiago F. Marcos, 156 SCRA 844
(1987), a lawyers failure to file brief for his client amounts to inexcusable negligence. x x x

In the instant case, the respondent Atty. Ocampos had no justifiable excuse for not preparing
and filing the needed appellants brief. Granting that he was ill during that time, he could have
written to the complainant about it so that the latter will be able to hire another lawyer to handle
the case for her and to prepare and file the appellants brief. He also failed to make the
necessary Manifestation and Motion with the Court of Appeals. Sad to state, the respondent
failed to do all these in blatant violation of his duty towards his client and to the Courts.

We therefore maintain that a lawyers neglect of duty should not be tolerated and for such
inaction he has to be penalized.

The undersigned Commissioner could have recommended for a stiffer penalty. But considering
that he is now in the twilight years of his life, and for humanitarian reasons, it is recommended
that he just be suspended from the practice of law. (Emphasis in the original) 23 ςrνll

By Resolution of September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that the penalty of
suspension should only be for four months.24 ςrνll

This Court finds the IBP Board Resolution faulting respondent in order. A lawyer engaged to
represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost
diligence.25 By failing to file appellants brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge of such
responsibility. He thus violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.

Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

That respondent accepted to represent complainant et al. gratis et amore does not justify his
failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file appellants brief. Every
case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.26 ςrνll

It bears emphasis that a client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law and expects his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.27 ςrνll
Respondents claim that he conferred with complainant to request Atty. Osorio to draft and file
the appellants brief does not persuade, especially given his filing of a motion of extension of
time to file brief upon the grounds therein stated, without him mentioning that Atty. Osorio was
going to be the one to prepare and file it.

Until his final release from the professional relationship with a client, a counsel of record is
under obligation to protect the clients interest. That is why if a party has a counsel of record, a
court does not recognize any other representation on behalf thereof unless it is in collaboration
with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution of counsel is effected. Since
respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as he, it bears repeating, in fact filed a motion
for extension of time to file brief, he was under obligation to discharge his professional
responsibility.

As for complainants allegation that respondent denied that the appeal was dismissed by the
appellate court, it does not merit consideration, no factual finding thereof being reflected in the
IBP Report and Recommendation.

A word on the penalty to be imposed. In administrative complaints, this Court has exercised its
discretion on what penalty to impose on the basis of the facts thereof. Thus, for a lawyers failure
to file a brief or other pleading, this Court imposed penalties ranging from reprimand,28 warning
with fine,29 suspension30 and, in aggravated cases, disbarment.31 ςrνll

In the present case, owing to respondents advanced age, this Court imposes upon him the
penalty of suspension for three months.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Balmes

L. Ocampos is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon the
finality hereof, with WARNING that a repetition thereof will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo at 4-22.

2
 Id. at 34-36.

3
 Id. at 15.

4
 Id. at 4.

5
 Id. at 18.

6
 Id. at 19-20.
7
 Id. at 21.

8
 Id. at 22.

9
 Id. at 31-36.

10
 Id. at 31.

11
 Id. at 32.

12
 Id. at 33.

13
 Id. at 41.

14
 Id. at 53, 147.

15
 Id. at 114-125.

16
 Id. at 148.

17
 Id. at 117.

18
 Id. at 139.

19
 Id. at 141.

20
 Id. at 141, 148.

21
 Id. at 145-149.

22
 Rule 18.01. A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

23
 Rollo at 149.

24
 Id. at 144.

25
 Ford v. Daitol, 250 SCRA 7, 12 (1995).

26
 Santiago v. Fojas, 248 SCRA 68, 75-76, (1995).

27
 Id. at 73-74.

28
 Vda. de Orbiana v. Gerio, 88 SCRA 586 (1979).

29
 Basas v. Icawat, 338 SCRA 648 (2000).
30
 Rabanal v. Tugade, 383 SCRA 484 (2002); Galen v. Paguirigan, 378 SCRA 527 (2002);
Ford v. Daitol, supra.

31
 Mariveles v. Mallari, 219 SCRA 44 (1993).

Adm. Case No. 5530               January 28, 2013

SPOUSES ARCING AND CRESING BAUTISTA, EDAY RAGADIO and FRANCING

GALGALAN, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO CEFRA, Respondent.
 DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by spouses Arcing and Cresing Bautista, Eday
Regadio1 and Francing Galgalan (complainants) against Atty. Arturo Cefra for violating Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and 139 of the Rules of Court.

The Facts

The complainants were the defendants in Civil Case No. U-6504 an action for quieting of title,
recovery of possession and damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 The complainants engaged the services of Atty. Cefra to represent
them in the proceedings. According to the complainants, they lost in Civil Case No. U-6504
because of Atty. Cefra’s negligence in performing his duties as their counsel. First, Atty. Cefra
only presented testimonial evidence and disregarded two (2) orders of the RTC directing him to
submit a formal offer of documentary exhibits. Second, Atty. Cefra belatedly submitted the
formal offer of documentary exhibits after the complainants had been declared to have waived
their right to make a submission. Third, Atty. Cefra did not file a motion or appeal and neither did
he file any other remedial pleading to contest the RTC’s decision rendered against them.

The Court ordered Atty. Cefra to comment on the complaint. Despite the extensions of time
given by the Court, Atty. Cefra did not file any comment. He did not also comply with the Court’s
Minute Resolutions,3 dated December 14, 2005 and March 22, 2006, directing him to pay a
₱2,000.00 fine and to submit the required comment.

On July 16, 2008, we held Atty. Cefra in contempt of court, ordering his detention for five (5)
days. We also reiterated the order for Atty. Cefra to pay a ₱2,000.00 fine and to submit a
comment on the complaint.4

On August 4, 2008, Atty. Cefra filed his Comment,5 denying the allegations in the complaint. He
claimed that the complainants misunderstood the RTC’s decision:

2. That Respondent denies the allegation in Paragraphs (sic) 7 of the complaint that
defendants miserably lost the case because the Decision itself confirmed and affirmed
our stand that defendants do not contest the ownership of x x x Serlito Evangelista x x x.

3. That it was defendants (sic) failure to fully understand the Decision which led to the
filing of this administrative case and which subsequent events have proven that in the
implementation of the Writ of Execution the land owned by the defendants covered by
Transfer Certificates of Titles were not affected.6

In a Minute Resolution7 dated September 24, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On June 11, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner8 recommended the dismissal of the

complaint. The Investigating Commissioner opined:
The administrative complaint failed to show sufficient evidence to warrant disciplinary action
against respondent. Complainants filed this complaint because they believed that they lost their
case, however, their claim over their properties was not affected by the Decision of the court.9

In Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Cefra
negligent in handling the complainants’ case and unanimously approved his suspension from
the practice of law for six (6) months.

Atty. Cefra filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 14, 2012, in Resolution No. XX-2012-
24, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted Atty. Cefra’s motion in this wise:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and unanimously

MODIFY Resolution No. XIX-2010-285 dated April 16, 2010 Suspending Atty. Arturo B. Cefra
from the practice of law for six (6) months to REPRIMANDED considering that the failure was
not material to the case and that complainants were not prejudice. [emphasis supplied]

The Court’s Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty.
Cefra has been guilty of negligence in handling the complainants’ case. His actuations in the
present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an
officer of the Court.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence."10

It further states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."11 In addition, a lawyer has the
corresponding duty to "keep the client informed of the status of his case."12

In Jardin v. Villar, Jr.,13 the Court held:

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free. Certainly, a member of
the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion.
A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical.

Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards. Interestingly, he did not deny the complainants’
allegations and impliedly admitted his actions in the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-6504.

The records further substantiate clear acts of negligence on Atty. Cefra’s part in handling the
complainants’ case.

First, Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within the
period given by the RTC. Atty. Cefra submitted a formal offer of documentary evidence
five (5) months after the RTC’s first order directing him to make a formal offer. The
formal offer of evidence was only made after the complainants had been declared by the
RTC to have waived their right to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence.
 Second, Atty. Cefra failed to comply with the two (2) orders of the RTC directing him to
submit a formal offer of documentary evidence. He made no effort to submit the required
formal offer of documentary evidence within the prescribed period. Neither did he give
his reasons, within the required period, on why he could not make the required formal
offer of documentary evidence. In fact, Atty. Cefra’s belated explanation for this omission
was only done in a motion for reconsideration (with motion to admit the formal offer of
documentary evidence) that he subsequently filed, which motion the RTC denied for lack
of merit.

Third, Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial
measure to contest the RTC’s decision. His claim that the complainants had not been
prejudiced by the RTC’s decision is incorrect. The dispositive portion of the RTC’s
decision clearly adjudged the complainants liable to pay ₱30,000.00 moral
damages.14 Considering the pecuniary consequence of the RTC’s decision to his clients,
Atty. Cefra should have filed a motion for reconsideration before the RTC or appealed
the RTC’s decision with the Court of Appeals, or he should have at least immediately
explained to his clients his reasons for not taking remedial action. The failure to avail of
available remedial measures apparently prejudiced his clients. As matter now stands,
the complainants’ liability under the RTC’s decision is already final and executory.

Fourth, Atty. Cefra’s allegations in his Comment show his failure to effectively
communicate with the complainants. As Atty. Cefra puts it, the administrative complaint
was the result of the complainants’ failure to fully understand the RTC’s decision. In
other words, he admits that the present case would have been averted had he exerted
reasonable efforts to inform the complainants of the legal implications of the RTC’s
decision and to explain to them the material developments in the case.

We significantly note that even before this Court, Atty. Cefra’s conduct was less than what is
expected of an officer of the Court. He was held in contempt for his cavalier and indifferent
attitude in complying with the Court’s directives.

In sum, the above actuations showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and inattention to his duties
as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. We have repeatedly held that "[t]he practice of law is a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for
it.

Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.15

Under the circumstances, the IBP Board of Governors’ recommended penalty of simple
reprimand is not commensurate with the gravity of Atty. Cefra’s infractions. As the complainants
incurred pecuniary damage by reason of Atty. Cefra’s negligence, a suspension of one (1) year
from the practice of law is in order.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Arturo Cefra guilty of negligence, in violation
of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Also referred to as "Iday Rogadio" in the records.

2
 Rollo, p. 1.

3
 Id. at 37 and 39.

4
 Id. at 41-42.

5
 Id. at 69-70.

6
 Id. at 69.

7
 Id. at 73-74.

8
 Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala.

9
 Page 6 of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

10
 Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

11
 Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

12
 Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
13
 Adm. Case No. 5474, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 1, 8.

14
 Except for complainant Francing Galgalan. Rollo, p. 21.

15
 Floran v. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 386, 392-393.

16
 Suzette del Mundo v. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012; and
Talento v. Paneda, A.C. No. 7433, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 1, 13.
A.C. No. 5044               December 2, 2013

FELIPE C. DAGALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA, JR. and ATTY. AMADO T. ADQUILEN,* Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an asministrative complaint1 filed by complainant Felipe C. Dagala

(complainant) against respondents Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (atty. Quesada) and Atty. Amado
T. Adquilen (Atty. Adquilen), charging them for gross negligence in handling his labor
complaints.

The facts

On November 8, 1994 complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando City, La Union
(NLRC-RAB) Complaint2 for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and
attorney’s fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol), and owner and General
Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as well as its Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De Jesus, docketed
as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-1??1123-94. The said case was, however, dismissed without
prejudice, through an Order3 dated December 13, 1994 (December 13, 1994 Order), for failure
of complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory
conference hearings despite due notice. Thereafter, complainant engaged the services of Atty.
Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter (LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case, re-
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-10-1091-95 (LU).4

Similarly, the case was dismissed without prejudice on June 28, 1996, this time due to the
parties' failure to submit their respective position papers.5

Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time on August 27, 1996, docketed
as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-08-1191-96 (LU).6

During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly offered the amount of ₱74,000.00
as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the latter’s position
paper.7

Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint "for lack
of interest and failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order8 dated February 27, 1997 (February
27, 1997 Order). Atty. Adquilen and complainant received notice of the said order on March 11,
1997 and March 24, 1997,9 respectively. On July 11, 1997, complainant – this time assisted by
Atty. Imelda L. Picar (Atty. Picar) – filed a motion for reconsideration10

from the February 27, 1997 Order, which was treated as an appeal and transmitted to the
NLRC-National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR).11
However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution12 dated June 17, 1998 for having
been filed out of time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client.13

Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters14 dated November 18, 1998 to
respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases
against them before the Court. Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of
settlement, respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picar’s office. Only Atty.
Quesada responded to the said letter and subsequently, through a Memorandum of
Agreement15 dated December 5, 1998 (December 5, 1998 MoA), undertook to compensate the
damages sustained by complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an administrative
complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus prompting
complainant to proceed with the present complaint.16

In a Resolution17 dated June 21, 1999, the Court directed respondents to comment on the
Complaint within ten (10) days from notice. However, despite notices18 and the extension
granted,19

Atty. Adquilen failed to comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause
resolutions.20 Accordingly, a fine in the amount of ₱500.00 was imposed21 against him, which he
duly paid on September 19, 2005.22 On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his
Comment,23 admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He,
however, explained that he was unable to file the required position paper due to complainant's
failure to furnish him with the employment records and other relevant documents. He also
claimed that when he was informed of the dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised
complainant to re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his
duties as Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La Union
Province.24 Anent the December 5, 1998 MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was merely
prevailed upon to sign the same for fear of losing his means of livelihood and license to practice
law, and that he had no intention of reneging on his promise to pay. Nonetheless, despite
earnest efforts, he still failed to come up with the agreed-upon amount.25

In a Resolution26 dated March 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation or
decision.

The Proceedings Before the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) set the case for mandatory conference on
August 25, 2006 and required the parties to submit their respective briefs.27

Complainant was duly represented28 by his counsel at the hearing,29 while respondents filed
separate motions to reset, only to subsequently waive their respective appearances. Atty.
Adquilen attributed the waiver to his medical condition;30 on the other hand, in a complete
turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant.31

On March 25, 2009, Investigating IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued a Report
and Recommendation,32 finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling
complainant's case in violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). As such, he recommended that each of them be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was directed to comply
with his undertaking under the December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of ₱68,000.00, with
legal interest from January 20, 1999 until fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay
the amount of ₱6,000.00, representing the difference between the ₱74,000.00 settlement
offered by Capitol and the above-stated settlement amount, with legal interest from date of
notice of the order of dismissal on March 25, 199733 until fully paid. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the afore-stated report and recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-
262 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. Consequently, it
directed respondents to pay complainant the total amount of ₱74,000.00 within thirty (30) days
from notice.34

In a Resolution35 dated September 12, 2012, the Court noted the Notice36 of the IBP’s
November 19, 2011 Resolution, and thereafter sent notices to the parties as well as the IBP-
CBD, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Public Information Office. However, the notice sent
to Atty. Adquilen was returned unserved with the notation "Return to Sender, Deceased."37

Thus, in the Resolutions dated February 20, 201338 and June 10, 2013,39 the IBP was required
to furnish the Court with the death certificate of Atty. Adquilen.

On August 30, 2013, the IBP filed its compliance,40 attaching therewith the Certificate of
Death41 of Atty. Adquilen which indicates that the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to
cardiac arrhythmia.1âwphi1 In view of Atty. Adquilen's death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision,42 the Court, bearing in mind the punitive nature of administrative liabilities,43 hereby
dismisses the case against him. Hence, what is left for resolution is the complaint against Atty.
Quesada.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively
liable for gross negligence in handling complainant’s labor case.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent Atty. Quesada’s administrative
liability, but deems it proper to delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of
₱74,000.00. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and
his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect
that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree
of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.44

He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts.45

These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which respectively read as follows:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x
x CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. x x x x

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 – A
LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule
18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and
Canons. Primarily, Atty, Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling
complainant’s case by his failure to justify his absence on the two (2) mandatory conference
hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 despite due notice, which thus resulted in its
dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with
competence and diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of
uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and
file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urge
their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.46

Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and
without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing
his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Moreover,
Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD
when he denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant,
and claimed that the labor case was handled by another lawyer,47 despite his previous
admission48 before the Court of having accepted complainant's case. To add a perusal of the
complaint49 dated November 8, 1994 in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 reveals that Atty.
Quesada signed the same as counsel for complainant.50

While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial
proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.51

Besides, Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that complainant's corresponding failure to
appear during the mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 was
upon his counsel’s advice.52

Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty. Quesada had indulged in
deliberate falsehood, contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code.53

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.54

In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,55 a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year for inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and
for misrepresentations committed before the CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. In the cases of Cheng v. Atty.
Agravante56 and Perea v. Atty. Almadro,57 respondent-lawyers were similarly punished for their
negligence in the discharge of their duties to their client and for misrepresentation committed
before the Court, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code.
Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by
the IBP and accordingly suspends Atty. Quesada for a period of one (1) year. The Court must,
however, clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive to return the amount
of ₱74,000.00 as ordered by the IBP in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the
settlement initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount
partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an
administrative-disciplinary proceeding such as this case. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,58 the Court
recently illumined that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of
whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar
and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link
to the lawyer's professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the parties which are purely
civil in nature, should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during
administrative-disciplinary proceedings, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repitition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

On the other hand, the admnistrative complaint respondent Atty. Amado Adquilen is
hereby DIMISSED in view of his supervening death.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELLA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Footnotes

* Passed away on June 22, 2008 as shown in the Certifcate of Death; see rollo, pp. 277-
278.

1
 Id. at 1-12.

2
 Id. at 13.

3
 Id. at 14-15. Penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario.

4
 Id. at 18.

5
 Id. at 58.

6
 Id. at 19.

7
 Id. at 5.

8
 Id. at 58-59. Penned by Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando.

9
 Id. at 20.

10
 Id. at 42-57.

11
 Id. at 20. See Order dated July 15, 1997.

12
 Id. at 61-64. Penned by Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo, with Presiding
Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala and Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso (now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals), concurring.

13
 Id. at 63.

14
 Id. at 68 and 70.

15
 Id. at 72-73.

16
 Id. at 9-10.

17
 Id. at 129.

18
 Id. at 129 and 181-182, dorsal portion.

19
 See Resolution dated November 7, 2005; id. at 193.

20
 See Resolutions dated December 6, 2000 and February 11, 2004; id. at 171 and 182.

21
 See Resolution dated June 27, 2005; id. at 183.
22
 Evidenced by Official Receipt No. 1866259 A; id. at 189.

23
 Id. at 130-133.

24
 Id. at 130-131.

25
 Id. at 132.

26
 Id. at 194.

27
 See Notice of Mandatory Conference dated June 13, 2006; id. at 197.

28
 See Special Power of Attorney dated August 24, 2006; id. at 202-203.

29
 See Minutes of the Hearing; id. at 204.

30
 See Manifestation dated September 19, 2006; id. at 213.

31
 See Compliance with Waiver of Appearance; id. at 215-218.

32
 Id. at 250-258.

33
 Id. at 258. Should be March 24, 1997 (id. at 20).

34
 Id. at 249.

35
 Id. at 259-260.

36
 Id. at 249.

37
 Id. at 263.

38
 Id. at 270.

39
 Id. at 274.

40
 See Letter dated August 29, 2013; id. at 276.

41
 Id. at 277-278.

42
 Bayaca v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, January 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 93, 107.

43
 In Re: Application for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits under R.A. No. 910, 575 Phil. 267,
271 (2008), citing Bote v. Judge Eduardo, 491 Phil. 198, 204 (2005), the Court stated:
The Court does not agree with the OCA Legal Office and the OCA. The dismissal of the
administrative case against Judge Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance
with Bote v. Judge Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge
Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose any administrative
liability of a punitive nature; and declared the administrative complaint against the
respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

44
 Pitcher v. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013.

45
 Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 1, 2013.

46
 Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 367, 374.

47
 Rollo, p. 215.

48
 Id. at 130

49
 Id. at 13.

50
 Id.

51
 Sambajon v. Atty. Suing, 534 Phil. 84, 101 (2006).

52
 Rollo, p. 2.

53
 Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr., supra note 46, at 375.

54
 Anastacio-Briones v. Atty. Zapanta, 537 Phil. 218, 224 (2006).

55
 Supra note 46.

56
 469 Phil. 869 (2004).

57
 447 Phil. 434 (2003).

58
 As noted in this case, "[a]n example of a liability which has an intrinsic link to the
professional engagement would be a lawyer's acceptance fees." (A.C. No. 4945,
October 8, 2013.)
A.C. No. 7944               June 03, 2013

REX POLINAR DAGOHOY, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For consideration are: (1) the letter1 dated August 28, 2012 of respondent Atty. Artemio V. San
Juan informing the Court of his compliance with the Court’s Resolution2 dated April 16, 2012;
and (2) the Report and Recommendation3 dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

The Facts

Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in connection with the
dismissal of his client’s appeal filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas),
his client and the father of complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted
of theft by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte.4 According to
the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San Juan’s failure to file the appellant’s
brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the
CA’s order of dismissal.6
The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful in dealing with him and
Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and
Tomas of the real status of Tomas’ appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its
dismissal.7

In his comment,8 Atty. San Juan denied the charge. He imputed fault on Tomas for failing to
furnish him a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare and file the appellant’s brief. He
claimed that he tried to save the situation but a rich niece of Tomas dismissed him and
prevented him from further acting on the case.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

After receipt of Atty. San Juan’s comment, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.9

On September 15, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag found Atty. San
Juan negligent and recommended the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice
of law.10 The Investigating Commissioner opined:

Under Section 7, Rule 44 of the same Rules, the period within which Appellant should file his
Brief is limited only to forty five (45) days, unless an extension of time to file briefs has been
granted by the Court upon good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed
before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. However, up to the present or for a
period of almost one (1) year, Accused Appellant neither moved for extension of time to file nor
filed his brief.11

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-305 dated May 15, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.12

The IBP refers its findings to the Court

The complainant and Atty. San Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against Resolution
No. XIX-2011-305 dated May 15, 2011. The IBP thereafter submitted its findings to the Court.

In our Resolution dated April 16, 2012, we resolved:

A.C. No. 7944 (Rex Polinar Dagohoy vs. Artemio V. San Juan). – The Court NOTES the Notice
of Resolution No. XIX-2011-305 dated 15 May 2011 of the IBP Board of Governors which
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules,
and finding respondent guilty of gross negligence, ordered the suspension of Atty. Artemio V.
San Juan from the practice of law for three (3) months; transmitted by letter dated 16 January
2012 of Acting Director Dennis A.B. Funa, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, together with the
records of the case and the notation that no motion for reconsideration was filed by either
party.13 (emphases and italics supplied)

Atty. San Juan’s letter dated August 28, 2012

and motion to lift suspension from the practice of law

In a letter dated August 28, 2012, Atty. San Juan manifested his compliance with the April 16,
2002 Resolution and prayed for the lifting of his suspension. He stated that:

This will please confirm receipt on May 31, 2012 of a Resolution dated 16 April 2012, by the
Hon. Supreme Court, Second Division, Baguio City, ordering my suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months. Upon receipt of the notice on May 31, 2012, I personally informed
the Presiding Judge of the [c]ourts where I have been handling cases by showing to them the
above-mentioned notice from the High Court.14

In its Report and Recommendation dated January 14, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant
recommended:

A resolution, whether to adopt or modify the penalty imposed on the respondent as

recommended by the IBP, be now issued;

For purposes of determining the effectivity of the order of suspension, respondent be

REQUIRED to notify the Court of the date of x x x the said resolution;

After the lapse of the entire duration of the order of suspension, the respondent be REQUIRED
to file a sworn manifestation, with attachment of certifications from the IBP Local Chapter where
he belongs and the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where he practices his profession,
all stating that he has ceased and desisted from the practice of law (stating the date of the start
of suspension up to the end of the period of suspension).15

The Court’s Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.

In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan,16 we held that the failure to file a brief resulting in
the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, Atty. San Juan’s
negligence in handling his client’s appeal was duly established by the records and by his own
admission. We cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to
provide him a copy of the case records.

In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juan’s control and is
a task that the lawyer undertakes. We note that Atty. San Juan received a notice dated April 19,
200517 from CA Clerk of Court Beverly S. Beja informing him that the case records were already
complete and at his disposal for the preparation of the brief.

Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellant’s
brief within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. In this case, Atty.
San Juan was directed to file an appellant’s brief within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice
dated April 19, 2005 sent by CA Clerk of Court Beja.

The preparation and the filing of the appellant’s brief are matters of procedure that fully fell
within the exclusive control and responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to
execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the perfection of his client’s appeal.
Third, the records also disclose Atty. San Juan’s lack of candor in dealing with his client. He
omitted to inform Tomas of the progress of his appeal with the CA.18 Worse, he did not disclose
to Tomas the real reason for the CA’s dismissal of the appeal.19 Neither did Atty. San Juan file a
motion for reconsideration to address the CA’s order of dismissal, or otherwise resort to
available legal remedies that might have protected his client’s interest.

Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to
"conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to (his) clients[.]" He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

"It is a fundamental rule of ethics that ‘an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.’"20 It was Atty. San Juan’s bounden duty to see
his cases through until proper completion; he could not abandon or neglect them in
midstream,21 in the way he did with the complainant’s case.

In light of these considerations, we find the IBP’s recommended penalty of three (3) months
suspension from the practice of law not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions
committed; as described above, these infractions warrant the imposition of a stiffer sanction. We
take into account the following acts, omissions, and consequence attendant to Atty. San Juan’s
inadequacies: first, the negligence in handling his client’s appeal; second, his failure to act
candidly and effectively in communicating information to his client; and more importantly, third,
the serious and irreparable consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client of
legal remedies in addressing his conviction.

In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal,22 we imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law
on a lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his
client’s case. With this case as the norm, we hold that Atty. San Juan should be meted a
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in
handling his client’s case.

Finally, we deny Atty. San Juan’s motion to lift the order of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. San
Juan’s self-imposed compliance with the IBP’s recommended penalty of three (3) months
suspension was premature. The wordings of the Resolution dated April 16, 2012 show that the
Court merely noted: (1) the IBP’s findings and the recommended penalty against Atty. San
Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the case back to the Court for its proper disposition. The IBP
findings and the stated penalty thereon are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court
has the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical
conduct.23 Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the
recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own.
Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or
compliance.24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

NOTE the Report and Recommendation dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar
Confidant;

SUSPEND from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for
violating his Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or
acts shall be dealt with more severely; and

DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan in the letter dated August 28, 2012 that he
be allowed to return to the practice of law.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
instructed to include a copy of this Decision in Atty. San Juan’s file.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen,** JJ., concur.

Brion,* J., (Acting Chairperson).

Footnotes

* In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 1460 dated May
29, 2013.

** Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per

Special Order No. 1461 dated May 29, 2013.

1
 Rollo, p. 112.

2
 Id. at 120.

3
 Id., pages unnumbered.

4
 Docketed as Crim. Case No. 99-12; id. at 9-14.

5
 Id. at 17-18.

6
 Id. at 2-3.

7
 Ibid.
 8
 Id. at 53-55.

9
 Id. at 63.

10
 Id. at 106-111.

11
 Id. at 110-111.

12
 Id. at 104-105.

13
 Id. at 120.

14
 Id. at 112.

15
 Id., pages unnumbered.

16
 A.C. No. 5862; through an extended resolution dated October 12, 2011.

17
 Rollo, p. 46.

18
 Affidavit of Merit dated January 24, 2008 of Tomas and Affidavit–Complaint dated
November 14, 2007 of the complainant; id. at 15-16 and 27-28, respectively.

19
 Ibid.

20
 Zarate-Bustamante v. Atty. Libatique, 418 Phil. 249, 255 (2001).

21
 Ibid.

22
 512 Phil. 668, 672 (2005).

23
 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 15.

24
 Lourdes Corres v. Atty. Juan A. Abaya, Jr., A.C. No. 2983; through an extended
Resolution dated February 29, 2012.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4945, October 08, 2013

MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant, v. EPIFANIA “FANNY” OBIAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
 PER CURIAM:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit1 filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-

Samonte (complainant) against Epifania “Fanny” Obias (respondent) charging her for grave
misconduct and/or gross malpractice.

The Facts

In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias), through respondent, offered
for sale a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject
property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of
P2,800,000.00 and payable in installments.2 Respondent, who was to receive the payment from
Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale and
owner’s copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase price.3 She
further undertook to cause the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential,
and the transfer of the title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package
agreement.4 Respondent received all the installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued
receipts therefor.5 After full payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997,6 and after giving an
additional P115,000.00 for capital gains tax and other expenses,7 Sps. Tria requested from
respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the owner’s copy of the title to them but
respondent failed to comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance for
conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential was taking time.8 Despite
several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her undertakings under the
package agreement.9cralawlibrary

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.10 Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps.
Tria, again demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and
the certificate of title of the subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps.
Jeremias informed complainant that they had received the consideration of P2,200,000.00 and
they had executed and turned-over the sale documents to respondent.11cralawlibrary

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by
Sps. Jeremias and notarized by respondent in favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on
May 26, 1998 for a consideration of P200,000.00.12cralawlibrary

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,13 claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997
not to proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another
buyer.14 She further averred that Nestor also demanded from her the return of the purchase
price, and that she complied with the said demand and returned the P2,800,000.00 in cash to
Nestor sometime during the latter part of January 1998.15 However, she did not ask for a written
receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the P115,000.00 intended for capital gains
taxes and other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorney’s fees for the other legal
services that she rendered for him.16cralawlibrary

In the Court’s Resolution17 dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent,18 only the complainant and her witnesses
testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondent’s right to present evidence was considered
waived.19cralawlibrary
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent to
have violated her oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the second sale of the subject
property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale of the same property to Sps.
Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent received, and admitted to have
received, from Sps. Tria the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for
expenses. He further found the second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear
indication that respondent: (a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their
family; (b) violated their proprietary rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in
her.21 On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondent’s
defense that she returned the P2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that the
latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the subject property in their favor, absent any receipt
or documentation to prove the same.22 As counsel for Sps. Tria, respondent failed in her
obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction and, as such, she was found
guilty of grave misconduct and gross malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (Code).23 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years.24cralawlibrary

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-18525 dated October 19, 2007 but reduced the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.

Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration26 which
were, however, denied in the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated
March 10, 2012.27cralawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her
Comment, already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria,28 which necessarily
gave rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them. The complete turnaround made by
respondent in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution No.
XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no lawyer-client relationship between her
and Sps. Tria,29 cannot thus be given any credence.

Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat
of a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession.
In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered
regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from
the category of legal services.30 Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs
or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.31 Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew
respondent to be, and transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification
of her own acts as being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case,
the lawyer-client relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the latter’s
admission that she rendered legal services to the former. With this relationship having been
established, the Court proceeds to apply the ethical principles pertinent to this case.

It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.32 They are duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.33 Irrefragably, the
legal profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of their clients.34 As enshrined in
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions
were evidently prejudicial to her clients’ interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the
deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale
over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed from protecting the
interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the
subject property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in bringing about the
defeat of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. To
add, by turning against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.35 These unyielding
standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a
period of five years to just one year by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which mandates that “[t]he decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.”
Verily, the Court frowns on the unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the
recommended penalty. Be that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence
reposed in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or
deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred
them. In Chua v. Mesina, Jr.,36 the Court disbarred the lawyer who, upon his
misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property subject
of that case, but instead, offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott,37 the
penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who, among others, actively sought to
sell the properties subject of that case contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the
infractions in the foregoing cases are akin to those committed by respondent in the case at bar,
the Court deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as
herein discussed, respondent committed deliberate violations of the Code as she dishonestly
dealt with her own clients and advanced the interests of another against them resulting to their
loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment
consistent with existing jurisprudence.

As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not – as it should not –
include an order for the return of the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of
P115,000.00 for expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit the Investigating
Commissioner’s findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno,38 it has been held that disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-
lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is
his administrative liability.39 Thus, the Court’s findings during administrative-disciplinary
proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in
nature – meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional
engagement40 – as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature.

WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania “Fanny” Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
accordingly DISBARRED.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-5.cranad
2
 Id. at 1.cranad
3
 Id.cranad
4
 Id.cranad
5
 Id. at 2. See also various attached receipts issued by respondent; id. at 12-16.cranad
6
 Id. See also receipt issued by respondent for the additional expenses; id. at 16.cranad
7
 Id. at 17.cranad
8
 See TSN, March 17, 2005, id. at 554.cranad
9
 See TSN, March 17, 2005, id. at 554-555 and 576.cranad
10
 Id. at 2. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that respondent was charged with the
murder of Nestor. In its November 24, 2010 Decision in G.R. No. 175887, entitled “Heirs of the
Late Nestor Tria v. Atty. Epifania Obias,” the Court even sustained the probable cause finding
against respondent for the said crime. (See Heirs of the Late Nestor Tria v. Obias, G.R. No.
175887, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 91.)
11
 Id. at 3.cranad
12
 Id. at 3-4. See also Deed of Sale dated May 26, 1998; id. at 23-24.cranad
13
 Id. at 56-59.cranad
14
 Id. at 57.cranad
15
 Id.cranad
16
 Id. at 57-58.cranad
17
 Id. at 72.cranad
18
 Id. at 628.cranad
19
 Id.cranad
20
 Id. at 620-639.cranad
21
 Id. at 638.cranad
22
 Id. at 637.cranad
23
 Id.cranad
24
 Id. at 639.cranad
25
 Id. at 619.cranad
26
 Id. at 640-646 (for complainant); and id. at 669-674 (for respondent).cranad
27
 Id. at 697.cranad
28
 Paragraph 5 of respondent’s comment states: “It is hereby further pointed out that
undersigned Respondent had been appearing as counsel for Nestor Tria since 1995 in
administrative cases and in investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and had rendered legal services by way of
documenting, or giving legal advice on, acquisition of many valuable real properties not
only in Camarines Sur but in Metro Manila in the names of the spouses Nestor Tria and
Pura S. Tria, or of their children[.]” (Id. at 58; emphasis supplied)
29
 Id. at 656-657.cranad
30
 See Barnachea v. Atty. Quiocho, 447 Phil. 67 (2003).cranad
31
Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, 432 Phil 840, 848-849 (2002).cranad
32
 Id. at 849.cranad
33
Barnachea v. Atty. Quiocho, supra note 30, at 75.cranad
34
 Id.cranad
35
Tabang v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6490, July 9, 2013, citing In the Matter of the IBP Membership
Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, 174 Phil. 55, 62 (1978) and Ventura v. Samson,
A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 430, 433.cranad
36
 479 Phil. 796 (2004).cranad
37
 See supra note 35.cranad
38
 A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693.cranad
39
 “[W]e cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the money paid
by complainant. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only
concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other.” (Roa v. Moreno, id. at 700; emphasis supplied.)
40
 An example of a liability which has an intrinsic link to the professional engagement would be a
lawyer’s acceptance fees
 A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the
status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This
is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He
thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Antecedents

On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of
the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the
serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil
Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer
with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform
the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing,
thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte
as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually
submit it three months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;

and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte
for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes,

namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of
the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2

2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order
issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal offer of
plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;”3 and
 3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the
counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to
the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4

On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative
complaint.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of
documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14,
1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the
filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00,
contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in
addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless,
because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with
counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply
(Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled
the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his non- attendance at the hearings in Civil Case No.
CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either
stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in another
court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed
Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte
had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request
because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had
been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in
addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk
of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the
practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change

counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand
on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been
forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to
change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the
counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9

On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying
additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the
reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply
attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement
of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply
had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly
filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 
Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and
reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his
testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.

Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was
P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus
P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s services after discovering the
latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.

On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.

Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at
10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing
was reset several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP
Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6,
1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the
hearing being cancelled until further notice.19

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest
on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.

Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on
February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty.
Abellana.

On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice.
Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24

Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.

On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.27

Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not
caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because
of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to
avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he
lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the
complainant, except the above-stated replies.

On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in
handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to
make it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal
offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19,
1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice
his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to
falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to
falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on
June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only
on June 14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his
having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively
different from that of the trial court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence
adduced against him; that he had explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the
complaint had been the complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had
only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed such in
court.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana,
observing as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has
shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his
delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole,
the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.

Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits a
member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above- entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”,
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to
exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)

On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:32

A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice
of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed
by the respondent;

B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;
 C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that
it is hearsay and self-serving.

In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated
that the “enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which
were attached as Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted,
however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s position paper were different documents,
namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and
Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the
records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court,
did not execute any affidavit or certification to the effect that both documents were inexistent. He
reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents “seemed to be falsified documents”
based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for reconsideration.36

In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty.
Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted that the
reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his
position paper and motion for reconsideration.

On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit
certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38

On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.40

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.41

Ruling

We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued
with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God. (Emphasis supplied)

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his
dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright
falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had
already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988,
the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of
the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his
falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at
the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him
as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte
in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on
the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil
case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the
investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to have been part of the records of
the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the
administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his
forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the
official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch
5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He
defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that “court personnel were authorized to accept
filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he manifested his great
disrespect towards both the Court and his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely
warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the
formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he
could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the
order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some
tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.

The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against

lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by
one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to
determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts
and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest
or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear
in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.

The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty.

Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on “4” but justified himself
by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct
amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it
appear as one actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed
because the rubber stamp imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber
stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers
filed in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of
course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not
present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in
court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file
them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating
that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9
turned out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court
to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually
finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty.
Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with
mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the respondent
lawyer was suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing in court that the
complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no
such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an
excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had
invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the complainant had filed a similar
case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no other
case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for six months for
making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension
from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition
suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N.
Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective
upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or
similar acts will be punished more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
2
 Id. at 6.
3
 Id. at 7-8.
4
 Id. at 9
5
 Id. at 11-16.
6
 Id. at 29-32.
7
 Id. at 33 (Annex 10).
8
 Id. at 35 (Annex 12).
9
 Id. at 36 (Annex 13 and Annex 13-A).
10
 Id. at 44-47.
11
 Id. at 52
12
 Id. at 53.
13
 Id. at 38.
14
 Id. at 57.
15
 Id. at 63.
16
 Id. at 64 and 66-67.
17
 Id. at 70.
18
 Id. at 75-76.
19
 Id. at 77-78.
20
 Id. at 79-81
21
 Id. at 86-87.
22
 Id. at 91.
23
 Id. at 92
24
 Id. at 93.
25
 Id. at 94.
26
 Id. at 101.
27
 Id. at 104-105.
28
 Id. at 107-113.
29
 Id. at 226-238 (penned by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco).
30
 Id. at 226-238.
31
 Id. at 225.
32
 Id. at 153-160.
33
 Id. at 154.
34
 Id. at 129-130.
35
 Id. at 131.
36
 Id. at 162.
37
 Id. at 163-165.
38
 Id. at 183.
39
 Id. at 189.
40
 Id. At 192-196.
41
 Id. at 223.
42
De Leon v. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 237, 243-244.
43
 Supra note 11.
44
Rollo, p. 158.
45
Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372.
46
 A.C. 6198, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 1, 8-10.
47
 A.C. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1, 6-7.
A.C. No. 9149               September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,
vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid,
Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross
misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

The antecedent facts follow:

Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the
spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses
defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract
against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s
payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that
he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged ₱30,000 as
attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before
Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and
transactions that transpired.

Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that
they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a
favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later
acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for ₱950 and delivered
it to respondent’s office.

Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the
spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was "needed
to have [the resolution] reversed."2 Respondent then prepared the motion and promised
complainant that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for
lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse
decision and presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the
spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional ₱10,000 to
respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the
complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case.
Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status
of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he
was able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the
spouses could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to
determine the whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on
January 24, 2005, but because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s
secretary a letter regarding the possible location of the spouses.

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s
possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program "Ito ang Batas with
Atty. Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was
filed on June 6, 20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee
was only ₱2,440 and not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio
program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter,
like all of complainant’s previous letters, was unheeded.

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found
guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.

Respondent harps a different tale.

In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack
of merit. He denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed
that he charged and received only ₱2,000. He also countered that the payment of ₱30,000
made by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case.
Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the
success of the case before the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos
Primero I to the prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged ₱10,000, as
he only charged ₱5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to
inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the
documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant
was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be
attending his daily court hearings.

The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his
counsel attended.5 The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were
directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days,6 to which complainant and
respondent complied.7

On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of
factual and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel
when he filed the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the
civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the
dismissal of both cases as his job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It
was unethical for him to guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win
such case for the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor
a bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000. Respondent
argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected
exceeded ₱30,000 – the amount being claimed by complainant from the spouses.

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for negligence within the
meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility," viz:

In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore
thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.

One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for
repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a
contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly
actionable in a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor,
the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a
contract of services and the respondent (spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual
obligation under the contract.

xxxx

Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the
dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where
the actual damages claimed is ₱36,000.00.

It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC
[which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains in filing an
action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when
the civil complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that
the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already ₱400,000.00.

xxxx

Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters
marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by complainant’s
secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M"
which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the
respondent with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is
willing to meet with the complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of
the legal engagement, but omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time
and place for the meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which
was done in bad faith on the part of respondent.10

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646,
adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s
violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his
negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of
suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009,
respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of
Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases
should not be attributed to him alone. He stressed that complainant had always been informed
that he only had time to meet with his clients in the afternoon at his office in Quezon City.
Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that
though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence in violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that
this was his first infraction.

In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent
filed a second Motion for Reconsideration15 which was no longer acted upon due to the
transmittal of the records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16

On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned Notices
of Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued
another Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal and respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under
Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we
also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s
Oath.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting
in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but
are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.19

The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the
following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

a)

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client;

b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body;

c)

Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from his client;

d)

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him;

e)

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

f)

Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and

g)

Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.20

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated
Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with
competence and diligence" when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after
the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing
a civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an
alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only ₱36,000. As
correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,]
vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount
of demand does not exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the
effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to ₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21

The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the
criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have
been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for
complainant. What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing
the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling
the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed
due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.

That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly
negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for
the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite
repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the
cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In
what may seem to be a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to
resort to consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the
very least, get his attention.

Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays
his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a
lawyer not to ‘neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.’ He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions
or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect
not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty
to the client’s cause."22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of
the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be
consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for
information from the client.

In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent
is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that
complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance
exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules
18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him." The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The
most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of
the client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon
taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him
for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of
not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the
interests of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform
such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.

All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the
complainant who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the
complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to prove respondent’s violation of
Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Lawyer’s Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon
15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly
instructed him to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get
a favorable decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent
indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the
required filing fees.

As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same
to constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the
Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that
respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating
Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be
disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1529 dated August 29, 2013.

1
 Rollo, pp. 2-7. Docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1630.

2
 Id. at 4.

3
 Id. at 18-21. Filed before the RTC, Branch 131, Caloocan City, and docketed as Civil
Case No. C-20115.

4
 Id. at 27-30.

5
 Id. at 35.

6
 Id. at 77.

7
 Id. at 37-44, 53-57.

8
 Id. at 78-80.

9
 Id. at 143-151.

10
 Id. at 147-149.

11
 Id. at 142, 165. Signed by National Secretary Tomas N. Prado.

12
 Id. at 152-155.

13
 Id. at 156-160.

14
 Id. at 164.

15
 Id. at 178-182.

16
 Id. at 177. Signed by Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal.

17
 Id. at 175-176.

18
 Id. at 185.

19
 Gonzaga v. Atty. Villanueva, Jr., 478 Phil. 859, 869 (2004), citing Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,
376 Phil. 336, 340 (1999).

20
 Rollo, p. 2.
 21
 Id. at 171.

22
 Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Seventh Edition (2002), p. 209,
citing Santiago v. Fojas, Adm. Case No. 4103, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 69, 75-76
& Torres v. Orden, A.C. No. 4646, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 1, 5.

23
 Rudecon Management Corporation v. Atty. Camacho, 480 Phil. 652, 660 (2004), citing
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido, 449 Phil. 619, 629 (2003) and
Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341 (2003).

A.C. No. 7749               July 8, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR., RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de Saldivar (complainan
Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Ru
and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972,2 filed by the hei
Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was represent
respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed to sub
trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently, the opposing counsel moved
case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order3 dated November 27, 2003. When compla
confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to worry, assuring her that
not lose the case since she had the title to the subject property.

On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision4 (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering her to vacat
over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the Region
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer
complaint.5 Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s ruling and reinstated the MTC
Decision.6 Respondent received a copy of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complain
the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did respondent pursue
action.7 As such, complainant decided to engage the services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking oth
remedies. Due to respondent’s failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such oth
remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant filed the instant administrative co
alleging that respondent’s acts amounted to gross negligence which resulted in her loss.8

In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the administrative compla
ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance10 dated May 19, 2008, admitting to have agreed
complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the subject property owned by the late Pelag
(Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he noticed a discre
between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which com
supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and
from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the sus
further proceedings and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determin
identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide on the manner of the
re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for t
purpose. In relation, the heirs’ counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in his office11 certain documents which
the subject property’s description. Thus, pending the conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary confe
tentatively reset to November 27, 2003.12

As it turned out, the heirs’ counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated documents,
notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary conference scheduled on Nov
2003 would not push through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened to coincide with an
provincial conference which he was required to attend. As such, he inadvertently missed the hearing.13 Nonethe
proffered that he duly appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the RTC,14 resulting to the dismissal of the unlawf
complaint, albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the disputed proper
subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 2715 filed by Pelagia again
complainant’s mother, Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents furnished to him by certain DAR
respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property for a long time and actually tilled the sam
name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information, respondent was convinced
Placida – and consequently, complainant (who took over the tilling) – was indeed entitled to the subject property
advised complainant that it would be best to pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of contesting th
filed by the heirs before the CA. It was respondent’s calculated legal strategy that in the event the CA reverses t
of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution or a motion to quash such writ may be filed base
afore-stated reasons, especially if an approved plan and later, an emancipation patent covering the subject prop
issued.16

Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage extended to about 5,
meters of the subject property which was determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title o
Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice
promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainan
respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to turn sour an
eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and retained the services of another lawy
In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated
Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 200919 and required
to submit their respective position papers.20

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating Commissione
Report and Recommendation (Commissioner’s Report),21 finding respondent to have been negligent in failing to
preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the immediate subm
the said case for decision and eventual loss of complainant’s cause.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring
court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push through, considering that the November 27, 200
was only tentative and the heirs’ counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact that respondent had t
important provincial conference which coincided with the said setting hardly serves as an excuse since he shou
a substitute counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned any legal remedy that he undertook when
elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not file any comment or opposition to the heirs’ appea
respondent’s enumerations of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainant’s interests were found to be
only after the fact.22

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to exercise ordinary
handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.23

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XIX-2011-266
May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and in accord with applicable la
rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-2012-51726 d
December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light,
led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, an
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
free.27 Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential directives a
respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
 xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therew
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasona
the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the c
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client
court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, pros
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to
or her to do so.28

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.29 While such negligen
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to p
obligations due his client is per se a violation.30

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required dilig
handling complainant’s cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference hearing in Civil C
1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the
hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively set and considering further that he was y
with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent had an important commitment during that day hardly exculp
from his omission since the prudent course of action would have been for him to send a substitute counsel to ap
behalf. In fact, he should have been more circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not have been
unattended in view of its adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendant’s failure to appear at the preliminary co
already entitles the plaintiff to a judgment.31 Indeed, second-guessing the conduct of the proceedings, much less
any contingent measure, exhibits respondent’s inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s
cause.1âwphi1

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs’ appeal before the CA. Record
that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected to inform her about the CA ruling which h
received, thereby precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As regards respondent’s suggested lega
pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state that the same does not excuse him from failing to fi
comment or an opposition to an appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse resolution, as in this case. Irref
these are basic courses of action which every diligent lawyer is expected to make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the above-cited prov
the Code.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross neglig
infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda
who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case fo
was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballestero
Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise su
six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in bre
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprude
Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period
months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in violation of Cano
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WAR
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1484 dated July 9, 2013.
1
 Rollo, pp. 32-34.
2
 Id. at 2.
3
 Id. at 11. Penned by Presiding Judge Maximino A. Badilla.
4
 Id. at 12-19.
5
 Id. at 20.

6
 Id. at 21-29. See CA Decision dated January 12, 2006. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q
with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.

7
 Id. at 203.
8
 Id.
9
 Id. at 52.
10
 Id. at 58-68.

11
 Id. at 60. Respondent was a lawyer working for the DAR Legal Division of Camarines Sur.

12
 Id. at 60-61 and 203-204.
13
 Id. at 61.
14
 Id.

15
 "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the
Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor."

16
 Rollo, pp. 62-63.
17
 Id. at 64-65.
18
 Id. at 88.
19
 Id. at 114. See Order dated February 18, 2009.
 20
 Id. at 121. See Order dated April 14, 2009.
21
 Id. at 162-169.
22
 Id.at 168-169.
23
 Id.
24
 Id. at 161.
25
 Id. at 153-158.
26
 Id. at 199.
27
 Villaflores v. Atty. Limos, 563 Phil. 453, 461 (2007).

28
 Conlu v. Atty. Aredonia, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 367, 374.

29
 Anderson, Jr. v. Atty. Cardeño, A.C. No. 3523, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 261, 271.

30
 Ylaya v. Atty. Gacott, A. C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013, citing Solidon v. Atty. Macalalad, A.C.
February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 472.

31
 Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides in part:

SEC. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later than thirty (30) days a
answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-t
applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Ru

xxxx

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in
accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of
defendants sued under a common cause of action defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference. (Emphasis supplied)

32
 A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 336.
33
 A.C. No. 5760, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 111.
34
 492 Phil. 149 (2005).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[G.R. No. L-28617. January 31, 1973.]

SOLEDAD ARANGCO, LAURENTE ABAÑO, FATIMA ABAÑO and GRACITA ABAÑO

 (Incompetent minors) represented by their guardian, LEONOR ABAÑO; CALIXTO,
JOCELYN and SORIANO, all surnamed "ABAÑO," represented by their natural guardian,
ANACORITA ANDES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GLORIA BALOSO, Defendant-Appellant.

Rodolfo A. Madrid for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Jose Bernabe, for Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE; MORTGAGE DEBT; AMOUNT CONSIGNED IN

INSTANT CASE EQUIVALENT TO MORTGAGE DEBT. — On May 28, 1964, Vicente Abaño
mortgaged to the defendant Gloria Baloso for the consideration of P1,200.00 a parcel of land
which Vicente and his wife acquired after their marriage. On November 17, 1964, the
consideration of the mortgage was increased to P1,800.00. Sometime later, Vicente’s sister and
his three minor children took from the defendant separate amounts totalling P800.00. On June
16, 1966, the widow and children of Vicente brought an action to redeem the land from the
defendant and deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of P1,800.00 for the purpose of
redemption. The trial court stamped its approval over the consignation and the redemption of
the land. It ordered Vicente’s sister to pay the P100.00 she took from defendant and held that
the P700.00 which Vicente’s minor children took from the defendant could be sought from them
in the proper guardianship proceedings. The decision appealed from should be affirmed. The
trial court merely paid deference to the unbroken line of decisions of this Court that the recovery
of the amount loaned and secured by the mortgage could alone be the subject of a proceeding
in foreclosure, the inference being that the payment of such sum necessarily would suffice to
release the mortgage. The amount of P1,800.00 consigned to redeem the land was the
mortgage debt. There was nothing in the mortgage to indicate that the additional P800.00
sought by defendant was likewise included.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; ERROR NOT VENTILATED IN LOWER COURT CANNOT BE

RAISED ON APPEAL. — The assigned error, to the effect that there was contemplated in the
mortgage a fixed period during which plaintiffs-appellees could not redeem the properly, can be
disposed of summarily. Such a question was not ventilated before the lower court. For the
appellate tribunal to consider a legal question, it must be raised in the court below.

3. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; REMINDER IN SEEKING APPELLATE REVIEW. — There is

need for members of the Bar to temper their enthusiasm in seeking appellate review whether by
an ordinary appeal or through a writ of certiorari. It is well that they keep in mind that as officers
of the court, they are required to exercise the utmost care and to undertake the most thorough
preparation to assure that all the learning at their command be brought to bear on the legal
questions that might be raised, or, in their opinion, could be reraised, for the resolution of a
higher court. To act otherwise would show less than full compliance with their duty to the bench.
Moreover, in the end, it might only signify that in their unbounded optimism they plant seeds of
hope in their client’s minds which, unfortunately, may never grow. For obviously unless they
could show the merit in such an appeal all that they would have accomplished would be to
increase unnecessarily the burden on appellate tribunals. In the final analysis then, the utmost
fidelity to a client’s cause requires a more discriminating appraisal of the matter, as in more
cases than not, the prospect for reversal is dim, not to say nonexistent. A sense of realism
should thus infuse their actuation. Nor should there be any hesitancy in so informing the
disappointed litigant that most likely the verdict would not be altered.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

It does appear at times, and this appeal on a question of law from a lower court decision is one
of them, that litigants manifest their resentment at losing cases by indulging their propensity for
elevating the matter to a higher tribunal in the hope of a successful outcome, notwithstanding
the absence of any clear illegality or rank injustice in the judgment thus rendered. Counsel, if
faithful to the command of legal ethics insofar as their duty to the judiciary is concerned, would
do well to temper such inclination on the part of clients. Otherwise, the result would be to clog
further what is already the crowded dockets of the courts. There is pertinence in the above
observation in the consideration of this appeal, as the most careful scrutiny of the decision of
Judge Roberto Zurbano fails to yield the slightest indication that in stamping with approval the
consignation of the amount equivalent to the mortgage debt and disregarding the claims of
defendant Gloria Baloso, now appellant, that there were additional sums advanced to plaintiffs,
now appellees, 1 admittedly not covered by such mortgage, there is a violation of the applicable
legal norm. The appeal then not prosper.

The antecedents of the case are set forth in the appealed decision thus: "Vicente Abaño was
married to Soledad Arangco. Vicente begot (four) children with Soledad namely: Laurente,
Jorge, Fatima and Gracita. Vicente begot (three) children with Anacorita Andes namely: Calixto,
Jocelyn and Soriano after his marriage to Soledad. In 1946, Soledad was brought to the
National Mental Hospital where she is actually confined. On May 28, 1964, Vicente mortgaged
to the defendant Gloria Baloso for P960.00 the parcel of land which Vicente and Soledad
acquired after their marriage. On July 24, 1964, another mortgage was executed by Vicente
when consideration was raised to P1,200.00. On November 17, 1964, another mortgage was
executed by Laurente Abaño with the conformity of Leonor Abaño for P1,800.00. On June 16,
1966, the widow and the children of Vicente brought this action seeking to redeem the land from
the defendant. On May 4, 1966, the plaintiffs deposited with the Clerk of Court of sum of
P1,800.00 to redeem the land. Leonor said that there are (two) houses built on the land, one is
owned by the defendant and the other house is owned by Salvacion who pays the rental of the
land to the defendant and her common-law husband, Piaka, a Chinaman. For attorney’s fees,
the plaintiffs paid Atty. Madrid P500.00 aside from the miscellaneous expenses of P200.00 they
incurred in prosecuting the suit. Defendant’s evidence is to the effect that she did not allow the
plaintiff to redeem the land because the amount they offered to pay her is only P1,800.00 when
the amount that should be paid is P2,600.00. It appears that on July 24, 1964, Vicente
mortgaged the land (Lot No. 539 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay) to the defendant for
P1,200.00. The mortgage consideration was increased to P1,400.00 but the deed of mortgage
was not renewed as according to the defendant, Vicente just initialed the deed of mortgage that
he executed on July 24, 1964, after he received the additional amount of P200.00 from her. On
October 26, 1964, Vicente obtained another amount of P100.00 from the defendant. On
November 17, 1964, the consideration of the mortgage was increased to P1,800.00 as shown in
the deed of mortgage that was executed by the plaintiff, Laurente Abaño. On January 21, 1965,
Leonor, the sister of Vicente took another amount of P100.00 from the defendant. On February
9 and 14, 1965, Leonor, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita took from the defendant the amount of
P100.00. On March 10, 1965, Leonor, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita took from the defendant
another amount of P100.00. On August 16, 1965, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita took from the
defendant P500.00. Adding the amounts taken from the defendant by Vicente, Leonor,
Laurente, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita, the total sum is P2,600.00." 2

Why such amount of P800.00 could not be considered as included in the mortgage debt was
explained in such decision in this wise: "There is no question that the total amount of P800.00
was taken by Leonor, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita from the defendant but they contend that they
are not liable for the said amount because at the time the various amounts were taken, Leonor
was not yet appointed guardian of the minor plaintiffs and that Jorge. Fatima and Gracita were
then minors. The Court is convinced that Leonor, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita received the
amount of P800.00 from the defendant. Considering however, that at the time the amounts were
taken, Leonor was not yet appointed guardian of the minor plaintiffs while Jorge, Fatima and
Gracita were minors, the Court cannot compel them to pay the said amount in these
proceedings. However, the Court noted that Leonor has been appointed guardian of the person
and estate of the minor plaintiffs in Special Proceedings No. 50 pending before the City Court of
Legaspi City. The Court, therefore, suggests to the defendant to prosecute her claim against the
minors in the guardianship proceedings so that the Court may authorize the guardian to pay her
the sum of P700.00. Relative to the amount of P100.00 which was taken by Leonor it is but fair
and proper that she should be sentenced to pay the aforesaid sum to the defendant." 3

Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court of November 23, 1967,
the redemption of the land subject to the deed of mortgage, the amount of P1,800.00 having
been consigned, was ordered. Likewise, one of the plaintiffs. Leonor Abaño, was made to pay
the sum of P100.00, thus leaving only the amount of P700.00 which, according to the lower
court, could be sought from the minors in the proper guardianship proceedings. It would thus
appear that the decision is not susceptible to the indictment that justice, according to law, was
not accorded the parties. Nonetheless, defendant, unwilling to abide by the terms thereof, did
prosecute this appeal at a time when under the Judiciary Act, she could do so as long as
questions of law were raised. In ten-page brief filed by her, characterized by brevity that hardly
adds to its persuasive character, two errors of such nature were assigned. Neither one, as will
be made clear, suffices for the reversal of the decision. For the first is so adroitly worded as to
yield the misleading impression that the lower court would not allow recovery of the P700.00
when all that the decision stated was that such a suit should be prosecuted in the guardianship
proceedings in view of the minority of the parties who obtained the loan. Neither is there any
merit to the second assigned error, not only because it involves a question not passed upon by
the lower court, but one essentially factual in character. Accordingly, as set forth at the outset,
this appeal is doomed to futility.

1. As noted, appellant would impute to the lower court the alleged error in holding that appellees
Jorge, Fatima and Gracita Abaño "cannot be held liable for the various sums in the total amount
of P700.00 for the reason that the said appellees are minors." 4 Such a characterization of the
ruling of the lower court is, to repeat, misleading. It took some temerity for appellant to make
such a flat assertion when the very decision quoted in her brief clearly states:" `The Court is
convinced the Leonor, Jorge, Fatima and Gracita received the amount of P800.00 from the
defendant. Considering, however, that at the time the amounts were taken, Leonor was not yet
appointed guardian of the minor plaintiffs while Jorge, Fatima and Gracita were minors, the
Court cannot compel them to pay the said amounts in these proceedings.’" 5 Even the most
cursory reading of the above should convince anyone, perhaps not blinded by his own feeling of
frustration, that all that was decided by the lower court was that the payment of the sum in
question, while in fact owing the defendant, could not be ordered in this suit for the redemption
of a mortgage debt. In reaching such a conclusion, the lower court, as it should merely paid
deference to an unbroken line of decisions of this Court. As early as 1909, in Nolan v. Majinay,
6 this Court, through Justice Torres, made clear that the recovery of the amount loaned and
secured by the mortgage could alone be the subject of a proceeding in foreclosure, the
inference being that the payment of such sum necessarily would suffice to release the
mortgage. Such a doctrine was reiterated categorically in Lim Julian v. Lutero 7 in the words:
"The rule, of course, is well settled that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the
amount mentioned in the mortgage." 8 It is true, as set forth in that case, that the exact amount
for which the mortgage is given need not be specifically named, future advancements being
likewise covered. Such a contention on the part of the parties must be evident, however, from a
reading of the mortgage "from its four corners." 9 There was a restatement of the above
doctrine in Tady-y v. Philippine National Bank. 10 in the opinion of the Court by Justice Regala,
thus: "Indeed, the provision in the mortgage deed, including as part of the obligation future
amounts that may be borrowed by the mortgagors-debtors from the Bank, is not improper. For
this Court, in the case of Lim Julian v. Lutero, 49 Phil. 703, held that the amounts named as
consideration in a contract of mortgage do not limit the amount for which the mortgage may
stand as security, if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other
indebtedness can be gathered." 11 In the decision now on appeal, it was very clear that the
parties left no doubt as to their true intention. Originally, the mortgage debt secured was in the
amount of P1,200.00. Then, it was increased to P1,400.00. Subsequently, it reached the sum of
P1,800.00. 12 That was the amount consigned. There was nothing in the mortgage to indicate
that the additional P800.00 sought by defendant was likewise included. The lack of any legal
support for the first error assigned, which perhaps led to its being so captiously phrased, is
made evident by its failure to cite any provision of the Civil Code on mortgages or any decision
of this Court that would lend persuasion to such a contention. There was no such citation
because none could be found.

2. The second assigned error, to the effect that there was contemplated in the mortgage a fixed
period during which plaintiffs could not redeem the property, can be disposed of summarily.
Such a question was not ventilated before the lower court. As far back as 1904, in Tan Machan
v. Trinidad, 13 for the appellate tribunal to consider a legal question, it must be raised in the
court below. Such a principle has been consistently adhered to. 14 As was categorically
announced in City of Manila v. Roxas 15 by Justice Hull, "the rule is almost universal, and it has
been repeatedly followed by this court . . ." 16 What is worse is that discussing this alleged
error, appellant would have this Court inquire into the facts to ascertain what the parties had in
mind when the mortgage deed was executed. Nothing can be clearer than that in a review on a
question of law, "when a party appeals directly to the Supreme Court and submits his case
there for decision, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by
court." 17 The second assigned error is thus clearly equally unfounded.

3. Nor is this all. There is need, it would appear, for members of the Bar to temper their
enthusiasm in seeking appellate review whether by an ordinary appeal or through a writ
of certiorari. It is well that they keep in mind that as officers of the court, they are required to
exercise the utmost care and to undertake the most thorough preparation to assure that all the
learning at their command be brought to bear on the legal questions that might be raised, or, in
their opinion, could be raised, for the resolution of a higher court. To act otherwise would show
less than full compliance with their duty to the bench. Moreover, in the end, it might only signify
that in their unbounded optimism they plant seeds of hope in their client’s minds which,
unfortunately, may never grow. For obviously unless they could show the merit in such an
appeal, all that they would have accomplished would be to increase unnecessarily the burden
on appellate tribunals. In the final analysis then, the utmost fidelity to a client’s cause requires a
more discriminating appraisal of the matter, as in more cases than not, the prospect for reversal
is dim, not to say nonexistent. A sense of realism should thus infuse their actuation. Nor should
there be any hesitancy in so informing the disappointed litigant that most likely the verdict would
not be altered. This observation has pertinence in a case like the present where the lower court
was commendably impelled to see to it that the children of the original mortgagor, all of whom
are still in their minority, enjoy the full benefit of the law, ever solicitous of the young. It is not to
be forgotten that appellees in this case had lost their father through a fatal accident, and the
mother was confined as an incompetent in a mental institution. Certainly, only a clear
misinterpretation or misapplication of the controlling legal norms would call for setting aside a
decision did not only apply settled doctrines but also did manifest full fidelity to the laudable
policy of protecting the minor. 18 There is, it must be stressed anew, no such failing in the
appealed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated November 23, 1967 is affirmed. With costs
against defendant.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Teehankee, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:

1. The plaintiffs-appellees are Soledad Arango, Laurente Abaño, Jorge Abaño, Fatima Abaño
and Gracita Abaño, represented by their guardian, Leonor Abaño; Calixto, Jocelyn and Soriano,
all surnamed "Abaño", represented by their natural guardian, Anacorita Andes.

2. Decision, Record on Appeal, 31-32.

3. Ibid, 33.

4. Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 5.

5. Ibid, 5 and 6.

6. 12 Phil. 559. Cf. Luengco v. Moreno, 26 Phil. 111 (1913).

7. 49 Phil. 703 (1926).

8. Ibid, 714.

9. Ibid, 715.

10. L-18817, Sept. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 19.

11. Ibid, 23. Cf. Bacordo v. Alcantara, L-20080, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 730.

12. Decision, Record on Appeal, 31.

13. 3 Phil. 684.

14. Cf. United States v. Dinglasan, 5 Phil. 695 (1906); Alvaran v. Marquez, 11 Phil. 263 (1908);
Perlas v. Ehrman, 53 Phil. 607 (1929); Ramiro v. Graño, 54 Phil. 744 (1930); Toribio v. Decena,
55 Phil. 461 (1930); Viuda de Echegoyen v. Collantes, 58 Phil. 518 (1933); City of Manila v.
Roxas, 60 Phil. 215 (1934); San Agustin v. Barrios, 68 Phil. 475 (1939); Amor v. Florentino, 74
Phil. 403 (1943); De Leon v. Padua, 75 Phil. 548 (1945); Roque v. De los Santos L-218 (1946);
Vda. de Saludes v. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754 (1947); Elks Club v. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272 (1948);
Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284 (1948); People v. Canlas, 82 Phil. 783 (1949); Suarez v. Santos,
96 Phil. 302 (1954); Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. v. Chua Hian Tek, 102 Phil 948 (1958); Subido v.
Lacson, 103 Phil. 417 (1958); Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, 107 Phil. 253 (1960); Medel
v. Calasanz, 109 Phil. 348 (1960); Ng Cho Cio v. Ng Diong, L-14832, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA
275; Republic v. Aricheta, L-15589, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 469; Zambales Chromite Mining Co.
v. Robles, L-16182, Aug. 29, 1961, 2 SCRA 1051.

15. 60 Phil. 125 (1934).

16. Ibid, 216.

17. Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, L-21749, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 279, 281.
Cf. Perez v. Araneta, L-18414, July 15, 1968, 24 SCRA 43, where 29 cases were cited.

18. Cf. Nery v. Rosario, L-23096, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 431

A.C. No. 9310               February 27, 2013

VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA,

CELEDONIO ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is a consolidated administrative complaint against herein respondent, Angelita
Villarin, for allegedly harassing complainants through the demand letters he sent to them.

The facts are as follows:

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision
against the subdivision's owner and developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto
Bassig.

In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the respondents
therein to accept the payments of the buyers under the old purchase price. These buyers
included some of the complainants in the instant case, to wit: Florentina Lander, Celedonio
Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin.

The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer
Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the
buyers to vacate the property.

Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and
executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.1 It was at this point that
respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence Realty.2 Specifically,
he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution3 for
being null and void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons
on his client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB.4

On 4 December 2003, respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.5 In all of these

letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence
Realty within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action against them.

True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Trinidad,6 Lander,7 Casubuan8 and
Mendoza.9 Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against
respondent.10 A month after, Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against
respondent.11

As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)12 and affirmed by its Board of
Governors,13 complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that the demand
letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that
the letters also contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the subdivision lots.
Considering that these two actions were related, Villarin moved for the consolidation of the
administrative cases, and his motion was granted by the IBP commissioner.14

In his Position Paper,15 Villarin denied the allegations of harassment and claimed that no malice
attended the sending of the demand letters. He narrated that when he inquired at the HLURB,
he was informed that his client did not receive a summons pertinent to the Complaint for specific
damages. With this information, he formed the conclusion that the HLURB Decision was void
and not binding on Purence Realty. Since his client was the lawful owner of the property,
respondent issued the ejectment letters, which were indispensable in an action for unlawful
detainer. Moreover, he insisted that the addressees of the letters were different from the
complainants who had filed the case with the HLURB.

Hence, the pertinent issue in this consolidated case is whether respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for sending the demand letters despite a final and executory HLURB
Decision directing, not the ejectment of complainants, but the payment of the purchase price of
the lots by the subdivision buyers.

Prefatorily, this Court affirms the factual finding of the IBP16 that of complainants herein, only
Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin were listed as the
subdivision lot buyers who were parties to the HLURB case; and that Verleen Trinidad, Wally
Casubuan and Minerva Mendoza were non-parties who could not claim any right pursuant to
the Decision in that case.

Proceeding to the contested demand letters, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP board of
governors that the issuance thereof was not malicious.17 According to its Report,18 respondent
counsel merely acted on his legal theory that the HLURB Decision was not binding on his client,
since it had not received the summons. Espousing the belief that the proceedings in the HLURB
were void, Villarin pursued the issuance of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment case
he would later on file to protect the property rights of his client.

As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of his client
with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.19 This simply means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense20 – including the institution of an ejectment
case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, we held that in
the full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that
they may displease the general public.21

Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall
perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law.22 They should only make such defense
only when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law.23 In this case, respondent’s act
of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally
sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an
action for ejectment.24 Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the
Code,25 just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.

Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error.1âwphi1 The factual findings of the IBP
board of governors reveal that in his demand letter, he brazenly typified one of the
complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal occupant. However, this description is the exact
opposite of the truth, since the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her
as a subdivision lot buyer who had a right to complete her payments in order to occupy her
property. Respondent is very much aware of this ruling when he filed an Omnibus Motion to set
aside the HLURB Decision and the appurtenant Writ of Execution.

Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the HLURB
Decision, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with
fairness and honesty. What he does is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any
document that they know is false.26

Considering the present circumstances, we agree with the 14 May 2011 Resolution of the IBP
board of governors that the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning is appropriate. Notably, no
motion for reconsideration27 was filed by either of the parties. Thus, by virtue of the rules for
disbarment of attorneys, the case is deemed terminated.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin

is REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA .J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 21-26.

2
 Id. at 27, Special Appearance dated 3 December 2003.

3
 Id. at 29-35.

4
 Id. at 147, Report and Recommendation dated 16 February 2009.
5
 Id. at 8-11; Letters addressed to Verleen Trinidad, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza,
and Florentina Lander.

6
 Id. at 37.

7
 Id. at 49.

8
 Id. at 41.

9
 Id. at 45.

10
 Id. at 98, docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1203.

11
 Id., docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1218.

12
 Id. at 148, Report and Recommendation dated 16 February 2009.

13
 Id. at 143-144, Notice of Resolution.

14
 Id. at 98, Order dated 22 June 2004.

15
 Id. at 99-105.

16
 Id. at 149, Report and Recommendation dated 16 February 2009.

17
 Id.

18
 Id.

19
 Pangasinan Electric Cooperative v. Montemayor, A.C. No. 5739, 12 September 2007,
533 SCRA 1, citing Natino v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 247 Phil. 602 (1991).

20
 Id.

21
 G.R. No. 94457, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 418.

22
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 19.

23
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20(c).

24
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 2.

25
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 10.

26
 ERNESTO L. PINEDA, LEGAL ETHICS, 306 (2009) citing Lacsamana v. Dela Peña,
156 Phil. 13 (1974).

27
 Rollo, p. 150, Report and Recommendation dated 16 February 2009.
 28
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (c).

A.C. No. 7350               February 18, 2013

PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by
complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan,
Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy2 in
violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by complainant, but
the latter denies said execution and claims that the signature and the community tax certificate
(CTC) she allegedly presented are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a
certain Christian Anton. 3 Complainant added that she did not personally appear before
respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent's client,
Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the
illegal transfer of a property registered in her name to that of Dollente.4

In his Comment,5 respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the document in question
at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him that it was personally signed by
complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by her.6 He, thus, claims good faith in
notarizing the subject document.

In a Resolution7 dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.8 Complainant insists that she was deprived of her property because of the illegal
notarization of the subject document.9 Respondent, on the other hand, admits having notarized
the document in question and asks for apology and forgiveness from complainant as a result of
his indiscretion.10

In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) reported that respondent
indeed notarized the subject document in the absence of the alleged affiant having been
brought only to respondent by Dollente. It turned out later that the document was falsified and
the CTC belonged to another person and not to complainant. He further observed that
respondent did not attempt to refute the accusation against him; rather, he even apologized for
the complained act.11 Commissioner Funa, thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
and that he be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer and six (6) months
suspension as a Notary Public.12

On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-166 which
reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent’s violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) month.13

Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied.
The above resolution was further modified in Resolution No. XX-2012-117, dated March 10,
2012, to read as follows:

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as

it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII- 2008-166 dated April 15, 2008, in addition to
Respondent’s SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) month, Atty. Roseller A. Viray
is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6) months. (Emphasis in the original)

The findings of the IBP are well taken.

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of the
affiant’s personal appearance before the notary public:14

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document –

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Moreover, Section 12,15 Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the "competent
evidence of identity" referred to above.

In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject affidavit
but he likewise notarized the same without the affiant’s personal appearance. He explained that
he did so merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente that the document was executed by
complainant. In notarizing the document, respondent contented himself with the presentation of
a CTC despite the Rules’ clear requirement of presentation of competent evidence of identity
such as an identification card with photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent
failed to ascertain the genuineness of the affiant’s signature which turned out to be a forgery. In
failing to observe the requirements of the Rules, even the CTC presented, purportedly owned by
complainant, turned out to belong to somebody else.

To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the
same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.16 Without the appearance of the person
who actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the party’s free act or deed.17

As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:18

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to
authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the
adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the
absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants
may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose
of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed.19

The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases20 the important role a notary public
performs, to wit:

x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.21

Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those
directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary
public and in degrading the function of notarization.22 He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully
observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.24 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the
duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.251âwphi1

As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP
which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public,
considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act
without the personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with competent
evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did
not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing
jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as
such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year.26

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent
commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two
(2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and the Office
of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into respondent's personal
record.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-4.

2
 !d. at 5.

3
 !d. at I.

4
 !d.

5
 Id. at 7-8.
6
 Id. at 7.

7
 Id. at 10.

8
 Id. at 40-42 and 44.

9
 Id. at 41.

10
 Id. at 44.

11
 Report and Recommendation of the Commissioner, pp. 4-5.

12
 Id. at 5.

13
 Vol. III, p. 1. (Emphasis in the original).

14
 Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, A.C. No. 5851, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 479,
483.

15
 Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of
identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a) At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or

(b) The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows
the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.

16
 Legaspi v. Landrito, A.C. No. 7091, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 1, 5; Dela Cruz v.
Dimaano, Jr., A.C. No. 7781, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 1, 5-6.

17
 Dela Cruz v. Dimaano, Jr., supra, at 6.

18
 Supra note 14.

19
 Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, supra note 14, at 487-488.

20
 Id. at 488; Legaspi v. Landrito, supra note 16; Dela Cruz v. Dimaano, Jr., supra note
16, at 7-8.

21
 Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, August 24, 2010, 628 SCRA 613, 619-620.

22
 Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, supra note 14, at 488.

23
 Id.
 24
 Legaspi v. Landrito, supra note 16, at 6.

25
 Dela Cruz v. Dimaano, Jr., supra note 16, at 7.

26
 Isenhardt v. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 20, 28; Linco v.
Lacebal, A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011, 659 SCRA 130, 136; Lanuzo v. Bongon, A.C.
No. 6737, September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 214, 218.

[A.C. No. 439. April 12, 1961.]

LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, Petitioner, v. QUINCIANO VAILOCES, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; CONVICTION INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. —

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that
he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

2. ID.; WORDS AND PHRASES; MORAL TURPITUDE. — Moral turpitude as used in section
25, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, includes any act deemed contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals.

3. ID.; MORAL TURPITUDE; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT. — Conviction of the

crime of falsification of public document is clearly contrary to justice and good morals. Hence
such crime involves moral turpitude.

4. ID.; ID.; CRIMES THAT INVOLVE MORAL TURPITUDE. — "Embezzlement, forgery, robbery
and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and as general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude." (58 C.J.S., 1266)

5. ID.; DISBARMENT PROCEEDING; NATURE. — The disbarment of an attorney does not

partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court." (In re Montagne and Dominquez, 3 Phil., 588)

6. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — The purpose of disbarment proceeding is "to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence." (In
re McDougall, 3 Phil., 77.)

DECISION

ANGELO, J.:

This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar.

It appears that as member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public, Vailoces, on
December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter.
Consequently, the probate court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying
probate to the will. This decision became final. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for
falsification of public document was filed against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to
the will before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental where, after trial, they were found
guilty and convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to
Vailoces but modified it with regard to his co-accused. As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsified of public document defined and
penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, fine
and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular
penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party instituted the present disbarment
proceedings.

In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him in
the criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence,
the charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of
herein complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing
him in double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed
contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. 1 Among the examples given of crimes of this
nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage.
2 The crime of which respondent was convicted is falsification of public document, which is
indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence
such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed it is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery,
robbery, swindling are crimes, which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of
which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude" (53 C.J.S., 1206).

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 26, Rule
127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on his part much as we sympathize with him to dispute now
the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a
closed chapter insofar as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are
concerned is that he was found guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving
moral turpitude. As this Court well said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The review of respondent’s conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say
that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved, himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice." (In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N. Jaramillo, Adm. Case No.
229, April 30, 1957).

The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which resulted in
the deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental
would be tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only
be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily
included therein, within the meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The
disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to
protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne
and Dominguez, 3 Phil., 588), and its purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence" (In re McDougall, 3 Phil., 77).

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this effect, our
Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Lobrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.

2. In re Isada, 60 Phil., 915.

A.M. No. 3135 February 17, 1988

MIGUEL CUENCO, complainant,
vs.
HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint dated 10 October 1987, complainant Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former
Member of the Philippine House of Representatives from the province of Cebu prayed for
judgment ordering the disbarment of Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Chairman of the Third
Division of this Court.

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

On 13 March 1952, Vito Borromeo died without any forced heirs, but leaving behind extensive
properties situated in the province of Cebu. On 19 April 1952, a Petition for probate (docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 916-R) of a one-page document — purportedly the last will and
testament of the decedent — was filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. Those
instituted under said will as the sole heirs of the late Vito Borromeo were Fortunate, Tomas and
Amelia, an surnamed Borromeo.

On 28 May 1960, the probate court rendered a Decision declaring the will to be a forgery. That
decision became final in 1967 after being affirmed by this Court in Testate Estate of Vito
Borromeo Jose H. Junquera vs. Crispin Borromeo, et al., 19 SCRA 656 [1967]. In the intestacy
proceedings that ensued, nine (9) individuals were declared by the trial court as the rightful
successors to the decedent Vito Borromeo's estate.

During the course of the intestacy proceedings, several petitions were filed with this Court by
the parties involved therein. These petitions are: G.R. No. L-41171 (entitled "Intestate Estate of
the Late Vito Borromeo. Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera v. Fortunato Borromeo, et al. G.R. No.
55000 (entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Vito Borromeo, Deceased. Pilar N. Borromeo, et
al. v. Fortunate Borromeo"); G.R. No. 62895 (entitled 'Jose Cuenco Borromeo v. Court of
Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 63818 (entitled 'Domingo Antigua, et al. v. Court of appeals, et al.");
and G.R. No. 65995 (entitled "Petra Borromeo, et al. v. Francisco P. Burgos, etc., et al."). These
five (5) petitions, having emanated from a common source and being closely interrelated, were
subsequently consolidated.

On 23 July 1987, the Third Division of the Court, through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
rendered a Decision in the consolidated petitions, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, —

(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24,
1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito
Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being
NULL and VOID;

(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document
valid is hereby SET ASIDE;

(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of
 Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R
is declared moot and academic. The judge who has taken over the sala of retired
Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately conduct hearings with a view to
terminating the proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be
implemented;

(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The issue seeking to
restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is
MOOT and ACADEMIC;

(5) In G.R. No.62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate and
close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory
of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank
deposits by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this Court in
its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and

(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market
value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be,
as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees
who individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the
services rendered but in amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the
market value of the property the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.

In a Manifestation dated 22 August 1987 and filed with this Court on 24 August 1987,
complainant Cuenco requested that he be given until 22 September 1987 within which to file a
motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision in the consolidated petitions. This
request was granted by the Court's Third Division in a resolution issued on 16 September 1987
with the Warning, however, that no further extensions of time would be allowed. Complainant's
formal Motion for Reconsideration was posted only on 28 September 1987.

Meanwhile, on 19 November 1987, the Court, sitting en banc resolved, among other things, to
dismiss for lack of merit Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ and Administrative Matter No. R-
672-RTJ, filed by complainant Cuenco and Numeriano E. Estenzo, respectively, against Judge
Francisco P. Burgos, the former trial judge at the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings.

Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo intestate
estate proceedings, makes the following allegations in his complaint for disbarment

1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, in Civil Case No. R-7646 filed with Branch III of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, appeared as counsel for the three (3)
instituted heirs (i.e., Fortunato, Tomas and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo) and
despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate Justice of the
Court, "continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs;'

2. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had exerted personal efforts to take away from the
Supreme Court en banc, the First and Second Divisions of the Tribunal, the Vito
 Borromeo proceedings to his Office as Chairman of the Third Division to enable
him to influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings "

3. That Mr. Justice Fernan "has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star
Chamber to fabricate fake and fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo," an action which
will not only dilute and diminish the distributive shares of complainant's clients,
but "will prolong indefinitely the agony of Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando
Ruiz to have their attorney's fees paid;"

4. That Mr. Justice Fernan has 'practically abolished and crippled the legitimate
functions of the Court of Appeals in CA. G.R. No. 08093, knowingly (sic) that the
claims for attorney's fees of movant Miguel Cuenco and Judge Fernando Ruiz
are pending in the Court of Appeals,' thereby 'render[ing] impossible the payment
of Miguel Cuenco's attorney's fees for his services rendered to the Vito Borromeo
Estate.

5. That Mr. Justice Fernan's strong and unyielding determination to collect big
sums of money in payment of his legal services rendered to his clients' had
induced the Honorable Justice, as Chairman of the Court's Third Division, to
unduly influence the Members thereof into dismissing Atty. Cuenco complaint
(Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ) against Judge Francisco P. Burgos, then
the trial judge in the intestacy proceedings, thereby resurrecting the claim of the
three (3) instituted heirs over the thirteen (13) commercial lots subject of Civil
Case No. R-7646; and

6. That Mr. Justice Fernan "had wilfully, persistently, stubbornly and

systematically violated his Oath of Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him
the duty not to delay any man for money or malice."

We find complainant's charges against Mr. Justice Fernan completely unsupported by the facts
and evidence of record.

1. We have found nothing in the record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings — and
complainant Cuenco has failed to point to anything therein — to indicate that Mr. Justice Fernan
had appeared as counsel in such proceedings representation of instituted heir and claimant
Fortunato Borromeo, who was represented in those proceedings, as early as 19 January 1953,
by Atty. Juan Legarte Sanchez. Mr. Justice Fernan did enter his appearance on 7 August 1965
as counsel, in collaboration with Atty. Crispin Baizas, for claimants Tomas and Amelia
Borromeo in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 1 The record, however, reveals that Mr. Justice
Fernan withdrew as such counsel as early as 19 February 1968. 2 The records of this case are
bereft of any suggestion that Mr. Justice Fernan had represented any of these instituted heirs in
any other case or proceeding arising from or related to Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Complainant Cuenco has submitted nothing at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice
Fernan "continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs." It is entirely clear that Mr. Justice
Fernan's professional involvement in Special Proceedings No. 916-R had ceased long before
his appointment to this Court in April of 1986.

2. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Justice Fernan to the Court, the aforementioned five (5)
consolidated petitions had already been assigned for preliminary study to Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., the ponente of the disputed Decision in G.R. Nos. L-41171, 55000, 62895, 63818
and 65995 and a Member then of the Court's First Division. The subsequent designation of Mr.
Justice Fernan as Chairman of the Court's Third Division and the assignment of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez along with three other Members of the Court to said Third Division, after the 1987
Constitution went into effect, were determined and carried out by the Chief Justice in
accordance with the time-honored procedures followed by the Court in those matters and were,
thus, circumstances of pure coincidence. Mr. Justice Gutierrez brought the Vito Borromeo
estate cases (and all other pending cases previously assigned to him) along with him to the
Third Division of the Court when the third Division was organized in accordance with procedures
agreed upon by the Court en banc. Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the
deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact, did not take part in the resolution
thereof; this was made explicit by the annotation appearing beside his signature: "No part — I
appeared as counsel for one of the parties". This express statement on the record has been
totally ignored by complainant Cuenco. Thus, not only has complainant Cuenco failed to submit
anything at all to support his accusation that Mr. Justice Fernan 'had exerted personal efforts' to
have the Vito Borromeo estate cases assigned to the Third Division "to enable him to influence
the outcome" thereof; complainant Cuenco is simply and clearly wrong in charging that Mr.
Justice Fernan had anything to do with the assignment of those estate cases to the Third
Division of the Court. The record is bare of any suggestion that complainant Cuenco made any
effort to inform himself on the procedures followed by this Court in constituting itself into three
(rather than two) Divisions, before making his accusation.

3. The principal opposing parties in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings are, on the
one hand, the group of heirs instituted under the will (i.e., Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia, an
surnamed Borromeo) and, on the other hand, the group of heirs — a number of whom are
represented by complainant Cuenco — declared as such by the trial court subsequent to the
declaration of nullity of said will. One of the main reasons that said proceedings had dragged on
for such a long period of time is that the three (3) instituted heirs had sought, as early as 1954,
the exclusion, from the inventory of the late Vito Borromeo's estate, of thirteen (13) parcels of
land over which the three claimed rights of ownership, and which rights continued to be
asserted against the other heirs- claimants. As far as the records show, there are no other
persons claiming successional rights adverse to those of either of the two major groups of heirs
in the intestacy proceedings.

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, Mr. Justice Fernan could not have, as claimed by
complainant Cuenco, "fabricate[d] fake and fictitious heirs Vito Borromeo." The Court is unable
to see how Mr. Justice Fernan, whose involvement in the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings
began on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19 February 1968, could have had any control or
influence over the actions of the instituted heirs (Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) either
in 1952 when Special Proceedings 916-R for probate of the will was, or in 1954 when said heirs
claimed rights of ownership over the aforementioned thirteen (13) parcels of land and sought to
exclude them from the estate of the decedent. We think it clear, that complainant Cuenco was
here making, once again, a totally baseless accusation which he made no effort to support as
he could not support it.

4. The dispositive portion of our Decision in the consolidated estate cases states in part:

... The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired
them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in
amounts which should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the
property the latter acquired from the state as beneficiaries.
It is evident that the "legitimate functions" of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 08093 —
where complainant Cuenco has filed a claim for payment of attorney's fees — have not been
abolished and crippled" by the mere fact that the maximum amounts, expressed in a percentage
of the market value of the distributive shares received from the estate, of attorney's fees had
been determined and set by this Court. This is a matter well within the competence and
authority of the Court. Furthermore, the Court is unable to see how payment of complainant
Cuenco's attorney's fees for services rendered in the Vito Borromeo estate case has been
"rendered impossible;' while final settlement of the decedent's estate may have to be awaited,
payment of such fees may nevertheless be expected in due course.

5. In Administrative Matter No. R-593-RTJ, complainant Cuenco charged Judge Francisco P.

Burgos, former trial judge in the Vito Borromeo intestate estate proceedings, with "gross
incompetence and manifest negligence" for allegedly having intentionally delayed settlement of
the estate of the late Vito Borromeo. In an En Banc Resolution dated 19 November 1987, tills
Court, having found that the delay complained of was caused by several factors beyond the
control of respondent judge, dismissed that complaint for lack of merit. The Court is completely
unable to understand the claim of complainant Cuenco that dismissal of administrative Matter
No. R-593-RTJ, has "resurrected, rejuvenated and reinvigorated the claims of the three (3)
instituted heirs (Fortunate, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo) over the aforementioned thirteen (13)
parcels of land. The Court is also baffled by complainant Cuenco's assertion that such dismissal
"has a great money value in itself" and would result in the big increase of assets of the Vito
Borromeo Estate." As pointed out above, complainant Cuenco's complaint in A.M. No. R-593-
RTJ was dismissed by a Resolution of the Court en banc, not of the Third Division as Cuenco
apparently believes. In any case, the Members of the Third Division of the Court expressly reject
complainant Cuenco's assertion or insinuation that they were unduly influenced by any
consideration other than the simple lack of merit of the complaint in A.M. No. R-593-RTJ.

6. There is no in the record, other than the undocumented assertions of complainant Cuenco,
that would suggest that Mr. Justice Fernan has violated his oath of office as a lawyer either
during the time when he was collaborating counsel for Tomas and Amelia Borromeo in the
proceedings below or thereafter, and since joining this Court. Complainant Cuenco has offered
not a shred of evidence to support his serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed,
complainant Cuenco is either unaware of the seriousness of the charges he made against Mr.
Justice Fernan, or complainant Cuenco, if he is aware of the nature of the charges he has
brought, has acted with bad faith.

Of his own accord, Mr. Justice Fernan made a statement to the Court en banc and embodied
that in a Memorandum given to the Members of the Court on 17 December 1987. In this
Memorandum, Mr. Justice Fernan invited attention to his written Appearance and Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel (already referred to above) and stressed that he had ceased a long time
ago to act as counsel for the two Borromeos mentioned earlier and that he did not in any way
take part in the deliberations and decision of G.R. Nos. 41171, etc.

By a telegram dated 6 January 1988, complainant Cuenco asked for leave to file a "Clarificatory
Memorandum based on official court records already filed in Supreme Court before and after
Honorable Fernan was appointed Justice of the Supreme Court — " by 24 February 1988. By a
Resolution dated 14 January 1988, the Court granted complainant Cuenco leave to file a
"Clarificatory Memorandum" within a non-extendible period of ten (1 0) days from notice thereof.
Complainant Cuenco received a copy of Resolution of the Court on 26 January 1988. To date,
no memorandum has been filed by complainant Cuenco. On 5 February 1988, the Court
received the following telegram from complainant Cuenco:

Received UST Hospital to [sic] resolutions S.C. En Banc co a first resolution

giving me February five file Clarificatory memorandum and second setting
February twenty-four file memorandum stop aye prefer February twenty-four file
memorandum paragraph memorandum affects Salud Borromeo and Asuncion
Borromeo signers Judge Laya's order of August 15 1969 which is res judicata
comma died long time ago paragraph Marcial Borromeo signer Judge Laya's
order died long time ago comma by agreement of parties approved by judge
Gomez substituted by heirs of Marcial Borromeo semicolon Cosme Borromeo
one of Marcial Borromeo's heirs reported dead living children stop aye cannot
remember names of one of two daughters of Marcial Borromeo stop am
confident Supreme Court En Banc exercising inherent power can order
substitution new parties give them due process stop it can also issue proper
orders have correct names of Marcial Borromeo daughters aye cannot remember
stop my preferences for February 24 deadline is due aye had not typist during
January 18 election long holidays stop my hospitalization also delays my legal
work stop many thanks.

From the above quoted telegram (to the extent the Court can understand it), it appears that
complainant Cuenco believes that he is preparing a memorandum addressing, not the
administrative charges he has preferred against Mr. Justice Fernan, but rather the merits of the
consolidated petitions in G.R. Nos. L-41171, etc. There appears no reason therefore why the
Court should entertain this second request of complainant Cuenco.

The Court could have dismissed outright the complaint of Mr. Cuenco, since the Court could
have simply taken judicial notice of the record of the consolidated petitions filed before the Court
and since the other charges made relate to matters peculiarly within the knowledge of Members
of the Third Division of the Court. The Court has, nevertheless, gone into substantial detail in
dealing with the accusations so freely made by complainant Cuenco, apparently in his concern
over the amount of the attorney's fees he can hope to claim and collect from some of the
distributees of the Vito Borromeo Estate. The Court has done so precisely because the person
charged is a Member of this Court. The record of this case suggests strongly, however, that
those accusations were not only instituted without any basis but were also made recklessly
without regard for the good name and reputation of Mr. Justice Fernan. Indeed, those charges
fly in the face of the record itself, which complainant has casually chosen to ignore.

There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of
the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the
Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2],
Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the
Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8]
in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on Elections
(Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of the Commission on
audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are
constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISCUSS the charges made by complainant Cuenco
against Mr. Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.

The Court, further, Resolved to REQUIRE complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should
not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice
Fernan within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Fernan, Griño-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Appearance dated 7 August 1965, Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; Rollo, pp. 22-23.

2 Motion to Withdraw As Counsel dated 19 February 1968, Sp Proc No. 916-R;

Rollo, pp. 24-25.
A.C. No. 7649               December 14, 2011

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN DANDA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO "PEEWEE" TRINIDAD, and
ANDRESITO FORNIER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and
Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao
"Peewee" Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents
instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City
Prosecutor’s Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S.
No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty of
disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to complainants’ letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-
Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants in the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaints.

The Facts

Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court
Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly
persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs.
Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in exchange for money.5 De
Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group, composed of Pasay City Mayor
Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go
Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were
untouchable.6

In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a
prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign
and file.7 The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and
manufactured by De Guzman.8
During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office,
complainants allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and
the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.9 When
complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De
Guzman allegedly replied, "Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila."10

Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De
Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-
31.11 Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents ₱ 200,000.00 to pursue the case, but
they refused.12 Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One Million
Pesos (₱ 1,000,000.00) to pursue the case until the end, but they refused again.13 For this
reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal
recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan
City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text message from De Guzman,
saying, "Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa
Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo."15

In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the

allegedly fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City
Councilor Orlando Badoy,18 De Guzman’s Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-
31,19 and other relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20 and prayed that the complaint be pursued
against De Guzman.

Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court21 and Position Paper filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad
vehemently declared that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has
never been to Cotabato.23 He further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not
contain ultimate facts because it does not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of
the meetings and conversations with him.24 Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a
fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros
(Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidad’s reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.25 Trinidad
claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly believed
that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City.26 Trinidad also claims that he,
his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated criminal charges
committed by the syndicate headed by Montesclaros.27

Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by
filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated
addresses of defendants.28 Since the defendants’ addresses are fabricated, the defendants are
not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the
court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of
arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter know of the criminal complaint.30 At this point,
Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the defendant in order for the complainants to
drop the criminal complaint.31 To prove the existence of this syndicate, Trinidad presented the
letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to investigate the
syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in
Cebu City due to an extortion racket.32 Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend,
Emmanuel Cinco, which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted
by complainants themselves.33

Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their
members as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of
this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the
warrant of arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidad’s wife was not there.36 Lastly,
Trinidad declared that Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in
remote and dangerous places to harass his victims.37

Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court38 and Position Paper filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has
conducted himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the legal
profession.40 Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any
dealings or communication with any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for
himself or on behalf of a client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against
complainants.41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this case for acting as defense counsel
for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment. 42 Fornier claimed that the
Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.43 For coming to the
legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the plan of the group of
Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients.44 Fornier claimed that the filing of the
complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed
and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion.45 Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to
the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a
mockery of the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutor’s Offices, the Philippine
National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in carrying out their
criminal activities.46 Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to establish the charges
against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as complainants’ affidavits are replete
with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by
specific, clear and convincing evidence.47

De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of
Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative
complaint, are spurious.49 According to the Certification issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for
violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), which charge was subsequently
dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint
Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of Complaint
against any person.50

In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is an
81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details
regarding the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery,
falsification of documents, violation of lawyers’ oath and other administrative infractions.53 De
Guzman invited the attention of the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification
which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the
criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which was
masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of Clarification,55 De Guzman claimed that he
had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he
was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor
G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the
preparation of the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his
clients’ names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the
Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has "no familiarity with the
complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in
the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are
the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business."58

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13 March 2009,60 none

of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the
allegations in their complaint despite due notice.61

Report and Recommendation

of the Commission on Bar Discipline

The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline

reads:

In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed
to be without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges
against them.

As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to
hold him administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is
hereby recommended.62

The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint
as well as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against
respondents Trinidad and Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce
proof of Trinidad and Fornier’s supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the
acts constituting the complaint.64 In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the
non-participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed
their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these
reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges against Trinidad and
Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the
allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.66 Moreover, De Guzman
failed to controvert the "truly vicious evidence" against him:

But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to
Orlando D. Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was
alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had
confirmed the allegation of his travel to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did not
identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the
complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint along
with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was filed before the
Supreme Court.67
 The Decision of the Board of Governors of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges
against Fornier and Trinidad.68 In De Guzman’s case, the Board of Governors increased the
penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice
of law for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with

modification, and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that the case against Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without
merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal
recruitment cases in order to extort money.69

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively
disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier.

We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzman’s liability, and likewise dismiss the
charges against De Guzman.

Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of
crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as
an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his
oath.70

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.711avvphi1
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It
depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.72

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the
highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence,
and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a
member of the Bar.74

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.75 It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof,
according to the equipoise doctrine.77

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of
the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent.

De Guzman’s Liability

The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzman’s liability for the
following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support of their complaint
are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the mandatory conference
proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint; and (c) complainants were not
able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the
purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants
submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their
allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the
Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was
submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges
against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint purportedly appears to be
subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this document
by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO
LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of
Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page
240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29,
2006 rendered by the Office.

This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-
Affidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any
Affidavit of Complaint against any person.78 (Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct,
were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of
the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against
respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating
Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate
headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this
claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by
fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents
submitted by complainants. Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the
documents they submitted in support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are
authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference called by
the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or narrate in detail
the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents. To make matters worse,
the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants attached to their Letter-
Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct against respondents,
is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite
purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.

Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De
Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued,
what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants
submitted, where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who
are these complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even
bother to attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite
due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De Guzman’s misconduct are really doubtful.

Lastly, the supposedly "vicious" evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly
sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:

Dear Orly,
Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South and
the way of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed
charges against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man,
Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an
assistant prosecutor and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to
orchestrate the whole thing, from the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of
arrest.

Thank you and best regards.79

The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have
material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able
to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando
Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the
complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations
or authenticate the supporting documents.

The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this
purported letter:

Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the
letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants.
But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot
ignore the same and the message it conveys.80

Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom
respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication
of evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating
Commissioner’s observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of
complainants’ criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De
Guzman stated:

5. Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he

recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor
G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records
at the Surpeme Court does not have any "Daryll");

6. Undersigned counsel’s name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty.
Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros’ lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge
Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of
Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this
reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to make this affidavit of clarification for the
guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;

xxx

4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor
with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other
respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are
the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.81

For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of
their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the
charges against De Guzman.

De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing.

Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De
Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they
submitted were not authenticated and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not
appear in the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is
preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence in the
hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file fabricated
charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of
the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the
equipoise doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of
Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
accordingly dismisses the charges against De Guzman.

Trinidad’s and Fornier’s Liabilities

The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to Trinidad’s and Fornier’s liabilities:

A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit
with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their
charges against Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not
adduce proof of Respondent’s supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the
acts complained of. For instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone
to Cotabato City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment
charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have prodded and
stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The supposed telephone call
the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made during the proceedings before the
Cotabato City Prosecutor’s Office to the Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is
inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a
serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
before the City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly
militates against the reliabiity of Complainants’ charges against Respondents.

xxx

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable
Respondents’ non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they
wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.
The undersigned realizes only too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this
Commission, however, any such pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear
reading of the same reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have
erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular,
they explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said lawyers as
to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges. The undersigned finds the
affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the import of the same as a piece of
evidence.82

At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c)
of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with
this Court within 15 days from notice:

c. If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated
unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise.

Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the
charges against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad and Andresito Fornier
for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador
P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 1.

2
 Id. at 2.

3
 Id. at 3-10.

4
 Id. at 4.

5
 Id.

6
 Id.

7
 Id. at 4-5.

8
 Id.

9
 Id. at 5.

10
 Id.

11
 Id.

12
 Id.

13
 Id. at 6.

14
 Id. at 7.

15
 Id. at 6.

16
 Id. at 11-14.

17
 Id. at 15-61.

18
 Id. at 24.

19
 Id. at 27-29.

20
 Id. at 493-498.

21
 Id. at 135-167.

22
 Id. at 549-560.

23
 Id. at 140, 507.
24
 Id. at 149.

25
 Id. at 151.

26
 Id. at 152.

27
 Id. at 151.

28
 Id. at 138-139.

29
 Id.

30
 Id.

31
 Id. at 156-157.

32
 Id. at 169-171.

33
 Id. at 181-182.

34
 Id. at 158.

35
 Id. at 153.

36
 Id. at 152.

37
 Id. at 156.

38
 Id. at 240-300.

39
 Id. at 584-612.

40
 Id. at 244-245.

41
 Id. at 245.

42
 Id. at 245-246.

43
 Id. at 246.

44
 Id.

45
 Id.

46
 Id.

47
 Id. at 247.
48
 Id. at 218-220.

49
 Id. at 219.

50
 Id. at 221.

51
 Id. at 572-575.

52
 Id. at 572.

53
 Id.

54
 Id. at 573.

55
 Id. at 27-29.

56
 Id. at 27.

57
 Id.

58
 Id. at 29.

59
 Id. at 515.

60
 Id. at 541.

61
 Id. at 515, 541.

62
 Id. at 733-737.

63
 Id. at 734.

64
 Id.

65
 Id. at 735.

66
 Id. at 736.

67
 Id.

68
 Id. at 731.

69
 Id.

70
 In Re: De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127 (1974); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554
(1939); In Re: Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922); Acosta v. Serrano 166 Phil. 257 (1977).

71
 Santos v. Dichoso, 174 Phil. 115 (1978); Noriega v. Sison, 210 Phil. 236 (1983).
72
 Lim v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 400, 413 (1996).

73
 Manalo v. Roldan-Confessor, G.R. No. 102358, 19 November 1992, 215 SCRA 808.

74
 Santos v. Dichoso, supra note 71; Noriega v. Sison, supra note 71.

75
 Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 613 (2005); Bank
of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157177, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 206,
216.

76
 Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 169801, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 598, 612.

77
 Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 743 (1998); Marubeni Corp. v. Lirag, 415
Phil. 29 (2001).

78
 Rollo, p. 221.

79
 Id. at 24.

80
 Id. at 736.

81
 Id. at 27-29.

82
 Id. at 734-735.
A.M. No. R-368-MTJ September 30, 1987

BENJAMIN C. UY petitioner,
vs.
HON. RENATO S. MERCADO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Municipal Trial Court Judge Renato S. Mercado of Cabarrogue Quirino Province, later Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge of Aglipay-Sagaday, Quirino Province, is administratively charged with
abuse of judicial power and discretion and gross ignorance of the law.

The records show that, on 3 May 1985, former Mambabatas Pambansa (MP) Orlando C. Dulay
of Quirino Province filed a complaint for libel with the Municipal Trial Court of Cabarroguis,
Quirino Province, presided over by respondent judge, against herein complainant Benjamin C.
Uy, Apolonio Batalla and Ulpiano Quizon, based on a publication in the Tempo newspaper,
dated 28, April 1985, implicating said former MP Orlando C. Dulay, along with several others,
who were charged before the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite with the crime of robbery in band.

The records further show that respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation on
former MP Orlando C. Dulay, as complainant on 3 May 1985, and issued the warrant for the
arrest of the accused in the libel case on the same day, without any evidence or proof that there
was immediate necessity of placing the accused under custody of the court and without proof or
evidence to warrant a conclusion that the accused may frustrate the ends of justice by their non-
appearance in the trial, as mandated by Rule 112, Section 6(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. As a result, complainant Benjamin C. Uy, on 14 May 1985, while in the vicinity of the
City Hall in Quezon City, was arrested and ordered detained in Cabarroguis, Quirino Province.
The issuance of said warrant of arrest caused incalculable damage and suffering to complainant
and his family, particularly because of the unusual arrest effected by the military elements under
the control and supervision of then MP Orlando C. Dulay.

Complainant alleges that respondent judge gave due course to the complaint of libel despite the
fact that, under Rep. Act No. 1289, as amended by Rep. Act No. 4363, the proper jurisdiction
and venue of the case is Quezon City, where former MP Orlando C. Dulay held office or in
Manila where the allegedly libelous article was printed and first published.

Respondent judge, in his Comment, admits having conducted the preliminary investigation in
the libel case. He claims, however, that from the preliminary examination made, along with what
he gleaned from the news item, there was reason to believe that there was probable cause for
issuance of the warrant of arrest and the court, over which he presided, was of the behalf that
the three accused were probably guilty of said libel. Citing the cases of US vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil.
1, and Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, respondent judge case that the judicial determination of
probable cause is final and conclusive and that whether probable cause exists or not is
discretionary for the court. He asks for the dismissal of the administrative complaint.

Under Sec. 37 of Batas Pambansa No. 129, judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in
the National Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been committed within
their respective territorial jurisdictions and cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. And, Art. 360
of the Revised Penal Code on held, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1289 and further amended by
Rep. Act No. 4363, provides that, where one of the offended parties is a public officer, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city
where he holds office at the time of the commission of the offense or of the province or city
where the libelous article was printed and first published. It is also provided that preliminary
investigation of criminal actions for written defamations shall be conducted by the provincial or
city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province
where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the above article. The
limitation of choice of venue is clearly intended to minimize or limit the filing of out-of-town libel
suits to protect the alleged offender from hardship, inconvenience, and harassment and to
protect the interest of the public service where one of the offended parties is a public
officer. 1 Hence, the proper court to hear the libel case, in this instance, was either the court in
Quezon City where former MP Orlando C. Dulay held Office, or the court in Manila where the
allegedly libelous matter was printed and final published, but not the court in Qurino Province.

When respondent judge, in the libel case filed by MP Dulay, conducted the preliminary
investigation on Dulay, he issued the warrant of arrest against the accused on the same day.
While it is mandated by law that preliminary investigations should be simple, speedy and should
not drag on for weeks and months, to protect the substantial rights of the accused, and that the
investigating judge acts only upon probable cause and reasonable belief in issuing a warrant of
arrest, it is equally mandated that preliminary investigations should secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution to protect him from public accusation of crime,
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of public trial and to protect the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions. 2

Considering that libel suits are often intended to harass an alleged offender, respondent judge
should have satisfied himself not only that probable cause exists, but likewise made certain that
venue is properly laid and jurisdiction legally acquired before taking cognizance of the case and
issuing the warrant of arrest. This, he did not do. Reference may be made, at this point, to
cases where despite the existence of probable cause, the investigating judge does not issue a
warrant of arrest when there appears to be no necessity therefor.3

It should be noted that the accused in the held case filed a motion to dismiss, raising the issue
of venue and jurisdiction, thus affording respondent Judge an opportunity to rectify his previous
stand, but respondent fitted and refused to dismiss the libel suit, 4 even as it was clear that the
court, over which he presided, really had no jurisdiction over the case. With this unjustified
action, respondent judge placed his integrity under a heavy cloud, leading the Court to believe
that he went "out of his way" to accommodate and favor the then influential and powerful former
Governor and later Mambabatas Pambansa of Quirino Province, Orlando C. Dulay. As held by
this Court in Montemayor vs. Judge Collado. 5

... The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the position of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge to the
lowest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be character with propriety and above all
must be above suspicion. Although every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position acts a greater demand on momentarily righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. ...
It appearing that the records of the case sufficiently provide a clear basis for the determination
of charges. 6 The unjustified and irregular acts of respondent judge in the premises constitute
serious misconduct or at least, gross ignorance of the law. Ordinarily, the misconduct of the
respondent would have warranted his dismissed from the service in view of its gravity. However,
this penalty may no longer be imposed because of his automatic separation from the service
upon his filing of a certificate of candidacy for the position of Congressman for the province of
Quirino in the elections of 11 May 1987. But, his actions cannot be allowed to go unpunished.

WHEREFORE, the Court orders the forfeiture of respondent's accrued retirement benefits as
well as leave and other privileges, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
agency of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent
is further required to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be
disbarred for the misconduct referred to in this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Time, Inc, vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303.

2 Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216.

3 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Jose Y. Feria, Philippine Legal Studies,

Series No. 2, p. 16.

4 Rollo. p. 32.

5 107 SCRA 258.

6 Flores vs. Tatad, 96 SCRA 676.

 A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the
status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This
is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He
thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.

Antecedents

On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of
the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the
serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed
Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement,
although the complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the
answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the
case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on
a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained
absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit
required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;

and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by
Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes,

namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC
and of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2

2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the
order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal
offer of plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;”3 and

3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had
failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of
him as the counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted
the motion subject to the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4

On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative
complaint.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of
documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14,
1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the
filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00,
contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in
addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless,
because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with
counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply
(Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled
the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his non- attendance at the hearings in Civil Case No.
CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either
stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in another
court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed
Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte
had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request
because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had
been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in
addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk
of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the
practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change

counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand
on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been
forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to
change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the
counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9

On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying
additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the
reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply
attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement
of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply
had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly
filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 
Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and
reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his
testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.

Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was
P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus
P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s services after discovering the
latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.

On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.

Proceedings in the IBP

On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at
10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing
was reset several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP
Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6,
1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the
hearing being cancelled until further notice.19

On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest
on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.

Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on
February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty.
Abellana.

On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice.
Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24

Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.

On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.27

Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not
caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because
of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to
avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he
lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the
complainant, except the above-stated replies.

On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in
handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to
make it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal
offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19,
1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice
his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to
falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to
falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on
June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only
on June 14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his
having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively
different from that of the trial court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence
adduced against him; that he had explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the
complaint had been the complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had
only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed such in
court.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana,
observing as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has
shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his
delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole,
the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.

Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits a
member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above- entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”,
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to
exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:32

A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the
practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical
conduct committed by the respondent;

B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with
evidence;

C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence

so that it is hearsay and self-serving.

In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated
that the “enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which
were attached as Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted,
however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s position paper were different documents,
namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and
Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the
records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court,
did not execute any affidavit or certification to the effect that both documents were inexistent. He
reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents “seemed to be falsified documents”
based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.

The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for reconsideration.36

In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty.
Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted that the
reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his
position paper and motion for reconsideration.

On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit
certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38

On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39

On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.40

On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.41

Ruling

We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.

In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued
with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help
me God. (Emphasis supplied)

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his
dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright
falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had
already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988,
the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of
the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his
falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at
the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him
as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte
in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on
the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil
case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the
investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to have been part of the records of
the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the
administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his
forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the
official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch
5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He
defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that “court personnel were authorized to accept
filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he manifested his great
disrespect towards both the Court and his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely
warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the
formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he
could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the
order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some
tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.

In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.

The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against

lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by
one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to
determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts
and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest
or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear
in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.

The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty.

Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on “4” but justified himself
by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct
amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it
appear as one actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed
because the rubber stamp imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber
stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers
filed in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of
course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not
present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in
court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file
them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating
that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9
turned out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court
to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually
finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty.
Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with
mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the respondent
lawyer was suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing in court that the
complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no
such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an
excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had
invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the complainant had filed a similar
case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no other
case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for six months for
making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension
from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition
suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N.
Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective
upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or
similar acts will be punished more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
2
 Id. at 6.
3
 Id. at 7-8.
4
 Id. at 9
5
 Id. at 11-16.
6
 Id. at 29-32.
7
 Id. at 33 (Annex 10).
8
 Id. at 35 (Annex 12).
9
 Id. at 36 (Annex 13 and Annex 13-A).
10
 Id. at 44-47.
11
 Id. at 52
12
 Id. at 53.
13
 Id. at 38.
14
 Id. at 57.
15
 Id. at 63.
16
 Id. at 64 and 66-67.
17
 Id. at 70.
18
 Id. at 75-76.
19
 Id. at 77-78.
20
 Id. at 79-81
21
 Id. at 86-87.
22
 Id. at 91.
23
 Id. at 92
24
 Id. at 93.
25
 Id. at 94.
26
 Id. at 101.
27
 Id. at 104-105.
28
 Id. at 107-113.
29
 Id. at 226-238 (penned by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco).
30
 Id. at 226-238.
31
 Id. at 225.
32
 Id. at 153-160.
33
 Id. at 154.
34
 Id. at 129-130.
35
 Id. at 131.
36
 Id. at 162.
37
 Id. at 163-165.
38
 Id. at 183.
39
 Id. at 189.
40
 Id. At 192-196.
41
 Id. at 223.
42
De Leon v. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 237, 243-244.
43
 Supra note 11.
44
Rollo, p. 158.
45
Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372.
46
 A.C. 6198, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 1, 8-10.
47
 A.C. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1, 6-7.
 A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014

MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Mariano R. Cristobal against Atty. Ronaldo E.

Renta.

The facts are not disputed.

Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law Office for the filing of a
“petition for recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell Green” before
the Bureau of Immigration.  Respondent as the managing partner signed the “Special Contract
of Legal Services”2 in behalf of said law office.  Respondent also received from complainant the
“full and package price” of P160,000 for the filing of the petition for recognition.3  No such
petition, however, was filed.4cralawred

Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent for the latter’s failure to file the petition
for recognition and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand.

In his comment,5 respondent explained that the petition for recognition was not filed because
Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file the petition, misplaced it and did not inform him of such
fact.  He also claimed that he begged complainant to forgive him and assured him that he will
return the money.  However, respondent failed to refund the money on time for he was “hard up
in funds.”  Eventually, he was able to save enough and refunded the money to complainant. 
Respondent likewise begs forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his mistake.
In addition, respondent submitted complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance.6  In the said affidavit,
complainant said that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has forgiven him. 
Complainant confirmed that respondent had already refunded the amount he paid.

We required Cristobal to file his reply to Atty. Renta’s comment.  In his Reply,7 complainant
confirmed the contents of his affidavit of desistance, the refund made by respondent and his act
of forgiving the respondent for the latter’s misdeeds.

Since the facts are not contested, we deem it more prudent to resolve the case now rather than
refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

On complainant’s affidavit of desistance, we hold that its execution cannot have the effect of
abating the instant proceedings against respondent in view of the public service character of the
practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern.  A case
of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a
civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts.  A disbarment case is not an investigation
into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.8cralawred

Under the established facts, we find that respondent violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

We have held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the
client with competence and diligence.9cralawred

Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve complainant with diligence
and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.  He himself admits that the petition for
recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his
mistake.10  Complainant also submitted official letters11 from the Bureau of Immigration that
indeed no such petition was filed.  That Anneth Tan supposedly lost the petition for recognition
and failed to inform respondent cannot absolve him of liability for it was his duty not to neglect
complainant’s case and handle it with diligence.

We note that while respondent failed to refund immediately the amount paid by complainant, he
nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that he eventually was able to fully repay complainant and
begged complainant’s forgiveness.

In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Bautista,12 we found Bautista negligent in handling Voluntad-Ramirez’s

case and ruled that he is guilty of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  We admonished Bautista to exercise greater care and diligence in
the performance of his duty to his clients and ordered him to restitute to Voluntad-Ramirez
P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee.  In said case, we cited Cariño v. Atty. De Los
Reyes13 where the respondent lawyer who failed to file the complaint-affidavit before the
prosecutor’s office restituted the P10,000 acceptance fee paid to him.  The respondent lawyer
in Cariño was reprimanded by the Court with a warning that he should be more careful in the
performance of his duty to his clients.

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and Rule

18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2
 Id. at 6-7.
3
 Id. at 8.
4
 Id. at 3, 15, 16, 18, 31.
5
 Id. at 28-33.
6
 Id. at 35-37.
7
 Id. at 40-41.
8
Ventura v. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 430, 443.
9
Hernandez v. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 1, 8.
10
Rollo, pp. 31-32.
11
 Id. at 15, 16, 18.
12
 A.C. No. 6733, October 10, 2012, 683 SCRA 327, 335.
13
 414 Phil. 667 (2001).
A.C. No.7054               November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine
Bar.

Factual Background

In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of
law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions
and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before
the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed
on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally
recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense
of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of
justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of
the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that
he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of
the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated

December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board
of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon
8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying
that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court
En Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained
that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also
attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager
of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the
charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his
lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He
appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE
compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by
a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En
Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others
that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never
been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter
Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted
regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was
also denied on July 3, 2012.12

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed
that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for
its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being
disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and
immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency,
morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance
with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011,
July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with
finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment
has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had
been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice
weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law,
he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister
and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to
be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind.
Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical
Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St.
Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are
dedicated parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to
the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free
legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through
the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and
President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision.
According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to
reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity
of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and
deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to
his character reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he
has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of
Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs
in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of
Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown
by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to

reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution
by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind."
Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he
was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that
he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in
court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court
considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review
by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature
and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his

guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

(On official leave)

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On official leave) (On official leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA** LUCAS P. BERSAMIN***
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On official leave.

*** On official leave.

1
 Unpaged.

2
 Unpaged.

3
 Unpaged.

4
 Unpaged.

5
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated February 8, 2011.

6
 Unpaged, Most Respectful Appeal for Compassion and Mercy.

7
 Unpaged, OfficialReceipt No. 818682.

8
 Unpaged, Official Receipt No. UPD-2305656.

9
 Unpaged, Letter from the Roman Catholic Bishop of Boac.

10
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated August 2, 2011.

11
 Unpaged, Letter dated May 16, 2012.

12
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated July 3, 2012.

13
 Unpaged, Most Respectful Petition for Judicial Clemency.

14
 Unpaged, Notice of Resolution dated October 9, 2012.

15
 Unpaged, Letter dated March 24, 2013.

16
 Unpaged, Notice dated June 4, 2013.

17
 Unpaged.

18
 Unpaged, Medical Abstract dated July 1, 2014.

19
 Unpaged, Letter from St. Peter Parish: Shrine of Leaders dated May 4, 2014.

20
 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillion, A.C.
No. 1928, December 19, 1980, 101 SCRA 612.

21
 In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant
Al C. Argosino, B.M. No. 712, July 13, 1995, 246 SCRA 14, citing In Re Keenan, 314
Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943).
 22
 Scholl v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 213 S.W. 3d 687 (Ky. 2007).

23
 McGuire v. The Mississippi Bar, 798 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 2001).

24
 Bernardo v. Mejia, Adm. Case No. 2984, 558 Phil. 398, 401 (2007).

25
 Id., citing Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil. 725, 731 (1964).

26
 Id.

27
 G.R. No. 100643, 321 Phil. 556, 560 (1995).

28
 A. C. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543, 579 Phil. 1 (2008).

29
 A.C. No. 7056, 533 Phil. 250 (2006).

A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013

JAIME JOVEN AND REYNALDO C. RASING, Ccomplainants, v. ATTYS. PABLO R. CRUZ

AND FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Jaime Joven and
Reynaldo C. Rasing against Attys. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III for deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and falsification of public documents.
The disbarment complaint stemmed from NLRC NCR CA No. 039270-04, a labor case filed by
complainant Jaime Joven against Phil. Hoteliers, Inc. and/or Dusit Hotel Nikko, a client of
respondents’ law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices.

On July 16, 2007, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a decision in
NLRC NCR CA No. 039270-04. Joven’s counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia, received their copy of
the decision on August 14, 2007.  As to respondents, they received a copy of the decision on
August 24, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt2 that was sent back to the NLRC.
Stamped thereon was “RECEIVED AUG 24 2007” and signed by “tess.”

On September 5, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail at his law office located in
Quezon City the Partial Motion for Reconsideration3 of Phil. Hoteliers, Inc. and/or Dusit Hotel
Nikko.  The motion was dated August 29, 2007 and signed by respondents in behalf of their
client. The opening statement on page 1 of the Motion reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Respondents-Appellants, through counsel, unto this Honorable Commission, by way of their

Partial Motion for Reconsideration assailing the Decision dated 18 (sic) July 2007 in the above-
entitled case, copy of which was received on August 24, 2007, most respectfully submit:4

x x x x (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied.)

As Atty. Garcia found it unusual for the postman to belatedly deliver a copy of the NLRC
decision to respondents (whose law office is also located in Quezon City) on August 24, 2007 or
10 days after he received his copy on August 14, 2007, he requested Larry Javier, Vice-
President of National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN)-
Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter, to secure a post office certification of the actual date respondents
received a copy of said decision.  Through a letter-request of Angelito V. Vives, NLRC Board
Secretary IV, Javier was able to secure the following Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO)
Certification dated September 17, 2007:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

CERTIFICATION

Reference

To Whom It May Concern:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

This is to certify that per records of this Office, Registered Letter No. 6452 as per record
6463 address[ed] to Atty. Frankie O. Magsalin III Unit 2A & RD, [Genesis] Condo., #26 E.
Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Q.C. and which was posted at NLRC PO on Aug. 6, 2007

{ / } was delivered by Postman/Window Delivery Clerk/Lock Box In-Charge Rosendo

Pecante and duly received by Henry Agillon on Aug. 14, 2007.

{ } was return to sender on ______ for reason ________ despite due notices issued 1st on
___________ 2nd on _____________ last notice on _________.

This certification is issued this 17th day of Sept. 2007 upon request of Mr. Angelito V. Vives for
whatever legal purpose it may serve.
                                                                 Mr. LLEWELYN F. FALLARME (Sgd.)
x x x                                                  Chief, Records Section5  (Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was supposedly based on the logbook of Postman Rosendo Pecante.

Based on the certification of the QCCPO, complainants lodged the instant disbarment complaint
against respondents.  They allege that Teresita “Tess” Calucag, secretary of respondents’ law
firm, altered the true date of receipt of the NLRC decision when she signed and stamped on the
Registry Return Receipt the date August 24, 2007 to make it appear and to mislead the NLRC
and the opposing party that the decision was received on such later date and not on August 14,
2007.  They conclude that respondents caused the alteration of the true date of their actual
receipt with the intention of extending by ten days the period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration.  Complainants submit that the alteration of the true date of receipt done on the
registry return card (a public document), the use of the altered date and the making of untruthful
statements in a narration of facts in the Partial Motion for Reconsideration (also a public
document) constitute falsification of public document on several counts, deception and gross
professional misconduct.

On February 6, 2008, this Court issued a Resolution6 requiring respondents to comment on the

disbarment complaint.

In their Comment with Motion to Dismiss,7 respondents denied complainants’ allegations and

alleged that the subject NLRC decision was received under the following
circumstances:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

On August 14, 2007, P.R. Cruz Law Offices received four registered mails through one of its
office staff, Henry A. Agellon.  Agellon received Registered Mail Nos. 938, 005, 061 and 13497. 
As evidence of receipt of the four registered mails, Agellon signed the Postman’s Logbook.  On
a page on the Postman’s Logbook corresponding to August 14, 2007, a bracket enclosed the
lines corresponding to the four registered mails.  As evidence of receipt of said mails, Agellon
signed after the bracket and stamped thereon “AUG 14 2007.”  The next line after Registered
Mail No. 13497 corresponds to Registered Mail No. 6463, which is addressed to “F. Magsalin”
and supposedly pertains to the subject NLRC decision.

According to respondents, Agellon receives the mails when the firm secretary, Tess Calucag, is
busy or is out of the office.  According to Agellon, he makes sure that he writes the correct date
of receipt on the Registry Return Cards attached to the registered mails he receives.  He then
stamps “Received” and the actual date of receipt on the mails and turns them over to Calucag
so she can record them in her logbook before she distributes them to the lawyers.

On August 24, 2007, P.R. Cruz Law Offices received another batch of registered mails. Based
on the Postman’s Logbook, nine registered mails were for delivery to the firm.  On said date, it
was Calucag who received the registered mails based on the signature beside the bracket
enclosing the lines corresponding to the nine registered mails.  She then stamped “RECEIVED
AUG 24 2007” and signed all the Registry Return Cards in front of the postman who in turn
checked the same.  It appears, however, that the subject NLRC decision was among the
registered mails delivered on August 24, 2007 and its Registry Return Card was among those
stamped and signed by Calucag, even if it was not among the nine registered mails listed in the
postman’s logbook.  After receiving all the registered mails, Calucag recorded them in her
logbook.  A copy of the page pertaining to August 24, 2007 of Calucag’s logbook shows that the
subject NLRC decision was among those received on even date.

On the other hand, records would show that the Registry Return Card pertaining to the subject
NLRC decision signed and stamped with the date August 24, 2007 was duly returned to the
NLRC as sender.

Respondents, relying on the date August 24, 2007 as the actual date of receipt of the subject
NLRC decision as indicated by their secretary, stated said date in their Partial Motion for
Reconsideration of said decision.

Respondents submit that complainants did not present any clear, convincing or satisfactory
proof that they induced or ordered their secretary to alter the true date of receipt and such
allegation was merely based on pure assumption and self-serving conjectures. They further
argue that their reliance on their secretary’s actual receipt of the subject NLRC decision as
corroborated by the entries of the law office’s logbook and stamped date on the upper right side
of the law firm’s copy of the decision does not constitute malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct
and falsification of public documents. They also presented the two Certifications8 from the NLRC
Post Office (NLRC PO) which they claim destroys any evidentiary weight that the QCCPO
certification may have.  The first certifies that there is no Registered Letter No. 6452 dispatched
by NLRC PO to QCCPO addressed to Atty. Frankie O. Magsalin III in connection with NLRC CA
No. 039270-04/NCR-00-05-05406-03 entitled Jaime Joven v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.  The
second one certifies that Registered Letter No. 6463 addressed to Atty. Frankie O. Magsalin III
was mailed at NLRC PO and was dispatched and sent to QCCPO on August 10, 2007.

By Resolution9 dated June 2, 2008, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation10 dated February 18, 2009, IBP Commissioner Salvador B.
Hababag recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.  He
ruled that complainants have not only failed to show sufficient proof in support of their claim, but
respondents also rebutted their accusation.  Commissioner Hababag held that vis-à-vis
certifications issued by the NLRC PO and the certification issued by the QCCPO, the former is
controlling as it was the post office where the copies of the subject decision were actually
mailed.

On March 25, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner
Hababag’s report and recommendation. In its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-112 the IBP Board of
Governors stated:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED[,] the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the
complaint lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.11

On July 29, 2009, complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors.  They argued that the IBP erred in holding that they failed to show
sufficient proof in support of the complaint. They contended that the QCCPO certification clearly
and convincingly established that the actual and true date of receipt of respondents of the NLRC
decision is August 14, 2007 and not August 24, 2007 as they stated in their Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.  Complainants further argued it is only the QCCPO which can certify when the
registered letter was delivered to and received by respondents and not the NLRC PO as the
issue in this case is not where the decision was mailed but when the decision was received by
respondents.  They likewise submit that the IBP failed to explain how the certifications from the
NLRC PO could have rebutted the QCCPO certification, postman’s affidavit and delivery book.

Following the denial of their motion by the IBP, complainants filed the present petition for review
before this Court.

The appeal should be dismissed for lack of merit.  The IBP Board of Governors correctly
resolved to dismiss the complaint.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders
of the complainant.  The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the
harsh penalty.  As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges made against him until the contrary is proved.  An attorney is further presumed as an
officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.13

In this case, complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving respondents’

administrative liability.  Granting that the certification of the QCCPO of the actual date of receipt
of the subject NLRC decision has prima facie credence, this Court finds it is not sufficient to hold
respondents administratively liable as contended by complainants.

While there is incongruity between said certification and the records of respondents’ law firm as
to when the subject NLRC decision was actually received by the latter, there is no clear and
convincing evidence presented by complainants that respondents maliciously made it appear
that they received the decision on a date ten days later than what is reflected on the records of
the QCCPO.  Complainants would like to convince this Court that the only logical explanation as
to the discrepancy is that Calucag, a secretary under the employ of respondents, was ordered
by respondents to stamp a much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose
of extending by ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC
Rules of Procedure.  Clearly, such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and
not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.

It is likewise worthy to note that the registry return card which the QCCPO itself returned to the
NLRC corroborates respondents’ claim that to their knowledge, their law firm actually received
the subject NLRC decision on August 24, 2007, after relying on the date of receipt relayed to
them by their secretary and as stamped by the latter on their copy of the subject NLRC
decision.  We find merit in respondents’ argument that had Calucag stamped the wrong date on
the Registry Return Card, the postman who had full view of the receiving and stamping, would
have called Calucag’s attention to correct the same or he would just have refused to receive the
same altogether considering that it was erroneous.  Having accepted the Registry Return Card
with the date August 24, 2007 stamped on it as the date of receipt can only mean that the
postman considered it as correct.

Also, the registered mails delivered on August 14, 2007 were received by Agellon which
explains his signature appearing on the postman’s logbook for said date.  The fact that the
Registry Return Card was signed by Calucag, and not by Agellon, buttresses respondents’
contention that the subject NLRC decision may not have been among the registered mails
received on August 14, 2007  by Agellon.  Otherwise, it should be Agellon’s signature that would
appear on the Registry Return Card and not Calucag’s.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondents Attys. Pablo R. Cruz
and Frankie O. Magsalin III is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-7.cralawlibrary
2
 Id. at 14.cralawlibrary
3
 Id. at 9-12.cralawlibrary
4
 Id. at 9.cralawlibrary
5
 Id. at 13.cralawlibrary
6
 Id. at 17.cralawlibrary
7
 Id. at 20-56.cralawlibrary
8
 Id. at 85-86.cralawlibrary
9
 Id. at 128-129.cralawlibrary
10
 Id. at 282-286.cralawlibrary
11
 Id. at 281.cralawlibrary
12
 Id. at 287-297.cralawlibrary
13
Arma v. Montevilla, A.C.No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1, 8; see also Acosta v.
Serrano, Adm. Case No. 1246, February 28,1977, 75 SCRA 253, 257 and Maderazo v. Del
Rosario, Adm. Case No. 1267, October 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 540, 542-543.
G.R. No. 194578               February 13, 2013

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA
OQUENDO, ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS,
REYNALDO HULOG, REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA
NETWORK INC., through its new editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA
DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION, through the Head of its News Group, Maria Ressa,
CECILIA VICTORIA OREÑA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. represented by
its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES, PHILIPPINE STAR
represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU PUNAY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (petitioner)
against Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma),
Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose
Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond
Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas (Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and
the other respondents, who are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network)
through its news editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABS-
CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa), Cecilia
Victoria Oreña-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) represented by its Editor-in-
Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres), Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by
its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay). Respondents Atty. Quinsayas, et al.
and respondent media groups and personalities are collectively referred to in this case as
respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao
vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists, was on their way to
the Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of
Candidacy1 when they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in
Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to ten kilometers from their destination.2 The group
was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating,
Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao.3 The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking
was later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by
shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were
dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe.4 These gruesome killings
became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them
journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-
09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10- 163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before
this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an article,
written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a
portion of which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33
page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every
conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal
remedies available."5

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres,
which according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows:

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede and
degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope of
burying the principal issue of his client’s participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-
fated day of November 23, 2009," the petitioners said.6

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by
Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the rules,
muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the cases,
read the complaint.

***** ***** *****

"Respondent Attorney Fortun’s act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the complaint.

"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession, rendering
him unfit to be called a member of the Bar."7

Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national television a
program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the
program’s host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case
against petitioner, including its principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and
identified in the program as the lead counsel of the Ampatuan family.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature
of disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and
personalities conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on
their respective media platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment
complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a television program viewed nationwide

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed
this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged
that opinion writers wrote about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his
professional and personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in
publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign his personal and professional reputation,
considering the following: (1) the bases of the charges were not new but were based on
incidents that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the
anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr.
and his counsel and violated the accused’s right to presumption of innocence and due process;
(3) it was published following articles written about petitioner’s advocacy for the rights of an
accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that
the charges were baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy trial and protection of the
accused’s rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in announcing their "causes of action" in
the disbarment case, respondents were only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public
against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication where it
could have printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on its
television station. GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done and
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the
members of the media who reported the news and the media groups that published it on their
website, including GMA Network, did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network further
alleged that Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice
when she forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith in posting
the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with the other respondents in
publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the disbarment complaint, without any
unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et
al. who furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the media reporters. GMA Network
alleged that it had no intention to malign petitioner’s personal and professional reputation in
posting the news about the disbarment complaint on its website.
In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network and not a
writer of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Department of Justice. Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she
received an advice from fellow field reporter Mark Merueñas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu
would be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She waited at the Supreme Court. At
around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to news
reporters and Dedace received one. Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network
where it went to the editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good faith and without malice in
forwarding her news story to the news desk and that she had no intention to, and could not,
influence or interfere in the proceedings of the disbarment case. She further alleged that she
honestly believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was newsworthy
and should be reported as news.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website through a
syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are not found on the
broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two
different corporations, with separate legal personalities, and one may not be held responsible
for the acts of the other.

Torres8 alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told her and
several other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner. The disbarment
case was actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the complaint.
Since the lead of the story came from a lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing a story about
the filing of the disbarment complaint might amount to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the
writing of the story was an independent act and she did not conspire with any of the other
respondents. Torres maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news report because
the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the allegations in the
disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioner’s handling of the case. Torres further
asserted that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings,
affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBN’s News and Current
Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on terminal leave
beginning 30 October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her contract on 3 January 2011.
Ressa alleged that she had no participation in the production and showing of the broadcast on
23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon
insofar as it was applicable to her case.

ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News Channel,
commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network News (SNN) and
not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the
Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical personality
although SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the
presentation and hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to
violate the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the program was a
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report solely on the disbarment
complaint against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the one-hour program. They
alleged that the program was not a publication intended to embarrass petitioner who was not
even identified as the respondent in the disbarment complaint. Drilon even cautioned against
the revelation of petitioner’s name in the program. ABS-CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior
to the broadcast of the program on 23 November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner was already the subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge.
They denied petitioner’s allegation that they conspired with the other respondents in violating
the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge
violates their right to equal protection because there were other reports and publications of the
disbarment complaint but the publishers were not included in the charge. They also assailed the
penalty of imprisonment prayed for by petitioner as too harsh.

In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged that
petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of the disbarment
complaint against him. They alleged that while they were the ones who filed the disbarment
complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who caused the
publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did not provide the name of any
particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the dissemination
of the disbarment complaint.

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of the
Board of Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty. Quinsayas,
former counsel for FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged posting and
publication of the articles were not established as a fact. Respondents alleged that petitioner did
not submit certified true copies of the articles and he only offered to submit a digital video disk
(DVD) copy of the televised program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by
Drilon. Respondents alleged that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to
support his allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.

In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas,
et al. went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not able to file it on that
day.9 Atty. Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment complaint the following day, or on
23 November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged that their news article, which was about the
plan to file a disbarment complaint against petitioner, was published on 23 November 2010. It
came out before the disbarment complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article
on the disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the
article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article was
straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author. They alleged that
Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment complaint against
petitioner as it involved public interest and he perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They
further alleged that assuming the news article is not a privileged communication, it is covered by
the protection of the freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution.
They also alleged that the case is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit
contempt of court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further alleged that
they did not commit any contemptible act. They maintained that the news article did not impede,
interfere with, or embarrass the administration of justice. They further claimed that it is
improbable, if not impossible, for the article to influence the outcome of the case or sway this
Court in making its decision. The article also did not violate petitioner’s right to privacy because
petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and
character.
Pavia died during the pendency of this case10 and was no longer included in the Comment filed
for the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees and was no longer
represented by the FFFJ counsel in filing its comment.11 Gozo did not file a separate comment.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v.
Godoy,12 this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party
therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is
made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense
against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice
which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are
punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the
purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is
neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil
contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant’s intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court’s order is not a
defense in civil contempt.13

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner
had been published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups
and personalities.

We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.

GMA Network, Inc.

GMA Network’s defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could
be printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the
publication was already completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment
complaint to the media.
GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its website.
It merely said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that the news was
not televised. Online posting, however, is already publication considering that it was done on
GMA Network’s online news website.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI attached
a photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI
and Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net."14

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, the Philippines’ most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group
of Companies."15 PDI was not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from
Inquirer.net.

ABS-CBN Corporation

ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors, SNN
has its own juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN
controls the line-up of shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent and
separate juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit against
the the latter does not bind the former and vice-versa.16 A corporation is an artificial being
invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which
it may be connected.17 Hence, SNN, not ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this
case.

Maria Ressa

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the
Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. Ressa’s
defense was supported by a certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN,
stating that Ressa went on terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010.18 This was not disputed
by petitioner.

Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Oreña-Drilon,

and Edu Punay

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the
disbarment complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice;
that petitioner is a public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest;
and that there was no conspiracy on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also
argued that the news reports were part of privileged communication.

In Drilon’s case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner.
Even as the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioner’s name was
not mentioned at all in the program.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and Personalities

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.

However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from
any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and
irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative
cases or portions thereto without authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized
publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers
by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a
contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the
Court. x x x19

In People v. Castelo,20 the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of
privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for
both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by
our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the
other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the
press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications
can also be invoked in favor of appellant.21

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech."22 As a general rule, disbarment
proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this
Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a
matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The
interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and
participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in
the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao
Massacre case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30
were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is
considered a matter of public interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner,
are considered as public figure. The Court explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily follow
that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance, if and
when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in
some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public’s primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity or
notoriety.23 (Boldface in the original)

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to
publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media
groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the
filing of the disbarment complaint.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not
sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However,
since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a
matter of public concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment
case against petitioner is a matter of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing
of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case
against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the
confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press.1âwphi1 If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair,
true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public
interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings during its pendency. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still
remain private and confidential until their final determination.24 Only the final order of this Court
shall be published like its decisions in other cases.25

Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and personalities
acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their postings and publications of
the filing of a disbarment complaint against him. Respondent media groups and personalities
reported the filing of the disbarment complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as
it was – a news item. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media groups and personalities
acted with malicious intent. Respondent media groups and personalities made a fair and true
news report and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and posting the details of
the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the commemoration of the Maguindanao
Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was briefly discussed but petitioner was not named.
There was also no proof that respondent media groups and personalities posted and published
the news to influence this Court on its action on the disbarment case or to deliberately destroy
petitioner’s reputation. It should also be remembered that the filing of the disbarment case
against petitioner entered the public domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will
discuss later, the members of the media were given copies of the disbarment complaint by one
of the complainants.

Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo

Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the disbarment
complaint against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were the ones who
disseminated the disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation
that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the ones who caused the publication of the
disbarment complaint against him. There was nothing in the records that would show that
Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner.

Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and
Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that petitioner
was not able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment
complaint, and that assuming the posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed
to support his allegation that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.
They further alleged that they did not cause the publication of the news articles and thus, they
did not violate the rule on privacy and confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents, namely
De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not file his separate comment,
had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It
would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the
disbarment complaint. In its Comment, GMA Network stated that the publication "had already
been done and completed when copies of the complaint for disbarment were distributed
by one of the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas x x x."26 Dedace also stated
in her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Fortun and she received one."27

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant
in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the
Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes
contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon,28 the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by
publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the
confidentiality rule.29 In that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused
the publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment
proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is
punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or
both.30 Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting aside the confidentiality rule which every lawyer
and member of the legal profession should know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for
distributing copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members
of the media and we order her to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 The Ampatuan Massacre: a map and timeline., 25 November
2009. http://gmanetwork.com/news/story/177821/news/specialreports/the-ampatuan-
massacre-a-map andtimeline (visited 4 December 2012).

2
 Id.

3
 Id.

4
 Id.

5
 Rollo, pp. 5-6, Contempt Charge.
6
 Id. at 6.

7
 Id. at 6-7.

8
 Ma. Theresa Torres in her Comment. Id. at 209.

9
 From Dedace’s Comment, it appeared that Quinsayas, et al. arrived at the Supreme
Court at around 5:00 p.m. Id. at 121.

13
 Id. at 999.

14
 Rollo, p. 204.

15
 <http://services.inquirer.net/about/> (visited 12 December 2012).

16
 Velarde v. Lopez, Inc., 464 Phil. 525 (2004).

17
 See McLeod v. National Labor Relations Commission (1st Div.), 541 Phil. 214 (2007).

18
 Rollo, p. 274.

19
 Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 522 Phil. 556, 561 (2006).

20
 114 Phil. 892 (1962).

21
 Id. at 901.

22
 See Borjal v. CA, 361 Phil. 1 (1999).

23
 See Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., G.R. No. 164437, 15 May 2009, 588
SCRA 1, 13.

24
 Tan v. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 532 Phil. 605 (2006).

25
 Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

26
 Rollo, p. 97. Boldface in the original.

27
 Id. at 121.

28
 128 Phil. 104 (1967).

29
 Then Section 10, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

30
 Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
A.C. No. 5239               November 18, 2013

SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses

George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M.
Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants
alleged that they secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages
captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner,
plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to
submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested
period, respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent
did not file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants
to have waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent
belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent
did not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s move to dismiss the
Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of
herein complainants. In a Resolution2 dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his
Comment to this administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24,
2000,3 respondent requested for an extension of 30 days which was granted.4
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet
filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice."5 Respondent received our
directive but chose to ignore the same.6 In another Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we
imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his
Comment and to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent
again ignored this Court’s directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we increased the fine to
₱2,000.00 but respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions.8 Consequently, on March 10,
2008, we resolved to order respondent’s arrest and detention until he complies with our
Resolutions.9

This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance10 and

Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative
case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy
from the RTC to no avail.

In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that
complainant Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient
scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of
charge; that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the
Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriner’s claim that the construction
being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil
towards his property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of
other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriner’s
claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were
fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of
Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner authored the damage to his
property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him
with a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about
the status of the case; that he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no longer
visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to
perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing a
belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal
profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.

In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to comply
with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more circumspect in
his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.

In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before
the RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits almost three months after the prescribed
period; that respondent did not present complainants’ Marriage Contract and General Power of
Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is out of the
country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience; that complainants have a son out of
said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
did not secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the
construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the records of Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a fabrication.

In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before
the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time
that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a
representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to
secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring
houses such as Warriner’s. He insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which
caused the soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment before
this Court that it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches
constructed by the developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of damages provided by
Bening’s Garden which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as
there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.

In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since more
than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that Bening’s Garden relocated to another address
but it does not mean that it never existed.

In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found respondent guilty

of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and thus recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-44218 dated August 28, 2010,
approved with modification the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants,
respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not supported by
facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence,
although belated, exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were fabricated
thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the hope that
the same would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC
or this Court. He insisted that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute
refusal and not mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file comment to the
Motion to Dismiss as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his
clients. Respondent argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to
his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly
disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should
have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file the same, and
not as defiance of this Court’s orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by
the IBP was the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have
delved on whether he disregarded or was disrespectful of the Court’s orders because he was
not given any opportunity to rebut the same.

Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He
argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is handling would be affected.

Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be
disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice of law. To this, respondent filed his
Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he
stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the
complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence and
until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants.
He maintained that he had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no
evidence that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and elementary in
any legal procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and
puts the controversy submitted for resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondent’s failure or omission as having
such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x x."

The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration.

On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for
Reconsideration)19 insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the administrative case
does not constitute defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a natural human expression of
frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly
unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City
Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local
chapter. He claims that –

x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the
[IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to the profession but
will be ‘praised to the heavens’, so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for
his invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to discipline its
members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law by serving justice in an orderly and
dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by
this local chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the
personal knowledge of undersigned’s personal character, integrity, uprightness, reputation and
sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.

As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting
aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the
practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be.
Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the [IBP], measures
be adopted to prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional organizations in the
Philippines worthy for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory
stance of disciplining its members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant
proceeding on the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high
heavens for his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization
that condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.

Our Ruling

Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the
10-day period given to respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant
to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the
respondent.

Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the
submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set aside the above
Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in
Evidence. As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Again,
respondent failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by
the RTC. As a result, Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.

Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and
Rule 18.03 which provide:

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the
prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this
Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of
exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same
would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to
withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such
as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is
handling"20 or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden as
a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately, respondent
anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C.
Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation
by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that
since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean
that his practice has ceased to exist.

We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court
orders and processes.1âwphi1 Note that we required respondent to submit his Comment to this
administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment
eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order
which should be complied with promptly and completely.22
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions
in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed
that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper
filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a
former barangay official and a representative from DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment
filed before this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter
threatened him with a disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account
when he submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly, respondent claimed in his
Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating
Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation
that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent claimed
in his Comment before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining
the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he
again contradicted himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of
the place was the cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court, he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court."23 He
"shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."24

Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and
had him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner, and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla25 and Pesto v.
Millo,26 commensurate to respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that
"suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the
legal profession."27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar violation will be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this
Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 4-6.

2
 Id. at 35.

3
 Id. at 41.

4
 Id. at 45.

5
 Id. at 46.

6
 Id. at 48.

7
 Id. at 51.

8
 Id. at 54.

9
 Id. at 55-57.

10
 Captioned as Manifestation with Compliance and Apologies, id. at 60-62.

11
 Id. at 63-70.

12
 Id. at 84.

13
 Id., unpaginated.

14
 Id.

15
 Id.

16
 Id.

17
 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag.

18
 Rollo, unpaginated.

19
 Id.

20
 Rule 22.01(a), Code of Professional Responsibility.
 21
 Rule 22.01(b), id.

22
 Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204 (2004).

23
 Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.

24
 Rule 10.01, id.

25
 A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 1, 12.

26
 A.C. No. 9612, March 13, 2013.

27
 Mr. and Mrs. Saburnido v. Atty. Madroño, 418 Phil. 241, 248.

G.R. No. 183952               September 9, 2013

CZARINA T. MALVAR, Petitioner,
vs.
KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC. and/or BIENVENIDO BAUTISTA, KRAFT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Although the practice of law is not a business, an attorney is entitled to be properly
compensated for the professional services rendered for the client, who is bound by her express
agreement to duly compensate the attorney. The client may not deny her attorney such just
compensation.

The Case

The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in a
labor litigation, but has mutated into a dispute over attorney's fees between the winning
employee and her attorney after she entered into a compromise agreement with her employer
under circumstances that the attorney has bewailed as designed to prevent the recovery of just
professional fees.

Antecedents

On August 1, 1988, Kraft Foods (Phils.), Inc. (KFPI) hired Czarina Malvar (Malvar) as its
Corporate Planning Manager. From then on, she gradually rose from the ranks, becoming in
1996 the Vice President for Finance in the Southeast Asia Region of Kraft Foods International
(KFI),KFPI’s mother company. On November 29, 1999, respondent Bienvenido S. Bautista, as
Chairman of the Board of KFPI and concurrently the Vice President and Area Director for
Southeast Asia of KFI, sent Malvar a memo directing her to explain why no administrative
sanctions should be imposed on her for possible breach of trust and confidence and for willful
violation of company rules and regulations. Following the submission of her written explanation,
an investigating body was formed. In due time, she was placed under preventive suspension
with pay. Ultimately, on March 16, 2000, she was served a notice of termination.

Obviously aggrieved, Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a decision dated
April 30, 2001,1 the Labor Arbiter found and declared her suspension and dismissal illegal, and
ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, plus attorney’s fees.

On October 22, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter but additionally ruled
that Malvar was entitled to "any and all stock options and bonuses she was entitled to or would
have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her employment," as well as to
moral and exemplary damages.2

KFPI and Bautista sought the reconsideration of the NLRC’s decision, but the NLRC denied
their motion to that effect.3

Undaunted, KFPI and Bautista assailed the adverse outcome before the CA on certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 69660), contending that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, the petition for certiorari was dismissed by the CA on December 22, 2004, but with
the CA reversing the order of reinstatement and instead directing the payment of separation pay
to Malvar, and also reducing the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary damages.4

After the judgment in her favor became final and executory on March14, 2006, Malvar moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution.5 The Executive Labor Arbiter then referred the case to
the Research and Computation Unit (RCU) of the NLRC for the computation of the monetary
awards under the judgment. The RCU’s computation ultimately arrived at the total sum of
₱41,627,593.75.6

On November 9, 2006, however, Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno issued an order,7 finding that
the RCU’s computation lacked legal basis for including the salary increases that the decision
promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 did not include. Hence, Labor Arbiter Reyno reduced
Malvar’s total monetary award to ₱27,786,378.11, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, in so far as the computation of complainant’s other

benefits and allowances are concerned, the same are in order. However, insofar as the
computation of her backwages and other monetary benefits (separation pay, unpaid salary for
January 1 to 26, 2005,holiday pay, sick leave pay, vacation leave pay, 13th month pay), the
same are hereby recomputed as follows:

1. Separation Pay
8/1/88-1/26/05 = 16 yrs
₱344,575.83 x 16 = 5,513,213.28
2. Unpaid Salary
1/1-26/05 = 87 mos.
₱344,575.83 x 87 = 299,780.97
3. Holiday Pay
4/1/00-1/26/05 = 55 holidays
₱4,134,910/12 mos/20.83 days x 55 days 909,825.77
4. Unpaid 13th month pay for Dec 2000 344,575.83
5. Sick Leave Pay
Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 yrs
₱344,575.88/20.83 x 15 days x 6 = 1,488,805.79
Year 2005
₱344,575.83/20.83 x 15/12 x 1 20,677.86 1,509,483.65
6. Vacation Leave Pay
Year 1999 to 2004 = 6 years
₱344,575.88/20.83 x 22 days x 6 = 2,183,581.83
Year 2005
₱344,575.83/20.83 x 22/12 x 1 30,327.55 2,213,909.36

10,790,788.86
Backwages (from 3/7/00-4/30/01, award in LA Sytian’s Decision 4,651,773.75
 Allowances & Other Benefits:
Management Incentive Plan 7,355,166.58
Cash Dividend on Philip Morris Shares 2,711,646.00
Car Maintenance 381,702.92
Gas Allowance 198,000.00
Entitlement to a Company Driver 438,650.00
Rice Subsidy 58,650.00
Moral Damages 500,000.00
Exemplary Damages 200,000.00
Attorney’s Fees 500,000.00
Entitlement to Philip Sch G Subject to
"Share Option Grant" Market Price

27,786,378.11

SO ORDERED.

Both parties appealed the computation to the NLRC, which, on April19, 2007, rendered its
decision setting aside Labor Arbiter Reyno’s November 9, 2006 order, and adopting the
computation by the RCU.8

In its resolution dated May 31, 2007,9 the NLRC denied the respondents’ motion for
reconsideration.

Malvar filed a second motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision of
the NLRC rendered on April 19, 2007. After the writ of execution was issued, a partial
enforcement as effected by garnishing the respondents’ funds deposited with Citibank worth
37,391,696.06.10

On July 27, 2007, the respondents went to the CA on certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction), assailing the NLRC’s setting
aside of the computation by Labor Arbiter Reyno (CA-G.R. SP No. 99865). The petition mainly
argued that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion in ruling that: (a) the inclusion of the
salary increases and other monetary benefits in the award to Malvar was final and executory;
and (b) the finality of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 69660 precluded the respondents from
challenging the inclusion of the salary increases and other monetary benefits. The CA issued a
TRO, enjoining the NLRC and Malvar from implementing the NLRC’s decision.11

On April 17, 2008, the CA rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 99865,12 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Petition is GRANTED and the 19 April 2007
Decision of the NLRC and the 31May 2007 Resolution in NLRC NCR 30-07-02316-00 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The matter of computation of monetary awards for private respondent is hereby REMANDED to
the Labor Arbiter and he is DIRECTED to recompute the monetary award due to private
respondent based on her salary at the time of her termination, without including projected salary
increases. In computing the said benefits, the Labor Arbiter is further directed to DISREGARD
monetary awards arising from: (a) the management incentive plan and (b) the share option
grant, including cash dividends arising therefrom without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
remedy by the private respondent in the proper forum. Private respondent’s allowances for car
maintenance and gasoline are likewise DELETED unless private respondent proves, by
appropriate receipts, her entitlement thereto.

With respect to the Motion to Exclude the Undisputed Amount of ₱14,252,192.12 from the
coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to order its immediate release, the same is
hereby GRANTED for reasons stated therefor, which amount shall be deducted from the
amount to be given to private respondent after proper computation.

As regards the Motions for Reconsideration of the Resolution denying the Motion for Voluntary
Inhibition and the Omnibus Motion dated 30 October 2007, both motions are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion on July30, 2008.14

Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the CA’s decision.

On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and the respondents
entered into a compromise agreement, the pertinent dispositive portion of which is quoted as
follows:

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the covenants and understanding between the
parties herein, the parties hereto have entered into this Agreement on the following terms and
conditions:

1. Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in the presence of Ms. Malvar’s attorney,
KFPI shall pay Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos Forty Million (Php 40,000,000.00),
which is in addition to the Philippine Pesos Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand
One Hundred Ninety-Two and Twelve Centavos (Php14,252,192.12) already paid to and
received by Ms. Malvar from KFPI in August2008 (both amounts constituting the "Compromise
Payment").

The Compromise Payment includes full and complete payment and settlement of Ms. Malvar’s
salaries and wages up to the last day of her employment, allowances, 13th and 14th month pay,
cash conversion of her accrued vacation, sick and emergency leaves, separation pay,
retirement pay and such other benefits, entitlements, claims for stock, stock options or other
forms of equity compensation whether vested or otherwise and claims of any and all kinds
against KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors-in-interest, their stockholders,
officers, directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and subsidiaries, up to the last day
of the aforesaid cessation of her employment.

2. In consideration of the Compromise Payment, Ms. Malvar hereby freely and voluntarily
releases and forever discharges KFPI and KFI and Altria Group, Inc., their predecessors or
successors-in-interest, stockholders, officers, including Mr. Bautista who was impleaded in the
Labor Case as a party respondent, directors, agents or successors-in-interest, affiliates and
subsidiaries from any and all manner of action, cause of action, sum of money, damages,
claims and demands whatsoever in law or in equity which Ms. Malvar or her heirs, successors
and assigns had, or now have against KFPI and/or KFI and/or Altria Group, Inc., including but
not limited to, unpaid wages, salaries, separation pay, retirement pay, holiday pay, allowances,
13th and 14th month pay, claims for stock, stock options or other forms of equity compensation
whether vested or otherwise whether arising from her employment contract, company grant,
present and future contractual commitments, company policies or practices, or otherwise, in
connection with Ms. Malvar’s employment with KFPI.15

xxxx

Thereafter, Malvar filed an undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case,16 praying that the appeal
be immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise agreement, and that the case
be considered closed and terminated.

Intervention

Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, the Court received on
February 15, 2011 a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights17 from The
Law Firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its Of Counsel Retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo18 (Intervenor), whereby the Intervenor sought, among
others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and severally the
Intervenor’s contingent fees.

The Motion for Intervention relevantly averred:

xxxx

Lawyers, oftentimes, are caricatured as alligators or some other specie of voracious carnivore;
perceived also as leeches sucking dry the blood of their adversaries, and even their own clients
they are sworn to serve and protect! As we lay down the facts in this case, this popular, rather
unpopular, perception will be shown wrong. This case is a reversal of this perception.

xxxx

Here, it is the lawyer who is eaten up alive by the warring but conspiring litigants who finally
settled their differences without the knowledge, much less, participation, of Petitioner’s counsel
that labored hard and did everything to champion her cause.

xxxx
This Motion for Intervention will illustrate an aberration from the norm where the lawyer ends up
seeking protection from his client’s and Respondents’ indecent and cunning maneuverings. x x
x.

xxxx

On 18 March 2008 Petitioner engaged the professional services of Intervenor x x x on a

contingency basis whereby the former agreed in writing to pay the latter contingency fees
amounting to almost ₱19,600,000.00 (10% of her total claim of almost ₱196,000,000.00 in
connection with her labor case against Respondents. x x x.

xxxx

According to their agreement (Annex "A"), Petitioner bound herself to pay Intervenor
contingency fees as follows (a) 10% of ₱14,252, 192.12 upon its collection; (b) 10% of the
remaining balance of ₱41,627,593.75; and (c)10% of the value of the stock options Petitioner
claims to be entitled to, or roughly ₱154,000,000.00 as of April 2008.

xxxx

Intervenor’s efforts resulted in the award and partial release of Petitioner’s claim amounting to
₱14,252,192.12 out of which Petitioner paid Intervenor 10% or ₱1,425,219.21 as contingency
fees pursuant to their engagement agreement (Annex "A"). Copy of the check payment of
Petitioner payable to Intervenor’s Of Counsel is attached as Annex "C".

xxxx

On 12 September 2008 Intervenor filed an exhaustive Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court containing 70 pages, including its Annexes "A" to "R", or a total of 419 pages against
Respondents to collect on the balance of Petitioner’s claims amounting to at least
₱27,000,000.00 and ₱154,000,000.00 the latter representing the estimated value of Petitioner’s
stock options as of April 2008.

xxxx

On 15 January 2009 Respondents filed their Comment to the Petition for Review.

xxxx

On 13 April 2009 Intervenor, in behalf of Petitioner, filed its Reply to the Comment.

xxxx

All the pleadings in this Petition have already been submitted on time with nothing more to be
done except to await the Resolution of this Honorable Court which, should the petition be
decided in her favor, Petitioner would stand to gain ₱182,000,000.00, more or less, which
victory would be largely through the efforts of Intervenor.19 (Bold emphasis supplied).

xxxx
It appears that in July 2009, to the Intervenor’s surprise, Malvar unceremoniously and without
any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to withdraw from the
case.20 Hence, on October 5,2009, the Intervenor reluctantly filed a Manifestation (With Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner),21 in which it spelled out: (a) the terms of and conditions
of the Intervenor’s engagement as counsel; (b) the type of legal services already rendered by
the Intervenor for Malvar; (c) the absence of any legitimate reason for the termination of their
attorney-client relationship; (d) the reluctance of the Intervenor to withdraw as Malvar’s counsel;
and (e) the desire of the Intervenor to assert and claim its contingent fee notwithstanding its
withdrawal as counsel. The Intervenor prayed that the Court furnish it with copies of resolutions,
decisions and other legal papers issued or to be issued after its withdrawal as counsel of Malvar
in the interest of protecting its interest as her attorney.

The Intervenor indicated that Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even
embarrassed the Intervenor, because it had done everything legally possible to serve and
protect her interest. It added that it could not recall any instance of conflict or misunderstanding
with her, for, on the contrary, she had even commended it for its dedication and devotion to her
case through her following letter to Justice Bellosillo, to wit:

July 16, 2008

Justice Josue Belocillo (sic)

Dear Justice,

It is almost morning of July 17 as I write this letter to you. Let me first thank you for your
continued and unrelenting lead, help and support in the case. You have been our "rock" as far
as this case is concerned. Jun and I are forever grateful to you for all your help. I just thought I’d
express to you what is in the innermost of my heart as we proceed in the case. It has been
around four months now since we met mid-March early this year.

The most important and immediate aspect of the case at this time for me is the collection of the
undisputed amount of Pesos 14million which the Court has clearly directed and ordered the
NLRC to execute. The only impending constraint for NLRC to execute and collect this amount
from the already garnished amount of Pesos 41 million at Citibank is the MR of Kraft on the
Order of the Court (CA) to execute collection. We need to get a denial of this motion for NLRC
to execute immediately. We already obtained commitment from NLRC that all it needed to
execute collection is the denial of the MR. Jun and I applaud your initiative and efforts to
mediate with Romulo on potential settlement. However, as I expressed to you in several
instances, I have serious reservations on the willingness of Romulo to settle within reasonable
amounts specifically as it relates to the stock options. Let us continue to pursue this route
vigorously while not setting aside our efforts to influence the CA to DENY their Motion on the
Undisputed amount of Pesos 14million.

At this point, I cannot overemphasize to you our need for funds. We have made financial
commitments that require us to raise some amount. But we can barely meet our day to day
business and personal requirements given our current situation right now.

Thank you po for your understanding and support.22

According to the Intervenor, it was certain that the compromise agreement was authored by the
respondents to evade a possible loss of ₱182,000,000.00 or more as a result of the labor
litigation, but considering the Intervenor’s interest in the case as well as its resolve in pursuing
Malvar’s interest, they saw the Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise
agreement that it was then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the Intervenor
was to have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This prompted the Intervenor to
bring the matter to the attention of the Court to enable it to recover in full its compensation
based on its written agreement with her, averring thus:

xxxx

28. Upon execution of the Compromise Agreement and pursuant thereto, Petitioner immediately
received (supposedly) from Respondents₱40,000,000.00. But despite the settlement between
the parties, Petitioner did not pay Intervenor its just compensation as set forth in their
engagement agreement; instead, she immediately moved to Dismiss/Withdraw the Present
Petition.

29. To parties’ minds, with the dismissal by Petitioner of Intervenor as her counsel, both
Petitioner and Respondents probably thought they would be able to settle the case without any
cost to them, with Petitioner saving on Intervenor’s contingent fees while Respondents able to
take advantage of the absence of Intervenor in determining the settlement price.

30. The parties cannot be any more mistaken. Pursuant to the Second Paragraph of Section 26,
Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court quoted in paragraph 3 hereof, Intervenor is still entitled
to recover from Petitioner the full compensation it deserves as stipulated in its contract.

31. All the elements for the full recovery of Intervenor’s compensation are present. First, the
contract between the Intervenor and Petitioner is reduced into writing. Second, Intervenor is
dismissed without justifiable cause and at the stage of proceedings where there is nothing more
to be done but to await the Decision or Resolution of the Present Petition.23

xxxx

In support of the Motion for Intervention, the Intervenor cites the rulings in Aro v. Nañawa 24 and
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals,25 particularly the following passage:

x x x. While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to compromise a
suit without the intervention of his lawyer," We hold that when such compromise is entered into
in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the fees justly due him, the compromise must
be subject to the said fees and that when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in
confabulation with the adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer’s contingent interest or
such interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the better
practice is to settle the matter of the attorney’s fees in the same proceeding, after hearing all the
affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the compromise agreement in so far as it
does not adversely affect the right of the lawyer.26 x x x.

The Intervenor prays for the following reliefs:

a) Granting the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights in favor of the
Intervenor;
 b) Directing both Petitioner and Respondents jointly and severally to pay Intervenor its
contingent fees;

c) Granting a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments; and

d) Holding in Abeyance in the meantime the Resolution of the Motion to

Dismiss/Withdraw Case filed by Petitioner and granting the Motion only after Intervenor
has been fully paid its just compensation; and

e) Other reliefs just and equitable.27

Opposing the Motion for Intervention,28 Malvar stresses that there was no truth to the
Intervenor’s claim to defraud it of its professional fees; that the Intervenor lacked the legal
capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from
the Intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred from private practice upon his
appointment as head of the Legal Department of the Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation, a government subsidiary; and that Atty. Llasos and Atty. Dasal had personally
handled her case.

Malvar adds that even assuming, arguendo, that the Intervenor still existed as a law firm, it was
still not entitled to intervene for the following reasons, namely: firstly, it failed to attend to her
multiple pleas and inquiries regarding the case, as when communications to the Intervenor
through text messages were left unanswered; secondly, maintaining that this was a justifiable
cause to dismiss its services, the Intervenor only heeded her repeated demands to withdraw
from the case when Atty. Dasal was confronted about his appointment to the government
subsidiary; thirdly, it was misleading and grossly erroneous for the Intervenor to claim that it had
rendered to her full and satisfactory services when the truth was that its participation was strictly
limited to the preparation, finalization and submission of the petition for review with the Supreme
Court; and finally, while the Intervenor withdrew its services on October 5, 2009, the
compromise agreement was executed with the respondents on December 9,2010 and notarized
on December 14, 2010, after more than a year and two months, dispelling any badge of bad
faith on their end.

On June 21, 2011, the respondents filed their comment to the Intervenor’s Motion for
Intervention.

On November 18, 2011, the Intervenor submitted its position on the respondent’s comment
dated June 21, 2011,29 and thereafter the respondents sent in their reply.30

Issues

The issues for our consideration and determination are two fold, namely: (a) whether or not
Malvar’s motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of the execution of the compromise
agreement was proper; and (b) whether or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorney’s
rights can prosper, and, if so, how much could it recover as attorney’s fees.

Ruling of the Court

We shall decide the issues accordingly.

1.

Client’s right to settle litigation

by compromise agreement, and
to terminate counsel; limitations

A compromise agreement is a contract, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to

avoid litigation, or put an end to one already commenced.31 The client may enter into a
compromise agreement with the adverse party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is
rendered therein.32 If the compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to law,
morals, good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in order.33 A compromise
agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force of res judicata between the
parties and will not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.34

A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention of the attorney, for
the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation and may at anytime, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of
court before judgment, even without the attorney’s intervention.35 It is important for the client to
show, however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third persons who
are not parties to the agreement.36

By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at
any time with or without cause.37 But this right of the client is not unlimited because good faith is
required in terminating the relationship. The limitation is based on Article 19 of the Civil Code,
which mandates that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The
right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is clear from Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at anytime from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from
an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to
the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case
of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the
contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the
attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full
compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued
in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by
the client. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. The
attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of
the client should be reasonably compensated for his service.38
2.

Compromise agreement is to be approved

despite favorable action on the
Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention

On considerations of equity and fairness, the Court disapproves of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees.39 Thus, the Court grants
the Intervenor’s Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting
the Intervenor’s right to its stipulated professional fees that would be denied under the
compromise agreement. The Court does so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.

Nonetheless, the claim for attorney’s fees does not void or nullify the compromise agreement
between Malvar and the respondents. There being no obstacles to its approval, the Court
approves the compromise agreement. The Court adds, however, that the Intervenor is not left
without a remedy, for the payment of its adequate and reasonable compensation could not be
annulled by the settlement of the litigation without its participation and conformity. It remains
entitled to the compensation, and its right is safeguarded by the Court because its members are
officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of
fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In
other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and
lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the legitimate
compensation for professional services rendered.40

The basis of the intervention is the written agreement on contingent fees contained in the
engagement executed on March 19, 2008 between Malvar and the Intervenor,41 the pertinent
portion of which stipulated that the Intervenor would "collect ten percent (10%) of the amount of
Ph₱14,252,192.12 upon its collection and another ten percent (10%) of the remaining balance
of Ph₱41,627,593.75 upon collection thereof, and also ten percent (10%) of whatever is the
value of the stock option you are entitled to under the Decision." There is no question that such
arrangement was a contingent fee agreement that was valid in this jurisdiction, provided the
fees therein fixed were reasonable.42

We hold that the contingent fee of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75 and 10% of the value of the stock
option was reasonable. The ₱41,627,593.75 was already awarded to Malvar by the NLRC but
the award became the subject of the appeal in this Court because the CA reversed the NLRC.
Be that as it may, her subsequent change of mind on the amount sought from the respondents
as reflected in the compromise agreement should not negate or bar the Intervenor’s recovery of
the agreed attorney’s fees.

Considering that in the event of a dispute between the attorney and the client as to the amount
of fees, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be
evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking
into account the facts determinative thereof,43 the history of the Intervenor’s legal representation
of Malvar can provide a helpful predicate for resolving the dispute between her and the
Intervenor.
The records reveal that on March 18, 2008, Malvar engaged the professional services of the
Intervenor to represent her in the case of illegal dismissal. At that time, the case was pending in
the CA at the respondents’ instance after the NLRC had set aside the RCU’s computation of
Malvar’s backwages and monetary benefits, and had upheld the computation arrived at by the
NLRC Computation Unit. On April 17, 2008, the CA set aside the assailed resolution of the
NLRC, and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of her monetary awards.
It was at this juncture that the Intervenor commenced its legal service, which included the
following incidents, namely:

a) Upon the assumption of its professional duties as Malvar’s counsel, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2008 consisting
of thirty-eight pages was filed before the Court of Appeals on May 6, 2008.

b) On June 2, 2009, Intervenors filed a Comment to Respondents’ Motion for Partial

Reconsideration, said Comment consisted 8 pages.

c) In the execution proceedings before Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno, Intervenor prepared
and filed on Malvar’s behalf an "Ex-Parte Motion to Release to Complainant the
Undisputed amount of ₱14,252,192.12" in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-07-02716-00.

d) On July 29, 2000, Intervenor prepared and filed before theLabor Arbiter a Comment to
Respondents’ Opposition to the "Ex-Parte Motion to Release" and a "Motion Reiterating
Immediate Implementation of the Writ of Execution"

e) On August 6, 2008, Intervenor prepared and filed before the Labor Arbiter Malvar’s
Motion Reiterating Motion to Release the Amount of ₱14,252,192.12.44

The decision promulgated on April 17, 200845 and the resolution promulgated on July 30,
200846 by the CA prompted Malvar to appeal on August 15, 2008 to this Court with the
assistance of the Intervenor. All the subsequent pleadings, including the reply of April 13,
2009,47 were prepared and filed in Malvar’s behalf by the Intervenor.

Malvar should accept that the practice of law was not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigations in court but embraced also the preparation of pleadings and other papers incidental to
the cases or litigations as well as the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
the clients.48 Consequently, fairness and justice demand that the Intervenor be accorded full
recognition as her counsel who discharged its responsibility for Malvar’s cause to its successful
end.

But, as earlier pointed out, although a client may dismiss her lawyer at any time, the dismissal
must be for a justifiable cause if a written contract between the lawyer and the client exists.49

Considering the undisputed existence of the written agreement on contingent fees, the question
begging to be answered is: Was the Intervenor dismissed for a justifiable cause?

We do not think so.

In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his
just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed
the worth of the Intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to
defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most
importantly, fell short of being justifiable.

The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the Intervenor,
debunked her allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she thereby lavishly lauded
the Intervenor for its dedication and devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the
protection of her interests. Also significant was that the attorney-client relationship between her
and the Intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasal’s appointment to public office and Atty.
Llasos’ resignation from the law firm. In other words, the Intervenor remained as her counsel of
record, for, as we held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa v. Eastern
Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,50 a client who employs a law firm engages the entire law
firm; hence, the resignation, retirement or separation from the law firm of the handling lawyer
does not terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to provide a replacement.

The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the Intervenors, not being
contrary to law, morals, public policy, public order or good customs, were valid and binding on
her. They expressly gave rise to the right of the Intervenor to demand compensation. In a word,
she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations towards the Intervenor, for
Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.

To be sure, the Intervenor’s withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor terminated the
written agreement on the contingent attorney’s fees. Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver
of the agreement. On the contrary, the agreement continued between them because the
Intervenor’s Manifestation (with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner)explicitly called
upon the Court to safeguard its rights under the written agreement, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned counsel respectfully pray that instant Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner be granted and their attorney’s lien pursuant to the written
agreement be reflected in the judgment or decision that may be rendered hereafter conformably
with par. 2, Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Undersigned counsel further requests that they be furnished copy of the decision, resolutions
and other legal processes of this Honorable Court to enable them to protect their interests.51

Were the respondents also liable?

The respondents would be liable if they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the
execution of the compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its
attorney’s fees. Thereby, they would be solidarily liable with her for the attorney’s fees as
stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that they unfairly and unjustly interfered
with the Intervenor’s professional relationship with Malvar.

The respondents insist that they were not bound by the written agreement, and should not be
held liable under it.1âwphi1

We disagree with the respondents’ insistence. The respondents were complicit in Malvar’s move
to deprive the Intervenor of its duly earned contingent fees.
First of all, the unusual timing of Malvar’s letter terminating the Intervenor’s legal representation
of her, of her Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, and of the execution of compromise agreement
manifested her desire to evade her legal obligation to pay to the Intervenor its attorney’s fees for
the legal services rendered. The objective of her withdrawal of the case was to release the
respondents from all her claims and causes of action in consideration of the settlement in the
stated amount of ₱40,000.000.00, a sum that was measly compared to what she was legally
entitled to, which, to begin with, already included the ₱41,627,593.75 and the value of the stock
option already awarded to her. In other words, she thereby waived more than what she was
lawfully expected to receive from the respondents.

Secondly, the respondents suddenly turned around from their strong stance of berating her
demand as offensive to all precepts of justice and fair play and as a form of unjust enrichment
for her to a surprisingly generous surrender to her demand, allowing to her through their
compromise agreement the additional amount of ₱40,000,000.00 on top of the₱14,252,192.12
already received by her in August 2008. The softening unavoidably gives the impression that
they were now categorically conceding that Malvar deserved much more. Under those
circumstances, it is plausible to conclude that her termination of the Intervenor’s services was
instigated by their prodding in order to remove the Intervenor from the picture for being a solid
obstruction to the settlement for a much lower liability, and thereby save for themselves and for
her some more amount.

Thirdly, the compromise agreement was silent on the Intervenor’s contingent fee, indicating that
the objective of the compromise agreement was to secure a huge discount from its liability
towards Malvar.

Finally, contrary to the stipulation in the compromise agreement, only Malvar, minus the
respondents, filed the Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case.

At this juncture, the Court notes that the compromise agreement would have Malvar waive even
the substantial stock options already awarded by the NLRC’s decision,52 which ordered the
respondents to pay to her, among others, the value of the stock options and all other bonuses
she was entitled to or would have been entitled to had she not been illegally dismissed from her
employment. This ruling was affirmed by the CA.53 But the waiver could not negate the
Intervenor’s right to 10% of the value of the stock options she was legally entitled to under the
decisions of the NLRC and the CA, for that right was expressly stated in the written agreement
between her and the Intervenor. Thus, the Intervenor should be declared entitled to recover full
compensation in accordance with the written agreement because it did not assent to the waiver
of the stock options, and did not waive its right to that part of its compensation.

These circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater
liability towards the Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. It
cannot be simply assumed that only Malvar would be liable towards the Intervenor at that point,
considering that the Intervenor, had it joined the negotiations as her lawyer, would have
tenaciously fought all the way for her to receive literally everything that she was entitled to,
especially the benefits from the stock option. Her rush to settle because of her financial
concerns could have led her to accept the respondents’ offer, which offer could be further
reduced by the Intervenor’s expected demand for compensation. Thereby, she and the
respondents became joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the
Intervenor. Joint tort-feasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit.54

They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury.55 Under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code, joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. As regards the extent of
their respective liabilities, the Court said in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals:56

x x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor’s negligence ceases
to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.

There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions
of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. x
xx

Joint tort-feasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint
tort-feasors that individual participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the
other.57 To stress, joint tort-feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned
among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose
of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount.58 Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should be held solidarily liable
to the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these circumstances except in this light.

That the value of the stock options that Malvar waived under the compromise agreement has
not been fixed as yet is no hindrance to the implementation of this decision in favor of the
Intervenor. The valuation could be reliably made at a subsequent time from the finality of this
adjudication. It is enough for the Court to hold the respondents and Malvar solidarily liable for
the 10% of that value of the stock options.

As a final word, it is necessary to state that no court can shirk from enforcing the contractual
stipulations in the manner they have agreed upon and written. As a rule, the courts, whether trial
or appellate, have no power to make or modify contracts between the parties. Nor can the
courts save the parties from disadvantageous provisions.59 The same precepts hold sway when
it comes to enforcing fee arrangements entered into in writing between clients and attorneys. In
the exercise of their supervisory authority over attorneys as officers of the Court, the courts are
bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to preserve the decorum
and respectability of the Law Profession.60 Hence, the Court must thwart any and every effort of
clients already served by their attorneys’ worthy services to deprive them of their hard-earned
compensation. Truly, the duty of the courts is not only to see to it that attorneys act in a proper
and lawful manner, but also to see to it that attorneys are paid their just and lawful fees.61

WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the Motion for
Intervention to Protect Attorney's Rights; and ORDERS Czarina T. Malvar and respondents
Kraft Food Philippines Inc. and Kraft Foods International to jointly and severally pay to
Intervenor Law Firm, represented by Retired Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, its stipulated
contingent fees of 10% of ₱41,627,593.75, and the further sum equivalent to 10% of the value
of the stock option. No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 132-141.

2
 Id. at 143-173.

3
 Id. at 83.

4
 Id. at 175-187; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (retired), with Associate
Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a
Member of this Court) concurring.
5
 Id. at 292-300.

6
 Id. at 188-189.

7
 Id. at 216-221.

8
 Id. at 273-288.

9
 Id. at 290-291.

10
 Id. at 91.

11
 Id. at 96-97.

12
 Id. at 450-485.

13
 Id. at 483-485.

14
 Id. at 487-500.

15
 Id. at 733-734.

16
 Id. at 744.

17
 Id. at 755-765.

18
 Id. at 756.

19
 Id. at 755-757.

20
 Id. at 725.

21
 Id. at 718-722.

22
 Id. at 770.

23
 Id. at 761.

24
 No. L-24163, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1090.

25
 G.R. No. 90983, September 27, 1991, 202 SCRA 16.

26
 Supra note 24, at 1105.

27
 Rollo, p. 763.

28
 Id. at 792-798.
29
 Id. at 802-807.

30
 Id. at 809-811.

31
 Article 2028, Civil Code.

32
 Supra note 24, at 1098, citing Jackson v. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798.

33
 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143108-09, September 26, 2001, 366 SCRA
87, 90.

34
 Article 2037 and Article 2038, Civil Code; see San Antonio v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 121810,December 7, 2001, 371 SCRA 536, 543.

35
 Gubat v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010, 613
SCRA 742, 758-759.

36
 University of the East v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 93310- 12,
November 21,1991, 204 SCRA 254, 262.

37
 Francisco v. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 571, 580.

38
 Traders Royal Bank Employees Union–Independent v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120592,
March 14, 1997, 269SCRA 733, 743.

39
 Supra note 24, at 1105.

40
 Supra note 35, at 759-760.

41
 Rollo, pp. 768-769.

42
 Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995, 245 SCRA 30, 36-37.

43
 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828,
August 24, 2011,656 SCRA 60, 96-97.

44
 Rollo, pp. 719-720.

45
 Id. at 80-116.

46
 Id. at 118-130.

47
 Id. at 720.

48
 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 213.

49
 Section 26 (2), Rule 138, Rules of Court.
50
 G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 566, 574.

51
 Rollo, p. 721.

52
 Id. at 171-172.

53
 Id. at 186-187.

54
 Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 177,
186.

55
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1979, pp. 752-753, citing Bowen v. Iowa Nat.
Mut. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 486, 155 S.E. 2d 238, 242.

56
 G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30, 84.

57
 Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No.
155173, November 23,2004, 443 SCRA 522, 545.

58
 Id.

59
 Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No.
157480, May 6, 2005,458 SCRA 164, 166.

60
 Matute v. Matute, No. L-27832, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 35, 37.

61
 National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association v. National Power
Corporation, G.R. No. 156208, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 417, 437.

[G.R. No. 147010. July 18, 2003.]

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DE DIOS

TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSIT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the October 31, 2000 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58519 2 and its January 30, 2001 Resolution denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said decision.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The petition at bar arose from the following factual milieu:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Herein respondents De Dios Transportation Co. (DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transport
Corporation (DMTC) were the franchise holders and owners of fifty-eight buses plying the
Buendia-Ayala-UP and Monumento Ayala routes. On February 23, 1995, the respondents, as
vendors, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale covering the said buses and their franchise in
favor of Willy Choa Coyukiat (Coyukiat) and/or Goldfinger Transport Corporation (Goldfinger) as
vendees. In the said contract, the respondents bound and obliged themselves to sell to Coyukiat
and Goldfinger the fifty eight buses and their corresponding franchise, and to deliver and turn
over possession of the said buses to the vendees for the price of P12,000,000, payable as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) A downpayment of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS in personal check shall be paid
upon the execution of this Contract;

(b) The balance of ELEVEN MILLION (P11,000,000.00) to be paid by eleven (11) postdated
checks at the rate of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) a month all of which shall likewise be
delivered to the VENDORS upon the execution of this Contract; provided, however, that the
date of the first postdated check shall be thirty days from the full and actual delivery of the units
as provided in paragraph 3 hereof and the subsequent dates of the other postdated checks shall
be reckoned from the date of the first postdated check; 3

The parties further agreed that in case of default by the vendors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

8. CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT. It is agreed and understood that the representations and

warranties made by the VENDORS in this Contract are the primary motivations/reasons that
induced, convinced and moved the VENDEE to enter into this contract and the Deed of Sale. In
the event of default by the VENDORS, the VENDEE shall at its option either consider the
obligations of the VENDORS under the Contract immediately due and demandable and the
VENDORS shall immediately execute the Deed of Sale of the buses and their corresponding
lines/franchises without need of any further payments or reimburse all the amounts paid by the
VENDEE to the VENDORS. In either case, the VENDORS shall, likewise, be liable to the
VENDEE for liquidated damages in the amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) pesos.

In the event of default by the VENDEE, the VENDORS shall at their option, declare the entire
obligation due and demandable, and demand for the payment of the entire balance of the
purchase price or declare the contract as without any further force and effect and that all
payments previously paid are forfeited. In either case, the VENDEE shall, likewise, be liable for
liquidated damages in the amount of Twelve Million (P12,000,000.00) Pesos in favor of the
VENDORS. 4

The respondents, as vendors, guaranteed that the franchise and routes to Buendia-Ayala-UP
and vice versa and Monumento-Ayala via EDSA were valid, fully and completely utilizable, and
merely required registration with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) for the vendees to be
able to operate the same. 5 The vendees delivered the downpayment and postdated checks
drawn upon the account of Goldfinger with the Philbanking Corporation for the balance of the
purchase price.

On March 23, 1995, the respondents delivered the buses to the vendees. The respondents
were able to encash the check for the downpayment of the purchase price. However, before the
respondents could deposit the first check for the remaining balance, the vendees stopped all
payments, on their claim that, contrary to the representations of the respondents, some of the
buses were not in good running condition. The color of the buses had been changed without the
proper permits or clearances from the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB), the LTO and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Consequently, the vendees failed
to operate the buses. The vendees were, likewise, unable to operate the buses along the
Buendia-Ayala-UP route, notwithstanding the representation of the respondents that only
registration with the LTO was required.

On July 20, 1995, the vendees, through its counsel, the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office,
filed a complaint against the respondents and Philbanking Corporation as defendants with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for rescission of contract with a plea for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. 6

Therein plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger alleged that defendants (the respondents herein)
reneged on their obligation to deliver the buses in good running condition. By reason of the
defendants’ misrepresentation regarding the registration of the buses, they failed to secure
certificates of registration under their names, preventing them from operating the buses, thus
causing tremendous losses to their business which impelled them to stop the payments of the
eleven remaining postdated checks. The complaint contained the following prayer:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1. Declaring the Deed of Conditional Sale entered into between the plaintiffs Willy Choa
Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport Corporation and the defendants De Dios Transportation Co.,
Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation as RESCINDED.

2. Ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to return the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) down payment and all other
amounts given by the plaintiffs to them under the Deed of Conditional Sale.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

3. Requiring the defendants De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to accept the return from the plaintiffs of the fifty-eight (58) passenger buses;

4. Ordering the defendant De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the De Dios Marikina Transit
Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of Twelve Million Pesos
(P12,000,000.00) as liquidated damages.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

5. On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and
the De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amount
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages.
ON THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

6. On the third cause of action, ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and the
De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.

ON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

7. On the fourth cause of action, ordering the defendants De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and
the De Dios Marikina Transit Corporation to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the
amounts of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as attorney’s fees and at least One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as litigation expenses. 7

The plaintiffs therein prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, and after due
notice and hearing, to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the therein defendants
DDTC and DMTC, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in their behalf from
encashing, depositing, discounting or transacting the postdated checks issued by plaintiff
Goldfinger as listed in Annex "B" of the complaint, and enjoining the defendant Philbanking
Corporation (Del Monte branch), its agents, representatives and all persons acting in its behalf
from encashing, accepting, clearing, or transacting in any other manner, the postdated checks
listed in Annex "A" of the complaint.

On July 21, 1995, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants and
their agents from encashing, accepting, clearing, or transacting twelve postdated checks issued
by therein plaintiff Coyukiat. 8 On August 11, 1995, the RTC granted the plaintiffs’ plea for a writ
of preliminary injunction on a bond of P11,000,000. The plaintiffs posted Bond No. 71336 issued
by herein petitioner Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation for the amount of P11,000,000. 9

On August 17, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint dropping Philbanking Corporation
as party-defendant.

The defendants, in their answer with counterclaim, denied the material allegations of the
complaint and prayed for the dismissal thereof. The defendants interposed counterclaims for
damages and attorney’s fees, thus: (a) P11,000,000 representing the plaintiffs’ unpaid balance;
(b) P12,000,000 representing liquidating damages; (c) P1,000,000 for moral damages; (d)
P1,000,000 for exemplary damages; and (e) twenty percent of the claim representing attorneys
fees and P1,000 for each court appearance. 10

On September 21, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case on motion of the
defendants for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute the same. As directed by the trial court on
motion of the defendants, the latter adduced evidence ex parte to prove their counterclaim.

On December 14, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and granting the
counterclaims of the defendants, the dispositive portion of which is herein quoted:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, defendants’ counterclaim is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is

hereby rendered ordering plaintiff to pay the defendants the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(1) ELEVEN MILLION (P11,000,000.00) PESOS representing the plaintiff’s unpaid balance on
the consideration of the Deed of Conditional Sale;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(2) TWELVE MILLION (P12,000,000.00) PESOS as liquidated damages;

(3) FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as moral damages and FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

(4) TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS as attorney’s fees and P113,783.50 as litigation
expenses;

(5) Costs of suit. 11

Aggrieved, the plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61310.

On August 20, 1999, the appellants, through Atty. Ronaldo Reyes, filed their brief with the CA.
Before the appellees (the respondents herein) could file their brief, the Padilla Reyes & De la
Torre Law Office filed on September 14, 1999 its withdrawal of appearance as counsel for the
appellants. On the same day, the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed its appearance as
counsel for the appellants and filed a notice of withdrawal of appeal. However, the withdrawal of
appearance of the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office, the appearance of the Luis Q.U.
Uranza, Jr. & Associates and the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. &
Associates did not bear the conformity of the appellants. The appellees (herein respondents)
were served with copies thereof thru their counsel by registered mail. 12

On September 15, 1999, the respondents filed with the CA a Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond posted by herein petitioner Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, serving
a copy thereof on Atty. Ronaldo Reyes. 13

The respondents alleged inter alia in their motion that the appellants Coyukiat and Goldfinger
were not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. They
contend that were it not for the said temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, the appellants would not have been able to hide and dispose of their assets and sell
the buses, thus frustrating the collection of the amount of P11,000,000 representing the
respondents’ counterclaim. 14 The CA issued a resolution requiring the petitioner to file its
comment on the motion.

On September 16, 1999, the CA issued a resolution granting the withdrawal of the Padilla
Reyes & De la Torre Law Office as counsel for the appellants and noting the entry of the Luis
Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates as new counsel. However, with respect to the withdrawal of their
appeal, the CA directed the appellants to submit their written conformity thereto, and held in
abeyance the resolution of the said incident pending compliance by the appellants to its
resolution. 15

On September 28, 1999, the appellants submitted to the CA their conformity to the withdrawal of
their appeal. On October 8, 1999, the CA issued a resolution (a) declaring that the appeal of the
appellants was considered withdrawn and dismissed; and (b) directing the appellees to address
their motion to execute the bond with the trial court after the remand thereto of the records. On
the same day, an entry of judgment was issued by the CA. 16

On November 4, 1999, the petitioner filed with the CA its comment on the opposition to the
motion to execute filed by the respondents with the CA on the following grounds:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

There is no basis for defendants-appellees to execute against the injunction bond. 17

II

The Decision of the lower court has become final and, therefore, defendants-appellees’ Motion
can no longer be entertained. 18

III

Even assuming, for the sake of argument that an application for damages can still be made,
defendants-appellees suffered no damage by reason of the issuance of the injunction. 19

In accordance with the directive of the Court of Appeals, the respondents filed on December 9,
1999 with the RTC Quezon City, Br. 223, a Motion to Resolve their Motion to Execute Against
the Injunction Bond. The respondents alleged inter alia that (a) the trial court had ruled that the
plaintiffs Coyukiat and Goldfinger were not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction; (b) were it
not for the writ, the respondents would have been able to negotiate and collect on the remaining
postdated checks of the plaintiffs which had become stale in the meantime; (c) the plaintiffs
were able to hide and dispose of their assets because of a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the court; (d) by reason of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay
the amount due and demandable under the decision of the court, the respondents sustained
damages; (e) in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court, before the
decision of the court a quo became final and executory, the respondents filed their motion to
execute against the injunction bond on September 15, 1999 before the CA; (f) the CA directed
the respondents to address their motion to the trial court for consideration and resolution
thereof. 20

On February 2, 2000, the court a quo issued an order denying the motion of the respondents on
the following grounds: (a) its Decision dated December 4, 1998 had already attained finality in
view of the withdrawal of the appeal by the plaintiffs; and (b) the resolution of the respondents’
motion to execute against the injunction bond would necessitate the reception of evidence
which could no longer be done as its decision had become final and executory. The
respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the court on March 13,
2000. 21

On April 21, 2000, the respondents, consequently, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA seeking the annulment of the February 2, 2000
and March 13, 2000 Orders of the court a quo. The respondents in this case alleged inter alia
that the court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied their motion to resolve (the motion to execute against the injunction
bond) on the ground that the judgment in the main case had become final and executory, and
that the case could no longer be re-opened for the parties to adduce evidence in support of the
motion. 22chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On June 23, 2000, herein petitioner filed its comment. The petitioner averred that the decision of
the trial court had become final and executory on September 14, 1999, upon the withdrawal of
the appeal. Further, when the CA issued its October 8, 1999 Resolution directing the
respondents in this case to address their motion to the trial court, it had already lost its
jurisdiction over the appeal. Even assuming that the motion of the respondents was timely filed,
nevertheless, they did not suffer any damages arising from the preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court. The injunction bond answers only for the damages caused to the adverse party
by reason of the wrongful issuance of the injunction and not for the damages awarded by the
trial court on the respondents’ counterclaims.

On October 31, 2000, the CA rendered a decision annulling the assailed orders of the trial court
and granting the motion to execute on the injunction bond issued by the petitioner therein,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated February 2, 2000 and March 13, 2000 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is rendered granting the petitioners’
Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond. No costs. 23

The Court of Appeals cited the ruling of this Court in International Container Terminal Services,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 24 which declared that Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
regarding the application against the surety bond in support of the writ of preliminary attachment
shall apply by analogy to a preliminary injunction. The CA likewise cited the ruling of this Court
in Rivera v. Talavera, 25 and Ponce Enrile v. Capulong, 26 that the application or claim for
damages against the injunction bond must be filed before the trial court either during the trial
with due notice to the surety or sureties, or even after trial when judgment is rendered, but
before entry thereof.

In its petition at bar, the petitioner contends that the decision and resolution of the CA should be
reversed and set aside based on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals decided the case in a way not in accord
with law and the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court. The Honorable Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that it still had jurisdiction over the case even after Coyukiat and
Goldfinger had filed their Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal as a matter of right.

2. Respondents are not entitled to execute on the injunction bond for failing to file an application
for damages against the injunction bond at the trial of the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-
24462, and for filing the same only after the decision in said case had become final and
executory.

3. The judgment of the Quezon City RTC-Branch 223 in the main case, Civil Case No. Q-95-
24462, did not include any award for damages in favor of respondents by reason of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and the fact that the decision therein was in favor
of respondents did not automatically entitle them to such award for damages.

4. The damages allegedly sustained by respondents were not by reason of the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. 27

The petition is bereft of merit.

On the first ground, the petitioner argues that the withdrawal of the appeal on September 14,
1999 rendered the decision of the trial court ipso facto final and executory. Since the appellants
filed their notice of withdrawal of appeal before the filing of the appellees’ brief, under Section 3,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the appeal could be withdrawn without the need for the trial
court’s post factum approval. Further, under Section 1(c) of Rule 15 of the 1996 Internal Rules
of the CA, when an appeal is withdrawn, entry of judgment shall be made immediately.

For their part, the respondents contend that the filing of the withdrawal of appeal through new
counsel, but without the appellants’ written conformity to the substitution and to such withdrawal
of appeal, was not self-executory. The appeal was deemed withdrawn and dismissed only upon
the submission by the appellants of their written conformity to the substitution of their new
counsel and to the withdrawal of their appeal, and the CA’s approval of the same. It was only
then that the appeal of the appellants was deemed withdrawn and dismissed, and the decision
of the trial court rendered final and executory. Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Court of Appeals still had jurisdiction over the case when the Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond was filed.

Petitioner argues in its Petition that Coyukiat filed a Withdrawal of Appeal on September 14,
1999 or one day before respondents filed their Motion to Execute Against Injunction Bond on
September 15, 1999. Since no appellee’s brief had been filed at that time, petitioner argues that
the withdrawal of the appeal was a matter of right. Thus, Pioneer triumphantly concludes, on
September 14, 1999 the appeal was already effectively withdrawn and the Decision of the trial
court had already become final and executory.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

What Pioneer conveniently does not disclose is that the Withdrawal of Appeal was not filed by
counsel of record for Coyukiat but a different counsel purporting to be the newly substituted
counsel for Coyukiat. This different counsel from the counsel of record had entered her
appearance as such only for the purpose of withdrawing the appeal.

More importantly, Pioneer also conveniently fails to disclose that neither the Entry of
Appearance of new counsel for Coyukiat nor the Withdrawal of the Appeal bore the conformity
of Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger Transport Corporation — the appellants.

It is well-established that substitution of counsel is not effective without the conformity of client.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing the
appeal should bear the conformity of the Appellant.

Clearly therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed on September 14, 1999 was not effectual
because it did not bear the conformity of Coyukiat. The new counsel of Coyukiat (who entered
her appearance without Coyukiat’s conformity in substitution of the counsel of record) cannot
reasonably expect that she will be allowed by the Court of Appeals to withdraw the appeal on
her own. This is especially so when even her substitution of the counsel of record does not bear
the conformity of the appellants.

In a long line of cases, the court has ruled that the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel
who should be held responsible for the conduct of the case (Fojas v. Navarro, 32 SCRA 476,
485 [1970]).

For a substitution of attorneys to be effectual, the procedure to be followed strictly is as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1) a written
application for substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent cannot be secured, there must be
filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be
substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied
with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the case,
before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be
held responsible for the proper conduct of the case." (Adarne v. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, June 27,
1978; Cortez, Et. Al. v. CA, Et Al., L-32547, May 9, 1978; Ramos v. Potenciano, 118 Phil. 1435;
and U.S. v. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189).

In this case, therefore, the Withdrawal of Appeal filed by a new counsel who substituted the
counsel of record — Atty. Ronaldo Reyes, without bearing the conformity of Coyukiat was a
mere scrap of paper.

This is precisely the reason why the Court of Appeals issued a resolution requiring the appellant
to submit his conformity to the withdrawal.

As mentioned above, the appellants only manifested their desire to withdraw the appeal, by way
of the signature of Coyukiat in his behalf and in behalf of Goldfinger Transport Corporation, on
September 29, 1999.

This conformity was taken note of by the Court of Appeals on October 8, 1999 when it
dismissed the appeal.

Clearly, therefore, even if we were to follow petitioner’s argument that a withdrawal of appeal is
a matter of right and needs no further action from the court, in this case the intention of
withdrawing the appeal was only properly made known to the court by Coyukiat and Goldfinger
Transport Corp. on September 29, 1999.

By that time, respondents had already filed their Motion to Execute Against the Injunction Bond.

It is, therefore, not factually and legally accurate for petitioner Pioneer to claim that the Court of
Appeals had already lost jurisdiction over the case when the Motion to Execute Against the
Injunction Bond was filed. 28

In its reply to the comment of the respondents, the petitioner avers that the compliance to the
CA Resolution of September 16, 1999, to submit the appellants’ conformity to the substitution of
new counsel and the withdrawal of the appeal was a ratification of the withdrawal of the appeal
by the new counsel which should be deemed effective as of the date of the filing of the notice of
withdrawal of appeal, or on September 14, 1999.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

For its part, the CA ruled that it still retained jurisdiction over the appeal when the respondents
filed their motion for execution of the bond with the said court, the supervening finality of the
RTC decision notwithstanding:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The record shows that the withdrawal of their appeal by appellants Willy Choa Coyukiat and
Goldfinger Transport Corporation from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 was
approved by the Thirteenth Division of this Court only on October 8, 1999. Having preceded the
resolution to the effect issued in CA-G.R. CV No. 61310 (p. 92, Rollo) by twenty-three (23) days,
there is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioners’ filing of their application for damages against
the injunction bond on September 15, 1999 (pp. 72-75, ibid.) was still well within the time frame
the law prescribes therefor. That this Court still had jurisdiction over the case when the
petitioners’ Motion for Execution Against the Injunction Bond was filed is evident from the
referral thereof to the court a quo in the same order which granted the appellants’ withdrawal of
their appeal (p. 92, ibid.). The supervening finality of the decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462
notwithstanding, the respondent court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petitioners’ motion to resolve their application for damages solely on the ground that the
withdrawal of the appeal rendered its Decision dated December 4, 1998 final and executory (p.
28, ibid.). 29

The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.

First. The notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates on
September 14, 1999 with the CA was a mere scrap of paper, absent a valid substitution of
counsel. The counsel of record as of September 14, 1999 was the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre
Law Office. On the said date, the law office filed a motion with the CA to withdraw as counsel for
the appellants, while the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates filed the notice of withdrawal of
appeal for the appellants. In the case of Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 30 this Court
enumerated the essential requisites of a valid substitution of counsel:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

. . . No substitution of counsel of record is allowed unless the following essential requisites of a

valid substitution of counsel concur: (1) there must be a written request for substitution; (2) it
must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of the
attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot
be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served
on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. . . . 31

There was clearly no compliance to these essential requisites. It was only on September 16,
1999 when the CA granted the motion of the Padilla Reyes & De la Torre Law Office to
withdraw as counsel for the appellants that the withdrawal of the said counsel and its
substitution by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates became effective.

Second. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Section 3. Withdrawal of appeal. — An appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time
before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the
discretion of the court.

We agree with the respondents that the notice of withdrawal of appeal of the appellants in CA-
G.R. CV No. 61310 filed on September 14, 1999 was not self-executory, and did not render the
trial court’s December 4, 1998 Decision final and executory. While we agree with the petitioner
that under Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal maybe withdrawn by the
appellants as a matter of right at any time before the filing of the appellees’ brief; however, the
rule does not apply in this case because the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61310 by the Luis Q.U. Uranza, Jr. & Associates did not bear the appellants’ conformity
thereto. It bears stressing that the counsel of the appellants was a mere agent holding a special
power of attorney to act for and in behalf of the principal respecting the ordinary course of the
appealed case. There was a need for the appellants, as the principals, to execute a special
power of attorney specifically authorizing the withdrawal of a perfected appeal. 32 Absent a
special power of attorney expressly authorizing their counsel to withdraw their appeal, or in lieu
thereof, the written conformity of the appellants to the withdrawal of their appeal, the notice of
withdrawal of appeal by the new counsel of the appellants was a mere scrap of paper.

Third. The submission by the appellants on September 28, 1999 of the requisite conformity to
the withdrawal of their appeal should not be given retroactive effect so as to foreclose the right
of the respondents to file with the CA their motion to execute against the injunction bond, thus
enabling the petitioner to escape liability on the same. As ratiocinated by the CA:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

. . . Having successfully enjoined the encashment of the checks they issued through the surety
bond issued by the private respondent (pp. 55-58, ibid.), Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger
Transport Corporation were able to use and dispose of the petitioners’ buses (p. 134, ibid.) and
to evade the satisfaction of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-9524462 pending appeal
(pp. 76-77, ibid.). Far from acknowledging the judgment debt, therefore, it appears that the
withdrawal of the appeal was merely calculated to further frustrate the satisfaction of the same.
33

The notice of withdrawal of appeal was deemed filed only on September 28, 1999 upon
compliance with the September 16, 1999 Resolution of the CA. The appeal of the appellants
was effectively withdrawn and dismissed before October 8, 1999 when the CA issued its
resolution therein. The petitioner should not be benefited by the deleterious manipulation of the
rules of procedure.

On the second ground, the petitioner avers that the respondents failed to serve a copy of their
(respondents’) motion to execute on the bond as mandated by Section 20, Rule 51 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;

2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and

3. After hearing with notice to the surety. 34

In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 35 this Court ruled that
due notice to the adverse party and its surety setting forth the facts supporting the applicant’s
right to damages and the amount thereof under the bond is indispensable. The surety should be
given an opportunity to be heard as to the reality or reasonableness of the damages resulting
from the wrongful issuance of the writ. 36 In the absence of due notice to the surety, therefore,
no judgment for damages may be entered and executed against it.

In this case, the petitioner was not served with a copy of the motion to execute on the bond filed
by the respondents with the CA in CA-G.R. CV 61310. But the records show that the CA
directed the petitioner to file its comment on the said motion. 37 On November 4, 1999, the
petitioner filed its comment on the respondents’ motion, and on December 9, 1999, the
respondents filed their motion to resolve with the trial court, serving a copy . thereof to the
petitioner. It cannot, thus, be gainsaid that the petitioner was deprived of its right to be heard on
the respondents’ motion to execute on the bond.

We also agree that the Court of Appeals had the authority to remand to the court of origin the
resolution of the motion to execute against the injunction bond after the parties adduced their
respective evidence on the motion. To repeat, the respondents’ motion to execute was filed
earlier than the motion to withdraw the appeal, and more importantly, before the December 4,
1998 Decision of the court of origin became final and executory. 38

On the third and fourth grounds, the same should be addressed to and resolved by the trial
court after due hearing and presentation of evidence. As it was, the trial court denied the motion
of the respondents on its finding that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the motion,
without affording the parties the right to adduce evidence thereon.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The RTC Quezon City, Branch 223, is directed to resolve
on the merits the Motion to Execute Against Injunction Bond filed by the respondents after the
parties shall have adduced their respective evidence in Civil Case No. Q-95-24462 with
dispatch.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1. Penned by Associate Justice Fermin Martin, Jr., with Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili
and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. concurring.

2. Entitled De Dios Transportation Co. Inc. and De Dios Marikina Transit Corp. v. Hon. Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 22, and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation.

3. Rollo, p. 39.

4. Id. at 40.

5. Id. at 57.

6. The complaint was entitled and docketed as follows: Willy Choa Coyukiat and Goldfinger
Transport Corporation v. De Dios Transportation Co., Inc., De Dios Marikina Transport Corp.,
and Philbanking Corporation, Civil Case No. Q-95-24462.

7. Id. at 64–65.

8. Id. at 80.

9. Annex "D."cralaw virtua1aw library

10. Rollo, p. 80.

11. Id. at 84.

12. Annex "F," Petition, id. at 85–87.

13. Annex "G," Petition, id. at 88–91.

14. Id. at 89–90.

15. Annex "I," Comment, id. at 194.

16. Annex "2," Comment, id. at 195.

17. Rollo, p. 92.

18. Id. at 97.

19. Id. at 98.

20. Id. at 103–107.

21. Id. at 109.

22. Id. at 112.

23. Id. at 50.

24. 214 SCRA 456 (1992).

25. 2 SCRA 272 (1961).

26. 185 SCRA 504 (1990).

27. Rollo, pp. 24–25.

28. Id. at 181–184.

29. Id. at 47–48.

30. 361 SCRA 520 (2001).

31. Id. at 532.

32. Lim Pin v. Liao Tan, 115 SCRA 290 (1982).

33. Rollo, p. 48.

34. Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 377 (1999).

35. Supra.

36. Ibid.
37. Rollo, pp. 92–101.

38. Ponce Enrile v. Capulong, 185 SCRA 504 (1990).

G.R. No. 173188               January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA

ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA,
PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R.
CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part
the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty.
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses
Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued
Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on
July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses
Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before the
RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of
money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance
of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo
Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.

On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and
the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the
public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya
on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on
contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the
sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6

In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses
Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was
pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No.
T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their children’s names.
On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.

On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of
the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses
Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue
another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused
the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-
25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the
spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.

With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21,
1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses
Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the
spouses Ames’ children).

On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on
October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He
caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected
the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No.
215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.

On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion
obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC
approved the compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC
subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the
CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case
No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.

On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among
others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be
ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the
RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses
that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of
Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled
and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the
proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.

The Ruling of the RTC

In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent
fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to
5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.

The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed
attorney’s fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that
the parties novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC
added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of
Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned
out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.

These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject
lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC
was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and
complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote
much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.

Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess
portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to
receive its fruits.

On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and
deliver the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the
RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988
until final restoration of the premises.

The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

 The Ruling of the CA

In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September
17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the
compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served
as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the present case
against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty.
Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case
No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted
for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
entered into a compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty.
Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and
(7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in several
cases.

Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the
lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya
rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other
employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo,
and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya,
instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the
respondents accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion
(that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding
the validity of the purported oral contract between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13

The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services,
especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s
fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case,
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was
₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.

The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent
attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue
that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of
one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult
questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in
research. They point out that the two subsequent civil cases should not be considered in
determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his
services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus,
these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim
that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for
each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in
the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.

The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the
case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half
of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous
contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary
relationship between a lawyer and a client.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They
reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.

The Case for the Respondents

In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended
complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the
questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would
inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.

The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and
subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession
with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2)
Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case)
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the
conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and
(5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.

While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife
-Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L.
Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-
Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present
controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel.
For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings
pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights
due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23,
1981.

Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed
on May 21, 1982.

Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between
the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement
on May 13, 1982.

Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).

The agreement on attorney’s fee

consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession

The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the
subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the
reasons discussed below.

A. The written agreement providing for

a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as
asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.

Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the
court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a
representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in
the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.

At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by
both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was
not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the
spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his
client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing
contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on
attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of
₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee
agreement of one-half of the subject lot.

B. The contingent fee agreement between

the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous

Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral
contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is
nevertheless void.

In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses
Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.18

Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common
law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was
directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the
intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without
justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a
share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions,
however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer
must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of
assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation
that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in
exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to
safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down
champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds
of public policy."24

In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to
"conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the
law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of
the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action
which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a
settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27

In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between
therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy.
There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against
public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in
consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client.29

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same
reasons discussed above underlie this rule.

C. The attorney’s fee consisting of

one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable

We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive
and unconscionable.1âwphi1 The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly
agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for
only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil
Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then
stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that
special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as
observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya
extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale
of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases
did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As
assertedby the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate
arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for
the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of Based on these
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and
unreasonable.

D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of

the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code

Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.33

A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the
judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when
Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following
established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed
Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted
the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses
Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot
was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one
of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the
compromise agreement.

From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an
agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion
(which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts.
Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a
client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.

Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and
the compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find
them to be prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared
void by law are considered in existent and void from the beginning.37

What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated
the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the
transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil
cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to
the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent
fee agreement.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception
to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position,
however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an
agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent
fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after
the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion
to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client
relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition
provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in
jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the
basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.

Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of
the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if
not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it
undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42

E.The compromise agreement could not

validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No.
215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and
possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which
had for its object a void transaction, should be void.

A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor
the action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any
contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46

Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee
agreement providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from
questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced
thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case.
The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise
agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be
attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of
possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession
founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present
action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half
portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.

Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis

In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any
express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on
a quantum meruit basis.

"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a

lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors
in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by
one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify
him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The
doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services,
the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service,
to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer
is entitled.

In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not
novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the
performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant
case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching
up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property
subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765
hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification
on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the
disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder
of the disputed one-half portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit
of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and
express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium
consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped
the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer
does indeed effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed
property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION
that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to
two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The
fruits that the respondents previously received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form
part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired
pursuant to the compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division's Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 15-41.

2
 Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia; id. at 45-60.

3
 Id. at 71.

4
 Penned by Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez; id. at 82-97.

5
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1721 (Cadavedo v. Ames).

6
 Rollo, p.47; emphasis ours.

7
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 3352 (Ames v. Cadavedo).

8
 Id. at 89-90. The compromise agreement, in part, reads:

That defendants recognize the possession of plaintiff Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. over the
northern half of Lot 5415 to be designated as Lot 5415-A, being his share as
payment of attorney’s fees on contingent basis originally covered by O.C.T. No.
P0376 and now covered by T.C.T. No. T-25984 in the name of Rosario Ames, et.
al., situated at Lower Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte;

xxxx
 III.

That the parties shall cause these portions to be surveyed and segregated from
each other by a licensed surveyor and the portion of Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. shall be
identified as Lot 5415-A; that of Vicente Cadavedo as Lot 5415-B; x x x

IV.

That the defendants shall vacate the premises of the portions belonging to the
plaintiffs and, in fact, have already vacated the premises in question and restored
the plaintiffs in their respective peaceful possession thereof since March 5,
1982[.] [emphasis ours]

9
 Action for "Judicial Determination of Attorney’s Fees, Recovery of Possession,
Accounting of Products, Ejectment and Damages with Prayer for Receivership and
Preliminary Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction."

10
 Supra note 4.

11
 Rollo, pp. 98-100.

12
 Supra note 2.

13
 See also the Petitioners’ Memorandum dated September 26, 2007, rollo, pp. 157-196;
Reply to the respondents’ comment to the petition dated May 8, 2007(id.at138-140),and
Reply to the Respondents’ Memorandum dated November 12, 2007(id.at242-250).

14
 Comment to the Petition dated November 17, 2006 (id. at 116-135. See also the
respondents’ Memorandum dated October24, 2007(id.at212-239).

15
 Copy of the Death Certificate indicated the date of death as September 18, 2007; id. at
205.

16
 Formal Notice of Death and Substitution of Parties dated October 3, 2007; id. at 200-
204.

17
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 24.

18
 Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266, 281(1990).

19
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2; and
www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising%20for%20Litigation.pdf.

20
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing British Cash and Parcel
Conveyors Ltd.v.Lamson Store Service Co.Ltd.(1908)1 K.B. 1006 at 1014, per Fletcher
Moulton L.J.

21
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing Giles v Thompson
(1994)1 A.C. 142; (1993) 2 W.L.R. 908; (1993)3 All E.R. 321 at 328, per Steyn L.J. See
also Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modifiedby Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

22
 Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

23
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf.

24
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179, www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

Recent foreign legal developments vary at their treatment of champertous

contracts. Several jurisdictions have abolished criminal and tortuous liability for
champerty (and maintenance). To name a few: Australia –abolished by the
Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act of 1993 for New South
Wales and the Wrongs Act 1958 and Crimes Act 1958 for Victoria; England and
Wales -by the Criminal Law Act 1967.
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Champerty_and_maintenance) and
www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. Other jurisdictions,
particularly some states in the United States of America, have relaxed the
application of this common law doctrine or have adopted it in a modified form as
the peculiar conditions of the society that gave rise to this doctrine have changed
(Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other American states have completely
repudiated it unless a statute specifically treats a contract as champertous.
These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas and West Virginia (Contracts,
Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions,
California Law Review, Vol.1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other jurisdictions, like Canada for one,
have retained the rule against champerty on public policy considerations, the
purpose being to prevent one party from inciting another to initiate or defend
litigation that would never have been brought or defended; or to prevent increase
in lawsuits, harassment of defendants, and suppression or manufacturing of
evidence and subornation of witness (www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising
%20for%20Litigation.pdf).
25
 See Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, supra note 18, citing JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S., 166
F.Supp. 324 (1958);and Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242
(1918).

26
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392.

27
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392, citing A.B.A. Op.
288 (Oct. 11, 1954); Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Mel 96 (1853).

28
 Supra note 18.

29
 Id. at 281.

30
 See CANON 16, specifically Rule 16.04, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The pertinent portion of Rule 16.04 reads:

"Rule 16.04 -x x x Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client."

31
 Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics reads in full:

"42. Expenses.

A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of
convenience, but subject to reimbursement." (emphasis ours)

32
 The pertinent provision of Article 1491 reads:

"Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession[.] [Emphases
ours]

33
 Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides:

"10. Acquiring interest in litigation.

 The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."

See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, 467 Phil. 1111, 1120(2004); Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, 273 Phil. 534, 543(1991); and Ordonio v. Eduarte, Adm. Mat. No.
3216, March 16, 1992, 207 SCRA 229, 232.

34
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico,522 Phil. 295, 308-309(2006); and Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, supra at 542.

35
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico, supra, at 310. See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, supra note
33, at 1121.

36
 See Fornilda v. The Br. 164, RTC IVth Judicial Region, Pasig, 248 Phil. 523,
531(1988); and Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33,at 542.

37
 See paragraphs 1 and 7, Article 1409 of the Civil Code. See also Vda. de Gurrea v.
Suplico, supra note 34,at. 310.

38
 Rollo, p. 58.

39
 See Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, March 11, 1991, 195
SCRA 28, 35; and Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, 177 Phil. 467, 479(1979).

40
 See Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, supra, at 475.

41
 See Biascan v. Atty. Lopez,456 Phil. 173, 180(2003);and Fabillo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 39, at39

42
 See Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33, at 542; and Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,
supranote 18, at 281.

43
 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1409 (1).

44
 Id., last paragraph.

45
 Id., Article 1410.

46
 Id., Article 1422.

47
 Spouses Garcia v. Atty. Bala, 512 Phil. 486, 494(2005); citation omitted.

48
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Dallas Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Colbert, 127 SW2d 1004.

49
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Traders Royal
Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733 (1997).

50
 Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in part, reads:
 "SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. x x x A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable."

51
 The pertinent provision of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

"CANON 20 –x x x x

Rule 20.01 –A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the

proffered case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the character of
the employment, whether occasional or established; and

h)The professional standing of the lawyer."

G.R. No. 191470               January 26, 2015

AUGUSTO M. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, as Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court-Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 33 and MA. ALA F. DOMINGO and MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO,
substituting Heirs of the deceased ANGEL T. DOMINGO, Respondents.
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated March
17, 2010, filed by Atty. Augusto M. Aquino (petitioner) assailing the Order dated January 11,
2010 issued by respondent Presiding Judge Ismael P. Casabar (public respondent), in relation
to Agrarian Case No. 1217-G,2 for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On June 27, 2002, Atty. Angel T. Domingo (now deceased) verbally contracted petitioner to
represent him in Agrarian Case No. 1217-G on a contingency fee basis. The case was for the
determination of the just compensation for the expropriation and taking of Atty. Domingo's
ricelands consisting of 60.5348 hectares, situated in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)27. The DAR and the Land Bank
of the Philippines (Land Bank) initially valued Atty. Domingo's property at ₱484,236.27 or
₱7,999.30 per hectare, which the latter, through petitioner-counsel, opposed in courts.
Eventually, the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court (RTC/SAC) issued a Decision dated April
12, 2004 fixing the just compensation for Atty. Domingo's property at ₱2,459,319.70 or
₱40,626.54 per hectare, or an increase of ₱1,975,083.43 over the initial DAR and the Land
Bank valuation. Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but was denied, thus, it filed a petition for
review docketed as CA-G.R. SPNo. 85394. However, in a Decision dated June 12, 2007, the
appellate court affirmed in totothe SAC Decision dated April 12, 2004. Land Bank moved for
reconsideration anew, but was denied.

Meanwhile, on September 30, 2007, Atty. Domingo died. Petitioner filed a Manifestation dated
December 11, 2007 of the fact of Atty. Domingo's death and the substitution of the latter by his
legal heirs, Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Margarita Irene F. Domingo (private respondents).

Land Bank assailed the appellate court's decision and resolution before the Supreme Court via
a petition for review on certiorari dated December 4, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 180108 entitled
"Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Angel T. Domingo". However, in a Resolution dated
September 17, 2008, the Court denied the same for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error in the appellate court's decision. On December 15, 2008, the Court denied with finality
Land Bank's motion for reconsideration.

On February 11, 2009,3 petitioner wrote private respondent Ma. Ala Domingo and informed her
of the finality of the RTC/SAC decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. He then requested her to inform the Land Bank of the segregation of petitioner's thirty
percent (30%) contingent attorney's fees out of the increase of the just compensation for the
subject property, or thirty percent (30%) of the total increase amounting to Php1,975,983.43.
Petitioner claimed never to have received a reply from private respondent.

On March 30, 2009, petitioner received a copy of the entry of judgment from this Court certifying
that its Resolution dated September 17, 2008 in G.R. No. 180108 has already become final and
executory on March 3, 2009.
On July 28, 2009, petitioner received a Notice of Appearance dated July 16, 2009 filed by Atty.
Antonio G. Conde, entering his appearance as counsel of herein private respondents and
replacing him as counsel in Agrarian Case No. 1217-G.

On August 14, 2009, private respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Conde, filed a Motion
for Execution dated August 6, 2009 of the RTC/SAC Decision dated April 12, 2004.

On August 12, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Approval of Charging Attorney's Lien and for
the Order of Payment.4 Petitioner further executed an Affidavit5 dated August 10, 2009, attesting
to the circumstances surrounding the legal services he has rendered for the deceased Atty.
Domingo and the successful prosecution of the Agrarian case from the RTC/SAC through the
appellate court and the Supreme Court.

On August 18, 2009, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss/Expunge Petitioner's

Motion.6 Public respondent Presiding Judge Casabar denied the same.7 Private respondents
moved for reconsideration.

On January 11, 2010, public respondent Judge Casabar issued the disputed Order denying
petitioner's motion for approval of attorney's lien, the dispositive portion of which reads:

xxxx

Examining the basis of the instant motion for reconsideration, this court agrees with
respondents – movants that this court has no jurisdiction over Atty. Aquino's motion for approval
of charging (Attorney's) lien having been filed after the judgment has become final and
executory. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is granted and the motion for approval of
(Attorney's) lien is denied and or expunged from the records of the case.

SO ORDERED.

On the same day, January 11, 2010, public respondent issued an Order directing the issuance
of a Writ of Execution of the RTC/SAC Decision dated April 12, 2004.

On January 12, 2010, the Clerk of Court of Branch 33, RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, issued a
Writ of Execution of the April 12, 2004. On January 15, 2010, the Sheriff of the RTC of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija issued a Notice of Garnishment.

Thus, the instant petition for certiorari via Rule 65, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CHARGING (ATTORNEY'S) LIEN CAN EFFECTIVELY BE FILED

ONLY BEFORE JUDGMENT IS RENDERED.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PRESIDING JUDGE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OVER PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF CHARGING
(ATTORNEY'S) LIEN FILED AFTER THE JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT PRESIDING JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER.8

Petitioner maintains that he filed the motion for charging attorney's lien and order of payment in
the very same case, Agrarian Case No. 1217-G, as an incident thereof, wherein he was the
counsel during the proceedings of the latter, and that he is allowed to wait until the finality of the
case to file the said motion.

Private respondents, on the other hand, counter that the motion was belatedly filed and that it
was filed without the payment of docket fees, thus, the court a quodid not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.

RULING

In a nutshell, the issue is whether the trial court committed a reversible error in denying the
motion toapprove attorney's lien and order of payment on the ground that it lost jurisdiction over
the case since judgment in the case has already become final and executory.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

In the case of Rosario, Jr. v. De Guzman,9 the Court clarified a similar issue and discussed the
two concepts of attorney’s fees – that is, ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its
extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the
losing party as indemnity for damages.10 Although both concepts are similar in some respects,
they differ from eachother, as further explained below:

The attorney’s fees which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, anitem of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment
of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of
attorney’sfee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending,
through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in
any of the instances authorized by law. Onthe other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays
his counsel refersto the compensation for the latter’s services. The losing party against whom
damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his liability
dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount
stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in fixing
the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.

The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of
his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree
that whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the
lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion
may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a
prerequisite totheir grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a
lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never
rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor
of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both
fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination
of their reasonable amount are applicablein one as in the other.11

Similarly, in the instant case, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner is the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not an indemnity for damages. Petitioner
is claiming payment from private respondents for the successful outcome of the agrarian case
which he represented. We see no valid reason why public respondent cannot pass upon a
proper petition to determine attorney's fees considering that it is already familiar with the nature
and the extent of petitioner's legal services. If we are to follow the rule against multiplicity of
suits, then with more reason that petitioner's motion should not be dismissed as the same is in
effect incidental to the main case.

We are, likewise, unconvinced that the courta quodid not acquire jurisdiction over the motion
solely due to non-payment of docket fees. Petitioner's failure to pay the docket fees pertinent to
his motion should not be considered as having divested the court a quo's jurisdiction. We note
that, in this case, there was no showing that petitioner intended to evade the payment of docket
fees as in fact he manifested willingness to pay the same should it be necessary.12

Likewise, pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, should there
be unpaid docket fees, the same should be considered as a lien on the judgment. Thus, even
on the assumption that additional docket fees are required as a consequence of petitioner's
motion, its non-payment will not result in the court’s loss of jurisdiction over the case.13

With regards tohow attorney’s fees for professional services can be recovered, and when an
action for attorney’s fees for professional services can be filed, the case of Traders Royal Bank
Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC14 is instructive:

x x x It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action in
which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees cannot
be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is
at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may arise has
become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client
issatisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his
claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he made
his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential, instead of filing it
ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for feesin
the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of
his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this
Court.15 Here, apparently petitioner filed his claim as an incident of the main action, as in fact,
his motion was for the court's approval of charging attorney's lien and the prayer thereto was to
direct the entry into the case records the attorney's fees he is claiming. Needless to say,
petitioner's motion for approval of charging attorney's lien and order of payment was not
intended to be filed as a separate action. Nevertheless, it is within petitioner's right to wait for
the finality of the judgment, instead of filing it ahead of the court's resolution, since precisely the
basis of the determination of the attorney's fees is the final disposition of the case, that is, the
just compensation to be awarded tothe private respondents.

Moreover, the RTC/SAC decision became final and executory on March 3, 2009, and petitioner
filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on August 10, 2009, or only about four (4) months
from the finality of the RTC/SAC decision. Considering that petitioner and Atty. Domingo’s
agreement was contracted verbally, Article 114516 of the Civil Code allows petitioner a period of
six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services
rendered.17 Thus, the disputed motion to approve the charging of attorney's lien and the order of
payment was seasonably filed.

Petitioner claims that he and Atty. Domingo agreed to a contract for contingent fees equivalent
to thirty percent (30%) of the increase of the just compensation awarded, albeit verbally.
However, a contract for contingent fees is an agreement in writing by which the fees, usually a
fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, are made to depend upon the success
in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. Contingent fees depend upon an express
contract, without which the attorney can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.18 Here,
considering that the contract was made verbally and that there was no evidence presented to
justify the 30% contingent fees being claimed by petitioner, the only way to determine his right
to appropriate attorney’s fees is to apply the principle of quantum meruit, to wit:

Quantum meruit– literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining
an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruitis a device that prevents an unscrupulous client
from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also
avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.

Further, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for
determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:

Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved;

c) The important of the subject matter;

 d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered

case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Private respondents never rebutted the fact that petitioner rendered legal services in the subject
case.1âwphi1 It is likewise undisputed that it was petitioner who successfully represented Atty.
Domingo in Agrarian Case No. 12-17-G before the Special Agrarian Court, in the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 85394, and before this Court in G.R. No. 180108 where the case
eventually attained finality. It is, therefore, through petitioner's effort for a lengthy period of
seven (7) years that the just compensation for the property owned by deceased Atty. Domingo
increased. It cannot be denied then that private respondents benefited from the said increase in
the just compensation. Thus, considering petitioner's effort and the amount of time spent in
ensuring the successful disposition of the case, petitioner rightfully deserves to be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered.

Ordinarily, We would have left it to the trial court the determination of attorney's fees based on
quantum meruit, however, following the several pronouncements of the Court that it will be just
and equitable to now assess and fix the attorney's fees in order that the resolution thereof would
not be needlessly prolonged,19 this Court, which holds and exercises the power to fix attorney's
fees on quantum meruit basis in the absence of an express written agreement between the
attorney and the client, deems it fair to fix petitioner's attorney's fees at fifteen percent (15%) of
the increase in the just compensation awarded to private respondents.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as
a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the
client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a
lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just
fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his
client he himself would not get his due.20

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion for Approval
of Charging Attorney's Lien filed by petitioner Atty. Augusto M. Aquino. Based on quantum
meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the
increase in valuation of just compensation awarded to the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2
 Entitled "Angel T Domingo vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and the land Bank of the
Philippines."

3
 Rollo, pp. 35-36.
4
 Id. at 25-28.

5
 Id. at 29-34.

6
 Id. at 40-44.

7
 Id. at 23-24.

8
 Id.at 12.

9
 G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013, 701 SCRA 78.

10
 Ortiz v. San Miguel, 582 Phil. 627, 640 (2008).

11
 Id. at 7, citing R.E. Agpalo, Comments on The Code of Professional Responsibility and
The Code of Judicial Conduct (2004 edition Rex Book Store, Inc., Manila 2004), pp. 329-
330.

12
 Comment/Opposition dated September 25, 2009; rollo, pp. 47-51.

13
 See Home Guaranty Corp. v. R-11 Builders Inc., and NHA, G.R. No. 192649, March 9,
2011, 640 SCRA 219, 243.

14
 336 Phil. 705, 713-714 (1997).

15
 Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, supra,at 713-714.
(Emphasis ours)

16
 Article 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:

(1) Upon an oral-contract.

(2) Upon a quasi-contract.

17
 Anido v. Negado, 419 Phil. 800, 807 (2001).

18
 National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828,
August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 60, 96, citing Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2009), p.
408.

19
 Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, supra note 14, at 724;
Rosario Jr. v. De Guzman, supra note 9, at 91.

20
 Rosario, Jr. v. De Guzman, supra note 9, at 91-92.
G.R. No. 173188               January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA

ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA,
PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R.
CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part
the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty.
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses
Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued
Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on
July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses
Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before the
RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of
money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance
of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo
Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and
the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the
public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya
on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on
contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the
sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6

In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses
Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.

On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was
pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No.
T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their children’s names.
On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.

On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of
the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses
Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue
another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused
the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-
25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the
spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.

With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21,
1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses
Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the
spouses Ames’ children).

On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on
October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He
caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected
the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No.
215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.

On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion
obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC
approved the compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC
subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the
CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.

The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case
No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.

On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the
respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among
others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be
ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the
RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses
that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of
Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled
and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the
proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.

The Ruling of the RTC

In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent
fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to
5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.

The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed
attorney’s fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that
the parties novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC
added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of
Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned
out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.

These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject
lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC
was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and
complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote
much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.

Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess
portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to
receive its fruits.

On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and
deliver the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the
RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988
until final restoration of the premises.

The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September
17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the
compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served
as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the present case
against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty.
Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case
No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted
for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
entered into a compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty.
Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and
(7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in several
cases.

Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the
lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya
rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other
employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo,
and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya,
instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the
respondents accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion
(that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding
the validity of the purported oral contract between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services,
especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s
fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case,
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was
₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.

The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent
attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue
that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of
one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult
questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in
research. They point out that the two subsequent civil cases should not be considered in
determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his
services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus,
these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim
that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for
each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in
the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.

The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the
case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half
of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous
contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary
relationship between a lawyer and a client.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They
reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.

The Case for the Respondents

In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended
complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the
questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would
inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.

The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and
subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession
with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2)
Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case)
approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the
conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and
(5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife
-Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L.
Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-
Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present
controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel.
For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings
pertinent to each) as follows:

Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights
due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23,
1981.

Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed
on May 21, 1982.

Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between
the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement
on May 13, 1982.

Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).

The agreement on attorney’s fee

consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession

The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the
subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the
reasons discussed below.

A. The written agreement providing for

a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as
asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the
court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a
representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in
the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.

At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by
both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was
not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the
spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his
client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing
contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on
attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of
₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee
agreement of one-half of the subject lot.

B. The contingent fee agreement between

the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous

Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral
contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is
nevertheless void.

In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses
Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for
reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.18

Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common
law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was
directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the
intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without
justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a
share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions,
however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer
must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of
assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation
that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in
exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to
safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down
champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds
of public policy."24

In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to
"conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client
therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the
law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of
the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to
prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action
which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a
settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client
in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27

In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between
therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy.
There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against
public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in
consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client.29

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same
reasons discussed above underlie this rule.

C. The attorney’s fee consisting of

one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable

We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive
and unconscionable.1âwphi1 The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly
agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for
only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil
Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then
stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that
special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as
observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya
extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale
of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases
did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As
assertedby the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate
arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for
the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of Based on these
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and
unreasonable.

D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of

the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.33

A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the
judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when
Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following
established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed
Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted
the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses
Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot
was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one
of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the
compromise agreement.

From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an
agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion
(which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts.
Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a
client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.

Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and
the compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find
them to be prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared
void by law are considered in existent and void from the beginning.37

What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated
the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the
transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil
cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to
the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent
fee agreement.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception
to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position,
however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an
agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the
action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent
fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after
the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion
to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client
relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition
provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in
jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the
basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.

Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of
the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if
not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it
undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42

E.The compromise agreement could not

validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement

The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No.
215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and
possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of
the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which
had for its object a void transaction, should be void.

A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor
the action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any
contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46

Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee
agreement providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from
questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced
thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case.
The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise
agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be
attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of
possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession
founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present
action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half
portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.

Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis

In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any
express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on
a quantum meruit basis.

"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a

lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors
in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by
one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify
him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The
doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services,
the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service,
to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer
is entitled.

In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not
novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the
performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant
case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching
up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property
subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765
hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification
on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the
disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder
of the disputed one-half portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit
of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and
express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium
consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped
the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer
does indeed effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed
property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION
that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to
two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The
fruits that the respondents previously received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form
part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired
pursuant to the compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division's Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 15-41.

2
 Penned by Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia; id. at 45-60.

3
 Id. at 71.

4
 Penned by Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez; id. at 82-97.

5
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1721 (Cadavedo v. Ames).
6
 Rollo, p.47; emphasis ours.

7
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 3352 (Ames v. Cadavedo).

8
 Id. at 89-90. The compromise agreement, in part, reads:

That defendants recognize the possession of plaintiff Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. over the
northern half of Lot 5415 to be designated as Lot 5415-A, being his share as
payment of attorney’s fees on contingent basis originally covered by O.C.T. No.
P0376 and now covered by T.C.T. No. T-25984 in the name of Rosario Ames, et.
al., situated at Lower Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte;

xxxx

III.

That the parties shall cause these portions to be surveyed and segregated from
each other by a licensed surveyor and the portion of Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. shall be
identified as Lot 5415-A; that of Vicente Cadavedo as Lot 5415-B; x x x

IV.

That the defendants shall vacate the premises of the portions belonging to the
plaintiffs and, in fact, have already vacated the premises in question and restored
the plaintiffs in their respective peaceful possession thereof since March 5,
1982[.] [emphasis ours]

9
 Action for "Judicial Determination of Attorney’s Fees, Recovery of Possession,
Accounting of Products, Ejectment and Damages with Prayer for Receivership and
Preliminary Mandatory/Prohibitory Injunction."

10
 Supra note 4.

11
 Rollo, pp. 98-100.

12
 Supra note 2.

13
 See also the Petitioners’ Memorandum dated September 26, 2007, rollo, pp. 157-196;
Reply to the respondents’ comment to the petition dated May 8, 2007(id.at138-140),and
Reply to the Respondents’ Memorandum dated November 12, 2007(id.at242-250).

14
 Comment to the Petition dated November 17, 2006 (id. at 116-135. See also the
respondents’ Memorandum dated October24, 2007(id.at212-239).

15
 Copy of the Death Certificate indicated the date of death as September 18, 2007; id. at
205.
16
 Formal Notice of Death and Substitution of Parties dated October 3, 2007; id. at 200-
204.

17
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 24.

18
 Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266, 281(1990).

19
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2; and
www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising%20for%20Litigation.pdf.

20
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing British Cash and Parcel
Conveyors Ltd.v.Lamson Store Service Co.Ltd.(1908)1 K.B. 1006 at 1014, per Fletcher
Moulton L.J.

21
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf, citing Giles v Thompson
(1994)1 A.C. 142; (1993) 2 W.L.R. 908; (1993)3 All E.R. 321 at 328, per Steyn L.J. See
also Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modifiedby Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

22
 Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

23
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf.

24
 The Role of the Doctrines of Champerty and Maintenance in Arbitration by Jern-Fei
Ng, www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. See also Contracts, Champerty,
Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions, California Law Review,
Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 179, www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2.

Recent foreign legal developments vary at their treatment of champertous

contracts. Several jurisdictions have abolished criminal and tortuous liability for
champerty (and maintenance). To name a few: Australia –abolished by the
Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act of 1993 for New South
Wales and the Wrongs Act 1958 and Crimes Act 1958 for Victoria; England and
Wales -by the Criminal Law Act 1967.
(en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Champerty_and_maintenance) and
www.essexcourt.net/uploads/JERN-FEI%20NG.pdf. Other jurisdictions,
particularly some states in the United States of America, have relaxed the
application of this common law doctrine or have adopted it in a modified form as
the peculiar conditions of the society that gave rise to this doctrine have changed
(Contracts, Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and
Decisions, California Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
 www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other American states have completely
repudiated it unless a statute specifically treats a contract as champertous.
These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Texas and West Virginia (Contracts,
Champerty, Common Law Rule Modified by Modern Statutes and Decisions,
California Law Review, Vol.1, No. 2, January 1913, pp. 178-180, 180,
www.jstor.org/stable/3474485?seq=2). Other jurisdictions, like Canada for one,
have retained the rule against champerty on public policy considerations, the
purpose being to prevent one party from inciting another to initiate or defend
litigation that would never have been brought or defended; or to prevent increase
in lawsuits, harassment of defendants, and suppression or manufacturing of
evidence and subornation of witness (www.danielnelson.ca/pdfs/Fundraising
%20for%20Litigation.pdf).

25
 See Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales, supra note 18, citing JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S., 166
F.Supp. 324 (1958);and Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242
(1918).

26
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392.

27
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 392, citing A.B.A. Op.
288 (Oct. 11, 1954); Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Mel 96 (1853).

28
 Supra note 18.

29
 Id. at 281.

30
 See CANON 16, specifically Rule 16.04, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The pertinent portion of Rule 16.04 reads:

"Rule 16.04 -x x x Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client."

31
 Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics reads in full:

"42. Expenses.

A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of
convenience, but subject to reimbursement." (emphasis ours)

32
 The pertinent provision of Article 1491 reads:

"Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxxx
 (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession[.] [Emphases
ours]

33
 Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides:

"10. Acquiring interest in litigation.

The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."

See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, 467 Phil. 1111, 1120(2004); Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, 273 Phil. 534, 543(1991); and Ordonio v. Eduarte, Adm. Mat. No.
3216, March 16, 1992, 207 SCRA 229, 232.

34
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico,522 Phil. 295, 308-309(2006); and Valencia v. Atty.
Cabanting, supra at 542.

35
 Vda. de Gurrea v. Suplico, supra, at 310. See also Pabugais v. Sahijwani, supra note
33, at 1121.

36
 See Fornilda v. The Br. 164, RTC IVth Judicial Region, Pasig, 248 Phil. 523,
531(1988); and Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33,at 542.

37
 See paragraphs 1 and 7, Article 1409 of the Civil Code. See also Vda. de Gurrea v.
Suplico, supra note 34,at. 310.

38
 Rollo, p. 58.

39
 See Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, March 11, 1991, 195
SCRA 28, 35; and Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, 177 Phil. 467, 479(1979).

40
 See Director of Lands v. Larrazabal, supra, at 475.

41
 See Biascan v. Atty. Lopez,456 Phil. 173, 180(2003);and Fabillo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 39, at39

42
 See Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, supra note 33, at 542; and Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,
supranote 18, at 281.

43
 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 1409 (1).

44
 Id., last paragraph.
45
 Id., Article 1410.

46
 Id., Article 1422.

47
 Spouses Garcia v. Atty. Bala, 512 Phil. 486, 494(2005); citation omitted.

48
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Dallas Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Colbert, 127 SW2d 1004.

49
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2002), Seventh Edition, p. 395, citing Traders Royal
Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, 269 SCRA 733 (1997).

50
 Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in part, reads:

"SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall

be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. x x x A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable."

51
 The pertinent provision of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

"CANON 20 –x x x x

Rule 20.01 –A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the

proffered case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the character of
the employment, whether occasional or established; and

h)The professional standing of the lawyer."

 [A.C. NO. 6962 : June 25, 2008]

CHARLES B. BAYLON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the
supposed principal thereof.

Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon,
conspired in preparing an SPA1 authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in
Signal Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on
June 17, 1996, and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support
his contention that he was overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification2 from the
Government of Singapore showing that he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996;
and (2) a certification3 from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the
country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. To prove that his signature on the SPA was
forged, the complainant presented a report4 from the National Bureau of Investigation stating to
the effect that the questioned signature on the SPA was not written by him.

The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to
Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of
his wife to settle her mortgage obligations.

In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially
refused to notarize it when the complainant's wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due
to the absence of the supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the
complainant's wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she
introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended that he believed in good faith that
the person introduced to him was the complainant because said person presented to him a
Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the
respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or
falsehood.5

After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board
of Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his
notarial commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a
notarial commission for one year.6
In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline stated that

In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein respondent to ascertain the
true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the document,
i.e., giving a third party authority to mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving
grace on the part of respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person being authorized
under the SPA to act as agent and who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the principal
mentioned therein.7

On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-109 which
reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent's failure to properly ascertain the true identity of the person
seeking his legal services considering the nature of the document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Respondent's notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.8

In our Resolution9 dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.

We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the
performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v.

Rafanan,10 we explained,

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive

public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at
large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced.
They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by
public policy and are impressed with public interest.11

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in
this case authorized the complainant's wife to mortgage the subject real property, the
respondent should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the
person who represented himself and was represented to be the complainant.12 He should not
have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the said impostor in view of the ease
with which community tax certificates are obtained these days.13 As a matter of fact, recognizing
the established unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person who
wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of competent evidence of
identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of persons appearing before
them to have their documents notarized.14

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted15 in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that
he had already previously notarized some documents16 for the complainant, he should have
compared the complainant's signatures in those documents with the impostor's signature before
he notarized the questioned SPA.

WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is
hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a
period of two years.

To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED
to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached
to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 Additional member in place of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga who took no part because of
close professional relation to a party.

**
 Additional member in place of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. who is on official
leave.

***
 Additional member in place of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on official
leave.

1
 Rollo, p. 5.

2
 Id. at 6.

3
 Id. at 7-8.

4
 Id. at 14-15.

5
 Id. at 124-126.

6
 Id. at 126.

7
 Id.
8
 Id. at 123.

9
 Id. at 127.

10
 A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91.

11
 Id. at 99.

12
 See Vda. de Bernardo v. Restauro, Adm. Case No. 3849, June 25, 2003, 404 SCRA 599,
604.

13
 Dela Cruz v. Zabala, A.C. No. 6294, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 407, 411.

14
 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule II, Sec. 12.

SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers
to the identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or

(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.

15
 Rollo, pp. 103-108.

16
 Id. at 45-46. Affidavit dated November 26, 1993 and Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
26, 1993.
A.C. No. 3324           February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO,

SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

BUENA, J.:

Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays
that administrative sanctions be imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not
having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his duties as notary public.

In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo D.

Estores, they filed a complaint against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region
XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.

Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin's Et. Al.,
Complaint To The Securities and Exchange Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:

V E R I F I C AT I O N

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.

WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY,

LEVI PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn
in accordance with law depose and say:

1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;

2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are
true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February,
1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.

By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz           (Sgd.) Camagay           (Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan           (Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of
February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
 (Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.
Notary Public3

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain Lilian
Diaz; that with regard to the signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty.
Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it appear that
said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants averred
that respondent's act undermined the public's confidence for which reason administrative
sanctions should be imposed against him.

In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado
swore to the correctness of the allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC
through their authorized representatives known by their names as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of Paterno
Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every
signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest of his
client backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and in behalf
of her husband as evidenced by a written authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of
the said authorizations he notarized the said document.

Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado,
his signature was preceded by the word "By" which suggests that he did not in any manner
make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that his clients
authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence
to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon
with. Respondent further alleged that the complaint is malicious and anchored only on evil
motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is only a
lawyer defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for damages
to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a consequence thereof.

The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended

that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public
for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent's Commission for
six (6) months for failure to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the
Motion to Dismiss With Answer prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in behalf of
Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed for her husband Pastor Diaz),
three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures, because
he was their counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of the religious sect and
corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.

But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the same
cannot be condoned. He failed to state in the preliminary statements of said motion/answer that
the three respondents were represented by their designated attorneys-in-fact. Besides, having
signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as
Notary Public.1âwphi1.nêt

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements.7 That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories
to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position,
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.8

Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document
is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.9

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein
are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through
any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their
signatures and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred

duties pertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and
failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion.10

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent
situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times.11 For notarizing the
Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not
before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he
failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one
(1) year.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
 Affidavit-Complaint, Rollo, pp. 2-4.

2
 Annex "B" of Affidavit-Complaint, Rollo, pp. 9-19.

3
 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

4
 Records of the proceedings before the IBP, pp. 8-13.

5
 Affidavit of Dr. Pagunsan and Rev. Bofetiado, Annex "C", Answer, IBP Records, p. 22.

6
 Certification issued by Rev. Diaz, Annex "B", Answer, IBP Records, p. 21.

7
 Valles vs. Quijano, A.M. No. P-99-1338, Nov. 18, 1999, citing Balinon v. De Leon, 50
O.G. 538.

8
 Valles vs. Quijano, ibid., citing Cf. Cruz vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31.

9
 cited in Arrieta vs. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 251.

10
 Flores vs. Chua, G.R. No. 109767 April 30, 1999.

11
 Arrieta vs. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 253.
 [A.C. NO. 5864 : April 15, 2005]

ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant, v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang

Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to
complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January
4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.

He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract
with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the
construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs
amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the
services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in
the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management
and/or Cesar Goco.   The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the
authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.

Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act
or proceeding when in fact they did not.

In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already
signed the SPA.   He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he
was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at
all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his
death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same
day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed. Respondent
prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges
had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the
assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594,3 PD
1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that
no criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP
submitted its investigation report:

x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001
purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident
that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already
dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards
Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter
appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of
Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality
of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said
Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans.7

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that
he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8

After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's
accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He
likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was
a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it
was his duty to serve the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act
at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself
and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.10

In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent notarized
certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them,
the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries
public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very
same persons who executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must
observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the
confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.

In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However,
respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001
or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent
declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free
and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful
statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.13 It converts a private
document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14

Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary,
and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability.  His assertion of falsehood in a public
document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially
cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta,
he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public
officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to
his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality
of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not
have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a
spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the
Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:

Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of
Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the
conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount
of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating
signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in
the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x15

We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by
the IBP which we find too light.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the
immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, p. 1.

2
 Rollo, page 21.

3
 Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure
Contracts.

4
 Government Auditing Code.
5
 Local Government Code of 1991.

6
 Rollo, p. 40.

7
 Rollo, pp. 98-108.

8
 Notice of Resolution, Rollo, p. 97.

9
 Essentials of Judicial and Legal Ethics by Sergio A. F. Apostol, p. 114.

10
 Id., p. 115.

11
 A.C. No. 4370, May 25, 2004.

12
 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

13
 Heck v. Judge Antonio E. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004.

14
 Supra, at 5.

15
 "Annex B-2," Rollo, p. 54.

A.C. No. 9081               October 12, 2011

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and
Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer,
malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal
(Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and
dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang,
dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy.
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-
sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga
sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng

walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng
makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang;
Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na
kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama
sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama
naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay

pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-
aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay
naninirahan;
 4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing
may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang

kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga

kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako
interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga

panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na
pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,
dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997,

dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract
dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal
eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they
acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then
hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied
that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for
the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time
office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her
allegations and to show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a
letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the
document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence
together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He
further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s
desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña
had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to
comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship,
thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law
and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is
exactly what Omaña did in this case.1avvphi1
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was
sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a
document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed
the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually
and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document
authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring
the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the
contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were
true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s
negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally
responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully
well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary
public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114 dated 3 October 2011.

1
 Signed by Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, Commissioner.

2
 Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, A.M. No. 804-CJ, 159-A Phil. 360 (1975).

3
 Albano v. Mun. Judge Gapusan, A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 162 Phil. 884 (1976).

4
 Supra, note 2.

5
 Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 (1933).

6
 Biton v. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7 (1935).

7
 In re: Atty. Roque Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 (1940).

8
 Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277 (1954).

9
 Lingan v. Calubaquib and Baliga, 524 Phil. 60 (2006).

10
 Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 209.
 [A.C. No. 4958. April 3, 2003.]

FIDEL D. AQUINO, Complainant, v. Atty. OSCAR MANESE, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint 1 (in Tagalog) dated September 7, 1998 addressed to the Office of
the President which forwarded it to the Office of the Court Administrator, Fidel D. Aquino
(complainant) of Pinasling, Gerona, Tarlac charged Atty. Oscar Manese (respondent) with
falsification of public document for preparing and notarizing a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 dated
September 15, 1994 which could not have been executed and sworn to by Lilia D. Cardona, one
of the therein three vendors-signatories, she having died on November 25, 1990 3 or four (4)
years earlier.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Complainant alleges that, inter alia, he has since 1960 been tilling the land subject of the Deed
of Absolute Sale as tenant of the now deceased owner thereof, Luis M. Cardona; in 1975, the
spouses Antonio and Fe Perez unlawfully took possession of the land, thus spawning the filing
of a case that reached the Court of Appeals which recognized him to be the lawful tenant; 4 and
on September 15, 1994, without his knowledge, the Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly
executed on even date by the three heirs of Luis Cardona, including the already deceased Lilia
Cardona, in favor of Ma. Cita C. Perez, daughter of the spouses Perez, and was notarized
by Respondent.

Attached to the letter-complaint are the following documents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Investigation Report of the Department of Agrarian Reform dated August 20, 1996; (2)
Memorandum of Regional Director Eugenio Bernardo to the DAR Secretary dated 4 June 1996;
(3) May 20, 1996 letter of OIC-PARO Teofilo Inocencio to Atty. Epifanio Devero, Chief Regional
Legal Division, DAR (4) Questioned Documents Report No. 517-696 of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (5) Death Certificate of Lilia Cardona; (6) Deed of Absolute Sale; (7) Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 30, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 12847-CAR; (8) Special Power
of Attorney dated 27 December 1989 executed by Jose D. Cardona in favor of Fidel D. Aquino;
(9) General Power of Attorney executed by Luis Cardona in favor of Fidel D. Aquino; and (10)
Certification dated October 27, 1977 of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

By his Comment of January 4, 1999, 5 respondent asserted that complainant has no personality
to complain as he has neither a legal right or claim over the land nor any personality to
challenge the sale; even assuming that Lilia Cardona was already dead at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, no interested party had complained about it; as a
Notary Public, he is not expected to personally know every person who goes to him for
notarization of documents; and when he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale on September 15,
1994, he was only performing his duty as a notary public.
By Resolution of February 24, 1999, 6 this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Despite notice, respondent
failed to appear at any of the hearings scheduled by the IBP, he pleading ill health and/or
unavailability of counsel.

On June 29, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XV-2002-220 7 adopting
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that "respondent was gravely remiss in his obligation
as notary public." The IBP Board of Governors, however, modified the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that "respondent’s commission as Notary Public be revoked and
that [he] be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years" by recommending
that" [r]espondent’s commission as Notary Public be SUSPENDED with disqualification for
appointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years."cralaw virtua1aw library

The IBP Board of Governor’s Resolution, which is before this Court for final action pursuant to
Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, is well-taken.

Respondent’s assertion that complainant lacks the personality to institute the present complaint
does not lie. Complainant being a tenant at the land subject of the sale, his rights as such have
been disturbed by the transfer of ownership of the land.

In any event, proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may, under
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, motu proprio be taken by this Court or the IBP
upon the verified complaint of any person.

On the merits of the complaint.

The death on November 25, 1990 of Lilia Cardona is documented. 8 Her Death Certificate
shows so. The National Bureau of Investigation, which made a comparative examination of her
specimen signatures and that appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale, found that the signature
on the latter and the specimen signatures were not written by one and the same person. 9

In the Acknowledgment in the deed, respondent affirmed that before him "personally appeared
said vendors [including the late Lilia Cardona] whos (sic) personal circumstances are shown
above below their names and signatures, all known to [him] and to [him] known to be the same
individual (sic) who executed th[e] instrument and acknowledged to [him] that the same is their
free act and voluntary deed."cralaw virtua1aw library

The said acknowledgment notwithstanding, respondent asseverated in his Comment to the

letter-complaint that he is not expected to personally know every person who goes to him for
notarization of documents. Such jaunty indifference betrays his deplorable failure to heed the
importance of the notarial act and observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties as a notary public which include the ascertainment that the persons
who signed the document are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is

not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act
and deed. 10 (Italics and Emphasis supplied.)

By respondent’s reckless act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that
the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what were stated therein, he has
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and he thereby breached Canon
I of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01
thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent Atty. Oscar Manese’s notarial commission, if extant, is REVOKED and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two (2) years.

Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for a period of two (2) years, effective
immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it to
determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

Let copies of this Decision he furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Rollo, pp. 5–6.

2. Id., p. 29–A.

3. The Certificate of Death of Lilia Cardona Aguire issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac, shows that she died on November 25, 1990, Id., p. 27.

4. Court of Appeals Decision of August 30, 1988, Id., pp. 40–48.

5. Id., pp. 59–60.

6. Id., p. 74.

7. Id., p. 133.

8. Vide Note 3.

9. NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 517–696, Rollo, pp. 16–17.

10. Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. De Rosales v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 5645, July 2, 2002 at 5–6
(Citations omitted).

A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942             July 21, 2006

ELSA L. MONDEJAR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA, respondent.
 DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By two separate complaints filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Elsa L.
Mondejar (complainant) sought the disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia (respondent) and the
cancellation of her notarial commission for allegedly committing deceitful acts and malpractice in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the administrative complaints are as follows:

Sometime in 2002, complainant charged Marilyn Carido (Marilyn) and her common law husband
Japanese national Yoshimi Nakayama (Nakayama) before the Digos City Prosecutor's Office for
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law,1 claiming that the Bamiyan Group of Enterprises (Bamiyan)
which was capitalized at P15 million and which was engaged in, among other things, money
lending business and operation of miki and siopao factory was actually owned by Nakayama but
it was made to appear that Marilyn was the owner.2

Marilyn, by her Counter-Affidavit dated November 6, 2002 which she filed before the
Prosecutor's Office, denied the charge, in support of which she attached a Memorandum of
Joint Venture Agreement3 (the document) forged by her and Nakayama, acknowledged before
respondent on January 9, 2001 but appearing to have been entered in respondent's notarial
register for 2002 and bearing respondent's Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) No. issued in 2002.
The document purported to show that Marilyn owned Bamiyan, albeit its capital was provided by
Nakayama.

Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she filed the criminal charge
in 2002 before the Prosecutor's Office, complainant, who was formerly an employee of
Bamiyan, filed the first above captioned administrative complaint against respondent, as well as
criminal complaints for falsification of public document and use of falsified public document
before the Prosecutor's Office also against respondent, together with Marilyn, Nakayama, and
the witnesses to the document Mona Liza Galvez and John Doe.4

It appears that on April 20, 2001, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale5 of a parcel of
land situated in Digos City, purportedly executed by Manuel Jose Lozada (Lozada) as vendor
and Marilyn as vendee. Complainant alleged that respondent falsified the document by forging
the signature of Lozada who has been staying in Maryland, U.S.A. since 1992.6 Hence,
spawned the second above-captioned administrative complaint.

After respondent submitted her Comment to which she attached her November 18, 2002
Counter-Affidavit7 to the Affidavit-Complaint of Marilyn charging her with falsification before the
Prosecutor's Office, the administrative complaints were referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from notice.8

Commissioner Doroteo Aguila, to whom the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the
cases, set them for mandatory conference on November 24, 2003. It turned out that
complainant had died on September 15, 2003. Complainant's husband Celso Mondejar had
requested, however, that consideration of the cases continue on the basis of documentary
evidence already submitted.9
In her Position Paper filed with the IBP, respondent argued that complainant was neither a party
nor a witness to the document as well as to the Deed of Absolute Sale, hence, devoid of legal
standing to question the authenticity and due execution thereof.10 Besides, added respondent,
complainant had passed away.11

To her Position Paper respondent again attached her November 18, 2002 Counter-Affidavit
which she filed with the Digos City Prosecutor's Office wherein she explained that the
discrepancies of dates appearing in the document executed by Nakayama and Marilyn on
January 9, 2001 came about when the document was "revise[d] and amend[ed]" in 2002.12

After evaluation of the evidence of the parties, Investigating Commissioner Aguila, by Report
and Recommendation13 dated May 12, 2004, recommended the dismissal of the second
complainant (Administrative Case No. 5942) relative to respondent's notarization of the Deed of
Sale.

As for the first complaint (Administrative Case No. 5907) relative to the discrepancies of dates
appearing in the document, Commissioner Aguila found respondent to have violated Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct,

and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for One Month.

Pertinent portions of Atty. Aguila's Report read:

[T]here is sufficient proof to discipline the respondent in Adm. Case No. 5907. In
the Memorandum of a Joint Venture Agreement, Atty. Rubia stated in the
acknowledgment portion thereof that the parties personally appeared before her "on this
9th day of January, 2001." But then this document . . .
was entered in respondent's notarial register as Document No. 5707; Page No. 1144;
Book No 25; Series of 2002 [Annex "A-1," Petition]. It is further pointed out that
respondent's PTR Number as indicated in this document is PTR Number 4574844 that is
likewise indicated as being issued on January 3, 2002. On the other hand, the [Counter]
Affidavit of Marilyn Carido, which Atty. Rubia notarized . . . was notarized
on November 6, 2002 [Annex "B-2" of the Petition]. This [counter] affidavit also indicates
respondent's PTR Number as 4574844 issued on January 3, 2002. It must be stressed
that this is the same Number indicated in the Memorandum of a Joint Venture
Agreement [notarized on January 9, 2001]. But then a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 28
March 2001 between one Leandro Prosia and Jocelyn Canoy-Alson [Annex "D," Petition]
that was also notarized by respondent, indicates that her PTR for the year 2001 was
PTR No. 4320009 [p. 14, SC Records].

As already pointed out, the [January 9, 2001] Memorandum of a Joint Venture

Agreement indicates that it was entered as Document No. 5707, Series of 2002 in
respondent's notarial register. On the other hand, the [November 6, 2002] Affidavit of
Marilyn Carido was entered as Document No. 2791, Series of 2002. Since the
[Counter] Affidavit was notarized [o]n 06 November 2002, it is illogical why the
document number for the Memorandum of a Joint Venture is greater (higher) than
 that of the former since the latter was supposed to have been notarized many
months earlier, or specifically, on 09 January 2001.

All of the foregoing show that the respondent effectively made an untruthful declaration
in a public document when she attested that the Memorandum of a Joint Venture
Agreement was acknowledged before her on 09 January 2001 when evidence clearly
shows otherwise.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the finding of the
Investigating Commissioner's Report that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for making a false declaration in a public document. It,
however, modified the recommended sanction in that, instead of suspension from the practice of
law for One Month, it merely WARNED respondent that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future would be dealt with more severely.15

By Resolution of March 12, 2005, the BOG denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.16

Hence, the elevation of the first administrative case to this Court by respondent who reiterates
her challenge to the standing of complainant's husband in pursuing the cases.

Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person."

That an administrative complaint filed by any person against a lawyer may be acted upon by this
Court is settled. In re Almacen17 explains the raison d'être:

. . . [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, this proceeding is not – and does not involve – a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)

Complainant's husband's pursuance of the cases was thus in order.

Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, thus
rendering the document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.18

Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to their office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest.19 A graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the
laws, to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any,20 and to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement,21 and other duties and responsibilities.

In exculpation, respondent, in her November 18, 2002 Counter Affidavit, proffered the following
explanation, quoted verbatim:

xxxx

5. That way back in the early 2001, specifically in January of the year 2001, Marilyn A.
Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, had me prepared [sic] a document in preparation of the
business enterprises to be established by Marilyn A. Carido, wherein Yoshimi
Nakayama, will grant the former CAPITAL for the establishment of the proposed
enterprises, the main purpose of which is to secure the future of Marilyn A. Carido, their
children, and the family of Marilyn A. Carido. A copy of the said agreement is hereto
attached as ANNEX "A," with its corresponding submarking;

xxxx

7. That in fact, on May 10, 2002, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama came to my
office, for two (2) purposes: First, Yoshimi Nakayama had me prepared a document
which would be an ADDENDUM to their original transaction in January 2001, wherein
Yoshimi Nakayama gave Marilyn A. Carido additional capital to augment the operation of
the "Bamiyan Superstore;" Second, that Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama
wanted me to REVISE and AMEND the original agreement made by them in January,
2001, because Yoshimi Nakayama wanted to add certain conditions to the original
agreement, specifically referring to the flow of money unto the coffers of the enterprises
of Marilyn A. Carido, and as to the fact of the technical assistance that he is giving
Marilyn A. Carido, because, at that time, there were already many problems in the
operations of the Bamiyan enterprises. That, for the first purpose, I prepared the
ADDENDUM to the original agreement between Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi
Nakayama. A copy of the said addendum is hereto attached and made another part
hereof as ANNEX "C," with its corresponding submarking;

8. That for the second purpose referring to the REVISION or AMENDMENT of the

original transaction, I told both Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, to submit to
me all the copies of the original agreement in their possession, and I will just make
another instrument which would supplant or replace the old one while incorporating the
needed conditions suggested by Yoshimi Nakayama. That I told them that I will be
making a new and/or revised agreement, but I will retain the original date of the
first transaction made in January, 2001, because anyway, I have not yet submitted
the documents which I have notarized for the year 2001, since my notarial
commission will expire yet on the last day of December, 2002;

9. That, therefore, on the same date, Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama
submitted to me all the copies in their possession of the old agreement, and I proceeded
to have another one encoded in my computer by my secretary, Mona Liza Galvez,
incorporating the needed additional conditions in accordance with the wishes of my said
clients. A copy of the said REVISED agreement is hereto attached as ANNEX "D," with
the its corresponding submarkings;
 10. That in fact, on November 6, 2002, I attached a copy of the revised agreement on
the COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT of Marilyn A. Carido, in the case for a violation of the Anti-
Dummy law filed against her by an assumed witness, Elsa Mondejar who is also the
assumed complainant in this instant investigation; That, however, while I was going over
the documents of Marilyn A. Carido, I noticed that the revised agreement referred to
above, although retained the original date of the original one as January,
2001, mistakenly or erroneously bear the series of 2002 in my notarial register, and
likewise bear my new PROFESSIONAL TAX RECEIPT (PTR) NO. and IBP No. for the
year 2002;

11. That even before then, I already instructed my secretary to make the necessary
corrections in the said revised document because the accountant and administrator of
the Bamiyan, Felicisima Abo, had already brought the erroneous entries to my attention
when all the legal papers of Marilyn A. Carido were turned over to her profession, as
early as June, 2002. That, however, because of my workload, I forgot to remind my
secretary about the corrections that she should made therein. However, I already told
Marilyn A. Carido and Yoshimi Nakayama, that the corrections are proper because I will
just make the necessary initials on the corrected portions;

12. That, again because of the fact, that I had to arrange certain matters on the labor
aspects of all the Bamiyan enterprises, because at these times, both Marilyn A. Carido
and Yoshimi Nakayama, were in Japan, it was only after I filed the counter-affidavit of
Marilyn A. Carido, in the said Anti-Dummy case, that I was reminded on the said
erroneous entries. Therefore, on November 8, 2002, I had Mona Liza Galvez, my
secretary, make the necessary corrections; A copy of the corrected revised
agreement is hereto attached as ANNEX "E," with the corresponding submarkings; as
well as copies of the memos that I had issued in behalf of my principal, Marilyn A.
Carido, for the Bamiyan, are likewise hereto attached as ANNEXES "F" TO "I,"
respectively;

x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In sum, respondent claimed that the document was forged on January 9, 2001 but she made a
"new and/or revised agreement" in 2002 to incorporate additional conditions thereto, retaining,
however, its original date – January 9, 2001; that on noticing that the document "mistakenly or
erroneously [b]ore the series of 2002 in [her] notarial register and likewise b[ore] her new . . .
[PTR] No. and IBP No. for the year 2002," she instructed her secretary to make the necessary
corrections, but on account of her workload, she forgot to remind her secretary to comply
therewith; and that it was only after Marilyn's Counter-Affidavit of November 6, 2002 was filed
before the Prosecutor's Office that she (respondent) was reminded of the erroneous entries,
hence, she had her secretary make the corrections on November 8, 2002.

And as reflected in her above-quoted portions of her Counter-Affidavit, respondent further

claimed that she retained the original January 9, 2001 date of the document since the
"documents which [she] notarized for the year 2001" were not yet submitted as her notarial
commission was to expire yet on the last day of December, 2002.23

Respondent's explanation does not impress as it betrays her guilt.

The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to exculpate Marilyn from
the Anti-Dummy charge against her in 2002.

The document was allegedly notarized on January 9, 2001 but a new revised/amended
document was made in 2002 bearing the original date of execution/acknowledgment. If that
were so, how could an error have been committed regarding the other year 2001 original entries
in the notarial register, when the purported new document was to retain the original January 9,
2001 date as it would merely input additional conditions thereto? The above-quoted discussion
by the Investigating IBP Commissioner of why he discredited respondent's explanation behind
the conflicting dates appearing in the document is thus well-taken.

As for respondent's submission that corrections could be subsequently made on the document,
she not having anyway submitted the documents she notarized for the year 2001 since her
notarial commission was still to expire in 2002, the same does not lie.

One of the grounds for revocation of notarial commission is the failure of the notary to send a
copy of notarized documents to the proper clerk of court or Executive Judge (under the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice) within the first ten (10) days of the month next following.24

In fine, the recommendation of Investigating IBP Commissioner Aguila merits this Court's
approval.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Vivian Rubia, for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, is suspended for One (1) Month, and warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal records in this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing*, Chairman, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

* On Official Leave.

1
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. I, p. 8 and Vol. II, p. 36.

2
 Id., Vol. II at 46.

3
 Id., Vol. I at 6-7; Annex "A."

4
 Id., Vol. II at 36.

5
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5942), Vol. I, pp. 8-9; Annex "A."
6
 Id., Vol. I at 3-4.

7
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, pp. 14-18.

8
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, p. 124 and Rollo (A.C. No. 5942), Vol. I, p. 46.

9
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, p. 6.

10
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, p. 10 and Rollo (A.C. No. 5942), Vol. III, p. 9.

11
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, p. 11 and Rollo (A.C. No. 5942), Vol. III, p. 10.

12
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. III, p. 15.

13
 Id., Vol. III at 124-128.

14
 Id., Vol. III at 127.

15
 Id., Vol. III at 123.

16
 Id., Vol. III at 140.

17
 No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600-601; Esquivias v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119714, May 29, 1997, 272 SCRA 803, 812; See also Batac, Jr. v.
Cruz, Jr., A.C. No. 5809, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 309, 318.

18
 Aquino v. Atty. Manese, 448 Phil. 555, 561 (2003); Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758,
April 30, 1998, 306 SCRA 487, 491.

19
 Fulgencio v. Atty. Martin, 451 Phil. 275, 281 (2003); Villarin v. Atty. Sabate, Jr. 382
Phil. 1, 6-7 (2000); Maligsa v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 408,
414.

20
 Gokioco v. Mateo, A.C. No. 4179, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 1, 9; Alitagtag v.
Atty. Garcia, 426 Phil. 542, 547 (2002); Flores v. Chua, A.C. No. 4500, April 30, 1999,
306 SCRA 465, 484-485.

21
 Cruz v. Villasor, No. L-32213, November 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 31, 34.

22
 Rollo (A.C. No. 5907), Vol. II, pp. 7-8.

23
 Id., Vol. III at 15-16.

24
 Vide: Notarial Law (Revised Administrative Code, Chapter II, Title IV), Section 249(c)
as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule XI, Section 1(b)(3).
A.C. No. 7036               June 29, 2009

JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, CJ.:

This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed from a
letter1 addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge
Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper
disciplinary action be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato,
which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.

In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, executive
judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public within the territorial bounds
of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public shall not extend notarial functions beyond
the limits of their authority. Hence, she wrote a letter2 to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop
notarizing documents within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his
notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain
documents3 notarized by him had been reaching her office.

However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in

Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card4 executed by
Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License5 executed by Elenita D.
Ballentes.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III6 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could not extend
his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap,
Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the
Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not
Cotabato City.

Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered
that it was Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office
as attested to by the Joint Affidavit7 executed by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,8 we required Atty. Quintana to comment on the letter
of Judge Laquindanum.

In his Response,9 Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial commission before
Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon
by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanum’s
inaction was that she questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Cotabato City Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to
obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to withdraw
his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge Laquindanum sent a clerk from
her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did not oblige because at that time he already
had a Commission for Notary Public10 issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.

Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because the latter
immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many
requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked down all his
pleadings; communicated with his clients; and disseminated information through letters,
pronouncements, and directives to court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be
ostracized by fellow lawyers.

Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and
Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was equipped with a notarial commission.
He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato,
where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of
Cotabato. He claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal
profession in the entire Philippines.

Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive,
because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the
Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of Cotabato.

In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,11 we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.

In the February 28, 2007 Hearing12 before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa
(Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation,13 which was notarized by
Atty. Quintana in 2004.14 Honorata Rosil appears as one of the signatories of the document as
the donor’s wife. However, Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate
of Death15 issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.

Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents in the years
2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of
Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not
renewed the same.16 To support her claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1)
Affidavit of Loss [of] Title17 executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006
at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy18 of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with subscription
dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Driver’s License19 executed by Anecito C. Bernabe
with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of
Loss20 executed by Santos V. Magbanua with subscription dated February 22, 2007 at
Midsayap, Cotabato.

For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked
as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM
Card21 executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s License22 executed by
Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss23 executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained
that those documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation of
Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife, when they
knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop doing it as it would ruin
his profession.

Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition, because he did
not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his membership to the Kidapawan Chapter,
wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP President.

On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her responsibility
and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not act on his petition was that
he had not paid his IBP dues,24 which is a requirement before a notarial commission may be
granted. She told his wife to secure a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not
return.

This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response the
certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues. However, when the same was
examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed
that he be given time to send them later which was granted by the Hearing Officer.

Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised not to repeat
the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and not be divested of his privilege to
notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his family.

On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents25 issued by the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.

In a Manifestation26 dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum submitted a Certification27 and its

entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006
per Official Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993,
1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387.
Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely
paid his IBP dues.

In its Report and Recommendation,28 the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified
from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if his notarial commission still
exists, the same should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and
arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit, viz:

Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato,
which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary Public.

Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:

"Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is
made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.

Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of
Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap
or Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to
do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of respondent that he
can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of
the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.

xxxx

Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the
respondent’s wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be blamed for the
act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize documents in his absence. According
to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.

In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held,
thus:

"A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic) secretaries"

A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his
notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that he
did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally accountable for the activities
in his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.

Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79)
wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants therein, was already dead at
the time of notarization as shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the Civil
Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]

"A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is
not personally known to the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules."

Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or

qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and ignorance of
the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

xxxx

Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the right to
practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This statement is barren
of merit.

While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the
Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial
functions without having been commissioned as notary public as specifically provided for under
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning
court by filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning
court may or may not grant the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not
meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit
himself to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no reason at
all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for lack of authority to do so.

Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the commissioning court in
Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to
monitor the duties and responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a notary public
commissioned or those performing notarial acts without authority in her territorial jurisdiction. 29

xxxx

We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty. Quintana's notarial commission
for two (2) years more appropriate considering the gravity and number of his offenses.

After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as
a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife
notarize documents in his absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.

The act of notarizing documents outside one’s area of commission is not to be taken lightly.
Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it also partakes
of malpractice of law and falsification.30 Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a
violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Since the public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also
amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes.31 Notarizing
documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of Sec. 2(b)(1),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,32 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the lawyer’s oath which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare
any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the documents that he
admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to
his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession.

That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family
will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On the contrary, we feel that
he should be reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making
venture. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with
public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity
thereof.33

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable
this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.1avvphi1

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the
Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 (on leave)
RENATO C. CORONA
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1
 Dated November 29, 2005; rollo, pp. 3-5.

2
 Exhibit "A," id. at 6-8.

3
 Exhibit "B" and Exhibit "C," id. at 9 & 10-13.

4
 Exhibit "D," id. at 21.

5
 Exhibit "E," id. at 22.

6
 SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

7
 Exhibit "F," rollo, p. 24

8
 Rollo, p. 27.

9
 Dated September 29, 2005; id. at 30-36.

10
 Dated and effective May 24, 2004 until December 31, 2005; Exhibit "J," id. at 23.
11
 Rollo, p. 50.

12
 TSN, id. at 132-334.

13
 Exhibit "G"; id. at 78-79.

14
 Exhibit "G-2," id. at 79.

15
 Exhibit "H," id. at 80.

16
 As evidenced by the following: (i) Certification dated June 14, 2006 issued by Clerk of
Court Abdul S. Buayan of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City; Exhibit "M," id. at
94; (ii) Certification dated January 5, 2007 issued by Clerk of Court Abdul S. Buayan of
the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City; Exhibit "N," id. at 97; (iii) Certification dated
January 3, 2007 issued by Acting Clerk of Court Lilibeth S. Palines of the Regional Trial
Court of Midsayap, Cotabato; Exhibit "O," id. at 100; and (iv) Certification dated January
3, 2007 issued by Clerk of Court Atty. Teresa Gagabe-Natividad of the Regional Trial
Court of Kabacan, Cotabato; Exhibit "P," id. at 101.

17
 Exhibit "K-5," id. at 88.

18
 Exhibit "Q," id. at 102-103.

19
 Exhibit "R," id. at 104.

20
 Exhibit "S," id. at 105.

21
 Supra note 4.

22
 Supra note 5.

23
 Supra note 20.

24
 As evidenced by the following: (i) Certification dated March 23, 2004 issued by
Emerlinda Molina Diaz, Treasurer of the IBP North Cotabato Chapter; Exhibit ‘T," rollo,
p. 128; and (ii) Certification dated March 16, 2004 issued by Frances Cynthia Guiani-
Sayadi of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter; Exhibit "U," id. at 106.

25
 (i) Receipt of Payments with O.R. No. 610381 covering the year 2005 to 2006; rollo, p.
117; (ii) O.R. No. 610488 covering the year 2007; id. at 116; (iii) Certification dated
January 12, 2006 of good standing and good moral character; id. at 112; (iv) Certification
dated March 1, 2007 of good standing and good moral character; id. at 113; and (v)
Certification dated March 2, 2007 stating that Atty. Quintana is a member of the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter, and that he has fully paid his IBP dues from 1985 to 2003; id. at
114.

26
 Rollo, p. 124.

27
 Dated March 6, 2007; id. at 125.
 28
 Dated October 3, 2008; id. at 335-348.

29
 Id. at 344-348.

30
 Tan Tiong Bio v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6634, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 748.

31
 Zoreta v. Simpliciano, A.C. 6492, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 1.

32
 (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document —

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;

33
 Maddela v. Dallong-Galacinao, A.C. No. 6491, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 19, 26
citing Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 (1999).

G.R. No. 172196               October 19, 2011

ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN M. CARBONEL-

GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 27,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 and its Resolution dated April 5, 2006, denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals’ Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040, as the appellate court declared
respondent Rosario G. Venturozo the owner of the land in dispute, and ordered petitioner
Adelaida Meneses to vacate and surrender her possession thereof to respondent.

The facts are as follows:

On June 8, 1988, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, respondent herein, filed a Complaint2 for

"ownership, possession x x x and damages" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
against defendant Adelaida Meneses, petitioner herein, alleging that she (plaintiff) is the
absolute owner of an untitled coconut land, containing an area of 2,109 square meters, situated
at Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and declared under Tax Declaration No. 239. Plaintiff
alleged that she purchased the property from the spouses Basilio de Guzman and Crescencia
Abad on January 31, 1973 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,3 and that the vendors, in
turn, purchased the property from defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated
June 20, 1966. Plaintiff alleged that she has been in possession of the land until May 1983
when defendant with some armed men grabbed possession of the land and refused to vacate
despite repeated demands prompting her to engage the services of counsel. Plaintiff prayed
that after preliminary hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued; and that after
hearing, a decision be rendered declaring her as the owner of the property in dispute, ordering
defendant to vacate the property in question and to pay her ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
₱1,000.00 as litigation expenses; ₱10,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs of suit.

In her Answer,5 defendant Adelaida Meneses stated that plaintiff is the daughter of Basilio de
Guzman, the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 that was purportedly
executed by her (defendant) covering the subject property. Defendant alleged that she never
signed any Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, and that the said deed is a forgery.
Defendant also alleged that she never appeared before any notary public, and she did not
obtain a residence certificate; hence, her alleged sale of the subject property to Basilio de
Guzman is null and void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 31,
1973, executed by Basilio de Guzman in favor of plaintiff, covering the subject property, is
likewise null and void. Defendant stated that she acquired the subject property from her
deceased father and she has been in possession of the land for more than 30 years in the
concept of owner. Plaintiff’s allegation that she (defendant) forcibly took possession of the land
is a falsehood. Defendant stated that this is the fourth case the plaintiff filed against her
concerning the land in question.

In her Counterclaim, defendant stated that in view of the nullity of the falsified Deed of Absolute
Sale of the subject property, and the fact that plaintiff and her father Basilio de Guzman had
never been in actual possession of the property, plaintiff is under legal obligation to execute a
deed of reconveyance over the said property in her favor.

The issue before the trial court was whether the sale made by defendant Adelaida Meneses in
favor of plaintiff’s father, Basilio de Guzman, was valid.6

On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40 (trial court) rendered a Decision in favor
of defendant Adelaida Meneses. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20, 1966 (Exhibit "B")
and the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 (Exhibit "A") null
and void ab initio;

2) Declaring the defendant Adelaida Meneses as the owner of the property in question;

3) Ordering the plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo to execute a Deed of Reconveyance in

favor of the defendant Adelaida Meneses over the property in question described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint;

4) Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant ₱10,000.00 as damages; and ₱1,000.00,
as litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court found that defendant Adelaida Meneses inherited the land in dispute from her
father, Domingo Meneses; that she did not sell her property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and
that the signature of Adelaida Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a
forgery. The trial court stated that the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, is very much different from her specimen signatures and
those appearing in the records of Civil Case No. 1096 in the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan.
It held that since there was no valid transfer of the property by Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de
Guzman, the conveyance of the same property in 1973 by Basilio de Guzman to his daughter,
plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, was also invalid. The trial court stated that the claim of plaintiff
Rosario G. Venturozo, that her parents, Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman,
purchased from defendant Adelaida Meneses the subject property in 1966, is negated by
defendant’s continued possession of the land and she gathered the products therefrom.

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

On October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 40)
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered declaring plaintiff-appellant the owner
of the subject land and ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and surrender possession thereof
to the former.8
The Court of Appeals stated that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was
a forgery. Instead, she admitted on direct examination that her signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was genuine, thus:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit "6" and Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f]
Real Property of one (1) Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this
if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?

A. I do not know this document, sir.

Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was previously
marked as Exhibit "6-a" and Exhibit "A-1" for the plaintiff, will you examine this signature, if do
you (sic) know this signature?

A. This is my signature, sir.9

According to the Court of Appeals, such admission is binding on her, there being no showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.10

The Court of Appeals also stated that mere variance of signatures cannot be considered as
conclusive proof that the same were forged, as forgery cannot be presumed.11 Appellee
Adelaida Meneses should have produced specimen signatures appearing on documents
executed in or about the year 1966 for a better comparison and analysis.12

The Court of Appeals held that a notarized document, like the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 20, 1966, has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the
same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the document should be upheld.13 Moreover, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala − the notary
public before whom the questioned Deed of Sale was acknowledged − testified and confirmed
its genuineness and due execution, particularly the signature in question. The appellate court
stated that as against appellee Adelaida Meneses’ version, Atty. Biala’s testimony, that appellee
appeared before him and acknowledged that the questioned deed was her free and voluntary
act, is more credible. The testimony of a notary public enjoys greater credence than that of an
ordinary witness.14

The Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the evidentiary force of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 1966, which appears on its face to have been executed with all the formalities
required by law.

Adelaida Meneses’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution15 dated April 5, 2006.

Hence, Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her heir, filed this petition raising this lone issue:

I
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH REVERSED THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.16
Petitioner contends that her statement, made during the course of her testimony in the trial
court, was taken out of context by respondent to be used merely as an argumentative point. The
examining lawyer used the words, "Do you know this signature?" viz.:

Q. I am showing to you Exhibit "6" and Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff a Deed of Absolute Sale o[f]
Real Property of one (1) Adelaida Meneses in favor of Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine this
if you know this Deed of Absolute Sale?

A. I do not know this document, sir.

Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was previously
marked as Exhibit "6-a" and Exhibit "A-1" for the plaintiff, will you examine this signature, if do
you (sic) know this signature?

A. This is my signature, sir.17

Petitioner contends that in the above-quoted transcript of stenographic notes, she was merely
asked if she was cognizant of such a signature as hers or whether the signature appearing on
the questioned document was similar to that of her signature, and not if she was the one who
indeed affixed such signature on the said deed of sale.1avvphil

She avers that the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party invoking it
and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: (1) when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake; and (2) when it is shown that no such admission was in
fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission. For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but
cites the admission "out of context," then the one making the admission may show that he made
no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.18 This may be interpreted as
to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear.19

Petitioner also contends that a comparison of the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1966 and her specimen signatures, as well as her genuine signature on pleadings,
were made by the trial court, and it ruled that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1966 was a forgery. She submits that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect,20 and the appellate court should
have given weight to the trial court’s findings that her signature on the said Deed of Absolute
Sale was a forgery.

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed cases from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as
its findings of fact are deemed conclusive.21 Thus, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.22 However, this
rule admits exceptions,23 such as when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to the findings and conclusions of the trial court24 like in this case.

The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over
immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code,25 is only for convenience; it
is not essential for validity or enforceability.26 As notarized documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale
carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution27 and enjoy the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and
convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.28 The presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular.29 A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce
it to a private instrument.30 Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a
document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized
document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is
preponderance of evidence.311avvphi1

In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the
Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with the formalities required by law,
specifically Act No. 496,32 otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, which took effect on
January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the Act provides:

FORMS

Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases, and discharges affecting

lands, whether registered under this Act or unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey,
encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the
more prolix form heretofore in use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed by the
person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the
instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their
free act and deed by the person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of
record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who shall certify
to such acknowledgment x x x.33

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed his name as one of
the two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence, there was actually only one witness
thereto. Moreover, the residence certificate of petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was
given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and notarization;
hence, the number of petitioner’s residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21, 1966)
thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after
the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966.34 Considering the defect in
the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public
document, but only a private document,35 and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be
based on preponderance of evidence.

Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a)
by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In regard to the genuineness of petitioner’s signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966,36 the Court agrees with the trial court that her signature therein is very
much different from her specimen signatures37 and those appearing in the pleadings38 of other
cases filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years when the specimen
signatures were made. Hence, the Court rules that petitioner’s signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.
The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of context, considering that in
her Answer39 to the Complaint, she stated that the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed
by her in favor of Basilio de Guzman is a forgery; that she never signed the said Deed of Sale;
that she did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not secure the
residence certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also testified that she never sold
her land to Basilio de Guzman;40 that she never met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo
Biala,41 and that she did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.42 The trial court found
petitioner and her testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966
null and void ab initio. These circumstances negate the said admission.

The Court finds the Notary Public’s testimony self-serving and unreliable, because although he
testified that petitioner was the one who submitted her residence certificate to him on June 21,
1966,43 the next day after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on June 20, 1966,
Crescencia de Guzman, respondent’s mother, testified that she and her husband got the
residence certificate from petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June 21, 1966.44 Thus, it
is doubtful whether the Notary Public really knew the identity of the vendor who signed the Deed
of Absolute Sale45 dated June 20, 1966.

The Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible. It is a well-
settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree
of respect.46 Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a
better position to determine the issue of credibility.47

In fine, the preponderance of evidence is with petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated October 27,
2005 and its Resolution dated April 5, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case
No. D-9040 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
 Docketed as Civil Case No. D-9040, records, p. 1.

3
 Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 2.

4
 Exhibit "A," id. at 1.

5
 Records, p. 12.

6
 Pre-Trial Order, id. at 18.

7
 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

8
 Id. at 83.

9
 TSN, October 23, 1989, p. 14. (Emphasis supplied.)

10
 Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 4.

11
 Citing Veloso v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 398, 406 (1996).

12
 Citing Causapin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615,
624.

13
 Citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 736, 746 (2000)..
14
 Citing Sales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40145, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 858,
865.

15
 Rollo, p. 89.

16
 Id. at 17.

17
 TSN, October 23, 1989, p. 14. (Emphasis supplied.)

18
 Citing Atilo III v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 546, 552 (1997).

19
 Id.

20
 Citing People v. Binad Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757, 766 (2003).

21
 Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1167-1168 (1997).

22
 Id. at 1168.

23
 Id.

24
 Bernales v. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA
90.

25
 Civil Code, Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of
real property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and
1405.

26
 Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February
10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164, 180.

27
 Rules of Court, Rule 132.

SEC. 19. Classes of documents.—For purposes of their presentation in

evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

xxxx

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; x x x x

xxxx
 SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.

xxxx

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly acknowledged or

proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of
the execution of the instrument of document involved.

28
 Dizon v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 172167, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 487, 494.

29
 Dela Rama v. Papa, G.R. No. 142309, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 233, 244.

30
 Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 702, 709.

31
 Dela Rama v. Papa, supra note 29, at 244-245.

32
 Entitled AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADJUDICATION AND REGISTRATION OF
TITLES TO LANDS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

33
 Emphasis supplied.

34
 TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 10-12.

35
 Fuentes v. Roca, supra note 30, at 709.

36
 Exhibit "B," folder of exhibits, p. 2.

37
 Exhibit "8," id.

38
 Exhibits "3," "3-F-1," "7," "7-F-1," id.

39
 Records, p. 12.

40
 TSN, October 23, 1989, pp. 14-16, 21-23.

41
 Id. at 13, 15.

42
 Id. at 15.

43
 TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 8-9.

44
 TSN, December 19, 1988, pp. 15-18.

45
 Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, p. 1.
 46
 Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998, 288 SCRA 558, 563.

47
 Id.

[A.C. NO. 6713 : December 8, 2008]

ZENAIDA B. GONZALES, Petitioner, v. ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment of Atty. Narciso Padiernos (Respondent) filed
on May 12, 2003 by Ms. Zenaida B. Gonzales (Complainant) with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.

Commissioner San Juan submitted a Report and Recommendation1 dated September 10, 2004
to the IBP Board of Governors who approved this Report and Recommendation in a resolution
dated November 4, 2004.

In a letter2 dated March 14, 2005, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan transmitted
to the Office of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (retired) a Notice of Resolution 3 and the
records of the case.

The Factual Background

The complainant alleged in her complaint for disbarment that on three (3) separate occasions
the respondent notarized the following documents: (1) a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated July 16,
1979 which disposed of her property in Jaen, Nueva Ecija in favor of Asterio, Estrella and
Rodolfo, all surnamed Gonzales; (2) a Subdivision Agreement5 dated September 7, 1988 which
subdivided her property among the same persons; and (3) an affidavit of Non-Tenancy6 dated
March 3, 1988 which certified that her property was not tenanted. All three documents were
purportedly signed and executed by complainant. All three documents carried forged signatures
and falsely certified that the complainant personally appeared before the respondent and that
she was "known to me (the respondent) to be the same person who executed the foregoing and
acknowledged to me that the same is her own free act and voluntary deed." The complainant
claimed that she never appeared before respondent on the dates the documents were notarized
because she was then in the United States.

The respondent filed his Answer7 on June 16, 2003. He admitted that he notarized the three
documents, but denied the "unfounded and malicious imputation" that the three documents
contained the complainant's forged signatures. On the false certification aspect, he countered
that "with the same or identical facts obtained in the instant case, the Highest Tribunal, the
Honorable Supreme Court had this to say - That it is not necessary to know the signatories
personally, provided he or she or they signed in the presence of the Notary, alleging that they
are the same persons who signed the names."

On October 13, 2003, the respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of verification and
notification of the date of hearing.8

On December 19, 2003, complainant amended her complaint.9 This time, she charged
respondent with gross negligence and failure to exercise the care required by law in the
performance of his duties as a notary public, resulting in the loss of her property in Jaen, Nueva
Ecija, a 141,497 square meters of mango land covered by TCT NT-29578. The complainant
claimed that because of the respondent's negligent acts, title to her property was transferred to
Asterio Gonzales, Estrella Gonzales and Rodolfo Gonzales. She reiterated that when the three
documents disposing of her property were notarized, she was out of the country. Estrella
Gonzales Mendrano, one of the vendees, was also outside the country as shown by a
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) on September 14,
1989.10 She likewise claimed that Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales (the widow of Rodolfo
Gonzales, another vendee) executed an affidavit describing the "Deed of Absolute Sale and
Subdivision Agreement" as spurious and without her husband's participation.11 The affidavit
further alleged that the complainant's signatures were forged and the respondent did not
ascertain the identity of the person who came before him and posed as vendor despite the fact
that a large tract of land was being ceded and transferred to the vendees.

The complainant prayed for the revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his
suspension from the practice of law due to "his deplorable failure to hold the importance of the
notarial act and observe [with] utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
duties as a notary public which include the ascertainment that the person who signed the
document as the very person who executed and personally appeared before him."

On May 3, 2004, the complainant moved that the case be considered submitted for resolution in
view of respondent's failure to answer the amended complaint.12

The IBP Findings

In her report to the IBP Board of Governors,13 Commissioner San Juan categorically noted the
respondent's admission that he notarized the three documents in question - the Deed of
Absolute Sale on July 16, 1979; the Subdivision Agreement on September 7, 1988 and the
affidavit of Non-Tenancy on March 3, 1988. Commissioner San Juan also noted that the
complainant's documentary evidence supported her claim that she never executed these
documents and never appeared before the respondent to acknowledge the execution of these
documents. These documentary evidence consisted of the certification from the BID that
complainant did not travel to the Philippines on the dates the documents were allegedly
notarized;14 and the affidavit of Guadalupe Ramirez Gonzales described above.15

Commissioner San Juan found that the respondent had no participation in the preparation or
knowledge of the falsity of the spurious documents, and found merit in the complainant's
contention that the respondent "was negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary
public." She faulted the respondent for not demanding proof of the identity of the person who
claimed to be complainant Zenaida Gonzales when the documents were presented to him for
notarization. She concluded that the respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of him
as notary public to ensure the integrity of the presented documents. She recommended that the
respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three months.

The Court's Ruling

Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice16 provides:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and present an integrally complete instrument on
document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purpose stated in the instrument or document, declares that he
has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts
in a particular representative capacity that he has the authority to sign in that capacity."

Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with the foregoing rules
when he notarized the three documents subject of the present complaint. The respondent did
not know the complainant personally, yet he did not require proof of identity from the person
who appeared before him and executed and authenticated the three documents. The IBP
Report observed that had the respondent done so, "the fraudulent transfer of complainant's
property could have been prevented."

Through his negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public resulting in the loss of
property of an unsuspecting private citizen, the respondent eroded the complainant's and the
public's confidence in the notarial system; he brought disrepute to the system. As we held
in Pantoja Mumar v. Flores,17 he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes) as well as Rule 1.01 of the same Code (which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct).

The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its face and by authority of
law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in
complying with the formalities intended to ensure the integrity of the notarized document and the
act or acts it embodies.18
We are not persuaded by the respondent's argument that this Court, in a similar case or one
with identical facts, said "that it is not necessary to know the signatories personally provided he
or she or they signed in the presence of the notary, alleging that they are the persons who
signed the names." The respondent not only failed to identify the cited case; he apparently also
cited it out of context. A notary public is duty bound to require the person executing a document
to be personally present, and to swear before him that he is the person named in the document
and is voluntarily and freely executing the act mentioned in the document.19 The notary public
faithfully discharges this duty by at least verifying the identity of the person appearing before
him based on the identification papers presented.

For violating his duties as a lawyer and as a notary public, as well as for the grave injustice
inflicted on the complainant, it is only proper that the respondent be penalized and suffer the
consequences of his acts. We note in this regard that in her amended complaint, the
complainant no longer sought the disbarment of respondent; she confined herself to the
revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of law.
Thus, the recommendation of the IBP is for revocation of his notarial commission and for his
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. We approve this recommendation as a
sanction commensurate with the transgression committed by the respondent as a member of
the bar and as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. NARCISO PADIERNOS of 103 Del Pilar Street,

Cabanatuan City, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
and his notarial commission is hereby REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, pp. 53-57.

2
 Rollo, p. 51.

3
 Id, p. 52.

4
 Annex "A", Complaint; id., p. 2.

5
 Annex "B", Complaint; id., p. 3.

6
 Annex "C", Complaint; id., p. 4.

7
 Id., pp. 6-7.

8
 Rollo, pp. 14-15.

9
 Id., pp. 20-23.

10
 Id., p. 31
11
 Id., p. 32

12
 Rollo, p. 47

13
 Supra note 1, p. 1

14
 Supra note 10, p. 3

15
 Supra note 11, p. 3

16
 A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

17
 A.C. No. 5426, April 4, 2007; 520 SCRA 470.

18
 Traya Jr. v. Villamor, A.C. No. 5595, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 293.

19
 Social Security Commission v. Coral, A.C. No. 6249, October 24, 2004; 440 SCRA 291.
A.C. No. 9514               April 10, 2013

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile against

respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.

The Facts of the case are not disputed.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L. Brosas, Herizalyn

Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas
Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to
perform the notarial act3 per Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which
reads as follows:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or

consanguinity of the principal4 within the fourth civil degree.

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in the
complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.

In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted
Jandoquile’s material allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr., is whether the single
act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at
the same time, not requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for
disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says
that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel
than as a notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the
affiants to present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas
and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of
the Brosas family.

Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead
of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient
ground for disbarment.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla,
Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the
fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly
disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since
two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Given
the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with
prudence and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we
consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary public, when he
notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit
shows his signature as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31,
2012.

He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.

On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary
public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification
cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is
personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d)
takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In this
case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his
wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring
them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to
indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that
he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly
disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of
affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from
liability for violating the disqualification rule.

As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty.
Revilla, Jr. did not commit any deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct,
or any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and disqualified him from
being commissioned as notary public for six months. We were convinced that said punishment,
which is less severe than disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortez’s violation. In
Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special power of
attorney without having the alleged signatories appear before him. In imposing the less severe
punishment, we were mindful that removal from the Bar should not really be decreed when any
punishment less severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the
end desired.1âwphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr.,
we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than disbarment would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED

from being commissioned as a notary public, or from performing any notarial act if he is
presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his
disqualification has lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-7.

2
 Id. at 14. The complaint-affidavit charged Jandoquile of fraudulent enlistment with the
Philippine Army. After due proceedings, the investigating officer of the Philippine Army
recommended that Jandoquile be discharged from military service. Jandoquile says that
he has appealed his case before the Office of the Provost Marshal, Armed Forces ofthe
Philippines.

3
 Under Section 7, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, ''notarial act" and
"notarization" refer to any act that a notary public is empowered to perform under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

4
 Under Section 10, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a "principal" refers to
a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization.
5
 Rollo, pp. 16-22.

6
 Supra note 2.

7
 Id.

8
 SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)

9
 A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 87, 93-94.
 A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against
respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave
misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23

June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real
Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that
the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with
a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted

three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s allegations against
respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However,
complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only
copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered
owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action,
because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a “Build Operate and
Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its
owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of
herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that
complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage
contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared
and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and
that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however,
reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized,
complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it.
Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily
gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the
document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized
in the principal’s place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2)
five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds
of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an
unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned
Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached
to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her
disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the
three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon
187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural requisites under
Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the
Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was
prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was
not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner
should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and
emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the
IBP’s findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio –
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.15

THE COURT’S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’
submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose
of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the
respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasoned as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no
dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore,
is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly
for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible
in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth
records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in
the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the
other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a

supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading
only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said
that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her
charges against respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the
SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally
barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she
committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent
fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent
any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the
lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand
that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a
notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath
as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of
the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 1-15.
2
 Id. at 14-29.
3
 Id. at 30.
4
 Id. at 33-69.
5
 Id. at 142-196.
6
 Id. at 256-285; 286-356.
7
 Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
8
 Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
9
 Id. at 381.
10
 Id. at 365.
11
 Id. at 382-413.
12
 Id. at 495-572.
13
 SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. — (a) In the notary's presence, any person
may inspect an entry in the notarial register, during regular business hours, provided:

(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through competent
evidence of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier, in the
notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the
principal in the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an
official investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal intent or
wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access
to any entry or entries therein.
14
 Rollo, p. 575.
15
 Id. at 573-592.
16
 483 Phil. 546 (2004).
17
 Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information relating
thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:

a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;

b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or
other official proceedings to determine the identity of the child's parents or other circumstances
surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2)Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at least two
months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the
court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
18
Tolentino v. Mendoza, supra note 16, at 557-558.
19
Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp., 496 Phil. 263 (2005).
20
Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.
21
Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, 541 Phil.
17 (2007).
22
 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
23
 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
24
 Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
25
Rollo, p. 8; Annex “C” of the Affidavit-Complaint.
26
 Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632 (1978).
27
Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1 (2003).
28
 Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
29
Fulgencio v. Atty. Martin, 451 Phil. 275 (2003).
30
 See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 19; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013,
698 SCRA 1.
31
Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628 (2005).

A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014

IMELDA CATO GADDI, Complainant, v. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi (Gaddi) against Atty. Lope
M. Velasco (Velasco) for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

The Facts

According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada
Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya (BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada (Angelo), the Chief Operations Officer of
BLSS. Believing that Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, in April 2010,
Angelo informed the management that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelo’s
complaint, the police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano, namely:
Jonathan Lagamzon Lozare, Katherine Agatha Gaddi Ancheta, who is Gaddi’s niece, and
Lorenz Ocampo Gaddi, who is Gaddi’s grandson.

At past 10:00 a.m. of 22 April 2010, while inside the BLSS main office in Sta. Ana, Manila,
Gaddi was informed of the apprehension of the swimming instructors. Worried, Gaddi pleaded
with Angelo’s wife, Kristina Marie, and the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for
permission to leave the office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of acceding to her plea,
they commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission1 that the BLSS in Solano was
unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the office without the handwritten
admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten admission and left the office before
1:00 p.m. of the same day. Subsequently, Gaddi found out that Angelo filed a complaint against
her regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten admission, which was already
notarized by Velasco.

Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that
she personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. She
alleged that she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally know him, give any
competent evidence of identity or sign the notarial register.

In his comment dated 17 September 2010,2 Velasco alleged that he was commissioned notary
public for Makati City from 4 January 2010 to 31 December 2011. He alleged that Gaddi
appeared before him in his notarial office in Makati City on 22 April 2010 and requested for the
notarization of a four-page handwritten document. He ascertained Gaddi’s identity, through two
identification cards – her BLSS ID and Tax Identification Number (TIN) ID, and that the
document was her own. Thereafter, he notarized the document and recorded it in his notarial
register as Doc. No. 130, Page No. 27, Book No. 192, Series of 2010. Velasco insisted that he
duly complied with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and it was Gaddi’s complaint, which was
notarized by a fake notary public. Velasco claimed that Gaddi only denied having the document
notarized when she found out that Angelo used the document against her.

In a Resolution dated 18 October 2010,3 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 23 June 2011,4 Investigating Commissioner Pablo S.

Castillo (Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with merit, and
recommended a penalty of fine of P5,000.00 on Velasco for violation of Rule IV, Section 2(b)
and Rule VI, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

The Investigating Commissioner gave more credence to Gaddi’s statement that she did not
personally appear before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. The
Investigating Commissioner found it contradictory to logic and human experience that Gaddi
went first to Makati City to have her self-incriminating handwritten admission notarized before
proceeding to Nueva Vizcaya. The Investigating Commissioner also believed Gaddi’s statement
that the identification cards presented by Velasco were computer-generated from the BLSS
office, since the portion of the notarial certificate listing the evidence of identity was left blank.
As to Velasco’s claim that Gaddi’s complaint had a fake notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner found it unsubstantiated.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-1275 passed on 13 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules,  and for violation of Rule IV, Sec. [2(b) and Rule VI, Sec.] 3 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, Atty. Lope M. Velasco’s Notarial Commission is hereby REVOKED and
DISQUALIFIED for being Commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years with stern [w]arning
to be more circumspect in his dealing and that repetition of the same act shall be dealt with
more severely.

There was no motion for reconsideration filed.

The Ruling of the Court

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations with modification.

Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, and routinary act.6 Notarization converts a private document to a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.7 A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; for this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.8cralawred

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the
time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
through competent evidence of identity.9 At the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or
affix with a thumb or mark the notary public’s notarial register.10 The purpose of these
requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to
ascertain that the document is the signatory’s free act and deed.11 If the signatory is not acting
of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act.12 A
notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate
that is incomplete.13cralawred

In the present case, contrary to Velasco’s claim that Gaddi appeared before him and presented
two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself
indicates:  “SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS  APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI
CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO.__________ISSUED
AT/ON___________.”14 The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had been remiss in
his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply
with the most basic function that a notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of
Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed
involuntarily and refused to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in
an incomplete notarial certificate. Velasco did not even present his notarial register to rebut
Gaddi’s allegations. It is presumed that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.15cralawred

In Isenhardt v. Real,16 a notary public who failed to discharge his duties was meted out the
penalty of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. For
notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and voluntariness of the signatory to the
document, for affixing his signature in an  incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in
his pleadings, Velasco failed to discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon
117 and Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Considering these findings and
our previous rulings,19 Velasco should not only be disqualified for two years as a notary public,
he must also be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lope M. Velasco GUILTY of violating the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year, REVOKES his incumbent notarial
commission, if any, and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two
years, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library

Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1767 dated 27 August 2014.
1
Rollo, pp.  6-9.
2
 Id. at 13-20.
3
 Id. at 23.
4
 Id. at 55-59.
5
 Id. at 54.
6
  Angeles v. Ibañez, 596 Phil. 99 (2009); Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, 592 Phil. 219
(2008); Legaspi v. Landrito, 590 Phil. 1 (2008); Pantoja-Mumar v. Flores, 549 Phil. 261
(2007); Gonzales v. Ramos, 499 Phil. 345 (2005); Dela Cruz v. Zabala, 485 Phil. 83
(2004); Follosco v. Mateo, 466 Phil. 305 (2004); Aquino v. Manese, 448 Phil. 555 (2003).
7
 Id.
8
 Id.
9
 Rule IV, Section 2(b).
10
 Rule VI, Section 3(a).
11
Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan, supra note 6.
12
 Rule IV, Section 4(c).
13
 Rule IV, Section 5(b).
14
Rollo, p. 9.
15
 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Section 3(e).
16
 A.C. No. 8254, 15 February 2012, 666 SCRA 20, citing Lanuzo v. Bongon, 587 Phil. 658
(2008); Bautista v. Bernabe, 517 Phil. 236 (2006); Judge Lopena v. Cabatos, 504 Phil. 1
(2005);  Tabas v. Mangibin, 466 Phil. 296 (2004).
17
 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and  legal processes.

18
 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
19
Isenhardt v. Real, supra note 16; Angeles v. Ibañez, supra note 6; Pantoja-Mumar v.
Flores, supra note 6; Gonzales v. Ramos,  supra note 6.
A.C. No. 8384               April 11, 2013

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez

(respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in Cordon,
lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon.

This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
To support her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:

a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren
M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public within the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to
2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on either list;

b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in
the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and

c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit

notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's seal and
 signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of the
document's notarization."2

In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never been
notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has "never committed any
malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic) oath".4 He dismissed such allegations
as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated and x x x meant to harass or intimidate
him".5

Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were "tampered and
adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature."6 He failed to attend the
mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position Paper.

In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating Commissioner

Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner but increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months to
one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or any other subsequent
pleading.

On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the Supreme
Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.8

The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.

Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had notarized
various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that respondent's name does not
appear on the list of notaries public commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the
years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.

Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.1âwphi1 Per Section

1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the
truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez,10 where a party resorts to
bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained. Respondent merely posited that the
notarized documents presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were
results of forgery, but he failed to present any proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a sweeping
and unsupported statement that he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the reasonable
conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without the requisite notarial
commission.

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court."12 Accordingly, '"lawyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing."13

Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.14 "Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution."15

In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other

lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments.
As noted by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and
falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be
sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial practice without
a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2)
years and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He
is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe
sanction.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 59

2
 Id. at 59.

3
 Id. at 37.

4
 Id.

5
 Id.

6
 Id.

7
 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

8
 Rule 139-B, Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. -

xxxx

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

9
 Rule 131, Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.

10
 A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012.

11
 Supra note 3.
 12
 In the Muller of the lBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARC!AL A. EDILLON
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), 174 Phil. 55, 62 ( 1978).

13
 Ventura v. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012.

14
 Dela Cruz v. Dimaano, A.C. No. 7781, September 12,2008, 565 SCRA 1, 7, citing
Domingo v. Reed, G.R. No. 157701, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 227, 238.

15
 Id

G.R. No. L-40145 July 29, 1992

SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO GONZALES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III which
upheld the validity of the deed of sale of a parcel of land executed by petitioner Severo Sales in
favor of respondent Leonilo Gonzales.
Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan. Covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5861, the property had an area of 5,733 square meters more or less. 1 On July
4, 1955, Sales mortgaged said property, together with two other parcels of land, to Faustina P.
Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P2,240.00 payable
on or about July 4, 1956. 2 On October 30, 1957, Tax Declaration No. 5861 was canceled and in
lieu hereof, Tax Declaration No. 13647 was issued to Sales but the area of the property was
stated therein as 5,229 square meters more or less. 3

More than a year later, or on December 24, 1958, Sales, with the consent of his wife, Margarita
Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the same property in favor of their
daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. 4 The duly notarized deed of donation was
presented to the Assessor's Office on the day of its execution. Hence, Tax Declaration No.
13647 was replaced by two tax declarations: Tax Declaration No. 13875 5 in the name of
Esperanza Sales Bermudez for the 900-square-meter lot donated to her and Tax Declaration
No. 13874 6 in the name of Sales covering the remaining portion or 4,339 square meters.

As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, sometime in January 1959, the mortgaged property of Sales was set
for foreclosure. To prevent such foreclosure, Sales requested his friend, Ernesto Gonzales, to
pay his total indebtedness of P2,700 to the Agpoon spouses. 7 Ernesto Gonzales acceded to
the request and asked Sales and his wife to sign a document transferring the mortgage to him.
According to the Sales spouses, they were not given a copy of said document. 8 Around a
month later, Sales had the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5861 surveyed by a private
surveyor. 9

On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo Sales and Leonilo
Gonzales was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 10

In October 1968, Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale appearing to have been
signed by him and his wife on January 29, 1959 before ex-officio Notary Public Arturo Malazo in
San Manuel, Tarlac. The document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land described
under Tax Declaration No. 5861 in consideration of the amount of P4,000 to Leonilo Gonzales,
son of Ernesto Gonzales.

In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, (SP 42692) in the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, the land in question was claimed by respondent Leonilo Gonzales.
Subsequently, upon submission of the Deed of Sale between Severo Sales and Leonilo
Gonzales, the questioned land was excluded therefrom. 11 Said parcel of land was declared by
Leonilo Gonzales under Tax Declaration No. 12483. 12

On November 7, 1968, Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal detainer against Sales before
the Municipal Court of Bugallon. 13 Before the case could be tried, Sales and his daughter,
Esperanza Sales Bermudez filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch III a complaint
for annulment of the deed of sale between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud.
Consequently, the municipal court suspended the illegal detainer proceedings before it pending
the outcome of the annulment case.

On October 27, 1969, the Court of First Instance 14 rendered a decision finding that the
allegation of fraud was not supported by convincing evidence. Its dispositive portion reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, and
against the plaintiffs by:

1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;

2. Declaring that the defendant is the lawful owner of the land described in
Exhibits "2" and "2-A" (same as Exh. "H") and is, therefore, entitled to the
possession thereof;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendant the sum of
P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and

4. Ordering the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The lower court noted that while plaintiffs counsel claimed that Sales and his wife were
illiterates, their signatures on each page of the two-page deed of sale revealed "striking
features" of intelligence. The court added:

Defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is valid, it having
been properly executed and notarized, and is therefore a public document, and
carries weigh as provided for in Section 31, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Defendant likewise proved that the money paid by his father, Ernesto Gonzales
was his. Arturo V. Malazo, the Notary Public ex-officio and Justice of the Peace,
before whom the Deed of Sale was executed, testified personally in Court and
confirmed the genuineness and validity of the Deed of sale, together with the
signatures appearing therein, particularly those of the vendors Severo Sales and
Margarita Ferrer, and the witnesses thereto. The bare and naked assertions of
the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife, could not offset the presumption of
regularity as to the execution of the Deed of Sale, especially so, that the ratifying
officer was, and still is, a municipal judge. The contention of plaintiff Severo
Sales that he was made to sign the document hurriedly by the deceased Ernesto
Gonzales does not deserve credence, considering that he has affixed (sic) or
signed the said Deed of Sale no less than three (3) times, together with his wife
and the other witnesses. Considering the interest of the plaintiff Severo Sales
and his wife in this case, it could not overthrow the testimony of the Notary
Public ex-oficio Arturo V. Malazo. 15

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Sales and his daughter elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court erred in upholding the validity of the
deed of sale and in not considering the unschooled Sales as an illiterate executor thereof. On
December 19, 1974, the Court of Appeals16 affirmed the decision of the lower court but added
that the petitioners shall pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,000 as attorney's fees.
Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners primarily invoke Art. 1332 of the Civil Code which provides that when one of the
parties to a contract is unable to read, "or if the contract is in a language not understood by him,
and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms
thereof have been fully, explained to the former." Petitioners contend that respondent Gonzales
failed to prove that the contents of the deed of sale were ever explained to Sales, an illiterate.
They also argue that granting that the deed of sale was valid, the courts below failed to take into
consideration the fact that the deed of donation was executed ahead of the deed of sale and
must not, therefore, be disregarded considering that with reference to unregistered lands, an
earlier instrument prevails over a later one.

With regard to the issue of whether or not there was compliance with the provision of Art. 1332
of the Civil Code, before said article may be invoked, it must be convincingly established that
the disadvantaged party is unable to read or that the contract involved in written in a language
not understood by him. 17 It is the party invoking the benefits of Art. 1332 or Sales, who has the
burden of proving that he really is unable to read or that English, the language in which the deed
of sale was written, is incomprehensible to him. Only after sufficient proof of such facts may the
burden or proving that the terms of the contract had been explained to the disadvantaged party
be shifted to the party enforcing the contract, who, in this instance, is Leonilo Gonzales.

The records of this case, however, show that although Sales did not go to school and knew only
how to sign his name, 18 he and his wife had previously entered into contracts written in English:
first, when Sales mortgaged his property to Faustina P. Agpoon and second, when he donated
a portion of the property involved to his daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. 19 The
court below also noted the fact that the signatures of the Sales spouses in the deed of sale
showed the "striking features of the signatures of intelligent" individuals. Coupled with this is the
fact that in court, the Sales spouses themselves admitted that the signatures on the deed of
sale "looked like" their signatures. 20

But more revealing is the fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial
acknowledgment thereof, contains a statement that its executors were known to the notary
public to be the persons who executed the instrument; that they were "informed by me (notary
public) of the contents thereof" and that they acknowledged to the notary public that the
instrument was freely and voluntarily executed. 21 When he testified at the hearing, notary public
Arturo Malazo stated, "I know Mr. Severo Sales and he appeared before me when I notarized
that document." Later, he added that "the document speaks for itself and the witnesses were
there and those were the persons present" (sic). 22 Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners,
specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale pales in the face of Malazo's testimony
because the testimony of the notary public enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary
witness. 23

The extrinsic validity of the deed of sale is not affected by the fact that while the property subject
thereof is located in Bugallon, Pangasinan where the vendors also resided, the document was
executed in San Miguel, Tarlac. What is important under the Notarial Law is that the notary
public concerned has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial
jurisdiction. 24 A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document
concerned. 25 It also vests upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is
impugned by strong, complete and conclusive proof. 26 Such kind of proof has not been
presented by the petitioners.

While it seems improbable that Severo Sales sold the property described in Tax Declaration
5861 when in fact this had been subsequently cancelled already by Tax Declaration 13875 in
the name of Esperanza Sales Bermudez and by Tax Declaration No. 13874 in Severo Sales'
name, one can hardly ascribe bad faith to respondent, for unlike a title registered under the
Torrens System, a tax declaration does not constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a
registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land. 27

On the issue of whether or not the earlier deed of donation should "prevail" over the deed of
sale or be "recognized", petitioner invokes Nisce v. Milo 28 and Estate of Mota
v. Concepcion 29 which purportedly ruled that "with reference to unregistered lands, an earlier
instrument, be it a sale or
mortgage, prevails over a later one, and the registration of any one of them is immaterial." 30

The deed of donation explicitly provides that the land involved "has not been registered neither
under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. The parties hereto have agreed to register
this document under Act 3344." 31 Such agreement had to be expressly stipulated in the deed of
donation 32 because under Act 3344, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to effect any
registration unless the parties have expressly agreed to register their transaction thereunder. A
perusal of the records shows, however, that the deed of donation was not registered at all.
Besides, at the hearing, petitioners failed to show any evidence proving registration. Petitioners'
counsel even failed to secure a certification from the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan of its due
registration as directed by the trial judge.

Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donee thereby effectively
transmitting the rights to said property from Sales to his daughter, such deed, however, did not
bind Leonilo Gonzales, a third party to the donation. This is because non-registration of a deed
of donation under Sec. 1 of Act No. 3344 does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction, notwithstanding the provision therein which petitioners invoke that "any registration
made under this section shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a better
right" Petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez may not be a considered a third party 33 being the
daughter of the vendor himself and the "better right" possessed by a third party refers to other
titles which a party might have acquired independently of the unregistered deed such as title by
prescription. 34

We take note of the fact that while the Deed of Donation was not registered, the Deed of Sale
was registered as evidenced by the notation made by Cipriano Abenojar, Register of Deeds of
Lingayen, Pangasinan 35 and the official receipt issued by the Registry of Deeds. 36

Finally, we cannot be convinced that it is useless to register deeds or instruments affecting

unregistered lands because the books of registration provided under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code as Amended by Act 3344 continue to remain in force even to this day. In
fact, under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, instruments dealing with unregistered
lands can still be registered. 37

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Exh. A.

2 Exh. G.

3 Exh. B.

4 Exh. I.

5 Exh. J.

6 Exh. C.

7 TSN, August 6, 1969, p. 78.

8 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

9 Exh. F.

10 Exhibit 9, 9-A and 10.

11 Exhibit 11-E.

12 Exhibit 5.

13 TSN, May 13, 1969, p. 35.

14 Presided by Judge Jose C. de Guzman.

15 Record on Appeal, pp. 38-39.

16 Justice Ramon C. Fernandez, ponente, and Justices Ricardo C. Puno and

Mariano Serrano, concurring.

17 Bunyi v. Reyes, L-28845, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 504.

18 TSN, March 19, 1969, pp. 35-36.

19 Exhibits G & J.

20 TSN, March 19, 1969, p. 40; August 6, 1969, p. 82.

21 Exh. 2-A.

22 TSN, July 14, 1969, pp. 9 & 11.

23 Carandang-Collantes v. Capinco, G.R. No. 55373, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA
652.
24 Section 240, Article II Chapter 11 of the Revised, Administrative Code
(Notarial Law).

25 Ramirez v. Ner, Adm. Matter No. 500, September 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 207.

26 Castillo v. Castillo, L-18289, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 40; Gonzales v.

Court of Appeals, L-37453, May 25, 1979, 90 SCRA 185; Yturalde vi Azurin, L-
22158, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 407; Chilianchin v. Coquinco, 84 Phil. 714
(1949).

27 See David v. Bandin, L-48322, 49712, 49716, 49687, April 8, 1987, 149

SCRA 140.

28 62 Phil. 976 (1936), unpublished.

29 56 Phil. 712 (1932).

30 Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 6.

31 Exh. I.

32 The same stipulation appears in the deed of sale.

33 "Third Party" includes a member of the household or a member of the family

within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. (Moreno's Philippine Law
Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 948.)

34 Lichauco v. Berrenguer, 39 Phil. 643 (1919).

35 Exhibit 9-A.

36 Exhibit 10.

37 Section 3 of P.D. 1529, entitled, "Amending the Codifying the Laws relative to
Registration of Property and other purposes."
 A.C. No. 7169, March 11, 2019

SPOUSES RAY AND MARCELINA ZIALCITA, COMPLAINANTS, v. ATTY. ALLAN LATRAS,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

The case stemmed from an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by spouses Ray and
Marcelina Zialcita against Atty. Allan Latras for violation of the notarial law.

The spouses obtained a loan from a certain Ester Servacio to aid in the construction of their
commercial building. As security for the loan, a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase, for a
period of one year, over a commercial land and building, was executed by the spouses in favor
of Servacio in the amount of P11 Million. The spouses alleged that Servacio and Atty. Latras
fraudulently substituted the first page of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase with a Deed
of Absolute Sale for P2 Million. Furthermore, the spouses contended that Atty. Latras acted as
legal counsel and notary public for Servacio, and notarized the deed of absolute sale without
their knowledge and appearance in his office.

In his Comment, Atty. Latras denied having substituted the first page of the notarized document.
He contended that the burden to prove the allegation of such fraud rests upon the complainants.
To bolster his defense, he added that it was one of the spouses, Ray Zialcita, who asked for the
dispensation of their appearance. He further contended that as long as there was the affirmation
as to the contents and truth of what are stated in the document, then such notarization may be
considered as substantial compliance with the requirements under the notarial law.

On July 19, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) found that insofar as the violation of the notarial law by Atty. Latras is concerned, there is
no doubt that he did not act in accordance with the law. The Commission agreed with the
spouses that the notarial act must be done in the presence of the parties personally appearing.

However, the complainants failed to show that Atty. Latras acted fraudulently nor was with
connivance with anyone in notarizing the document; hence, the Commission recommended that
mere reprimand is sufficient.2

On September 27, 2014, a Resolution3 was passed by the IBP Board of Governors which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and for violation of the 2004
Rules of Notarial Practice, Atty. Allan Latras' notarial commission if presently commissioned is
immediately REVOKED.

FURTHER, he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years
and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. (Emphases and italics supplied.)
Atty. Latras moved for reconsideration of the above resolution, but the same was denied.
 The Court's Ruling

The Court upholds the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the necessity of the parties to personally
appear before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 and Rule IV, Section 2 (b) provide:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that
he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he
acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.

xxxx

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. — x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument
or document —
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or  otherwise   identified  by  the  notary  public 
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Latras notarized the subject document without the
personal appearance of the spouses. In fact, in his Comment,4 he admitted that he indeed
notarized the deed. Atty. Latras, however, reasoned out that he only followed the instruction of
Ray Zialcita to notarize the same without their presence and that he merely relied on the alleged
assurance of the spouses that they would be present on that weekend.

Atty. Latras' contention that there has been substantial compliance with the notarial law holds
no water. It is of no moment that he talked with the spouses over the phone and that, through
the presence of witnesses, he was able to verify that the signatures in the said document were
those of the spouses. This Court has repeatedly stressed in a number of cases the requirement
for the parties to personally appear before the notary public in the notarization of documents.
The purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging party before the
notary public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the former.5

Thus, in Agagon v. Bustamante,6 the Court explained that notarization of documents is not an

empty, meaningless or routinary act:
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a
private document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need
of preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe
utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.7
Clearly, Atty. Latras failed to exercise the due diligence required of him as a notary public when
he notarized the document without the spouses personally appearing before him.

As regards the alleged conspiracy of Atty. Latras and Servacio to substitute the first page of the
deed, it is elementary that in administrative complaints for disbarment and suspension against
lawyers, the required quantum of proof is clear and preponderant evidence.8 In this case,
however, the complainants failed to present any evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery
and fraud on the part of Atty. Latras. Hence, the same shall fail.

In Gonzales v. Bañares,9 the respondent lawyer was meted a penalty of revocation of notarial

commission and suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Court held the
respondent lawyer administratively liable for notarizing the subject deed of sale without the
affiant personally appearing before him. In Orola v. Baribar,10 the Court deemed it proper to
impose the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, revocation of
incumbent commission as a notary public, and disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years.

In line with the foregoing principles, the Court finds Atty. Latras administratively liable for
notarizing the subject document without the spouses personally appearing before him. He
cannot avoid responsibility by pointing out that he merely complied with the instruction of the
complainants to notarize the document without their presence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Allan Latras from the
practice of law for six (6) months, REVOKES his notarial commission, if presently
commissioned, and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years, all effective upon receipt of this Resolution. The Court
further WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be included in the personal records of Atty. Allan Latras and
entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Further, let copies of this Resolution be
disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang,*JJ., concur.

April 30, 2019

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on March 11, 2019 a Resolution, copy attached hereto, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on April 30, 2019 at 2:42 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
  Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
 Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.
1
Rollo, pp. 1-10.
2
Id. at 332-335; Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Maria Editha A. Go-
Binas.
3
Id at 331.
4
Id. at 38-55.
5
Orola, et al. v, Baribar, A.C. No. 6927, March 14, 2018.
6
 565 Phil. 581 (2007).
7
Id. at 587.
8
Cruz v. Arty. Centron, 484 Phil. 671 (2004).
9
 A.C. No. 11396, June 20, 2018.
10
Supra note 5.