THE NEW COLD WAR: EXPLAINING THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

THROUGH CLAUSEWITZIAN THEORIES

Date of submission: 25-04-2019

Word count: 1645

Pages: 9
 Introduction

War and its nature has existed since the beginning of recorded time, and can be found in all
parts of the world (Freedman, 1994, p. 3). Wars shape our international system and lead to
social and economic developments. We must study wars in order to contain them and reduce
their role in human affairs (Freedman, 1994, p. 5). Additionally, wars help us understand how
people, organizations and states adjust to changes, challenges and stress.

One of the most notorious authors in war studies, Von Clausewitz (1873), conceptualized
three aspects that govern the conduct of all wars. However, recent conflicts have led
researchers to conclude that the nature of war is evolving and adaptions to our understanding
of warfare are necessary (Schuurman, 2010, p. 89). This new school of thought argues that
modern developments create fundamental changes in the nature of war which leads modern
war to be inapplicable to the Clausewitzian concept (Kaldor, 2005). Specifically, critics have
argued that the trinity of war is relevant to nation states only, making it unsuitable to modern
forms of warfare (Schuurman, 2010). In order to conclude the applicability of Clausewitz’s
conceptualization on modern-day warfare, the Ukrainian crisis will be analyzed.

This paper aims to critically evaluate Clausewitz’s trinity of war, in order to conclude to what
extent it applies to modern warfare. The research question is: ‘To what extent does the
criticism misrepresent Clausewitz’s thinking on the nature of war, when analyzing the
Ukrainian crisis?’. This paper will first outline the main ideas of Clausewitz, then explain the
Ukrainian crisis, and lastly examine to what extent Clausewitzian theories can be applied to
this modern war. This paper concludes that Clausewitz (1873) still remains the most valuable
source in order to understand the nature of war.

2
 Methodology

In Clausewitz’s books (1873), two contradicting philosophical concepts are examined. These
are a result of his own ideological development throughout the years: what war looks in
theory (absolute war) and what war looks like in practice (real war). Both types of wars will
be examined in the following section. Afterwards the trinitarian nature of war will be
explained.

Absolute war is an example of what war could be when violence and destruction is
unmitigated (Heuser, 2002, p. 27). The Napoleonic wars and WWI are examples of absolute
wars – their aims and means were limitless (Heuser, 2002; Schuurman, 2010). The goal of
annihilating the opponent precedes all other goals, and only maximum use of force will lead
to success (Heuser, 2002, p. 28). Absolute wars are free from political constraints, almost
entirely apolitical, which allows war to reach its full potential (Heuser, 2002, p. 30).

However, in real wars, there are multiple political constraints that prevent the existence of an
absolute war (Heuser, 2002, p. 33). War is not an independent phenomenon but the
continuation of politics by other means. Political discourse between parties does not end
when wars do, but continues to exist and take on various forms (Heuser, 2002, p. 35). War is
thus never accidental, as it is always directed by political intentions (Heuser, 2002, p. 37).
Because real wars are continuously influenced by politics, they are less violent than absolute
wars (Heuser, 2002, p. 37). Additionally, the same goals can have varying values for different
individuals (Heuser, 2002, p. 36). This leads absolute wars to be inherently unpredictable and
difficult to control.

While Clausewitz describes war as a chameleon, ever-changing in its nature, he

conceptualizes the ‘paradoxical trinity of war’ – which explains fundamental principles of
war (Clausewitz, 1873, p. 89). The primary trinity states that war always contains some forms
of violence or emotional connotation; has some element of chance and probability; and war is
subject to rational purpose. The secondary trinity applies these three concepts by providing an
example of how these can be embedded in a war. For example, citizens are subjected to
emotion, military to chance and states implement policies on the basis of rational purpose.
Clausewitz additionally mentions a tertiary trinity, however, due to the scope of this research

3
it will not be discussed. The main take-away of this conceptualization is that war will always
contain aspects of violence, chance & rational purpose.

4
 Case description

The Ukrainian crisis has been coined as the worst crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold
War, comparable in its gravity with the Cuban missile crisis (Sakwa, 2015). Like before,
Europe finds itself in a new area of division and confrontation, this time sparked by the
Ukrainian war and on-going crises inside the European Union (EU) (McCormick, 2017;
Sakwa, 2015). The following section will establish how the Ukrainian crisis developed, in
order to evaluate to what extent Clausewitz’s trinity of war applies to modern cases.

While EU negotiations for a free trade and association agreement with Ukraine began in
2008, the election of Yanukovich in 2010 brought Ukraine back under the influence of Russia
(Rutland, 2015). That same year Yanukovich signed a deal to extend Russia’s lease of the
Sevastopol naval base, in return for a 30% cut in gas price; NATO membership aspirations
were abandoned; and limits on presidential power were overturned (Rutland, 2015, p. 132).
Despite these recent developments, the EU has pushed forward with its plans for Ukraine,
notably the implementation of a free trade agreement (Rutland, 2015).

On 21 November 2013 protests broke out in Kiev as a result of Yanukovich’s refusal to sign
this agreement with the EU and the further alignment with Russia (Menon & Rumer, 2015;
Rutland, 2015). Protests intensified and escalated to fights between protestors and police,
which resulted in violence dispersing to the Crimean peninsula (Menon & Rumer, 2015).
Soldiers in green uniforms without emblems started emerging whom fought alongside
insurgents. These soldiers were later confirmed to be backed by Russia (Walker, 2015). In
March, Crimea declared its independence and after a referendum it was annexed by Russia
(Menon & Rumer, 2015; Rutland, 2015). To this day, despite various attempts to resolve the
conflict, Ukraine is still intertwined in a conflict between Pro-Russian separatists and pro-
Western forces (Lansford, 2019).

5
 Analysis

Previous scholars explain the Ukrainian civil war as a result of Ukraine’s ambiguous
geopolitical stance and clumsy and self-centered interventions of opposing powers (Rutland,
2015). Furthermore, since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, there has been a domestic tension
between democratic principles and the logic of realpolitik (Rutland, 2015; Sakwa, 2015).
However, this analysis will examine to what extent Clauzewitzian theories can be applied, in
order to conclude if the conflict aligns with his conceptualization on the nature of war.

The emotional aspect of war is highlighted in tensions between opposing ideologies.

International players (Russia, the EU and the US) all backed one of the two ideas dominated
in Ukraine. An example of an actor that portrays this emotion the most, would be those
citizens that protested on the streets in 2014. Angered by increasing corruption and the
government’s decision to align with Russia, citizens are driven by these emotional
motivations. These emotions led to violence after the government cracked down on protestors
on 30th of November 2013. These emotions in turn shaped military strategy of the state and
insurgency groups.

The notion of chance is best represented by the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic
(DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR), whom are both backed by Russia
(Zadorozhny & Korotkyi, 2015). With various political goals, that were made aware to the
Ukrainian government, both insurgency groups developed a military doctrine. Both groups
declared their independence from Ukraine, and thus preside over some extent of autonomy
and authority (Yuhas & McCarthy, 2014). However, both groups are not formally recognized
by external powers (Hurak, 2015). DPR and LNR’s strategy has been one that is dependent
on control of territory and use of violence (Hurak, 2015). Because these forces are in fact on
the battle-field, they are subjected to uncertainty the most in comparison to all other actors.

Lastly, the condition of rational purpose is represented in the various states (Russia, the EU
and the US) that are involved in the conflict. All states were divided into opposing, self-
centered goals they wished to accomplish within Ukraine. The EU plan to unify Ukraine’s
economy was in conflict with Putin’s effort to create an economic union in the post-soviet
space (Rutland, 2015, p. 132). While the EU feels it has legitimacy over Ukraine because it
has similar cultural and historical ties, Russia used similar arguments when annexing the

6
Crimean peninsula, in which a Russian ethnic majority coincides (Menon & Rumer, 2015;
Jha, 2015). Both sides used propaganda and informational warfare to achieve their goals and
gain public support (Sakwa, 2015).

In conclusion, when applying the primary and secondary trinities to the Ukrainian crisis, it is
clear that these concepts still describe the fundamental nature of war. First of all, the
emotional nature of war was clearly represented in the growing tension between democratic
principles and the logic of realpolitik. Both ideologies have led citizens to the use of violence.
While the examples of actors mostly subjected to chance has shifted from state-based military
to private military organizations, the Ukrainian crisis nevertheless presides over forces that
are most subjected to this aspect. Lastly, the rational nature of war is still represented by
nation states. All states hoped to achieve various goals, all using informational warfare and
the sponsoring of insurgency groups as their means to achieve these goals.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that Clausewitz’s trinity of war is still relevant in this age, however, the
types of actors that are most subjected to certain natures of war is evolving. The secondary
trinity must thus be understood as a mere example which can be susceptible to change.
Clausewitz himself even mentions war to be ‘’like a chameleon – ever-changing in its
nature’’ (Clausewitz, 1873, p. 89). Overall, analysis of the Ukrainian crisis has shown the
trinitarian concept of violence, chance and reason to still be applicable to modern wars.

7
 References

Freedman, L. (1994). General Introduction. In War (pp. 3-8). Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.

Gray, C. (2012). War, Peace and International Relations (2nd ed., pp.17-32.), “Chapter 2:
Clausewitz and the theory of war”. New York: Routledge.

Heuser, B. (2002). Reading Clausewitz. “Chapter 1: The Story of the Man and the Book”,
pp.1-23. Pimlico.

Heuser, B. (2002). Reading Clausewitz. “Chapter 2: Clausewitz the Idealist vs. Clausewitz
the
Realist”. pp.24-43. Pimlico.

Hurak, I. (2015). The Minsk Agreements of 2015: A Forced Step or A Small Achievement of
the Ukrainian Side Within the Diplomatic Confrontation Around the War in the
Donbas. The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies. 1(7). pp. 124-140.

Jha, K., L. (2015, March 14). US sanctions individuals, entities involved in Ukraine crisis.
[Greater Kashmir]. Retrieved from https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/world/us-
sanctions-individuals-entities-involved-in-ukraine-crisis/

Kaldor, M. (2005). Elaborating the ‘new war (Doctoral dissertation, thesis. In I. Duyvesteyn,
& J. Angstrom (Eds.), Rethinking the nature of war. London & New York: Frank
Cass).

Lansford, T. (Ed.). (2019). Political handbook of the world 2018-2019. Cq Press.

McCormick, J. (2017). Understanding the European Union. A Concise Introduction (7th ed.).
London: Palgrave.

Menon, R., & Rumer, E. (2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The unwinding of the post-Cold War
Order. Boston: Boston University Press.

8
Rutland, P. (2015). An unnecessary war: the geopolitical roots of the Ukraine crisis. In A.
Pikulicka & R. Sakwa (Eds.). Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and
Perspectives (pp. 129-140). Bristol, UK: E-International Relations.

Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B Tauris.

Schuurman, B. (2010). Clausewitz and the ‘’New Wars’’ Scholars. Parameters: Journal of
the
US Army War College. 40(1). pp. 89-100.

Villacres, E. J., & Bassford, C. (1995). Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity. Parameters 20,
9-19.

Von Clausewitz, C. (1873). On War. (Howard, M. & Brodie, B., Trans.) Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.

Walker, S. (2015, December 17). Putin admits Russian military presence in Ukraine for the
first time. [The Guardian]. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/vladimir-putin-admits-russian-
military-presence-ukraine

Yuhas, A. & McCarthy, T. (2014, April 16). Crisis in east Ukraine: a city-by-city guide to
the
spreading conflict. [The Guardian]. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/16/crisis-east-ukraine-city-by-city-
guide-map

Zadorozhny, O. & Korotkyi, T. (2015). Legal Assesment of the Russian Federation’s Policy
in
the Context of the Establishment and Activities of Terrorist Ogranisations ‘Donetsk
People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) in Eastern
Ukraine. International Law and Relations. 2(1). pp. 8-18.

9
 Appendix

Figure 1: The Clausewitzian “Paradoxical Trinity”

Primary trinity Secondary trinity Tertiary trinity

Violence/emotion People Irrational

Chance/luck Military Non-rational

Rational purpose Government Rational

10