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FROM PARTY POLITICS TO

PERSONALIZED POLITICS?
COMPARATIVE POLITICS
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Reforming Democracy
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of Organizational Change
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How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy
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From Party Politics to

Personalized Politics?
Party Change and Political
Personalization in Democracies
GIDEON RAHAT AND OFER KENIG
1
3
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Acknowledgments
This book marks a milestone on our academic journey, during the course of
which we have met many wise and thoughtful people; the insights that they
shared with us often informed our work. To all of them we offer thanks, and
none of them should be blamed for our faults.
We are grateful to Helene Helboe Pedersen, who made Gideon’s visit to the
department of political science at Aarhus University in Denmark so fruitful
for this project; her ongoing encouragement and observations were also much
appreciated. We thank the participants in a two-day workshop and Helene’s
colleagues and students for their valuable comments. Our gratitude also goes
to Karina Pedersen, for the opportunity she gave us to present our work to her
students and colleagues at Copenhagen University. We thank those who
participated in the workshops and conferences where we presented parts of
our work and had the opportunity to hear about other studies on party change
and political personalization—particularly at the 2016 ECPR workshop
“Institutionalization and De-Institutionalization of Political Organizations”
in Pisa, Italy, led by Robert Harmel and Lars Svåsand, and at the Third
Annual BAGSS Conference in Bamberg, Germany. Our thanks go especially
to Thomas Saalfeld and Agata Maria Kraj and to the members of the panel on
“Party Change and Reform” at the ECPR General Conference in Oslo, Norway,
in September 2017, Matthias Dilling in particular. Many thanks also to the
participants in the Political Science Department seminar at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem for their comments and encouragement.
Appreciation goes to our friend and colleague Bill Cross, who arranged two
workshops on political personalization, in Banff in 2016 and in Toronto in
2017. In addition, we benefited from conversations with the many wise
women and men who participated in those events and from reading the papers
presented there. Special thanks to Anika Gauja, our friend and colleague, who
commented most appositely on two papers that became chapters in this book.
There are many others whose contribution allowed us to complete this
project: Gideon’s research assistants, Shahaf Zamir and Avital Friedman,
built the database that allowed us to examine personalization online. Alona
Dolinsky also deserves thanks for helping us with data analysis. We also
benefited enormously from the data-mining efforts of our colleagues around
the world: Maria Bäck, Stefanie Bailer, Amanda Bittner, Ruth Dassonneville,
Stefaan Fiers, Adam Gendzwill, Ken Hijino, Lauri Karvonen, André Krouwel,
Jean-Benoit Pilet, Antti Pajala, Scott Pruysers, Arjan Schakel, and Davide
Vampa. And special thanks are due to Elisa Volpi, who generously shared
vi Acknowledgments
with us her original data on party switching. Apologies if we forgot anyone, but
your contribution is included in these pages.
In addition, a number of researchers in legislatures around the world made
great efforts to provide us with data on the submission of private member bills
(Appendix 15). We were most impressed with your willingness to help! The
same goes for the country experts who responded so swiftly to our request for the
names of three prominent politicians from each party (list in Appendix 17).
It has been an honor to share our journey with Reuven Hazan, a fellow
traveler to partyland, and with Tamir Sheafer, Shaul Shenhav, and Meital
Balmas, fellow travelers to personalization-land. In addition, Pazit Ben-
Noon-Blum and Matan Sharkanski are always a source of wisdom for us.
Thousands of thanks to Lisa Perlman for her wisdom, kindness, and perfect
editing; and the same for the Oxford University Press people who skillfully
handled the various stages of the review and publication process.
Finally, a shout out to the Israel Institute that helped fund the database of
online personalization at its inception. We also thank the Ashkelon Academic
College for its help in funding this project.
Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
1. Introduction 1
Part I. Party Change

2. Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 15
3. Indicators of Party Change 42
4. The Presence and Success of National-Level Parties in Local
and Regional Elections 68
5. A Cross-National Comparison of Party Change 91
Part II. Political Personalization

6. Political Personalization: Definition, Typology, and Causes 115
7. Indicators of Political Personalization 137
8. Parties versus Politicians Online 171
9. A Cross-National Analysis of Political Personalization 192
Part III. Party Change and Political Personalization

10. Party Change and Political Personalization: A Critical
Overview of the Literature 223
11. Party Change and Political Personalization: An Empirical
Analysis 243
12. Summary and Conclusions 255
Appendices 265
References 333
Author Index 369
Index 376
List of Figures
2.1 A Graphic Illustration of the Coverage of the Indicators

of Partyness Regarding the Party–Society Linkage 30
5.1 Change in Partyness per Indicator 99
5.2 Average Change in Partyness by Country 102
6.1 Political Personalization: Types and Subtypes 118
6.2 Causes of Personalization 126
7.1 Selectorates: From the Most Personalized to the Most
Depersonalized 151
9.1 Political Personalization per Indicator 194
9.2 Average Personalization by Country (Average of Indicators) 200
9.3 Average Personalization by Country (Average of Dimensions) 200
9.4 Personalization of Countries with and without Indicators
of Online Personalization 204
9.5 The Relationship between the Rankings of Countries in Terms
of Self-Expression Values and Offline Political Personalization 209
11.1 The Relationship between Changes in Partyness and Political
Personalization 244
11.2 The Relationship between Changes in Partyness and Offline
Political Personalization 248
List of Tables
2.1 The Selected Dozen Indicators of Partyness 29

3.1 Change in the Party Background of Ministers 45
3.2 Change in the Party Background of Legislators 47
3.3 Change in the Proportion of Party Members in the Electorate
(M/E in %) 50
3.4 Change in Party–Interest Group Relationships 52
3.5 Change in Party Identification 55
3.6 Change in Net Electoral Volatility (Pedersen Index) 57
3.7 Change in Electoral Turnout 59
3.8 Change in the Effective Number of Parties among Voters (ENPV) 62
3.9 Change in Party System Innovation: Total Share of Votes (%)
Given to New Parties 65
3.10 Survival of Old (Founder/Traditional) Parties: Share of Votes
for “New” Parties in the Most Recent Elections up to 2015 66
4.1 Percentage of Votes or Seats for Local Parties in Local
(Municipal) Elections: National Summaries 76
4.2 Change in the Percentage of Seats Held by Local
Parties/Independents in the Municipal Councils of the Five
Largest Cities 79
4.3 Calculating the Dissimilarity Index for Austria 86
4.4 Dissimilarity Index: Vote in the Region for National Elections vs.
Vote in the Region for Regional Elections: Averages by Decade 87
4.5 National-Level Parties in Local and Regional Elections:
Summary of Findings (Partyness Index) 88
5.1 Changes in the Partyness of Legislators and Changes in the
Partyness of Ministers 93
5.2 Pairwise Comparisons of the Trend in Partyness for Indicators
Concerning the Mediators (Number of Countries) 94
5.3 Indicators of Party–Voters Relationship (Partyness Index) 96
5.4 Pearson Correlations between the Indicators of Partyness 98
5.5 Change in Partyness per Indicator and Dimension 101
xii List of Tables

5.6 Partyness at Starting Point and Change in Partyness
(Countries’ Ranking) 105
5.7 Levels of Variance in Partyness at Start and End Points
(Standard Deviation and Range) 106
5.8 Self-Expression Values, Change in Partyness, and Partyness at
End Point in Twenty-Six Democracies (Countries’ Rankings) 107
5.9 Party Switching 1960–9 and 2001–10: Average per Year
(in Percentages) 111
7.1 Indicators of Political Personalization 138
7.2 Personalization and Depersonalization of the Electoral System
for the Lower House of Parliament, 1960–2015 143
7.3 Prime-Ministerial Power and Presidentialization 144
7.4 The Adoption of Direct Elections for National, Regional,
and Local Chief Executives 147
7.5 Personalization of Leadership Selection, 1975–2015 152
7.6 Personalization of Candidate Selection 153
7.7 Personalization in Uncontrolled Media Coverage of Politics 156
7.8 Parties and Electoral Lists that Included Their Leaders’ Names
in Their Name, 1965–2015 159
7.9 Change in Patterns of Private Member Bills Submission 162
7.10 Change in the Number of Coalition Members per Minister 165
7.11 Trends in Voters’ Personalized Behavior 169
8.1 Number of Facebook Updates and the Online Personalization
Index for the UK Parties January 15–February 14, 2015 180
8.2 Number of Facebook “Likes” and the Online Personalization
Index for UK Parties 180
8.3 Share (in Percentages) of Parties, Party Leaders, and Prominent
Politicians Who Had Websites, Facebook and Twitter Accounts
in February 2015 182
8.4 Parties or Party Leaders Online: Who Was There First? 185
8.5 Facebook, Supply, and Consumption: The Online
Personalization Index of Party Leaders/Prominent
Politicians: Parties 186
8.6 Actors with the Highest Numbers of Facebook “Likes” 189
9.1 Personalization by Indicator and Dimension 196
9.2 Personalization by Dimension 198
List of Tables xiii

9.3 A Comparison between Karvonen’s (2010) Estimations and
Our Estimations of Personalization by Countries 205
9.4 Partyness at Starting Point and Personalization
(Countries’ Ranking) 207
9.5 Self-Expression Values, Change in Partyness and Partyness at
End Point in Twenty-Six Democracies (Countries’ Ranking) 208
9.6 Trust in Political Parties and Trust in Politicians: A Comparison 214
11.1 Levels of Change: Partyness by Personalization 246
11.2 Levels of Change: Partyness by Offline Personalization 249
11.3 Pearson Correlations between Change in Partyness (Average
of Indicators) and Political Personalization (Average
of Dimensions) 251
Introduction
The “century that has just started will be the age of personalization, just as the
previous one was the century of mass collective actors—a trend that political
science has a duty to consider with greater attention.” With these words
Musella and Webb (2015: 226) end their introductory chapter to a special
issue of Italian Political Science Review on “The Personal Leader in Contem-
porary Party Politics.” From a broader historical perspective, what we have
witnessed in recent decades may be “the comeback of personal power” (Calise
2011: 3). Alternatively, perhaps, what we are currently witnessing is not a
complete change or comeback but rather a synthesis of partisan and person-
alized politics.
This book will examine two of the most prominent developments in con-
temporary democratic politics: the change in party–society linkage and pol-
itical personalization. The former is manifested in many ways: from changes
in the party background of politicians to changes in the density of party
membership; and from changes in party–interest group relationships to
assorted aspects of voter behavior (such as electoral turnout and electoral
volatility). We will refer to all these elements as pointing to an increase,
decline, or no change in partyness.1 The latter development, political person-
alization, is the process by which the weight of the group (in this book, the
political party) declines in politics, while the centrality of individual politi-
cians rises. This phenomenon is multifaceted and is reflected in changes in
political institutions, in the ways in which politics is presented and covered by
the media, and in the behavior of both politicians and voters.
These two phenomena appear to be related: when parties decline, it would
be reasonable to expect that the weight of individual politicians in politics will
increase. Up until now, the analysis of these relationships was limited either to
1
We borrowed the term “partyness” from Dalton and Wattenberg (2000b), though they were
not the first to use it (see, for example, Katz 1987). The term “partisanship” was rejected because it
is used in the research literature either to denote the attachment of voters’ sentiments to parties or
specifically in relation to party identity (see, for example, Dalton 2000; Dalton and Weldon 2007).
Partyness is a wider concept that can be applied to voters and also to other elements, such as
ministers’ and MPs’ party backgrounds, links of parties with interest groups, and the status of
national parties at the local and regional levels.
2 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

specific aspects of these phenomena (Renwick and Pilet 2016) or to single-
country studies (Wattenberg 1994). No study has empirically examined, in a
comprehensive manner, the relationship between these two developments
from a cross-national comparative perspective. Moreover, while decline in
the party–society link may be a necessary condition for personalization,
personalization is not a necessary outcome of party change, because actors
other than individual politicians (e.g., the media, interest groups, courts) may
take over some of the functions previously assumed by political parties. In
addition, it is plausible to suggest that in some cases personalization will be
channeled in ways that may not hurt the party or may even strengthen it.
THE GOALS OF THE BOOK
In these pages we endeavor to take the cross-national comparative study of party

change, of political personalization, and of the relationship between them a step
forward. With regard to party change, no study, to the best of our knowledge,
offers a comparative cross-national estimation of variance in the levels and
patterns of party change among countries.2 The literature on party change has
thus far acknowledged the differences between countries but has tended to
overlook them, sacrificing them to the “party decline” versus “party adaptation”
debate, as it is usually framed (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011 and Mair
2013 are among the most prominent recent works on the subject).
Our aim is not merely to examine and integrate the existing data but to
inject fresh cross-national comparative data into the study. This addition is
particularly pertinent to the almost neglected aspect of the presence and
success of national parties at local and regional levels. Beyond some single-
case studies (Åberg and Ahlberger 2015; Brichta 1998), there are several
comparative studies that throw light on this aspect (Dandoy and Schakel
2013; Detterbeck 2012; Reiser and Holtmann 2008a), but, to date, it has not
featured in the general study of party change.
As for political personalization, the book presents a more comprehensive
cross-national analysis than other studies, in terms of both number of countries
and indicators (Downey and Stanyer 2010; Karvonen 2010). The literature
offers some good theoretical reasons for expecting political personalization.
The decline in the party–society linkage, the mediatization of politics (especially
through television, with its visual emphasis) and the overall cultural process of
individualization all suggest that we might find clear evidence of a general trend
2
Krouwel (2012) is something of an exception, although he takes a different direction, as
elaborated in Chapter 2, “A Variance-Based Approach.”
Introduction 3
toward political personalization. Yet most studies until now did not detect such
evidence (Adam and Maier 2010; Karvonen 2010). By emphasizing variance
among countries, this book will take the first step toward bridging the gap
between the very good theoretical reasons we have to expect political personal-
ization and the generally weak empirical findings. In addition, it will outline the
most expansive cross-national comparison of online personalization to date.
This area has been researched, but not in a comprehensive manner, which
directly compares the activity of parties and politicians and how online person-
alization is consumed in twenty-five countries, as will be done here.
Finally, regarding the relationship between the decline of the party–society
linkage and political personalization, many studies claim, logically, that party
change breeds political personalization (Karvonen 2010; McAllister 2007;
Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny 2012). However, except for Wattenberg’s
(1994) study of American politics, no work has empirically examined these
relationships. Having completed the two preliminary tasks of measuring the
levels of party change and measuring the levels of political personalization
(each one important in its own right), the book is then able to systematically
analyze the relationship between the two phenomena.
The three main research questions that guided us are as follows. First, are
there significant differences in the levels and patterns of party change among
democracies? If there are, how can we explain them? Second, are there signifi-
cant differences in the levels and patterns of political personalization among
democracies? Again, if there are, how can we explain these differences? Third,
what is the relationship between party change and political personalization?
The emphasis on variance across states and on the development of the
numerous aspects and dimensions of party change and political personaliza-
tion exposes differences and leads to a richer and better informed discussion.
In the case of party change, it offers an analytical framework that extends
beyond the dichotomous debate of party decline versus party adaptation.
In the matter of political personalization, as noted, the emphasis on variance
helps in bridging between the high theoretical expectations and the dis-
appointing empirical findings. As for the theoretically sound linkage between
the two phenomena, this volume not only is the first to submit it to a
comprehensive cross-national examination, but it also proposes a more
nuanced understanding of this relationship.
THE SCOPE AND LEVEL OF THE ANALYSIS
Current comparative politics literature points to an array of recent develop-

ments in the field, for example on the decline in partisanship (Dalton and

Wattenberg 2000a; Mair 2013), the expansion of political opportunities
beyond party politics (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003), the presidentializa-
tion of politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005a; Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny
2012), the growth of power of independent lists in local politics (Reiser and
Holtmann 2008a), changes in party membership (Van Haute and Gauja
2015; Scarrow 2015), institutional reforms (Bedock 2017), electoral reforms
(Renwick and Pilet 2016), party reforms (Gauja 2017b), the opening up of
leadership and candidate selection methods (Cross and Blais 2012; Cross
and Pilet 2015; Hazan and Rahat 2010), and the changing relations of
center-left parties with trade unions (Allern and Bale 2017). This book can
be seen as an ambitious attempt to present an integrated analysis of all these
developments as facets of two superdevelopments: party change and polit-
ical personalization.
Party change and political personalization can be analyzed at various
levels: the country level, the party level, and, in the case of personalization,
the individual level. This study will focus on variance at the country level. It is
based on the premise that in modern representative democracies political
parties operate mainly in relation to other parties within their specific party
system. That is, parties compete and cooperate with other parties at the
national level and are deeply influenced by these interactions. Even in a
globalized world, each country has its specific political, social, institutional,
and economic order, which justifies its being treated as an autonomous polit-
ical unit. It is not only the case that countries differ when comparison is at the
country level (e.g., their national electoral systems); studies also recognize
significant similarities between subsystems (regions, municipalities, parties)
within a given country and significant differences between these subsystems
and their counterparts in other countries. These within-country similarities
stem from the fact that the subunits are nested within the national order.
Indeed, in his concluding overview to the collection Organizing Political
Parties, Katz (2017: 326) observes:
One important result common to most of the chapters in this volume is to

highlight the importance of national differences, which virtually always
overwhelm everything else. This is certainly evident in the various com-
parisons of nation versus party family as a distinguishing characteristic,
but it can also be evident when either system-level variables or country
dummies are included in explanatory models.
Having said that, it is of course also possible to study the phenomena both at
the party level and at the individual level, and even to account for the influence
of the country by including it as a control variable in the analysis. Kölln (2015a)
has made a convincing study of party change at the party level and identified
differences among party families. When studying political personalization, one
may argue, for example, that radical and extreme right-wing parties typically
Introduction 5
are highly personalized by comparison to parties from other families. Yet, in
view of the task we set ourselves here—of looking at both phenomena from the
broadest possible perspective—and in view of the limitations of the available
data, we will focus on the country level.
THE RESEARCH POPULATION: COUNTRIES

DURING A SPECIFIC PERIOD
Our starting point is the early 1960s. This decade is relevant to both phenom-
ena under investigation. It can be seen as representing a “golden age,” the
heyday of the mass political party, when parties were the central political
actors. The early 1960s can also be seen as the beginning of the new age of
mass-political communication (marked by the famous Nixon–Kennedy tele-
vised debate in the United States), which is characterized by the rise of
television and its personalizing influence (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999).
Our end point is the most recent one we could manage: 2015. Unfortunately,
many pieces of data that were collected fail to cover the entire span of about
fifty years, but the 1960s is the initial reference point and the aspiration was to
cover as many years as possible.
Our group of democracies, twenty-six in total, includes a core of veteran
and established democracies. After all, we are dealing with processes whose
starting point is in the 1960s; thus first- and second-wave democracies should
be our main focus. This group of countries contains longtime European
democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom) and veteran democracies elsewhere in the world (Australia,
Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand). We also examine here early third-wave
(Greece, Portugal, Spain) and late third-wave democracies (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland).
We did not include presidential democracies in our study, because parties
play a substantially different role in such systems of government (Samuels and
Shugart 2010) and because the inherently personalized nature of such a regime
would have overburdened the study. Most of the countries are purely parlia-
mentarian, while a few belong, according to the various definitions of scholars,
in an interim category.3 This implies that, by comparison to presidentialized
3
Following Samuels and Shugart (2010: 32–3), seventeen of the countries in our group were
parliamentary (including Israel, except for the period 1996–2003), five were premier-presidential
(prominent among them is France), and one, Austria, was president-parliamentary. The most
presidential country, according to these authors’ categorization, is Austria, which, in its

systems, and especially to the presidential regime types, parties should be
relatively central actors in their politics, while levels of personalization can
be expected to be lower (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Yet it emerges that these
countries differ in many aspects, from their general institutional order (con-
sensus versus majoritarian, federal versus unitary) and electoral system to their
political cultures (Lijphart 2012). Overall, our group covers almost all cases of
nonpresidential veteran democracies, together with cases of younger democ-
racies. This variance in the potential independent variables allows us a fair
chance to explain the varying levels of party change and personalization.
IMPORTANT NOTE: LET’S NOT FORGET THAT

WE ARE STUDYING PROCESSES
The aim of this book is to study processes, developments over time, and not a
static condition such as the polities’ level of partyness or of personalized
politics. It is highly likely that there is variance among countries regarding
the starting points. In some countries, parties were the dominant actors in
politics in the 1960s, while in others they were “just” central actors; similarly,
some countries had a more personalized politics than others. This means, for
example, that some countries that started from “higher” partyness points may
have witnessed high levels of party decline and yet came up (at the end point)
with a higher level of partyness than countries that experienced smaller
changes. For example, 14.3 percent of the Danish electorate around 1960
were party members, by comparison to 4.1 percent around 2008, while only
2.7 percent of the German electorate in 1960 were party members, by com-
parison to 2.3 percent around 2008. Thus Denmark experienced a much
steeper decline (in absolute and relative terms), yet retained a much higher
level of party membership than Germany, which saw a much smaller decline.
We should not only keep this in mind, but relate to it in our analysis of change.4
parliamentary de facto dynamic, is an outlier in their group. Switzerland, Iceland, and

Luxembourg are not included in their categorization. Luxembourg can clearly be claimed to
belong in the parliamentary group, while Iceland is more parliamentary than presidential. The
exception, for all the types, is Switzerland, and its inclusion is beneficial, as demonstrated in the
analysis, owing to its different features. It can thus be claimed that our group is about
parliamentary democracies and additional regime types that tend to be parliamentary more
than presidential.
4
For example, at least on the basis of these limited pieces of information, we may argue that
party decline is about convergence (however, in Chapter 5, “Party Change: A Comparison
between Democracies,” we will see that this not the case).
Introduction 7
THE METHODOLOGICAL PATH
Due to lack of comprehensive data, many studies in political science (includ-

ing some of our own) focus their efforts on the limited area where the lamp
post shines its light. Scholars understandably prefer to probe those cases
they are more familiar with and often limit themselves to the use of existing
or more readily accessible data. To a certain degree, this is an inevitable
result of real limitations of knowledge and resources. Yet a review of the
literature reveals that there are studies that may be relevant to a wider
approach to the phenomenon of party change and political personalization.
For example, studies of political recruitment and regional and local politics
can also contribute to the study of party change, while studies of institu-
tional reforms at the state and party levels may benefit the study of political
personalization.
Indeed, the strategy adopted here is one that applies the broadest possible
perspective in terms of indicators of both phenomena. That is, instead of the
few indicators of relatively high quality and specific properties that allow for
some sophisticated analysis, this study looks at a wider set of indicators. These
cover much more ground but are necessarily of a lower quality and compel
us to process the data in a manner that will take their weaknesses into
consideration.
Our data come from various sources: first, extensive data mining from
works of other scholars; second, analyses based on available cross-national
(e.g., Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, World Value Survey) and
national political surveys (e.g., national elections studies); third, analyses
based on newly available databases concerning aspects of party change (e.g.,
Members and Activists of Political Parties, MAPP); and, fourth, analyses of
original material that include, where needed, updating the data, making
additions to them, and also collecting and coding new data on our own,
from scratch.
There were several challenges to our ambitious aim to cover as much
ground as possible in terms of data gathering, coding, and analysis. First,
the availability of data. For some countries, almost all data are available, at a
rather satisfactory quality and with coverage of almost all the period in
question, but for others this is not the case. We are studying here processes
that developed over more than half a century. Some data from the past can no
longer be gathered, whether or not they ever existed. Questions that were not
asked in surveys decades ago are a clear case in point. The other side of the
coin is that today’s trend of establishing online data sets and our newfound
ability to conduct online searches for stats that are hiding in books and articles
mean that we are much richer in data by comparison to previous generations
of scholars, and even to ourselves just a decade ago.

A second challenge regards the quality of the data. Some indicators are
based on data drawn from electoral records (e.g., electoral volatility, turnout)
that are of high quality. Others are based on surveys, and thus suffer to a
greater or lesser degree from the problems that arise when surveying citizens,
from ensuring the representativeness of the sample to phrasing questions in an
optimal manner. And these are relatively easy to handle by comparison to
cases in which one has to base the coding of the various aspects of the
phenomena on scholars’ analyses of case studies.
The reliability of the data was a third challenge. A relevant example is the
Pedersen (1979) index that is used to measure net electoral volatility and
serves as a possible sign of party change. That is, when volatility increases,
it is a sign of decline in party loyalty and one of the indicators of dealignment.
This measure seems to be straightforward. All one has to do in order to
compute it is to detract the percentage of votes each party won in election
t from the percentage of vote it won in election t-1, add up all the products,
and divide the sum by two. Yet the problem is that this computation requires
us to face the complex reality of splits and mergers and in general the
complicated issue of defining what constitutes a new party (Barnea and
Rahat 2011). And then different scholars offer different answers to this
question, if they address it at all.
A fourth challenge that is especially relevant to this study is comparability.
Many of the codings of indicators are based on single-case studies or com-
parisons of several cases. These have to be “translated” and integrated into
one database. Even when there are seemingly comparable data, for example
of party membership, their nature may differ across countries and even within
countries, in ways that affect the numbers (amount paid, obligations, etc.; see
Scarrow 2015). In some cases, data are simply not comparable. For example,
party membership in Iceland could not be included because parties seem to
accumulate members—once a person joins, she is a member for life, without
any obligations (Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015).
We must cope with these challenges, because our aim is to look at the
phenomena from a wide angle rather than using the best available data as a
“proxy” for the study. We thus looked for a way to include the less than
perfect and much less than perfect data we gathered as well. This led us to
search for a remedy in the field of qualitative comparative analysis, which
proposes dealing with such difficulties by calibrating the data (Downey and
Stanyer 2010). That is, we translated each indicator of party change or
political personalization into a five-point scale ( 2, 1, 0, 1, 2). In this way
we limited our analysis to two levels of change for each direction (high or
moderate increase or decrease) and to one level of no trend. In addition, we
invested much effort in being transparent with our data, as is evident from the
number and richness of our twenty-one appendices. We also came up with
various other solutions to these problems, as will be elaborated in the sections
Introduction 9
“Coping with the Challenges of Measuring Variance in Party Change” in
Chapter 2 and “On the Processing of the Data” in Chapter 3, and in the
discussion of each indicator in Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8.
BOOK PLAN
The logic of the structure of the book is very plain. Part I focuses on party
change. It starts with a chapter that lays out the conceptual and theoretical
foundations for the later chapters, which offer an empirical analysis of the
phenomena. The end product is a broad cross-national analysis of party
change that allows us to identify both the general trend and the variance
among countries. Part II follows the same path, this time for political person-
alization. Part III examines the links between these two phenomena. It starts
with a critical review of the literature and ends with an empirical analysis that
uses the two data sets presented in the previous chapters in order to examine
the relationship between party change and personalization.
Part I, then, examines party change. Its first chapter, Chapter 2, sets the
theoretical and conceptual basis for the attempt made in the subsequent three
chapters to analyze party change from a cross-national comparative perspec-
tive. Here we argue that, while the literature frames the study of party change
around (1) a broad agreement concerning the very existence of a change and
(2) a debate that revolves around the depth and meaning of this change
(decline or adaptation), it tends to overlook cross-country variance. In order
to map variance, a dozen viable indicators of party change are identified. The
chapter also describes the methodological barriers for conducting research on
longitudinal cross-country variance and the ways in which they were
addressed. In addition, it discusses other indicators that were not included
in the analysis, explaining why they were left out, and assesses the cost of their
exclusion.
Chapter 3 starts with a brief explanation of data processing and then turns
to examine nine of the twelve indicators of party change. These include widely
used ones (e.g., party membership, electoral volatility, electoral turnout) as
well as several that have been proposed and examined by only a few scholars
(partyness of ministers and members of parliament, party–unions relation-
ships, continuity of parties). All these indicators examine the direct and
indirect links of parties with society. The indirect, mediated links include the
relationship between the extra-parliamentary organization and the “party in
government,” the party and its members, and the party and interest groups.
The direct links with voters include voter attitudes toward parties, as well as
patterns of voter behavior and the resulting party system. The significance of

each indicator is explained, its advantages and limitations are examined, and
the trends over time for each indicator are discussed.
Chapter 4 detects patterns of stability and change in the strength of national
parties at the local and regional levels. It starts by explaining why the presence
of national parties at subnational levels should be regarded as an important
indicator of partyness. It continues by justifying the expectations for the
decline of national parties at these levels. It then turns to analyze the per-
formance of the national parties. This is done using three different measure-
ments: the proportion of local-level parties’ votes or seats in local elections;
the proportion of their seats in the councils of the five largest cities in each
country; and their proportion in holding the mayor’s position. In the regional
arena, the indicator used is the change in the level of dissimilarity between
voting in regional and in national elections.
Chapter 5, which concludes Part I, gives an integrative view of the dozen
indicators of party change. This includes, first, a separate examination of the
relationship between indicators within the three main types of links: through
socialization (party background), through mediators (party membership,
interest groups, local and regional government) and directly (voter stands
and behaviors). Second comes an analysis of the findings per indicator and
dimension. An analysis by country comes next. Finally, we look at the
available data on the development of party switching over the years, in
order to determine whether parties in some countries already ceased to exist
and became just formal and nominal entities.
Part II examines political personalization. The opening chapter lays down
the conceptual and theoretical basis for the analysis of political personaliza-
tion from a cross-national perspective. It proposes a definition of political
personalization and closely examines its core meaning, its broadness, and the
implications of perceiving personalization as a process. A typology of perso-
nalizations is presented, differentiating between institutional, media, and
behavioral types and between subtypes within each category. In addition,
the chapter examines what the research literature has to say about the general
causes of political personalization and about the relationships between its
different types.
Chapter 7 identifies ten viable indicators that cover all types and subtypes of
offline political personalization: institutional personalization of both govern-
mental institutions (the electoral system and the executives) and nongovern-
mental institutions (political parties); media personalization, both uncontrolled
(news coverage of politics) and controlled (the ways parties and politicians
present themselves); and personalization in the behavior of politicians (legisla-
tive behavior) and of voters. The logic and significance of each indicator is
explained, its advantages and limitations are examined, and trends over time
are discussed. For each type of personalization, other potential indicators are
mentioned and examined and their exclusion is explained.
Introduction 11
Next, Chapter 8 looks at online political personalization. After reviewing
the study of political personalization online and its claims about the influence
of online platforms on political personalization, it presents the results of an
original research that compares parties, party leaders, and prominent politi-
cians from twenty-five democracies. The study looks at both the production
side (presence and publication of Facebook posts) and the consumption side
(Facebook likes).
Chapter 9, which closes this part, presents an integrative analysis of the
dozen indicators of political personalization (ten offline and two online). It
looks at personalization per indicator and at the relationship between the
three types—institutional, media, and behavior. It also compares the levels of
personalization by country and attempts to explain them by looking at
institutional and political cultural explanations. Finally, the chapter examines
the claims that are raised in the literature about the consequences of political
personalization.
Part III links party change and political personalization. It opens with a
theoretical discussion in Chapter 10 that looks at their relationship from
the perspective of the study of political parties and from that of the study of
political personalization. It also examines the integrated perspective expressed
in Wattenberg’s works (1991, 1994)—the only case in which both phenomena
were given equal weight, without one overshadowing the other. It then
turns to examine the challenges that were posed to the common wisdom
of a zero-sum relationship between party change and political personaliza-
tion and to the issue of the direction of the causal relationship between the
two phenomena.
Chapter 11 presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between the
two processes of party change and political personalization: is this indeed a
negative relationship? Is it always a zero-sum relationship? It does so using the
analysis of the two phenomena that was applied in the previous two parts and
integrated in Chapters 5 and 9. It also examines the question of the direction
of this relationship: does party change cause personalization, or is it the other
way around?
The final, concluding chapter comprises an overview of the main findings
presented in the book. It also proposes directions for future research in the
three subject areas covered: party change, political personalization, and the
relationship between them. Its final section is dedicated to the claim that
personalization should be seen as a threat to the quality of democracy, indeed
to its very existence, and also suggests ways to redirect personalized energies
to the benefit of political parties and democracy.
Part I
Party Change
Party Change
The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend
In October 2016, Spain completed a ten-month period under a caretaker

government and was heading toward a third general election within a year.
This was the result of two landmark elections that shattered the two parties
that had dominated Spanish politics since the return to democracy in the mid-
1970s. The rise and success of two new parties—Podemos and Ciudadanos—
produced hung parliaments that thrust the political system into a deadlock.
Eventually the deadlock was resolved when Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy
formed a minority government, but the weakness of the established parties
was clear. Several years earlier the two parties that had dominated Greece
since it, too, returned to democracy in the mid-1970s were crushed with the
emergence of the radical left Syriza, the extreme right Golden Dawn, and
several centrist parties. In Israel, the political map has suffered from extreme
fragmentation since the late 1990s and from chronic instability, as seasonal
center parties—each with a promise of political change—popped up and pros-
pered, even if only briefly. In Italy, the new party system—which emerged in
the early 1990s and finally seemed to find its way with the near-consolidation
of two possible broad coalitions—was cracked in the 2013 elections, after the
huge success of the Five Star Movement (M5S). And in Ireland the large
parties suffered heavy losses in the last two general elections (2011, 2016), in
favor of independents and smaller parties.
Meanwhile, in Australia, the duopoly of the Labor Party and the Liberal–
National Coalition still looks as solid as a rock, even in the face of the 1970s
electoral reforms for the Senate that facilitated the entrance of new parties. In
the Scandinavian nations, despite a recent breakthrough of the populist right,
the veteran parties are doing rather well and the newcomers seem to be
integrating into the existing system. The national parties still dominate polit-
ics at all levels of government.
Germany’s two main parties are suffering a prolonged and consistent
decrease in support but still control the political scene. The same can be said
for Belgium, with its three large parties (or six, if we count Walloon and
Flemish counterparts separately). In Canada, the fortunes of the Liberal

Party—the party that governed throughout most of the twentieth century
almost by default—took a heavy blow in the 2011 elections, when it was
reduced to an unprecedented third in party status, but then demonstrated a
remarkable recovery in the 2015 elections. In the United Kingdom the Labour
Party reinvented itself in the early 1990s, adapting to social and value changes.
This adaptation allowed it to govern for thirteen consecutive years—the longest
run in its history. Following the selection of Jeremy Corbyn as its leader, this
impressive adaptation seemed to have come to an end. In 2016 the party has
been internally divided, ideologically lost, and struggling to find its balance.
The results of the Brexit referendum of June 2016 exposed the internal weakness
and lack of cohesion not only of Labour, but also of the governing Conserva-
tive Party. Nevertheless, even though the 2017 elections produced a hung
parliament, it was also marked by the concentration of electoral support on
the two core parties, Labour and the Conservatives.
This brief and partial account of the fortunes of political parties in different
countries tells a range of stories. In some countries parties declined, crashed,
or just lost a significant amount of power; in others the parties adapted and
performed rather well; and in others still a decline–adaptation–decline pattern
is observed. What we are seeing here is cross-country variance. Curiously, the
cross-national comparative literature has hitherto overlooked variance, tend-
ing to describe parties only through generalizations. This chapter and the
following three aim to fill that lacuna and promote discussion on this under-
explored topic, which is critical to understanding party change over time.
This chapter sets the theoretical and conceptual basis for our attempt to
analyze party change from a cross-national comparative perspective. It starts
from the central arguments in the literature pertaining to party change: the
broad agreement concerning the very existence of a change, and then the
debate that revolves around the depth and meaning of this change. Are parties
declining or adapting? While decline is about losing power by comparison to
the past and to other political actors that play in the same arena, adaptation is
a “change intended to better suit the party to its environment or to some other
circumstance which the party cannot immediately and directly alter” (Harmel
2002: 139). Thus the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the first
implies a negative interpretation of the developments that concern the party
species, while the latter largely revolves around a positive one.
The next section explains the tendency in the literature to overlook cross-
country variance. A possible reason for this, it suggests, is that party change is
explained using similar universal factors, which are spelled out here. The end
of this section examines the cases of research in which variance was acknow-
ledged. These cases, however, center on the level of the individual party rather
than on that of the country.
The section after the next outlines the approach adopted in this book. It
starts by explaining the emphasis on cross-national variance rather than on a
Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 17

generalized trend. It continues with a brief presentation of the dozen indica-
tors that are used to map the various aspects of party change, mostly as a
group (each indicator is addressed separately in Chapters 2 and 3). The end of
the section describes the methodological barriers to conducting research on
longitudinal cross-country variance and how we overcame them. The final
section presents indicators that are not included in our analysis; it explains
why they were left out and assesses the “cost” of their exclusion.
THE AGREEMENT AND THE DEBATE IN RESEARCH

LITERATURE AROUND A GENERAL TREND
As noted earlier, we can point to a substantial variance, at the country

level, with respect to the fortunes of political parties. Surprisingly, the extant
literature pays very little attention to this variance. It tends to make general-
izations about party change, pointing to changes in the role, functioning,
effectiveness, and organizational structure of political parties and their cen-
trality to representative democracy. These changes have been discussed and
framed under various labels: decline (Selle and Svåsand 1991; Wattenberg
1994; Coleman 1996; Smith 2003; LaPalombara 2007), crisis (Ignazi 1996),
failing (Lawson and Merkl 1988; Webb 2009), challenge (Mair 1984; 2008a;
Gunther, Montero, and Linz 2002; Bartolini and Mair 2001), adaptation (Katz
and Mair 1994; Mair 1997), response (Bibby 1998), prosperity (Lawson and
Merkl 2007), or simply “change” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a; Pettitt 2014).
This variety notwithstanding, the leading themes were adaptation and decline,
sometimes as competing concepts and sometimes as concepts that highlight the
different faces of the same phenomena.
The Consensus
Scholars of political parties in the 1980s and 1990s were often seen to spar
over the question of whether political parties might be on the decline (Lawson
and Merkl 1988) and showing signs of destabilization (Maguire 1983;
Pedersen 1983) or whether not much had actually changed and continuity
was the prominent pattern (Mair 1983, 1997; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995).
The debate sparked further research and fresh data pointed to change that was
recognized by parties and led to modifications in their operation (Mair,
Muller, and Plasser 2004b). This change was largely interpreted in a kind of
synthesized consensus: scholars tend to agree that parties adapt to changing
social, technological, and political circumstances in a way that ensures the

survival of their species. Parties, they claim, have weaker links with society
today than in the 1960s (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a), but at the same time
created a strong base for their survival—and, some will add, even proper or
reasonable functioning (Webb 2002a)—by “capturing” the state (van Biezen
and Kopecký 2007, 2014; Ignazi 2014). Almost all agree on this diagnosis:
those who see the current state of parties as sustaining the democratic repre-
sentative connection (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011), those who are
concerned that citizens and parties have drifted too far apart from each other
in a way that threatens democracy (Mair 2013), and those whose views lie
somewhere in between.1
Regardless of differences in terminology, most scholars seem to agree that
there is “no obvious alternative to political parties” (Dalton, Farrell, and
McAllister 2011: 231). There is also general agreement that political parties
have changed, that they are “not what they once were” (Schmitter 2001).
Furthermore, there seems to be broad consensus that there is a growing public
detachment from political parties, in other words that the party–society linkage
has weakened.
The declining capacity of parties to engage ordinary citizens is often recog-
nized by looking at four sets of evidence at the country level (Mair 2013):
(1) declining electoral turnout; (2) falling levels of party identification; (3)
increasing voter volatility; and (4) a drop in the levels of party membership.
The decline in electoral turnout is one of the most easily recognizable
phenomena found in established democracies in the past decades. Wattenberg
(2000) argued that parties’ inability to inspire a sense of identification in
the public and to properly fulfil their representative duties yielded a nearly
universal turnout decline in OECD nations. Other studies (Gray and Caul
2000; Franklin 2004; Gallego 2009) offered similar conclusions. Our analysis
of twenty-six countries (see Table 3.7) concurs. In twenty-three out of the
twenty-six democracies studied, turnout decreased between the 1960s (or the
earliest relevant period) and the 2006–15 period.
A related trend concerns the erosion in party identification. In the past,
many citizens demonstrated strong and longtime loyalties, a sense of belong-
ing, and commitment to political parties. Later on these bonds between voters
and parties loosened and eroded. In surveys, fewer and fewer citizens reported
that they identified with parties, and among those who did the strength of
identification declined (Dalton 2000). Our analysis comes to a more nuanced
conclusion (see Table 3.5). While before the turn of the millennium party
identification dropped in twenty of the twenty-three countries on which we
have data, after 2000 it fell in only twelve of the twenty-three countries on
which we have data.
1
For the whole spectrum, see the overviews by Bardi, Bartolini, and Trechsel 2014a, 2014b.

As can be expected, decline in party identification was reflected in
(or maybe translated into) a parallel change in actual voter behavior. Yet,
despite the fact that traditional social cleavages already began to get eroded
already in the 1970s, electoral volatility remained rather low, keeping the
party systems of Western Europe fairly stable up until the late 1980s
(Bartolini and Mair 1990; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). The situation
began to change in the 1990s, and this process has continued since (Baldini
and Pappalardo 2009). The likelihood that voters will switch their party
preference from one election to another has increased. Veteran voters aban-
doned their traditional loyalties, while new generations of voters—if they even
showed up—were free of these commitments to begin with. Our analysis of
twenty-six countries comes to similar conclusions (see Table 3.6). In eighteen
of the twenty-six countries, levels of volatility increased when comparing the
1960s (or the earliest relevant period) to the 2006–15 period.
Finally, citizens’ disengagement from political parties is clearly reflected in
the falling rates of party membership. Parties used to rely on a large mem-
bership base, which signified the legitimacy granted them by the masses.
Beyond legitimacy, party members provided parties with material and organ-
izational resources—membership fees and manpower respectively (Van
Haute and Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2000). Several studies pointed to a substan-
tial decline in party membership (e.g., Scarrow 2015; van Biezen, Mair, and
Poguntke 2012). In Europe, in the early 1960s, the average proportion of
party members in the electorate was about 15 percent; but this figure dropped
below 5 percent in the last years before 2010. This decline not only reaffirms
public detachment from parties but also gives the impression that parties
have “abandoned any pretensions to being mass organizations” (van Biezen,
Mair, and Poguntke 2012: 42). According to our examination, party mem-
bership declined in twenty-one of the twenty-three countries on which we
have data (see Table 3.3).
To conclude, there is strong evidence of a universal trend of growing public
detachment from political parties. Whether parties in a specific country had
stronger or weaker ties with society to begin with, they all find it harder to
mobilize voters today, to keep them loyal, and to engage them. The party–
society linkage has weakened, which has caused a change in the balance of
power within parties. The party in government has become the dominant
power, while parties’ extra-parliamentary institutions are waning (Katz and
Mair 1995; 2009).
The Debate
The overall agreement about both the irreplaceable role of parties and their
weakening connection to citizens should not obscure the existence of a debate

concerning their overall functioning. Scholars disagree over questions such as
these: How far have parties distanced themselves from society? To what
reference point in time should the current state of parties be compared: to
their “golden age” in the 1950s–1960s or to an earlier period? Should the
interpretation of change be that parties are in decline, or that they are in fact
successfully adapting to their ever-changing environment? Is party democracy
still the right model to explain the working of current parliamentary democ-
racies? Might the changing status of parties yield worrying consequences
for modern representative democracy, or could it perhaps offer a chance for
improvement?
Two relatively recent comprehensive accounts of the state of political
parties allow us to present competing approaches in answering such ques-
tions. Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011) make a positive evaluation of
the state of political parties, while Mair (2008a, 2013) delivers a negative
judgment. Interestingly, both Dalton and Mair devoted a fair share of their
analysis to the opposite side of the debate in the past: Dalton to the party-
decline camp—especially in the volume Parties without Partisans, co-edited
with Wattenberg, a dedicated pessimist (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b)—
and Mair to the party-adaptation school (see, e.g., Bartolini and Mair 1990;
Mair 1997). Mair also insisted that Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) freezing
hypothesis was the most relevant way to characterize the generally stable
European party systems.2
To begin with, Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011: 12–13) suggest that,
while there is no dispute regarding public detachment from political parties,
the interpretation of this development is often overstated. For them, even if
less loyal and more nonpartisan, in the end citizens face a choice between
competing political parties when they enter the polling stations; and they are
still heavily dependent on parties for the representation of their views and
interests in government. Furthermore, these authors suggest that we need
to differentiate between the broad societal changes (e.g., individualization,
breakdown of collective identities) that weakened the attachment to parties
and the centrality and importance of parties as political institutions. In other
words, even if parties suffer from a poor public image, they nevertheless
continue to play a vital role in modern representative democracies.3
A related yet independent argument concerns the reference point often used
by scholars for detecting the sharp decline of parties. In many accounts, it is
argued, the current (poor) state of parties is compared to their “golden age.”
That period, the 1950s and 1960s, was the age of the mass party, which was
deeply rooted in society and able to engage many citizens on the basis of social
2
For a collection of the works of Peter Mair, where one can trace these developments over
time, see van Biezen 2014b.
3
For a similarly positive analysis of the state of political parties, see Enyedi 2014.

cleavage politics. This reference point, however, might be misleading because
it refers to historically very specific social, economic, and political circum-
stances and may thus distort our interpretation of the fortunes of parties. We
can certainly talk of a decline in the mass-party model, yet that does not
necessarily imply overall party decline but rather adaptation to changing
circumstances (Mair 1994). Mass parties went through changes as early as
the 1960s and evolved first into catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966) and later
into cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995).
From this perspective, it may be wrong to focus on changes in party
membership, perceptions of parties, and electoral behavior as evidence
of how well or how poorly parties are doing. As Dalton, Farrell, and
McAllister (2011) claim, what is important is that political parties continue
to provide a meaningful policy linkage: even if ideological differences have
blurred, it still matters which party or parties are in office. Changes in the
preferences of the electorate lead to change in government and this, in turn,
leads to changes in public policy. This important linkage is exercised by
political parties. To conclude, these authors suggest that parties have certainly
changed but this does not mean that they are necessarily much weaker. Rather
they appear to adapt to the constantly changing environment in which they
act. This stance echoes earlier studies, which argued that “parties remain
absolutely central in the view of those who feel that democracy is principally
a means of facilitating popular control and choice over public affairs” (Webb
2002b: 4) and that
it is in the main an exaggeration to speak of “the decline,” or the “crisis,”

of party . . . Parties continue to fulfill a number of important functions in
representative democracies and remain central mechanisms for the delivery
of democracy. However, it is widely recognized that the mass party of old is
largely obsolete in advanced industrial democracies, and that today’s major
parties have adapted in various ways. (Webb and Poguntke 2005: 346–7)
In his earlier works Mair (1994; Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 2003) emphasized
the adaptation of parties. But later on he veered toward a more negative
view of their fortunes (Mair 2005, 2013). Beyond presenting evidence that
indicates the public’s detachment from the parties and their weakening organ-
izational capacity, he also pointed to an alarming failure in their ability to
represent, to govern, and to promote policy. In other words, he claimed that
the impact of political parties on policymaking and on policy outputs had
diminished and that this was a new development. In the 1980s, the govern-
ments of Ronald Reagan in the United States and of Margaret Thatcher in
the United Kingdom, with their shift toward neoliberal policies, offered
convincing testimony in favor of the “parties do matter” thesis. Several
studies argued that even globalization did not alter the autonomy of national
governments and that the political parties that controlled them succeeded in

pursuing their policies (Schmidt 1996; Garrett 1998). However, more recent
studies point to reduced partisan effects and impact on public policies. Caul
and Gray (2000), for instance, concluded that “the erosion of the traditional
socioeconomic constituencies of parties will add to the lack of a clear
partisan impact on economic policy” (236). Similarly, Huber and Stephens
(2001) pointed to the disappearance of partisan effects with regard to
welfare policies.
The changing nature of the electorate and of parties themselves has blurred
the clear programmatic differences between parties. They are less able and, as
Mair stressed, perhaps less willing to offer clear policy alternatives to voters.
Furthermore, the European Union has gradually strangled the life out of
national democracies by cultivating a protected sphere, safe from the
demands of voters and their parties. Decision-making on major issues, from
the economy to immigration, was taken away from national parliaments.
Under these circumstances, representative democracy is becoming hollow.
Elections these days resemble a sort of a beauty contest or horse race between
competing teams: they are perhaps exciting to watch, but lack substance
(Mair 2013). From this perspective, the decline of parties—as reflected by
their disconnect from broader society and by the meaningless nature of
elections as far as public policy is concerned—also implies nothing less than
a transformation of democracy:
The age of party democracy has passed. Although the parties themselves
remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider society, and
pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no
longer seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form.
(Mair 2013: 1)
To this pessimistic view we can add Lawson’s (2007) claim in the concluding
chapter of a book with the rather optimistic title When Parties Prosper
(Lawson and Merkl 2007): on the basis of success stories of specific parties
around the world, Lawson concludes that the parties that succeed in the context
of parties’ overall decline are those that hurt democracies—for example by
being undemocratic leader parties, or by corruption and opportunism—rather
than those that help sustain them.
As noted in this chapter (see “The Consensus”), there is wide agreement
that, while parties are distanced from society, they are now closer to the state.
They are increasingly funded and sourced by the state and enjoy a privileged
status under its legal protection. These changes are claimed to demonstrate
that, while parties may have lost something through their declining relation-
ship with society, they have gained something else by getting close to the state
(Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; van Biezen 2014a). However, this
interpretation is contested. Strong institutions do not need laws and in fact
are better off without laws that will limit their actions. In that golden age half

a century ago, there was hardly any legislation concerning political parties.
Indeed, legislation may have prompted the adoption of compensation for
parties for their weakening links with society, for example by supplying
state funds instead of membership fees and donations or paid staff instead
of volunteers (Kölln 2015a). Yet, over time, such legislation hurt party
autonomy and the parties’ ability to act, as state courts and regulation
agencies became more deeply involved in what parties did and in how they
should do it. That is, parties had to invest time to satisfy the state and became
increasingly limited in their activities (Cross 2016). Moreover, higher levels of
regulation were found to be correlated with lower levels of political trust and
party activism (Rashkova and van Biezen 2014; Whiteley 2011, 2014).
Party scholars serve their mission as political scientists in identifying gen-
eral trends, explaining their origins, and analyzing their consequences. The
state of parties in democracies is sometimes characterized as one of either
adaptation or decline—and, more frequently and in a more sophisticated
manner, as a blend of both. For example, a main theme in Poguntke (2004)
is that parties respond to the challenges that they face. These include the
decline of cleavage politics, loss of control over mass communication, and
the erosion of the parties’ role as central policymakers. In such conditions, the
ability of parties to aggregate interests dwindles. The response seems to
answer some, but not all challenges. That is, the verdict is somewhere between
decline and adaptation. This is also reflected in Karvonen’s (2014: 148)
conclusion to his study of Finnish politics: “Much has been written and said
about the ‘crisis’ or ‘decline’ of parties, but it is too early yet to proclaim the
end of parties in Finland or elsewhere. Still, Finnish parties and electoral
politics are clearly plagued by increasing problems of popular legitimacy.”
Yet beyond the general universal trend there is variance that is largely
overlooked. Maybe, we may ask, in a dichotomous manner, political parties
adapted in some cases but declined in others? Or maybe we may ask, in a
less simplified manner, whether we can identify different levels of party
change in democracies—differences that imply differing levels of adaptation
and decline.
THE LITERATURE: LARGELY IGNORING VARIANCE
No study, to the best of our knowledge, has proposed a large n comparative

cross-national analysis of the variance in the levels and patterns of party
change among countries. To date, the literature on party change has acknow-
ledged the differences between countries, yet has tended to overlook them and
to sacrifice them to generalizations. For example, in their seminal collection on

party change, Dalton and Wattenberg (2000b: 273) go as far as to declare that
“nations actually vary considerably in their degree of partyness”; but they do
not pursue this idea any further, concentrating on the general trend rather than
on the variance they identified. Interestingly, an early critic of the claim
concerning party decline (Reiter 1989) made the case for variance and called
for a nuanced look rather than generalizations. But no one seemed to pay heed.
Ignoring variance may result from seeing party change stem from common
causes (Bartolini and Mair 2001) and from developing the notion that this also
creates a more or less similar trend. We thus turn now to briefly examining the
common causes found in the literature that pertain to party change.
The modernization theory pointed to several societal developments that
changed the relations between citizens and political parties. Increasing edu-
cational levels improved the political knowledge of citizens and led them to
become “self-sufficient” in politics. Independent-minded citizens were less
likely to support a particular party simply out of habit and started to question
the political elite (Strøm and Bergman 2011). This eroded the partisan bonds
that used to structure electoral competitions (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b).
Modernization also shifted the values, priorities, and interests of the public
in western democracies. Postmaterial issues such as environmental issues,
consumerism and lifestyle choices expanded the boundaries of politics, inject-
ing new concerns into the public sphere (Inglehart 1990). The participatory
aspects of these sets of values sometimes led to a built-in objection toward the
hierarchic structured nature of parties and a tendency to prefer forms of direct
democracy (Scarrow 1997, 2003) and “nonconventional” kinds of political
participation (Dalton 2008).
Developments such as secularization and improved social and geographical
mobility have weakened the ties between individuals and bonded communi-
ties, for example the working class and socialist parties, or religious voters and
Christian Democrat and conservative parties. This process has in turn weak-
ened cleavage-based voting patterns and the political parties formed around
them (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). Further, it has encouraged the
expansion of interest groups and other single-issue lobbies. This has changed
the status of parties by providing alternative channels. Sometimes these
alternative interest groups and lobbies assumed the role of parties in repre-
senting public interests (Panebianco 1988).
A cause (and also a consequence) of the breakdown of group identity is
individualization. According to one school of thought, this development has
led to depolitization, that is, to a decline in political activity in general (Putnam
2000) and in party politics in particular (Mair 2013). Another school claims
that individualization has led to a change in the type of political participation
that people prefer and made them abandon party politics and seek out other
arenas and types of activities (Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein 2017).

The rapid expansion of the mass media is often cited as an additional
common cause for party change. First, the mass media (and, more recently,
online social networks) nullified the roles of political parties as providers of
political information and became the primary source of campaign information
and debate. Second, it is claimed that the mass media have a strong and malign
effect on politics in general and on parties in particular: the superficial content
of news, its sensation-driven reporting style, and the focus on “packaging” over
substance breed in the public ignorance, incomprehension, cynicism, and
fatigue toward the political process (Newton 2006). Indeed, many countries
witnessed an increase in anti-party sentiments that was expressed in voting for
“anti-party parties” (Deschouwer 1996; Poguntke 1996), among other ways.
Third, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) suggest a much more central role for the
mass media. From their explanation of the difference in party-system institu-
tionalization between pre- and post-1978 democracies, it could be asserted that
parties are not actually needed anymore. They still play a central role in places
where their status was entrenched before TV became central: “For the history
of liberal democracy until the 1980s, the answer to John Aldrich’s (1995)
question, Why Parties? was obvious to political candidates: parties provided
a huge, almost indispensable electoral advantage. In many post-1978 competi-
tive regimes, this advantage is marginal or non-existent” (Mainwaring and
Zoco 2007: 167). As they put it: “When television emerges as a major campaign
vehicle before parties are well entrenched, political actors have less incentive to
engage in party-building. It is easier and—in the short term—more effective to
use the modern mass media than to build a party” (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007:
156–7). If we adopt this logic, then the development of the World Wide Web,
and especially of social media, made parties redundant.
To all of the above we should add the tendency of many studies to view social
and political forces through the lenses of today’s “one world.” Globalization,
the erosion of national borders, implies convergence also in institutional terms
(Inkeles 1998). This suggests, once again, that similar developments take place
under similar circumstances. Globalization means not only that similar societal
experiences breed similar developments, but also that national governments
face comparable constraints when confronted by comparable challenges
(Strøm and Bergman 2011). These common developments and constraints
may lead scholars to overlook country-level variance.
To summarize, even if their interpretation is contested, common develop-
ments in democracies are expected to have similar consequences. While
scholars may acknowledge cross-country variance, they emphasize the com-
mon trend and mainly debate its general magnitude (stability versus change)
and its interpretation (adaptation or decline). The debate about the extent of
change and its meaning breeds generalizations rather than a nuanced analysis.
Thus, one might suggest that variance is hiding and waiting to be revealed.

Some studies have emphasized variance in party change at the party level.
The two volumes by Lawson and Merkl (1988, 2007), for instance, represent a
collection of case studies that explore the failures and successes of political
parties in contemporary democracies. In the volume dedicated to party
failure, Rose and Mackie (1988) explored the factors that could explain
why some parties persist while others fail. Recently Kölln (2016) analyzed
the causes of variance in organization change at the party level. She
illuminated the existence of variance within the main trend of decline in
party membership and identified factors that explain it at the party level. In
their conclusion to a collection of case studies on party–interest group
relationships, Allern and Bale (2012a) emphasized the variance behind the
trend in the weakening of such relationships. Other scholars pointed to variance
in the fortunes of parties (stability, adaptation, and institutionalization) in
established democracies vis-à-vis third-wave democracies (Mainwaring and
Torcal 2006; Tavits 2005).
And still, despite acknowledging its existence, there has been no attempt to
focus on cross-country variance. There are good reasons to expect similarities
within national party systems: parties are nested within a specific national
political system and a specific party system, where they interact in a competi-
tive (and sometimes cooperative) manner and thus influence one another.
There are also good reasons to expect to find cross-national variance because
the influence of the universal trends mentioned here is moderated by more
specific national institutional and social environments. Indeed, a cross-
national study of levels of intraparty competition for party leadership found
that the main explanation for variance between parties is actually the state
within which they operate (Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer 2015). This should
not come as a surprise, because parties that compete with each other, operate
within the same national political culture, and are compared by the voters are
expected to influence one another even when it comes to an intraparty affair
such as leadership selection.
A VARIANCE-BASED APPROACH
Political parties, as formal institutions that place candidates in elections for

public posts and also as formal collective associations within parliaments,
are not under threat. That is, the issue is not one of demise versus survival of
parties. Hence political parties are not likely to die as long as representative
democracies live. They were created because individuals found them useful for
coordinating their actions in parliament (Bowler 2000; Deschouwer and
Depauw 2014a; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014; Thies 2000); and later they turned

out to be crucial for mobilizing voters as well (Aldrich 2011). More recently
they also became, in more and more places, formal entities officially recog-
nized by powerful democratic states. The legal and formal status of parties has
been strengthened over the years to the point that they (almost) monopolize
the electoral and legislative arenas (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011).
However, Harmel (2002) is right when he claims that not all party changes
were created equal and that their type, degree, and extensiveness should be
taken into consideration.
In the face of deep changes in their environment, political parties may either
preserve their status as dominant actors in politics or stay (or become) just
central actors alongside others—if not secondary actors in a play mainly run
by others. Yet scholars almost ignored the possibility that the party species
may be healthy and vibrant in some countries while in others it may be in a
poor condition.
The seminal collection Parties without Partisans (Dalton and Wattenberg
2000a) inspired our attempt to look for a variety of indicators for mapping
party change. Following in the footsteps of Dalton and Wattenberg and their
contributors, we tried to cover as much ground as possible in terms of
indicators of party change and countries. Our project, however, differs. We
are not interested mainly in mapping the general trend of party change or the
differing changes of the different faces of the party, but rather in examining
cross-country variance. This implies a need for finding data and creating
indicators that will allow cross-country comparison of the direction and
level of party change.
A recent attempt to map party change—an attempt of similar magnitude,
in terms of case coverage and scope of indicators, to the one presented here—
is that of Krouwel (2012), who looks at party change from 1945 to 2010 in
fifteen European democracies. There are several important differences
between his study and ours. First, Krouwel chose an earlier starting point
(1945), and this may affect the interpretation of the level and nature of
change. Second, in terms of research populations, he focused on fifteen
European democracies, while we also look at democracies outside Europe
and include relatively young European democracies (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland), which are not considered in his study. Third, while
some of the indicators he used in order to measure party change are similar,
many others are different; in some cases similar indicators are also coded and
measured differently. Finally, while he does refer to variance, he wraps his
study in overall generalizations.
All these differences between the two studies are important and may have
required further comparison, had their respective theories and goals been
the same. But the primary and crucial difference between our study and
Krouwel’s lies in the interpretation of change. He sees party change in terms
of evolution of party types. We hold that the changes we measured are about

the parties themselves, regardless of their exact model or type, and that they
all point to a relative increase or decrease in their power vis-à-vis other
political actors. We accept the claim that parties adapt and transform and
that the 1960s were probably the heyday of political parties when we compare
their power to that of other political actors. As for Krouwel’s (2012: 288)
statement in the concluding paragraph of his book, we are not “silly and
suggest[ing] many more ‘new’ party models.” We actually distance ourselves
from a full commitment to the adaptation approach, which does not allow us
to examine the possibility that parties as such are pushed to the back seat.
By “parties as such,” we mean parties as political actors with a significant
amount of autonomy and power of their own. That is, while parties that,
according to our measurements, chalk up small or even moderate losses may
be seen as holding on and adapting, those that sustained heavy losses may be
pushed to the back seat and, as we argue in Chapter 11, largely replaced by
individual actors.
The Selected Dozen

Our study emphasizes country-level variance in party change. We expect to
find countries where parties declined, countries where parties adapted, and yet
others where parties can be placed between these two poles. Party change is a
multifaceted phenomenon and, in consequence, should be examined through
a variety of indicators. Thus our aim was in the first place to identify as many
indicators of party change as possible—beyond the “usual suspects” (mem-
bership, volatility, identification, turnout). To do this, we took a broad look at
the literature on party change. While most studies concentrated on a few
available indicators, some offered a larger variety or focused on indicators
beyond the usual ones. This second category includes the wide cross-national
study of Dalton and Wattenberg (2000a) and Krouwel (2012) and studies that
are about smaller n comparisons (e.g., Bergman and Strøm 2011a), or even
case studies (e.g., Karvonen 2014). Thematic projects that concentrate on
specific aspects of party change, for example Reiser and Holtmann’s (2008a)
book on parties at the local level, Allern and Bale’s (2017) on the relationship
between left-of-center parties and unions, and Best and Cotta’s (2000) and
Cotta and Verzichelli’s (2007) on the recruitment of representatives inspired
us to add new indicators to the habitual ones. While the long list of possible
candidates for indicators of party change had to be shortened (see “Indicators
That Were Left Out” in this chapter), we were still able to retain a dozen.
Our selected twelve indicators of change in the party–society linkage can be
distributed into three categories that cover the three faces of the party: party in
government, party as an extra-parliamentary organization, and party on the
ground. These indicators also represent various types of links, mediated and

T A B L E 2 . 1 The Selected Dozen Indicators of Partyness
Dimension (Face of Indicator: Change in . . . Linkage with . . .

the party)
Socialization of 1) Party background of ministers Party organization

representatives (Party 2) Party background of legislators Party organization
in government)
Mediators (Party 3) Party-membership density More politically active
organization) parts of society
4) Party–interest group relationships Interest groups
5) Performance of local parties Local government
(national total)
6) Performance of local parties (five Local government
largest cities)
7) National–regional electoral Regional government
dissimilarity
Voters (Party in the 8) Party identification Voters (stands)
electorate) 9) Electoral volatility Voters (behavior)
10) Electoral turnout Voters (behavior)
11) Effective number of electoral parties Voters (party system)
12) Party continuity Voters (party system)
direct (see Table 2.1). They were selected because we could find good enough
data for a satisfactory number of countries. In this section we present them as
a group and introduce each one briefly; in the next two chapters we look at
each indicator closely. Nine of them will be explained and analyzed individu-
ally in Chapter 3. Another three, which deal with parties at the regional and
local levels, will be analyzed in Chapter 4.
Poguntke (1998: 156) claims that “[p]arties are intermediaries, establishing
linkages between societies and institutions of democratic government. To
perform this function, they need to be anchored in both arenas, that is, in
state institutions (such as parliaments, governments, and bureaucracies)
and in society.” This opening to his chapter on party organizations captures
what our group of indicators of partyness covers—the change in the depth of
parties’ anchorage in the arenas of the state, society, and what lies in between
(the mediators).
Figure 2.1 illustrates the position of each indicator within the party–society
linkage. It demonstrates that, for all the filtering we had to do in the selection
process (see “Indicators that Were Left Out” in this chapter), our final dozen
indicators still cover the required aspects and dimensions of this linkage, from
mediated to direct relationships and from relationships within the party
organization to relationships with the world outside it.
Figure 2.1 starts with the linkage between the party in government and the
party organization; this linkage is covered by the two indicators (1 and 2 in
Party Society
Party in Party Party in the

government organization electorate
(Socialization of) Mediators: Voters:

representatives: indicators indicators
indicators 1–2 3–7 8–12
F I G U R E 2 . 1 A Graphic Illustration of the Coverage of the Indicators

of Partyness Regarding the Party–Society Linkage
Table 2.1) that estimate the strength of the link between the party’s extra-
parliamentary organization and the party in government. These indicators
measure the partyness of party representatives in government (a) according to
their background in the party organization and (b) as its representatives at
other levels of government. This background is supposed to socialize them in
terms of party values and interests and to create and consolidate their loyalty
to the party.
Next, we have the mediators that stand between the party organization and
the party in the electorate (indicators 3–7 in Table 2.1). Change in party
membership (3) is a well-known indicator of party change. The density of
party membership indicates the ability of the party to recruit citizens who are
expected to be more than just voters or passive supporters—to serve as its
ambassadors in society and as a potential human resource during election
campaigns. Another aspect of the link of parties with society is their relation-
ships with interest groups (4). We estimated change on the basis of scholars’
assessments of the development of these relationships over the years, espe-
cially with trade unions. Next we examined various indicators (5–7) for
vertical linkages in the party, between the national, the regional, and the
local levels. These included the power of the local versus the national party
in local government (5 and 6) and the (dis)similarity of party power at the
national and regional levels (7). This almost neglected dimension, we argue, is
an important sign of the (de)penetration of parties into (and from) society.
Both interest groups and local and regional party organizations can serve the
parties in various ways, from supplying a solid base of voters, and even of
activists, to serving as a hothouse for future national politicians.
The next five indicators (8–12 in Table 2.1) examine various aspects of the
relationships between parties and voters (that is, the party in the electorate), at
both the individual and the collective levels. This group contains an indicator
for change in attitudes toward parties, that is, in party identification (8). Two
other indicators address voting behavior: electoral volatility (9) and the ability
of parties to mobilize voters, measured through trends in electoral turnout (10).
Finally, there are two indicators for the collective result of changes in voter

behavior: trends in party system fragmentation among voters (11); and party
continuity, that is, the persistence of old parties and the penetration of
new ones (12).
As Figure 2.1 illustrates, this collection of twelve indicators covers various
aspects of the party–society link. Numerous studies support the expectation
that some of these indicators correlate among themselves. Poguntke (2002),
for example, demonstrated that there is a strong negative correlation between
the strength of parties’ relationships with collateral organizations and a high
density of party membership, on the one hand, and electoral volatility, on the
other. He also found that a decline in the density of party membership over
time leads to an increase in volatility. Heath’s (2007) study of the United
Kingdom found a positive relationship between party identification and
turnout. Whiteley and Seyd (2002) convincingly argued that a decline in
party-membership numbers and activism is likely to negatively affect the
pool of potential candidates, especially at the local level, and the partisan
socialization of the candidates.
Yet not all studies would lead us to expect our indicators of partyness to
increase or decline together. For example, some found a positive relationship
between turnout and volatility (Hansford and Gomez 2010); that is, if party-
ness decreases in terms of turnout (which means that fewer citizens participate
in elections), it increases in terms of volatility (which means that voting
patterns are more stable). Other studies found no relationship between the
two (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2011). Geys and Heyndels (2006) found a
positive relationship between turnout and party system fragmentation: if par-
tyness increases in terms of turnout, it decreases in terms of fragmentation
(i.e., the party system becomes more fragmented). Mainwaring and Zoco
(2007) found a moderate positive relationship between electoral volatility and
party system fragmentation. Anderson (1998), meanwhile, found a negative
relationship between party membership and electoral volatility, as expected,
but also a positive relationship between party membership and party system
fragmentation. Thus, in the first case, both indicators of partyness seem to
reinforce each other, while in the second they seem to weaken each other.
Our own examination of the relationship between indicators also identified
cases of positive, negative, and also no relationship (see Table 5.4). Yet in no
case were the correlations among indicators strong enough to justify forgoing
one of them on the basis of the claim that we are measuring similar phenom-
ena (or phenomena that offset each other in case of a negative relationship).
Coping with the Challenges of Measuring Variance in Party Change

Now that we have briefly presented the indicators, we turn to look at the
obstacles we faced when trying to gather data and to transform them into usable,

comparable indicators of party change. We state here what is obvious to party
scholars whose hands get dirty mining the data: While we did our best to come
up with reliable and valid data, the quality of the material is far from ideal.
Of late, high-quality search engines on the one hand and, on the other, the
growing availability and accessibility of online data started to facilitate the
search for the kind of information needed for such a study. Nevertheless, as
noted, the data are far from ideal. Not only are there missing values for many
indicators of party change, but also many of the available pieces of data do not
cover the whole period under investigation. Some indicators are based on
surveys (e.g., party identity), and different surveys asked different questions
regarding the same phenomena. While in some cases relatively high-quality
data are available (e.g., effective number of parties among voters and turnout),
in others the data are of a limited or problematic quality (e.g., party member-
ship: see Scarrow 2015; party identification: see Johnston 2006). In yet other
instances, comparative data are drawn from estimations made on the basis of
available case studies (e.g., changes in parties–interest groups relationships).
For these and other reasons, data are not ideally comparable. Yet we
believe that looking beyond generalizations is a must at this stage of the
research. We thus do our best to cope with these methodological challenges
and to provide solutions to the various problems of reliability and validity.
Sometimes we felt like archeologists who try to discover humans’ ancient
eating habits from a bone they find, or like historians or econometricians who
draw conclusions about the agricultural economy of a region hundreds of
years ago from the remaining partial accounts of one single farm. We tried to
make the sources of our data and analysis fully transparent, so that scholars
may be able to replicate our moves. This should be an obvious rule, but in our
mining expedition we found out that it was not always upheld. In addition, we
opted for a bird’s-eye view, and in so doing we may have missed certain details
and nuances. We thus invite constructive criticism, hoping that, rather than
causing our structure to collapse, it will improve it from the bottom up.
For reliability, for example, we did our best to mine data from the same
source for as many cases as possible—be it a survey project (e.g., Euroba-
rometer, World Value Survey, European Social Survey), an online dataset
(Gallagher’s Election Indices Dataset, Dassonneville’s 2015 Dataset on Net
Volatility in Western Europe, etc.) or an edited collection. That is, we can
trust the reliability of computation of each scholar separately, if we trust her
common sense to stay coherent throughout her approach, but we cannot
integrate data with equal confidence. For the missing data, which we had to
compute on our own, we followed the formats used in those sources. Such a
rule is important even when the data seem to be readily available, as in the
case of indicators that are based on national election results. So it is for
volatility, for example, which can be calculated differently on the basis of
rules concerning party mergers and splits, as well as for the very definition of

new parties (Barnea and Rahat 2011). Yet even the use of the same source has
its limitations, owing to differences among parties and countries, as Scarrow
(2015) demonstrates in her analysis of the nature of party membership. In
some cases we had to mine our data almost case by case and to use different
measurements for the same general phenomena; so the issue of reliability
could not be solved this way.
For improving validity, when possible, we gathered and crossed data from
various sources and chose the source that seemed to be supported by other
studies. Mining does, however, have its limitations. In the case of data based
on surveys, one cannot, of course, make one’s own survey of past years; one
must rather use available survey data. Nor could we, in our attempt to cover
as much ground as possible, initiate and conduct a study of each indicator
(though we did do so for several of them). In some of the cases we were
fortunate to benefit from cross-national studies, such as Scarrow’s (2015) on
party membership, or the cross-national comparative study on parties–unions
relationship that was led by Allern and Bale (2017). But even these did not
cover all the cases and we had to supplement the missing information and
code it in a similar manner.
A major methodological challenge was to construct a simple, standard
index of partyness for all indicators. To achieve this, we followed several
guidelines.
First, we faced the need to code various types of data, from estimations of
change on the basis of single-case studies to data in numbers and percentages.
Moreover, as noted, some of the data were of a low quality and should have
been seen as pointing to a rough trend rather than being treated as expres-
sions of an interval or ratio variable. We thus standardized and calibrated
all indicators on a 5-point scale, with two negative values for high ( 2) and
moderate decline ( 1) in partyness, two positive values for high (2) and
moderate increase (1) in partyness, and one for no change/no trend (0).
The 5-point scale was selected as optimal with regard to its sensitivity to
the type and quality of the data.4
Second, because we study processes, we look at developments over time and
compare values from an early and from a late period for each indicator. Thus
change was measured by comparing the latest and the earliest points in time
for which we had data. The limits of our research do not encompass study of
fluctuations over time.5 These, however, might be an interesting subject in
4
The idea of calibration was inspired by the works of Ragin (2008, 2014) but it should be noted
that we do not follow Ragin’s path as regards the analysis, because our goals differ. Our main aim
is to cover the various aspects of the party-change phenomenon, not to expose the relationship
between its components.
5
Yet, as part of our commitment to transparency, we present in the Appendices data for the
whole period, when they are available.

cases where data are available, such as on the subject of party membership
(see van Haute, Paulis, and Sierens forthcoming). Fluctuations may even be
the more significant story in some cases; for example, in the Danish case, our
findings of an overall stability in partyness, when comparing the 1960s–1970s
to recent times, hide the dramatic event of the 1973 political earthquake. But
we are not attempting to tell the whole story (could anybody?), only the story
of national variance in party change since the 1960s. This simplified approach
served our aim by providing comparable indices for a broad set of indicators
for twenty-six countries, over time (see Chapter 1, “The Research Population:
Countries during a Specific Period”).
A related challenge concerned the various time ranges. Wherever possible,
we mined data that would fit our time frame; but there were cases where we
had to settle for later starting points or for earlier end points (or both). The
different range of years could have distorted the picture; therefore, wherever
possible, we calculated the change per annum and from the result obtained we
determined the value of the index.
Third, the longitudinal analysis has been carried out, in parallel, along
national (within-country) and cross-national lines. This means that we had
to examine both absolute and relative change. For example, for a decline in
voter turnout from 75 percent to 50 percent, the absolute value is ( 25 percent),
while the relative value is ( 33 percent); for a decline in voter turnout from
50 percent to 25 percent, the absolute value is also ( 25 percent), but the
relative value is ( 50 percent). Similarly, for a decline in party membership
from 20 percent to 16 percent, the absolute value is ( 4 percent), while the
relative value is ( 20 percent); for a decline in party membership from 5 percent
to 4 percent, the absolute value is just ( 1 percent), but the relative value is
again ( 20 percent). Our solution was to look at both relative and absolute
change where this was possible and to give them equal weight in our final,
calibrated estimation of change.
Finally, we presented the analysis either per indicator for our group of
countries (Chapters 3 and 4) or per country for the whole group of indicators
(Chapter 5). That is, acknowledging the limitations of our maneuver, we base
our analysis on accumulated evidence rather than on a single piece of codified
data that relates to a single case.
INDICATORS THAT WERE LEFT OUT
Our initial policy was to try to collect data for as many indicators as possible.
We left filtering for a later stage. The success stories were briefly described
earlier in this chapter (“The Selected Dozen”) and will be detailed in the next

two chapters. Here we look at additional potential indicators that did not
make it.
There were many other indicators of party change beyond the selected
dozen, which were considered but were found to be problematic; hence we
decided not to include them in the analysis. But it is important to mention
them here, and for a number of reasons. One is the need to be faithful to our
commitment to transparency—that is, to exposing potential weaknesses and
pitfalls in our study. The second is the need to cope with the cost of not
including these indicators—in other words we must make a convincing case
that our study stands without including them. The final reason is that this
section may serve as a basis and as an incentive for future research, which may
find better ways to tackle these problems. While we will claim that these other
indicators neglected here are not crucial to fulfilling our purpose of mapping
variance in party change, we hope that future research will be able to incorp-
orate at least some of them into the analysis. For example, we hold that
increasingly generous public funding cannot replace assets such as broad
party membership and extensive and strong party identification. Yet a study
able to map cross-national variance in these indicators would nevertheless be
worthwhile, because it would add new aspects to the general cross-national
map of party change or may contribute to an examination of the impact of
finance (if any) on the magnitude of party change.
Material Resources
A major claim of the adaptation thesis is that, while parties may have lost
something in terms of their linkage with society, they took care to compensate
for it by taking over more and more state resources (Mair 1994, 1997; Farrell
and Webb 2000; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). More resources and
fewer members (to be precise, disempowered activists, according to the cartel
party thesis: see Katz and Mair 1995) meant more room for maneuver and
flexibility in campaign and policy making for party elites (Luther and Müller-
Rommel 2002). In the case of party resources, evaluating change centers on
questions such as whether parties became wealthier (as the party adaptation
school argues) or poorer—financially, in human resources, and also in free
access to resources that usually cost money, for example the media. This can
be measured in values such as party income, size of party staff, and amount of
free broadcast time allocated to a party.
Finance
The available data on party finance and campaign finance cover changes in
about a dozen countries. These data may serve the debate on whether parties

have become more resourceful over the years (Katz 2002; Farrell 2002) or not
(Nassmacher 2009). Yet neither the way the data were processed nor the way
they are presented allows us to make comparisons between countries. It is
beyond the scope of our research here to create such a dataset, which would
require a huge effort; in any case, this part of the puzzle is of limited importance
for our purposes. Indeed, parties may compensate for income losses in mem-
bership fees that are due to declining membership, and in this respect it would
still be interesting to look at variance. But, even if party finance—specifically,
campaign resources and spending (Farrell 2002)—has prospered, this evi-
dently fails to compensate for the losses in voters’ trust and loyalty. Money
and other material resources cannot buy the love, loyalty, and trust of voters.
Party Staff
Katz and Mair (1993), Katz (2002), and Webb (2002a) identified an increase
in party-staff size over the years. They base their analysis on identical sources
(Katz and Mair 1992, which is a data book); but they also use some different
sources. As in the case of party finance, the data may be good enough to make
the case for the claim that party staff increased in numbers over the years, but
not for reliable cross-country comparison. Yet in this case we would argue not
only that more staff cannot compensate for the loss of loyalty and trust, but
that we doubt that additional staff serves the party. First, it might be that
more staff members are serving the leader more and the party as a whole less.
There are good reasons to make this speculation (Poguntke and Webb 2005a,
2005b), but it still requires closer examination. Second, the most dramatic
growth is in the staff that serves the party in government (Katz and Mair
2002). These staff members are likely to serve individual representatives and
to enhance personalization rather than partyness.
Media Access
As for our mission of identifying variance, we could find no data that enable
us to differentiate between cases. Yet we hold, once again, that this is not a
resource that can in any sense compensate for loss of trust and loyalty.
Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011: 37) argue that the “media environment
has become friendlier to the parties (and by this we mean all parties) over
time.” They base their estimation, first, on the data that show that parties and
their representatives are central during campaigns (in other words they do not
distinguish the parties from the politicians); and, second, on the increase in
free media access in general and on the spread of leadership debates. Yet, even
if parties enjoy more free or state-subsidized air time, their exposure has
declined in the age of multichannel TV, VOD, and Internet. Moreover,
leadership debates are about personalization (Reinemann and Wilke 2007),

not about increased partyness. Thus, once again, we claim that the absence of
this aspect in our study is not a crucial drawback.
Summary: Material Resources

The rather optimistic view of parties as organizations that are becoming richer
is not without misgivings. First, it should be noted that Nassmacher’s (2009)
extensive longitudinal analysis of party finance does not recognize a trend that
signifies an increase. Second, even if resources have increased, it seems that
money and other resources cannot buy loyalty. Even with more resources,
fewer citizens are mobilized (decline in turnout); and there is greater change in
their vote from one election to the other (increase in volatility). As Dalton and
Wattenberg (2000b: 275) suggest, if the general model of party government
is a “causal chain connecting voters at one end to policy outcomes at the other
end of the chain,”
If this causal chain fails at any point, then the process as a whole may
break down. Extra strength in one section of the causal chain (e.g., better
financed and more professionalized party organizations) cannot compen-
sate for a gap at another part of the chain. Thus, the chain is as strong as
its weakest link, and the weakest link appears to be dealignment among
contemporary electorates.
Third, more money for the parties that compete among themselves in a zero-
sum game might not strengthen the parties themselves, but rather enrich
campaign professionals and leave the parties wounded in the wake of well-
funded dirty campaign wars. Another option is simply that public subsidies
“are too weak to make a decisive difference in any crucial aspect of party
development” (Pierre, Svåsand, and Widfeldt 2000: 22).
Fourth, as Bartolini and Mair (2001: 337) suggest, “increasing public
privileges at a time of declining representativeness may serve to sustain
the parties in the short term, it may also undermine their legitimacy in the
longer term” (see also Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b; Kitschelt 2000).
Fifth, the ability of parties to use the closer link with the state in allocating
patronage seems to diminish rather than grow (Kitschelt 2000; van Biezen
and Kopecký 2014). Finally, a general trend within parties is the increase in
the share of resources of the central organization vis-à-vis lower levels
(Farrell and Webb 2000) and of the parliamentary party (in terms of
staff) vis-à-vis the central office (Katz and Mair 1993). A main claim is
that these trends are about changes in power relations between the faces of
the party (Katz and Mair 1993, 1995, 2009). But maybe they are mainly—
or at least significantly—about resources that are concentrated in the hands
of individuals rather than of the party as a group. Such developments may
increase personalization, and thus they may help weaken the party from

within. More money to the center may mean more resources to the national
party leader and her personal staff. A larger parliamentary staff may be
about MPs having more personal assistants who concentrate on their
personal work. To summarize: we would be happy to include data on
change in party resources over time in our analysis, but the lack of them,
we hold, is not likely to be of crucial importance by comparison with the
material available.
The Chain of Representation

A central element in Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister’s (2011: 7) optimistic
analysis of parties’ functioning is their demonstration of what they call “the
chain of democratic linkage.” They divide this chain into five stages. We do
not deal with the last three, which are about voters being informed on party
policies and voting accordingly, or about the elections’ effect of making voters
express their policy preferences and making parties deliver “the policies they
advocated in the election.” While Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister make the
case that parties still serve their role as mediators between voters and politi-
cians, another study of some of these aspects from a longitudinal perspective
is much less optimistic in its findings and identifies decline over time (Caul and
Gray 2000).
It would be interesting to re-examine the development of these parts of the
chain over time, and specifically their linkage to the other elements of party
change (and also to personalization). Yet this is beyond the scope of our
study. We hope that other scholars will follow this path. We agree with
Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011) that, as long as parties supply cues
to voters and are more or less united in government, they can serve the chain
of delegation. Yet, as our analysis of personalization and its relationship with
party change implies, in some cases parties decline so much that they are
replaced by individuals. It is unclear whether specific individuals can serve as
electoral cues in the long run; and it is true that party unity is broken more
frequently in extreme cases of party decline and personalization (e.g., in Italy
and Israel), as reflected in many instances of party switching.6
Other Indicators That Were Not Used

The partyness of governments may be measured by the number of nonparti-
san cabinet members. As Strøm (2000) demonstrates, it is quite rare to find
nonpartisan cabinet members in parliamentary democracies. Even though it is
6
See “The State of Political Parties in 2015” in Chapter 5; also Kenig et al. 2014.

possible to identify some variance over time, the numbers seem to be too low.
We thus preferred looking at changes in the party background of ministers,
because the mere label of a party can hide a lot concerning their partyness.
There may be huge differences between two ministers who are both formally
labeled as “partisans.” One may be a popular public figure with no party
affiliation or activity to her record, who was recruited on the eve of elections
to improve the party’s prospects and had to register to the party as a formal
condition for being its candidate. Another may be a longtime active member
of the party, who already served as its representative in parliament and at
sublocal levels and who possibly held senior positions in the party apparatus.
While the data we used did not make room for much differentiation, they did
allow us to look beyond formal partisan affiliations.
When examining the party in parliament, it is also possible to use indicators of
party unity (mainly, but not necessarily solely, measured as cohesion in voting of
the parliamentary party group) and party switching. A decline in unified voting
and an increase in divergence between the voting of individuals and that of their
parties may serve as a sign of party decline, while opposite trends are signs of
party strengthening. We did not examine party cohesion (which could actually
be more beneficial for measuring personalization), because the data that could
be gathered were not good enough for a large n cross-national comparison
(for an explanation, see Chapter 7, “Changes in Patterns of Private Members’
Bills Submission”). This indicator may be seen as important especially for
examining the party adaptation claim, which holds that, while the “party
face” outside government has lost some strength, the party in government has
gained some. That is, if parties indeed manage to maintain high levels of unity,
they may be seen as holding on to one of their main raisons d’être: being a stable
solution for a collective action problem. As for party switching, we used the data
on fourteen countries, kindly supplied to us at the last moment by Elisa Volpi, to
examine whether parties with all the declines we identified are still holding on
(see “The State of Political Parties in 2015” in Chapter 5).
An important indicator for which we could not find reasonable longitudinal
cross-national comparable data is mass media independence from parties.
This indicator may teach us about an important change over time in one of the
central functions of political parties, that of communicating with the public
(Bergman and Strøm 2011a; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002). However, we
could not find suitable data to identify variance.
Like many scholars before us, we used changes in the number of party
members as an indicator of party change. We also hoped that we might be
able to gather enough longitudinal data on membership activity, because
relatively recent studies pointed out that there is a difference between quantity
(decline) and quality (stability) and because the findings indicated cross-
country variance (Scarrow 2015). Yet past surveys of party members are
scarce, so there is no way of using such an indicator effectively.

Change in the levels of individual trust in political parties is an indicator of
change in the party–voters relationship. Increased trust would signal a
strengthening of the link, while a decrease would suggest weakening. Changes
in the levels of trust in political parties are an indicator on which we spent
hours, trying to incorporate it into our analysis. There are quite a lot of data
on trust in democratic political institutions, but unfortunately questions
regarding trust in parties were included in the Eurobarometer only since
1997. The World Value Survey covered too few countries, and not before
1989. We found data on questions that were asked in various national election
surveys, but they were very different from each other and did not allow us to
conduct even a pragmatic comparison.
Another sign of the strength of a party’s identity may be the stability of its
brand name. No change can indicate the appeal of the brand name, while
changes may express its weaknesses and the attempt to regain support. In
general, strong parties are expected to keep their brand name, while weaken-
ing parties are expected to change it or rebrand themselves (Kim and Solt
2017). Yet we can only check relabeling over time for those parties that
survived, and this causes a problem. For example, if in country A 100 percent
of the parties survived yet relabeled themselves, while in country B no party
relabeled itself but none survived, we have 0 percent relabeling in country A,
yet its parties are clearly more resilient than those of country B. Thus the right
indicator for us would look at continuity (or survival) first, and only then
at relabeling. Within the constraints of our study we limited our analysis to
party continuity.
Additional indicators on voters’ behavior could have been useful. The
timing of a voting decision could serve as another indicator of party change
(Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000, 2002). That is, if over the years
more and more voters make up their mind only when the election day is very
near, then fewer and fewer voters have a stable and clear party preference. We
were able to find longitudinal survey data for only thirteen countries. In all
cases they told us the same story: over the years, voting decisions were made in
progressively closer proximity to the election day.7 Yet we could not differ-
entiate between cases and between levels of change, because the phrasing
of the questions in the surveys differs. Voters are variously asked whether
they made their decisions “shortly before election day,” “during elections,”
“during campaigns,” “in the last few days before election day,” or “in the last
few weeks before election day” (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2002).
7
Allern, Heidar and Karlsen 2016; Bengtsson et al. 2014; Bergman and Bolin 2011; Bille and
Pedersen 2004; Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg
2002; Damgaard, 2011; Kristjánsson and Indridason 2011; McAllister and Cameron 2014; Narud
and Strøm 2011; Raunio, 2011; Webb 2002c.

It would also be useful to examine changes in voters’ campaign activities
over time (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000) as another sign of
change in the relationship of parties with voters, this time with the active
few. While the different questions can serve to map an overall trend, they
are problematic when it comes to cross-national comparisons and, as we
have better alternative measures for voters’ behavior, we did not include it
in our study.
Finally, change in the vote for anti-party parties (or anti political establish-
ment parties) can serve as an indicator of party change: a decline in such a
vote indicates an increase in parties’ strength, while an increase testifies to
alienation from parties. Prominent studies in this field, however, end their
analysis too early, more than two decades ago (Abedi 2002; Poguntke 1996).
But, owing to more recent changes in anti-partisan sentiments, this kind of
work has to be updated theoretically before it can be updated empirically and
extended; and that, again, is beyond the scope of the present study.
This section looked at what we do not have and exposed potential and real
weaknesses in our analysis. Nevertheless, we truly believe that, given the
availability and quality of the data, we cover as much ground as possible
within the limits of our study and that this ground is good enough to be called
an expedition. It is also an invitation to others to propose improved data and
analyses. This may be done not only by employing more sophisticated mining
techniques, but by innovating the crafting of indicators on the basis of
additional data that are available.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we set the case for our exploration and explained its main
goal: to analyze the overlooked cross-national variance in party change. We
then outlined our selected indicators of party change as well as those that
were not included, with an explanation as to why. It is now time to take a
closer look at the selected dozen indicators, which will be done in the next
two chapters, and then to get a more integrated view of the topic, which will
be undertaken in Chapter 5.
Indicators of Party Change
This chapter examines nine of the twelve selected indicators of party change.
Some indicators in this group of nine are widely used (e.g., party membership,
electoral volatility, electoral turnout), others have been proposed and examined
only by a few scholars (background of ministers and members of parliament,
party–interest groups linkage, continuity of parties). All these indicators exam-
ine the direct and the indirect (mediated) links of parties with society. The latter
include the relationship between the extra-parliamentary organization and the
party in government, the relationship between the party and its members, and
the relationship between the party and various interest groups.1 The category of
direct links with voters contains voter attitudes toward parties as well as
patterns of voter behavior and the resulting party system. In the following
pages we explain the significance of each indicator, examine its advantages
and limitations, and present the trends related to it over time. Before doing so,
let us return briefly to the processing of the data.
ON THE PROCESSING OF DATA
One procedure that is repeatedly used is that of measuring change in both

absolute and relative terms and then weighing the two equally, in order to
derive a final estimation of change. Both measurements reflect the magnitude
of change and its direction, but they have different points of emphasis. The
measurement of absolute change is more general, in the sense that it treats
equally the values of change for all countries; but it is too sensitive to the
starting point of each country. For example, in a country that has 20 percent
party membership to begin with, membership decline will be potentially much
higher than in a country that starts with 4 percent party membership. The
measurement of relative change is more country-specific and treats changes
1
The presence and the power of national parties at the local and regional levels, topics that are
examined in Chapter 4, also belong to this group of indirect (mediated) links.
Indicators of Party Change 43

according to each country’s starting point. But in so doing it somewhat
ignores the significance of the change for the specific polity. Thus declines
from 2 percent to 1 percent and from 20 percent to 10 percent are identical in
relative terms, yet the former are clearly less significant than the latter. By
using the two measurements for each indicator and by weighing them equally
to calculate the partyness index, we can obtain a balanced, albeit not perfect,
evaluation of the change.
Another recurring procedure is that of dividing the amount of change to the
number of years over which it is measured. This move allows us to standardize
our measurement for the cases in which we have data for different time
periods. This difference may occur because data are not available for specific
years or, in some cases, because democratization occurs after our ideal
starting point.
As explained in Chapter 2, in the section “Coping with the Challenges of
Measuring Variance in Party Change,” each indicator is calibrated and stand-
ardized. We call this codification of the data the partyness index. It appears in
the last column (and sometimes in additional columns that separately calibrate
absolute and relative change) of each table in which we present one of our
indicators. The partyness indices show our estimations of change on the scale
that we use along this book: 2 for large decline in partyness; 1 for moderate
decline in partyness; 0 for no trend; 1 for moderate increase in partyness; 2 for
large increase in partyness.
THE PARTY IN GOVERNMENT AND THE

EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATION
Let us begin by examining the change in the strength of the link between the
party’s extra-parliamentary organization and the party in government. We do
this by looking at changes in the partisan background of the party represen-
tatives (1) in cabinet and (2) in the legislature. Political parties are expected
to determine, or at least influence, the policy of the government. When a
politician is appointed as a cabinet minister or elected to parliament, she is
more likely to follow the party line if she was socialized in the party; that is, if
she has a background of serving in the party organization or of representing
the party at lower levels of government. Such a background is likely to bring
her ideological positions and worldviews closer to those of her party and
would probably foster in her a sense of solidarity that would make her loyal
to the party even when she may not be completely in agreement with its
policies (van Vonno et al. 2014). An increase in the proportion of ministers
or members of parliament (MPs) with a partisan background may be

interpreted as a sign of the strengthening in the party–society linkage, while a
decline may be interpreted as a sign of its weakening.
It would have been ideal if we had, for example, the number of years during
which each minister (first indicator) and MP (second indicator) was a party
member before they were appointed or elected to these positions. The best we
could come up with in these cases was, however, indicators such as the share
of MPs or ministers who previously held party positions, and also of those
who previously held a position in the local government (assuming they served
there as party representatives, which would be true in most cases).
Indicator: Party Background of Ministers

The party background of ministers is an indicator designed to assess the
strength of the linkage between the party extra-parliamentary organization
and the party in government. Parties are central in building coalitions, in
defining policy priorities, and in assuring the balance of power within the
executive branch. Since the position of cabinet minister in parliamentary
democracies is regarded as one of the more prestigious and powerful, the
allocation of ministerial positions should be considered a major resource for
political parties. If parties are in control of the government (as the party
government model predicts) we should expect to see individuals with a parti-
san background filling these positions. This is the case even if in practice the
prime minister or the party leaders are in charge of selecting the ministers
(Dowding and Dumont 2009). Thus, if we observe a decline in the share of
cabinet ministers with partisan backgrounds, this tells us something about the
degree of influence and control parties hold in the executive.
Table 3.1 presents estimations of the direction and magnitude of change
in the partyness of ministers. The second column presents estimations that
are based on Krouwel’s (2012: 18) data on the proportion of ministers with
parliamentary experience, while the estimations in the third column are based
on various types of data culled from studies of political recruitment (for
details, see Appendix 1). The estimations include calibration of absolute and
relative changes in the share of ministers with parliamentary experience; in the
share of those who were party representatives in parliament at the time of
their nomination;2 in the average years of parliamentary experience before
nomination; in the share of ministers with prior high-rank party positions or
major local or regional electoral office; and in the share of those who were
party employees. The last column presents the partyness index, which sum-
marizes these estimations. In the cases for which we had data from both
2
This is different from the previous measurement, which does not require the minister to be an
MP at the time of her nomination.

T A B L E 3 . 1 Change in the Party Background of Ministers
Country Share of ministers Other sources Partyness index

with parliamentary
experience (Krouwel
2012: 118)
Austria 1.5 1.5

Belgium 1.5 1.5
Italy .5 2 1.5
Japan 1.5 1.5
New Zealand 1.5 1.5
France 2 0 1
Iceland 1 1
Spain 1.5 2 .5
Netherlands 0 0
Portugal 0 0
UK 0 0
Ireland .5 .5
Israel .5 .5
Sweden 0 1 .5
Germany 1.5 .5 1
Denmark 2 1 1.5
Norway 2 1 1.5
Finland 2 1.5 2
See Appendix 1 for a detailed analysis and sources.
Krouwel and additional sources, the value of the partyness index is the
average of these two values. Where we have only one of them, the partyness
index is similar to the value that appears in either the second or third column.
In his analysis of the parties at the core of government, Strøm (2000: 201)
concludes: “The evidence we have encountered suggests that political parties
remain well entrenched in the core executives (cabinets) of most advanced
capitalist nations.” Indeed, our findings support this claim. There is no
general declining trend in the partyness of ministers. Yet the overall picture
is nuanced. We could find satisfactory data for eighteen cases. In eight cases
we witness a decline in partyness of ministers; in three, no change; and in
another seven, an increase. We have an almost balanced picture in terms of a
general trend with high variance in the magnitude of the change. The cases
cover a range from a strong trend of increase in partyness (Finland, with a
value of 2) to a moderate–strong trend of decline (Austria, Belgium, Italy,
Japan and New Zealand, with values of 1.5).
These findings may reflect contradictory pressures. On the one hand, par-
ties, with their declining reputation, need to recruit outsiders in order to
strengthen their image. On the other hand, given the weakening of their
connection with society (as evident from most of the analysis in this chapter),

they need to produce senior politicians from their own ranks. In other words,
given the professionalization of politics and the fact that parties move away
from society to become agents of the state (Katz and Mair 1995, 2009), we
may expect an increase in the number of politicians who progress along the
partisan path.
Indicator: Party Background of Legislators

Here we follow the same logic of the previous indicator, but for legislators.
The party background of MPs is seen as a sign of party influence through
socialization and loyalty. More years of belonging to a party and of serving
within its organization or as its elected representative—at the local and
regional levels or in other representative institutions—are expected to produce
more partisan MPs. In other words, these MPs have been socialized for a
longer time and will thus be more supportive of the party line and also more
loyal to it than those who lack such experiences. Indeed, as Cotta and
Verzichelli (2007: 423) demonstrate, modern politics has seen the develop-
ment of party democracy and, with it, a process of “partization” of represen-
tation: “Partisation means also that representatives will have to pass the
scrutiny of party organizations: to have occupied a position of responsibility
in the party at any level will obviously enhance the chances of selection” (and
see also Fiers and Secker 2007). It thus makes sense to examine whether, since
the 1960s, the trend of “partization” of representation has continued or rather
changed direction toward “departization.”
Table 3.2 presents estimations of the direction and magnitude of change in
the partyness of MPs. It is based mainly on the collection edited by Best and
Cotta (2000) and on Cotta and Verzichelli (2007), as well as on some studies
that were published at the turn of this century. It thus relates mostly to the
developments up to the late 1990s and the early years of the decade 2000–10.
It takes various elements as signs of partyness, for example holding a position
within the party organization (outside and inside parliament), serving as a
party representative in local or regional government, or acting as the official
of a pressure group that is connected to the party.
We found data relevant to fifteen out of the twenty-six cases under study.
The data cover different periods; and the specific indicators also differ in
many cases (see Appendix 2). So here again we should be cautious and satisfy
ourselves with examining the rough trends. The balance clearly tips toward an
increase in partyness (five cases of decline, one case of no change, and nine
cases of increase). This contrasts with the overall picture of decline in party-
ness that emerges from most of the other indicators. As was proposed in the
case of countries in which ministers became more partisan, this may be a
result of the party’s becoming more isolated from society and from its

T A B L E 3 . 2 Change in the Party Background of Legislators
Country Partyness index
Switzerland 2
Finland 1.5
Italy 1.5
Denmark .5
France .5
Israel 0
Poland .5
Germany .5
Norway .5
Netherlands 1
Portugal 1
Australia 1.5
Czech Republic 2
Hungary 2
UK 2
potential pools of recruitment, as is evident from our analysis of its relation-

ships with interest groups (see “Indicator: Party–Interest Group Relation-
ships” in this chapter) and the presence of national parties in local and
regional government (see Chapter 4).
As noted, the most recent, systematic, and reliable values we could find, for
most countries, for the partyness of ministers and legislators were from the
late 1990s or early years of the twenty-first century. It is possible that things
have changed since then, but without a systematic longitudinal analysis of
reliable data we cannot be sure in which direction. If parties indeed continue
to detach themselves from society (Mair 2013), a claim that is largely sup-
ported by the analysis of other indicators here, we might see one of two
possible developments. One is an increase in the partyness of ministers and
legislators. Parties as such monopolize politics, and even strengthen their
monopoly through laws (Dalton, Farrell, McAllister 2011). Thus, to become
an MP or a minister, one has to follow the partisan path even more than in the
past. On the other hand, victories such as that of Donald Trump in the 2016
US elections and of Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French presidential and
parliamentary elections underscored the possibility that nonpartyness has
become a key in electoral success. Trump, though elected as the Republican
nominee, had no partisan background, and many in the party elite resented
him. Nor did Macron compete in the first round of the presidential elections,
or in the parliamentary elections, with the support of any of the established
parties of his country. This seems to have worked for both of them. While

the same development, of electing a total outsider to head the executive, is
much less likely to occur in parliamentary systems, a parallel phenomenon
is the evident increase in the success of new parties (see “Indicator: Continuity
of Parties/Emergence of New Parties” in this chapter). And in genuinely new
parties politicians naturally lack party background by the very nature of
these parties.
THE MEDIATORS BETWEEN PARTY AND SOCIETY
The next two indicators are about mediators between party and society,
individuals (party members: see Katz 1990), and groups that stand between
voters and parties—what Poguntke (2002) calls the “party organizational
linkage.” He explains that the “organizational linkage extends the organiza-
tional ‘reach’ of party elites beyond the boundaries of their own organization”
and that “it stabilizes relevant environments” (Poguntke 2002: 46). To these
“environments” we should add regional and local governments, which are
examined separately in Chapter 4.
Indicator: Party Membership Density

Party members are important to parties for numerous reasons: they serve as a
stable electoral base; they provide an army of potential volunteers during
elections; their membership dues help to fund party activities and campaign-
ing; they serve as a pool of potential future candidates for elections at various
levels (local, regional, national, and supernational); they enhance the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the party as a representative organization with a grass-
roots base in society; they communicate ideas and preferences from and to
society; and they can serve as the party’s ambassadors in society, bringing the
word and convincing other people to support the party (van Haute and Gauja
2015; Scarrow 2000, 2015; Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Thus their number and
activity can serve as a sign of increase or decrease in partyness.
Scholars examine various aspects of the behavior of party members. They
refer, for example, to party activism, which is checked by asking pointed
questions in surveys. These typically include how many hours a month the
party members dedicate to party activities, whether they took part in any
party activities in the last year, and if so, which ones. Unfortunately, longi-
tudinal data on the behavior of party members are rare and cover mainly the
last decade. We thus have to limit our longitudinal examination, like other
scholars, to changes in the size of party membership over the years.

When studying party membership at the country level, there are two main
ways to gather data. One (the so-called objective measure) relies on the
parties’ self-reports. The other (sometimes called “the subjective measure”)
relies on surveys in which people are asked whether they are members of a
party.3 Parties’ reported membership better serves here our purpose of cover-
ing as many countries and years as possible.
Table 3.3 (see Appendix 3 for more details) examines changes in member-
ship density by looking at the share of party members out of all voting age
populations (membership/electorate or M/E) in each country at the beginning
of the earliest available or possible decade (data in the second column) and
around 2008 (data in the third column). As noted at the beginning of this
chapter, in the section “On the Processing of Data,” we offer two interpret-
ations of these changes. One is based on looking at change in absolute terms
(data in the fourth column and calibration in the fifth), the other on looking in
relative terms (data in the sixth column and calibration in the seventh). The
last column presents the average value for the calibrated values of the absolute
and relative indices. We did not have sufficient data from two countries,
Japan and Luxembourg, and we omitted Iceland because the nature of
party membership in that country and the way in which the party records
are managed do not allow us to identify trends over time (Indriðason and
Kristinsson 2015; Kristinsson 2010).
Of the twenty-three countries for which we have sufficient data, only two—
the veteran third-wave democracies of Greece and Spain—experienced an
increase in party membership. All other twenty-one cases indicate decline.
These findings are in line with studies that pointed to a general decline trend
(van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; van Haute,
Paulis and Sierens forthcoming) and with studies that discussed the emergence
of parties that are not based on membership, such as business-firm parties
(Krouwel 2006) and memberless parties (Mazzoleni and Voerman 2017).
This almost universal trend is constant, and even almost linear in most
cases. There are very few fluctuations in membership figures (see Appendix 3).
Among the indicators of partyness, party-membership change is prominent
for pointing clearly to a declining trend in almost all cases. This may partly
explain why studies of party change ignored cross-country variance. Still,
when we look closely at these twenty-one countries even through the rough
prism of our calibrated index, we can identify variance among them. Some are
about sharp decline in both absolute and relative terms (7); some are about
moderate decline in absolute terms but sharp in relative terms (6); others are
3
For a discussion of the pros and cons of using party records rather than surveys, and for a
general discussion of the problems of party-membership data, see Scarrow 2015.
T A B L E 3 . 3 Change in the Proportion of Party Members in the Electorate (M/E in %)
Country ~Earliest ~2008** Absolute Index Relative Index Partyness

decade* change per absolute change per relative index
annum change annum change +
***
New 20.2 1.7 .46 2 2.29 2 2

Zealand
Israel 17.0 4.8 .44 2 2.56 2 2
Switzerland 23.4 4.8 .39 2 1.66 2 2
Czech 7.0 2.0 .28 2 3.97 2 2
Republic
Norway 16.0 5.0 .23 2 1.44 2 2
Finland 19.1 8.1 .23 2 1.20 2 2
Denmark 14.3 4.1 .21 2 1.49 2 2
Austria 26.2 17.3 .19 1 .71 2 1.5
Canada 3.6 .8 .16 1 4.32 2 1.5
UK 9.0 1.2 .16 1 1.81 2 1.5
Sweden 11.7 3.9 .16 1 1.39 2 1.5
Netherlands 9.5 2.5 .15 1 1.54 2 1.5
Italy 12.7 5.6 .15 1 1.16 2 1.5
Belgium 9.8 5.5 .09 0 .91 2 1
Ireland 4.6 2.0 .07 0 1.49 2 1
Australia 3.7 1.4 .06 0 1.64 2 1
Poland 1.2 1.0 .03 0 2.09 2 1
Hungary 2.1 1.5 .03 0 1.59 2 1
Portugal 4.3 3.8 .02 0 .41 1 .5
Germany 2.7 2.3 .01 0 .31 1 .5
France 2.2 1.9 .01 0 .28 1 .5
Spain 1.2 4.4 .11 1 9.53 2 1.5
Greece 3.2 6.6 .12 1 3.80 2 1.5
* Data for the closest available membership figures within three years of decennial year. The starting decade
is the 1960s, except for Ireland and Australia (1970s), Israel, Portugal, Spain, and Greece (~1980), Canada,
Czech Republic, and Hungary (~1990), and Poland (~2000).
** For New Zealand the data relate approximately to the decade 2000–10.
*** Key for the index:
2: more than 0.2 annual decrease
1: between 0.1 and 0.2 annual decrease
0: less than 0.1 change
1: between 0.1 and 0.2 annual increase
2: more than 0.2 annual increase.
+ Key for the index:
2: more than 0.5 annual decrease
2: more than 0.5 annual increase.

only about a sharp relative decline (5); and still others show just a moderate
relative decline (3).
Indicator: Party–Interest Group Relationships

Parties attempt to create closer links with citizens by recruiting them as
members and making them part of their internal life. But they can also
connect with citizens by having relationships with the interest groups to
which they belong and that represent their interests. Such relationships have
historical roots. Especially prominent among them were the relationships
between trade unions and labor parties and between the church or church-
affiliated organizations and conservative or Christian-democratic parties
(van Biezen and Poguntke 2014). These relationships changed and ebbed
over the years (Thomas 2001). Both interest groups and parties developed
their own separate organization, focus areas, and identity. Still, a relationship
could remain close as long as each side would bring something into it. Parties
could promote policies that served the goals of the interest groups and block
those that worked against them. Interest groups, for their part, could help the
party reach beyond its organizational boundaries and could serve as a rela-
tively stable support base (Poguntke 2002).
Interestingly, in his research on eleven European countries, Poguntke
(2002) found that in the 1960–89 period there was no change in the formal
linkages between parties and collateral organizations. Specifically, these
organizations continued to maintain their proportion of representatives in
the parties’ central institutions. Signs of a weakening of this bond could be
identified when corporate party membership was either phased out (Sweden,
Norway) or significantly changed (the United Kingdom). However, such
membership was never widespread. But, as Poguntke concluded from com-
paring these findings with the clear trend in the decline in party-membership
density, the very formal survival of the linkages does not prove that there was
no gradual erosion of their effectiveness. In addition, the fact that new parties
hardly have such linkages may testify to their decline at the country level.
Table 3.4 presents estimations of the change in party–interest group rela-
tionships. Among these relationships, the most significant and studied are
those between trade unions and political parties. We base our analysis on
available sources that relate to various indicators that may testify to the
development of these relationships: first, Scarrow and Gezgor’s (2010: 833)
analysis, based on ESS and Eurobarometer surveys, of changes in the over-
representation of union members among party members; and, second, certain
country studies of party–interest group relationships, among them studies
from the collection of Thomas (2001), and of party–union relationships,
especially from the collection of Allern and Bale (2017).
T A B L E 3 . 4 Change in Party–Interest Group Relationships
Country Scarrow and Gezgor (2010): Estimations of the development of Estimations of the development of center left Partyness
Change in union members’ party–interest group relationships and left parties–trade unions relationships index

overrepresentation among party
members, 1990s vs. 2000–10*
Canada Savage 2010 2

Israel Yishai 2001 Mandelkern and Rahat 2017 2
Luxembourg High decline 2
Portugal High decline 2
Australia Larkin and Lees 2017 1
Austria Luther 2017 1
Belgium High decline Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010 1
Denmark Moderate increase Christiansen 2012; Jensen 2003 Aylott 2004; Allern, Aylott, and 1
Christiansen 2007
France High decline Appleton 2001 Parsons 2017 1
Germany High decline Gellner and Robertson 2001; Spier 2017 1
Wessels 1997
Ireland Moderate decline 1
Italy No change Constantelos 2001 Mattina and Carrieri 2017 1
Japan Hrebenar 2001 1
Netherlands Moderate decline Otjes and Rasmussen 2017 1
Norway Aylott 2004; Allern, Aylott, and 1
Christiansen 2007
Spain Moderate decline Hamann, 2001 1
Sweden Widfeldt 2001 Aylott 2004; Allern, Aylott, and 1
Christiansen 2007; Jansson 2017
UK Moderate decline Jordan and Maloney 2001 Webb and Bale 2017; Norris and 1
Lovenduski 1995
Finland Raunio and Laine 2017 0
Greece No change 0
Switzerland Erne and Schief 2017 0
* The source is Scarrow and Gezgor’s (2010: 833) analysis of ESS and Eurobarometer surveys. Large decline in density = 10% or more; 3% < Moderate decline < 10%;
No trend = any change smaller than 3%; 3% < Moderate increase < 10%; Large increase = 10% or more.

Some studies of the same countries present different conclusions, and
occasionally we identify in the same study signs of both decline and increase
in the linkage. Take the Labour Party–trade unions relationship in the United
Kingdom: many signs point to its weakening; for example, the decline in the
weight of the unions in candidate and leadership selection and in union
member density among party members (Alderman and Carter 1994). At the
same time, the number of trade union-sponsored candidates and MPs rose.
We used our best judgement to weigh these pieces of data and to indicate our
sources, as we do in all cases, so that our estimation may be reexamined and
challenged. Our rough estimation is insensitive to relatively small differences.
For example, a close comparison of developments in the party–union rela-
tionship in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark points to differences (Allern,
Aylott, and Christiansen 2007). Still, from our wider perspective, the measure
of decline in these countries is similar.
In only one case is there an increase in union member overrepresentation
among party members (Denmark), and no country expert reports that the
relationship between political parties and interest groups is becoming closer
than before. We thus have three cases of no change, fourteen cases of mod-
erate weakening, and four cases of apparent sharp decline. The general picture
of party–interest group relationships indicates decline. Yet in most cases we
may talk about a blend of decline and adaptation: the relationships, though
weakening, are not over but are rather being redefined. It is also a story
that may be interpreted as tracing the growing autonomy of civil society
groupings—the story of a changing societal environment that is causing
both sides to recalculate the sort of relationships that are beneficial to them
(Allern and Bale 2012a, 2012b, 2017). In any event, we have to remember that
the weakening of the link between political parties and interest groups is not
only about diminished cooperation. It may also create competition and
alternative channels for citizens to influence politics. This differs from other
examples of decline: decline in the voter–party relationship leaves the voter on
her own, disconnected; decline in the presence and power of national parties
at the regional and local levels of government still means that local groupings
and independents have an incentive to cooperate with the national level rather
than to compete with it.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

PARTY AND THE VOTERS
We started by examining the relationship between the various parts of the

party organization and the relationship between this organization and the

mediators. We turn now to the party’s direct relationship with voters. Changes
in this relationship can be examined from several perspectives. First, we can
check whether there is a change over time in the ways citizens perceive political
parties. Here we look at changes in identification with a specific party. Second,
we can examine the behavior of voters. Here we examine their loyalty to parties
by looking at changes in levels of electoral volatility. We also assess whether
there is a change over time in parties’ success in mobilizing voters, measured by
changes in the levels of electoral turnout. Finally, we look at two indicators of
the stability and change of party systems, that is, measurements of the aggre-
gative consequences of voters’ electoral behavior: we look at the effective
number of parties among voters (ENPV) and at change and continuity in the
party composition of each parliament under study.
Attitudes toward Political Parties

Indicator: Party Identification
We will address, first, the basic distinction between people who have a party
identity and people who do not have one. When individuals feel closer to one
party than to all others, it means that the party has succeeded in differentiat-
ing itself from the rest and in making its case vis-à-vis its potential supporters
in society. When individuals have no such identification, it means that parties
have failed in making this initial step toward the people. We will also look at
data that tell us about changes in the proportion of those who have a strong
party identity. These are people who not only differentiate one party from the
others but also express a strong affiliation to their preferred alternative.
Data on party identification are quite abundant. Most of the relevant
countries and international political surveys include questions that measure
the existence of party identification, and sometimes also its magnitude. The
main problem with these measurements is that the questions asked are not
identical, either across countries or over time. We did our best to cope with
this problem by using the same sources insofar as this was possible.
Table 3.5 (see Appendix 4 for more details) presents the calibrated partisan
index for change in party identification, over time, for the earlier period
(second column)—that is, for the decades before 2000—and for the latest
period, after 2000 (third column); and an average of the two, weighted by
years (last column). For the decades before 2000, the index is based, first, on
Dalton’s (2004) analysis of changes in the share of party identifiers and in the
proportion of citizens with a strong level of party identification for the two or
three decades before 1998. Second, the index is based on our own analysis of
the change in the share of those without any party identification, which draws
on answers to an identical question that was asked in the Eurobarometer
surveys in 1978–96. Third, for later years, we analyzed data from the European

T A B L E 3 . 5 Change in Party Identification
Country Change in Change in Partyness

partyness, partyness, late index*
early period period
Czech Republic 2 2
Hungary 2 2
Ireland 2 2 2
Israel 2 2 2
Italy 2 2 2
Japan 2 2
New Zealand 2 2
Iceland 1.5 2 2
Austria 2 1 1.5
Greece 1 2 1.5
France 2 0 1.5
Netherlands 1.5 1 1
Finland 1 1 1
Luxembourg 1 1
Poland 1 1
UK 1.5 1 1
Australia 1.5 1 .5
Belgium 1 0 .5
Sweden 2 2 .5
Canada 1 1 .5
Switzerland 1 1 .5
Germany 1.5 2 0
Portugal 1 2 0
Denmark 0 1 .5
Norway 1.5 2 .5
Spain 2 1 1.5
* Based on a calculation, roughly weighted by years, of the indices from the two
previous columns.
Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2014. Finally, we used supplementary data
from additional sources. In most cases for which we have several sources for
roughly the same period, the trends are similar in direction (increase or
decrease), and also in strength, for the most part. We coped with a few large
differences and the more frequent small ones by treating as equal all the data
adopted by us and by giving them roughly the same weight.
Table 3.5 is mostly about decline, as can be expected from the literature
(Dalton 2000; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2002). In twenty-one cases
there is a decline in party identification, in three there is an increase, while in
two the verdict is no trend. Nevertheless, there are various nuances that should
be noted. First, the magnitude of the change varies, as can be understood by
looking at the last column, which weighs the data and tries to come up with a
verdict for the longest possible part of the investigated period. Second, while the

earliest period is mainly about decline (except for Denmark, which had stabil-
ity, and the third-wave democracies of Spain and Portugal, which had an
increase), in the latest period one encounters nine cases of increase. To sum-
marize, within a general decline trend there are different magnitudes of change.
Decline is more evident in the 1980s and 1990s than in the last fifteen years (see
also Norris 2011).
Actual Behavior toward Political Parties

If party identity is about the way in which citizens perceive parties, the next
two indicators are about the actual behavior of voters: the stability of their
voting, which may be seen as the actual expression of their (dis)loyalty to a
specific party; and their actual participation in voting, which may partially be
understood as an expression of their trust in parties. In other words, it is likely
that those who do not see much difference between parties or perceive them as
a cartel—or, even worse, as a corrupted bunch—will stay home.
Indicator: Electoral Volatility

The most common measure for electoral volatility is the Pedersen (1979)
Index.4 It expresses net volatility, that is, it ignores those switches of voters
between parties that neutralize each other. Hence it displays the minimum
level of volatility. Yet the alternative, to measure volatility at the individual
level through surveys, is no less problematic in terms of validity and reliability
and is much less readily available for cross-national comparison. However, a
reliable use of the Pedersen Index requires using a single source wherever
possible, because there is no one standard, agreed upon protocol that relates
to the treatment of mergers and splits and to the question of what should be
regarded as a “new party” (Barnea and Rahat 2011).
Table 3.6 (see Appendix 5 for more details) presents data and indices for
changes in net electoral volatility. The second column presents the average
level of electoral volatility for the earliest available decade, while the third
column presents the average level of electoral volatility for the latest period,
2006–15. Most data are from Dassonneville (2015). In cases not covered by
Dassonneville, we followed her rules for the treatment of mergers and splits
and for the definition of new parties.5 The fourth column presents the value of
4
For alternative measurements, see Rose and Urwin 1970; Drummond 2006.
5
Generally, there are two approaches to accommodate these challenges. The first simply
measures the change in electoral support for party labels between elections. The second takes
mergers and splits into account, calculating the difference between a party’s vote share and the
total vote share of its predecessor parties before a merger, or the successor parties after a split. This
more cautious approach better represents, in our opinion, net volatility and therefore we adopted
it, following several studies (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017).
T A B L E 3 . 6 Change in Net Electoral Volatility (Pedersen Index)
Country Averages of 2006–15 Change Partyness

earliest averages index
available Absolute Index Relative Index
decade* change absolute change per relative
per change** annum change***
annum
Japan 2.8 22.5 .66 2 23.45 2 2

Poland 32.7 37.9 .52 2 1.59 2 2
Israel 5.2 20.4 .38 2 7.31 2 2
Ireland 2.7 17.3 .37 2 13.52 2 2
Iceland 8.3 22.4 .35 2 4.25 2 2
Italy 6.9 18.3 .29 2 4.13 2 2
Austria 3.8 13.7 .25 2 6.51 2 2
Germany 6.2 14.6 .21 2 3.39 2 2
Netherlands 11.9 19.3 .19 1 1.56 2 1.5
Canada 6.1 11.9 .15 1 2.38 2 1.5
Belgium 7.1 12.5 .14 1 1.90 2 1.5
UK 6.9 11.9 .13 1 1.81 2 1.5
France 11.7 16.5 .12 1 1.03 2 1.5
Sweden 7.6 11.7 .10 1 1.35 2 1.5
New 6.7 8.5 .05 0 .67 2 1
Zealand
Switzerland 6.0 7.7 .04 0 .71 2 1
Australia 5.4 6.7 .03 0 .60 2 1
Finland 9.0 9.7 .02 0 .20 1 .5
Portugal 11.5 11.4 .00 0 .03 0 0
Denmark 14.1 13.4 .02 0 .13 0 0
Norway 11.2 10.4 .02 0 .18 0 0
Greece 17.7 16.1 .05 0 .30 1 .5
Luxembourg 13.2 7.2 .15 1 1.14 2 1.5
Spain 26.3 16.9 .31 2 1.19 2 2
Czech 32.3 21.7 1.06 2 3.28 2 2
Republic
Hungary 38.1 20.6 1.75 2 4.59 2 2
* The earliest decade for most countries is 1966–75; the exceptions are Greece, Japan, Portugal, and Spain,
where the earliest decade is 1976–85, and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, where the earliest decade
is 1990–2000 and the comparison is with the period after 2000.
** Key for the index:
2: more than 0.2 annual increase
2: more than 0.2 annual decrease.
2: more than 0.5 annual increase
2: more than 0.5 annual decrease.

absolute change per annum, and the fifth column presents the values of the
calibrated index for absolute change. The sixth column presents the value of
relative change per annum, and the seventh column presents the values of
the calibrated index for relative change (see Appendix 5 for the calculations).
The last column presents the summary index, which is a simple average of the
indices for absolute and relative change.
The general trend, as can be expected from the literature (Dalton,
McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000, 2002; Baldini and Pappalardo 2009;
Dassonneville and Hooghe 2011), is an increase in volatility—which can be
found in eighteen cases. Volatility declined in only five countries. Four out of
these are third-wave democracies (Spain, Hungary, Greece, and the Czech
Republic), and thus could be expected to have higher volatility rates for the
earliest decade, when the party system was just starting to be consolidated. In
three other countries there is no evident trend. The general trend is one of
decline in partyness, but variance is nevertheless evident and the use of two
indices—of absolute and relative change, with their different logics—enables
a nuanced picture.
Indicator: Electoral Turnout

If volatility is about the ability of parties to keep “their” voters, turnout is
about the capacity of parties as a whole to convince voters to make the effort
and come and vote and, in some cases, even to actively organize and bring
them to vote. In view of the low individual benefit that a voter is expected to
gain from this act, the parties have an important role to play in creating a
general atmosphere that will encourage citizens to make the effort.
Decline in turnout is one of the most prominent indicators of citizens’
growing detachment from politics (Gray and Caul 2000; Franklin 2004;
Gallego 2009; Wattenberg 2000). It is connected to the loss of trust in the
political system in general, and specifically in political parties. It is argued that
the parties’ inability to inspire a sense of identification in the public and to
fulfill properly their representative duties yielded a significant decline in
turnout. As Mair (2013: 27–8) points out, in the majority of Western Euro-
pean democracies, most (if not all) of the lowest turnouts have occurred since
the 1990s.
Table 3.7 (see Appendix 6 for more details) presents changes in electoral
turnout. The second column presents the average turnout for the earliest avail-
able decade, while the third column presents the average for the latest available
decade (2006–15). The fourth column presents the values of absolute change per
annum and the fifth column presents the calibrated partyness index for absolute
change. The sixth column presents the values of relative change per annum and
the seventh column presents the calibrated partyness index for relative change
T A B L E 3 . 7 Change in Electoral Turnout
Country Averages of 2006–15 Change in partyness Partyness

earliest averages index
available Absolute Index Relative Index
decade* change absolute change relative
per change** per change***
annum annum
Czech 69.4 61.1 .83 2 1.20 2 2

Republic
Portugal 82.1 57.8 .81 2 .99 2 2
France 80.8 57.7 .58 2 .72 2 2
Greece 82.1 65.2 .56 2 .69 2 2
Germany 88.9 71.2 .44 2 .50 1 1.5
Austria 92.7 77.4 .38 2 .41 1 1.5
Finland 80.6 66.4 .36 2 .44 1 1.5
Italy 93.0 79.8 .33 2 .36 1 1.5
Israel 79.9 67.1 .32 2 .40 1 1.5
Japan 71.4 60.4 .28 2 .39 1 1.5
Canada 74.6 63.4 .28 2 .38 1 1.5
New 87.4 76.9 .26 2 .30 1 1.5
Zealand
UK 75.0 66.0 .23 2 .30 1 1.5
Netherlands 85.9 76.8 .23 2 .27 1 1.5
Switzerland 57.5 48.6 .22 2 .39 1 1.5
Ireland 76.8 68.5 .21 2 .27 1 1.5
Iceland 91.1 83.4 .19 1 .21 1 1
Sweden 89.5 84.1 .14 1 .15 0 .5
Norway 82.0 77.3 .12 1 .14 0 .5
Spain 75.0 72.5 .08 0 .11 0 0
Australia 95.3 93.7 .04 0 .04 0 0
Denmark 88.4 86.7 .04 0 .05 0 0
Belgium 90.7 89.9 .02 0 .02 0 0
Luxembourg 89.4 91.0 .04 0 .05 0 0
Hungary 63.8 64.6 .08 0 .13 0 0
Poland 44.9 51.2 .63 2 1.40 2 2
* The earliest decade for most countries is 1966–75; the exceptions are Portugal, Greece, and Spain (earliest
decade 1976–85) and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (earliest decade 1996–2005).
2 more than 0.2 annual decrease
1 between 0.1 and 0.2 annual decrease
0 less than 0.1 change
1 between 0.1 and 0.2 annual increase
2 more than 0.2 annual increase.
2 more than 0.5 annual decrease
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data culled from IDEA 2015, see Appendix 6 for the complete data.

(see Appendix 6 for the calculations). The last column presents the final party-
ness index for this indicator, which is simply the average of the index for absolute
change and the index for relative change.
The overall trend of decline is clear. There is only one case of increase in
turnout (in both absolute and relative terms), and that is the young Polish
democracy, which even after the increase still has the second-lowest turnout
level. There are six cases of stability, in both absolute and relative terms. Two
of these are countries that have effective rules of compulsory vote (Australia
and Belgium). All other cases show some decline: moderate decline in abso-
lute terms but no change in relative terms (Norway and Sweden); moderate
decline in both indices (Iceland); sharp decline in absolute terms and moderate
in relative terms (twelve countries); sharp decline in terms of both indices
(four countries). So, again, we witness a clear general trend and, within it,
some variance.
Voter Behavior and the Party System

The next two indicators are about changes at the party-system level that stem
from the aggregation of changes in the behavior of individual voters. Both
indicators are about the ability of parties to control their electoral environ-
ment. The first refers to party-system fragmentation and, for our purposes, it
expresses the ability of parties to preserve the party system. Yet this indicator
is blind to the content of the system; that is, it ignores whether the same parties
preserve the structure of the party system over time. This justifies the addition
of a second indicator that measures the success of older parties in retaining
control over representation in parliament against the attempts of newer
parties to penetrate the established party system.
Indicator: Party System Fragmentation

The effective number of parties among voters (ENPV) is a measure that
expresses the number of parties and their relative support in a given system
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979). An increase in the ENPV means that voters
spread their votes over time among a growing number of parties (most likely
also genuinely new ones) and that parties tend to split. A decrease means that
voters concentrate their votes over time on a dwindling number of parties
(most likely established ones) and that parties tend to merge. Thus crystal-
lization is interpreted as an increase in partyness, while fluidity is interpreted
as a decrease in partyness. As Mair (1997) notes, systematic fragmentation
indicates a crisis of the more established parties. Dalton, McAllister, and
Wattenberg (2000) use it as a general summary for the combination of voters’
change of behavior and the penetration of new parties into what used to be

“frozen” party systems, while for Strøm (2000) it serves as one of the indica-
tors of change in the strength of party government.
Table 3.8 (see Appendix 7 for more details) presents change in the ENPV.
The second column presents the average ENPV for the earliest available
decade, while the third column presents the average for the latest available
decade (2006–15). The fourth column presents the values of absolute
change per annum and the fifth column presents the calibrated partyness
index for absolute change. The sixth column presents the values of relative
change per annum and the seventh column presents the calibrated partyness
index for relative change (see Appendix 7 for the calculations). The last
column presents the final partyness index for this indicator, which is simply
the average for the index for absolute change and the index for relative
change.
In only two countries did we witness a decline in the effective number of
electoral parties in both absolute and relative terms. These two countries,
Poland and Hungary, are young democracies whose party systems in the
earliest decade had yet to be stabilized. In an additional ten cases we witnessed
no clear trend, either absolutely or relatively. In the remaining fourteen cases
we saw an increase in fragmentation. While the general trend is one of
fragmentation, an increase in fragmentation over time is not a predetermined
fate. Almost half of the countries did not experience this fate. Focusing on the
nations that experienced decline, a variance in scope is evident from the
extreme fragmentation that Israel experienced to the moderate fragmentation
in the United Kingdom and to the moderate-to-low ones in Japan or
New Zealand.
Indicator: Continuity of Parties/Emergence of New Parties

The final indicator presented in this chapter examines how well the traditional,
“old” political parties have managed to survive and, from the opposite per-
spective, to what extent new parties have succeeded in obtaining electoral
support at the expense of the established parties. While the emergence of
new parties should be regarded as a natural and even positive thing in a
competitive democracy, the scope of their success in different countries may
tell a lot about the state of parties. The rise of new parties is perceived as a
consequence of parties’ dealignment (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg
2002). It goes hand in hand with dealignment if and when citizens who are
dealigned, but still make the effort to vote, prefer the unknown to the devil they
know. In some countries the established parties might have adapted to the
penetration of new issues or cleavages, managed to react to it, and absorbed
these issues into their political program. In other cases this did not happen and
new parties penetrated the system. Moreover, an unstable set of choices,
specifically the emergence of new parties, leads the voters to look for different
T A B L E 3 . 8 Change in the Effective Number of Parties among Voters (ENPV)
Country Averages Averages Change in partyness Partyness

of earliest for index
available 2006–15
decade*
Absolute Index Relative Index
change absolute change per relative
per change** annum change***
annum
Israel 3.73 8.19 .12 2 2.99 2 2

Czech 4.95 6.09 .11 2 2.30 2 2
Republic
Belgium 5.77 9.57 .10 2 1.65 2 2
Austria 2.31 4.55 .06 2 2.43 2 2
Greece 3.00 4.88 .06 2 2.09 2 2
Germany 2.94 5.20 .06 2 1.92 2 2
Ireland 2.82 4.27 .04 1 1.29 2 1.5
Sweden 3.39 4.95 .04 1 1.15 2 1.5
UK 2.79 3.82 .03 1 .92 1 1
Iceland 3.78 4.81 .03 1 .68 1 1
Australia 2.79 3.71 .02 1 .83 1 1
Italy 4.01 4.95 .02 1 .59 1 1
New 2.51 3.16 .02 0 .65 1 .5
Zealand
Japan 3.30 4.05 .02 0 .57 1 .5
Luxembourg 3.89 4.55 .02 0 .43 0 0
Canada 3.06 3.60 .01 0 .44 0 0
Norway 4.27 4.71 .01 0 .26 0 0
Finland 5.81 6.31 .01 0 .22 0 0
Denmark 5.20 5.66 .01 0 .22 0 0
Spain 3.91 3.99 .00 0 .07 0 0
Switzerland 5.81 5.93 .00 0 .05 0 0
Portugal 3.68 3.69 .00 0 .01 0 0
France 4.85 4.80 .00 0 .03 0 0
Netherlands 6.72 6.24 .01 0 .18 0 0
Hungary 4.06 2.95 .11 1 2.73 2 1.5
Poland 4.98 3.84 .11 2 2.29 2 2
* The earliest decade for most countries is 1966–75; the exceptions are Portugal, Greece, and Spain (earliest
decade: 1976–85) and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (earliest decade: 1996–2005).
2 more than 0.05 annual increase
2 more than 0.05 annual decrease.
2 more than 1.0% annual increase
1 between 0.5% and 1.0% annual increase
0 less than 0.5% change
1 between 0.5% and 1.0% annual decrease
2 more than 1.0% annual decrease.

heuristics, beyond the ideological positions of parties, in order to identify
parties and their positions (Marinova 2016). Ignazi (1996: 552) even argues
that the most significant sign of the crisis of parties is the emergence of new
parties—especially extreme right “nonpartisan parties,” which pose a “challenge
to the party per se,” but also the Greens, which try to offer alternatives to
conventional party politics.
Such developments were previously identified and recorded, under various
names, in several studies that used various operationalizations. Mair (1997:
85), for instance, called the phenomenon “the survival of traditional parties”
and checked the share of votes obtained by parties that contested both the first
elections since 1960 and the most recent ones. Scarrow (2010) labeled the same
phenomenon “party continuity,” applying a more complex index, based on
shares of legislative seats. Karvonen (2014: 44) calculated the average total
vote for “new parties” (defined as parties “that began contest elections in 1960
or later”) by decade; and so did Emanuele and Chiaramonte (forthcoming),
who called it “party system innovation.”
The basic quandary for all these efforts has been how to conceptualize a
“new” political party, and especially how to treat splits, mergers, and changes
of party labels. Several solutions to the problem of what to regard as a new
party have been elaborated (Arter 2012; Barnea and Rahat 2011).6 Here we use
a rather conservative and cautious approach, which was laid down by Bartolini
and Mair (1990) and recently adopted by other scholars (Dassonneville and
Hooghe 2017; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).
We apply two separate measurements that differ in their emphasis, and thus
illuminate the phenomenon from two perspectives. One is based on the
operationalization of Emanuele and Chiaramonte’s (forthcoming) concept
of “party system innovation.” It sums up, for each election, the total vote
percentage of new parties (a threshold of 1 percent is designed to exclude
marginal parties). A party is considered “new” only the first time it enters the
party system by receiving at least 1 percent of the vote. Then, in subsequent
elections, it becomes “old.” We receive a value for each election and then
calculate averages by decades, starting with 1966–75 and ending with
2006–15. This measurement allows us to detect change in the rate of success
of new parties over time and to assess the extent to which, in more recent
periods, the established “old” parties have faced a growing challenge that they
express less and less ability to resist.
The obvious drawback of this measurement is that it regards a party as new
only in its first elections, and hence it is less sensitive when it comes to
capturing gradual electoral successes of new parties. For instance, the True
6
Krouwel (2012) examines, for example, various types of new parties: parties that emerged
from splits, parties that resulted from mergers, parties that are about name change, and parties
that are “genuinely new.”

Finns party was regarded as new in the 1999 elections, when it received
1 percent of the vote. After that it was no longer regarded as new. This fails
to capture its considerable electoral success (garnering more than 17 percent
in both the 2011 and the 2015 elections), although in many ways it is still
considered a new force in Finnish politics.
The second measurement partially overcomes this drawback. It compares
the results of the closest elections up to 2015 with the first election after 1966.
It sums up the total vote percentage given to parties at a recent point in time
that did not exist at an early point in time (a party is considered here either in
its current form or as a party predecessor). In other words, it aggregates the
vote share of all the parties that began to contest elections in 1966 or later.7
This criterion better captures the current success of parties that did not
belong to the old established parties (the ones that scholars also refer to as
“founder” or “traditional parties”). However, it is much less sensitive to
patterns of change in the parties’ ability to block newcomers from entering
the system within the fifty-year time frame. Another shortcoming is that this
criterion is rather blind to the “seniority” of a new party. For instance, in the
case of Netherlands, it would regard as new parties both the D66, which first
contested in 1967, and the Freedom Party (PVV), which first contested in 2006.
Table 3.9 (see Appendix 8 for more details) presents the data and calcula-
tions on which the index of partyness is based for the first measurement, that
of party-system innovations. The second column presents the level of party-
system innovation at the earlier available (or possible) decade, while the third
presents the value for 2006–15. The fourth column presents the value of
change per annum, while the last one presents the calibrated partyness index
for this indicator.
“Genuinely new parties without any link to political insiders remain, with
a few important exceptions, a rather marginal phenomenon in Europe”
(Krouwel 2012: 75)—and, we may add, almost elsewhere. Yet the rate of
new entries was found to increase over time (Bolleyer 2013; Chiaramonte and
Emanuele 2017). Indeed, the data in Table 3.9 point to the old parties’
growing weakness in guarding “their” base. The general trend shows a decline
in partyness: increase in partyness is evident in five cases, no change in six, and
decrease in thirteen. Here again, the balance tips toward decline, but there is
much variance. The rising trend is in line with what Strøm (2000) identified
regarding “fringe parties,” parties that did not have a significant record as
governing parties. These are more likely to be newer parties, though this is not
necessarily so.
7
For Greece, Portugal, and Spain, as well as for Hungary and the Czech Republic, the “zero
point” is the second general democratic elections.

T A B L E 3 . 9 Change in Party System Innovation: Total Share of Votes (%)
Given to New Parties
Country Averages of Averages Change Partyness

earliest decade for 2006–15 per annum index**
available*
Czech Republic 3.0 16.9 1.390 2

Spain 1.4 12.4 .367 2
Italy 0 12.5 .313 2
Iceland 1.0 10.7 .243 2
Japan 1.8 10.2 .210 2
Greece .6 6.0 .180 2
Israel 2.7 8.8 .153 2
Austria .3 4.5 .105 2
Germany 0 3.9 .098 1
Luxembourg 0 2.9 .073 1
Australia .5 2.2 .043 1
Sweden 0 1.0 .025 1
Belgium 1.0 1.8 .020 1
Netherlands 2.5 3.2 .018 0
New Zealand .5 1.2 .018 0
Ireland .6 1.1 .013 0
UK .5 1.0 .013 0
Canada 0 0 .000 0
Finland .4 0 .010 0
Norway 2.5 1.4 .028 1
Denmark 4.1 2.5 .040 1
Switzerland 2.8 1.2 .040 1
France 5.2 0 .130 2
Portugal 5.4 1.0 .147 2
* The earliest decade for all countries is 1966–75; the exceptions are Portugal, Greece, and Spain (earliest
decade: 1976–85) and the Czech Republic (earliest decade: 1996–2005).
** Index for the interpretation of the gaps between earliest and latest period:
2: increase of more than 0.1
1: increase between 0.02 and 0.1
0: change of less than 0.02
1: decline between 0.02 and 0.1
2: decline of more than 0.1.
Source: For eighteen countries, the list of new parties was taken from Emanuele (2016); for Australia, Canada,
Czech Republic, Israel, Japan, and New Zealand we constructed the list of new parties relying on the same
criteria.
Table 3.10 presents the data and calculations on which the index of party-
ness is based for the second measurement of party continuity, that is, for the
survival of old parties. The second column presents the starting and ending
years for the calculation of change, while the third column presents the
amount of change, the percentages of votes for new parties in the latest
elections. The fourth column presents change per annum. The last three

T A B L E 3 . 1 0 Survival of Old (Founder/Traditional) Parties: Share of Votes for
“New” Parties in the Most Recent Elections up to 2015
Country Years of % of Per annum Change Measurement Partyness

latest and votes for change in in 1 (Table 3.9) index
earliest new % partyness**
elections parties*
Czech Republic 2013–1996 32.2 1.894 2 2 2

Italy 2013–1968 66.1 1.469 2 2 2
Spain 2015–1979 37.0 1.028 2 2 2
Iceland 2013–1967 24.7 .537 1 2 1.5
Israel 2015–1969 35.1 .763 1 2 1.5
Japan 2014–1967 38.6 .821 1 2 1.5
Austria 2013–1966 23.1 .491 0 2 1
Germany 2013–1969 24.9 .566 1 1 1
Greece 2015–1977 18.2 .479 0 2 1
Hungary 2014–1998 25.6 1.600 2 0 1
Luxembourg 2013–1968 26.2 .582 1 1 1
Australia 2013–1966 15.2 .323 0 1 .5
Belgium 2014–1968 13.9 .302 0 1 .5
Finland 2015–1966 26.2 .535 1 0 .5
Netherlands 2012–1967 33.9 .753 1 0 .5
New Zealand 2014–1966 26.1 .544 1 0 .5
Sweden 2014–1968 22.9 .498 0 1 .5
Denmark 2015–1966 33.4 .682 1 1 0
Ireland 2011–1969 12.7 .302 0 0 0
UK 2015–1966 16.4 .335 0 0 0
Canada 2015–1968 8.1 .172 1 0 .5
Norway 2013–1969 20.2 .459 0 1 .5
Switzerland 2015–1967 13.9 .290 0 1 .5
France 2012–1967 19.1 .424 0 2 1
Portugal 2015–1979 3.6 .100 2 2 2
* The values represent the total share of votes in the latest elections stated in column 2 (the most recent election
up to 2015) given to parties that were established after the earliest elections stated in column 2.
** The values are:
2: new parties gained more than 1% of the votes per annum
1: new parties gained between 0.501% and 1% of the votes per annum
0: new parties gained between 0.251% and 0.500% of the votes per annum
1: new parties gained between 0.101% and 0.250% of the votes per annum
2: new parties gained 0.100% or less of the votes per annum.
columns present the values of the calibrated index: for the survival of old
parties, for the first measure of party system innovation, and for the final
measure, which is an average of the two. In the case of the survival of old
parties, the possible range of success for new parties is 0–100. We thus
determine the values of the partyness index on the basis of the assumption
that certain low levels of penetration of new parties express the strength of the
“old” parties, and only higher levels are about their weakness. For example,

we see a loss of 0.251 percent to 0.5 percent per annum—that is, a 12.55
percent –25 percent loss over fifty years (two generations)—as a reasonable
loss that actually expresses stability (a value of 0). Following these guidelines,
two countries experienced an increase in partyness, ten experienced stability,
and thirteen experienced a decline. The differences between the values of the
index of change in partyness for measurements 1 and 2 in fifteen of the twenty-
five cases justifies the use of the two. The average of the two measurements
creates an interesting range of cases, from ( 2) to 2, with cases spread in eight
of the nine possible points (0.5 differences). Within the general decline trend
there are differences of direction, and especially of magnitude.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we examined nine indicators of party change. These cover a lot
of aspects of the party–society linkage, from intraparty socialization to indir-
ect and direct relationships with citizens. An overall look at the separate
analysis of each indicator led us to conclude that there is a general trend
toward decline in partyness. Following various works (e.g., Dalton and
Wattenberg 2000; Mair 2013), this is not a surprise. But the accumulation
of all of these indicators allows us to map what is hiding beyond the general
trend. There is considerable variance, which ranges from cases of increase in
partyness to cases of stability, and from these to cases of decline that vary
in magnitude. This overall picture and its parts will be further elaborated
upon in Chapter 5. Before that, in Chapter 4, we will add three indicators that
measure change at the overlooked local and regional levels.
The Presence and Success of

National-Level Parties in Local
and Regional Elections
The previous chapter presented nine of our twelve indicators for party change.
We left out three indicators that measure the state of political parties at
subnational levels of government, namely local (municipal) politics and
regional politics. The presence of national parties at the local level was seen,
fifty years ago, as a basic requirement for defining an organization as a
political party. But, as LaPalombara (2007: 148) puts it,
It seems fair to say . . . that the political party as it has existed in the past is
in steady decline, so much so that even the definition of the political party
we utilized four decades back may require revision. In particular, it
appears that the existence of organizational articulation at the local
level is no longer a necessary condition that would qualify an organization
to be numbered in the political party category.
From this claim we can extrapolate that, while having a local presence is no
longer a prerequisite for national parties to be regarded as parties, changes in
the pattern of national parties’ presence and power at the local and regional
levels can still be seen as indicators of party change.
Political parties link society to the state. They may supply this link at
different levels: local, regional, national, and, these days, even supranational
(e.g., the European Union). In many countries, the same political parties are
active at all of these levels. The British Labour and Conservative Parties, for
example, present candidates for the European, British, regional (Scotland,
Wales) and municipal levels. Even the regionally based Scottish National
Party (SNP) and the Welsh Plaid Cymru compete at all these levels. Yet it is
not necessary that the same parties will be present at all levels. In Canada, for
instance, federal and provincial parties are almost absent from the local scene,
which is dominated by nonpartisan elected representatives or by local lists.
The voting patterns for local and regional elections are not identical
with—sometimes not even similar to—those at the national level. The dif-
ferences may be due to various reasons. Scholars explain that, because these
elections are regarded as second-order ones, voters feel that there is less at
stake in them, and thus turnout is lower and voting patterns are dissimilar
The Presence and Success of National-Level Parties 69

to those of the national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Different results
may stem from the low turnout: opposition and regional party voters are
more likely to participate in order to make a stand than are supporters of
the governing parties. In addition, voters sometimes use the second-order
elections vote to punish the governing parties (Tufte 1975) or to balance the
power of the governing parties at the national level by supporting regional
or opposition parties at subnational levels (Lutz Kern and Hainmueller
2006). The timing of elections also creates differences between voting patterns
at this level—for example, whether national and local or regional elections
take place on the same day: when they did not, the time gap between them was
found to create differences in voting patterns (Jeffery and Hough 2001).
Finally, in some countries we may expect to find bigger differences in voting
patterns among elections that are held in more powerful (in terms of authority)
or in more distinct (in terms of national, linguistic, or ethnic identity) regions.
In fact, there are places where regional elections are perceived to be no less
important than national elections (Schakel and Jeffery 2013).
All these factors may explain differences in the power of national-level
parties at various levels across countries, and sometimes between elections.
But our purpose here is not to explore matters in that direction; it is rather to
assess whether there are changes over time in the power of national parties at
the local and regional levels. The factors mentioned above are not expected to
become stronger or weaker along time; they are dependent on specific con-
texts. We are aware, however, that some factors, such as electoral reform at
the sub-national level for the direct election of governors1 or mayors, may
prompt the creation and success of regional and local parties; and we will
relate to this phenomenon in our analysis.
The integration or separation of party politics at various levels is not a static
arrangement. It can be challenged. In several countries where national-level
parties used to dominate the local scene, there are growing signs that this
dominance is eroding. A book titled Farewell to the Party Model?, which
examines local government in a dozen European countries, has identified a
trend toward increase in the participation and success of local lists in local
elections (Reiser and Holtmann 2008a, 2008b). In the Netherlands, one study
reported an “enormous growth of independent local parties and of their
electoral support” (Boogers and Voerman 2010). In Italy, a recent study
demonstrated that the average share of municipal seats held by nonpartisan
councillors has almost tripled in the last twenty years (Vampa 2016), while in
Poland local government seems to be heading toward a nonpartisan model
(Gendźwiłł 2012).
1
The regional chief executives are given various titles: “president of the region” (Italy, Spain),
“minister president” (Germany, Belgium), “premier” (Australia, Canada), “first secretary”
(Scotland and Wales), “state captain” (Austria), and “governor” (Japan).

There are also signs of such a development in regional politics. Comparing
the performance of parties in national and in regional elections, one study
found strong empirical evidence for a growing differentiation of voting pat-
terns in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Belgium (Detterbeck 2012).
Elsewhere there are signs of electoral “denationalization,” which is expressed
in the rising electoral success of regionally based parties in regional elections.
In Sicily, for example, in the 2012 elections, a regionally based electoral
coalition secured an unprecedented one sixth of the seats in the regional
parliament.
In this chapter we will try to detect patterns of stability and change in the
strength of national parties at the local and the regional levels.2 The first
section starts by justifying the expectation of a decline of national parties at
these levels. This is followed by a discussion of the importance of the presence
of national parties at subnational levels and of their performance at these
levels. We claim that a weakening of the performance of national parties in
the two subnational arenas (local and regional) may point to yet another
erosion of their roles as mediators between state and society.
The second section looks at local politics. It demonstrates that in several
countries national-level parties have lost their long-standing hold (almost a
monopoly) on local politics to lists or to independent councilors (or both). We
use three measurements to assess these developments over time: (1) the
national proportion of votes or seats gained by local lists and independents
in local elections; (2) the proportion of seats held by the representatives of
local lists and independents in the city councils or assemblies of the five largest
cities in each country; and (3) the existence of mayors who ran as independ-
ents or under the label of a local party. We find that, in about two thirds of the
cases, there is some decline in the power of national-level parties. At the end of
this section we also examine whether the adoption of direct elections for
mayors (a development we see as institutional personalization: see “Direct
Elections for Chief Executive Posts” in Chapter 7) triggers party decline at the
local level. It does seem that direct elections for mayors create opportunities
for local parties, but the extent to which these are facilitated depends on other
factors.
The next section focuses on regional politics. It uses the values of the
dissimilarity index (Johnston 1980; Jeffery and Hough 2003) to detect whether
the differences among voting patterns in national elections and in regional
2
In some studies, the term “local” refers to all subnational levels (regional and municipal).
Here we use “local” to refer only to the municipal level. Depending on context, we use both
“national” and “national-level” parties (which is used in the literature interchangeably with other
terms), to refer to statewide and national parties. We try to avoid the unnecessary proliferation of
the term “(-)level” in close proximity when the meaning is obvious and the word repetition would
make reading difficult.

elections have changed over time. We find many cases in which the gaps in
voting patterns have widened, which implies a weakening of national parties
at the regional level. The final section offers an integrative look at the findings
of the analysis of national-level parties in the local and regional arenas. While
general party decline is evident, it is far from constituting a unified trend in
terms of magnitude. There are also countries where stability is evident, and a
few with opposing developments, that is, countries where there is an increase
in partyness at these levels.
PARTY PERFORMANCE IN MULTILEVEL ARENAS
Since political parties link society and the state, they are expected to be
present at all levels of democratic representative government, and not just at
the national level. Yet it is not necessarily the same party that will be active at
all the levels. Notably, in Canada, the national-level parties do not play a role
in local politics. At the local level a nonpartisan approach dominates and
political actors are either representatives of local lists or independent coun-
cillors (Lightbody 2006; Tindal and Tindal 2004). There is also a separation
between parties at the regional level and at the national (or “federal”) level,
even though there are clear links between them as well. These are especially
strong in the case of the New Democratic Party; but they also exist in other
national parties (Pruysers 2014). Such a separation is rare in Europe, where
national-level parties still dominate regional and local politics in most coun-
tries. Even regionally based parties in Europe, including those with separatist
ideologies, tend to compete at all levels. Thus the starting point differs across
various democracies, but should we also expect to find change over time?
And, if so, in what direction?
Why Should We Expect the Decline of National-Level

Parties at the Local and Regional Levels?
There are two general developments that justify (1) the expectation that more
separate, independent, solely local and regional parties will steadily enter the
scene and win more and more popular support; and (2) the expectation that
the electoral fortunes of national-level parties will increasingly differ from one
level to the next. These developments are party change and change in the
powers and status of local and regional governments.
First, the organizational consolidation of mass parties in the past resulted
in a process of centralization and in the strengthening of the ties between
local, regional, and national-level elites. That is, there was a process of

nationalization and politicization of the local and regional levels. Since the
heydays of the mass parties in the 1950s and 1960s, however, it can be
expected that the national party’s dominance in local and regional politics
has somewhat weakened. As noted in the previous two chapters, the citizens’
affiliation with parties is in decline: a dwindling number of citizens are party
members; in surveys, ever fewer declare that they identify with any party,
while ever more are willing to change their vote from one election to the next.
On the supply side, party elites have moved toward the state, that is, toward
the statewide level. Local party organizations are in decline when parties tend
to invest more resources in that party’s central organization and less at
subnational levels (Farrell and Webb 2000). In such circumstances, it is easier
to convince citizens to support new regional and local parties.
This development might simply lead to the decline of national-level parties
or to a redefinition of their role in the regional and local arenas. National
parties that read this new map will adapt to it either by giving up and
concentrating on the national level or by changing and becoming more
federative and adopting structures such as the franchise model (Carty 2004).
But even the federative path may prove to be destructive in the long term, if
and when the local and regional autonomous units discover that they are
better off on their own.
Second, recent movements toward strengthening local government through
devolution (McAteer and Bennett 2005; Jeffery 2006), decentralization
(Sellers and Lidström 2007), and “new localism” (Pratchett 2004) may help
new regional and local forces to make their case. For many, the ideologies of
national-level parties are quite irrelevant to local issues. As local governments
are busy providing services, there may be reduced support for national-level
parties that are constructed around values and worldviews that are no longer
of direct interest to whole swaths of the public (Evans 2010). Local politics is
often perceived as a matter of pragmatism, effectiveness, and common sense
for which the programmatic nature of the national parties is out of place.
Thus independent local lists and individual independents might get more
credit when promising to focus on regional or local concerns.
Why Should National Parties Invest at the Local

and Regional Levels?
Facing the above developments, national-level parties should still be motiv-
ated to fight back and make the effort to stay dominant also on the local and
regional scene (Clark 2004). First, presence in these arenas allows national-
level parties to communicate with local interests, to be able to respond to
their grievances through policy and patronage. In negative terms, a party
that exists only at the national level may be too far from the citizens and too

busy with grand issues to be able to truly serve the citizens and be responsive.
Thus national parties’ strong presence at the local level might help sustain
and even reinforce their links with society, opening the door to potential
electoral rewards.
Second, a national-level party that operates at the municipal and regional
levels can more effectively create a solid base of membership—people who
will serve as its ambassadors in local society and as its army of volunteers. The
relatively small size of their local branches gives national parties an oppor-
tunity to work with smaller groups of activists, members, and supporters.
According to some studies (Olson 1971; Weldon 2006), this should improve
their ability to foster deeper and more stable commitments. Especially when
the times are bad for national elections, national-level parties may actually
survive and remain resilient thanks to their strength in this area. Moreover, a
party with a strong local presence may reward its loyalists and activists with
selective benefits and bonuses, such as candidacy positions for local elections
(not to mention patronage).
Third, both local politics and regional politics often serve as a “hot-
house” in which future politicians grow, socialize, and acquire experience.
Many national-level politicians started out in local politics, gained experi-
ence and power, and only later stepped up to the national level. In Sweden,
Finland, and Norway, for instance, more than half of the ministers had
already been elected to some significant position at the local or regional
level; in Denmark, the proportion of such ministers was 30 percent in 2005;
and in New Zealand it was about 16 percent after 2000 (see Appendix 1).
In September 2016, we identified in our group of countries eight prime
ministers who held local or regional political offices before ascending to
national-level politics: Theresa May in the United Kingdom, Matteo Renzi
in Italy, Mariano Rajoy in Spain, Charles Michel in Belgium, António
Costa in Portugal, Lars Løkke Rasmussen in Denmark, Erna Solberg in
Norway, and Xavier Bettel in Luxembourg. Indeed, the importance of
“playing” on the local and the regional political fields brings parties in
most democracies to compete at these levels. The proportion of legislators
with a background in local politics is even higher (see Appendix 2). Were
this hothouse to shrink, that would likely affect the share of ministers and
representatives with party backgrounds, and thus it would also weaken
their partyness.3
3
The Israeli experience teaches us that the nonpartisan local level is a hothouse for
opportunistic politicians who switch parties quite easily. In addition, the correlations between
the indicators for the partyness of ministers and the power of national parties at the local level are
quite high and positive and point to moderately strong relationships. However, the relationships
between the indicators for the partyness of legislators and the power of national parties at the local
level are weak and their value is negative (see Table 5.4).

THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL-LEVEL
PARTIES IN LOCAL POLITICS
Political parties operating at the local (municipal) level can play two different
roles: they can act as local political parties pursuing representation on the
local council or as local extensions of national-level parties. In many cases,
parties at the local level combine the two functions. They operate not only as
political parties in the local arena, but also as the local representatives of their
national-level “mother” parties. And yet there are parties that limit them-
selves to only one role. On the one hand, some national parties may decide—
for tactical or practical reasons—to back out of local politics; on the other
hand, there are independent local parties with no formal ties to any national-
level party (and often with no informal ties either).
Thus we can find in local politics two main types of parties: local exten-
sions of national-level party organizations; and independent local parties
(Saiz and Geser 1999; Boogers and Voerman 2010). In most parliamentary
democracies, national-level parties were, and still are, the dominant actors
in local politics. This means that local councils (especially in large cities) are
dominated by local representatives of national-level parties. In a few coun-
tries one cannot find—or one finds very few—national-level parties in local
politics. This is the case for Canada and, to a lesser extent, for Australia and
New Zealand. But these are the exceptions. Evidently, parties in democra-
cies recognize the importance of local politics, fiercely compete in local
elections, and in most cases take the lion’s share of elected positions in
local government.
There are also borderline cases of local parties that have loose or informal
ties with a national-level party. For instance, in his study of local parties in
Italy, Vampa (2016) differentiates between independent lists, which run
autonomously and are fully outside national party politics, and what he
calls “politicized” local parties (or partisan lists “in disguise”), which are
more inclined to establish alliances with national-level or regional-level par-
ties. In his study on independents in local elections in Japan, Hijino (2013)
further distinguishes between five subtypes of independent councillors, some
with no links whatsoever to national-level parties and others with various
degrees of affiliation, overt or covert.4
Our main concern here is whether we can detect a change over time in the
status of national-level parties at the local level. Did national-level parties lose
ground, in local politics, to local lists or to independent councillors? A volume
4
We will address the methodological challenge of how to classify these borderline cases in the
section “The Performance of National-Level Parties in the Five Largest Cities: A Comparison of
1985 to 2015.”

of studies that analyzed trends in local government in several established
European democracies (Reiser and Holtmann 2008a) points to an increase in
the electoral success of local lists and independents in some countries, namely
the United Kingdom (Copus, Clark, and Bottom 2008), Sweden (Worlund
2008), Belgium (Steyvers, Reynaert, De Ceuninck, and Valcke 2008), and the
Netherlands (Boogers 2008). Similarly, in Italy the share of local seats held by
nonpartisan councillors significantly increased (Vampa 2016). In Israel, local
lists already hold the majority of council seats and mayoral positions, and the
large national aggregative parties have an extremely low representation in
local politics (Kenig and Tuttnauer 2017). A reversed trend was evident only
in a few countries, such as Norway (Aars and Ringkjøb 2008) and (at least until
two and a half decades ago) Finland (Sundberg and Gylling 1992), where
national-level parties gained or regained power while local lists and independ-
ents declined. We thus have a collection of case studies that points to the
existence of change, especially (though not exclusively) in the direction of
decline of the national parties in the local arena. The following analysis will
try to examine change over time through an extended cross-national compara-
tive analysis. We will try to cover as many democracies as we can from the
predefined group of twenty-six.
We have used three different indicators in order to evaluate whether
national-level parties have lost ground (or gained or maintained their pos-
ition) in local politics. The first looks at the overall electoral performance of
local lists or independent candidates in local elections. The second focuses on
the performance of national-level parties in the five largest cities in each
country in 1985 by comparison to 2015. The third examines the political
affiliations of the mayors of the five largest cities in the period of 1980–2015.
Overall Electoral Performance of Local Lists

and Independents in Local Elections
This indicator looks at the overall electoral performance of local lists and
independent candidates in local elections. It is based on various sources that
reported national summaries of local election results, either as the percentage
of votes received by each party or as the percentage of local council seats, won
by a party nationwide. We could not, of course, impose our definition of
“local lists” on other scholars whose data were used here, although the rules
we suggest in the next section generally are the norm. In any case, because we
study trends within each country, what is central here is, first, to use the same
definition and measurements in each case, in order to identify trends reliably,
and, second, to be cautious when comparing the magnitudes of national
trends and to look at the calibrated measurement rather than make too
much of small differences between countries.

Table 4.1 offers national summaries of (1) the proportion of seats or votes
that were won by local parties and (2) their calibrated values. The second
column presents the earliest available national summary of the percentage of
votes or seats of local parties and independents, while the third column
presents the latest (around 2015). The fourth column gives the values of
absolute change per annum. The fifth column contains the calibrated party-
ness index for absolute change. The sixth column displays the values of
T A B L E 4 . 1 Percentage of Votes or Seats for Local Parties in Local (Municipal)

Elections: National Summaries*
Country Earliest Latest Absolute change++ Relative change+++ Partyness

available available index
point in point in Per Partyness Per Partyness
time+ time+ annum Index annum index
Israel 8.9 75.0 1.65 2 18.57 2 2

Italy 13.0 34.1 1.41 2 10.82 2 2
Belgium ~23 ~46 .96 2 4.17 2 2
Netherlands 8.4 27.8 .49 2 5.77 2 2
Czech 8.5 15.0 .33 2 3.82 2 2
Republic
Ireland 7.9 20.3 .31 2 3.93 2 2
Spain** 7.4 15.4 .25 2 3.60 2 2
Sweden 1.7 5.5 .13 1 7.45 2 1.5
Luxembourg 2.4 2.5 .01 0 .23 1 .5
Japan*** 61.0 61.7 .01 0 .03 0 0
Finland 2.6 1.7 .03 0 .96 2 1
Portugal 4.0 2.5 .05 0 1.29 2 1
Norway 8.0 4.6 .09 0 1.06 2 1
Denmark 14.5 4.1 .27 2 1.84 2 2
* Figures representing the support (votes) for local parties are in roman type; figures representing the seats for
local parties are in italics.
** The values for Spain refer to local elections that are held on the same day in thirteen out of the seventeen
regions.
*** The values for Japan refer only to cities (as opposed to villages and towns).
+ For the exact earliest and latest elections years, see Appendix 9.
++ Key:
2: more than 0.2 decline
1: between 0.1 and 0.2 decline
1: between 0.1 and 0.2 increase
2: more than 0.2 increase.
+++ Key:
2: more than 0.5 decline
1: between 0.2 and 0.5 decline

relative change per annum. The seventh column shows the calibrated party-
ness index for relative change. The last column presents the final partyness
index for this indicator, which is simply the average between the index for
absolute change and the index for relative change.
In nine out of the fourteen countries on which we have data, we could detect
growth in the power of local lists and independents; in one we detected
stability; and in the remaining four there was an opposite trend of decline in
the power of local lists and independents. Variance is evident when looking at
the magnitude and direction of these trends. The increase from 9 percent to
75 percent in the power of local lists in Israel is no less than dramatic, implying
a transformation of the local arena into a separate realm. In all other cases,
even those where local lists and independents made a substantial break-
through (Italy, Belgium), national-level parties still dominate the scene.
The cases of Denmark and Norway are especially interesting because they
demonstrate that national-level parties are not doomed to fail and can even
make breakthroughs in the local arena. In Denmark, the power of local lists
was slashed by more than 70 percent in the 1975–2015 period. As for Norway,
while the data in Table 4.1 suggest a moderate decline of local parties, the
previous decades show an even sharper change than in Denmark: during the
twenty-year period 1963–83, support for local lists slumped from 27 percent to
5 percent (Aars and Ringkjøb 2008).
A prominent drawback of this measurement is that it better suits countries
where local elections are held nationally on the same day. When local elec-
tions are not synchronized, it is practically impossible to achieve the nation-
wide totals (percentage of votes or of council seats) for various parties, and
therefore to get a picture of a specific point in time. Another drawback relates
to the fact that in some countries we have the proportion of votes, in others, the
proportion of seats. This creates a problem, because data about the proportion
of seats on local councils are biased in favor of small local authorities. The
smaller a local authority, the more it is likely that nationwide political consid-
erations will not play a significant role in local elections, hence voters will go
for candidates from local lists or for independents. Since there are many small
local authorities, the overall result might distort the picture and create a bias in
favor of the local parties and independents. This is not a problem when we look
at trends over time within each country, but it means that we must be careful
when making cross-national comparisons.
The Performance of National-Level Parties in the Five

Largest Cities: A Comparison of 1985 to 2015
We applied a second measurement, which overcame some of the problems of
the first one. It examined the performance of national-level parties at the local

level in more countries, but in fewer municipalities. We calculated the pro-
portion of seats held by of local lists and independent representatives in the
legislative organs (city councils, assemblies, and so on) of the five largest cities
(in 2015) in eighteen established democracies at two points in time: the most
recent local elections before 1985 and the most recent local elections before
2015. Local elections in the largest cities are much more likely to be nation-
alized and to resemble the voting patterns at the national level than do local
elections in towns and villages. Thus a breakthrough of local forces or
independents in large cities is of great significance from the perspective of
national-level parties.
Our definition of “local lists” was based on three decisions. First, we did not
regard provincial or regional parties as local parties. For instance, we did
not consider Bayern Partei (in Munich), Grande Sud (in Palermo), Esquerra
Republicana de Catalunya (in Barcelona), or One Osaka (in Osaka) to be
local parties, because they also compete at the regional level, and sometimes
nationally. Second, we included “independents,” since, by definition, these are
not affiliated to national-level or regional-level parties. Third, our definition
was based on party labels. In other words we regarded a party as “local,” even
those that had a loose affiliation with national-level parties, as long as its
name was not identical with that of a national-level party. For example, we
treated Ahora Madrid—which won twenty city council seats in the 2015
municipal elections—as a local party despite the fact that it was supported
by Podemos and other political parties or movements (some local, some
regional, some national).
This operationalization is not only a practical solution for a large n cross-
national comparative study; it can also be justified by the claim that, “[b]y
using a local name, these political groups emphasize their focus on the
municipality and simultaneously highlight their independence from political
parties” (Reiser 2008: 284). Clearly there are cases of local lists or “independ-
ents” who are affiliated one way or another to national-level parties. Yet for
us the very decision to blur this affiliation, to refrain from using the party
brand name, and to keep a distance from it is a sign of change (Brichta 2005).
It is not only a tactical move that enables candidates to make electoral gains,
for example, by requesting the support of voters of various national-level
parties. Once this decision is made, it is also likely to increase the autonomy of
elected candidates from their national party, to the point where they can claim
to have an independent power base.5
Table 4.2 summarizes change in the proportion of seats held by local parties
and independents in the municipal councils of the five largest cities in eighteen
5
For other purposes and without the obvious limitations of a longitudinal cross-national large
study, there is room to consider adopting more restrictive definitions for local lists. For such
definitions, see Åberg and Ahlberger 2015.
T A B L E 4 . 2 Change in the Percentage of Seats Held by Local Parties/Independents

in the Municipal Councils of the Five Largest Cities*
Country Most recent Most recent Absolute change Relative change Partyness
elections elections index
prior to 1985 prior to 2015 Per Partyness Per Partyness
annum index** annum index***
Israel 26.8 56.4 .987 2 3.68 2 2

Spain 0 23.8 .744 2 NA 2 2
Portugal 0 20.0 .714 2 NA 2 2
Netherlands 0 17.3 .541 2 NA 2 2
Italy .5 11.1 .379 2 75.71 2 2
Ireland 8.3 18.5 .352 2 4.24 2 2
Czech 2.8 8.9 .203 2 7.26 2 2
Republic
Japan 3.6 8.6 .156 1 4.34 2 1.5
Germany 0 4.5 .161 1 NA 2 1.5
Austria 7.4 9.0 .053 0 .72 2 1
France 0 1.1 .035 0 NA 2 1
UK 1.4 2.4 .032 0 2.30 2 1
Belgium 0 .4 .013 0 NA 2 1
Canada 100 100 .000 0 .00 0 0
Denmark 0 0 .000 0 .00 0 0
Norway 1.0 1.0 .000 0 .00 0 0
Sweden 1.5 1.3 .007 0 .46 1 .5
Finland 3.5 .3 .114 1 3.27 2 1.5
NA = not applicable
* The five largest cities in 2015. The list of cities is as follows (and the election years in our comparisons are
added in brackets): Austria (1982–5 to 2012–15): Graz, Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt (Vienna was
excluded because the city council corresponds to the parliament of the Land of Vienna); Belgium (1982 to 2012):
Antwerp, Ghent, Charleroi, Liege, City of Brussels; Canada (1982–5 to 2013–14): Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa,
Calgary, Edmonton; Czech Republic (1994 to 2014): Prague, Brno, Ostrava, Pilsen, Liberec; Denmark (1985 to
2013): Copenhagen, Odense, Aalborg, Aarhus, Frederiksberg; Finland (1984–2012): Helsinki, Espoo, Tampere,
Vantaa, Oulu; France (1983 to 2014): Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Nice; Germany (1984–5 to 2011–14):
Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Essen, Dortmund (Berlin and Hamburg were excluded because their city councils
correspond to the parliaments of the Länder of Berlin and Hamburg); Ireland (1985 to 2014): Dublin, Cork,
Limerick, Galway, Waterford; Israel (1983 to 2013): Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Rishon LeZion, Ashdod; Italy
(1983–5 to 2011–13): Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo; Japan (1983 to 2015): Yokohama, Osaka,
Nagoya, Sapporo, Kobe; Netherlands (1982 to 2014): Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Eind-
hoven; Norway (1983 to 2015): Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand; Portugal (1985 to 2013):
Lisbon, Sintra, Vila Nova Gaia, Porto, Loures; Spain (1983 to 2015): Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville,
Zaragoza; Sweden (1985 to 2014): Stockholm, Goteborg, Malmo, Uppsala, Vasteras; United Kingdom (1982–4
to 2012–15): London (we did not refer to the London Assembly but rather to the aggregative London Borough
Councils), Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow, Sheffield.
** Key:
2: more than 0.2 decrease
1: between 0.1 and 0.2 decrease
*** Key:
2: sharp increase; more than 0.5 decrease
1: moderate increase; between 0.2 and 0.5 decrease
0: no change; less than 0.2 change
1: moderate decline; between 0.2 and 0.5 increase
2: sharp decline; more than 0.5 increase.

countries. The second and third columns show the proportion of seats held by
local parties in these municipal councils at the earliest point and respectively
at the latest point of the period under investigation. The fourth column
presents the values of absolute change per annum, which are calculated by
dividing the gap between the values that appear in the second and third
columns by the number of years. The fifth column gives us the calibrated
partyness index for absolute change. The sixth column presents the values of
relative change per annum, which are calculated by dividing the value for the
latest available point in time to the value for the earliest point in time, then
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100, and then dividing the result by the
number of years. The seventh column shows the calibrated partyness index of
relative change. The last column contains the final partyness index for this
indicator, which is simply the average between the index for absolute change
and the index for relative change.
Thirteen countries out of the eighteen in Table 4.2 demonstrated an
increase in the representation of local parties in their five largest cities; three
exhibited no change; and in only two was there a decline (Sweden and
Finland). It is interesting to note that around 1985 there were seven countries
where the national-level parties completely dominated the five largest cities
(not a single council seat went to local lists or independents). Thirty years
later, Denmark remained the sole country in this situation. Beyond the special
case of Canada, where national parties do not play in the local arena, and of
Israel, where local lists did quite well already in 1985, the other countries saw
the emerging success of local lists. In the Netherlands, the breakthrough of
Livable Rotterdam in 2002 paved the way for the emergence of local lists
in other cities. More recently, in the 2015 elections, Spanish local politics,
until then dominated almost completely by national-level parties (and their
regional branches), was swept up by the success of local lists loosely associated
with Podemos (see n. 8 in this chapter).
Thus the general trend of decrease in partyness in large cities is quite
similar to the trend we witnessed concerning the overall electoral perform-
ance of local lists and independents in local elections. Yet it also adds to it,
because the national parties’ dwindling in the largest municipalities should
be seen as a decline in an area that they should invest much of their efforts
to dominate and where they are more likely to succeed. We now turn to see
whether the penetration of local forces was also reflected in capturing the
position of the city mayor.
The Affiliation of the Mayors of the Five Largest Cities (1980–2015)

To complete the picture, we also looked at the affiliation of the mayors of the
cities of interest (i.e., the five largest) in ten established democracies during the

period 1980–2015 (or during a period determined by elections years closest to
these). In some cases we were able to find data for all the elections; in others
we were able to gather only partial data. This overview identified no trends for
the most part. No change occurred in Canada, where all of the mayors, just
like the council members, were not formally affiliated to a federal party. No
change occurred in Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden (data only since 1988),
Netherlands, and Belgium (four cities), where all mayors were affiliated to
national-level parties.6 Nor was there evidence of change in Austria, where all
mayors were affiliated to national parties, except for the mayor of Innsbruck.
For the United Kingdom we have only the case of London since 2000.7 Ken
Livingstone, a Labour politician, was elected mayor as an independent in the
2000 elections but subsequently returned to his party and, as its candidate,
was elected to a second term in 2004. His successor, Boris Johnson, was
elected mayor as a candidate of the Conservative Party and was recently
replaced by Sadiq Khan, who was elected as a Labour candidate.
In Spain, from 1983 until 2011, all the mayors of the country’s five largest
cities were affiliated to national parties. In the local elections in the spring of
2015, three of the elected mayors were heads of local lists. These were loosely
supported by the new Podemos movement, which had been founded in early
2014 and successfully competed in the national elections of 2015 and 2016.8 It
is too early to frame this as a trend. It may be a one-shot earthquake that
could evolve into a trend; or it may somehow get synchronized with national-
level parties. We are thus left with Israel, where we can find a clear trend of
decline among national-level parties: one mayor ran under a local party label
in the 1983 and 1989 elections; two in the 1993 and 1998 elections; three in the
2003 elections; and all five in the 2008 and 2013 elections.
Summary: National Parties at the Local Level

To summarize, in most of the democracies under examination national-level
parties still dominate the local scene. In a few countries they even improved
their stand vis-à-vis local parties and independents, and in some others no
trend can be detected. Yet, in about two thirds of the cases studied, local
6
In 2011 Giuliano Pisapia was elected mayor of Milan. While formally not affiliated to a
party, he ran as a candidate in the primary elections of the center-left coalition and was supported
by the Left Ecology Greens (SEL).
7
In most cities in the United Kingdom, lord mayors are appointed for a one-year term. By
convention, during their term in office they are nonpolitical and nonexecutive figures.
8
The leadership of Podemos decided not to run in the local elections but rather to support local
grassroots candidacies. Following our definition, we included the five lists supported by Podemos
as “local.” These are Ahora Madrid, Guanyem Barcelona, València en Comú, Participa Sevilla,
and Zaragoza En Común.

parties and independents made some progress from the 1980s, as is evident in
their national share of votes or seats and in the number of the seats they
occupy on the municipal councils of the five large cities. In most cases,
however, these are relatively small and moderate breakthroughs. The domin-
ance of national-level parties is evident not only in their holding the lion’s
share of council seats, but in their retaining the position of mayor.
Does the Adoption of Direct Elections Ignite

National-Level Party Decline?
The Israeli case is an extreme one in which the local scene experienced a
radical transformation from almost a monopoly of national-level parties to
the dominance of local lists. This process coincided with the adoption of
reform that separated the dates of the national and local elections and
determined that mayors would be directly elected. It is interesting to see
whether we can detect a similar development in countries that adopted the
practice of direct election for their mayors.
The Israeli experience seems to tell us that the adoption of the direct
election of mayors is expected to encourage both the creation of local parties
and their success. This is because mayors, for their part, need to get the
support of a majority, or at least a large plurality, of voters. This makes
affiliation to a national-level party a burden rather than an asset in many
cases, because the mayoral candidates need to reach out beyond the party
electorate. Thus candidates might find it beneficial to blur their partisan
affiliation and to establish local “nonpartisan” lists. Over time, this trend
might spread beyond mayoral competition, into the competition for council
seats, legitimizing the claim for genuine local representation. National-level
parties might not be able to resist this trend, because their own candidates are
those who blur their affiliation for the sake of electoral success (or do so at
least in the first stages of this development). The national-level parties are
expected to wait patiently and to count the success of their “hidden” candi-
dates after the elections. The problem is that over the years the “semi-local”
lists and mayoral candidates become more and more independent. Their
relationships with national-level parties are often self-serving and unstable
and may reach a point where party switches become very common.
A reform that introduced direct elections for mayors was also adopted in
Italy, Germany (in the Länder of Bavaria and Baden Wurtemburg this
practice existed as early as the 1950s), Austria, Wallonia in Belgium, and in
some cities of the United Kingdom (Scarrow 2001; Magre and Bertana 2007;
Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012). It would be interesting to see whether it had
a similar influence on the power of national-level parties—similar, that is, to
the one it had in Israel.

Italy, which adopted direct elections for mayors in 1995 and where local
parties are gaining strength, fits our expectations. The system of direct election
of mayors encouraged the formation of local lists that serve as platforms for
mayoral candidates, even if they also lead to coalitions of national-level
parties. For instance, in the 2013 municipal elections in Rome, we saw the
Civic List Marino for Mayor win five council seats and Alfio Marchini for
Mayor win three council seats. In the 2011 Milanese municipal elections, the
local platform Milano Civica per Pisapia Sindaco won two council seats, and
similar lists succeeded in Naples and Palermo as well.
Germany and Austria also fit our expectations, although developments
related to the presence of local lists and independents are more moderate
there and the elected mayors still come from one of the two large national
parties in most cases. Interestingly, Ireland and the Netherlands, where we
saw an increase in local lists and independents, did not adopt direct elections
for mayors. And in several cities elsewhere that did, national-level parties still
dominate (e.g., London). It thus seems that direct mayoral elections create
opportunities for local parties, but the extent to which these are facilitated
depends on other factors. Identifying these factors is beyond the scope of this
chapter. Yet it seems plausible to argue that the rates of national party decline
at the local level are influenced by the overall extent of party decline in a given
country. Indeed, Israel and Italy are the two countries identified in this book
as registering the highest levels of party decline, and this is also true of the
local performance of their national-level parties (see Chapter 5).
NATIONAL PARTIES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL
The voting patterns in regional elections are not identical with the voting
patterns in national elections. Sometimes regional party systems are even
substantially different from the national ones. As can be expected, these
differences are more common in regions with a distinct national or ethno-
linguistic identity and with substantial constitutional powers. It is thus not
surprising to find regional voting patterns and party systems that differ
significantly from the national voting patterns and party systems in regions
such as Quebec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain, and Corsica in France.
In the framework of this study, we are interested in detecting changes in
the performance of national-level parties in regional elections over time. If
the difference in voting patterns between national (first-order) and regional
(second-order) elections decreases and voting patterns become similar over
time, then we detect a process of nationalization—that is, a homogenization
of voting behavior where peripheral and regional specificities disappear

(Caramani 2004). While many scholars agree that nationalization was a
dominant trend until the 1960s, there is disagreement as to whether there
has been a resurgence of distinct territorial–regional patterns since then. If we
find that the difference in voting patterns between the two levels has increased
over time, then we may speak of a process of denationalization of electoral
politics, as territorial variations have grown (Detterbeck 2012).
If we witness nationalization, this means that national-level parties, as a
class of the same species, are becoming stronger. In contrast, denationaliza-
tion is a sign of the weakening of national-level parties’ hold in the regional
arena. It testifies to the break of the national balance: the weakening of ties
between levels, in the minds of the voters. This is eventually likely to influence
the behavior of regional politicians and to make them more independent.
The number of countries using regional elections has increased over the past
decades. Once an institutional trait that was practiced almost exclusively by
federal countries (Germany, Canada, Austria, Australia, Switzerland), regional
elections were adopted in the last decades by several semi-federal countries as
well as by unitary ones. Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Sweden introduced
regional elections in the 1970s and were followed later on by other countries
such as Spain, France, and Belgium (which turned into a federal state in the mid-
1990s). As part of the devolution process seen in the late 1990s in the United
Kingdom, regional elections were introduced in Scotland, Wales, and London.
The expansion of regional elections was accompanied by an allotment of
broader power and authority to regional, subnational units. This “territorial
reconstruction” has vitalized substate political arenas and has grown as a
consequence the importance of regional politics and elections. In some cases,
it even created an environment where regional issues, the performance of the
regional government, and the credibility of regional candidates became more
important than national-level party alignment and statewide political dynam-
ics (Detterbeck 2012).
If we take these regionalization trends and add the body of evidence that
indicates the distancing of parties from society (e.g., declining levels of party
loyalty, increased electoral volatility), we may expect national parties to
experience increasing difficulties in holding on to their power at the regional
level. People can increasingly decide to split their vote between national and
regional elections. If this is the case, we might expect to find a growth in the
asymmetry between national and regional voting patterns.
A measure that allows calculating the difference in voting patterns between
regional and national elections is the index of dissimilarity (Johnston 1980).
This index compares the results of a national election with the results of the
regional election that comes closest to it in time. There are several possibilities
for comparing the regional and the national vote. For our present purposes,
we use the index that evaluates the extent to which regional electorates vote
differently in regional and in the national elections. This measurement keeps

the regional electorate constant but varies with the type of elections (Jeffery
and Hough 2003; Schakel 2013a).
This index is similar to the Pedersen (1979) index of electoral volatility, but
instead of comparing party support in one election to party support in the
previous election, it compares party support in national elections to party
support in regional elections. It is calculated by taking the sum of absolute
differences between regional and national vote shares for each party in each
region and dividing it by 2 (Schakel and Dandoy 2013: 19):
1
X
n
jXiN XiR j
2
i¼1
In this formula, XiN is the percentage of the vote won by party i in the region
in a given national election, and XiR is the percentage of vote won by party i in
the regional election closest in time to the national elections in question. If all
voters were to cast their vote differently, the value of the index would be 100;
if all voters voted the same, the value would be 0.9
To evaluate whether a change has occurred through time, we used the data
set of Schakel (2013b), which presents the values of the dissimilarity index for
more than a dozen countries. We performed the following procedure: first, we
calculated unweighted national averages of dissimilarity values for the individ-
ual regions. This gave us a value for a certain year. The decision to calculate
unweighted averages is not optimal, of course. It gives equal weight to regions
with small and regions with large populations (e.g., Northern Territory vs. New
South Wales in Australia) and to regions with weak and regions with strong
powers (e.g., Extremadura vs. Catalonia in Spain). However, in the absence of
any consistent method of weighing these differences, this was the best available
option.10 Second, using the values we received in the first stage, we calculated
the averages by decade, starting with the years 1970–9 and ending with the
years 2000–9, as 2009 was the last available year in Schakel’s data set.
Table 4.3 exemplifies our calculation procedure as applied to Austria with
its nine regions. It presents the values of the dissimilarity index for each
regional election in 1983–2008, the average per election (tenth row), and the
average per decade (last three rows). As one can see, there is an increase in
the values of the dissimilarity index between the 1980s and the years after
9
We checked the correlation between the annual change in dissimilarity in national and
regional elections and the annual change in volatility (absolute values). For the fourteen cases
for which we have data, we found a quite high correlation (r = 0.716; p < 0.01). This may be seen
as further testimony, beyond the theoretical logic, that we are dealing with similar (yet
nonidentical) indicators for partyness.
10
We also calculated the medians in order to neutralize the influence of the extreme values, but
this did not change the general picture.

T A B L E 4 . 3 Calculating the Dissimilarity Index for Austria
Year (national 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 2006 2008
election)
Burgenland 5.95 5.06 3.38 5.18 4.38 10.7 7.43 7.53 18.63
Carinthia 5.15 6.81 2.62 7.65 6.13 9.43 19.15 37.71 7.86
Lower Austria 6.15 6.14 8.71 10.36 9.83 14.15 5.56 16.63 21.28
Upper Austria 8.92 11.93 12.64 16.69 14.1 14.21 2.26 14.93 18.62
Salzburg 5.54 11.98 14.94 13.38 13.42 13.68 13.87 16.27 22.97
Styria 8.21 13.31 11.55 9.34 7.58 20.25 5.72 9.06 27.12
Tyrol 9.25 13.18 9.61 12.31 20.75 13.13 4.66 11.14 18.13
Vorarlberg 7.64 6.59 9.81 16.2 20.44 12.21 6.65 16.89 27.07
Vienna 1.62 6.52 7.1 6.14 9.57 9.96 16.14 9.6 14.61
averages 6.49 9.06 8.93 10.81 11.8 13.08 9.05 15.53 19.59
average 1980s 7.78
average 1990s 11.15
average 2000s 14.72
2000 (the value for the 1970s, which is not presented in the table, is even
lower, at 4.7). In other words, a process of denationalization is evident in the
case of Austria.
Table 4.4 presents changes over the years in the values of the dissimilarity
index and their calibrated values in fourteen countries. The second column
shows the earliest available dissimilarity index, while the third column shows
the latest. The fourth column contains the values of absolute change per
annum. The fifth column records the calibrated partyness index for absolute
change. The sixth column gives the values of relative change per annum. The
seventh column presents the calibrated partyness index for relative change
(for its calculation, see Appendix 10). The last column offers the final party-
ness index for this indicator, which is simply the average between the index for
absolute change and the index for relative change.
Overall, we can point to an increase in the asymmetry of voting patterns
in ten of the fourteen countries under consideration. In four countries there
are signs of a decrease in dissimilarity, but only in Denmark do these look
somewhat strong.11 Thus, not only is a general trend of decline in partyness
at the regional level evident, but even those cases that display an opposite
trend show more evidence of holding on to the status quo than of improving
their position.
11
We excluded the case of the United Kingdom because the data set did not include enough
cases of regional elections (only three in Scotland and Wales and two in Greater London) that
would allow us to detect any trend. Yet our own calculations for the 2010 and 2015 UK general
elections, when compared to the 2011 and 2016 elections in Scotland and Wales, indicate the
continuation of relatively high dissimilarity values for the two regions.

T A B L E 4 . 4 Dissimilarity Index: Vote in the Region for National Elections vs.
Vote in the Region for Regional Elections: Averages by Decade
Country Earliest 2000s Absolute change++ Relative change+++ Partisan

available index
decade+ Per Partisan Per Partisan
annum index annum index
Japan 12.3 28.1 .53 2 4.28 2 2

Italy 7.9 22.4 .48 2 6.12 2 2
Belgium 10.7 15.4 .47 2 4.39 2 2
Austria 4.7 14.7 .33 2 7.09 2 2
Canada 18.9 26.5 .25 2 1.34 2 2
France 16.7 21.4 .24 2 1.41 2 2
Germany 5.3 11.4 .20 2 3.84 2 2
Norway 6.6 10.5 .20 1 2.95 2 1.5
Switzerland 16.6 20.5 .13 1 .78 2 1.5
Sweden 1.8 4.0 .07 0 4.07 2 1
Australia 11.1 10.4 .02 0 .21 1 .5
Netherlands 12.3 11.5 .03 0 .22 1 .5
Spain 10.1 9.2 .05 0 .45 1 .5
Denmark* 14.1 10.3 .13 1 .90 2 1.5
* The data set does not include the regions of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, whose party systems are
completely incongruent with the party system of the other parts of Denmark.
+ Earliest available decade is the 1970s for most countries; for France, Norway, and Spain it is the 1980s and
for Belgium it is the 1990s.
++ Key:
2: more than 0.2 increase
2: more than 0.2 decrease.
+++ Key:
2: more than 0.5 increase
2: more than 0.5 decrease.
See Appendix 10 for a detailed analysis and source.
INTEGRATED DISCUSSION: THE ELECTORAL

PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL PARTIES AT
LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS
Previous sections examined the performance of national-level parties in local

and regional elections. Several measurements were used to identify changes in
the power of national parties over time. For local elections, we looked at trends
in the national share of support for local lists and independent candidates

and inspected the success of independents and local lists in elections to the city
council and in capturing the mayoral position in the five largest cities in each
country. For regional elections, we used the index of dissimilarity to find out
whether levels of asymmetry in voting in national and regional elections had
changed over time.
Table 4.5 presents a rough summary of the findings. As is evident, only in
eight cases could we apply all three measurements. Obviously, the third
indicator could not be applied in countries where regional elections do not
take place. Even for the second measurement, for which we could obtain the
fullest and most comprehensive data, we had three missing cases, which has to
do with the availability of the data.
The findings indicate that eighteen out of the twenty-one countries for which
we managed to find at least one indicator of the presence and performance of
national parties at the local or regional level have experienced a decline in
partyness. Beyond the general trend, variance in the levels of decline is clear.
And the decline of national parties at subnational levels varies from one
country to another. A few countries actually experienced an increase in their
T A B L E 4 . 5 National-Level Parties in Local and Regional Elections: Summary

of Findings (Partyness Index)
Country Local parties: Local parties in the Dissimilarity: national Average

national five largest cities vs. regional elections
summary
Italy 2 2 2 2
Czech Republic 2 2 2
Ireland 2 2 2
Israel 2 2 2
Germany 1.5 2 1.8
Belgium 2 1 2 1.7
Austria 1 2 1.5
France 1 2 1.5
Switzerland 1.5 1.5
Japan 0 1.5 2 1.2
Netherlands 2 2 .5 1.2
Spain 2 2 .5 1.2
Canada 0 2 1
UK 1 1
Sweden 1.5 .5 1 .7
Luxembourg .5 .5
Portugal 1 2 .5
Norway 1 0 1.5 .2
Australia .5 .5
Denmark 2 0 1.5 1.2
Finland 1 1.5 1.3

national parties’ power at regional or local levels. A few others mainly saw
stability. But even among those that experienced decline, which constituted the
vast majority, we witnessed various levels of change, from moderate to major.
In only three countries does the final verdict highlight an opposite trend.
The cases of Denmark and Finland prove that there are ways in which parties,
even when facing decline, can strengthen their position at the substate level. In
Denmark, a major reorganization at regional and local levels of government
that occurred in the years after 2000 may explain the success of the national
parties at these levels. As part of this reform, many municipalities and all
the regions were amalgamated. This produced a nationalization effect; it
decreased split voting between local or regional levels and the national level,
and thus buttressed the statewide parties (Elklit and Kjaer 2009).
In most cases of local elections, local lists and independents are doing better
than in the past. In most cases of regional elections, there is a growing
asymmetry of vote between national and subnational elections. These changes
may be explained by processes of territorial reconstruction that generate
an enhanced sense of localism and regionalism. In any case, these same
changes are also linked to processes that have to do with the political parties
themselves—processes that paved the way for increased split voting and for
new opportunities for regional and local parties. These developments may
have resulted not only from the general causes of the decline in the party–
society linkage (see Chapter 2, “The Literature: Largely Ignoring Variance”)
but also from parties’ tendency to place less emphasis on local branches
(Kölln 2014). In any case, the evident direction of most of these changes
points to an overall decline in partyness at the local and regional levels.
Moreover, while “localism” or “regionalism” are indeed challenges to national
parties, there are solutions to such challenges in the form of federative or
stratarchical models of party organization (Carty 2004).
What are the implications of these changes for democracy? On the one hand,
the expansion of separate local polities might be seen as a positive development.
People are closer to their local or regional representatives, who are responsive
to these people’s interests and accountable for their own actions specifically
at these levels. This change is also about decentralization and the dispersion
of political power—positive developments from a liberal point of view. Such a
process may serve the party in government, and especially its political leader,
because both would be free of the burden of dealing with local intraparty
conflicts and thus, where policy is concerned, both would have more room
for maneuver in the face of weaker intraparty local and regional pressures.
On the other hand, some types of local list might hurt democracy. This
applies especially (1) to lists with a strong local clientelist component that are
established to promote private interests and (2) to anti-party populist and
extreme local parties, which often find it easier to pass the more relaxed legal
or effective thresholds at the local and regional levels. In addition, many of the

local lists are short-lived, so much so that they can hardly be seen as focal
points for responsiveness and accountability. Besides, it may be burdensome
to promote projects that need national support when the two systems are
separated.
If, as demonstrated above, democratic theory can be a source for both pros
and cons in relation to these developments, we argue that, for political parties
and therefore for party democracy, the decline of national parties at local and
regional levels is bad news.
Political parties that lack local or regional bases will be considerably less
linked to society. They will find it hard to communicate with citizens and with
localized or regionalized groups in society. They will lack a core of volunteers
and loyal voters who might serve as their solid electoral base and help them
mobilize additional voters. Politicians socialized at the loose level of local
parties will be rather opportunistic and not much of the team player type.
Are changes in the presence and performance of national parties at the
regional and local levels just a reflection of the overall decline in partyness at
the national level, elements that were already captured by such indicators as
party identification and electoral volatility, or do they stand on their own, as
separate indicators? We looked for bivariate correlations between the values
of the partyness index for changes in electoral volatility and party identifica-
tion, on the one hand, and the three indicators for change in partyness at the
regional/local level, on the other. Among the six possible correlations, only
two were found to be significant (p < 0.05) and stood at 0.53 (change in
party identification and change in dissimilarity between national and regional
vote) and at 0.61 (change in electoral volatility and change in the share of
local parties in national vote). On this basis it can be argued that we are
dealing with a phenomenon that has a life of its own.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter added the almost neglected dimension of party politics at the
local and regional levels to the general examination of party change. It used
several indicators to decide whether the performance of national-level parties
in the local and regional arenas has changed. Even if recent trends, such as
devolution and new localism, might be argued to assist new regional and local
political forces to gain some ground at the expense of national-level parties,
such trends can still be interpreted as signs of decline of these parties. As we
demonstrated in this chapter, party decline is indeed evident at these levels in
most countries, but one can also find variance in the magnitude of this change
as well as cases of stability, even enhancement of partyness.
A Cross-National Comparison
of Party Change
Most studies of party change interpret their findings as attributable to

adaptation rather than to decline. Indeed, few are the scholars who put
decline at the center of their analysis of party change.1 On the basis of a
comprehensive cross-national comparative analysis of party change built
around the twelve indicators that were analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4, we
will make here two general claims. First, the general trend is in fact one of
decline. Second, beyond the general trend there is a considerable degree of
country-level variance. This may lead us to a simplified claim that party
adaptation is characteristic of some countries while party decline is charac-
teristic of others, or to a more sophisticated argument that there is a
continuum with successful adaptation and sharp decline at the extremes,
along which countries are spread. In any case, cross-country variance cannot
and should not be ignored.
This chapter starts with an examination of the relationships between indi-
cators within the three dimensions of party change: socialization of represen-
tatives (party background), linkage with mediators (party membership,
interest groups, local and regional politics), and direct linkage with voters
(voter stands and behavior). There are good theoretical reasons to expect to
find close relationships between the indicators within each group. Yet, apart
from often sharing the same decline trend, indicators appear to be independ-
ent of one another. This could imply that parties in different countries invest
different efforts on different fronts (for example, in their relationships with
interest groups, in regional and local politics, or in various aspects of voters’
perceptions and behavior). The second section analyzes the findings per
indicator and per dimension. Most indicators, those that refer to the various
mediators as well as those that refer to voters, point clearly to decline.
Conversely, those that do not, those that look at the party background of
representatives, stand out as prominent survivors of a major decline trend.
The third section presents a comparison between levels of change in partyness
1
Two prominent exceptions would be Lawson and Merkl 1988 and the more recent writings
of Mair (2008a and 2013).

in democracies and seeks explanations for the evident variance. Many explan-
ations are ruled out. This situation makes room for the possibility that human
agency—that is, parties’ different reactions, in different countries, to similarly
changing environments—rather than environmental factors may explain vari-
ance. The fourth section focuses on the trend of an overall decline, with its
high cross-country variance. It links the findings discussed so far to the
seemingly dichotomous debate on decline versus adaptation. The final section
attempts to describe the state of political parties in 2015 on the basis of these
findings. It clims that, while parties are not on their way out and dying, in
some countries they have clearly experienced a decline, while in others their
experience may be better described as adaptation. In many other countries
still, parties lie somewhere in-between these poles.
We treat all indicators of partyness as equal. Thus, when we combine them
(e.g., for the sake of assessing dimensions of party change, or in order to make
an integrated comparative cross-country comparison), we average them. The
assumption that no indicator is more important than the others is arbitrary, as
would be a decision to give different weights to different indicators. A thor-
ough study on the relationship between indicators of partyness may allow us
to systematically allocate to them different weights; but we are not sure that
any statistical path would help here, given the variety of qualities and prop-
erties in our indicators.2 We thus decided to stick to the default alternative of
allotting the same weight to all indicators.
RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN DIMENSIONS

OF PARTY CHANGE
This section examines the relationships between indicators within the three
dimensions of party change: the two indicators of the party background of
representatives (ministers and MPs); the five indicators of linkages with
mediators (party members, interest groups, regional and local politics); and
the five indicators of voters’ perceptions (identification), behavior (turnout,
volatility), and the results of aggregative voter behavior (effective number of
parties among voters [ENPV], party system innovation). The analysis dem-
onstrates that, while most of the data point to decline and there are good
theoretical reasons to expect the indicators within each dimension to correl-
ate, the levels of decline hardly do so (see also Table 5.4).
2
Maybe expert judgment that would follow a thorough discussion and brainstorming is the
optimal path. But, to judge from our personal experience, this could take forever . . .
A Cross-National Comparison of Party Change 93

Party Background
We might expect changes in the partyness of ministers to be affected by changes
in the partyness of legislators, because parliament is the primary pool for
ministerial recruitment. That is, if there is a trend of decline in the partyness
of legislators, we should also expect a trend of decline in the partyness of
ministers. Yet these should not be expected to be in a perfect relationship,
and for two main reasons. First, the number of ministers is always much lower
than that of legislators, so ministerial selection does not show the same propor-
tions but is rather biased, either toward the party or toward the nonparty side.
Second, although there are strong incentives and traditions that encourage the
appointments of MPs to ministerial positions, appointees for cabinet positions
do not have to be MPs, so the pool is wider and may include not only MPs.
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the findings regarding the partyness of
ministers and legislators. It locates each of the ten cases on which we have
data for both indicators in a 33 table: for each indicator, we have the option
of increase in partyness, no trend, and decline.
In four cases the trends for both indicators are similar (two increases, two
declines). In an additional four, there is no trend for one indicator and a
change in the other. The remaining two cases show contradicting trends of
decline in the partyness of legislators and increase in that of the ministers. An
increase in partyness in the legislature, which in most cases is a preliminary
stage for politicians, before they are considered potential ministers, does not
occur together with decline in partyness in the cabinet. This may imply that
there is necessarily some relationship between the partyness of legislators and
the partyness of ministers. Yet, beyond that, it seems that the legislature and
the cabinet are almost separate realms in terms of trends of change in their
partyness. This variance may result from national differences in political
institutions and from traditions associated with the rules of the game. This
spread and variance call for further research in the framework of studies of
political recruitment.
T A B L E 5 . 1 Changes in the Partyness of Legislators and Changes in the

Partyness of Ministers*
Partyness of ministers
Partyness of legislators increase no trend decline
increase Germany (.5, 1) UK (2, 0)

Norway (.5, 1.5) Portugal (1, 0)
Netherlands (1, 0)
no trend Israel (0, .5)
decline Finland ( 1.5, 2) Italy ( 1.5, 1.5)
Denmark ( .5, 1.5) France ( .5, 1)
* The values of the calibrated partyness index appear in brackets.


Mediators (Membership, Interest Groups, Local and Regional Politics)
Party members can be seen as individual mediators between parties and
society, interest groups as collective horizontal mediators, and locally
and regionally elected politicians as vertical mediators. Close relation-
ships with interest groups and local and regional strongholds are likely to
encourage people to join parties, because parties would be seen as rele-
vant to people’s interests and as facilitating a sense of closeness. More-
over, in such cases of (perceived) “kinship,” leaders of interest groups
and local politicians are more likely to invest, and also to succeed, in
recruiting party members. A close relationship with interest groups may
help mobilize support in local and regional elections. This may, in turn,
help interest groups influence policy at all levels of government and may
foster close relationships beneficial to all sides. All these effects would
also be expected to hold true for the opposite trend—decline. That is, a
decline in relationships with all kinds of mediators can be expected to
occur at the same time.
Table 5.2 presents a pairwise comparison of the trends of partyness for three
types of mediators: membership, interest groups, and regional–local politics.3
For every pair and also in general (see last row), our expectation for synchronized
decline in partyness is met in a large majority of cases. In most countries
for which we have data, decline appears on all fronts. A look at Table 5.4,
which also takes into account the magnitude of change, reveals that in
most cases the pairwise correlations across different types of mediators are
T A B L E 5 . 2 Pairwise Comparisons of the Trend in Partyness for Indicators

Concerning the Mediators (Number of Countries)
Pairs compared Both Both Unsynchronized* Total

decline increase
Membership/Interest groups 15 3 18
Membership/Local–regional presence** 15 4 19
Interest groups/Local–regional presence** 16 4 20
Total 46 11 57
* Includes cases of no change in partyness in one indicator and decline/increase in the other; or cases of increase
in partyness in one indicator and decline in the other.
** Based on the summary for the local and regional performance of national parties; see the last column in
Table 4.5.
3
Note that the values for the change in regional or local presence are based on averages
for the three indices that were discussed in Chapter 4. These appear in the last column of
Table 4.5.

weak and none of them is significant. Thus we have the common direction of a
declining trend, but no correlation for its magnitude.
A closer look at the pairwise relationship between our three indicators of
local and regional presence and performance (Table 4.5) reveals the following
picture: half of the cases (sixteen out of thirty-three) are about decline in both
paired elements. Another half are about decline in one paired element and
increase in another (eight), stability in one and decline in another (four), and
stability in one and increase in another (three). Only in the remaining two
comparisons is there an increase on both fronts. Thus, while the general
picture again supports the decline thesis, there is much variance. Interestingly,
the correlations between the dissimilarity index, which looks at regional
performance, and the indicators of local-level presence and performance are
very weak (Table 5.4). Once again, declines in both realms are evident but
their levels do not correlate.
When focusing on the local level—on the relationship between the
overall change in the power of national parties at that level and the change
in their power in the large five cities—we do find a correlation that is
moderately high (r = 0.58) and also significant (p < 0.05). In this case,
however, what is revealing is not the expected correlation but rather the
difference that remains between the two. This calls for further studies that
will find, for example, whether national parties’ losses are a process that
starts at the periphery and only later also appears in the largest cities (if at
all), or whether they are a process that occurs simultaneously on all fronts.
A look at the data in Chapter 4—comparing the power of national-level
parties at the local level with their power in the five large cities—reveals
that losses are indeed more pronounced at the periphery and less pro-
nounced in the large cities. But the levels of change (usually losses) are
quite similar.
Voters’ Stands and Behavior

The general decline trend is clear in this dimension (Table 5.3). In twenty-one
out of twenty-six countries, the averages for the five indices for partyness
in the voters’ stand and behavior are negative and point to decline. In only
five countries (three of them relatively young democracies) are the average
values for these indices about small increases in partyness. Of the 129 values of
the five indicators that appear in Table 5.3, only twenty-five (19.4 percent) are
about no change and only fifteen (11.6 percent) are about increase. All the
other eighty-nine (69.0 percent) are about decline.
It makes sense to expect to find similar trends for all indicators of voter
behavior in each country. That is, we may expect voters with declining party
identification to be less willing to participate in elections and, when they do

T A B L E 5 . 3 Indicators of Party–Voters Relationship (Partyness Index)
Country Party Electoral Electoral ENPV Party system Average

identification volatility turnout innovation
Israel 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.80

Italy 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.70
Austria 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.60
Iceland 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.50
Japan 2.0 2.0 1.5 .5 1.5 1.50
Ireland 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 .0 1.40
Germany .0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.30
Czech 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.20
Republic
Greece 1.5 .5 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.20
New 2.0 1.0 1.5 .5 .5 1.10
Zealand
UK 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 .0 1.00
Belgium .5 1.5 .0 2.0 .5 .90
Netherlands 1.0 1.5 1.5 .0 .5 .90
Sweden .5 1.5 .5 1.5 .5 .90
France 1.5 1.5 2.0 .0 1.0 .80
Finland 1.0 .5 1.5 .0 .5 .70
Australia .5 1.0 .0 1.0 .5 .60
Canada .5 1.5 1.5 .0 .5 .60
Switzerland .5 1.0 1.5 .0 .5 .50
Luxembourg 1.0 1.5 .0 .0 1.0 .10
Portugal .0 .0 2.0 .0 2.0 .00
Denmark .5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .10
Hungary 2.0 2.0 .0 1.5 1.0 .10
Norway .5 .0 .5 .0 .5 .10
Poland 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 .25
Spain 1.5 2.0 .0 .0 2.0 .30
vote, to be more likely to change their vote from election to election, to

spread it among more parties, and to vote for new parties. Table 5.3 shows
that this is not the case. In only seven cases (Israel, Italy, Austria, Iceland,
Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden) do we see decline on all fronts. In all
other countries, there is one value (or more) that points to stability, and
sometimes even an increase in partyness. The pairwise correlations that
appear in Table 5.4 reveal that, while the relationship between most indica-
tors is in the expected positive direction, these are weak and insignificant
relationships (except for one incident). Once again, decline is all over, but its
level varies and the values do not correlate. Thus, beyond the general decline
trend, there are various combinations of decline in partyness in some indi-
cators and no trend—and even an increase—in others.

PARTY CHANGE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
INDICATORS AND DIMENSIONS
Correlations between Indicators

Table 5.4 presents the Pearson correlations between all our indicators of
partyness (i.e., between all possible pairs). The rough nature of our indicators
and the small number of cases (even smaller than twenty-six in many compari-
sons, owing to missing values) should make us cautious about overinterpreting
these correlations. But we can nevertheless suggest some insights. First, most
correlations (forty-five of sixty-six) are, as can be expected, positive. In other
words, the values change in the same direction—of decline or increase.
Second, out of these correlations, only a few are moderately high or high,
and even fewer (eight) are significant. While these few may fascinate us, they
are clearly not the subject of this study, one of whose main aims is to capture
the phenomena of party change in the widest possible perspective.4 Thus
Table 5.4 only repeats what was already claimed in the section “Relation-
ships within Dimensions of Party Change” in this chapter: that, while the
overall trend is one of decline (save for partyness of legislators), the levels of
change do not seem to correlate in most cases. This buttresses the claim that
each indicator measures a different aspect of party change. But at the same
time it opens the field for a debate and an examination of numerous inter-
esting questions. For example, will parties lose on some fronts, yet still be
successful in sustaining their linkage in other respects? Will they, perhaps
even intentionally, give up on some matters and invest in others, as do forward-
thinking organizations, which understand that in a changing, more hostile
environment they should invest their limited resources in more beneficial
realms? To use the adaptation–decline buzzwords, maybe successful parties
are those that do relatively well in facing the declining trend, especially in terms
of limiting the magnitude of decline, and thus suffer only reasonable or sus-
tainable losses. And are perhaps the parties that fail the ones that do not invest
wisely, and thus witness decline in all, or almost all, realms?
Party Change by Indicator

Figure 5.1 presents, for each indicator, the number of countries in which
partyness had declined, increased, or stayed more or less at the same level.
The declining trend is evident in various realms and dimensions. In all respects
4
We nevertheless hope that someone will investigate the interesting relationships that were
revealed between dissimilarity in voting at the national and regional levels and voters’ stands and
behaviors.
T A B L E 5 . 4 Pearson Correlations between the Indicators of Partyness
Indicator Ministers MPs Membership Interest groups Local total Local big 5 Dissimilarity ID Volatility Turnout ENPV
MPs .01
Membership .25 .29
Interest groups .19 .53 .14
Local total .56 .24 .27 .11
Local big 5 .54* .44 .40 .43 .58*
Dissimilarity .50 .41 .14 .08 .26 .01
ID .45 .09 .28 .03 .40 .26 .53*
Volatility .30 .41 .32 .01 .18 .02 .61* .26
Turnout .16 .15 .06 .13 .12 .30 .60* .34 .15
ENPV .21 .05 .04 .08 .65* .29 .38 .20 .25 .51*
Innovation .30 .08 .13 .12 .59* .29 .07 .32 .14 .17 .35
* P<.05

25
21 21
Number of countries 20 19
18 18 17
15 14
13
9 10 9 10
10 8
7 6
5 4 4 5 5
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3 2 2 2
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Decline No trend Increase
F I G U R E 5 . 1 Change in Partyness per Indicator
but one (party background of legislators), the instances of decline are higher
than those of increase. In most cases, the gap between the number of cases of
decline and the number of cases of increase, and also of stability, is large. In
ten of the twelve compared indicators, the number of instances of decline is
larger than the combined number of instances of stability and increase.
Two prominent exceptions are the party background of legislators, in
which there are more cases of increase than of decline, and the party back-
ground of ministers, in which the numbers for decline and for increase are
almost even. This falls well within the claim that, while the party–society
linkage has been weakened, the party in government has kept itself in rela-
tively good health (see the discussion in “The Party in Government and the
Extra-Parliamentary Organization” in Chapter 3).
The indicator of the ENPV also stands apart from the general trend, but in
a different way. While there are hardly any cases of increase in partyness (that
is, of decline in ENPV), there are many that point to stability. This seems to
demonstrate that the decline of older parties may mean partial (or, rarely, full)
replacement by new ones. That is, the shape of the party system (as expressed
by the ENPV)—which is affected especially by the nature of the electoral
system—is more resistant to change than are individual parties. This clarifies

the difference between dealignment, which is about the decline of parties per se,
and realignment, which is about the decline of older parties. Yet, within the
framework of our wide perspective, these two should still be seen to indicate
change. The success of new parties, which partially overshadow and sometimes
replace the established ones, does not perforce spell survival for the party
species. As Deschouwer (2017: 80–1) puts it, “[t]he research on new parties
so far, and especially the research on their survival and role in government does
not reveal important transformations in the way in which parties govern.” And
he adds: “New political parties are strong indicators of the malaise with
democratic governance. So far they are however not the remedy.”
Party Change by Dimension

This section is mainly devoted to comparing the dimensions. The main finding
here—which only reinforces what was already found—is the difference
between party change in the first dimension of socialization and party change
in the two other dimensions. Table 5.5 presents, for each indicator and for
each dimension, the number of countries in which partyness declined or
increased, highly and moderately, or remained more or less at the same level.
In the party background of legislators and ministers, decline is evident in
“just” 39 percent of the cases (thirteen out of thirty-three), while an increase
was found in almost half of them (48 percent, sixteen out of thirty-three).
When we look at the dimensions of the mediators—vertical (regional and
local politics), horizontal (interest groups), and individual (party members)—
we see a clear trend of decline: 79 percent cases (seventy-one out of ninety),
as against only 13 percent that present an increase (twelve out of ninety). As
for voters, 69 percent of the cases (eighty-nine out of 129) are of decline and
only 12 percent are of increase (sixteen of 129). The difference between
the two last dimensions—with the somewhat lesser decline in terms of voters
vis-à-vis mediators—may reflect the not too impressive fruits of the efforts
of parties to invest directly in voters rather than in mediated linkages
with society.
In his analysis of parties at the core of government, Strøm (2000: 201)
concludes: “The farther we move away from this key political institution [e.g.,
the cabinet], the more clearly we see signs of partisan decay.” Our findings are
similar, in the sense that the indicators of change in partyness in the party in
government point to little decline and even to some increase, while the
indicators of the other dimensions show mainly decline.
This also fits the general conclusion of Dalton and Wattenberg (2000a,
2000b) at the end of their seminal collection. But two qualifications might be
added to round the picture off. First, more partyness was preserved in the
legislature than in the cabinet; and, second, if a difference was found between

T A B L E 5 . 5 Change in Partyness per Indicator and Dimension
Indicator Decline No Increase Total

Trend
High Moderate Total (0) High Moderate Total
( 1.5, 2) ( .5, 1) (1.5, 2) (.5, 1)
Party background of 5 3 8 3 3 4 7 18
ministers
Party background of 3 2 5 1 4 5 9 15
legislators
Socialization 8 5 13 4 7 9 16 33
Party membership 13 8 21 0 2 0 2 23
density
Party–interest groups 4 14 18 3 0 0 0 21
relationship
National–regional 9 1 10 0 1 3 4 14
electoral dissimilarity
Performance of local 9 4 13 3 1 1 2 18
parties (five largest
cities)
Performance of local 8 1 9 1 1 3 4 14
parties (national total)
Mediators 43 28 71 7 5 7 12 90
Party identification 11 10 21 2 1 2 3 26
Electoral volatility 14 4 18 3 4 1 5 26
Electoral turnout 16 3 19 6 1 0 1 26
ENPV 8 6 14 10 2 0 2 26
Party innovation 6 11 17 3 1 4 5 25
Voters 55 34 89 24 9 7 16 129
Total 106 67 173 35 21 23 44 252
“mediators” and “voters” (and the works of Dalton and Wattenberg did not
suggest such a distinction), then the mediators, who were supposed to be
closer to the party than the voters, actually experienced a somewhat more
substantial decline.
PARTY CHANGE: A COMPARISON

BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES
Figure 5.2 presents the average values of the twelve indicators of party change
for each country. The values of the averages make sense as general expressions
of partyness when we look at the established democracies at the extremes.

0.50
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0.17
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–0.33
–0.43
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–0.65
–0.64
–0.77
–0.79
–0.91 –0.91 –0.89
–1.00
–0.94
–1.11
–1.18
–1.25
–1.29
–1.35
–1.42
–1.50
–1.50 –1.50
–1.67
–2.00
F I G U R E 5 . 2 Average Change in Partyness by Country
Taking Norway as an example, a systematic analysis of parties in that country

(Strøm and Svåsand 1997a) concluded that, “[c]ompared to developments in
other countries, Norwegian parties have fared well with respect to most facets
of party decline” (Strøm and Svåsand, 1997b: 358). Some more recent
accounts of Norwegian parties (Aars and Ringkjøb 2005; Allern 2010;
Narud and Strøm 2011) came to a similar conclusion.
The conclusion drawn from a comparison across all the Nordic countries
also parallels the findings here. First, the relative positions of the Nordic
countries, the “ ‘least likely’ cases of party or parliamentary decline” (Strøm
and Bergman 2011: 28), seem to make sense. Second, the positions of each
Nordic country in relation to the others also correspond to experts’ assess-
ments. Iceland’s relatively high position in terms of decline in partyness is
reasonable, following the analysis by Kristjánsson and Indridason (2011); and
Denmark is indeed found to be the stable country among the five (Bergman
and Strøm 2011b).
At the other extreme, on the declining side, we find Israel and Italy.
A comparative analysis found that Israeli parties, especially the mainstream
aggregative ones, suffer the highest levels of decline by comparison to parties
in other democracies (Kenig and Tuttnauer 2017). The same situation is also
found in Italy since the political “earthquake” of the early 1990s (Cotta 2015).
After validating the results of our research by comparing it to the work of
others, we turn to look at the main findings of our analysis. First, the general

trend is toward decline in partyness. Only three out of twenty-six countries
have positive averages. And, even in those rare cases, the values are rather
low, less than 0.25 (out of a maximum of 2). On the other hand, we see a range
of decline up to the value of 1.67. It may be claimed that this is anything but
news, because the case was already made by many established scholars (see,
for example, Lawson and Merkl 1988; Mair 2013). But this is still one of the
most comprehensive examinations we know of, if not in terms of countries
then in terms of the variety of indicators, which go beyond the “usual
suspects”—party membership, volatility, identification, and turnout. True,
there have been some attempts to cover similar numbers of indicators, but
these were limited to a single country (Strøm and Svåsand 1997a) or to several
countries (Bergman and Strøm 2011a).
Second, it is hard to find clear patterns for countries along lines of regime
structure (Westminster versus consensus democracies) or along cultural
lines. Westminster democracies are spread all over our continuum, and the
same is true of consensus democracies. Indeed, three out of five countries
that belong to the Nordic group (Finland, Denmark, and Norway) experi-
enced the lowest levels of decline in partyness, as would be expected from
these “ ‘least-likely’ cases” of party decline (Strøm and Bergman, 2011: 28).
But one country (Sweden) was found to experience a moderate level of
decline, and another (Iceland) sharp decline. This may point to the import-
ance of factors beyond national culture and institutions—perhaps to the
importance of action on the side of the parties, for example. The initiation
and implementation of a successful initiative for coping with the challenges
to parties imposed by a single party in a given party system may be imitated
and may result in less decline and more adaptation for the parties in that
country. In other words, the limited explanatory power of differences in
institutions and political culture should lead us to look for explanations that
take human agency into account. This is the story of party evolution set by
Katz and Mair (1995), which is about a Lamarckian rather than a Darwin-
ian evolution. But here we also suggest—in line with the later works of Mair
(see Mair 2013), although, unlike him, we do not generalize—that some of
these attempts have failed.
Third, another possible factor that could influence party decline is the
size of the polity. It may be claimed that processes take more time in large
countries (given the size of population). Yet no clear link exists between
size and party change; some large countries (e.g., Italy) experienced high
levels of decline, while others (the United Kingdom, Spain) did not. Among
the Nordic countries, the smallest (Iceland) and the largest (Sweden) experi-
enced the relatively highest levels of decline.
Fourth, out of six newer democracies, five experienced either a relatively
small decline in partyness (Greece, Portugal, Spain) or a slight increase
(Poland, Hungary). This does not reflect the shorter duration of the process,
because we did look at annual change in most instances; it might reflect a low

starting point in those five countries. That is, the reference point for change in
these countries was not the 1960s, the “golden age” of the mass parties. Their
later starting point was much lower.
Following these cases, we should look at the possible correlation between
each country’s starting point and the amount of change it experienced in
general. The higher the starting point, the higher the potential levels of
decline. After all, our analysis included absolute values of change that are
sensitive to the height of the starting point. This premise may be strengthened,
seeing that the three countries with the highest levels of decline—Italy,
Austria, Israel––are those that were described as countries with an especially
high dominance of parties in their past (Akzin 1955; Galnoor 1982; Yishai
2008; La Palombara 1987; Luther 1992). Moreover, as Lisi (2015) suggests,
political parties whose status is “overinstitutionalized” may be unable to
respond and adapt to change and thus would probably experience higher
rates of decline than parties with a lower status, whose DNA includes a
struggle for survival and status.
The relative ranking of the starting point in each country—that is, the
country’s level of partyness at the beginning—and its ranking in terms of
amount of change are presented in Table 5.6. The calculations of both starting
point and the amount of change are not based on all our dozen indicators, but
only on seven of them, for which we had the necessary data (see Appendix 11).
There is a positive correlation between the rankings of parties according
to the amount of their decline and the level of partyness at the starting
point. Spearman’s correlation is moderately strong and significant at 0.514
(P < 0.01). The rankings of Austria and Italy at one extreme and Hungary and
Poland at the other satisfy this expectation. The relatively low rankings of five
out of the six newer democracies (besides the Czech Republic) also fit the
expectations. Overall, in eleven cases, the gap between the rank of the country
starting point and in terms of its amount of change was up to 3. The other
cases are countries with a high ranking in terms of starting point and with a
relatively low (Australia) or moderate (New Zealand, Sweden) decline; a low
starting point with a relatively high decline (Czech Republic); and also
moderate starting points and high declines (Israel and Japan).
The existence of a correlation between partyness at the starting point and
amount of change leads us to think that countries converge in their levels of
partyness. That is, levels of partyness are expected to be more similar across
countries than they used to be. This institutional convergence may be a
result of globalization (Inkeles 1998). It could be expected that, when parties
face increasingly similar pressures and react more similarly to them, they
end up being more similar among themselves. In contrast, it is still possible
that, although countries face similar pressures and an overall decline trend,
their reactions differ, as do their levels of success in adaptation, which may
conserve their differences.

T A B L E 5 . 6 Partyness at Starting Point and Change in
Partyness (Countries’ Ranking)
Country* Partyness at Level of change

starting point** in partyness**
Austria 1 2
New Zealand 2 11
Germany 3 5
Australia 4 18
Sweden 5 13
Italy 5 3
Belgium 7 9
UK 8 10
Luxembourg 9 24
Ireland 10 8
Iceland 11 5
Norway 12 19
Japan 12 4
Canada 14 12
Israel 15 1
Finland 16 20
Denmark 17 23
Portugal 17 20
Netherlands 19 14
Greece 20 16
Spain 21 22
Switzerland 22 15
France 23 17
Czech Republic 24 7
Hungary 25 26
Poland 26 25
* In italics, countries whose rankings are close within a range of up to

three positions.
** For details on the computation of the countries’ rankings, see
Appendix 11.
In order to examine whether there is indeed convergence, Table 5.7

presents the spread of the values of seven indicators for which we have
data at the starting and end points for all countries. The data do not
support the expectation for convergence. While the values of standard
deviation are lower at the end point for two indicators, they are higher
for five. As for the range, it is smaller at the end point in three indicators,
similar in one, and larger in another three. If anything happened over the
years, it is an increase in differences between countries rather than
convergence.
Finally, party decline may signal a move to a less mediated and more direct
democracy. Daalder (2011: 121) raises the possibility that parties are a “tran-
sient phenomenon”: “Parties were necessary instruments to bring new social

T A B L E 5 . 7 Levels of Variance in Partyness at Start and End Points
(Standard Deviation and Range)
Indicator SD: earliest SD: latest Range: earliest Range: latest

point point point point
Party membership density 7.6 3.5 1.2–26.2 .8–17.3

Electoral volatility 9.7 6.5 2.7–38.1 6.7–37.9
Electoral turnout 11.8 12.2 44.9–95.3 51.2–93.7
ENPV 1.2 1.5 2.3–6.7 3.0–9.6
Party system innovation 1.6 4.8 0–5.2 0–16.9
Vote for local parties (five 23.7 25.1 0–100 0–100
largest cities)
National–regional 5.0 7.2 1.8–18.9 4–28.1
electoral dissimilarity
strata into the political process, so it is argued, but once ‘parochials’ have
turned into ‘subjects’ and better, into ‘citizens’ in the Almond-Verba sense,
parties have outlived their usefulness.” If that were the case, we would expect
the countries with the highest scores on “self-expression” values—which are a
combination of attitudes that emphasize the emancipation and autonomy of
the individual (Welzel and Inglehart 2011)—to have the lowest levels of
partyness at the end point.5
Table 5.8 presents the rankings of each country in terms of the average score
of the self-expression values of its population (from highest to lowest), level
of change in partyness (the higher the decline, the higher the rank), and level of
partyness at the end point of our time frame (from highest to lowest). We check
both the relationship between the change in partyness and the latest level of
partyness and the level of self-expression values in 2015. It might be that the
amount of self-expression correlates with change in partyness because the
more decline there was, the more this late development increased; or it may
be that partyness negatively correlates with levels of self-expression.
We found no correlation between country rankings in change in partyness
and in level of partyness at the end point and rankings in self-expression
values. We can actually find, against the logic presented so far, cases of high
partyness and medium to low decline in partyness combined with high levels
of self-expression values (Sweden, Denmark, Norway). Partyness and self-
expression values do not necessarily contradict each other. Parties that are in
relatively good shape do not seem to block the development of empowered
individuals.
5
According to Inglehart (2009: 140), “[s]elf-expression values give high priority to environmental
protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in
economic and political life.”

T A B L E 5 . 8 Self-Expression Values, Change in Partyness, and Partyness at End
Point in Twenty-Six Democracies (Countries’ Rankings)
Country Self-expression Level of change Level of partyness

values* in partyness** at end point***
Sweden 1 12 3
Denmark 2 23 7
Norway 3 19 4
Canada 4 12 13
Iceland 5 5 22
Australia 6 18 1
New Zealand 7 11 6
UK 8 10 10
Switzerland 9 15 14
Belgium 10 9 8
Netherlands 11 14 20
Finland 12 20 5
Ireland 13 7 17
France 14 17 15
Luxembourg 15 24 2
Germany 16 5 16
Italy 16 2 18
Austria 18 2 9
Spain 19 22 12
Poland 20 25 26
Japan 21 4 22
Greece 22 16 19
Czech 23 7 25
Republic
Israel 24 1 24
Portugal 25 20 11
Hungary 25 26 21
* The rankings according to which we ordered countries in terms of self-expression are based on the countries’
location on the cultural map of 2015 (World Value Survey 2015). To rank Israel and Italy we had to use the
locations on the cultural map of 1996 (also in World Value Survey 2015). When we compared 1996 and 2015,
the differences in ranking in other countries turned out to be minor, hence we should not expect them to
influence the analysis.
** Level of change in the same seven indicators that were used to calculate the level of partyness at the end point
(see Appendix 12).
*** For details concerning the computation of the countries’ rankings, see Appendix 12.
THE OVERALL TREND
Daalder (2011: 122) claims that “the idea of a ‘golden age’ of party is likely to
be myth, rather than reality” and that parties may lose some and gain some.
Our examination of the countries’ starting and end points shows that there
were—and are—differences in partyness between countries, a conclusion that

makes these claims valid for some cases. But in general our analysis clearly
shows that the peak or “golden age” of parties is over. The overall decline
trend is evident, unless we see the party in government as the exclusive point
of reference: out of 252 values (Table 5.5), we have 173 (69 percent) that
attest to decline, thirty-five (14 percent) that point to stability, and forty-four
(17 percent) that indicate increase. Furthermore, within the category of
decline, 61 percent of the values are high. If we look only at the veteran
democracies, which were already democratic in the 1960s and thus experi-
enced the heyday of the mass party, the picture is even sharper: out of
201 values, we have 147 (73 percent) that testify to decline, twenty-seven
(13.5 percent) that point to stability, and twenty-seven (13.5 percent) that
point to increase. A look at these data per country or per indicator, as was
done in this chapter in “Party Change by Indicator” and “Party Change:
A Comparison between Democracies,” also validates these claims. Partyness
has declined in more countries in eleven out of the twelve indicators
(Figure 5.1); in terms of an average for all indicators, twenty-three countries
show decline while only three show increase (Figure 5.2).
In his introductory book Contemporary Party Politics, Pettitt (2014: 18)
argues: “In essence, whether one agrees with the party crisis idea is less
an objective evaluation, but a normative one based on what one thinks parties
ought to be doing.” The indicators used in Chapters 3 and 4 may also become,
of course, a matter of normative debate. Yet the general picture is mostly one
of decline. Parties’ linkages with mediators and with the electorate have
clearly weakened over time. Only if one holds the normative or theoretical
stance that parties are solely about their role in government and all other
facets are redundant is no decline trend evident.
Looking at a wider set of indicators than Mair, we do not quite come to the
conclusion that “virtually all of these separate pieces of evidence point in the
same direction” and that they “are consistent across counties” (Mair 2013: 21).
While most data support his pessimism and the overall picture is that of party
decline, a significant minority of the values of the indicators are about stability
in partyness, or even about increase in it; and there is also variance in the
magnitude of decline among countries. Kölln (2014) suggests focusing on
individual parties when examining party decline. She then demonstrates that
not all parties are in decline. What our findings demonstrate—looking at a
larger variety of indicators, but at the country level—is additional support for
her claim for variance. Variance is found not only at the party level but also by
indicator and by country.
Thus the picture of general decline and of variance in its magnitude requires
us to look beyond the simplified party decline–party adaptation divide. The
more precise, shorter description is one of general decline in partyness, but of
various magnitudes. This highlights the possibility that in some countries
parties managed to adapt to their less welcoming environment—losing

small amounts of partyness—while in others they failed to do so, as expressed
in their loss of large amounts of partyness.
THE STATE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2015
We saw that in most cases parties are now weaker than they used to be. First,
fewer citizens are willing to become members of them. Second, in comparison
to the past, interest groups keep their distance from them. Third, a growing
number of local lists and independents are being elected to local office at the
expense of national-level parties. Fourth, fewer citizens than in the past
identify strongly, or even just mildly, with any party. Fifth, many more people
than in the past do not bother to show up and vote. Sixth, far less people than
in the past vote for the same party at different levels (national, regional, and
local) and at different times. Seventh, parties’ ability to guard the existing
party system and to resist newer parties is diminishing. Only when it comes to
socializing party representatives have parties held on (in government) and
even become stronger (in legislatures) in comparison to the past.
It should be stressed that, formally and nominally, political parties do exist,
and as such they are not expected to face a demise. Yet, as Mair (2008b: 189)
puts it, “to conclude, on the basis of the minimal definition of party, that
parties will always be present, is correct in itself, but it offers little of theor-
etical (as opposed to definitional) interest.”
In consequence, perhaps the more effective way to look at the end product
of party change is to define “a failed party.” This phenomenon would be
similar to that of “failed states.” A failed state may be one that significantly
fails to hold the monopoly on force. In a similar manner, a failed party would
be one that exists in name but has lost its core resonance, that is, has ceased
to serve as a solution to the problem of collective action. La Palombara
(2007: 148) presents a scenario in which parties fail and can be claimed to
be there only nominally and formally:
in situations where party discipline is difficult or impossible to enforce,
where both voters and candidates are highly volatile as to their party
identifications, and where, within legislative bodies, their members act
and vote as individuals, rather than as party members, the political party
may well be unable to govern in its own name, even if this is what some of
its leaders may desire.
This description touches on the two basic rationales for politicians to belong
to parties (Strøm 2000; Aldrich 2011; Mershon and Shvetsova 2013): their
ability to coordinate action within parliament (and thus to be effective in

promoting policy) and their ability to supply cues to voters (and thus to be
effective in getting the vote). The best sign of the existence of failed parties is
the frequent occurrence of party switching. This means that coordination
within parliament is weakening and the value of party labels is lost.
Indeed, party switching—that is, MPs moving from one party to another—
can serve as an indicator of both party change and political personalization.
Put differently, an increase in party switching testifies to (1) the weakening of
the party’s capacity to serve as a permanent solution to a collective action
problem in parliament; and (2) the decline of the value of its label for electoral
purposes. A decrease in party switching testifies to (1) the strengthening of the
party’s capacity to serve as solution to a collective action problem; and (2) the
increase in the value of its label for electoral purposes. At the same time, party
switching is a sign of personalized behavior; thus its increase can be seen as
a sign of personalization, and its decrease as a sign of depersonalization.
However, the analysis of party switching would be best applied in determining
whether parties have really lost their value and are no more than formal and
nominal entities or whether they still hold on to the fundamental reason of
their existence.
Table 5.9 compares party switching in fourteen countries from the decade
1960–9 (or, for Greece and Spain, the earliest relevant decade) to the dec-
ade 2001–10. Party switching in these countries grew over the years from an
annual average of 0.61 percent to one of 0.92 percent. This may seem like a
negligible shift, but we should not forget that switching is a rather rare
phenomenon and, as a result, even a minor change marks a trend. In ten
countries we see an increase, while in only four there is a decrease. Still, in
most countries, switching still seems to be at levels that largely express
stability. And when it is evidently high, this is based on a single incidence
(Switzerland) or on “politics as usual” (Italy). In short, parties have not (yet?)
come to their demise.
Indeed, political parties are still more than formal and nominal entities. It is
evident, however, that the mediated and direct linkage with the electorate is
generally in decline in most democracies. These findings tend to fit into the
claim of the cartel party theory (Katz and Mair 1995), in that the party in
government in many cases remains as partisan as it was, while the party
organization’s ability to sustain the link with society weakens. Cartelization
may be a general theme that captures a trend in the development of parties.
Yet the general variance in the levels of party decline and the variance in the
direction and magnitude of change in the partyness of legislators and minis-
ters tell us that some cases are better captured by this notion than others. This
accords with the claim that the cartel party is a prototype against which
empirical cases should be analyzed, rather than a model into which all cases
should fit. Because our perspective is not one of evolution of party types, we
will not develop this idea further, but we do believe that the data presented in

T A B L E 5 . 9 Party Switching 1960–9 and 2001–10: Average per Year
(in Percentages)*
Country 1960–9 2001–10 Change
Switzerland .0 2.7 2.7

Austria .1 1.3 1.2
Greece **.1 .7 .6
Ireland .1 .7 .6
Netherlands .5 1.1 .6
Denmark .7 1.1 .4
Belgium **.3 .5 .2
Norway .3 .5 .2
Finland .2 .3 .1
Italy 2.6 2.7 .1
UK .6 .4 .2
Germany .4 .1 .3
France 1.4 .5 .9
Spain **1.2 .3 .9
Average .61 .92 .31
* We thank Elisa Volpi for the data and the explanation below.
Switching was coded in the following situations:
1. An MP changed her affiliation to a party that already existed.
2. An MP became independent.
3. A group of MPs merged with an already existing group.
4. A group of MPs established a new group.
Volpi did not consider label changes as incidents of party switching. Her data were
collected through an analysis of parliamentary records, therefore including only those
cases when switching was formally recorded.
** For Belgium, the data are from the period 1961–70; for Greece, from 1974–83; and
for Spain, from 1977–86.
this part of the book can be useful for such an analysis. We will proceed by
looking at variance vis-à-vis the status of parties as political actors, disregard-
ing the specific model they fit.
Our findings of a major trend of party decline might be interpreted to
support Mair’s (2013) pessimism and to contradict the optimistic findings of
Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister (2011), who reject the party decline thesis and
argue for party adaptation. But, although our findings appear to buck the
latter’s optimism, we find this line of interpretation to be highly problematic.
A simplistic categorization, according to a binary division between decline
and adaptation, would take us nowhere. Our main claim would be that the
time has come to recognize variance and to grant it more attention. And if we
return to a binary perspective, within this variance there are countries in
which the parties adapted and countries in which they declined.
It is thus reasonable to conclude a book about parties in the Nordic
countries with the claim that they mainly transform or adapt (Bergman and
Strøm 2011b); but, in speaking of other countries, such as Israel or Italy,

nothing but decline is evident. And, as for the in-between countries, those
with moderate levels of decline, the jury may still be out, or we may want to
consider a classification of them (and of periods within each) into countries in
which parties are the dominant actors, countries in which they are one of the
main actors, and countries in which they became a secondary actor. In
addition, even if the possibility that parties would become “failed parties” is
still theoretical, in some countries parties are closer to this state than in others.
Furthermore, there may be, within the same political system, parties that
declined and parties that adapted. Another interesting line of research, then, is
to look at variance in party change at the level of the party. Kölln (2016)
showed this to be a fruitful path in her study of differences in levels of
membership decline. Arter and Kestilä-Kekkonen (2014) provided a set of
indicators of party institutionalization that may work well for studying
changes in the partyness of individual parties over time—or may at least
serve as a beginner’s working kit.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pettitt (2014: 205) claims: “There is currently no viable alternative to party

democracy, and thus Schattschneider’s claim that democracy is unthinkable
save in terms of political parties, cited at the very beginning of this book, holds
as true today as it did then.” In this part of our study we saw that in most time
frames and in most countries parties have declined since the 1960s, although
at differing rates. Still, we did not identify an alternative actor that could take
the place of the party or push it to the back seat. The following chapters will
look at the possibility that individual politicians, those who came together and
created parties, may take the central stage. To do this, we will examine
political personalization (Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9) and then the relationship between
party change and political personalization (Chapters 10, 11).
Part II
Political Personalization
Definition, Typology, and Causes
Postwar Italy was known as a partitocrazia, a political system dominated by

party rule. That was until the transformation to the Second Republic, which
was characterized by an upsurge of personal parties (Venturino 2010), labeled
by Cotta (2015: 48) as a move from “partitocracy” to “leaderocracy.” Initially
this was most clearly demonstrated in the rise and success of Silvio Berlusco-
ni’s Forza Italia, a one-man enterprise that overwhelmingly dominated the
Italian right (Fabbrini 2013). More recently, the center of the map was
captured by another personal project, of Beppe Grillo, a comedian and
blogger who established the Five Star Movement (M5S), which came in a
strong third place in the 2013 elections. On the left, the shift away from parties
to individuals was expressed by the adoption of open primaries for leadership
and candidate selection in the Democratic Party (Sandri and Seddone 2015).
In Israel, David Ben-Gurion was the most prominent of the state’s found-
ing fathers. He served as the leader of the Jewish community in Mandatory
Palestine from the 1930s until the establishment of the state in 1948 and as
the prime minister of Israel for more than ten years (1949–53; 1955–63). For
all this time he was the undisputed leader of the dominant party, Mapai. In
1965 he left Mapai to establish a new party. The party competed in the 1965
elections and won only 7.9 percent of the votes. This support was worth ten
seats, which placed it as the fourth largest party in the Knesset, the Israeli
legislature, in comparison to its mother party, Mapai (in alliance with another
socialist party at the time), which won 36.7 percent of the votes (forty-five
seats). Nearly half a century later, in 2012, Yair Lapid, a journalist, author,
TV presenter and news anchor, formed a new party and competed in the 2013
elections. His party, Yesh Atid, won 14.3 percent of the votes (nineteen seats)
and became the second largest party in the Knesset, second only to the Likud-
Yisrael Beytenu alliance, which won 23.3 percent of the votes (thirty-one
seats). In 1965, the “net value” (without the party) of a national democratic
leader of the caliber of Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, or Nelson
Mandela was no more than ten seats. In 2013, the “net value” of a successful
journalist, a “celebrity,” was twice as much. At a time when no party won

more than 25 percent of the seats, Yair Lapid also headed the second largest
party in the legislature.
These examples from Italy and Israel epitomize the two phenomena that
stand at the center of this book—namely party change (in this case, decline)
and political personalization. Recently we have seen many more examples of
the personalization of politics. In Austria in 2017, the thirty-year-old Sebas-
tian Kurz was selected as the new leader of the Austrian People’s Party
(ÖVP), one of the country’s two prominent parties in the post-World War II
period. Soon afterwards Kurz made several demands that were accepted
by the ÖVP, all about the personalization of his party. For example, the
party would run in the 2017 parliamentary elections under the name “List
Sebastian Kurz—The New People’s Party.” He was also given a free hand in
conducting coalition negotiations, selecting ministers, drafting the party
program, and nominating legislative candidates, including outsiders. Austria,
once a country known for its strong-rooted parties (Müller 1994), became
highly personalized.
Two additional recent and unequivocal examples of political personaliza-
tion are Donald Trump, who won the Republican ticket and the presidency of
the United States despite strong antipathy from the party elite, and Emman-
uel Macron, who glided in to win the French presidency without a real party
machine behind him—only a loose political movement. These are indeed
examples from the context of the more personalized presidential and semi-
presidential regimes, but, as we saw, they can be added to the signifiers of the
personalization of politics that were found in parliamentary democracies.
Beyond these events and similar others, scholars also have good theoretical
reasons to expect to identify political personalization (Blondel and Thiébault
2010; Lobo 2014; Garzia 2011b; Kriesi 2012; McAllister 2011; Poguntke and
Webb 2005b; van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012). Yet, while some specific
country studies (Fabbrini 2013; Mughan 2000; Rahat and Sheafer 2007;
Balmas et al. 2014), and also some cross-national studies of more specific
phenomena (e.g., presidentialization—Poguntke and Webb 2005a, 2005b;
Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny 2012—or electoral reform—Renwick and
Pilet 2011, 2016), identified a clear trend, the empirical findings of cross-
national comparisons are generally mixed (Bjerling 2012; Karvonen 2010;
Renwick and Pilet 2016; Wauters et al. forthcoming), if not largely negative
(Adam and Maier 2010; Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and
Boumans 2011). This gap between results can be attributed to a conceptual
and methodological muddle (van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012) and, in the
case of behavioral aspects, may be blamed on a sociological rather than a
psychological perspective (Blondel and Thiébault 2010). But this confusing
situation could simply be a result of differences between countries (Karvonen
2010; Kriesi 2012; Stanyer 2013), and even between parties and individuals
(Adam and Maier 2010). Thus, after clarifying the concept and proposing
Political Personalization: Definition, Typology, and Causes 117

tools for its measurement, one should map variance here, just as in the case
of party change.
This chapter lays down the conceptual and theoretical basis for the next
ones (Chapters 7, 8, 9), which will analyze political personalization from a
cross-national perspective. It begins by proposing a definition of political
personalization and a typology for it (i.e., a classification into types and
subtypes). It then turns to examine closely the core meaning of the proposed
definition, its broadness, and the implications of perceiving personalization
as a process. Finally it examines, on the basis of the research literature, the
general causes of political personalization and the relationships between its
different types.
WHAT IS POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION?
The study of political personalization is in great need of conceptual clarity

(van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012). Indeed, van Santen and van Zoonen
(2010) identified no less than seven definitions of the term in the literature.
Here we will start by presenting our preferred broad definition of political
personalization, then we will examine its various facets or “faces.” Next we
will make a case for using a definition of the phenomenon that places its core
meaning in the contrast between the political collective and the political
individual and that is broad enough to cover much more ground than a
study-specific definition—even to go beyond the relatively broad phenom-
enon of presidentialization; and we will also make a case for viewing person-
alization as a process.
Definition and Typology

Political personalization is defined here as a “process in which the political
weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while
the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines” (Rahat and
Sheafer 2007: 65; for a similar definition, see Karvonen 2010: 4; Mancini and
Swanson 1996: 10). This broad definition allows us to perceive political per-
sonalization as a multidimensional phenomenon (Karvonen 2010; van Aelst,
Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012). An opposite process, of depersonalization, is also
possible: this is a situation in which the political weight of the individual actor
in the political process declines over time, while the centrality of the political
group increases.
Before we turn to present our typology of political personalizations, we
should first recognize that personalization can be centralized or decentralized

(Balmas et al. 2014). Centralized personalization is a process in which a single
individual becomes increasingly prominent while her “team” is decreasing in
prominence. Examples would be the prime minister vis-à-vis her cabinet, or
the political leader of a party vis-à-vis her party. But personalization can
also be a process in which several individuals are on the rise even as their
“team” is waning. In this case, good examples would be ministers vis-à-vis
their cabinet, or party parliamentarians vis-à-vis the parliamentary party
group. These denote decentralized political personalization.1 The literature
suggests that centralized personalization is the more prominent phenomenon
(Balmas et al. 2014), but caution is advised here, because this also seems to
be the phenomenon more easily identified, and that could bias impressions
about its occurrence.
We will adopt here a somewhat different and improved version of Rahat
and Sheafer’s (2007) typology of political personalizations (see Figure 6.1).
Three types of political personalization will be identified: institutional, media,
and behavioral. Each type can be further categorized into two subtypes,
namely personalization in government and nongovernmental institutions;
controlled and uncontrolled media personalization; and behavioral personal-
ization among politicians and voters. All these categories are defined and
described in what follows.
Political personalization
Institutional Media Behavioral

personalization personalization personalization
non-
government politicians’ voters’
government
institutions behavior behavior
institutions
controlled uncontrolled
media media
F I G U R E 6 . 1 Political Personalization: Types and Subtypes
1
In his study of personalization in Italy, Musella (2014a) labels “presidentialization” what we
call here centralized personalization, and his “micro-personalization” parallels our decentralized
personalization. See also Wauters et al. forthcoming.

Institutional Personalization
Institutional personalization occurs when an institution is reformed in a manner
that increases the political weight of an individual actor (or actors) and dimin-
ishes the centrality of the political group. It may be expressed in a change that
enhances the power of the person who heads the institution (the prime minister,
the party leader, etc.) vis-à-vis the power of the institution itself and of its
political groupings (the cabinet, party institutions). This kind of development
implies centralized institutional personalization. Institutional personalization
may also be found in a reform that enhances the power of many persons within
the institution (ministers, party MPs) vis-à-vis the power of the institution itself
and of its political groupings (the cabinet, the party parliamentary group). This
version implies decentralized institutional personalization.
The personalization (and also the depersonalization) of governmental insti-
tutions may be identified when reforms are adopted in the various institutions of
government (e.g., electoral systems, the executive), possibly at various levels
(national, regional, local). A prominent historical example of a reform that led
to the personalization of the government system is the replacement of the
parliamentary regime of the French Fourth Republic with the semi-presidential
one of the Fifth Republic. Generally the adoption of direct elections of chief
executives—be it at the national level (e.g., direct elections of the prime minister
in Israel in 1996), at the regional level (as in Italy in 1995; see Bedock, Mair, and
Wilson 2012), or at the local level (as in parts of Austria and Germany, or in
Greater London) is an example of centralized personalization in governmental
institutions. Electoral reforms that enhance the ability of voters to influence
the composition of parliament—such as those that were adopted in Sweden
(1997, 2014) and Belgium (1995, 2003)—are other examples (Renwick and Pilet
2016), this time of decentralized institutional personalization. There are also
examples of the depersonalization of governmental institutions: the abolition of
direct elections for the prime minister in Israel (2001), the abolition of the
preference vote in the election for the houses of parliament of Italy (1991), and
the replacement of the single nontransferable vote in Japan with a mixed-member
majoritarian electoral system (1994).
The personalization and the depersonalization of nongovernmental institu-
tions occur when a party or some other political group (an interest group, a
social movement) adopts reforms that change the power balance between its
members (as a collective) and its leader (centralized personalization), or among
its individual members (decentralized personalization). Enhancing the power
of the party leader, for example by granting her a veto on the selection of
candidates, would be seen as a form of centralized personalization, while
diminishing it would be seen as centralized depersonalization. Adopting party
primaries (with their explicit element of personal competition) for candidate
selection, in order to replace some less inclusive method, would be an
example of decentralized personalization of a nongovernmental institution.

Media Personalization
Media personalization is a process in which the presentation (controlled
media personalization) and coverage (uncontrolled media personalization)
of politics focuses less and less on collective entities and more and more on
individual politicians.2
Controlled media personalization occurs when messages sent by political
actors increasingly originate from, and are preoccupied with, individuals—at
the expense of political groupings. This is evident, for example, when election
campaigns put the parties in the back seat and highlight both political and
nonpolitical (private) traits of individual politicians—party leaders at the
national level (centralized personalization) and candidates at the constituency
level (decentralized personalization). Such personalization can also be found
online (see Chapter 8), when individual politicians’ websites or Facebook and
Twitter accounts are more frequently updated (supply or production) than the
corresponding websites and accounts of their political parties.
Uncontrolled media personalization occurs when the coverage of politics
concentrates progressively on individual actors and incrementally less on
political groupings. If and when this occurs, the “story” shifts away from
competing teams and their brand names, party labels, and ideological mark-
ers (blocs, coalition, “left” and “right”), which are replaced with individual
politicians’ names. For example, a government starts to become branded by
its prime minister rather than by its party or country. Such coverage is a sign
of centralized media personalization, whereas, if the media start for example
to identify specific issues with specific members of parliament, that would be
seen as a form of decentralized media personalization.
Scholars of political communication are also interested in a different cat-
egorization (or types) of media political personalization, which is organized
around the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical traits of an
individual politician and sometimes involves a further (sub-)categorization of
these traits (Bjerling 2012; Stayner 2013; van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012).
Given our broad focus here, we have to put this criterion aside. We also put
aside an interesting distinction between negative and positive personalization,
which looks into whether personal coverage (uncontrolled media) and presen-
tation (controlled media) emphasize positive or negative traits of the individual
politicians (Pruysers and Cross 2016).
2
Rahat and Sheafer (2007) suggested differentiating between paid and unpaid media
personalization. Karlsen (2011: 6) offers even better parallel terms: controlled and uncontrolled
media. These are preferable because they emphasize the core issue of control rather than a possible
tool for achieving it—payment. We thus adopt Karlsen’s terms here. Regarding the online world,
the paid–unpaid media division is even misleading: websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter
accounts of politicians and parties are controlled but not necessarily paid for.

Behavioral Personalization
Behavioral personalization applies to both politicians and voters. Among
politicians, it reflects a change in their patterns of behavior, from team players
who act together and coordinate their moves to separate individuals with
uncoordinated actions. Such a development can happen at the top (central-
ized behavioral personalization)—for example, when the leader distances
herself from her party. She builds her own nonpartisan professional personal
team of advisors and, increasingly, makes her own policy decisions. In her
speeches there is a perceptible shift from “we” and “us” to “I” and “me.” With
decentralized personalization, each individual is on her own; parties, coali-
tions, and other coordination tools become less used and less effective than
before. A clear sign of this phenomenon is the weakening of a group’s unity of
action, which can take many forms—from voting against the party line in
parliament to rejecting party policies in public. Decentralized personalization
may also be expressed in an increase in individualized actions that do not
necessarily contradict those of the party, for example the issuing of private-
member bills in great numbers. This reflects investing time and effort in
making oneself prominent vis-à-vis other members of the institution (e.g.,
the parliament) and of the team (e.g., the parliamentary party), which is all
about boosting one’s own prominence. The case of Italy demonstrates that
centralized and decentralized behavioral personalization can occur simultan-
eously when the leader distances herself from the other politicians and they, for
their part, behave more and more independently with regard to their party
(Musella 2014a, 2014b).
Among voters, behavioral personalization means that they perceive politics
more and more as a game between competing individuals rather than between
competing teams. It also implies a change in behaviors such as voting, which
tends to follow the evaluations of leaders (centralized personalization) and
candidates (decentralized personalization) and is done less and less according
to party loyalty, identity, and ideology. This kind of personalization is evident
for example when election surveys indicate an increase in the proportion of
respondents who claim that the identity of the party leader or constituency
candidate plays a significant role in their voting decision.
Wrapping up
These types and subtypes of political personalization can be divided even
further. This naturally occurs in studies that focus on specific phenomena. For
example, Hermans and Vergeer (2013) looked at e-campaigning and divided
the types of personalization that they identify along four different dimensions:
professional and personal preferences, home, and family. For our purpose
here, which is to grasp the big picture, we will not go beyond the typology

proposed so far. The logic of the definition and typology we gave leads us, in
the next chapters, to examine the various expressions of personalization
separately and only then to present an integrative look.
We should note that, when looking at political personalization as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, we can expect its different types to enhance each
other as they develop (see “Personalization Breeds more Personalization” in
this chapter). Yet, as we will see in Chapter 9, we may also witness personal-
ization in one realm and not in another. There is even the possibility that
personalization and depersonalization occur at the same time in different
realms. Were this not the case, the value of differentiating between types
and subtypes would be very limited.
The Main Properties of the Definition and the Typology

This section focuses on the main properties of our definition and typology in
order to make the case for their utility, especially for our research here but
also, we believe, in general. We examine their core meaning, explain the
benefits of their broad range, and emphasize that personalization should be
seen as a process.
Core Meaning: The Individual versus the Collective

An alternative to the definition quoted at p. 117 sees personalization not only
as an expression of the decline of the political collective but also as a shift of
focus from topics to persons. Adam and Maier’s (2010: 213) definition, which
regards personalization as a change in the “focus of politics from topics to
people and from parties to politicians,” exemplifies this perspective. It is
possible to view the move from topics to people merely as a viable conse-
quence of political personalization, and not as a phenomenon in its own right.
Yet a specific kind of political personalization—of a different cut from what was
proposed so far—does indeed imply a shift in focus from topics to people. This
kind of personalization is known as “privatization” (Rahat and Sheafer 2007)
or “intimization.” As Stanyer (2013: 15) describes it,
intimization consists of the publicizing of information and imagery
from . . . three domains . . . exposure of information and imagery about
the politician as a person; the public scrutiny of personal relationships
and family life; and the opening up of personal living spaces or spaces a
politician might reasonably expect to be private from the public gaze.3
3
An additional venue of research is “celebrity politics.” This phenomenon may be seen as a
specific form of the personalization of politics. See Street 2012.

Personalization encompasses this possibility of intimization, but this is just
a sub-subtype of media personalization. It can be countered by identifying
political topics with individual politicians. For example, a strong identifica-
tion of radical and extreme right-wing party leaders with anti-immigration
policies may emerge that is not weaker than the party’s identification with the
policy. The Netherlands’ Geert Wilders is probably identified with an anti-
immigration approach even more than his party, the Freedom Party. Here we
will encounter the core meaning of personalization, which is in the relation
between individual and collective.
Broad Definition
The definitions of political personalization that appear in the introduction of
some studies of the phenomenon tend to be rather narrow. They may suffice
for the needs of a specific study; but they cannot serve as broad definitions of
political personalization. Take, for example, the following: “Personalization
is a form of interactivity in which users can personalize their engagement with
the campaign through the Web site” (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009: 24).
This is a narrow definition because it refers only to one subtype of personal-
ization (controlled media), which occurs on a specific platform (website).
Other definitions see personalization as a process of focusing on leaders or
on parties’ top candidates (Schweitzer 2012). While most research does indeed
focus on centralized types of political personalization (Balmas et al. 2014),
there is no reason to exclude the possibility of decentralized personalization—
that is, of the involvement of many (rather than a few) in the process.
A distinct school of thought about centralized personalization is active under
the label of “presidentialization of politics.” Poguntke and Webb (2005b: 1)
defined presidentialization as “a process by which regimes are becoming more
presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal
structure, that is, their regime type.” The authors declare that “all regime-types
can move (to varying degrees) between partified and presidentialized forms of
government” and “the location on the continuum is determined by the shift of
political power resources and autonomy to the benefit of individual leaders and a
concomitant loss of power and autonomy of collective actors like cabinets and
political parties” (ibid., 5, 7).4 From these claims it is clear that presidentializa-
tion is indeed about personalization, specifically of the centralized kind.5
4
For works on presidentialization that preceded Poguntke and Webb’s cross-national study,
see Foley’s (1993) and Mughan’s (2000) works on the United Kingdom.
5
A debate around the use of the term “presidentialization” has developed in the literature
(Dowding 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Foley 2013; Webb and Poguntke 2013; Heffernan 2013). For our
purpose here it is important to note that its participants seem to agree that the phenomenon
identified in this way—whatever label is used—is indeed about the personalization of politics.

Interestingly, Poguntke and Webb treat presidentialization as a broad
phenomenon and posit that it has three facets or “faces.” In other words,
they also see it as multifaceted. Two of these aspects, the executive face and
the party face, fit the institutional personalization category (government and
party level). The third, the “electoral face,” covers controlled and uncon-
trolled media personalization as well as the behavioral personalization of
voters. Thus even a multifaceted approach to presidentialization can be
included in our broad definition of political personalization.
In short, presidentialization may be seen as similar to what we call central-
ized personalization. But it still has a life of its own, because its emphasis is
substantially different: specifically, it aims for the very top—the person who
heads the government. In addition, as Ohr (2011) suggests, presidentialization
may occur when leaders are emphasized over second- and third-rank politi-
cians. In other words, presidentialization may also be about changes in an
already personalized power balance.
Personalization Is a Process
Many studies under the moniker of political personalization ignore the fact
that we are dealing with a process. They do so mainly by examining the
phenomenon at one point in time rather than looking at its development
over time. A diachronic comparison of two or more cases may result in a
claim that the campaigns in polity A are much more personalized than those
in polity B; but such a comparison is not about personalization. As we will
demonstrate in Chapter 7, there are several indicators that can be measured
at different points in time and that can testify to the occurrence of a process
of personalization, of depersonalization, or of no change at all. The only
case in which personalization must be identified (mainly for the lack of any
viable alternative) through examination at a single point in time is that of the
World Wide Web, as will be elaborated in Chapter 8.
Studies of personalized politics can help us in studying personalization. For
example, a comparison between two countries (at one point in time), one with
a highly personalized electoral system and the other with a highly impersonal
electoral system, might find in the former higher levels of personalized media
and personalized behavior than in the latter. From this we may infer, for the
study of personalization, that institutional personalization is likely to breed
media and behavioral personalization. The study of personalization will also
teach us where to expect to find more personalized politics. Thus the two paths
of research can enrich each other. Yet it must be remembered that they differ.
One studies a process, and the other a specific point in time.
The levels at which politics is personalized at a specific point in time can be
expected to vary by country. That is, in one country politics might be highly
personalized to begin with, while in another the starting point might be

highly nonpersonalized. Moreover, levels of personalization may fluctuate,
for example because of the different personalities of the leaders (McAllister
2011). Our interest here, however, is in systematic developments over time,
in a process. Political personalization is a process and not a universal human
state that is uniform at all times, nor is it a static snapshot of a polity. Thus its
identification requires a comparison of at least two points in time and a
specific direction of change between them: if at time t + 1 we see that the
political weight of the individual actor in the political process increased by
comparison to time t, while the centrality of the political group (political
party) declined, then we are witnessing personalization. An opposite process,
of depersonalization, is also possible: if at time t + 1 we determine that the
political weight of the individual actors in the political process declined in
comparison to time t, while the centrality of the political group (political
party) increased, then we are witnessing depersonalization. Of course, there is
also the possibility that no change will be found.
In order to begin our story here and to decide whether a system went
through a process of personalization, we must set a date for the starting
point of our analysis. Following the common claims (see “The Causes of
Personalization” in this chapter) that party decline (or the transformation
from mass to catch-all parties, as the party adaptation school would describe
it) and mediatization (specifically, the spread of television) ignited person-
alization, our story should begin roughly in the 1960s. As Karvonen (2010:
3) puts it, claiming that there is a personalization process “is based on a
comparison with the heyday of the class-based, collective political organ-
ization.” Poguntke and Webb (2005b: 18) also chose 1960 as a starting point
in examining presidentialization; their reasons were “the development of
mass access to TV, the erosion of cleavage politics and the ‘international-
ization’ of decision-making (at least in the case of the European-Community
member states).” Thus, as in the case of party change, the 1960s will be our
starting point, except for those countries in our study that became demo-
cratic later on: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary.
THE CAUSES OF PERSONALIZATION
Existing research examines political personalization and proposes causes for

it. There is scant reference to causes of the opposite trend, depersonalization,
and for a good reason: current developments tend toward enhanced person-
alization. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that such a development
is possible.

Figure 6.2 sketches the general picture that arises from an integrated
examination of the causes of political personalization in the literature. It
presents, first, the three main causes proposed there—mediatization, party
change, and individualization—and adds a category of “others” that contains
factors specifically mentioned for presidentialization. Second, it suggests that
specific types of personalization spawn, or at least encourage, the develop-
ment of others.
The three most common causes of the personalization of politics found in
the literature are as follows. The first is the mediatization of politics, which
consists of changes in the mass media; political communication scholars,
naturally, lead the way in proposing this cause. The second one is party
change—more specifically, decline of the party–society linkage. While many
scholars propose this cause, it has not been examined empirically except in the
case of the United States (see Wattenberg 1991, 1994) and, as already noted,
carrying out such an examination is one of the main goals of this book. A third
cause that gets mentioned, though less frequently, relates to cultural changes
that emphasize the individual over the group, that is, individualization. Scholars
of presidentialization offer some additional causes, which relate specifically to
the powers of the heads of the executive branch.
We will now turn to examine, first, each cause and, second, the proposed
relationships between types and subtypes of political personalization.
Mediatization Party change Individualization Other factors
Political personalization
Institutional Media
Behavioral
F I G U R E 6 . 2 Causes of Personalization

The Mediatization of Politics
Mediatization implies that “the media [are] moving toward the center of the
social process” (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 211). This movement can be
expected to result in institutional and behavioral changes (Donges and Jarren
2014). In the framework of studies in political communication, personalization
is perceived as one of the trends that characterize the mediatization of demo-
cratic politics (Kaid and Strömbäck 2008). Driessens et al. (2010: 322) claim
that personalization “is a manifestation of mediatization.” De Beus (2011)
suggests that the mediatization of politics serves as the basis for Manin’s (1997)
“audience democracy.” He claims that it is the current dominant model of
democracy, which replaced party democracy, and that one of its main prop-
erties is the personalization of politics. McAllister (2007: 584) argues: “While
the causes of the personalization of politics are numerous and complex, it does
appear that international trends in political communications have become so
uniform and pervasive that they dwarf all other explanations.”
Television, the main source of political information in the last decades, is
perceived as the main conduit of personalization (Blondel and Thiébault 2010;
Brettschneider 2008; Curtice and Hunjan 2011; Fabbrini 2013; Kaase 1994;
Plasser and Lengaur 2009; Schütz 2008; van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012).6
Mancini and Swanson (1996: 13) argue that “the format of television favors
personalization for formal and structural reasons. Formally, the medium favors
representation of human figures over complex institutions such as political
parties, while structurally the medium’s commercial logic favours offering access
to all candidates who can pay the cost of advertising, passing over the parties”
(and see also McAllister 2007). The spread of televised debates between political
leaders is an additional example of television’s personalizing influence
(McAllister 2011; Reinemann and Wilke 2007). As Epstein (1980: 240) claims,
while television is suited “to mak[ing] a personality familiar to millions of
voters . . . it is doubtful whether this medium is nearly as well suited to any
other political purpose . . . Certainly, it is not a likely means to convey the
ideological politics of mass-membership organizations.”
At least four reasons can be proposed that might explain television’s focus
on individuals, and especially on political leaders. One is the visual nature of
this medium. In television it is easier to present a living, flesh-and-blood figure
rather than an abstract entity or idea. Leaders serve the mass media as
convenient conduits for a party as well as for an abstract stand (“left,”
“right,” “center”), a role (government, opposition), or an ideology (conserva-
tive, socialist). Second, for viewers, it is easier to identify with a personality
6
In the last decade, television seems to have lost some of its centrality to new media, especially
among young people. Yet, according to the Eurobarometer (2014) survey, it is still the most
widely used medium and the main source of information on national politics.

they see in front of them on the screen, in their own living rooms, be that an
interviewer or a leader. Third, in this context, political parties themselves have
to line up behind their leader rather than under the banner of abstract ideas or
a collective institution. The leader represents the party and is more often than
not the image of the party. Finally, in the voters’ eyes, leaders can be held
accountable in a much clearer and more focused manner than abstract entities
such as parties, cabinets, coalitions, oppositions, and so on.
When the primary medium is personalized, the other media (e.g., newspapers)
are expected to follow suit. Beyond the influence of television, the increased
complexity of politics and increased media competition lead to changes in the
way politics is covered. This change, molded after the American experience, is
also about simplifying and popularizing politics. Personalization—together with
other features, such as negativism (Ohr 2011)—is one of the ways to achieve
these goals (van Santen and van Zoonen 2010).
A new medium that entered the ring some years ago is the World Wide
Web, and especially the social media networks. It is claimed that their rapid
development and diffusion have a bearing on the levels of personalization. As
will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, high levels of centralized personalization
can be found in the social media and are particularly prominent on the
consumption side—that of the citizen surfers. Yet high variance in the levels
of personalization in the new media across parties and countries indicates that
political parties are not doomed to be relegated to the back seat; they, too, can
exploit the properties of this new world.
LaPolombara (2007: 148) attributes great influence to media technological
developments that go beyond television, when he argues that politicians
are now able to reach great numbers of their actual and potential electoral
supporters directly, through the mass media and the Internet, and without
the intervention of traditional party cadres or local party organizations.
Technology, in effect, has served to make personalismo, once considered
the bane of Latin American political systems, the major characteristic of
contemporary electoral politics essentially everywhere.
Following a similar logic, Strøm (2000) suggests that technological develop-

ments that pertain to communication led to an increase in the autonomy of
legislators. His argument is that individual legislators can, and in the United
States did, develop their own networks rather than rely on the parties. These
networks allow them to raise funds, communicate with the voters, have direct
access to the media, and secure their own information.
Party Change
The relationship between party change and political personalization is one of
the main themes of this book, and will be explored in depth in Chapters 10 and
11. Here we will only look at a small sample of the relevant literature.

Wattenberg (1991, 1994), while not using the word personalization but
rather candidate-centered politics, clearly and broadly ties it to party decline.
In the preface to his book on the rise of candidate-centered politics in the
United States, he presents the work as “a sequel” to his volume The Decline of
American Political Parties (Wattenberg 1984): “Like nature, politics abhors a
vacuum, and candidates are the most logical force to take the place of parties
in this respect” (Wattenberg 1991: 2).
Scholars of media personalization (Kriesi 2012; Mancini and Swanson
1996; van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012) and scholars of the personaliza-
tion of voters’ behavior (Lobo 2014; Garzia 2011b, 2014) suggest, both, that,
in addition to the changes in the mass media, the weakening of ties between
voters and parties should be seen as a cause of personalization. A work based
on the cooperation between prominent party and media scholars (Mair,
Muller, and Plasser 2004b) examined parties’ reactions to changes in the
“electoral market” that stemmed from the consequences of the decline in
parties–voters linkage. The reactions that they identified included changes
that imply institutional personalization, such as the opening up of candidate
and leadership selection methods, electoral reforms, and other steps that
empowered party leaders. They also identified changes in campaigning that
emphasized the leader.
Renwick and Pilet’s (2011: 28) claim can be used to link party change and
cultural change as causes of personalization:7
All in all, therefore, we believe that there is good evidence for thinking
that European electoral systems are undergoing a gradual process of
personalization. This trend is grounded in voters’ growing disengagement
from traditional party politics and their desire for more individualized
forms of political expression and representation.
Cultural Change: Individualization

Either within the context of the weakening of the party–society linkage (decline
of ideology and class, rise of the catch-all party and the cartel party) or as a
phenomenon of its own, which has some bearing on the general decline of
collective identities (Putnam 2000), cultural changes are claimed to explain the
personalization of politics (Calise 2011; Garzia 2011b; Holtz-Bacha, Langer,
and Merkle 2014; Lobo and Curtice 2015b). As Karvonen (2010: 4) suggests,
“the personalization of politics may be viewed as part of an overall process of
individualization of social life.” And Bennett (2012: 22) describes it as follows:
“As ideology and formal group identifications (e.g., party, union, church, or
7
In their book, Renwick and Pilet (2016) are less clear about individualization and claim that
reforms that personalize electoral systems are initiated by politicians as a way to tackle the
increase in political alienation.

class) fade as the mechanisms for organizing civic life, individuals increasingly
code their personal politics through personal lifestyle values.”
Blondel and Thiébault (2010: 1–2) present personalization as a result of the
process of modernization that reduced
the weight of the social structure on the population as a whole: with the
spread of education, reactions of citizens were becoming more independ-
ent from the social groups to which they had been attached, especially if
class was viewed as the main “cleavage,” but even where other cleavages,
such as those based on religious or regional appartenance, had a promin-
ent place. Individuals seemed to count rather more, with all their charac-
teristics and not merely with those characteristics binding them to a group
often, perhaps typically, not even their own choosing.
As Caprara (2007) points out, personalization is also about the growing

impact of the voter’s personality in relation to her political behavior and the
decline of collective identities. If we translate these two developments to the
language of political culture, we may reach the view that a more individual-
istic citizen interprets the political world on the basis of individual actors, not
of collective entities. Thus the personalization of democratic politics would
reflect the rise of the postmodern citizen in a postmaterialistic society; and the
entire phenomenon of personalization of politics would be a result of social–
cultural developments that are helped by technological developments (espe-
cially the rise and spread of television, and maybe also the Internet) and by
political developments that are in turn linked to individualization (such as the
change or decline of the voters’ linkage to parties).
Other Factors Specific to Presidentialization

Obviously scholars of presidentialization—a specific type of centralized per-
sonalization, so far as our present discussion is concerned—address develop-
ments that empower the executive branch and, specifically, the person who
heads it and treat them as causes of the phenomenon they study.
First among these developments is the growth of the state. When the state
acquires more and more functions and its administration grows in order to
fulfill them, the leader standing at the top naturally gains more powers. At
such times we witness centralized institutional personalization both in the
government and in nongovernmental institutions. As a result, the head of the
executive and, to a lesser extent, those politicians who are perceived as
competitors for this position become more prominent in the media, controlled
and uncontrolled. They are likely to show greater independence from their
cabinet and party, and, in elections, voters are expected to place their own
evaluation of these candidates’ personal characteristics at the top of the list of
criteria for selection.

Second, even if, owing to economic limitations and changes of ideology, the
growth of the state has been somewhat constrained since the 1970s, an add-
itional phenomenon, globalization, which has grown in importance since the
1990s, contributes to enhancing the executive power worldwide (Lobo 2014;
Pakulski and Körösényi 2012; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Webb and Poguntke
2005). Thus all the dynamics described so far continue even at times when the
state does not grow, or forgoes some of its roles.
Personalization Breeds More Personalization

As Figure 6.2 illustrates, we can conclude from an integrated look at the
literature that one type of political personalization breeds other types. Rahat
and Sheafer (2007) go as far as proposing that personalization is developed in a
specific sequence: institutional personalization breeds media personalization,
and media personalization fosters changes in the behavior of politicians. That
is, the sequence of personalization generally fits the politics–media–politics
model proposed by Wolfsfeld (2004). Poguntke and Webb (2005b) claim that
we should expect the different faces of presidentialization—intraparty, execu-
tive, and electoral, which cover some aspects of the various kinds of personal-
ization suggested here—to influence one another. For the sake of simplicity, we
will look at paired relationships between the types—and also the subtypes—of
personalization.
Institutional Personalization as the Independent Variable

It should not come as a surprise that the personalization of political institu-
tions is supposed to generate other personalizations, since this notion touches
on the core assumption of the institutional approach: institutions influence
people by supplying incentives that encourage some types of behavior and
discourage others (March and Olsen 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Thus
we can expect personalized institutions to encourage personalized behavior,
personalized media presentation and coverage, and even further institutional
reforms, which involve still more institutional personalization.
The claim that institutional personalization breeds media personalization was
made by Rahat and Sheafer (2007), in connection with changes in the coverage
of campaigns by the uncontrolled media in Israel in the early 1980s; and also by
Samuels and Shugart (2010), who probed developments in controlled media
campaigning in France after the change of regime brought by the Fifth Repub-
lic. Yet most of the studies that link institutions to levels of personalization are
synchronic rather than diachronic. For example, some studies claim that differ-
ent institutions in different countries are likely to breed different levels of both
controlled and uncontrolled media personalization (Kriesi 2012; Mancini and

Swanson 1996). Van Aelst et al. (2017) found that in federal countries media
coverage is less personalized. Scholars also expect to find lower levels of media
personalization in parliamentary democracies in which political parties are the
main building blocks than in presidential democracies, with their emphasis on a
single directly elected chief executive (Downey and Stanyer 2010; Kaase 1994;
Kriesi 2012). Livak, Lev-On, and Doron (2011) found that in Israel representa-
tives of parties that adopted inclusive selection methods (personalized institu-
tionalization) had more personal websites (personalized uncontrolled media)
than parties with less inclusive methods.
Institutional personalization, it is claimed, also instills personalization in the
behavior of politicians. André, Depauw, and Shugart (2014: 231–2) suggest
that members of parliament, for instance, are expected to initiate more “par-
ticularized legislation,” to invest more in constituency casework, and to break
party discipline when the institutions provide them with incentives to do so.
They argue: “Electoral institutions, in particular, structure the options avail-
able to voters and thereby strengthen or weaken the incentives for legislators
to cultivate their personal reputations rather than the party’s reputation.”
Also, “when voters have the option to indicate a preference among co-
partisans, the candidate will need to win a personal vote. The candidate will
need to signal to voters some reason based on his or her qualities, qualifica-
tions, and actions to vote for the candidate and not a co-partisan.” André,
Freire, and Papp (2014) find that indeed parliamentarians who are elected
through personalized electoral systems (preferential systems or small districts)
tend to choose patterns of personalized behavior (constituency service and
dissent in parliament) more than their counterparts who are elected through
party-centered electoral systems. Karlsen (2011) argues that the absence of
incentives for political personalization—that is, a personalized electoral sys-
tem and a personalized candidate selection method—explains the lack of
personalization in the attitudes of Norwegian candidates toward online cam-
paigns. In a cross-national comparison of fifteen countries, Dudzińska et al.
(2014) found that the more parties are in control of their candidate selection,
the more they are expected to influence their perceptions as partisan (rather
than personal) delegates.
Following this logic, institutional personalization—the adoption of a more
candidate-centered or personalized electoral system—would also lead to
behavioral personalization on the part of voters. Indeed, studies of the impact
of leaders’ evaluations on voting find that their weight in voting decisions is
influenced by the institutional environment, that is, by whether the regime is
presidential or parliamentary, by the type of electoral system, and by the type
of party organization (Lobo and Curtice 2015c). Van Erkel, Thijssen, and van
Aelst’s (2017: 399) study of voting in the semi-open-list Belgian electoral
system found that “it pays off for candidates to adopt personalized campaign
strategies. Candidates who run personalized campaigns receive on average more

preferential votes than candidates adopting party-centered campaign strat-
egies.” That is, the personalized behavior of politicians brings rewards in
terms of the personalized behavior of voters.
Colomer (2011) outlines two contradictory possibilities concerning the
relationship between the two subtypes of institutional personalization. One
is that adopting inclusive candidate selection methods (personalization of
nongovernmental institutions) may correlate with adopting personalized
electoral systems (personalization of governmental institutions), as they
both reflect the dynamic of a specific political system. The other is that
adopting inclusive candidate selection methods may compensate for a deper-
sonalized electoral system, as it will respond to pressures for personalization.
While the first option suggests that personalization breeds more personaliza-
tion, the second proposes that lack of personalization at one level breeds
personalization at another level, as a way of balancing the system. Finland
may serve as an ideal case for openness in both realms, with its open-list
electoral system and inclusive selection methods (required by law). Israel is an
example of responding to pressures for a personalizing electoral reform that
cannot be fulfilled by adopting party-level personalizing reform, that is, party
primaries (Rahat 2008b). This option falls well under the logic of Shugart’s
(2001) theory on the adoption of mixed-member electoral systems in the sense
that such a reform seemingly balances an extremely partisan electoral system.
Interestingly, Shugart also raises that possibility of the depersonalization of
the electoral system, as will be elaborated below in “The Neglected Possibility
of Depersonalization.”
Media Personalization as the Independent Variable

Changes in the way in which the media cover politics, and also in the ways in
which campaigns are conducted, may affect the behavior of politicians. That
is, media personalization may spawn the personalization of politicians. This
claim is made by Rahat and Sheafer (2007) too, in the Israeli context: change
in media coverage affected the personalized behavior of politicians. These
relationships are also proposed by those who see social media (Web 2.0) as a
personalizing platform: “One risk is that personalized, decentralized, and
unsupervised communications and campaigning might lead to less party
control over the politician. Party discipline—politicians conforming to the
party standpoint—could subsequently become compromised” (Vergeer,
Hermans, and Sams 2011: 481).
Other scholars suggest that media personalization may be expected to
enhance voters’ behavioral personalization. Takens (2013) finds in her ana-
lysis of the 2010 Dutch elections that personalized coverage of leaders
influenced voting behavior, in other words personalized uncontrolled media
triggered the behavioral personalization of voters. However, Hayes (2009),

who examined the United States, claimed that media personalization there
did not produce a change in voter behavior. Thus he rejects the thesis
that the use of television (which encouraged the personalization of the
media) personalized the voters’ behavior. He found no change over time
in general, not even when he checked groups that were expected to be more
prone to the influence of television, such as people with low political
awareness, or TV watchers versus nonwatchers. Rather, an increase in
partisanship in the United States has countered the expected personaliza-
tion trend of the TV era.
Mancini and Swanson (1996: 14) link media personalization, both con-
trolled and uncontrolled, and personalization in politicians’ and voters’
behavior, without being explicit about the causal direction of this relationship:
In thoroughly modernized campaigns . . . the voter’s choice depends
increasingly upon the voter’s relationship with the individual candidate.
This relationship replaces traditional ideological and fiduciary bonds
between voters and the party apparatus. As a result, the party is weakened
as a symbolic aggregation and as an organizing structure. Candidates run
on their own, with personal organizations and personally obtained finan-
cing. At the same time, charismatic figures of leaders built up by the mass
media system replace the symbolic links previously assured by the polit-
ical parties.
We can expect that personalizations of the controlled and uncontrolled media

will influence each other (Mughan 2000). That is, if the way in which politi-
cians present themselves (controlled media) changes, then we should expect a
similar change in the ways in which they are covered (uncontrolled media),
and vice versa. As Langer (2007: 372) suggests, these personalizations “com-
plement and reinforce” each other. She explains:
The phenomenon has a self-reinforcing nature. Leaders, and even their
party colleagues, react to the personalisation of coverage by continuing
to increase their leader-centred communication strategy, because it is
strongly believed that it can boost the party’s chances of electoral success.
The media, for their part, inherently prone to focus on individuals, feel
even more compelled to do so as leaders increasingly come to be perceived
as the overriding centre of power (Langer 2007: 384).
Ohr (2011: 14) suggests that personalization of the uncontrolled media (the
coverage of election campaigns) will cause personalization of the controlled
media: “If personalization and the focus on the top two candidates increas-
ingly characterize the portrayal of politics in the media, party strategies are
under pressure to adapt accordingly and put the party leaders more and
more into the centre of election campaigns.” However, his research on the
United States did not verify this expectation. He argues that this may be
explained by the fact that the dominant frameworks for media coverage

have different emphases (“horse race” and “game”). Such findings lend
support to the idea that personalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that
cannot be summed up into a single dimension, type, or indicator.
We found no study that claims that media personalization leads to institu-
tional personalization. Scholars acknowledge the power of the media to
change behavior, and sometimes they even find this expectation to be correct;
but they do not attribute to it the direct power to change institutions. This fits
in with the notion that the media are not a central but a secondary actor in the
politics of reform (Rahat 2008a).
Behavioral Personalization as the Independent Variable

Renwick and Pilet (2016) suggest that the institutional reforms that person-
alized the electoral system may be seen as a proactive attempt by politicians to
adapt institutions to changing personalized perceptions of politics. That is, in
some cases institutions were adapted so as to reflect changes in the attitudes
and behavior of citizens. We may further suggest that the modern, individu-
alized citizen-consumer is perceived as someone who wants to identify the
person most responsible—for the good, but mainly for the bad. Thus we
should expect electoral institutions (direct elections of the executive, open-
list systems) that serve this perception to be adopted.
Quite surprisingly, we did not find many studies that presented behavioral
personalization as the cause of media personalization. Even if we accept that
the media do not merely reflect or mediate politics, we may still expect them to
be influenced by changes in the behavior of politicians whom they cover
(uncontrolled media) or present (controlled media). This might, however, be
a reflection of seeing media as obviously being there, mediating politics for the
citizens. This seems to be implicit in Wattenberg’s (1994: 125–6) claim regard-
ing the interaction between the personalization of the behavior of politicians
and that of the behavior of citizens:
The public did not decide all of a sudden that parties were bankrupt
political institutions and mandate their decline. Rather, voters reacted
gradually over the last quarter of a century to the way in which politics
was presented to them. Political parties themselves became less institu-
tionally relevant and the public adjusted their views of them accordingly.
As party leaders have come to act more and more on their own
initiative and to communicate with voters directly through the media,
the public has increasingly come to see the crucial short-term domestic
and foreign issues only in terms of the candidates. It is candidates
rather than parties that are now viewed as being responsible for solving,
or failing to solve, our current political problems. Therefore, parties are
receiving much less credit or blame for political outcomes than they did
several decades ago.

Mershon and Shvetsova (2013) demonstrate that personalized legislator
behavior breeds personalized voter behavior. They find that, when there is
an increase in the share of legislators who switch parties, electoral volatility
rises. In other words, voters move with “their” preferred candidates.
The Neglected Possibility of Depersonalization

As is evident, we did not examine the causes of the opposite process, of
depersonalization. The only claim we could find in the literature for some
depersonalization in the last decades is Shugart’s (2001) theory of extreme
electoral systems (Renwick and Pilet 2016). According to Shugart, highly
personalized electoral systems are expected to create pressures for their deper-
sonalization. This is indeed his explanation for the depersonalization of the
electoral systems of Italy and Japan in the 1990s.
Yet the development of democratic politics from the nineteenth century and
up to the 1960s is about political parties becoming central to modern repre-
sentative democracy. If we expect party decline to breed personalization, then,
following the same logic, the boost in the status of the party at those times has
likely bred depersonalization. Thus, if one is looking for depersonalization,
one should seek it in earlier times than the period examined here.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter started with a presentation of the definition and typology of

political personalization used in this book, and with their justification. In so
doing, it laid the conceptual and theoretical basis for the next chapters, where
political personalization will be analyzed from a cross-national perspective. It
continued with an examination of the ways in which the existing literature
explains the causes of personalization and the interactions between its types
and subtypes. This should suffice for the purpose of this introductory chapter.
At the same time, it clearly raises many questions about the relative impact of
the various causes of personalization and about the interactions between types
and subtypes. After presenting the successive analysis of each indicator of
political personalization in Chapters 7 and 8, we will return to these issues in
our integrated analysis in Chapters 9 and 11 and in the theoretical discussion
of Chapter 10.
Indicators of Political Personalization
Our attempt to identify viable indicators of political personalization that would

cover all types and subtypes resulted in a dozen indicators (Table 7.1). Ten will
be presented in this chapter, and the remaining two (numbered 8 and 12 in
Table 7.1) in Chapter 8. Our analysis starts with the institutional personal-
ization of both governmental (the electoral system and executives) and
nongovernmental institutions (political parties). It then turns to indicators
of media personalization of both the uncontrolled (news coverage of polit-
ics) and the controlled subtype (the way the party presents itself). Finally, it
looks at indicators of personalization in the behavior of politicians and of
voters. We explain the logic and significance of each indicator, examine its
advantages and limitations, and present trends over time by country.
Certain indicators that could help our analysis cover more ground were not
included because there were no sufficient data for them or because they
presented other problems. Still, they will be mentioned and their exclusion
will be explained when we deal with the subtype of personalization to which
they belong. It should also be noted that the distinction between centralized
and decentralized political personalization was pushed aside here because our
main goal was to present the broadest possible view of the phenomenon of
political personalization. A nuanced look at this distinction, however, might
be a fruitful path for future research (see Wauters et al. forthcoming).
It may be reasonable to expect to find personalization everywhere, if
indeed this is an inevitable result of universal trends such as the mediatization
of politics, the decline of the party–society linkage, and the individualization
of social life. Yet we know that, while these may be universal trends, they
are far from being identical, or even expressed to the same extent in every
polity. Unlike most work on party change, studies of the phenomenon of
political personalization tend to point to the variance found in its levels across
countries. In his comprehensive study, Karvonen (2010) categorized countries
into four groups (positive cases, mixed-positive cases, mixed-negative cases,
negative cases), on the basis of evidence for the occurrence of political
personalization in them. In more focused studies, van Aelst et al. (2017)
and Kriesi (2012) pointed to cross-national variance in levels of personal-
ized media coverage, while O’Malley (2007) found variance in the
prime minister’s influence (and change in it over time) in twenty-two

T A B L E 7 . 1 Indicators of Political Personalization
Type of political Subtype of Indicator

personalization political
personalization
Institutional Government 1) Electoral system reform

2) Prime-ministerial power
3) Adoption of direct election for top executive posts
Nongovernment 4) Leadership selection reform
5) Candidate selection reform
Media Uncontrolled 6) Uncontrolled media coverage of politics
Controlled 7) Parties’ names: inclusion of leader’s name
8) New media parties vs. politicians, supply
Behavioral Politicians 9) Private member bills submission
10) Change in number of coalition members per
minister
Voters 11) Voters’ personalized behavior
12) New media parties vs. politicians, consumption
parliamentary democracies. Our effort follows these studies by emphasiz-

ing variance.
We employ the same approach here as we did in Chapter 2: all indicators
are standardized in the last column of each table in the form of a calibrated
personalization index. And, like the index for partyness, the index for person-
alization has values in the range 2 to 2. High personalization gets the value
2; moderate personalization gets the value 1; no change or no clear upward
or downward trend gets the value 0; moderate depersonalization gets the
value 1; and high depersonalization gets the value 2.
But, first, a caveat: like the data for party change, the data used for identi-
fying political personalization are far from perfect or ideal. They suffer from
numerous problems and we deal with these here in the same ways that are
detailed in Chapter 2 (“Coping with the Challenges of Measuring Variance in
Party Change”) and in Chapter 3 (“On the Processing of Data”). For all their
faults, the indices that are based on these data, taken together, display general
trends in a valid and reliable manner. Here and in Chapter 8 we look at
personalization per indicator. In Chapter 9 we present an integrative analysis.
INSTITUTIONAL PERSONALIZATION
Institutional personalization is the adoption of rules, mechanisms, and insti-

tutions that put greater emphasis on the individual politician than on political
groups and parties. This may occur in both governmental (e.g., parliament,
Indicators of Political Personalization 139

cabinet) and nongovernmental (e.g., parties) institutions. Here we examine
five indicators, three about change in governmental institutions and two
about change in party organizations. Beyond those, one could also look at
changes in the ways in which campaign finance is collected and distributed
(Fiorelli 2017). Especially useful for our purpose is a comparison between the
amount donated to a party and how much that party controls its finances and
the amount collected by the party leader and how much control that leader
wields over party finances. In this context, the role of individual candidates
and the amounts they raise directly for their own campaigns can also be
useful. A change that will give the party greater control would imply deper-
sonalization, while a change that will give the leader or individual politicians
greater control would imply personalization (centralized in the first case,
decentralized in the second).1 Such data are not available (yet), and this is
unfortunate because an indicator of this kind could combine institutional
personalization at both the governmental and the nongovernmental level.
The Personalization of Governmental Institutions

Among government reforms, the proportion of personalizing and deperson-
alizing reforms is quite small. Reforms of governmental institutions tend to
revolve around a variety of issues, including decentralization, party finance,
structure of parliament, direct democracy, electoral systems. and access to
suffrage (see, for example, Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012; Bedock 2017).
Yet, among this wide range of reforms, one can identify some that enhance
personalization (or, in rare cases, depersonalization).
The personalization of governmental institutions is about reforms and
changes in national, regional, and local institutions. These include changes
in electoral and government systems. We look at reforms of the electoral
system for the lower house, at estimations of the change in the power of prime
ministers over time, and also at the adoption of direct elections for chief
executive posts at national, regional, and local levels of government.
Before turning to these indicators, it is worth mentioning another one,
which is potentially relevant yet has not been included in this analysis.
Admittedly, the most obvious change that involves personalization or deperson-
alization would be a regime or a government system change— the replacement of
a parliamentary regime by a presidential regime (personalization) or the replace-
ment of a presidential regime by a parliamentary regime (depersonalization).
1
For the idea of looking at developments in party finance as indicators of political
personalization, we thank the students of Helene Helboe Pedersen in her graduate seminar in
Aarhus in 2017.

Even the partial adoption of a semi-presidential regime would be considered a
significant change.
But changes in the system of government at the national level are rare.
Samuels and Shugart (2010), who examined eighty-eight countries over more
than sixty years, identified only fifteen significant changes in regime type.
Among those, eight tended toward a more presidentialized regime, while
seven veered in the opposite direction. If we focus on our own research
population, we are left with only two cases: France, which made the change
as early as 1958–62, and Israel, which adopted (1992) and then abolished
(2001) direct elections for the prime minister. We thus end up with a case
that occurred too early and a case of revocation of the half-hearted adoption
of a central component of a presidential regime—namely the direct election
of the chief executive. Having no variance for that indicator, we rather look
at changes in the prime minister’s power and at the adoption of direct
elections for chief executive posts at the national, regional, and local levels
of government.
The lack of regime changes (save for the short-lived reform in Israel) in our
group of democracies, which includes mostly parliamentary regimes, means
that grand-scale institutional personalization is somewhat limited. Initiatives
for the direct election of prime ministers, for example, which was proposed
in some countries (e.g., the Netherlands and Japan), were not adopted. That
is, consolidated parliamentary regimes—which are by nature less personal-
ized than presidential regimes—do survive.2 On the other hand, as we see,
significant institutional personalization does occur within the limits of par-
liamentarism and, at lower levels of government, a significant number of
parliamentary systems transform their local or regional government systems
into more presidentialized and personalized ones.
Another possible indicator of institutional personalization or deperson-
alization is the development of ballot papers over the years. For example,
the addition of the headshots of candidates in the Irish ballot papers around
the turn of this century (Gallagher 2005) could be interpreted as a sign of
personalization. In contrast, the addition of the candidates’ party affiliation
to the ballot in Ireland in 1963, in the United Kingdom in 1969, and in
Canada in 1970 (Crook and Crook 2015; Gallagher 2005; Robertson and
Spano 2008) can be understood as an element of depersonalization. Con-
ducting a cross-national study of the development of ballot papers is
beyond the scope of this study, but we believe the topic to open a fruitful
path for future research.
2
But they no longer represent the type of government system most widespread among
democracies (Samuels and Shugart 2010), which may imply a general trend of personalization
in new democratic regimes.

Electoral System Reform
Existing research delineates electoral systems not only by their levels of
proportionality or according to the majoritarian–proportional representa-
tion (PR) dichotomy, but also according to their being candidate-centered
or party-centered (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014; Carrey and Shugart
1995; Colomer 2011; Shugart 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). At one
extreme we find highly party-centered electoral systems such as the closed-
list PR system that operates in Spain, Portugal, and Israel. In these systems,
citizens vote for predetermined and preordered party lists, and the compos-
ition of parliament—the identity of the MPs who get elected—is decided
solely on the basis of the number of seats that each party wins. At the other
extreme, citizens vote for candidates rather than for parties, as they do for
instance in Ireland, and these votes determine the composition of parlia-
ment. In between these extremes there are various mechanisms that allow
voters to have higher or lower levels of influence. For example, in Switzer-
land and Luxembourg citizens may vote for candidates from several parties,
while in Finland they may only vote for a candidate from one party. There
are also cases of seemingly similar electoral systems, like the open-list
proportional representation systems of the Netherlands and Finland,
which, as a result of the structure of their ballots, are very different in the
de facto influence of the voter. In both these countries the citizens vote for a
single candidate. In the Netherlands, the candidates appear in an order that
is predetermined by the parties; most citizens vote for the candidate who
appears at the top, and by so doing they practically approve the predeter-
mined order. In Finland, the name of the candidate has to be filled in by the
voter; citizens have to deliberate and decide for themselves whom to vote for.
Scholars’ classifications of candidate versus partisan centeredness vary and
give a somewhat different weight to different elements associated with the role
of voters and the ballot structure (compare, for example, Carrey and Shugart
1995 with Renwick and Pilet 2016). For our purpose here, however, it is
sufficient to make a general claim that any electoral reform or change that
enhances voter influence on the personal composition of parliament is con-
sidered institutional personalization. Such personalization may be the result
of replacing a closed-list system with an open-list system, but also (as one
would rather expect) of less profound changes. For example, institutional
personalization occurred when Belgium, which uses a semi-open-list electoral
system, decided to lower the quota of votes needed in order for a candidate to
get personally elected as the party candidate (Karvonen 2010).
Here we will draw on the work of Renwick and Pilet (2016), which supplies
the most updated, comprehensive, and systematic analysis of personalizing
electoral reforms in Europe. As part of a wider project on electoral reform in
Europe since 1945, the two authors developed a detailed typology that iden-
tifies eight dimensions of electoral personalization. These relate to the act of

voting (to what extent, if at all, the voter can express preferences for individual
politicians) and to the way in which votes are translated into (personalized)
seats (to what extent, if at all, voter preferences are translated into the election
of individual politicians). With the help of Renwick and Pilet’s book and by
using additional sources, we updated the analysis of the reforms that occurred
after 2009 and up to 2015. We also added data for the non-European dem-
ocracies on the basis of other academic publications.
Table 7.2 presents personalizing and depersonalizing reforms in our group
of twenty-six countries. It differentiates between cases according to the num-
ber of times in which personalizing or depersonalizing electoral reforms were
adopted since 1960. In order to code the general trend for 1960–2015, we sum
up all the changes. Each incident of electoral reform that enhances personal-
ization is counted as 1 and each incident of electoral reform that reduces
personalization is counted as 1.3
In general, a look at the totals in the bottom row confirms what Renwick
and Pilet (2016) found, namely that there is a trend toward personalization.
Yet the most frequent pattern is one of no change: in thirteen countries no
reforms that pertain to the personal aspect of the electoral systems were
adopted. In three other countries the number of personalizing reforms is
equal to the number of depersonalizing reforms. The trend is toward person-
alization in eight countries; only in two is it toward depersonalization. Hence,
beyond the “total” trend, there is high variance, which—even in our meas-
urement, which ignores the magnitudes of each reform—creates a continuum
between moderate depersonalization (value of 1) and high personalization
(value of 2). Among the countries for which we identified a trend of person-
alization there are third-wave democracies (e.g., the Czech Republic) along-
side second-wave democracies (Greece) and veteran democracies. Still, all
these countries share a common feature: they all use multi-member districts.
This may tell us that in systems that use single-member districts, which have a
built-in emphasis on candidates, there is less pressure for personalizing
reforms.
Prime Ministerial Power

Another type of institutional personalization centers around the role of the
prime minister in parliamentary democracies: “In the institutional setting of
parliamentary democracy, the prime minister can be expected to have become
gradually more prominent at the expense of the rest of the government as well
as the parliament” (Karvonen 2010: 25). This gradual process, according to
3
It is possible to further differentiate between cases by considering the level of change. This is
exactly what Karvonen (2010) did when he used Shugart’s (2001) method. But doing so is beyond
the scope of this study.

T A B L E 7 . 2 Personalization and Depersonalization of the Electoral System
for the Lower House of Parliament, 1960–2015
Country Year of enactment Personalization

index
Personalization Depersonalization
Czech Republic 1992, 1995, 2002, 2006 2000 2*

Belgium 1995, 2003 2
Greece 1981, 1989, 1990 1985 2
Netherlands 1989, 1997 2
Sweden 1997, 2010 2
Austria 1992, 2013 1970 1
Iceland 2000 1
Poland 2001 1
Australia 0
Canada 0
Denmark 0
Finland 0
France 1986 1985 0
Germany 0
Hungary 0
Ireland 0
Israel 1992** 2001** 0
Italy 1993, 2015 1991, 2005 0
Luxembourg 0
Norway 0
Portugal 0
Spain 0
Switzerland 0
UK 0
Japan 1994 1
New Zealand 1993 1
Total 21 9
* While there were four changes toward personalization and one toward depersonalization, which thus
amounts to three, the highest value in our standard index is 2.
** It can be argued that the 1992 reform was first and foremost a government system reform, yet it created a de
facto personalization of the electoral system (Rahat 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2005; Shugart 2001).
Sources: Data are from Renwick and Pilet 2016, except for Japan (on which see Karvonen 2010; Shugart 2001),
New Zealand (Denmark 2001), Israel (Rahat and Hazan 2005), Australia and Canada.
O’Malley (2007), consists of an increase in the prime minister’s freedom to

choose, move, and remove his cabinet members and power to call early
elections, to set and restrict the cabinet agenda, to control the parliament
agenda, and to promote and enact his preferred policies. Poguntke and
Webb’s (2005b) “executive face” of presidentialism, too, focuses on the
power of the prime minister and examines developments over the years that
indicate an increase in his power vis-à-vis the power of his cabinet. These
developments have formal and procedural as well as informal aspects.

Table 7.3 presents data concerning (1) changes in the prime minister’s
influence over the years (second column) and (2) estimations of changes in
the levels of presidentialization in each country (third column). The second
column represents our calibration for Karvonen’s (2010) calculations, based
on O’Malley’s (2007) work, of the differences in experts’ estimations of the
influence of prime ministers, between the earliest and the latest points in time.
The time gap is about two decades, from the early 1980s to the years imme-
diately after 2000. This is probably the most systematic and reliable analysis
available, though it has its faults, especially its relatively short time span. Of
the twenty-one countries for which we have these data, in twelve we see an
increase in the influence of the prime minister, in three no change, and in six a
decrease. Thus the general trend points to personalization, but there is evi-
dently cross-national variance.
The values of the personalization indicator in the third column are based,
first, on Webb and Poguntke’s (2005) estimations on presidentialization in
T A B L E 7 . 3 Prime-Ministerial Power and Presidentialization*
Country Change in the power Presidentialization Personalization

of the prime minister index
Germany 2 2 2
Iceland 2 2
Luxembourg 2 2
New Zealand 2 2
Poland 2 2
Belgium 2 1 1.5
Denmark 2 1 1.5
Australia 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1 1
Finland 1 1 1
Ireland 1 1
Italy 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1
UK 1 1 1
Portugal 0 1 .5
Austria 0 0
Canada 0 0 0
France 0 0
Hungary 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 0
Israel 1 0 .5
Norway 2 1 .5
Greece 2 0 1
Japan 1 1
Spain 2 0 1
* For details on calculations and sources, see Appendix 13.


thirteen countries, and these are based, in turn, on accounts from country
experts (Poguntke and Webb 2005a). For these countries, we also looked at
Karvonen’s (2010) critical review of the estimations. Second, for six other
countries we added our own estimations, which are based on accounts from
numerous country experts (for details, see Appendix 13). Presidentialization
is seen by its prominent scholars, Poguntke and Webb (2005a, 2005b), as
mainly a personalization of the prime ministership and of party leadership in
the large parties. Two of the “faces” of presidentialization, the party facet
and the executive facet, can be interpreted as expressions of institutional
personalization at the party and state levels. The electoral facet is about
personalization in the controlled media. Thus, as in O’Malley’s index, pre-
sidentialization is not only about pure institutional changes but should be
rather seen as expressing changes in the institution. These data cover more
time (the declared starting point is in the 1960s, or later in the case of
younger democracies), yet they are based on a much less systematic evalu-
ation by comparison to O’Malley’s data.
According to the analysis of presidentialization (third column), eleven of
the examined countries were moderately becoming more presidentialized and
two were becoming strongly presidentialized. An additional six displayed no
change. There is no single case that can be described as depresidentialization.
When comparing the evaluations of change in the prime minister’s power to
the presidentialization trend, out of the fifteen countries where we have data
for both, seven are similar, in four the gap is 1, in three the gap is 2, and in one
(Norway) the gap is 3. The evident closeness in most of the cases could be
expected, but the differences should not be seen as a problem if we remember
the different time periods that these two measurements cover and their differ-
ent emphasis. In any case, in order to optimize the estimations on the basis of
the available data, we averaged them (fourth column). In the cases for which
we had data only on the change in the prime minister’s power or on pre-
sidentialization, we had to use the single estimation also as a general one.
The majority of the values of the combined personalization index for prime
ministerial power reflect personalization. In fifteen of the twenty-five cases the
values are positive. In another five we end up with no trend, while five more
are about depersonalization. While cases of high personalization are identi-
fied, on the side of depersonalization we deal with only a few moderate trends.
Once again, the general personalization trend is clear, but beyond it there is
indisputable variance in the magnitude of the change and a noteworthy
number of cases of no trend and depersonalization.
Direct Elections for Chief Executive Posts

One of the more straightforward indicators of personalization in governmen-
tal institutions is the adoption of direct elections of chief executives. This may

happen at the national (e.g., direct elections of the president in Finland in
1994), regional (direct elections of Italy’s regional presidents in 1995), or local
(direct election of mayors in parts of Austria in 1994) levels. Such reforms may
be a response to citizen disengagement from local and regional party politics,
or may reflect an assumption among political elites that citizens want more
personalized politics and accountability at these levels of government
(Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012).
Table 7.4 presents data about the adoption and abolition of direct elections
for chief executive posts. These are not necessarily reforms of the same
magnitude. For example, adopting direct elections for mayors and presidents
of regions as a national rule, as happened in Italy, is different from allowing
direct elections for mayors after the adoption of specific, local procedures, as
happens in the United Kingdom. Therefore our ordinal scale differentiates
between these cases and allots them different values. The second column
presents a collection of data on such reforms taken mainly from Bedock,
Mair, and Wilson (2012), while the third and fourth columns add Scarrow’s
(2003) data. The years covered are 1970–2010. The final estimation in the last
column reflects a roughly adjusted calibration of the two sources of data. In
the cases for which we had data only from one source, we used the single
estimation also as a general one.
Evidently, there is no incidence of depersonalization, and only one inci-
dence of abolition of a personalizing reform. The latter is the only case where
direct elections for the prime minister were adopted (Israel); direct elections
everywhere else seem to be irreversible. Yet in half of the cases (thirteen out of
twenty-six) we found no change. The changes we did find can be classified
into moderate personalization (a group of seven) and high personalization
(a group of six). Thus we have variance, but of a type that does not include
depersonalization but rather ranges from no change to high personalization.
This pattern is interestingly similar to patterns that were found in reforms
concerning leadership selection. We identified a clear, though moderate trend
of opening the selection beyond party delegates (what we see as personaliza-
tion), and hardly no case of a reverse trend (Pilet and Cross 2014a; also, see
“The Personalization of Nongovernmental Institutions: Leadership and Can-
didate Selection” in this chapter). This seems to imply that, while promoting
personalizing institutional reforms is not an easy task, once they are adopted
it is no less hard to get rid of them (especially those of the centralized kind).
The Personalization of Nongovernmental Institutions:

Leadership and Candidate Selection
Lobo (2014) presents Michels’s century-old “iron law of oligarchy” (first
developed in 1911) as evidence that the notion of personalization is not new.
T A B L E 7 . 4 The Adoption of Direct Elections for National, Regional,

and Local Chief Executives
Country Nature of reform (year of enactment) Scarrow (2003: 48) Personalization

1970 vs. 2001* index
Directly Directly
elected elected
head of mayors**
state
Germany Increase in the number of directly elected 0:0 1:4 2

mayors especially after 1990
Greece Direct election of mayors (1990; 2006); 2
Direct election of regional governors
(1994)
Hungary Direct election of mayors (1994) 2
Israel Direct election of mayors (1975); Direct 2
election of the PM (1992–2001)
Italy Direct election of mayors (1993); Direct 0:0 0:4 2
election of regional presidents (1995;
1999; 2001)
Poland Direct election of mayors (2002) 2
Austria Direct election of mayors in 6/9 Länder 4:4 0:2 1
(1994)
Belgium Introduction of semi-directly elected 0:0 0:0 1
mayors in Wallonia (2006)
Czech Direct election of the president (2012) 1
Republic
Finland Direct election of the president (1994) 2:4 0:0 1
France Direct election in regions (2004) 4:4 0:0 1
New Zealand 0:0 3:4 1
UK Direct election of the mayor of London, 0:0 0:1 1
possibility of direct elections in other
cities as well (2000)
Australia 0:0 2:2 0
Canada 0:0 3:3 0
Denmark 0:0 0:0 0
Iceland 0
Ireland*** Direct election of mayors—optional, 4:4 0:4 0
not yet implemented (2010)
Japan 0:0 4:4 0
Luxembourg 0
Netherlands 0:0 0:0 0
Norway 0:0 0:0 0
Portugal 0
Spain 0
Sweden 0:0 0:0 0
Switzerland 0:0 0:0 0
* Scarrow (2003: 48) has given the following key for her values: 0 never; 1 seldom; 2 sometimes; 3 usually;
4 always.
** “Larger cities only, if small municipalities differ” (Scarrow 2003: 48).
*** For Ireland, both Scarrow (2003) and Bedock, Mair, and Wilson (2012) relate to a reform that was in the pipeline
for a long time but was not implemented yet and thus we end up allotting it 0. A referendum on directly elected mayors
is scheduled to be held in October 2018.
Sources: Bedock 2017; Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012; Hejtmánek and Pink 2014; Rahat 2008a; Scarrow 2003;
Schaap, Daemen, and Ringeling 2009; Swianiewicz 2014.

She also points out that the literature that deals with change in party
organization over time implies a change in power relationships within parties
that gives more dominance to party leaders. These claims suggest that
personalization can be expected to occur in any institution over time
(Michels 1962) or that personalization developed over time, as a result of
changes in party organization, with the replacement of mass parties with
catch-all and cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995). At the same time, Michels’s
claim is about power concentration in the hands of small groups, not of
specific individuals. As Musella (2015: 241) puts it, personalization leads “to
the prevalence of monocratic power over oligarchies.” Furthermore, Michels
deals with the oligarchy’s complete takeover of the mass party, with its
developed extra-parliamentary organization; and this scenario does not
seem to hold for the party models that developed since the 1960s, the
leader-biased models of the catch-all, electoral, cartel, and business-firm
parties. As for party change, the more recent phenomenon of cartelization
(Katz and Mair 1995) may indeed imply personalization; but it may also be
seen as sustaining the party in a changing political and social environment.
Mair, Müller, and Plasser (2004a: 265) conclude their collection of case studies
by arguing that a common response of parties to changes in the electoral
markets is that “the parties become their leaders.” Here we focus on identifying
and developing sharper systematic indicators of personalization within parties
(or the lack thereof—or even indicators of depersonalization).
There are assorted ways to identify personalization within parties. For
example, one can compare the types of authority given to the party leader
in the past and now, or the resources (finance and staff) under her control
then and now (Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Koskimaa 2016). Two expressions
of party personalization are the presidentialization of existing parties—that
is, traditional parties that become presidentialized (Samuels 2002; Webb,
Poguntke, and Kolodny 2012)—and the appearance of new parties that are
established around a personality (Blondel and Thiébault 2010; Hloušek 2015).
Another possible sign is the rise in the creation of personalized intraparty
factions (Musella 2014a). The lack of a clear, systematic, and practical
operationalization of these potential indicators, however, prevents us from
using them here.4 More recently, Schumacher and Giger (2017) created a
database that includes information on party leadership domination over time.
Unfortunately, in our judgment, the data are good enough to conduct party-
level analysis but are not suited to our purpose here. We were able to find
4
Blondel and Thiébault (2010) dedicate a chapter of their book to proposals for ways to study
the personalization of party leadership. Their proposals seem to better fit single case studies and
small n comparisons. Were we to apply them, that would require an investment that exceeds the
scope of our study, which tries to map the broad picture in terms of indicators, dimensions of
personalization, and number of countries.

enough reliable data on the development of two main elements in party
organization over time: leadership and candidate selection.5
Even though intraparty selection is almost always about the selection
of individuals (not of teams of individuals or factions), different types of
selection methods may be seen as being more personalized or more
partisan. Atmor, Hazan, and Rahat (2011) look at four properties of selec-
tion methods and suggest that methods that employ inclusive candidacy rules
and selectorates, decentralize selection, and use voting systems (especially
majoritarian ones) should be seen as personalized. In contrast, there are
methods that enable a party to retain control of the selection process. They
employ exclusive candidacy rules and selectorates, centralized selection, and
appointment rather than voting. Thus any change in these dimensions may
be seen as a personalization or depersonalization of the selection method.
Here we will focus on the selectorate, the most important dimension and also
the one for which we were able to find data in order to identify a trend.
Putting aside the case of selection by a single party leader, the claim is that
adopting a more inclusive selectorate implies personalization. In that case,
candidate and leadership selection are transformed, from an intraparty elitist
affair decided behind closed doors into a public contest in which candidates
explicitly compete with their fellow partisans through personal campaigns
(Bobba and De Luca 2015). Moreover, the use of inclusive selectorates (party
members, supporters, or voters) increases the autonomy of those who are
selected by granting them a broader source of legitimacy. Selected leaders
become more independent of middle-level party elites (Poguntke and Webb
2005b) and their principal, the atomistic crowd of party members, gives them
wider space for maneuver (Katz 2001). In the case of candidate selection,
selection through nominating committees (the party elite or its representa-
tives) is about producing a balanced team of candidates through deliberation.
Selection by party agency and party members means that the aggregation of
individual votes decides the composition of the list. The relatively small size of
selected party agencies, as well as the deep involvement of their members in
intraparty politics, enables selection coordination for the sake of producing a
somewhat balanced candidate team. Selection by the less informed, less
committed, unstable, and atomistic crowd of party members (and of party
voters, who are even more uninformed, uncommitted, unstable, and atomis-
tic) transforms the process into an increasingly personal matter (Rahat and
Sheafer 2007).
Moreover, as Cross et al. (2016) claim, recruitment campaigns, which are a
central component of many primary contests, are highly personalized. Party
5
These were used for the study of political personalization by Rahat and Sheafer (2007) and by
Passarelli (2015).

members are often enrolled and mobilized to support a specific individual
candidate, and in many cases do not renew their membership after the contest
ends. Membership comes to reflect on the candidates more than on the party.
In addition, the ability to compete in a massive internal election requires a
capable campaign organization, focused on an individual’s success. If the
candidate is successful, this close inner circle may become an integral compo-
nent of the party’s machinery, taking on key responsibilities and leadership
roles while it has a primary commitment not necessarily to the party but to the
elected leader. Another personalizing influence concerns finance. Public party
finance and its regulations usually give political parties power and control
vis-à-vis individual politicians, who are dependent on them for funding their
electoral campaigns in general elections. But, when it comes to intraparty
selection, the candidate is on her own. The more inclusive the selectorate, the
more money is needed and the more the candidate raises her own funds, builds
her own campaign, and organizes her own team of campaign professionals.
While selection by a party leader—which operates for legislative candidates
or for the position of the next party leader—is the most exclusive type of
selection, it is also the most personal one. In many of these cases the party is
the leader, and that leader is the one that makes all the important decisions.
Even in cases where the leader shares some power with his fellow partisans, his
being the selectorate is a clear sign of his dominant role in the intraparty
power structure.
Indeed, Musella (2015) presents the adoption of the most inclusive and
exclusive candidate selection by the leader and by party members or voters
as two strategies that allow the leader to control the process and to protect
herself from party activists. When one looks at trends in the development of
selectorates in Israeli parties over the past two decades, a phenomenon
becomes evident that is strange from the exclusive–inclusive perspective:
some parties get highly democratized and adopt the inclusive selectorate
of party members, while others adopt the most exclusive one, that of the
party leader. From the personalization perspective, however, these are not
two extremes but rather two highly personalized versions of selection
(Rahat 2011).6
Thus changes in the types of selectorates that choose party leadership and
party candidates for public positions can be seen as changes at the level of the
personalization of selection methods. We can identify six main types of
selectorates in the case of leadership selection (Figure 7.1), from the most
personalized to the most depersonalized. Five of these (save for the the
parliamentary party group [PPG]) are also relevant for candidate selection
6
Balmas et al. (2014) see the opening of candidate selection as a sign of decentralized
personalization and selection by the leader as a sign of centralized personalization.

Most Depersonalized Most Personalized
(Parliamentary
Party elite Party delegates Party members Voters Leader
party group)
F I G U R E 7 . 1 Selectorates: From the Most Personalized to the Most Depersonalized
(Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2015). As explained above, putting aside the most
exclusive selectorate of party leader, we can treat any reform that involves
replacing or adding an inclusive selectorate as institutional personalization.
As noted, the most exclusive selectorate, that of a single leader, is also the
most personalized one. We find this type especially in new populist and radical
right-wing parties. Interestingly, green parties, the other successful breed of
new parties, tend to adopt personalized methods from the opposite, inclusive
type. Both, however, injected personalized selection methods into the existing
party systems.
Table 7.5 presents changes in the selectorates of party leaders from 1975 to
2015 in twenty-one countries, comparing the leadership selection methods of
1975 to those of 2015 in the main parties for which data could be gathered.
A value of 2, indicating an extensive opening of leadership selectorates, was
given to countries in which at least two parties went through democratization
in a method of leadership selection.7 A value of 1 was given to countries in
which only one party opened its method of leadership selection. We gave
positive values also in the cases where we compared different parties at the
two points in time. For instance, in Italy none of the parties of 2015 had
existed four decades earlier. Still, we gave Italy the value 2 because the parties
of 1975 used a relatively exclusive selection method, while two of the main
parties of 2015 used inclusive selection methods.
As can be expected if one follows the literature (Cross et al. 2016; Cross and
Blais 2012; Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2015; Lisi, Freire, and Barbera, 2015;
Pilet and Cross 2014a), there are no cases of depersonalization, and the
overall trend is personalization. All cases are in the range of no change (5),
moderate personalization (7) and high personalization (9). A trend is clear,
and in this case about three quarters of cases exhibit a change.
Table 7.6 faces the more difficult challenge of identifying trends in candi-
date selection methods. To reach our verdicts, we explored as many sources as
7
In three countries (Israel, Italy, and Netherlands) we also identified the rise and success of
several leadership parties—that is, new parties established around the personality of their
founders. These occurrences signal a trend of personalization according to our definition. In
any case, all three countries would have received the value of 2 even without including these cases.
T A B L E 7 . 5 Personalization of Leadership Selection, 1975–2015*
Country 1975 2015 Personalization

index**
Belgium delegates: BSP-PSB, CVP, PVV-PLP, PRL members: N-VA, PS, CD&V, Open VLD, MR, SP.A 2
Canada delegates: Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, NDP members: NDP, BQ, Conservatives; supporters: Liberals 2

France delegates: Socialists, National Front members: Socialists, UMP, National Front 2
Ireland PPG: Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, Labour mixed: Fine Gael, Fianna Fail; members: Labour 2
Israel delegates: Labor, Herut, NRP members: Labor, Likud, Jewish Home; leader: Yesh Atid, Shas, Yisrael Beytenu 2
Italy council/delegates: DC, PSI, PCI, MSI voters/members: Democrats; members: LN; leader: FI, M5S 2
Netherlands delegates: PvdA, VVD; PPG: CDA; missing: SP, D66 members: VVD, PvdA, CDA, D66; delegates: SP; leader: PVV 2
Portugal council/delegates: PSD, Socialists, CDS, members: PSD, Socialists; council/delegates: CDS 2
Communists;
UK PPG: Conservatives, Labour, Liberals supporters: Labour; mixed: Conservatives; members: Liberal Democrats 2
Australia PPG: ALP, Liberals, National PPG: Liberals, Nationals, Greens; mixed: ALP 1
Denmark delegates: Venstre, Social Democrats, Socialist delegates: Venstre, People’s Party, Social Democrats; PPG: RV; members: Socialist 1
People’s Party; PPG: RV People’s Party
Greece delegates: PASOK, ND members/supporters: ND, PASOK; delegates: SYRIIZA 1
Iceland delegates: Independence, Progressive, Social delegates: Independence, Progressive, Left-Green; members: SDA 1
Democrats
Japan mixed PPG domination: LDP; council: JCP mixed: LDP, DPJ; council/delegates: JCP, Komeito 1
New Zealand PPG: Labour, Nationals PPG: Nationals, NZ First; mixed: Labour; delegates: Greens 1
Spain council/delegates: PSOE, PP (in 1977) council/delegates: PP, IU; members: PSOE 1
Austria delegates: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ delegates: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Greens 0
Finland delegates: KOK, Social Democrats, Centre, SFP, delegates: KOK, Social Democrats, Finns Party, Left Alliance, Green League, 0
Christian Democrats SFP, Christian Democrats; unbinding primaries: Centre
Germany delegates: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP delegates: SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP 0
Norway delegates: Labour, Hoyre, Progress, KRF, SV, Centre delegates: Labour, Hoyre, Progress, KRF, SV, Centre 0
Sweden delegates: Social Democrats, Moderates, Centre, delegates: Social Democrats, Moderates, Swedish Democrats, Centre, Left, 0
Left, Liberals, Christian Democrats Liberals, Christian Democrats
* For party abbreviations, see Appendix 14.

** Key:
2: high depersonalization
1: moderate depersonalization
0: no change
1: moderate personalization
2: high personalization.
Sources: Barbera, Lisi, and Teruel 2015; Cross et al. 2016; Cross and Blais 2012; De Luca and Venturino 2015; Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015; Kenig, Rahat, and Tuttnauer 2015; Narita, Nakai, and
Kubo 2015; Pilet and Cross 2014b; Sandri and Seddone 2015; Wauters, Rahat, and Kenig 2015. In cases where there were no academic sources we also examined Internet sources.

T A B L E 7 . 6 Personalization of Candidate Selection
Country Personalization index
Denmark 2
Finland 2
Iceland 2
Ireland 2
Israel 2
Italy 2
Australia 1
Austria 1
Czech Republic 1
Germany 1
Netherlands 1
New Zealand 1
Portugal 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
UK 1
Belgium 0
Canada 0
France 0
Japan 0
Norway 0
Switzerland 0
Key:
2: high depersonalization
1: moderate depersonalization
0: no change
1: moderate personalization
2: high personalization.
Sources: Allern, Heidar, and Karlsen 2016; Atmor 2011; Bergman and Bolin 2011;
Bille 2001; Caul-Kittilson and Scarrow 2003; Cross and Gauja 2014; Detterbeck
2016; Freire and Teixeira 2011; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat
2010; Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015; Karvonen 2014; Miller 2010; Musella
2015; Ramiro 2016; Reidy 2011; Sandri and Seddone 2015; Scarrow, Webb, and
Farrell 2000; Simms 2010; Smith and Tsutsumi 2016; Williams and Paun 2011.
possible. We probed works that estimated changes along periods that started
from 1960 to 1989 (Bille 2001) and from 1960 to 2000 (Scarrow, Webb, and
Farrell 2000; Caul-Kittilson and Scarrow 2003). We also consulted and crossed
sources that mainly presented information on candidate selection at specific
points in time, such as the collection of Gallagher and Marsh (1988), Hazan and
Rahat (2010), Atmor (2011), Musella’s (2015) data, and several country studies.
As is evident, we did not find cases of depersonalization. Of the twenty-two
countries on which we were able to gather data, six presented no change.
These were not only cases of stability, such as Norway, but also cases such as
Belgium, where selection methods changed in the 1960s–1980s and became less
personalized, yet more recently they were somewhat reopened. Moderate

personalization was identified in ten countries, and high personalization in six.
As with leadership selection, the trend is one of personalization and the vari-
ance ranges from no change to high personalization. Similarly, no single case of
depersonalization was identified.8
MEDIA PERSONALIZATION
Media personalization is about developments in the ways in which the mass

media depict politicians (uncontrolled media) and in the way in which polit-
ical actors present themselves in the media (controlled media). The core
distinction is about control. A partisan media outlet, be it a newspaper, a
radio station, a TV station, or a website, is about controlled media. Paid
campaign advertisements and propaganda of all types also fall within this
category. In contrast, nonpartisan and private entities are seen as uncon-
trolled media outlets. Sometimes the boundaries between the two are
blurred, for example in the case of a nonpartisan newspaper that uncritically
supports a specific party. Yet in most cases the distinction is still quite clear
and useful.
Uncontrolled Media
When the uncontrolled media (newspapers, radio, television, news websites,
political blogs) relate to politics, they may cover it as a story whose heroes are
individuals or political groups (parties, parliamentary groups, cabinets). If,
over time, the mass media focus more and more on individuals and less and
less on groups, then we witness personalization in the uncontrolled media. In
their summary for the concluding chapter of The Handbook of Election News
Coverage Around the World, Kaid and Strömbäck (2008: 430) assert that there
are “signs that . . . personalized news coverage [has] become more common.”
This cautious claim reflects the lack of clear findings regarding uncontrolled
media personalization. Indeed, it reflects the overall mixed picture that arises
from studies of uncontrolled media personalization.
In order to identify personalization in the uncontrolled media, scholars
conduct content analysis. When addressing the general question of the occur-
rence of personalization, they calculate the share of news that focuses on
individuals (usually the party leader) vis-à-vis the share of news that focuses
on the group (usually a party) and assess whether there is change over time.
8
Depersonalization of candidate selection does occur, from time to time, at the party level. It is
not as rare as depersonalization of leadership selection.

This is done in various ways. Some studies examine the proportion of articles
that mention or focus on politicians in specific positions—such as the prime
minister (Mughan 2000) or candidates for chancellorship (Ohr 2011)—or on
individual politicians (Kriesi 2012); others dichotomize between these types
(Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000); and still others add a third
category, of mixed coverage of both party and individual politicians, within
the same unit of analysis (Rahat and Sheafer 2007). Kaase (1994) looked
beyond leaders and parties, and also codified media mentions of other polit-
ical institutions and actors. Other studies are more focused, for example on
examining whether cabinets are called in the media after the ruling party (e.g.
the Tory government), the country (e.g. the British government), or rather the
prime minister (e.g. Cameron’s government) (Balmas et al. 2014).
Studies also differed in the time spans they covered. Some dealt with
electoral campaign coverage in some countries (Kriesi 2012) or in a single
country (Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Reinemann and Wilke 2007). Others
looked at nonelection periods. For example, Langer (2007) examined the
coverage of British prime ministers by The Times during the 1945–99 period,
in nonelection intervals. Udris and Lucht (2014) analyzed personalization in
news coverage in five countries, as it presented itself in a mid-market paper
(i.e., a newspaper that ranges between a quality newspaper and a tabloid) at
three points in time (1960, 1980, 2005). Most studies analyze newspapers,
which are ostensibly more accessible, though some analyze TV programs. Van
Santen and van Zoonen (2010), for example, examined twenty-three televised
portraits of politicians in the Netherlands in the period 1960–2006. Finally,
studies differ in terms of what they look for: some look at specific types of
personalization, such as intimization (Stanyer 2013), while others explore
personalization in the broad sense of referrals to individual politicians rather
than to their parties (Rahat and Sheafer 2007).
The research literature on the personalization of the uncontrolled media
does not supply us with ready-made, comfortable data for a cross-national
comparative analysis. In fact, studies sometimes yield contradictory results
about the same cases in similar time frames (Van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer
2012). We cannot resolve these differences here, so we will treat all studies as
equal and grant them equal weight in our overall calibrations.
The studies mentioned so far and many others, with their various
approaches and emphases, were collected and used in order for us to reach
a final verdict on the levels of uncontrolled media personalization in our
group of democracies. Table 7.7 presents the best estimations we came up
with and the sources on which these estimations are based. As is evident,
we found studies on only fifteen of our twenty-six countries. Moreover,
for some countries there is a single study, while for the United Kingdom,
for example, we found no less than eleven studies. A trend of depersonal-
ization in news coverage was not identified in any country. In two countries

T A B L E 7 . 7 Personalization in Uncontrolled Media Coverage of Politics
Country Sources Personalization

index
Israel Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Balmas et al. 2014 2

Italy Umbricht and Esser 2016; Stanyer 2013 2
Japan Krauss and Nyblade 2005 2
Australia Stanyer 2013 1
Austria Udris and Lucht 2014; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 1
2000; Kriesi 2012
Denmark Zeh and Hopmann 2013 1
France Udris and Lucht 2014; Umbricht and Esser 2016; Dalton, 1
McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000; Kriesi 2012;
Stanyer 2013
Germany Esser and Hemmer 2008; Kriesi 2012; Ohr 2011; Reinemann 1
and Wilke 2007; Stanyer 2013; Udris and Lucht 2014;
Umbricht and Esser 2016; Zeh and Hopmann 2013
Netherlands Aizenberg et al. 2015; Boumans, Boomgaarden, and 1
Vliegenthart 2013; Kriesi 2012; Takens 2013; Van Santen
and Van Zoonen 2010; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, and
Boumans 2011
Spain Stanyer 2013 1
Sweden Karvonen 2010; Johansson 2008 (from Karvonen 2010); Ohr 1
2011
Switzerland Kriesi 2012; Udris and Lucht 2014; Umbricht and Esser 2016; 1
Udris, Lucht, and Schneider 2015
UK Boumans, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2013; Crewe and 1
King 1994; Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000;
Karvonen 2010 (update of Langer 2007); Kavanagh 1992;
Kriesi 2012; Mughan 2000; Stanyer 2013; Udris and Lucht
2014; Umbricht and Esser 2016; Vliegenthart,
Boomgaarden, and Boumans 2011.
Belgium Van Aalst and Van Mierlo 2003 (from Karvonen 2010) 0
Canada Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000 0
no clear personalization trend was identified, and only in three—Israel,

Italy, and Japan—was the trend clear-cut enough for us to allot the value
that expresses high personalization. In the remaining ten cases a moderate
trend was identified.
The very adoption of televised debates between party leaders is a clear sign
of media personalization. Scholars of German politics even argue that it
ignites personalization in media coverage (Reinemann and Wilke 2007).
But, while the adoption of debates may be a sign of personalization, most
countries have already experienced leaders’ debates, and we lack a solid
framework for a cross-national comparison that will identify variance in
televised debates. Another way of analyzing personalization in the uncon-
trolled media (and in the controlled media too, namely in opinion polls invited

by political parties, if such material can be accessible) is to examine changes in
the questions that were asked in opinion polls. The addition of questions on
the influence of party leaders and individual politicians on voting decisions
can in itself be seen as a sign of personalization; changes in how these results
are presented in the media, both controlled and uncontrolled, can be seen as
signs of personalization if the support for individuals is becoming more
prominent in media coverage and in media’s use of polls and as signs of
depersonalization if the support for individuals is becoming less prominent
in media coverage and in media’s use of polls over the years.9 Unfortunately,
here we have to be satisfied with a single indicator of media uncontrolled
personalization, one that is based on the good work of many scholars, yet
suffers from all the problems that were spelled above.
Controlled Media
Personalization in the controlled media occurs when, increasingly, messages
that are sent by political actors originate from and focus on individual actors
rather than political groupings. Political campaigns, particularly electoral
ones, represent the most typical realm of controlled media. The campaigners
may decide to focus on the party or on individual politicians (most probably
the party leader in national campaigns, but sometimes other politicians too).
If, over time, a campaign’s focus on parties drops and that on individual
politicians rises, then we identify personalization in the controlled media.
Karvonen (2010), for example, looked at the proportion of party and candi-
date advertisements in a Finnish newspaper over the years and used the
decrease in party advertisements since 1962 and the increase in individual
advertisements as evidence that supports the personalization thesis.
In our first attempt to operationalize controlled media personalization, we
tried to do the same thing we did in the case of uncontrolled media: to collate
as many studies as possible on our group of countries. We were able to find
many studies of trends in campaigning over the years. The problem was that
they all pointed in the same direction of personalization but lacked any
commonalities that would enable us to differentiate between high and mod-
erate levels (Balmas et al. 2014; Butler and Ranney 1992b; Charlot and
Charlot 1992; Curtis 1992; Esaiasson 1992; Gundle 1992; Karvonen 2010;
Kavanagh 1992; Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Vliegenthart 2015). The editors
of a collection from 1992 (Butler and Ranney 1992a: 280) summarized the
situation: “In most countries, including the parliamentary democracies, the
national campaigns of most parties have more and more focused on party
9
For the idea of using questions in opinion polls as indicators of political personalization, we
thank the students of Helene Helboe Pedersen in her graduate seminar in Aarhus in 2017.

leaders’ statements and personal qualities, diminishing the attention paid to
lesser leaders and to parties as collectivities.” It is interesting that we could
find variance in the coverage of campaigns, but not in their management.
This may support the supposition that personalization (and maybe also
Americanization) developed faster in controlled media than in uncontrolled
media.
Another option for studying and operationalizing controlled media per-
sonalization is to examine new media (websites, Facebook pages, Twitter
accounts, etc.). This is a topic to which we dedicate Chapter 8. Here we will
measure controlled media personalization by looking at the parties’ brand
names and seeing whether there is a trend toward including their leaders’
names. Adding the leader’s name to that of the party or to the electoral list
is about linking the institution to a specific individual. It may be a sign of a
personalized party that was established as a platform for a specific individ-
ual; it may be a result of the surrender of the party to a demand from its
leader; or it may be an electorally driven move when the leader seems to be
more popular independently of his party. In all these cases, the inclusion of
the leader’s name is a sign of personalization, while the reverse—the exclu-
sion of the leader’s name—obviously signifies depersonalization.
Table 7.8 presents our findings. We examined all the parties that contested
national elections from 1966 onward (or after their first democratic elec-
tions) and gained at least 1 percent of the vote. Parties or electoral lists that
included their leader’s name are shown in the table. If there are more parties
with the leader’s name in the first half of the examined period than in the
second half, we witness depersonalization. If there are more such parties in
the second half, then we witness personalization.10 Up to two additional
appearances in the second period are counted as marking moderate person-
alization, and more than two as marking high personalization. A decrease
of more than two appearances in the second period is considered high
depersonalization, and any value under 2 (but more than 0) is considered
moderate depersonalization.
As is evident, most countries did not pass the Rubicon yet, that is, in sixteen
of the twenty-six countries investigated party names never included their
leader’s name. This leaves ten countries where they did. In five of these
countries it was a rare phenomenon, which occurred no more than twice in
each until 2015. In the remaining five countries we came across more than two
cases of including the leader’s name in the name of the party: four in the Czech
Republic, five in Italy and Poland, eight in Austria, and up to forty in Israel.
In nine out of these ten countries, the leader’s name was added in the latest
10
The first period is 1966–90 and the second is 1991–2015 for most countries; the exceptions
are Spain (1976–96; 1997–2015), the Czech Republic, and Poland (1990–2002; 2003–15).
T A B L E 7 . 8 Parties and Electoral Lists that Included Their Leaders’

Names in Their Name, 1965–2015*
Country Party name (election year) Personalization

index
Austria Team Stronach (2013); BZÖ-Liste Jörg Haider (2008); 2

Bürgerforum Österreich—Liste Fritz Dinkhauser (2008);
Liste Westenthaler—BZÖ (2006); Liste Dr Martin (2006);
Die Unabhängigen—Liste Lugner (1999); Die Grüne
Alternative—Liste Freda Meissner-Blau (1986); Vereinte
Grüne Österreichs—Liste Tollmann (1983)
Czech Strana Práv Občanů—Zemanovci (2010, 2013); Úsvit Přímé 2
Republic Demokracie Tomia Okamury (2013); Suverenita—Blok
Jany Bobošíkove (2010)
Israel 40 cases (list with the authors): 1 (1977); 1 (1984); 1 (1992); 1 2
(1996); 8 (1999); 4 (2003); 4 (2006); 4 (2009); 8 (2013); 8 (2015).
Italy With Monti to Italy (coalition, 2013); Lista Bonino (2001); Lista 2
Pannella-Sgarbi (1996); Lista Pannella (1994); Patto Segni
(1993)
Poland Kukiz ‘15 (2015); KORWiN: Koalicja Odnowy 2
Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (2015); Ruch
Palikota (2011); Platforma Janusza Korwin-Mikke (2005)
Australia Palmer United Party (2013); Katter’s Australian Party (2013) 1
Belgium List Dedecker (2007, 2010) 1
Netherlands Pim Fortuyn List (2002, 2003) 1
New Jim Anderton’s Progressive (2005); Jim Anderton’s 1
Zealand Progressive Coalition (2002)
Canada 0
Denmark 0
Finland 0
France 0
Germany 0
Greece 0
Hungary 0
Iceland 0
Ireland 0
Japan 0
Luxembourg 0
Norway 0
Portugal 0
Sweden 0
Switzerland 0
UK 0
Spain Agrupación Ruiz-Mateos (1989) 1
* The starting year in third-wave democracies (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) is the year
of the first democratic elections. All cases are of parties named after their leader that contested an election and won at
least 1 percent of the vote.
Key:
2: the gap between the number of parties that included the name of the party leader in the late period
(1991–2015) in comparison to the early period is more than 2;
1: the gap between the number of parties that included the name of the party leader in the late period in
comparison to the early period is 2 or less;
0: no inclusion of the name of the party leader in the name of the party or equal inclusion in both periods;
–1: the gap between the number of parties that included the name of the party leader in the early period in
comparison to the late period is 2 or less;
–2: the gap between the number of parties that included the name of the party leader in the early period in
comparison to the late period is more than 2.

part of the period under study; in Spain it happened relatively early and was
not repeated. If we relate each of our countries to a specific cultural group
(Westminster, South Europe, etc.), the only such group in which this phe-
nomenon did not (yet) appear is that of the Nordic countries, although these
did have successful personal parties.
BEHAVIORAL PERSONALIZATION
The indicators in this category are about both the perception and the stand of
politicians and voters, on the one hand, and of their actual behaviors, on the
other. There are various perceptions, positions (or attitudes), and actual
behaviors that can be used as measures of (de)personalization. But we are
constrained by the availability of reliable and valid data (which is very clear
by now).
Politicians
The behavioral personalization of politicians is expressed in various ways
(Musella 2014a). All these expressions center around individualized actions.
Some may be in concert with the party, or at least not necessarily in conflict
with it (e.g., submission of private members’ bills), while others may express
deviation and even conflict (e.g., voting against the party line, publicly criti-
cizing it, or leaving the party). If such behaviors intensify over the years, then
we witness the behavioral personalization of politicians.
There are several indicators of personalization in the behavior of politicians
for which we did not find enough data, but they nevertheless warrant mention.
First, personalization may be studied by analyzing the perceptions of party
representatives, pitting the collective and partisan against the personal. In
other words, we may check whether the extent to which MPs perceive them-
selves as party representatives diminished or increased over the years. If, with
time, they perceive their role as being less partisan and more independent
from their party, then we witness personalization. It is also possible to ask
representatives about how they fulfill their representative role, for example how
much time they invest in party-oriented activity as against personalized activity.
As far as we can tell, existing studies show that there are indeed personalized
elements in MPs’ perceptions of their representative role (Thomassen and
Andeweg 2004; Deschouwer and Depauw 2014b), but there is no cross-national
study of trends over time.

Second, an increase in the use of a roll call vote could be also be interpreted
as signifying personalization in the behavior of legislators (Balmas et al.
2014). That is, in this type of vote, the way each legislator votes is made
explicit. In the past, this was the only record of a personal vote. More recently,
as in most legislatures each personal vote can be saved electronically, the
meaning and uses of roll calls may have changed.
Finally, the content analysis of speeches could also have served as a source
for identifying personalization trends. Balmas et al. (2014), for example,
counted the uses of first-person singular per total number of words in the
speeches of prime ministers in the Israeli parliament at the presentation of
their new governments in 1949–2009. While conducting this kind of cross-
national study is possible in the age of information and big data, such an
operation still requires linguistic expertise.
We thus ended up finding enough data on two indicators for the behavioral
personalization of politicians: changes in patterns of submission of private
members’ bills and changes in the number of coalition members per minister.
Changes in Patterns of Private Members’ Bills Submissions

The two main sources for the initiation of bills in parliamentary democracies
are the government and the members of the legislatures. In each legislature,
there are different rules and also norms that influence the rate of initiation of
bills from these sources. We are looking for a trend (or a lack thereof) and are
thus interested to see whether the initial ratio between these two sources
changed and, if so, in what direction and how much: an increase in the
proportion of private members’ bills—at the expense of government bills—
is a sign of behavioral personalization.
Table 7.9 presents evaluations of trends in the submission of private members’
bills. We found data on only twenty-three of our twenty-six countries. Except for
the countries that show a clear lack of trend (Germany and the United King-
dom), the evaluations are based on the computation of the absolute and relative
change in the proportion of private versus government submissions of bills (for
details, see Appendix 15). Personalization is evident in fourteen of the twenty-
three cases, in four there is no change, and in five we witness depersonalization.
We can thus claim that the general picture gives us a trend toward personaliza-
tion; but, again, we emphasize that there is cross-country variance.
We were not able to tap enough data on the outcomes of private members’
bills submissions, that is, on the trend in the proportion of laws that originated
in private members bills. This would not have been just a replication of the
submission indicator. Adoption points to another element, namely the power
of individuals to promote their agenda to the finishing line, beyond expressing
themselves through multiple submissions of bills.

T A B L E 7 . 9 Change in Patterns of Private Member Bills Submission
Country Years Absolute change Relative change Personalization

Personalization Personalization index
index index
Norway 1984–8 to 2004–8 2 2 2

Ireland 1997–2002 to 2011–15 2 2 2
Israel 1961–9 to 2009–15 2 2 2
Hungary 1990–4 to 2010–14 2 2 2
Belgium 1961–5 to 2010–14 2 2 2
Italy 1958–68 to 2001–08 2 1 1.5
Japan 1960–5 to 2010–15 1 2 1.5
New Zealand 1973–9 to 2008–14 1 2 1.5
Australia 1960–5 to 2010–15 1 2 1.5
Portugal 1976–80 to 2011–15 1 1 1
Canada 1960–5 to 2010–15 1 1 1
Netherlands 1980–4 to 2011–15 0 2 1
Austria 1959–66 to 2006–13 1 1 1
Sweden 1979–83 to 2004–8 1 0 .5
Czech Rep. 1996–2002 to 2006–13 0 0 0
Poland+ 1991–5 to 2011–15 0 0 0
Germany+ 1976 to 2009 0
UK 1979 to 2006 0
Luxembourg 1959–64 to 2010–14 0 1 .5
Iceland 1960–4 to 2004–8 1 1 1
Switzerland 1996–8 to 2013–15 1 2 1.5
Finland 1960–4 to 2004–8 2 1 1.5
Denmark 1972–6 to 2004–8 2 2 2
For detailed data and sources, see Appendix 15.

+ In Germany and Poland a bill cannot be submitted by a single MP but needs to be submitted by fifteen or more.
The analysis was thus based on a comparison of the number of government bills to the number of group bills.
Increased public expressions of party dissent may be a sign of the creation

of a new personalized equilibrium between the party and its elected represen-
tatives. But there is insufficient research and data that comparatively cover
change in public dissent over time. As mentioned above, changes in the
perceptions of MPs concerning their representative role could also be useful.
Andeweg and Thomassen (2010), for example, clearly demonstrate that there
was change over time in the perceptions of Dutch MPs, interestingly, toward
more partisan perceptions. But such studies are usually synchronic rather than
diachronic (Deschouwer and Depauw 2014b; Thomassen and Andeweg
2004), and there are not enough longitudinal data of this kind.
Unity in parliamentary voting could also serve to measure change in party
unity versus individualized behavior of MPs. Some data on parliamentary
voting over the years are available in several countries (Bowler 2000; Kam
2009). But this raises two main problems: first, a methodological problem,
which occurs when the data are far from similar in their coverage of voting

events and years; second, the problem that party unity may be achieved even
in a personalized environment. Even where party loyalty and cohesion
declined, unity may still be achieved through disciplinary measures. In add-
ition, party unity in parliamentary voting might stay at the same level or even
increase, while personalized behavior is increasingly “allowed.” Such features
as the submission of private members’ bills may be an outlet for personalized
behavior. When they face personalized pressures, parties may retain voting
unity by allowing MPs to express diverse voices (“rhetorical freedom”) with-
out also allowing this to slip into deviant voting (Hazan and Rahat 2015: 117).
The Number of Coalition Members per Minister

A key feature of parliamentary democracies is the dependence of governments
on legislative majorities. The circumstances place a premium on the process of
government formation, be it a single-party government or a coalition one.
A crucial issue that parties must resolve is how to allocate the ministries or
government portfolios. The study of portfolio allocation has yielded one of
the strongest empirical relationships documented in the social sciences: the
nearly one-to-one linkage between the proportion of legislative seats that a
coalition party contributes to the government and the proportion of cabinet
positions it receives in that government (Warwick and Druckman 2006). This
relationship has come to be known as Gamson’s Law (Gamson 1961). It
points to a compatibility between the “weight” of each party in government
and the “payoffs” it receives, namely ministerial positions. But what we are
interested in here is slightly different: to see whether the price tag for each
ministerial position (how many MPs are worth one ministerial position) is
constant or has changed with time. We argue that an increase in the price tag
may signal personalization.
It would be plausible to expect that more personal carrots and sticks will be
needed to ensure partyness in a more personalized environment. That is, the
same level of party unity (or even a higher one) can be evident in voting, but
its “price” will be higher. Sticks that can be used are disciplinary measures
available to the parliamentary party group. If the use of these measures
grows, then we may witness pressures of personalization that are countered
by available means. As for carrots, the allocation of an increasing number
of ministerial positions may be used to “buy” the loyalty of members of
parliament (Balmas et al. 2014; Hazan and Rahat 2015; Indridason and
Bowler 2014). Moreover, when the number of executive positions increases,
senior positions in parliament can be allotted to the next party representa-
tives who are in line, to “buy” their loyalty. Balmas et al. (2014: 45) put it as
follows: “The idea is simple: stronger parties will establish and maintain a
relatively small government because they can ensure the loyalty of their
parliamentary representatives in the coalition. In a personalized environment,

loyalty would be bought on a personal basis and the government would thus
be expected to be larger.”
Table 7.10 presents the annual changes in the numbers of coalition mem-
bers per minister (for explanations of the calculations, see Appendix 16).
Several alternative explanations for the evident trends reflected in changes
in the number of coalition members per minister were set aside. First, in the
cases we compared, we found no link between the number of parties that were
members in the coalition and the number of ministers. Sometimes coalitions
that included more parties had fewer coalition members per minister, and
other times the opposite was true; no relationship was evident. Second, we are
aware of the fact that in some countries the number of ministers is constrained
by law; this may stand as a barrier to the increase in the number of ministers.
But the people who can change the law and raise the cap are the same
politicians in whose behavior we are interested, so this does not make a
difference from our perspective. Finally, it can be argued that, over the
years, governments needed more ministers in order to cope with the increas-
ingly complex ministerial roles. Even if we adopt the problematic logic of this
claim (problematic because challenges and problems are always there, they
just change), the data do not support it, in the sense that enough countries saw
a decline in the relative number of ministers. However, we did find a strong
and significant correlation between change and parliament size: the smaller the
parliament, the higher the increase in the number of coalition members per
minister. This tells us that carrots are useful when one has to maintain the
support of a relatively small coalition within a relatively small parliament. The
effectiveness of this tool diminishes with increase in the size of parliament.
So in this case we should not relate significance in terms of personalization
to intercountry differences—not unless we control for size (and hence we omit
this relation from our integrative analysis in Chapter 9). The overall picture is
still interesting and, in terms of change over time, it is in line with other studies
(Indridason and Bowler 2014). It tips toward personalization (thirteen out of
all twenty-six countries), yet there is a substantive number of cases with no
change (six) and with depersonalization (seven). It would be interesting to
examine additional kinds of “payments,” such as trends in the allocation of
junior ministries, deputy ministers, and senior parliamentary posts. These
might not only complete the overall picture of “carrots for loyalty” but may
help to neutralize the bias of parliament and coalition size.
The Voters
An increase in the weight of individual politicians in voting calculations and a
decrease in the weight of the party can serve as signs of the personalization of
the behavior of voters. We examined numerous studies of voter behavior and
T A B L E 7 . 1 0 Change in the Number of Coalition Members per Minister*
Country Years Absolute Relative Calibrated Calibrated Personalization

change change absolute relative index
per per change per change per
annum annum annum** annum***
Hungary 1990–2006 .180 1.3 2 2 2

Austria 1960–2007 .103 1.2 2 2 2
Portugal 1976–2005 .074 1.1 2 2 2
Luxembourg 1964–2004 .064 2.1 2 2 2
Finland 1961–2007 .052 .8 2 1 1.5
Denmark 1960–2007 .040 1.1 1 2 1.5
Iceland 1963–2007 .037 1.2 1 2 1.5
Israel 1961–2006 .034 1.2 1 2 1.5
Netherlands 1963–2007 .042 .9 1 1 1
Belgium 1960–2007 .042 .7 1 1 1
Czech Rep. 1992–2007 .034 .6 1 1 1
Norway 1961–2005 .031 .8 1 1 1
Australia 1961–2007 .025 .5 1 1 1
Greece 1974–2007 .016 .2 0 0 0
Sweden 1960–2006 .012 .2 0 0 0
Canada 1962–2004 .010 .2 0 0 0
Switzerland 1960–2007 .007 .0 0 0 0
New Zealand 1960–2005 .003 .1 0 0 0
Japan 1960–2007 .000 .0 0 0 0
Italy 1960–2006 .024 .2 1 0 .5
UK 1963–2007 .033 .2 1 0 .5
Ireland 1961–2007 .024 .4 1 1 1
Poland 1991–2007 .083 .8 2 1 1.5
France 1962–2007 .181 .8 2 1 1.5
Germany 1960–2005 .231 .9 2 1 1.5
Spain 1977–2004 .107 1.0 2 2 2
* For additional data, see Appendix 16.

** Key:
0.050 and below High depersonalization = 2
between 0.020 and 0.049 Moderate depersonalization = 1
between 0.019 and 0.019 No trend = 0
between 0.020 and 0.049 Moderate personalization = 1
0.050 and above High personalization = 2
*** Key:
1% and below High depersonalization = 2
Between 0.9 and 0.4 Moderate depersonalization = 1
Between 0.3 and 0.3 No trend = 0
Between 0.4 and 0.9 Moderate personalization = 1
1% and up High personalization = 2
Source: calculations are based on Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 2011.

looked at various possible indicators of (de)personalization. These include,
first, works that analyzed election surveys over time and explored the patterns
of the impact of the voters’ evaluation of leaders (and sometimes other
candidates) on their behavior; and, second, studies of changes in voting in
cases of electoral systems that allow voters to express both partisan and
personal choices.
The Influence of Leader Evaluation on Voting

The first dichotomy in the literature on the influence of leader evaluation on
voting is between scholars who claim that the evaluation of party leaders has no
significant impact on citizens’ vote and scholars who claim, on the contrary, that
it affects voting in a significant manner. Those who argue that party leaders have
no significant influence on voting necessarily reject the personalization thesis.
The next dichotomy is within the second group, between those who claim that,
over time, the evaluation of leaders increasingly influences voting and those who
claim that voting has not changed over time. Thus only the former identify
personalization, while the later make a claim about personalized voting.
The problem that the first dichotomy poses for us is that different scholars
interpret the same data in contradictory ways. Their analyses differ in their
basic assumptions, and this leads to different results. As Lobo and Curtice
(2015b: 4) put it, at least part of the controversy concerning the impact of leader
evaluation on voters’ behavior “seems to stem from the differences in the way in
which authors estimate leader effects, and how they attempt to isolate those
from party identification, ideological effects, and other short-term factors.”11
As for the second dichotomy, one should wonder how the general decline in
party identification, which is evident over time (see Chapter 3), does not auto-
matically spur an increase in personalized voting over the same periods of time.
Indeed, while some scholars find a rise in the effect that leader evaluation has on
voting (Garzia 2014), others find that the effect may matter but does not change
over time (Bittner 2017; Curtice and Holmberg 2005; Karvonen 2010). Aardal
and Binder (2011) find not only no increase, but even a drop in the effect of
leaders’ popularity on voting. If Rahat and Sheafer’s (2007) claim that voters’
behavior is expected to be the last chain in the process of personalization is
right, then it might be a matter of time until clearer signals of the impact of
leaders’ evaluation will appear.
11
The theoretical and methodological divide is centered around the question of how the
influence of leaders should be distinguished from the influence of the party. For studies that
hold that leader evaluation matters, see Bittner 2011, 2015; Blondel and Thiébault 2010; Lobo
2014; Lobo and Curtice 2015c; Garzia 2011b; 2014; Mughan 2015; Takens 2013. For those that
hold that leader evaluation does not matter much, see Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; King 2002.
For a review of articles that suggests ways to solve these contradictions, see Barisione 2009.

In the framework of this study we refrain from deciding which side of the
controversy is right, or whether a third approach might be preferable. We
thus treat all studies as equal and collect them in order to estimate processes
within each country. While leader evaluation is about centralized personal-
ization in voters’ behavior, we will also combine a look at the impact of
other candidates’ evaluations, as they are expressed over time in surveys and
in actual voter behavior.
Additional Expressions of Voters’ Personalized Behavior

Personalization in voters’ behavior is not only about an increase in the party
leader’s weight in voting considerations; it may suggest an increase in other
candidates’ sway. Such a process of personalization in the behavior of voters
can be identified through the diachronic analysis of voting in some types of
electoral systems, including ones that allow voters to express more than their
partisan preference (Karvonen 2010). In some countries, the electoral system
does not allow any choice between personalized and partisan votes. Only
surveys can supply, in these cases, indicators for the increase or decline in the
influence of individual politicians on voting. This is true for (1) countries with
closed-list systems, in which voters can only vote for parties (Spain, Portugal,
Israel); (2) countries with open-list systems, in which candidates are not pre-
ranked (Finland); and (3) countries with single-member districts, in which there
is a single vote that cannot be divided (Canada, United Kingdom). In these
cases, identifying patterns of personalized voting requires using, when avail-
able, relevant questions in election surveys. Voters’ responses to questions
that ask them to name a candidate in their constituency and to questions
about support in adopting or enhancing a personal element in the electoral
system are good examples (Karvonen 2010).
The most straightforward indicators of personalization can be found in
countries with optional preference systems. Voting for candidates rather than
ratifying the existing list, and also changing the composition of the list by
voting for candidates who are located in relatively lower positions, are signs
of personalized voting. In these cases (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland),
an increase in voters’ use of the personal vote option would be seen as a
sign of personalization, while a decline would signify depersonalization. Yet
even in these cases it is not always simple: in Norway and Iceland, the
government does not report the percentages of voters who altered their ballots
(indeed, it is likely that it does not count these voters). Renwick and Pilet
(2016) provide, in both cases, a reasonable solution to these problems, which
consists in collecting data on the use of preference voting in local elections in
Norway and on other indicators of preference voting in Iceland. For Greece,
even Renwick and Pilet (2016) failed to gather data.

When we deal with an open-list system, in which voters are required to vote
for a candidate or candidates on a party list, personalization can be traced for
actual voting only in cases where voters are presented with a preordered
candidate list. In Finland this is not a possibility, because there the voter
has to note the name of the candidate she prefers without the help of a
preranked list. In the Netherlands and Poland personalization is evident if,
over time, more and more voters make an effort to choose lower-ranked
candidates instead of automatically voting for the first-ranked candidate.
When voters have several votes or preferences that they must allot to
individual candidates—as in Ireland, Luxembourg, or Switzerland—an
increase in the habit of splitting one’s votes or first preferences between
candidates from several political parties would be a sign of personalization.
Given the Irish single transferable vote, a sign of personalization in Ireland
would be an increase in the proportion of voters who did not put the same
party candidates as their first preferences on their ballot. For Luxemburg and
Switzerland, an increase in votes for candidates from several parties would
serve a similar function.
Actual voting in mixed-member systems (Germany, Japan since 1996, and
New Zealand since 1996), in which voters have one vote for a party list and
another for a candidate in a single-member district, is also not customized for
analyzing personalization (Renwick and Pilet 2016). While splitting the vote—
that is, voting for a candidate from one party at the single-member district level
and for a different party list in the upper tier—may be a sign of personalized
voting, it may also express strategic voting. Yet at least Karvonen (2010) comes
up with a convincing argument for perceiving the increase in split voting in
Germany as a sign of personalization; he refers to a study that found that the
proportion of strategic voters in the split vote is more or less stable over
the years.12 The same would be true for France: an increase in voting for
candidates of smaller parties may be a sign of personalization, but only as
long as it is not an expression of party preference but a personal one. These
are issues that have to be examined through surveys.
In Australia, which uses an alternative vote system in single-member
districts, parties field a single candidate. Two different indicators of person-
alization can be used there. One consists of changes in patterns of use of the
voting cards spread by parties (as reported in surveys); the assumption here
is that a decline in use implies an increase in the weight of personal
preferences vis-à-vis parties’ dictates. The other consists of changes in the
voting for the second house—the senate. Such changes relate to the use of
“voting above the line” (i.e., voting according to party ranking) and of voting
12
While we will limit ourselves to looking at the split vote as a possible sign of personalization,
it may be argued that people refrain from splitting their vote because their personalized vote
influenced their partisan vote (Plescia 2016).
T A B L E 7 . 1 1 Trends in Voters’ Personalized Behavior
Country Leader evaluation Additional expressions of voters’ personalized behavior Personalization index
Austria Renwick and Pilet 2016 2

Belgium Renwick and Pilet 2016 2
Ireland Renwick and Pilet 2016; Karvonen 2010 2
Israel Balmas et al. 2014 2
Italy Garzia 2011a 2
Japan Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Jou and Endo 2015 2
Netherlands Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; Karvonen 2010; Renwick and Pilet 2016 2
Takens 2013; Garzia 2014
Denmark Curtice and Holmberg 2005; Karvonen 2010 Karvonen 2010. Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Finland Karvonen 2014 Bengtsson et al. 2014; Karvonen 2010; Renwick 1

and Pilet 2016
Germany Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; Karvonen 2010; Karvonen 2010; Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Brettschneider and Gabriel 2002; Kaase 1994;
Garzia 2014; Curtice and Holmberg 2005
Norway Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; Karvonen 2010 Karvonen 2010; Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Poland Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Portugal Lobo and Ferreira da Silva 2017 1
Australia McAllister and Cameron 2014 McAllister and Cameron 2014 0
Canada Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; Bakvis and Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000 0
Wolinetz 2005; Bittner 2017
France Pierce 2002 0
Iceland Renwick and Pilet 2016 0
Luxembourg Renwick and Pilet 2016 0
UK Karvonen 2010; Mughan 2000; Garzia 2014; Karvonen 2010 0
Curtice and Holmberg 2005. Bittner 2017
Czech Rep. Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Switzerland Renwick and Pilet 2016 1
Sweden Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011; Karvonen 2010 Bengtsson et al. 2014; Karvonen 2010; Renwick 2
and Pilet 2016

“below the line” (i.e., expressing one’s own preferences—a de facto optional
preferential voting system).
In Table 7.11 the second and third columns present the sources for our
evaluations of personalization in voters’ behavior for each country, while the
last column presents our estimation of the evidence for (de)personalization on
the basis of these sources. A clear personalization trend is evident, as is
variance, when all the pieces of information concerning personalized voting
behavior are tallied (both the centralized and the decentralized kind): while
the majority of cases (thirteen) point to personalization, there are three cases
of depersonalization and six of no change.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter presented indicators of the various types and subtypes of polit-
ical personalization on the basis of the definitions and typology introduced in
Chapter 6. It examined the trends related to eleven indicators that cover all
proposed types and subtypes of political personalization.
The findings of this analysis vary. At one end there are indicators for which
there are more cases of personalization than of depersonalization, but stability
or a lack of a clear trend is the dominant pattern (electoral reform; the
inclusion of a leader’s name into the party label). For other indicators,
personalization is evident in about half of the cases, while the other half is
about stability (direct elections of the chief executive) or a mix of stability/no
trend and depersonalization (number of coalition members per minister).
There are also indicators where about 60 percent of the cases point to
personalization (prime ministers’ power, private members’ bills submissions,
personalized voting). In still other cases, personalization is generally evident,
and a minority of the cases are of no change, with no incidents of deperson-
alization (candidate and leadership selection, news coverage).
Thus, in general, we can claim that the prominent trend is toward person-
alization. Having said that, there is enough cross-national variance for each of
the indicators presented in this chapter to make the case for a cross-national
comparison. Moreover, no indicator can represent, on its own, the whole
phenomenon of political personalization, or even a part of it. But taken
together they can give us a general estimation of the levels of personalization
in each country. This will be the theme of Chapter 9. Before turning to the
general analysis, Chapter 8 will present two additional indicators of person-
alization from the increasingly important realm of online personalization,
namely from the supply side (uncontrolled media personalization) and from
the consumption side (voters’ behavioral personalization).
Parties versus Politicians Online
The previous chapter analyzed various indicators of political personalization

in the offline world. This chapter charts a separate exploration of personal-
ization, in the online world. Later, in Chapter 9, some of its findings will be
integrated into our comprehensive analysis of political personalization.
Within two decades, the World Wide Web was transformed from a
cryptic domain to which only a select few had access into a massive and
intricate cyber-labyrinth at a fingertip’s reach for almost all citizens of the
world. If in 1995 Internet use, counted in twenty-five democracies, ranged
from 0.4 to 13.9 users per 100 people and in 2005 from 25.2 to 87.0, by
2014 those figures had soared to 62.0 and 98.2 respectively (World Bank
2015). The spread and the extensive use of smartphones and tablets, now
added to the de rigueur home computer, mean that more and more people
are hooked to the web most (if not all) of the time. And things do not stop
here: not only are more citizens linked to the World Wide Web at increased
surfing speeds, but the numbers climb daily for individuals with social
media accounts. Especially prominent among the latter are Facebook and
Twitter, both of which have been available to the public since 2006. The
number of people with Facebook accounts grew from its public launching,
when it quickly garnered 12 million users, to an astonishing 1.23 billion in
2013 (Guardian, February 4, 2014). The high usage rates of the Internet, and
especially of social media, among youngsters (Eurobarometer 2014) tell us that
this trend is not likely to abate any time soon. As more people are connected
and spend increasing amounts of time online, the Internet becomes more and
more relevant to society, to the economy—and naturally also to politics.
Indeed, a constantly swelling number of political actors are present and
active online. For them, this modality is no longer a matter of choice but
one of basic necessity, even survival; and most, parties and politicians alike,
use one or more of the available platforms (see Table 8.3). If, in the early
days of the Internet, the presence of political actors online was mainly aimed
at winning kudos in the traditional media for being innovative, for more
than a decade now virtual space is a political arena in its own right. The
period 1995–2005 was mainly about building websites (Gibson, Ward, and
Lusoli 2002; Gibson and Römmele 2005; Tkach-Kawasaki 2003), but from
2006 on, with the development of Web 2.0, the interest has shifted to social

1
network sites. Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams (2011) go as far as to argue
that the addition of Web 2.0 indicates a change in political campaigns that is
no less significant than the move from the premodern to the modern cam-
paign (with its extensive use of mass media) and from the latter to the
postmodern or professional campaign (with its use of Web 1.0).
This chapter looks at political personalization online. Following the logic
of the classification of the types and subtypes of political personalization that
were presented in Chapter 6 (see “Definition and Typology” there), the two
types addressed in this chapter should be seen as personalization in the
controlled media on the supply side, that is, regarding the politicians’ activity;
and personalization in voters’ behavior on the consumption side, that is, in the
patterns of voters’ consumption of these media (see Table 7.1).
Because the content of websites and social network sites of parties and
politicians originate from these parties and politicians, or at least are overseen
by them, the corresponding phenomenon of personalization belongs to the
subtype of personalization in the controlled media. Parties and politicians
actually use these platforms to “circumvent the media” (Hermans and
Vergeer 2013: 84). As Karlsen (2011: 6) puts it: “With the introduction of
the Internet, parties and candidates have once again been able to reach voters
directly with their message without the distorting effect of journalists.”
It should be noted, however, that online controlled media differ from off-
line controlled media (party-owned media, campaign ads, etc.). True, online
communication and traditional mass media both facilitate the dissemination
of written, verbal, and visual announcements and information. But the online
option differs from its older counterparts in its capacity to easily combine
these features, in its massive volume and high speed, in its ability to support
two-way and multiple communication channels, and in the possibility it
grants each online participant to become a publisher and to control his own
publications (Gibson and Ward 2000).
We should also keep in mind that such media are controlled but not
isolated. That is, they affect the news on (online and offline) uncontrolled
media such as television, radio, and newspapers, which may be seen as more
important, or also important at this point in time. Journalists increasingly
follow the whereabouts of parties and politicians online and report on them
(Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2011). This was indeed found to be one motiv-
ation for using social media in political campaigns. Politicians also see social
media as an efficient campaign tool in and of itself—one that allows them
to communicate directly with voters and mobilize them—and as a means of
1
Web 2.0 is considered the second phase in the development of the World Wide Web. It is
characterized by the change from static irresponsive web pages (Web 1.0) to dynamic or user-
generated content and the growth of social media.
Parties versus Politicians Online 173

building a modern image and of boosting visibility as much as possible
(Karlsen 2011).
The second type, which is seen as an expression of personalization in the
behavior of voters, is about patterns of popular consumption of this media.
Here we are trying to see how citizens react to these attempts to contact them
directly. Specifically, we focus on a comparison of the numbers of parties’ and
politicians’ Facebook followers.
This chapter starts with a brief overview of the study of political personal-
ization online. It then examines what the research literature has to offer, in
terms of empirical findings, concerning the influence of the online platforms
on political personalization. The next section describes the research popula-
tion of parties, party leaders, and prominent politicians from twenty-five
democracies and the various measurements for online political personaliza-
tion. The last section presents the findings. High variance in the national levels
of personalization online demonstrates that personalization is not a necessary
development of online politics. Levels of online controlled media personal-
ization do not seem to be generally high. Parties are present online more than
individual politicians, and in the majority of cases the quantity of their online
output is higher. Online personalization in voters’ behavior—the consump-
tion side—is, however, more prevalent. Such personalization is evident in the
amounts of consumption of the output of party leaders, but not of the output
of other prominent politicians.
THE STUDY OF POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION ONLINE
The academic study of online politics largely began in 1995, and that of social
media and politics in 2008 (Vergeer 2013). That is, research of these new
arenas started to appear within a few years of their emergence, and it has since
won increasing scholarly attention. Of those studies of online politics that
address political personalization, some address it as one element out of several
examined (e.g., Schweitzer 2012; Vaccari 2013), while others focus on it
exclusively (e.g., Hermans and Vergeer 2013).
Like its offline counterpart (see, for example, Adam and Maier 2010;
Karvonen 2010; Wauters et al. forthcoming), the study of political personal-
ization online is characterized by a gap between the theoretical notion that
there are good reasons to expect high levels of personalization and the
generally mixed, if not largely negative, empirical findings. We might expect
to find clearer evidence of the personalization of online politics, because this
field came into being at a time when processes of the mediatization of politics
and the decline in the citizens–parties linkage became apparent. In addition,

many scholars expect online platforms to be more conducive to personalized
politics than to political parties (see “A Brave New Personalized World?” in
this chapter). But the picture is rather similar. Scholars start their research
with the expectation of identifying clear signs of high personalization and
many times end it with mixed findings, at best.
Interestingly, many studies of online political personalization focus on the
websites and social network sites of individual politicians without comparing
them to those of the corresponding political parties (Dolezal 2015; Enli and
Skogerbø 2013; Hermans and Vergeer 2013; Karlsen 2011; Kruikemeier 2014;
Lilleker and Koc-Michalska 2013). This may stem from the notion that
the use of tools from the online world, by its very nature, “strengthens
existing trends toward more candidate-centered campaigning” (Dolezal
2015: 103). These scholars see their contribution as one of identifying levels
of political personalization, its different expressions, and the causes of these
expressions—but not of the phenomenon itself. In other words, some scholars
take the phenomenon as a given: personalization is here, and our main
mission is to describe its different levels and explain them. They do so either
driven by the alleged personalized nature of the platforms used in the virtual
world or because the scholars they refer to argue that personalization is here—
if not as a result of both.
These studies, with their somewhat different definitions of personalization,
indeed identify similarities and variation among politicians from different
parties and countries, and also the factors that may explain variance. But,
from the perspective presented here, they ignore the other half of the person-
alization story—the political parties.
Scholars who focus on political parties online rarely address personaliza-
tion. For example, Gibson and Ward’s (2000) attempt to standardize the
analysis of websites of parties and candidates seems to have been quite
successful; but it was barely used to compare parties’ and candidates’ websites
(and, later, Facebook pages) in online personalization research.2 Indeed, in
their review of the literature on parties in the digital age, Gibson and Ward
(2009: 95) mention personalization only twice, as a phenomenon that is
enhanced online, but do not point to any study that deals with this issue
empirically.
The present study does not take personalization as a given but rather tries
to identify it by directly comparing politicians and parties. Some studies
did perform direct comparisons of parties and candidates; these will be discussed
in the next section. But no study has yet covered as much ground as this one, in
terms of number of countries. Like other studies, ours looks at the supply side
(the existence of websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts and at
2
For an exception, see Livak, Lev-On, and Doron 2011.

activities such as updatings of Facebook pages); but it also examines the
relatively neglected consumption side.
A BRAVE NEW PERSONALIZED WORLD?
Have the new opportunities of the online world empowered parties (deper-
sonalization), or rather individual politicians (personalization)? This ques-
tion is posed in a dichotomous manner but, as several scholars point out,
both sides are expected to garner some advantages and disadvantages in the
online world (Gibson and Ward 2009; Larsson 2016; Ohr 2011; Vaccari 2013;
Vergeer 2013).
Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams (2011: 481) argue that technological progress
returned one of the properties of the premodern campaign, the personal
interactive element, though in a new form:
With social media such as Facebook and Twitter, candidate-centered
campaigning of the pre-modern period (interactive and localized) seems
to be intensified, but now online, whereas personality-centered campaign-
ing goes beyond conveying political messages, sending out messages on
what occupies politicians from a personal or even private perspective.
Tormey (2015: 96) argues that “social media are a catalyst for the individu-
alization of politics, undercutting the rationale of representative bodies and
practices and bringing forward new styles of politics.” It seems that most
scholars accept the notion that personalization is enhanced in the online
world. Many see the platforms (especially Web 2.0, with its social media
features) as especially suitable for the enhancement of political personaliza-
tion thanks to their supposedly inherent personalizing nature—specifically,
the possibility of unmediated personalized interactions (Enli and Skogerbø
2013; Gibson and Ward 2009; Kruikemeier et al. 2013; Kruikemeier et al.
2015; Vergeer, Hermans, and Sams 2011); their affordability to individual
politicians, who in most cases do not have considerable resources by com-
parison to political parties (Calise 2011; Enli and Skogerbø 2013); and the
general expectation that individuals are more open to innovations than party
organizations (Vaccari 2013; Small 2010).
Yet some scholars remind us that the tools offered by the online world may
be used by parties and candidates alike (Bennett 2012; Ohr 2011; Vergeer
2013). While these scholars do not always refer to such tools in the context of
personalization, they identify some properties of the online world that may help
parties revive and may even enhance their status vis-à-vis individual politicians.
Parties can use information communication technology to centralize their

organizational control (Gibson and Ward 2009; Karlsen 2011). Having greater
resources (staff and money), parties can better develop, use, and activate the
available tools of the online world (Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin 2009; Vaccari
2013). Moreover, because they enjoy those needed resources, parties are better
equipped to ensure quality control of their online direct messages. That is,
individual politicians (especially those who are not party leaders and hold no
governmental posts) are more likely to face the consequences of sending prob-
lematic messages than do parties that have the tools to carefully monitor their
outgoing online activity.3
In addition, with the aid of the new tools, parties can innovate, use, and
revive traditional functions—from diverse affiliation types to the direct and
nonmoderated provision of news (Scarrow 2015), and from supplying infor-
mation for the mobilization of activists, members, and supporters to improv-
ing and coordinating their organization and activities (Römmele 2003).
Technology allows the creation of innovative intraparty realms for direct
democracy and deliberative democracy. Television enhanced personalization
owing to its being a visual medium in which it was easier to present a figure than
an abstract entity (McAllister 2007); conversely, the properties of the online
world may allow parties, as abstract entities, to revive. Indeed, the online world
even enables personalized connections between citizens (members, supporters,
etc.) and abstract entities (parties).
Just like studies of offline politics (Karvonen 2010), studies of online
politics that directly compared parties to politicians found high variance
across the levels of personalization between (Kruikemeier et al. 2015) and
within (Livak, Lev-On, and Doron 2011) countries. But when it comes to
identifying clear signs of personalization (rather than assuming it from start,
as a justification for studying individual politicians’ behavior in the online
world), the picture is vague. Those who research websites found either no
difference or some advantage to parties (Vaccari 2013; Livak, Lev-On, and
Doron 2011). Larsson (2016) found Norwegian parties to be more active on
Facebook than politicians around election time, while Small (2010), in her
analysis of Twitter, found that Canadian party leaders had a clear advantage
over parties. Studies that concentrated on individual politicians also found
high variance in levels of personalization among politicians from different
countries (Hermans and Vergeer 2013). A country study of Norwegian poli-
ticians’ use of Facebook found partisanship to be prominent (Karlsen 2011),
while a study of Dutch politicians found the personal use of Twitter to be
electorally beneficial (Kruikemeier 2014). Schweitzer (2012) identified a
decline in the personalization of German party websites in the period 2002–9.
3
We thank Thomas Poguntke for suggesting this partisan advantage.

These studies do identify variance in online political personalization and
the factors that may explain it—from the influence of electoral systems to
political culture at the country level, and from the type of candidate selection
methods to ideology at the party level. Yet one can hardly draw from these
studies any general answer to the question whether the online world is
generally more favorable to parties or to individuals—and for a good reason:
each study examines different platforms (websites, Facebook, Twitter), different
countries, and the behavior of different kinds of actors (individuals or parties).
Here, an attempt to answer this question will be based on a cross-national
comparison of twenty-five countries: parties and politicians online will be
compared directly, in terms of both supply (controlled media personalization)
and consumption (personalization in voters’ behavior).
THE INDICATORS OF CONTROLLED MEDIA

PERSONALIZATION AND PERSONALIZATION
IN VOTERS’ BEHAVIOR
The analysis of online political personalization covers aspects of online pol-

itics in twenty-five out of the twenty-six countries of our research population.4
The research population includes, in each country, all the parties that won
4 percent or more of the vote in the two most recent general elections to the
lower houses that took place before February 2015 (a total of 120 parties) and
their political leaders in early 2015 (a total of 127, because a few parties have more
than one leader). Three prominent politicians from each party (other than its
leader) were also included in twenty-three of the twenty-five countries. The
identity of these politicians was determined through an expert survey.5 Thus our
research population consists of three types of political actors: parties, their leaders,
and three prominent politicians from each party (for details, see Appendix 17).
The inclusion of party leaders on the one hand and of three other prominent
politicians on the other is intended to enable us to examine two types of
political personalization: centralized and decentralized (Balmas et al. 2014).
Though the comparative analysis of centralized and decentralized personal-
ization is beyond the scope of most of this research, we use here the oppor-
tunity to compare the two. When we look at party leaders, we look at a single
4
Greece was not included owing to complications in gathering the relevant data.
5
We asked each country expert to identify three prominent politicians from each party. Most
did, but sometimes we received fewer names (and occasionally more) than we had asked for. The
experts gave good reasons for these relatively few deviations, so we decided to accept them. We
ended up with the names of 323 prominent politicians who were not political leaders of their parties.

politician for each party—the one at the top (centralized personalization);
the other three allow us to decide whether or not personalization involves
other politicians too (decentralized personalization). Ideally, examining
decentralized personalization would require us to investigate a larger number
of politicians, but this is impossible at the scale of our study. Focusing on
three prominent politicians in each party gives the understudied decentralized
personalization its best chance. It can be argued, however, that, even if these
three prominent politicians are found to be powerful vis-à-vis the party and its
leader, we may be dealing with an oligarchy à la Michels. But in any case
looking at both the leader and at three prominent politicians serves our
general goal of covering as much ground as possible.
The first item we examined on the supply side was the very presence of
actors online. Did the political actors have a website, a Facebook page, or a
Twitter account in the first months of 2015? And, if so, which kind of actor got
there first: the party or the individual?
Next we examined how many times each actor updated his, her, or its
Facebook page within a given month (January 15–February 14, 2015).6
This gave us an indicator of the amount of activity that each actor invested
in her Facebook page. A content analysis of the page and posts may add much
information,7 but that is certainly beyond the scope of this study. One could
argue that, if parties relate to their leader and to other politicians on their
pages and posts and if politicians relate to their parties, then looking at
Facebook pages of parties and politicians as competing realms of activity
(and also of consumption) may be biased. It is true that studies looking at the
content of these Facebook pages, and especially at how these actors relate to
one another, can add a lot to our understanding of personalized politics and
can help us to map its levels. We claim, however, that, as a first cut in a large n
study that covers so much ground, seeing these two realms, the Facebook
pages of parties and those of individual politicians, as separate is justified and
beneficial. The distinction tells us who controls the content of the social
network site, parties, or individuals. After all, in a perfectly partisan environ-
ment, no politician would have her own Facebook page; in a perfectly
personalized environment, no party would have a Facebook page.
For consumption, we looked at the number of accumulated “likes” that a
page received on a given date in February–May 2015. The number of likes for
a Facebook page is an accessible and viable indicator of the exposure of
6
At that time, only Israel was in the middle of an election campaign. As we will see, even then,
the level of personalization in Israel was very high, although one could expect the parties to be
more active, especially because the country uses a closed-list electoral system.
7
See, for example, Bar-Ilan, Bronstein, and Aharony 2015; Samuel-Azran, Yarchi, and
Wolfsfeld 2015.

8
surfers to the Facebook pages of our actors (parties and politicians). While
an analysis of exposure to posts and of reactions to them may add much
information, this, too, is clearly beyond the scope of this study. We made sure
to check each party and its politicians on the same day because our online
personalization index is based on ratios between them.
The online personalization index for both supply (updates) and consump-
tion (likes) was calculated by dividing the values obtained for parties to
the values obtained for their leader and to the average values obtained for
their three prominent politicians. The higher values (for the party or for the
politicians) were put in the numerator. A minus sign was assigned when the
value for parties was higher, and a positive sign when the value for individual
politicians was higher. Then the average and median values for each country
were calculated. Thus the resulting online personalization index for each
country ranges from 1 up or from 1 down.9
Tables 8.1 and Table 8.2, which present UK data, are intended to help us
exemplify how our two online personalization indicators were calculated. The
calculation starts at the party level and relates to the three parties (first column
in both tables) that won 4 percent or more of the votes in the last two elections
before February 2015 (in the United Kingdom, this meant in 2005 and 2010),
together with their leaders and their three prominent politicians.
The second and third columns present respectively the number of updates in
a single month (Table 8.1) and the number of likes at a specific point in time
(Table 8.2) for the party’s and party leader’s Facebook pages. The fourth
column gives us the online personalization index. The fifth column registers
the number of updates in a single selected month (Table 8.1) and the number
of likes at a specific point in time (Table 8.2) for three prominent politicians
from each party. In updates, two of the parties (Conservatives and Labour)
present us with Facebook pages that were not updated, and therefore only one
value appears. Those are pages that supply information and are not activated
by the actor herself. The sixth column presents the average for all existing
cases of prominent politicians. The calculation of the online personalization
index that appears in the seventh column is based on the data in the second
and sixth columns and is made in exactly the same way as for the leader.
Finally, in the last two rows, in bold, we have the national average and
national median for the four online personalization indices calculated: party
leader/party updates (Table 8.1, fourth column, two last rows), prominent
politicians/party updates (Table 8.1, seventh column, two last rows), party
8
We looked at national Facebook pages of parties. Parties may have additional followers at
the local or regional level, but the same would be true for politicians.
9
National averages, averages of values for the three prominent politicians, and also medians
(in case of an even number of cases) may still have a value of between 1 and 1.

T A B L E 8 . 1 Number of Facebook Updates and the Online Personalization Index for
the UK Parties, January 15–February 14, 2015
Party Party’s Leader’s PL:P Prominent Average PP:P

number of number of online politicians’ number of online
updates updates Pers. index number of updates for Pers. index
updates politicians
Conservatives 54 55 1.0 2 2 27.0

Labour 69 27 2.6 46 46 1.5
Lib Dem 43 16 2.7 20, 30, 73 41 1.0
Average 1.4 9.8
Median 2.6 1.5
PL = party leader P = party PP = 3 prominent politicians
T A B L E 8 . 2 Number of Facebook “Likes” and the Online Personalization

Index for UK Parties*
Party Party’s Leader’s PL:P Pers. Prominent politicians’ Average PP:P Pers.
number number index number of likes number of index
of likes of likes likes for
politicians
Conservatives 347,557 479,347 1.4 3,306; 1,717; 311,207 105,410 3.3

Labour 215,138 69,301 3.1 2,732; 6,288; 870 3,296.7 65.3
Lib Dem 110,031 89,064 1.2 1,472; 2,578; 2,524 2,191.3 50.2
Average 1.0 39.6
Median 1.2 50.2
PL = party leader P = party PP = 3 prominent politicians
* Recorded on the same day in the first half of 2015.
leader/party likes (Table 8.2, fourth column, two last rows), prominent
politicians/party likes (Table 8.2, seventh column, two last rows).
Personalization is a process and, as such, should be empirically studied as a
diachronic phenomenon, a development that requires looking at two points in
time at the very least (see “Personalization is a Process” in Chapter 6). But in
the case of online personalization there are justifications for looking at a single
point in time. First, the World Wide Web is very dynamic and develops
rapidly and constantly. If until 2005 it involved mainly websites, since then
the emphasis has moved to social network sites. Moreover, these sites are very
dynamic in terms of numbers of users too, both political actors and citizens.
This dynamic character creates obstacles to studying and interpreting devel-
opments over longer periods of time. Indeed, Schweitzer (2012), who studied
party websites diachronically, found that they were depersonalized but right-
fully argued that this may be a result of the shift of online activity to social
media tools. Zamir and Rahat’s (2017) study of Israel found that this was
indeed the case: starting from 2015, fewer members of parliament had websites

than in 2010, but a growing number of them had active Facebook pages. In
short, it is complicated (if not impossible) to find two equivalent or comparable
points over a reasonably long period.
Second, a snapshot at only one point in time may still tell us the direction
that politics takes in terms of personalization, in a world that was recently
created from scratch. If we find a way to define clearly what reflects person-
alization and what does not, we can identify personalization in the online
world. Indeed, for the interpretation of the values of the online personaliza-
tion index, a dividing line was defined in order to differentiate between
values that express personalization and values that do not. Values equal to
or higher than 2 would be defined as indicating personalization; values
lower than 2 would be interpreted as indicating that parties have the upper
hand. The logic behind this demarcation is simple: it is based on the notion
that the party, which is a group made up of a leader and of politicians, can be
expected to be at least twice more active (through updates) or “consumed” at
least twice more (through likes) than its leader, or than any other individual
politician in it.
WHO HAS THE UPPER HAND IN THE ONLINE WORLD:

PARTIES OR POLITICIANS?
We now turn to presenting our findings for the two last indicators of political
personalization (see numbers 8 and 12 in Table 7.1). These two indicators
reflect online activity (supply) and consumption. But first we present our
findings for two preliminary questions regarding online activity: What is the
scope of the online presence? And who was there first—the parties or their
leaders?
Online Presence
The very presence of parties and politicians on the Internet should serve as a
first sign of their relative status in the online world. Table 8.3 supplies us with
data on the online presence of parties (P), party leaders (PL), and three
prominent politicians from each party (PP) in the twenty-five countries that
were studied in the first months of 2015.
Parties clearly command a stronger online presence when it comes to
websites. While all parties but one (the ultra-orthodox Shas in Israel) had
websites, less than 60 percent of the individual politicians (party leaders and
prominent politicians) had personal websites. In twenty of the twenty-five
countries, the proportion of parties with websites was higher than the
T A B L E 8 . 3 Share (in Percentages) of Parties, Party Leaders, and Prominent Politicians Who Had Websites, Facebook, and Twitter Accounts in February 2015
Country Websites Facebook accounts* Twitter accounts

P PL PP P PL PP P PL PP
Australia 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 100 (8/8) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 100 (8/8) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 100 (8/8)
Austria 100 (4/4) 25 (1/4) 15 (2/13) 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 46 (6/13) 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 38 (5/13)
Belgium 100 (5/5) 60 (3/5) 93 (14/15) 100 (5/5) 100 (5/5) 87 (13/15) 100 (5/5) 100 (5/5) 100 (15/15)
Canada 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 89 (8/9) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 89 (8/9) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 78 (7/9)
Czech Republic 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 83 (10/12) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 75 (9/12) 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 75 (9/12)
Denmark 100 (5/5) 40 (2/5) 53 (8/15) 100 (5/5) 100 (5/5) 93 (14/15) 100 (5/5) 60 (3/5) 60 (9/15)
Finland 100 (8/8) 100 (8/8) 100 (24/24) 100 (8/8) 100 (8/8) 96 (23/24) 100 (8/8) 88 (7/8) 79 (19/24)
France 100 (3/3) 67 (2/3) 56 (5/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 100 (9/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 100 (9/9)
Germany 100 (6/6) 100 (8/8) 88 (15/17) 100 (6/6) 100 (8/8) 76 (13/17) 100 (6/6) 75 (6/8) 29 (5/17)
Hungary 100 (4/4) 40 (2/5) 43 (3/7) 100 (4/4) 100 (5/5) 86 (6/7) 100 (4/4) 0 (0/5) 14 (1/7)
Iceland 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 33 (4/12) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 92 (11/12) 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 42 (5/12)
Ireland 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 67 (8/12) 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 75 (9/12) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 83 (10/12)
Israel 88 (7/8) 13 (1/8) 13 (3/24) 88 (7/8) 100 (8/8) 79 (19/24) 63 (5/8) 88 (7/8) 42 (10/24)
Italy 100 (5/5) 80 (4/5) 83 (10/12) 100 (5/5) 100 (5/5) 67 (8/12) 100 (5/5) 100 (5/5) 75 (9/12)
Japan 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 83 (10/12) 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 42 (5/12) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4) 67 (8/12)
Luxembourg 100 (5/5) 50 (3/6) 31 (5/16) 100 (5/5) 83 (5/6) 50 (8/16) 100 (5/5) 67 (4/6) 56 (9/16)
Netherlands 100 (6/6) 33 (2/6) 17 (3/18) 100 (6/6) 67 (4/6) 50 (9/18) 100 (6/6) 100 (6/6) 72 (13/18)
New Zealand 100 (4/4) 20 (1/5) 55 (6/11) 100 (4/4) 100 (5/5) 100 (11/11) 100 (4/4) 100 (5/5) 82 (9/11)
Norway 100 (6/6) 33 (2/6) 25 (5/20) 100 (6/6) 100 (6/6) 90 (18/20) 100 (6/6) 83 (5/6) 95 (19/20)
Poland 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 100 (4/4) 50 (2/4) 100 (4/4) 100 (4/4)
Portugal 100 (4/4) 0 (0/4) 100 (4/4) 75 (3/4) 75 (3/4) 25 (1/4)
Spain 100 (3/3) 67 (2/3) 56 (5/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 78 (7/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 100 (9/9)
Sweden 100 (8/8) 33 (3/9) 38 (9/24) 100 (8/8) 89 (8/9) 88 (21/24) 100 (8/8) 78 (7/9) 83 (20/24)
Switzerland 100 (5/5) 83 (5/6) 60 (9/15) 100 (5/5) 67 (4/6) 47 (7/15) 100 (5/5) 83 (5/6) 40 (6/15)
UK 100 (3/3) 33 (1/3) 89 (8/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 56 (5/9) 100 (3/3) 100 (3/3) 78 (7/9)
Total 99 (119/120) 57 (72/127) 56 (182/323) 99 (119/120) 90 (114/127) 76 (247/323) 97 (116/120) 80 (102/127) 68 (221/323)
P = party PL = party leader PP = prominent politicians; in brackets: the number of cases
* The data on Facebook pages do not include pages that were informative but did not contain any information supplied by the politicians or the parties. Such pages are not active pages of users
and probably they were not created or maintained by the party or the politician or by their representatives.

proportion of individual politicians who had websites. In five countries, all
parties and party leaders had websites, and thus they had equal presence. In
two of these five, Australia and Finland, all actors had 100 percent presence.
To sum up, when it came to websites, parties usually did better, and never
worse, than individual politicians. Yet websites might already be a thing of
the past, and Web 2.0, with its social network sites, may well reflect what
was more relevant in 2015.
When it comes to Facebook accounts, the gap between parties and indi-
vidual politicians still existed, but it was much lower than in the case of
websites: virtually all parties (except Israel’s Shas) maintained Facebook
accounts, and so did 90 percent of party leaders and 76 percent of the sampled
prominent politicians. In nine of the twenty-five countries, the share of parties
with Facebook accounts was higher than that of individual politicians (party
leaders and prominent politicians). In fifteen countries, all parties and party
leaders had Facebook accounts, and thus they had equal presence. In three of
these fifteen countries, all actors had 100 percent presence. Only in Israel did
party leaders have a higher presence (100 percent) than parties (88 percent).
Thus, when we compare Facebook with websites in general, the gap between
parties and individual politicians is not only lower in the former; in the case
of party leaders it does not even exist in sixteen out of twenty-five countries
(two thirds).
Twitter straddled the line between websites and Facebook. While almost
all parties (97 percent) had Twitter accounts, 80 percent of their leaders and
68 percent of the sampled prominent politicians did. In twelve of the twenty-five
countries, the proportion of parties with Twitter accounts was higher than the
proportion of individual politicians (party leaders and prominent politicians)
with Twitter accounts. In twelve countries, all parties and party leaders had
Twitter accounts, and thus they had an equal presence. In four out of these
twelve countries all actors had 100 percent presence. Again, only in Israel did
party leaders (88 percent) have more Twitter accounts than parties (63 percent).
Thus the advantage of parties is evident here more than in the case of the
Facebook platform, but still, in just over a half of the countries (thirteen of
twenty-five), parties are not present more than their leaders.
From this analysis we can deduce that parties do generally better than
individual politicians, as they have higher proportions of websites, Facebook
accounts, and Twitter accounts. We also see that the gap is larger when it
comes to websites. This might be a thing of the past, not necessarily reflecting
a recent and highly relevant gap between parties and politicians. Indeed, a
candidate survey in Norway found that candidates saw social media as more
useful than personal websites (Karlsen 2011). A study of Israel that compared
2010 and 2015 found a decline in the number of members of parliament who
had personal websites and an increase in the numbers of those who kept
Facebook and Twitter accounts (Zamir and Rahat 2017). When we look at

national patterns in the comparison between parties and their leaders on
social media, parties are worse off only in one case, are on a par with the
leaders in about half, and do better than them in the remaining half. In terms
of presence, then, parties have the upper hand—in relation to their leaders and
considerably more in relation to other prominent politicians.
Who Came First?

Another sign of presence may be found by looking back and answering the
question: Who came first? Who was the first actor that established a website, a
Facebook page, or a Twitter account? Was it parties or individual politicians?
This is not just another sign of online presence. Those who were present online
early had more time than the others to develop their sites and requisite skills
for operating them.
On the one hand, we may expect parties to be online first because they had
resources and staff to spare at the time the online platforms were just emerging
and seemed still relatively unimportant for politics by comparison to other
media. On the other hand, we may expect individual politicians to be more
open to innovation, and to adopt them and adapt to them more easily than
parties (Vaccari 2013).
Before looking at our findings about the early and the late adoption of
websites and social network sites, we have to remember that parties have a
clear and undeniable advantage here. That is, party leaders and prominent
politicians rise and fall; they come and go. It is thus expected that parties will
be there, first because most of them existed back in the mid-1990s, when
political websites started to appear, and in 2006, when Facebook became
relevant to politics and Twitter was established. Parties are more stable
entities, and most of them have been there since “day one”—that is, since it
became possible to operate websites and social network sites.
Table 8.4 looks only at cases in which both parties and their leaders had
websites, Facebook, and Twitter accounts in the first half of 2015 and exam-
ines who was there first. It is no surprise that, for the most part, the parties
were there first and the gaps are wider for the older websites than for the
younger Facebook and Twitter accounts. Yet the findings can still tell us
something new. First, parties did not view the online world as a realm that
does not suit them on account of its alleged “personalized nature”; rather they
entered it before their leaders did, or at least in the same year with them.
Thanks to that, they are likely to have some leverage. Second, by comparing
the findings about websites with those about Twitter and Facebook, we learn
that the leverage that parties had, presumably owing to their longer political
life, narrows in a faster world, as new platforms emerge, are adopted, and
spread at a very quick pace.

T A B L E 8 . 4 Parties or Party Leaders Online: Who Was There First?
Parties first Leaders first Same year Number of

comparisons
Websites 79.1% 19.4% 1.5% 67

Facebook 43.4% 34.9% 21.7% 107
Twitter 56.1% 21.4% 22.5% 99
Online Activity (Supply) and Consumption

We now turn to present our findings on the two final indicators of political
personalization. These indicators deal with new media and compare the
activity (measured in updates) and the consumption (measured in likes) of
parties to the activity and consumption of politicians (separately for party
leaders and prominent politicians). The findings are shown in Table 8.5.
Beyond the values for each country (including the average and the median
in the two last columns), the table presents, in the two last rows, the average
and median for each indicator.
The general level of online personalization seems quite low when we look at
aggregative country-level averages (second column from the right). There are
only four countries with values above the cutting point. A look at the average
and median values of the online personalization indices per indicator (last two
rows) tells almost the same story. Only four out of sixteen values point to
personalization. Yet a look at the country-level medians (last column) already
reveals ten cases above the cutting point. Eighty-five of the 192 (44.3 percent)
values that appear in the table are also above the cutting point. A rough
summary of these results would be this: while parties generally had the upper
hand, enough cases of personalization require a closer look, which will reveal
when and where personalization appears.
We now turn to the similarities and differences between supply and con-
sumption and centralized and decentralized personalization. First we consider
the supply side, examining the averages and medians of the online centralized
and decentralized personalization indices. These data appear in columns 2–5 in
Table 8.5. Of the ninety-six observations, the values of forty-four (45.8 percent)
are above the cutting point. The values in the last two rows, averages and
medians, tell us that parties are more active than individual politicians, and in
seven out of eight cases the values are below our cutting point, that is, they point
to partisan prominence.
Looking at the online personalization indices for each country, we can see
that in about half of the countries under investigation parties are at least twice
more active than party leaders, both in averages and in medians—in other
words the value of the online personalization index is higher than 2. This is
T A B L E 8 . 5 Facebook, Supply, and Consumption: The Online Personalization Index of Party Leaders/Prominent Politicians: Parties
Country Supply (updates in a given month)a Consumption (likes)b Total Total

averagee mediane
Party leader to partyc Prominent politicians to Party leader to partyc Prominent politicians to
partyd partyd
Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
Australia .2 .4 .1 .0 .6 .4 1.1 2.8 .6 .3

Luxembourg .6 .4 .3 2.3 35.6 1.1 .4 1.2 4.9 .5
Israel .3 1.1 2.2 2.0 21.4 8.7 13.1 .2 1.5 .7
Denmark .6 1.2 2.2 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.8 2.1 .6 1.1
Canada 1.0 1.2 2.3 1.6 .4 .2 7.5 7.0 2.5 1.4
Belgium 8.6 3.5 .5 1.7 1.6 1.6 4.8 1.5 3.0 1.7
Italy 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.9 6.8 5.2 3.1 2.3 .1 1.8
New Zealand 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.8 2.4 1.0 93.4 6.5 13.4 1.8
Austria .6 1.6 .5 1.6 2.8 2.2 11.8 12.4 4.2 1.9
Norway 1.7 1.7 2.7 2.0 .7 1.6 8.0 8.3 2.8 1.9
Spain 3.9 3.3 3.0 1.4 .6 1.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1
UK 1.4 2.6 9.8 1.5 1.0 1.2 39.6 50.2 13.4 2.1
Japan 1.9 2.7 3.2 1.0 1.2 1.7 6.7 7.2 3.2 2.3
Germany 5.4 .3 3.8 1.4 .4 1.5 6.5 3.8 2.8 2.7
France 3.4 3.6 6.0 5.3 .8 2.9 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.8
Hungary 1.9 2.0 4.6 4.5 2.0 1.3 8.8 11.7 4.6 3.3
Iceland 7.7 8.6 13.9 3.6 .1 .1 3.7 3.6 5.1 3.7
Finland 20.1 2.8 4.6 3.6 .8 1.7 5.6 3.8 5.4 3.7
Polandf 2.1 2.1 8.4 6.8 4.9 4.5
Irelandg 8.2 8.2 1.9 2.4 7.7 5.7 3.3 3.1 5.1 4.5
Sweden 3.7 1.3 11.0 1.5 5.6 2.9 12.9 12.7 6.5 4.7
Czech Republic 26.6 8.1 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.8 7.7 9.3 7.8 5.3
Switzerland 25.6 7.0 10.1 7.5 55.5 3.8 5.3 5.6 15.1 7.3
Netherlands 9.0 2.7 12.1 2.8 12.0 5.0 69.4 30.6 18.0 10.5
Portugalh 106.6 21.0 5.1 1.7 32.8 13.1
Average 9.7 3.5 4.4 2.4 4.6 .7 13.9 8.1
Median 2.1 2.1 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.2 6.5 3.8
* Bold means personalization. It follows the logic we proposed for adopting a “cutting point” see “The Indicators of Controlled Media Personalization and Personalization in Voters’
Behavior” in this chapter.
a
The values were collected for the period January 15–February 14, 2015. Facebook pages that contain information mainly from Wikipedia were not considered for the supply side
because they do not allow active updating.
b
The values were collected on the same day for each party and its politicians, during the period February–May, 2015. Likes for Facebook pages that contain information mainly from

Wikipedia were included, since these pages allow surfers to allot likes. Coding these likes enabled us to learn about consumption—that is, about the way in which Facebook users chose
to consume information about parties and politicians even if these did not have active pages. In personal Facebook profiles, since likes were not an option, we examined the number of
Facebook “followers” or “friends.”
c
Parties that did not have an active account, or whose leader did not have one, were not included in the calculation of the average/median of their country.
d
The values of the ratio of prominent politicians to party are based on the average values of three prominent politicians in each party. Prominent politicians who did not have accounts
were not included in the calculation of this average.
e
The total averages and medians for the eight values represented in the line for each country.
f
Data for Poland contain only information about party leaders. Only two polish leaders had an active Facebook account. The values for Facebook updates in Poland that appear in the
table are based on the ratio between these party leaders and their parties.
g
The values of the ratios between leader and party for Facebook updates in Ireland are based on ratios of only two parties. For the remaining Irish parties, the leaders did not have an
active Facebook account.
h
Data for Portugal contain only information about party leaders.

also true when we look at median online personalization indices for promin-
ent politicians; but, if we look at average online personalization indices,
parties are more active than prominent politicians in seventeen countries
(out of the twenty-three). Thus we can argue that, when we look at the supply
side in terms of activity rather than presence, the online world (or its most
prominent platform at the time, Facebook) seems to be somewhat more
personalized. But parties in general still have the upper hand.
Second, we focus on the consumption side, examining the average and
median online personalization indices. The data appear in columns 6–9 in
Table 8.5. In total, forty-one of the ninety-six values (42.7 percent) are above
the cutting point. But, for party leaders, consumption values are higher than
supply values (twenty-four values above the cutting point for supply, in
comparison to thirty-three for consumption). As for prominent politicians,
the result gives the opposite picture: the values for supply (twenty above the
cutting point) are higher than for consumption (eight above the cutting point).
When looking at the last two rows, at the general average and median online
centralized personalization indices, the picture seems to be more personalized
on the consumption side than on the supply side; the opposite is true for
decentralized politics. On the consumption side, the comparable values of
averages and medians are always higher for party leaders and lower for
prominent politicians (last two rows in columns 6–9). The medians are espe-
cially interesting: on the supply side, online personalization indices are quite
similar for party leaders and for prominent politicians and fall in a range that
goes from 1.9 to 2.7. But, on the consumption side, leaders enjoy better
online personalization indices ( 1.2, 1.2) while the interest of users in other
prominent politicians is much lower ( 6.5, 3.8).
Thus if, when we look at medians (last row), supply values tell us about
similar efforts of politicians, the consumption side tells us that party leaders’
efforts are much more fruitful. Moreover, three out of four values of the total
averages and medians for party leaders are above the cutting point, while
those of the other politicians (last two rows) are far from being there. So we
have clear signs of centralized personalization on the consumption side. In
most cases (fifteen out of twenty-five when examining the average, eighteen
out of twenty-five for the median), parties have less than twice as many likes as
their leaders do. However, when we look at prominent politicians, we find that
parties have the upper hand most of the time. In comparison to the supply
side, on the consumption side there is more evidence of centralized personal-
ization and less of decentralized personalization.
Up to this point, the state of online personalization may be summarized as
follows: high variance makes it clear that there is no technological determin-
ism here and both parties and individual politicians can take advantage of the
opportunities of the online world. However, a clear pattern emerges: when we
move from the supply side (presence and activity), in which parties usually

T A B L E 8 . 6 Actors with the Highest Numbers of Facebook “Likes”*
Name Actor Country Number of likes
1 Beppe Grillo leader Italy 1,700,000

2 Benjamin Netanyahu leader Israel 1,307,114
3 Angela Merkel leader Germany 1,029,315
4 Nicolas Sarkozy leader France 951,267
5 Matteo Salvini leader Italy 792,184
6 Matteo Renzi leader Italy 789,321
7 Silvio Berlusconi leader Italy 680,736
8 Marine Le Pen leader France 647,240
9 François Hollande leader France 535,504
10 David Cameron leader UK 479,347
11 Shinzo Abe leader Japan 463,204
12 Tony Abbott leader Australia 427,577
13 Five Star Movement (M5S) party Italy 421,000
14 Naftali Bennett leader Israel 402,852
15 Yair Lapid leader Israel 379,977
16 Luigi di Maio prominent politician Italy 362,000
17 Conservatives party UK 347,557
18 Viktor Orban leader Hungary 332,026
19 Boris Johnson prominent politician UK 311,207
20 Jobbik party Hungary 286,000
* Data collected in February–May 2015.
have the upper hand, to the consumption side, we face more personalization
of the centralized type but less of the decentralized type.
Looking beyond national averages and medians, it becomes even clearer
that the champions of Facebook are individual politicians. Table 8.6 presents
the twenty leading actors in terms of number of likes among the population of
120 parties, 127 party leaders and 323 prominent politicians from twenty-five
countries. Fifteen out of the twenty leading actors are party leaders and two
are prominent politicians. Two of the three parties that made it on the top-
twenty list are clearly highly personalized parties (M5S and Jobbik). This last
piece of evidence seems to imply that, while personalization is not a predeter-
mined consequence for all actors in all countries, the top political online realm
is that of individual politicians.
When we correlated the various indicators for supply and demand (aver-
ages and medians), we found only limited evidence for a positive correlation
between supply (updates) and consumption (likes). This contradicts the
assumption that efforts (measured in the intensity of updates) are rewarded
(rewards being measured in numbers of followers). It might be that those who
are less successful try harder because they aspire to be where the more successful
actors are. Indeed, a study of politicians’ activity on Facebook and Twitter in
Sweden and Norway in nonelection time found that the most active actors

were “the underdog”—that is, younger, less experienced backbenchers. This
study also identified an extra gap in supply and consumption. It found that
Swedish and Norwegian politicians were more active on Twitter, although
Facebook was more popular in these countries. They labeled these finding “a
potential online communicative mismatch between those electing and those
elected” (Larsson and Kalsnes, 2014: 663). This general mismatch between
supply and consumption; and the data on the high consumption of party
leaders seem to tell us that, while parties, party leaders, and other prominent
politicians invest in the online world, this activity seems to be somewhat more
beneficial for party leaders, namely in terms of consumption.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
High variance in national levels of personalization online demonstrates that

personalization is not a necessary development of online politics. Yet we
can see that, while in terms of presence and activity parties usually take the
lead, in terms of consumption there is a clear tendency for party leaders to
be more represented. Nevertheless, from comparisons with the records of
other prominent politicians, this is not a story of overall personalization
but, more specifically, one of personalization of the centralized type. Inter-
estingly, the presidentialization thesis (Poguntke and Webb 2005a, 2005b;
Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny 2012) finds support in terms of consumption,
but not of supply.
We may submit these findings to two approaches to online politics. One is
the normalization approach, which expects politics online to reflect politics
offline. That is, those who are powerful off line are expected to be similarly
powerful online. The second is the innovation or equalization approach,
which expects politics online not only to be different from offline politics,
but to allow weaker actors to use the tools of the online world to improve their
status (Gibson and McAllister 2015; Lev-On and Haleva-Amir forthcoming).
This second approach claims that the new opportunities that Web 1.0, and
especially Web 2.0, supply to political actors change the balance of power
among them. In other words, individual politicians who are not party leaders
can successfully attempt to compensate for their relative weakness in the off-
line world by using the tools and opportunities of the online world. Those who
are likely to take advantage of online opportunities are those who suffer from
offline deficits.
According to our analysis, in terms of supply, equalization is more appar-
ent when all three types of actors make efforts, especially the weaker ones (the
prominent politicians). But when it comes to consumption, normal power

relations are resumed and the gap between party leaders and prominent
politicians becomes apparent. The main challenge for the status of the parties
is clearly centralized personalization.
There is an element in the centralized personalization story that may
nevertheless be interpreted as testimonial to the power of parties. If the
Facebook pages of party leaders are consumed much more than those of
other prominent politicians, then there is something that their status in the
party gives them. This probably is their being number one in the party, with
all its implications, such as being a prime minister, a senior minister, or the
major representative of the opposition. If we take this a step further, we may
argue that the party is the factor that makes a specific politician the one most
wanted by the public. Because politicians come and go while parties stay, we
may claim that the latter still have the upper hand.
But this perspective emphasizes only one side of the story. In the case of
highly personalized parties, it is the party that is a vehicle for the leader, not
vice versa. Beyond these cases, at a time when the party–society linkage is
weakening (as demonstrated in Chapters 3–5), the strength of party leaders
may not always testify to the strength of parties, but rather to the fact that
parties, as state-regulated organs, are a must for any ambitious politician.
The next chapter presents a cross-national comparative analysis of polit-
ical personalization undertaken on the basis of the various indicators of
political personalization that were presented and analyzed in Chapter 7 and
in this chapter.
A Cross-National Analysis of
Discussions of political personalization often start with an agreement that

the phenomenon is alive and growing. But then someone, usually older and
wiser, recalls the great democratic leaders of the past, people like Mahatma
Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, David
Ben-Gurion. This throws cold water on the contemporary personalization
consensus and reminds us that we should not automatically assume that
politics today is more personalized than before. Rather scholars should
conduct an empirical analysis that will establish whether personalization
really occurred in the last decades. And in fact Chapters 7 and 8 did exactly
that. Now we are ready for a more integrated look at the phenomenon.
The first goal of this chapter is to map the occurrence of personalization
and its magnitude. Many researchers assume that personalization exists;
others even make a strong theoretical case for its development. But empir-
ical studies that tried to map the phenomenon cross-nationally (Karvonen
2010; Kriesi 2012), as well as an extensive literature review (Adam and
Maier 2010), interestingly came up with mixed or weak evidence for its
occurrence. We will retrace Karvonen’s (2010) footsteps here, examining the
phenomenon from a broad perspective and expecting cross-national vari-
ance as well as variance in the development of the different faces of person-
alization. The causes of personalization—especially mediatization, party
change, and individualization—are common to democracies. At the same
time, cross-national variance should be expected, because political culture
and institutional factors (e.g., majoritarian vs. proportional electoral sys-
tem) are likely to affect the development and magnitude of personalization.1
Thus the first half of this chapter presents an integrated analysis of political
personalization on the basis of the data gathered in the two previous
chapters (see Appendix 18 on the standardization of the new media indica-
tors). The second half displays the consequences of political personalization
1
See also the claims made in Chapter 6 (“Institutional Personalization as the Independent
Variable”) about the impact of personalized institutional structures on the development of media
personalization and behavioral personalization.
A Cross-National Analysis of Political Personalization 193

for democratic politics. Thus, once we see that personalization can indeed be
identified, we turn to discuss its implications.
The chapter starts with an examination of personalization per indicator and
per dimension. This is followed by an examination of the relationship between
the three dimensions of personalization: institutions, media, and behavior.
Regarding the examination of personalization per indicator, the two indicators
of online personalization stand apart where incidents of depersonalization
are concerned. The examination per dimension reveals that personalization
can be found especially in the institutional realm. When an institutional reform
is adopted, it almost invariably involves personalization. In the other two
dimensions, media and behavior, most cases are of personalization, but there
is also a significant number of cases indicating either no trend or depersonal-
ization. The claim of Rahat and Sheafer (2007) that institutional personaliza-
tion is the first link in a chain that leads to media personalization and then to
behavioral personalization does not find much support in the evidence.
The next section compares levels of personalization by country. It dem-
onstrates that, apart from the instances of extreme personalization in Italy
and Israel and the few ones of depersonalization, especially in Switzerland,
most countries experience moderate-low or low levels of personalization.
The next topic examined is the relationship between institutional and cul-
tural factors and levels of personalization. In most cases, no relationship is
identified. A moderately negative correlation is found between a country’s
self-expression values and its ranking along the scale of personalization.
We then turn briefly to examining the overall trend. We argue that, while
personalization indeed takes place, the findings point to high variance and thus
make personalization more relevant to some countries than others. We end the
chapter with the claims about the consequences of political personalization that
are raised in the literature. The main question here is whether this development
threatens democracy or rather strengthens it—or perhaps leaves it unaffected.
POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION: A COMPARISON

BETWEEN INDICATORS AND DIMENSIONS
There are two main reasons why indicators of personalization should correl-
ate: first, because often the same factors are expected to cause the whole array
of types and subtypes of personalization in different countries (see “The
Causes of Personalization” in Chapter 6); and, second, because personaliza-
tion is supposed to breed more personalization (see “Personalization Breeds
More Personalization” in Chapter 6). However, an overview of all fifty-five
paired correlations between the indicators of personalization revealed that

most relationships are weak and insignificant (see Appendix 19). Indeed, most
of the correlations (thirty-seven out of fifty-five) are positive, as should
be expected. But only three pairs of indicators were found to moderately
correlate and to be significant. A closer look at these pairs did not find that
the properties of their relationships deserve special attention in this research.
At any rate, the nature of the data and the frequent lack of variance (especially
the lack or small number of cases of depersonalization for several indicators)
should prompt us to refrain from making too much of the relationships
among these pairs. In short, only a broad-brush examination of the data we
collected and coded makes sense.
Let us now look at personalization per indicator, then per dimension.
Political Personalization by Indicator

Figure 9.1 presents, for each indicator, the number of countries where we
detected a process of depersonalization or personalization or where person-
alization remained more or less at the same level (see Appendix 20 for a
detailed table of values and indicators). For six of the eleven indicators, that
cover all its types, most cases are of personalization. For one indicator, the
number of the cases of no trend is equal to the number of cases of personal-
ization. For two other indicators, most cases show no trend; but, when there is
17
16 16 16 16
16 15
14 14
1313 13 13
Number of countries
12
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6 6 6
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Depersonalization No trend Personalization
F I G U R E 9 . 1 Political Personalization per Indicator


change, this is predominantly one of personalization. These nine indicators
are about the offline world and, as explained, they all point to personalization,
or at least support the claim that, if there is change, its direction is highly likely
to be toward personalization.
The two indicators of online personalization stand apart from the rest:
majority of cases related to them are identified to express depersonalization.
For this reason we focus on them next.
The Online World and the Offline World

The two indicators that were used in examining the online world exhibit a
majority of cases that point to depersonalization.2 As explained, for these
indicators we could not measure cross-national variance at two points in time.
Not only was it impossible to map developments from the 1960s and 1970s
(when the online world did not exist), but the intensity and speed of cyber-
evolution do not allow, or justify, measuring change even for a much shorter
period. Since Facebook has shown great resilience and has retained its pivotal
status, a look at two points in time may be of interest. For our study, which
starts long before the inception of the Internet, it makes more sense to view the
situation as starting from scratch both for parties and for politicians. Meas-
uring how personalized or depersonalized it is in 2015 tells us what was added
to the already exiting offline world, a more personalized or depersonalized
realm. We thus established a dividing line between values that express per-
sonalization and those that do not. When parties were more than twice as
productive and as consumed as politicians, we considered the situation to be
one of depersonalization. When parties were less than twice as productive and
as consumed as politicians, we considered the situation to be one of person-
alization. When parties were about twice as productive and as consumed as
politicians, we considered the situation to be one of no trend. The logic of this
differentiation was the notion that the party, which is a group with a leader
and several politicians, can be expected to be at least twice as productive (here,
in terms of Facebook updates) or “consumed” (here, in terms of Facebook
likes) as its leader or any other individual politician.
The gap between the findings in the online and in the offline world can be
interpreted as giving support to the “innovation” or “equalization” approach
to online politics. That is, the online world allows weaker actors (or, to be
more precise, weakening actors), in this case political parties, to use its tools in
order to improve their status. Indeed, the parties that suffer from offline deficits
take greater advantage of online opportunities than do individual actors. At the
2
For a detailed explanation, see “The Indicators of Controlled Media Personalization and
Personalization in Voters’ Behavior” in Chapter 8.

same time these findings lead to the rejection of the “normalization” approach,
which perceives online politics as largely an extension and a reflection of offline
politics (on these approaches, see “Concluding Remarks” in Chapter 8).
The “innovation” or “equalization” approach is not supported just because
it is the default; that is, just because hardly any similarities were found
between the indicators of online and those of offline personalization. It is
also supported because, from a wide perspective (as presented in Figure 9.1), it
really does stand apart. It is a game changer because, while personalization
offline clearly has the upper hand, in the online world this is not the case. We
will return to discuss the significance of this observation later, in the section
“Personalization with and without Online Influences.”
Political Personalization by Dimension

Table 9.1 presents, for each indicator, the number of countries in which
personalization and depersonalization highly and moderately increased, or
stayed more or less at the same level. This will also be useful in examining the
general trend later. In this section, the information will be used to compare the
T A B L E 9 . 1 Personalization by Indicator and Dimension
Indicator Depersonalization No trend (0) Personalization Total
High Moderate Total High Moderate Total

( 1.5, 2) ( .5, 1) (1.5, 2) (.5, 1)
Electoral reform 2 2 16 5 3 8 26
PM’s power 5 5 5 7 8 15 25
Direct elections 13 6 7 13 26
Leadership 5 9 7 16 21
selection
Candidate 6 6 10 16 22
selection
Institutional 7 7 45 33 35 68 120
Media coverage 2 3 10 13 15
Leader’s name 1 1 16 5 4 9 26
New media 9 5 14 4 1 6 7 25
supply
Media 9 6 15 22 9 20 29 66
Legislators’ 3 2 5 4 9 5 14 23
behavior
Voters’ behavior 1 2 3 6 7 6 13 22
New media 12 5 17 2 2 4 6 25
consumption
Behavior 16 9 25 12 18 15 33 70
Total 25 22 47 79 60 70 130 256

dimensions of personalization—institutional, media, and behavioral; we will
thus look at the totals for each of them.
Personalization is readily evident when it comes to institutions. The majority
of values (56.7 percent; that is, sixty-eight out of 120) reflect personalization; a
little more than a third (37.5 percent, forty-five out of 120) reflect no trend; and
only very few (5.8 percent, seven out of 120) reflect depersonalization. In the
institutional dimension, when there is change in a specific direction (and more
than 60 percent of the values express change), it is almost ten times more likely
to imply personalization.3
Regarding the two other dimensions, media and behavior, the plurality of
values imply personalization: 43.9 percent (twenty-nine out of sixty-six) for
media personalization and 47.1 percent (thirty-three out of 70) for behavioral
personalization. In the case of media personalization, most other instances
are of no trend (33.3 percent, twenty-two out of sixty-six cases). Deperson-
alization was identified in fewer cases than one in four (22.7 percent, fifteen
out of sixty-six). In the case of behavioral personalization, more than a
third of the values are for depersonalization (35.7 percent, twenty-five out of
seventy cases).
Finding more personalization in the institutional realm and less of it in the
media realm, and fewer cases of depersonalization in the media realm than in
the behavioral realm, might seem to fit Rahat and Sheafer’s (2007) claim
about the sequence of personalizations—first comes the institutional type,
then personalization of the media, and only later personalization in behavior.
But only a country-level examination will further substantiate (or refute) this
claim. The next subsection undertakes that attempt.
Relationships between Dimensions of Personalization

Drawing here on Chapter 6’s premise that personalization breeds more
personalization, we focus on Rahat and Sheafer’s (2007: 77) suggestion that
personalizing political institutions leads to personalization in how the media
present and cover politics (media personalization) and that this, in turn, leads
to change in the behavior of the political actors (behavioral personalization).
In the absence of data, we do not go as far as conducting a time-series
analysis, as Rahat and Sheafer (2007) did. We just observe the trends in each
dimension, in order to check whether their findings concerning Israel garner
support from the data here. Table 9.2 presents the values of the average
scores for each dimension (institutional, media, behavioral) in each country.
3
Of the seven instances of depersonalization, five are the result of estimations of changes in
prime-ministerial powers. If we put this indicator aside, we are left with two purely institutional
changes (the electoral reform in Japan and the one in New Zealand) against forty cases of no trend
and fifty-three of personalization.

T A B L E 9 . 2 Personalization by Dimension*
Country* Institutional Media Behavior

Australia .60 1.33 .83
Austria .60 1.33 .33
Belgium 1.30 .00 1.00
Israel 1.10 1.67 2.00
Italy 1.40 1.33 1.83
Canada .40 .33 .00
Denmark .90 .67 .00
Germany 1.00 .00 .00
Czech Republic 1.25 .00 1.00
Finland .80 1.00 .50
France .60 .33 .50
Hungary .67 .50 .00
Iceland 1.20 1.00 .33
Ireland 1.00 1.00 .67
Japan .20 .67 .50
Luxembourg .67 .50 .83
Netherlands 1.00 .00 .33
New Zealand .80 1.00 .25
Norway .10 .00 .67
Poland 1.67 1.00 .33
Portugal .70 1.00 .67
Spain .20 .33 1.00
Sweden .80 .33 1.17
Switzerland .00 .33 1.50
UK 1.00 .00 .67
* The table does not include Greece because we have no data on behavioral personalization there.
To support Rahat and Sheafer’s findings, we expect to identify one of the

following combinations: no trend in all three dimensions (0/0/0); institu-
tional personalization with no trend in the other two (positive value/0/0);
institutional and media personalizations with no trend for behavioral per-
sonalization (positive value/positive value/0); or personalization in all three
dimensions (positive value/positive value/positive value). Following this
logic, the same may also be expected when we try to find a sequence of
negative values. But we cannot expect to have a negative value in one or in two
dimensions alongside a positive value in the other dimension(s). We ignore
magnitudes of personalization at this stage. Note that, even if Rahat and
Sheafer’s (2007) claim does win support, it is still not proved to be correct, as
only a time-series analysis can verify it. What we do here is simply examine the
preliminary condition for setting up such an examination.
Less than a third of the cases—the eight that appear in the upper rows
(highlighted in grey)—lend support to the possibility that personalization may
have started in institutions, continued in the media, and ended in forms of

behavior. All other cases include either a negative value (that is, depersonal-
ization) that does not seem to generate additional negative values, or a zero
value for media personalization and a positive one for behavioral personal-
ization. We tried to give Rahat and Sheafer’s (2007) approach a better chance
by conducting the same examination, this time leaving out the indicators of
online personalization. This made sense, because their study was conducted
before Facebook was born. Since the indicators of online personalization
were indeed found to be different from the indicators of offline personaliza-
tion, we expected the amount of supporting evidence to increase. Indeed, in
the case of offline personalization, ten out of twenty-four cases fit the expect-
ation. This is a somewhat better balance. In general, Rahat and Sheafer’s
(2007) approach did not get much support, nor could we identify another clear
pattern of relationships among the dimensions. But maybe with some quali-
fications, and under some conditions, notions about the relationship between
types of personalization might find more support.
PERSONALIZATION: A COMPARISON BETWEEN

DEMOCRACIES
We can compare the overall level of personalization in the countries under

study by using two approaches. First we can treat all indicators as equal and
average them, as we did for party change. This approach is based on the
assumption that no indicator is more important than the others. Second, as a
way to neutralize the possible bias due to the difference in the number of
indicators within each dimension (five for institutions and only three for
media and behavior), we average the averages for each dimension.4 This
step is based on the assumption that all dimensions are equal and none is
more important than the others. Both of these notions can be claimed to be
arbitrary, as would be a decision to give different weights to different indica-
tors or dimensions. We opted for sticking with the default alternative of equal
weights, as a reasonable choice in a situation where we lack a better
alternative.
Figure 9.2 presents an average of the values for eleven indicators of political
personalization (or fewer, when values are missing) in twenty-six democracies.
Figure 9.3 presents an average of the values for the three dimensions of political
4
This approach might also have been optimal for our analysis of partyness, where we had only
two indicators for one dimension and five for the other two. We refrained from adopting it
because the quality of the data on which the indicators for our first dimension were based did not
allow us to give them extra weight in the overall analysis.

2.00
1.50 1.50
1.50
1.00
0.86
0.80 0.86
0.73 0.75
0.59 0.61
0.55
0.45 0.50
0.50
0.35
0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30
0.22 0.23
0.15
0.11 0.14
0.05 0.06
–0.05
0.00
d
en
rg
ain
ay
n
UK
da
ce
al
ny
nd
ia
ce
Au m
a
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ae
ep
lan
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er
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Fin
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Fr
Gr
Sw
Ca
Be
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Hu
Po
itz
the
Ge
De
ec
xe
Sw
w
Cz
Ne
Lu
Ne
–0.50
–0.61
–1.00
F I G U R E 9 . 2 Average Personalization by Country (Average of Indicators)
2.00
1.59
1.52
1.50
1.00 0.92
0.78
0.76 0.77
0.50 0.52
0.52
0.50 0.44
0.33
0.24 0.26 0.29 0.32
0.19 0.22
0.11 0.12
0.11
0.06 0.08
–0.04
0.00
d
en
rg
UK
al
ay
d
da
ce
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ny
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nd
ia
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lgi
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er
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Fin
Ice
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Au
Po
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No
r
Fr
Gr
Sw
Ca
Be
r
Ze
Hu
Po
itz
Au
the
Ge
De
ec
xe
Sw
–0.23
w
Cz
Ne
Lu
Ne
–0.23
–0.50
–0.61
–1.00
F I G U R E 9 . 3 Average Personalization by Country (Average of Dimensions)


personalization, after a preliminary calculation of the average value of the
group of indicators within each dimension.5 The differences between the two
approaches are not large. The overall picture is similar, yet the rank of each
country in terms of the average value may differ: the average difference in the
ranks is 2.2, the median is 1, while the range of difference is 0–9. We would
either look at both or prefer what seems to be the somewhat more logical
perspective, that of equality between dimensions.
The most prominent cases are on the one hand Italy and Israel—which seem
to be in their own league, having extremely high levels of personalization—
and on the other Switzerland, which demonstrates the highest level of deper-
sonalization. The location of these cases at the two poles makes sense and
helps to validate the maneuver. That is, the location of Italy and Israel on the
personalization pole could be expected, according to studies of political per-
sonalization in Israel (Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Shenhav and Sheafer 2008;
Balmas et al. 2014) and Italy (Cotta 2015; Musella 2015). Switzerland’s place-
ment on the depersonalized pole is also predictable: this is a country whose
collegial government in particular and decentralized institutional structure in
general can be expected to discourage personalization.
According to Figure 9.3, the trend of personalization is evident in twenty-
two countries, while depersonalization is evident in less than a sixth of the
countries. In Figure 9.2 the trend is even clearer: there are twenty-four cases
of personalization and only two of depersonalization. However, behind this
dichotomy there is variance. The range spread from 0.61 to 1.59 in Figure 9.3
or from 0.61 to 1.50 in Figure 9.2. Such range covers 55 percent, 2.2, in
Figure 9.3 and 53 percent, 2.11, in Figure 9.2 for a maximal range of 4.0.
However, if we set aside the three extreme cases of Italy, Israel, and Switzerland,
we end up with a much smaller range of 0.23 to 0.92 (29 percent, for
Figure 9.3) or 0.05 to 0.86 (23 percent, for Figure 9.2).
Caution is necessary in not assigning too much significance to small differ-
ences between countries. This is a lesson that we could already draw when
identifying small differences in the relative rankings of countries in Figure 9.2
(which is based on a simple average) and in Figure 9.3 (which are based on
averages among dimensions). We may be better off if we group the countries
roughly into clusters: countries with high personalization (Israel and Italy);
countries with moderate personalization (Australia, Poland, Belgium, Austria);
countries with moderate-low personalization (Denmark, New Zealand,
Greece); countries with low personalization (Netherlands, Germany, Japan,
Spain, France, Canada, Ireland, Norway); countries with no evident trend
(Portugal, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland);
5
For Greece we do not have any information on behavioral personalization.

countries with low depersonalization (Finland, Sweden); and countries with
moderate depersonalization (Switzerland).
Adam and Maier (2010: 234) suggest this: “Future research needs to specify
the cultural and institutional factors in regard to the political and media
systems that explain under which conditions personalized politics evolves.”
Factors that explain variance may be found at the national level, at the party
level, and at the individual level. Here we obviously limit ourselves to the
country level, on which all of this research is predicated. We follow their menu
of factors that may encourage or discourage personalization, with some
needed additions, changes, and amendments.
One factor is the regime type: presidential regimes, by their very nature, are
expected to breed personalization—more so than parliamentary regimes, in
which parties and collective executive are the building blocks (Blais 2011;
Kriesi 2012; Ohr 2011). While we do not include presidential regimes in our
analysis, we can still compare the parliamentary regimes to those regimes that
have some presidentialized elements. Samuels and Shugart’s (2010: 32–3) typ-
ology of regimes suggests that, among our twenty-six democracies, Finland,
France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Austria possess some presidential elem-
ents. However, these six countries range along a wide spectrum (Figure 9.3),
from depersonalization (Finland) to moderate personalization (Austria,
Poland). An exclusive look at offline personalization does not change this
picture (see Figure 9.4). Thus, having presidential elements does not seem to
cause a country to experience greater personalization.
Switzerland’s regime type, which can be classified either as a unique
hybrid (Lijphart 2012) or as a model of its own (Samuels and Shugart
2010), is an interesting case. While there are presidential elements—the
executive, once selected by the houses of parliament, is not dependent on
their support for its survival—the country’s collegial executive fits well with
most of the features of its highly consensual regime (Lijphart 2012). It makes
sense that an institutional structure in which power is dispersed in a hori-
zontal and vertical manner would not breed personalization; it would rather
encourage depersonalization (interestingly, without empowering the polit-
ical parties).
The Swiss case leads us to another distinction that is relevant to the
development of personalized politics: that between majoritarian and consen-
sus regimes. It may be expected that the concentration of political power
would be conducive to personalization, especially because it emphasizes the
leader at the top, and maybe also because in single-member districts
the individual candidates are more prominent. But it is also possible that, in
the context of power dispersion in a consensus regime, a number of person-
alities would become prominent; and this would explain the generally messy
picture. In any case, we did not find any correlation between levels of person-
alization (both in general and only offline) and either of the two dimensions of

consensus versus majoritarian regime proposed by Lijphart (2012)—the
party–executive dimension and the unitary–federal dimension.
Electoral systems may also be examined separately, as specific factors,
because, overall, consensus and majoritarian scores might hide important
differences. Studies of voters’ behavior indeed show that majoritarian elect-
oral systems encourage personalized voting according to leader evaluations
(Curtice and Hunjan 2011; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2011). Yet we found no
correlation between levels of personalization (both in general and only offline)
and the disproportionality of the country’s electoral system (Lijphart 2012).
In short, Westminster democracies, veteran consensus democracies, and
third-wave democracies can all be found spread among the groups with
higher and lower levels of personalization. The Nordic countries tend to
have low levels of depersonalization or low levels of personalization, except
for Denmark, which has a moderate level of personalization. Beyond this,
no common grouping of countries by political culture, regime structure, or
electoral system can be made on the basis of these results.
An additional cluster of factors at the national level relates to the media.
The nature of the media system might influence personalization. If market
pressures encourage the media to focus on the personal element, then the
more the system is in private hands, the more personalized the political
coverage will be. The weight of the different media outlets as sources of
political information may also influence personalization levels (Blais 2011).
The more television serves as a source of political information in a given
country, the more personalization will likely be seen (Ohr 2011). We could
not identify any relationship between our scores on personalization (general
and offline) and these factors, as they appear in the works of Ohr (2011) or
that of van Aelst et al. (2017).
It is possible that the relationship between personalization and these factors
is more complex and has to do with specific combinations of the latter
(Downey and Stanyer 2010). We leave this puzzle for other researchers and
turn now to evaluating the differences between national levels of average
personalization that include online indicators and national levels that do not
(offline personalization).
Personalization with and without Online Influences

In many cases, the inclusion of the two indicators of online personalization
reduces the overall average value of personalization. It should be noted that
we only looked at Facebook. Had we added Twitter to our analysis, we would
clearly see that the online world also has potential for increasing personaliza-
tion (Small 2010; Zamir and Rahat 2017). Nevertheless, Facebook was the
central social media platform at the time of the analysis and should thus be

2.00
1.72 1.70
1.59
1.52
1.50 1.39
1.27
1.17 1.20
1.10
1.00
0.92
1.00 0.89 0.92 0.85
0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78
0.67
0.57 0.50 0.52
0.52
0.50 0.47 0.44 0.50
0.50 0.37
0.30 0.32 0.33
0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30
0.23
0.18 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.22
0.11 0.11 0.12
0.06 0.08 0.10
–0.04
0.00
Sw d
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Hu d
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UK
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Fr
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Sw
–0.23
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–0.25 –0.23
–0.50
–0.61
–1.00
General personalization Offline personalization
F I G U R E 9 . 4 Personalization of Countries with and without Indicators

of Online Personalization*
* The values are of averages of dimensions, with and without including the indicators of online
personalization that are part of the second (media) and third (behavior) dimensions.
seen as expressing an important side of it.6 In addition, even if one would insist
that our dividing line is somewhat biased and requires higher party/politicians
ratios, less personalization would still be found in the online world by compari-
son to the offline world.
Figure 9.4 presents a comparison between the average values of the dimen-
sions of personalization for each country, with and without the online per-
sonalization indicators. Omitting those indicators does not influence all the
countries equally. Some have quite high levels of offline personalization,
which become evident once we omit the online indicators: the three late
third-wave democracies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary and
the veteran democracies of Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, and Ireland.
Some other countries have lower average levels of personalization once we
omit the online indicators: the most prominent among these are Australia and
Denmark. These comparisons point to the difference that the addition of an
6
While Twitter appears to be more personalized, websites look rather more partified (see “Who
Has the Upper Hand in the Online World: Parties or Politicians?” in Chapter 8). Websites may have
been less central in 2015, when we conducted our analysis, but they were clearly there for a long time,
which justified their inclusion. Thus Facebook seems to be the optimal compromise choice for our
purposes here.

T A B L E 9 . 3 A Comparison between Karvonen’s (2010) Estimations and Our
Estimations of Personalization by Countries
Country Karvonen 2010 Ranking in our Ranking in our study,

study* excluding indicators of
Estimation Ranking online personalization
1–4
Belgium Positive case 1 1 (5) 1 (4)

Ireland Positive case 1 3 (16) 2 (8)
Finland Positive case 1 4 (24) 4 (23)
Israel Mixed-positive case 2 1 (1) 1 (2)
Italy Mixed-positive case 2 1 (2) 1 (1)
Denmark Mixed-positive case 2 2 (8) 4 (20)
Netherlands Mixed-positive case 2 2 (10) 1 (6)
New Zealand Mixed-positive case 2 2 (8) 2 (7)
Sweden Mixed-positive case 2 4 (25) 4 (23)
Austria Mixed-negative case 3 1 (6) 1 (5)
Germany Mixed-negative case 3 2 (11) 3 (13)
Japan Negative case 4 2 (12) 2 (11)
Norway Negative case 4 3 (17) 3 (17)
Canada Negative case 4 3 (15) 4 (20)
* Based on average values per dimension; see Figure 9.3. In brackets is the original ranking of the twenty-six
countries in our study.
online or virtual space has made. Of course, a comprehensive political look at

the state of the world in 2015 that does not pay heed to indicators of online
personalization would make no sense.
Table 9.3 compares the general estimations of country-level political per-
sonalization of Karvonen (2010) with the findings of our research. Karvonen
suggested four categories, so we took the rankings of the fourteen countries
that appear in both studies from Figure 9.3 and spread them roughly over a
four-point scale: countries that ranked in the top six positions in the order of
personalization were categorized as 1; the next six (positions 7 to 12) were
categorized as 2; the next six (positions 13 to 18) were categorized as 3; and the
remaining seven (positions 19 to 25) were categorized as 4.
In only four of these fourteen countries is the ranking identical; in an
additional five the difference is of one ranking, and in five others it is of two
or three rankings. In addition, we also tried to compare the levels of person-
alization obtained by us with those obtained by Karvonen by using the same
method, but this time after we took the online indicators out of the calcula-
tion. This elimination could be expected to improve the resemblance between
Karvonen’s findings and our findings, because online indicators were not
taken into account in Karvonen’s study and, as we saw, they substantially
influenced our general estimations. However, the same lack of resemblance
between the two sets of results remained even after the elimination of online

indicators. Our study is more comprehensive (it covers more data) and more
systematic in processing the material. Yet two points should be made, one
oriented to the past, the other to the future. First, we emphasize that we
stand on the shoulders of Karvonen (2010) not only in that we used his data,
but because we owe him many theoretical and methodological elements on
which our study is based. Second, hopefully, future scholars will stand on
our shoulders and suggest an improved scale and rank. While we contend
that our general findings make sense especially when one looks at the two
extremes, we would not be surprised if more fine-tuned measures would
bring changes in the values and rankings of countries in the less differenti-
ated middle groups.
Unfortunately, the nature of the data did not allow us to examine the
relationship between the starting point—that is, how personalized each coun-
try was to begin with—and the magnitude of the process it went through—
that is, how much personalization it experienced. We could see whether
there was any relationship between partyness at the starting point and per-
sonalization, with or without including indicators of online personalization
(Table 9.4). We found no clear relationship between the two. We have cases of
high partyness at the starting point and high personalization (e.g., Austria,
Italy); of high partyness at the starting point and low personalization (actually
depersonalization, e.g., Sweden); of low partyness at the starting point and
high personalization (Poland); and of low partyness at the starting point and
moderate depersonalization (Switzerland).
Two competing hypotheses can be proposed for the relationship between
the national level of self-expression values and personalization.7 One is that
they are positively correlated, because they both emphasize the individual
over the collective. That is, postmaterialism is associated to higher status for
the individual, while survival values are tied to an old-fashioned politics in
which the collective is at the center. The other hypothesis is that personal-
ization is negatively correlated with self-expression values. This would be so
because personalization, which stresses charismatic rather than legal or
rational authority, is a nondemocratic, or at least a less liberal–democratic
tendency.
Table 9.5 examines the relationship between the countries’ rankings in self-
expression values and in personalization. No clear correlations were found
when comparing these two sets. Yet, when the indicators of online personal-
ization were omitted (Figure 9.5), we got a moderate significant Spearman
negative correlation ( 0.40 P < 0.05). This tells us that there is some support
for the expectation that personalization is not about individualism of the liberal
kind, but rather a tendency of a nondemocratic or less democratic nature.
7
On self-expression values, see n. 5 in Chapter 5.

T A B L E 9 . 4 Partyness at Starting Point and Personalization (Countries’ Ranking)
Country Ranking in partyness Ranking in the level of Ranking in the level of

at starting point personalization offline personalization
(excluding online indicators)
Austria 1 6 5
New 2 7 7
Zealand
Germany 3 11 13
Australia 4 3 12
Sweden 5 25 22
Italy 5 2 1
Belgium 7 5 4
UK 8 19 15
Luxembourg 9 19 24
Ireland 10 16 8
Iceland 11 23 21
Norway 12 17 17
Japan 12 12 11
Canada 14 15 19
Israel 15 1 2
Finland 16 24 22
Denmark 17 7 19
Portugal 17 18 14
Netherlands 19 10 6
Greece 20 9 15
Spain 21 13 25
Switzerland 22 26 26
France 23 14 18
Czech 24 21 9
Republic
Hungary 25 22 10
Poland 26 4 3
THE OVERALL TREND
Generally there is evidence for personalization. Out of 256 values, 50.8 percent
(130) express personalization, 30.9 percent (79) express no trend, and 18.4
percent (47) express depersonalization (Table 9.1). Six of the eleven indicators
clearly point to personalization. In another three, no trend is either the most
frequent pattern (two instances) or on par with personalization (one instance),
yet when change does occur it is almost always toward personalization. Only
for the two indicators of online politics is depersonalization the more frequent
trend. As for countries (Figures 9.2 and 9.3), most of them experienced
personalization (twenty-four or twenty-two out of twenty-six). However, if
we set aside the extreme cases, the general trend is quite moderate.

T A B L E 9 . 5 Self-Expression Values, Change in Partyness and Partyness at
End Point in Twenty-Six Democracies (Countries’ Ranking)
Country Ranking in self- Ranking in the level of Ranking in the level of off-
expression values* personalization line personalization
(excluding online indicators)
Sweden 1 25 22
Denmark 2 7 19
Norway 3 17 17
Canada 4 15 19
Iceland 5 23 21
Australia 6 3 12
New Zealand 7 7 7
UK 8 19 15
Switzerland 9 26 26
Belgium 10 5 4
Netherlands 11 10 6
Finland 12 24 22
Ireland 13 16 8
France 14 14 18
Luxembourg 15 19 24
Germany 16 11 13
Italy 16 2 1
Austria 18 6 5
Spain 19 13 25
Poland 20 4 3
Japan 21 12 11
Greece 22 9 15
Czech Republic 23 21 9
Israel 24 1 2
Portugal 25 18 14
Hungary 25 22 10
* The rankings in self-expression were taken from the cultural map of 2015 (World Value Survey 2015). For
Israel and Italy, we had to use rankings from the cultural map of 1996 ( World Value Survey 2015). For other
countries, differences in ranking between 1996 and 2015 were small, and thus we should not expect them to
influence the analysis.
CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION
This section presents the consequences of political personalization for demo-

cratic politics. It does so by focusing the discussion on several possible
consequences that the literature suggests. In each case, it presents critically
both the claims of those who are concerned that this development might
weaken or even threaten democracy and the claims of those who perceive it
as a harmless, if not even a positive development.

30
SWI
SPA
25 LUX
SWE FIN
Offline Personalization
ICE
20 DEN FRA
CAN
NOR GRE
15 POR
UK GER
AUS JAP HUN

10
IRE
CZ
NZ
NET
AUT
5
BEL
POL ISR
ITA
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Self-Expression Values
F I G U R E 9 . 5 The Relationship between the Rankings of Countries in Terms

of Self-Expression Values and Offline Political Personalization
Depoliticization, Irrationality, and Dealignment

Personalization does not necessarily imply intimization or privatization,
that is, politics based on nonpolitical themes and on the emotional rather
than the rational. Moreover, as Brettschneider (2008: 2) notes, “personaliza-
tion can be an adequate strategy in order to communicate complex content:
politicians then lend their party’s policies a face and a voice.” Yet the potential
for privatization and intimization is there. One cannot really have an allegedly
intimate relationship with an abstract entity such as a political party. Parties
are all about politics and have no family life, human properties, hobbies, or
emotions. Human beings, even full-time politicians, have nonpolitical sides.
If these become central to the electoral campaigns, for example, then politics
“is increasingly meaningless, issues are marginalized, and elections are turned
into mere beauty contests, designed by spin doctors who are practically
‘packaging’ their candidates for the media” (Brettschneider 2008: 1). Compe-
tition over issues and the supply of a proper amount of substantive informa-
tion about them may be replaced with personal struggles whose dominant
content is not political (van Aelst et al. 2017). With such presentation of
politics and media coverage, voting would be based not on rational calcu-
lations but on emotions (Langer 2007). Masket’s (2016) empirical study
of the consequences of active attempts to create nonpartisan personalized

politics (not necessarily of the intimized or privatized type) indeed finds that
these attempts led to a decrease in turnout and to more confusing and less
informed elections.
Poguntke and Webb (2017: 12–13) claim that “[p]residentialization feeds
into populism” of all kinds (left, right, center) for two reasons. First, “the fact
that strong executive leaders weaken parties means that more voters are ‘set
free’ from the old loyalties. Arguably, they are up for grabs by populists.”
Second, the fact that strong executive leaders are tempted to (and capable of)
pushing through sudden policy change legitimizes the idea, often embraced by
populists, that we need radical, sudden change to address (alleged) crises.
Moreover, “[t]he increasing ideological similarity [between parties] legitimizes
the argument of populists who claim that established parties ‘are all the same.’”
However, there are also scholars who perceive personalization as a positive
development for voters. Mazzoleni (2000) suggests that personalized political
leadership—especially in the age of individualism and decline of ideology—is
conducive in terms of encouraging people to participate in politics. Indeed,
Kruikemeier et al. (2013), who ran both a scenario-based experiment and a
laboratory experiment, found that more personalized communication
through websites prompted citizens to increase their political involvement
and enhanced the positive effects of interactivity.
Thus personalization does not equal privatization or intimization. It has the
potential to depoliticize voting and make it into a merely emotional act, but it
may also keep it rational and informed. Indeed, those who perceive person-
alization as a positive development stress that the focus on individual politi-
cians is not about depoliticization or irrationality. Even Wattenberg (2011),
who sees political personalization as a negative development, finds that, over
the years, US politicians are judged increasingly on the basis of how they deal
with various issues and less in terms of their personality. In other words,
leaders may serve as shortcuts for issues.
Lobo and Curtice (2015a: 248) argue: “If leader evaluations are political,
then they signify that electors are using leaders as a political cue. This means
that electors are behaving rationally and that leader evaluations convey a
political signal. In this respect, they cannot be seen to constitute a negative
sign for the quality of democracy today.” (For a similar approach, see
Mughan 2000.) Ohr and Oscarsson’s (2011: 212) empirical analysis finds
that “politically relevant and performance-related leader traits are important
criteria for voters’ political judgements and decisions”; therefore they declare
that “leader evaluations and their effect on the vote in the electorate are firmly
based on politically ‘rational’ considerations—be it in a presidential or in a
parliamentary system.” According to Marinova (2016), the use of informa-
tion on political personalities as an election cue in “complex elections”
(that is, in elections with a lot of party change: new parties, party splits and
mergers, and the demise of existing parties) is an efficient and rational use of

limited resources. Bjerling (2012) even suggests that political trust at a time
when party identification decreases and personalization increases would bene-
fit if the media could become more personalized and could produce more
information about individual politicians and deliver it to the public. In short,
personalization can be seen as a form of adaptation to cultural, sociopolitical,
and media changes.
Huber (2015) conducted an experiment in Sweden, Germany, and France
that demonstrated that personalization does not transform elections into a
beauty contest, because citizens evaluate leaders on the basis of political
considerations rather than of apolitical personal traits. In addition, Garzia
(2014: 83) claims that the findings of his study of voters’ behavior demonstrate
that “the most sophisticated would also seem to pay a growing attention
throughout time to leaders’ personalities when casting their vote as compared
with the least sophisticated segments of the electorate.” So personalization in
voters’ behavior does not reflect a decrease in the sophistication of voters and
an increase in the tendency to vote according to short-term reactions and
personal emotions; it is rather due to the addition of crucial factors that
pertain to politicians’ competence and honesty. Bittner (2011) demonstrates
that leaders’ evaluations are not shortcuts for the less educated and the ill-
informed; they are used mostly by the parts of the electorate that are better
educated and more knowledgeable.
Caprara (2007: 154) goes so far as to claim that:
In fact, the declining influence of social class and party identification on
voters’ political choices in most western democracies suggests that polit-
ical preferences are increasingly dependent on the likes and dislikes of
voters, their cognitive strategies, and their personal concerns. As individ-
uals emancipate themselves from conditions of scarcity and experience
higher mobility, they are confronted with multiple world views and
opportunities. As traditional ties and loyalties weaken, interpersonal
bonds are continuously re-negotiated. The ethos of modernity commends
the full expression of one’s own individuality and the full actualization of
one’s potentials.
Indeed, the criticism against the personalization of voting behavior is weak

because it usually equates personalization with privatization or intimization.
A stronger critic would ask, beyond voting, what would be a better focal point
for democracy: parties or individuals? This is the line of inquiry pursued here
in the next sections.
Responsiveness, Accountability, and Political Trust

What happens when politicians become the focal point of politics, in place of
parties? Those who perceive personalization as a positive development argue

that using leaders rather than parties as electoral cues not only is rational but
may even be more effective. That is, leaders may be more effective than
parties in supplying the necessary information shortcuts for citizens in the
context of mediated politics (Adam and Maier 2010). Lobo and Curtice
(2015a: 247) argue that their finding that leaders’ evaluations influence voting
in political systems where the role of leaders is more central (e.g., in presiden-
tial regimes or in majoritarian polities) “contribute[s] to the idea that citizens
use leaders as cues in situations where it is rational to do so.” Moreover, the
presidentialization of politics may imply that politicians are now monitored
more closely than before and can no longer take voters’ loyalty for granted; in
other words, voting becomes rational rather than based on party loyalty
(Lobo and Curtice 2015c).
Not all scholars agree with this view. Key (1949: 303) argued, on the basis
of his study of southern US politics, that personalized politics “confuses the
electorate” and thus does not supply it with a shortcut in elections or with a
clear basis for responsiveness and accountability. Analyzing US politics,
Wattenberg (1994: 111) demonstrated that parties function much better as
shortcuts for issues than do candidates. “Only 14 percent of the likes and
dislikes expressed about the candidates for Congress in 1978 could be said to
be references about matters of public policy, compared to 47 percent of the
responses about political parties.”
Moreover, according to Masket (2016: 23), who studied attempts to
actively create nonpartisan personalized politics, politicians may enjoy per-
sonalization, but not so those citizens who want to influence them:
Politicians and policy demanders may work simultaneously both inside

and outside the government to create or strengthen a party system.
This book, however, argues that such activities tend more often to
come from outside the government for the very simple reason that
incumbents have more to gain (or less to lose) from a nonpartisan
system than activists do. As much empirical evidence will attest,
incumbents can still enjoy lengthy and prosperous careers in the
absence of parties. It is a rare activist that can secure her policy goals
in such a system.
In addition, some scholars of presidentialization are concerned with the gap

between the prominence of leaders and their diminished ability to deliver
(Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Fabbrini 2013). Personalization makes leaders
a focal point in democratic politics, and in this respect it empowers them with
a popular individual mandate. Yet in a personalized environment these same
leaders lack a support basis from cohesive parties, cabinets, and coalitions
(Musella 2015). They will have to somehow aggregate the interests of many
individuals rather than those of several groupings. And, if indeed one leader
after the other fails to deliver, then public trust in democracy is likely to
deteriorate still further. In the case of party-centered systems, personalization

might create unbridged gaps between the formal and institutional rules of
the game and the actual ways in which personalized politics works. Such
gaps will not only hurt the ability of government to deliver; they will also
affect citizens’ trust.
Wattenberg (2011) asserts that the personalization of American politics
did not lead to improved popularity for leaders but rather the opposite, to
a decline. Langer (2007) suggests that, while emotional identification with
leaders may help connect and reconnect citizens to politics, it may also intensify
mistrust when the “intimate” relationship with a leader is undermined through
media exposure.
If personalization indeed takes place, “trust in individuals . . . should
over time increasingly have come to replace trust in parties” (Bjerling
2012: 6). If people trust individual politicians more than they trust parties,
then personalization is a positive development for democracy. Perhaps, then,
personalization is a result of people’s preferring to relate to politicians, who
are real, physical entities, rather than to political parties, which are abstract
entities with no physical expression? Or maybe people can trust parties more
than they can trust politicians? After all, a party is a relatively stable team with
a specific brand name, while individual politicians come and go. For example,
regarding personalistic parties, Gunther and Diamond (2001: 29) suggest that,
while these may, in the short run, integrate marginalized groups into the
system, “[i]t is more likely, however, that when the candidate loses popularity
and trust in office, political alienation increases.” In this case, personalization
hurts democracy. The intimization of politics, as a specific type of personal-
ization, may be seen as a way to bring people closer to politics; or perhaps
“the exposure of politician’s personal lives has potential negative conse-
quences, it can undermine the reputation or aura of those who govern and,
further, may discourage the honest from entering public office” (Stanyer 2013:
162). By contrast, the finding that voters have a preference for legislators who
dissent (Campbell et al. forthcoming) may nevertheless tell us that voters
prefer individuals over parties when having to select between the two.
It may be that people have stronger feelings, negative or positive, toward real
people than toward abstract parties. Indeed, in their studies of election cam-
paigns for Canadian parties before the 2015 general elections, Pruysers and
Cross (2017: 10) found that, “when parties engage in negative campaigning, it is
opposing party leaders, and not opposing political parties, who are the main
target.” From this point of view, personalization may be perceived as negative,
because it brings high emotions into what should be a rational choice between
policy options; or it may be perceived as positive, because it triggers high
emotions and thus mobilizes the public more effectively than the parties do.
As is evident from Table 9.6, there are hardly any differences between
national levels of trust in political parties and national levels of trust in
politicians: the two are strongly and significantly positively correlated. In
the European Social Surveys (ESS) of 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 these

T A B L E 9 . 6 Trust in Political Parties and Trust in Politicians: A Comparison*
Median Median Average Average Standard Standard

trust in trust in trust in trust in deviation deviation
political politicians political politicians trust in trust in
parties parties political politicians
parties
Netherlands 5.4 5.5 5.0 5.0 1.9 2.0

Denmark 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 2.0 2.0
Norway 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 1.9 2.0
Switzerland 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.2 1.9 1.9
Finland 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.8 2.0 2.0
Sweden 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.7 2.0 2.1
Belgium 4.6 4.7 4.2 4.3 2.2 2.2
Iceland 3.7 4.2 3.6 3.9 2.2 2.2
Germany 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 2.0 2.1
UK 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.2
France 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 2.1 2.1
Hungary 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.5
Israel 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.5
Ireland 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.2 2.3
Czech Republic 2.2 2.0 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.5
Poland 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0
Portugal 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
Italy 1.4 1.3 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.1
Spain 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2
Total average 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1
* Based on answers to questions from the European Social Survey 2012. Respondents were given an 11-point
scale from “no trust at all” (0) to “complete trust” (10).
correlations ranged from 0.85 to 0.89, and in all the cases P < 0.01. This may
explain why Renwick and Pilet (2016: 255) found that “the hopes of reformers
that personalizing the electoral system would contribute to bridging the
growing gap between citizens and politics are not met.”
So at the very least we can say that personalization will probably not save
liberal democracy from its current crisis and from public discontent with it
(Diamond 2015; Foa and Mounk 2016). Still, one question remains: In
conditions defined by this confidence crisis, is personalization a threat to
democracy or a possible remedy, even if a partial one?
Power Dispersion
One of the primary properties of liberal democracy is dispersion of political
power. Power is intentionally spread vertically and horizontally among sev-
eral institutions and political actors in order to prevent its concentration and

the possible threat of authoritarianism, as well as for creating checks and
balances. What is the impact of personalization on power dispersion? One
might argue that personalization, especially the decentralized kind, is good
for liberal democracy because it contributes to spreading power more evenly
among leaders and among individual politicians. These actors cooperate
but also compete, which essentially means that they check and balance
each other.
A much less optimistic interpretation is that personalization does not mean
that power is spread in a way that enhances a structure of checks and
balances. The weakening of political groups leaves the individuals at the top
with fewer restraints than before (Langer 2007). Individual politicians who
are not at the top may well be more independent of their groupings (e.g.,
parties), but they now act on their own and cannot effectively counterbalance
those at the top. Put differently, democracy may develop toward a plebiscitary
Napoleonic mode: a dominant leader who speaks directly to people and
cannot be balanced by the weakening political groupings, institutions, and
organizations; and an atomistic crowd of individual politicians. Balmas et al.
(2014: 47) summarizes the situation:
Which view one adopts of the influence of personalization on democracy
is a function of one’s view of the starting point. If one thinks that political
groupings had an appropriate amount of power in the past, personaliza-
tion will be an issue of grave concern. If one thinks that political group-
ings were too powerful, one might see this process positively in terms of
distribution of power.
Models of Democracy: Between Party Democracy

and Personalized Democracy
Some democratic orders (e.g., presidential democracies) are more personal-
ized, and therefore more capable of adapting to the personalization of politics.
It can thus be argued that parliamentary systems, in which parties rather than
individuals are the main building blocks, are more prone to be weakened by
this development (van Aelst, Sheafer, and Stanyer 2012).
Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny (2012: 94) state that the party government
model, as spelled out by Katz (1987), is under threat in parliamentary coun-
tries where the presidentialization of politics occurs:
Such a development tends to undermine the party government model in a
number of ways: government decisions are more clearly tied to individual
leadership decisions rather than to collectively formulated party policies;
party still matters in electoral processes, but elections are now often as
much about individual leaders in some countries, and the route to the
leadership seems increasingly likely to be defined by the (perceived)
electoral appeal of certain personalities.

De Beus (2011: 20) suggests that we witness a move from party democracy to
an “audience” democracy:
While not doing full justice to Manin’s theory of audience democracy one
could summarize it as conceptualizing the development, in the 20 years
since 1990, from traditional parties’ democracy—where the political party
was the dominant actor in the field of politics, the party programme the
leading principle and competence the virtue for which politicians strived
and with which they legitimized their politics—to audience democracy—
in which personalities are favoured over the party, performance over the
programme and authenticity over competence.
Kölln (2015b), for her part, points to an alternative personalized order that
would be decentralized. She compares, through a “thought experiment,”
party democracy, in which parties mediate between the citizens and their
representatives, and pluralist democracy, in which there are no parties and
each representative is on her own. That is, she compares a system based on
political parties with a personalized political system. Her conclusion is as
follows:
[A]lthough party democracy is by no means flawless, it is nonetheless the

better alternative to its strongest competitor—pluralist democracy with
individual representatives. It outperforms pluralist democracy in terms of
predictability of policy outcomes. Against the core meaning of represen-
tative democracy, pluralist democracy cannot easily fulfil authorization
and accountability simultaneously under certain conditions. In some
instances, party democracy performs slightly better. Especially, under
circumstances of a mandate model and a specific preference set, with
which the representative is authorized, political parties perform slightly
better than individual representatives. When assessed for their perform-
ance in party functions, individual representatives can probably perform
on par with political parties, except for in the function of issue structuring.
I argued that individual representatives are perfectly capable of taking
over parties’ work in structuring issues alongside policy dimensions.
However, what they lack is the provision of a long-term vision or an
ideology of how a country should be run, which is important for policy
coherence in the long run. (Kölln 2015b: 610)
If Kölln paints the picture of a decentralized personalized polity, Key (1949)

tells us about a centralized personalized order where one party rules and
political competition is an intraparty personalized competition. His account
portrays a very problematic and disorganized order, in which the lack
of continuity of political organization confuses the electorate rather than
supplying for it a clear focal point of responsiveness and accountability.
This situation “places a high premium on demagogic qualities” (ibid., 304),
which do not restrain leaders’ capricious actions; and these, in turn, lead to

instability. Balmas et al. (2014) suggest that in the short run personalization
might bring to the fore seemingly empowered leaders; but, without cohesive
parties, these leaders will not have the capacities to promote and implement
policies, and in the long run this kind of situation might cause the replacement
of party democracy with plebiscitary democracy. American politics, too, has
some experience of attempting to get rid of parties and to base representative
politics on individuals. Masket’s (2016: 16) analysis of the results of this
particular experience teaches us “that parties are coalitions of creative and
intense policy demanders, that they are endemic and essential to democratic
politics rather than disruptive of it, and that attempts to rein in or eliminate
them are inherently futile and undermine the goals of accountability and
transparency that their proponents purport to seek.”
Adam and Maier (2010) take a skeptical view of the criticism of personal-
ization. They argue that personalization can be seen as having a negative or
positive impact, or even no impact at all, but that empirical studies are needed
to verify such claims. For example, from the perspective of participatory
democracy theory, personalization may be considered positive if it enhances
participation, especially of those who otherwise would not take part in public
life. From the perspective of deliberative (or discursive) democratic theory,
personalization may appear to be negative if indeed it emphasizes personal
status at the expense of reasoning. De Beus (2011) states that criticism of the
current “audience democracy,” which is highly personalized, is based on
nostalgia for a past of party democracy and on romanticizing scenarios such
as a future of digital politics.
Pakulski and Körösényi (2012) are the champions of “leader democracy,”
which is—in our terms—a centralized personalized democracy. They argue
that post-World War II stability and fear of leaders encouraged party dem-
ocracy. The decline of cleavage politics, the entrance of new forces on the left
and on the right, and market reforms led by assertive leaders and positive
democratic leadership—all rehabilitated leadership. And these developments
led to the creation of leader democracy. This new form of democracy is “a
type of politic, democratic regime and an elite configuration in which political
leaders play a central role in providing a ‘democratic linkage’ between the
rulers and the citizenry” (ibid., 3). This personalized regime, they claim, while
not without its vulnerabilities, clearly falls within the democratic family.
We would like to pitch here a somewhat different perspective. It can be
claimed that parties will prevail even in highly personalized democracies.
Parties will remain because they signify a solution to a collective action
problem. Indeed, nobody “invented” political parties; they were created
because they served the needs of representatives. If so, then the question is
not whether parties will exist but who will control them—a single leader or a
set of actors and intraparty institutions. If democracy is about spreading the
power and giving voice to different perceptions and interests, and not only

about the will of the imagined people (or atomistic crowd that actually
constitutes it), then we should aspire to a democracy with viable parties.
This does not mean that we should ignore personalization, but we should
find ways to domesticize this trend within parties and party systems. This
point will be further developed in Chapters 10 and 11.
A Source of Authority
Modern liberal democracy is based on the rule of law and on institutions,
not on the rule of a person. Personalization could substantially change this.
In Weber’s (1958) terms, we are talking about nothing less than a change in
the source of authority, from the legal–rational type to the charismatic type
(Calise 2015). This change might appear as a threat to modern representa-
tive democracy. It is unlikely that democracy can survive in the long run if
it is sustained mainly through the skills of its leaders. A good regime, after
all, is one that remains in place even if the rulers are less than skilled or
successful.
However, Calise (2011: 3), who identified just such a change in the source of
authority, suggests a less pessimistic perception of it, which allows for per-
sonalization still to be contained within the legal–rational framework:
Political personalization thus appears as a mix of old and new forces. The
main novelty consists in the role of the media and their natural focus on
individuals and their personality. This has led to a revival of charisma in
an electronic form. Media charisma may have little if any of the extraor-
dinary gift of grace that characterized charismatic leaders in the past, with
their mass religious followings. Yet on various occasions, media charisma
has proved to be a key factor in the rise of powerful leaders. The come-
back of personal power also reflects the resilience, in industrialized soci-
eties, of cultural traits long considered bygones. The tendency to rely once
again on personal rather than collective and impersonal attributes is a sign
of weaker social cohesion and increased instability. On the positive side,
one may consider that the process of political personalization, today,
largely falls within the routines, discourse, and boundaries of democratic
politics. The nightmare of personal power getting out of control seems to
belong to the past.
A Threat to Democracy Itself?

The consequences examined above pertain mainly to the question of whether
personalization weakens, strengthens, or changes democracy. Of course, if it
weakens democracy, it can also ultimately bring about its demise. Scholars of
Eastern and Central Europe and of Latin America—with their expertise in

nondemocratic, personalist regimes—perceive personalization as a serious
threat to democracy (Cabada and Tomšic 2016; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).
But if personalization strengthens democracy, then in the long run it can
bring it to a new, improved phase. Pakulski and Körösényi (2012: 48) argue
that the highly personalized leader does not threaten democracy but rather
fulfills its values:
Leaders give meaning to political processes, inject consistency to policies,

integrate the highly differentiated elite, and—most vitally—establish and
cultivate relations of trust with mass publics. However, in line with the
democratic codes, they also take responsibility for their actions, submit to
periodic tests of popularity, and “fall on their swords” when unsuccessful
in subsequent leadership contests.
Pakulski and Körösényi go as far as to present leaders as superior substitutes

to parties—superior in performing their role of providing linkage between the
citizens and the state. Yet the two authors fail to give a satisfactory answer to
the problem at hand: even if an individual leader is center stage at a given
time, democracy is nevertheless built on the rule of law and depends on the
functioning of a web of institutions. No regime can survive for long if it is
identified with a particular person. This might seem like normatively good
news for the case of personalized authoritarian regimes, but not for those who
are interested in a stable democracy. For example, the real challenge for South
Africa seems to be the consolidation of democracy after Nelson Mandela, not
with him. And because individuals (even the best of them) are still mortals, the
stability of a regime had better not be dependent on them.
The literature on the institutionalization of political parties is interesting for
our discussion here because it is also divided in its perception of the relation-
ship between personalization and institutionalization. Implicit in the ways
institutionalization is perceived (Randall and Svåsand 2002) is that, in order
to become institutionalized, a party must have a life beyond that of its leader.
It must maintain, among other things, a stable organization, autonomous and
identifiable through its own routines. Indeed, there are party institutionaliza-
tion scholars who see personalization as antithetical to institutionalization
and as creating a high obstacle to it (Panebianco 1988; Mainwaring and
Torcal 2006). Harmel and Svåsand (1993) suggest that there is a path for
personalized parties (or “entrepreneurial issue parties,” as they call them) to
become institutionalized, but leadership change must occur to enable this
change—which, again, implies that the party must have a life of its own,
beyond its leader. Still, there are scholars who claim that even “hard charis-
matic parties” can become institutionalized (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002).
That is, highly personalized parties whose very existence depends on their
leader can become a stable part of a democratic system. Arter (2016) shows
that the question of leadership succession can be resolved even by such parties.

Interestingly, in his study of the True Finns in Finland and of the National
Front in France, the solution is based on the logic of the traditional authority
of family heredity. But this kind of solution is not a viable at state level. Even
if there are plenty of sons and daughters who follow in the footsteps of their
parents (Justin Trudeau, George Papandreou, George W. Bush, Indira Gandhi),
democracy cannot depend on their existence.
Moreover, if “[p]residentialization feeds into populism” (Poguntke and
Webb 2017: 12–13), then it might also threaten liberal democracy. Populist
leaders tend to weaken the guardians of liberal democracy (courts, free media,
etc.) and attack important elements of its ethos, such as rationalism, profes-
sionalism, and the importance of procedures that ensure equality before the
law. Thus personalization is not just a threat to democratic stability; it may be
a threat to the very nature of democracy and bring about its deterioration
(e.g., from a liberal democracy into an illiberal democracy, or even into an
autocracy).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Three main findings were presented in the first half of this chapter. First, there
is generally a moderate trend of personalization. Variance is not wide; it
ranges from moderate to low levels of personalization (if we set aside the
extreme cases of Italy, Israel, and a few cases of depersonalization, prominent
among them Switzerland). Second, personalization is most evident in the
institutional dimension. When there is any change on this front, it is almost
ten times more likely to be about personalization than about depersonaliza-
tion. Third, the online world seems to supply political parties with the tools to
fight back the trend of personalization, at least up to a point.
If personalization is the enemy of liberal representative democracy, then
this enemy has already won important battles in two countries, has been given
a hard time in four others, and is emerging as a potential threat in a few more
countries. If personalization indicates a healthy and adaptive democracy, we
will need to convince ourselves that Israel’s and Italy’s democracies are the
healthiest among our twenty-six democracies. But the accounts given by
experts and the relatively low ranking of Italy and Israel along various
political, economic, and social lines seem to push this option aside. A third
option, which will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11, is that in some
countries the parties have managed to rechannel individual energies that
might otherwise have created high levels of personalization, and thus they
contained this process. In cases of that sort, personalization does not threaten
the party—in fact it may even serve as a resource for strengthening it.
Part III
Party Change and Political Personalization

10

A Critical Overview of the Literature
Political personalization, as we saw in Chapter 6, is the result of several possible

causes. Prominent among them are the mediatization of politics, party change
(or decline), and individualization. In addition, some types and subtypes of
political personalization are claimed to ignite the development of other types
and subtypes of the same phenomenon. In this chapter we examine what the
research literature has to say about the relationship between party change and
political personalization and we conclude by claiming that, while the relation-
ship between the two can be expected to be negative, this is not always the case.
A long tradition in political science, one that goes back to Weber’s typology of
political authority, perceives institutional authority and personal authority as two
distinct categories with substantially different properties.1 In other words, Weber’s
notion of legal–rational authority can be logically associated with institutions such
as political parties, while his notion of charismatic authority can be associated
with individuals. Kitschelt (2000: 855) offers an example of this approach:
[C]harisma is a quality of personal authority that is difficult to sustain in a
movement or party. Sooner or later, charismatic leaders or their successors
will be forced to routinize authority relations and put them on a different
grounding. Charismatic leaders tie the allegiance of their rank and file on
their personal qualities by not permitting the emergence of party machines
with routines or with fixed programs that could bind their hands and divert
the attention of their supporters to more mundane and predictable bases of
political mobilization.
Admittedly, these two types of authority are ideal; in real life we can expect
to find various combinations, including a mixture of legal–rational and
charismatic authority. For example, the authority of prime ministers in
parliamentary regimes is based on, or emanates from, procedures in their
1
Note that we are not necessarily referring to what Weber would likely have written (or maybe
even claimed, as Pakulski and Körösényi 2012 argue), had he directly addressed political
personalization, but rather to the influence that his writing exercised on how political scientists
think about personalization.

parties (e.g., leadership selection) and in parliament (e.g., having majority
support or at least no majority rejection). Beyond that, the same prime
ministers may augment their political power by being charismatic. But it is
clear that in a liberal democracy the procedures are essential, while charisma
and traditional authority (which is Weber’s third type of authority) are just
valuable additions—a bonus for the ruler. They cannot replace the legal–rational
base. From this perspective, then, unless charisma is clearly an addition to the
legal–rational authority, these are two competing sources of authority.
In most democracies, the dominant legal doctrine concerning representa-
tives is the “personal mandate.” This means that each legislator is expected to
vote according to her best judgment. But in parliamentary democracies the
levels of party unity are high. This is not because legislators from the same
party hold exactly the same opinions on every issue, but because legislators, at
most times, accept the framework of the party, which obliges them to vote
together. While the tension between the personal and the partisan is there, in a
parliamentary democracy the party has the upper hand.
Indeed, scholars tend to see the relationship between parties and personal-
ization as a zero-sum game: when one declines, the other is expected to rise.
But, for party scholars, party decline (or, more precisely, decline in the party–
society linkage) does not necessarily imply political personalization, because
other organizations may take over some of the functions previously performed
by the parties. For most scholars of political personalization, however, person-
alization necessarily involves party decline, because it is intrinsically about
replacing an impersonal authority with a personalized alternative. In other
words, if scholars of political personalization regard party decline as the
starting point of their story, for scholars of party change personalization is
only one of the possible outcomes of party decline. These two perspectives will
be critically examined in the next two sections. We will then survey the inte-
grated perspective expressed in Wattenberg’s works (1991, 1994), the only
scholar who accorded equal weight to the two phenomena, not allowing either
one to overshadow the other. Next we will examine the challenges raised by this
common representation of the relationship between party change and political
personalization as a zero-sum game. We will end by reviewing the direction of
this causal relationship.
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Scholars of political parties proposed a variety of possible actors, not neces-

sarily individual politicians, that could step in when parties declined—
or adapt and change their function, as some would prefer to phrase it
Party Change and Political Personalization 225

(Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003; Daalder 2011; Koole 1996; Merkl 1988).
LaPalombara (2007: 150), for one, asks whether the mediating role of parties
“can survive in a new context where so many other social organizations are able
to compete with the parties as never before anywhere on earth.” Strøm and
Bergman (2011) go a step further, suggesting that party change does not
necessarily mean the rise of an alternative—a particular collective actor (organ-
ization or institution)—but the dispersion of authority in a more balanced
manner among several collective political actors; and they call it a transform-
ation from Westminster into Madisonian democracy. From this perspective,
individual politicians are just one out of a possible set of actor types that may
step in and seize abandoned strongholds of power or fulfill the functions that
parties stopped or failed to perform (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000b).
The first among these actors are the mass media (Mancini and Swanson
1996). They may enter not only to dominate the communication function, but
to represent certain interests; the media could even serve as an important
hothouse for future politicians. Second actors are protective interest groups
that may communicate, represent, and partly even aggregate interests (Farrell
and Schmitt-Beck 2008; Panebianco 1988), possibly even venturing into
policymaking (see Katz 1987). Third come social movements and promo-
tional interest groups that may represent various nonsectorial (and allegedly
nonpartisan) concerns, such as environmental issues (Lawson and Merkl
1988; Richardson 1995). Fourth, other state institutions may step in, for
instance the bureaucracy (this brings depoliticization; see Mair 2013) and
the courts (this brings judicialization; see Cichowski and Sweet 2003;
Hirschl 2008). Fifth, citizens may become more and more involved in
decision-making, through mechanisms of direct and deliberative democracy
(Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000, 2002; Farrell 2014; Katz 1987;
Scarrow 2003).
And let us not forget: personalization is also an option. Individual politi-
cians may push parties to the back seat. Panebianco (1988: 274) suggests that
politics would be personalized when parties “completely lose their own
organizational identity and appear to be only convenient tags for independent
political entrepreneurs.” The perception that personalized politics is the
opposite of party politics is evident in the works of some other party politics
scholars too. This makes a lot of sense, since parties are seen as entities whose
essence is the coordination of actions of individual politicians (Aldrich 2011;
Uslaner and Zittel 2006). If and when they fail in this, they lose their raison
d’être. Parties are also seen as cues for voters. When they flounder, individual
politicians may replace them. As Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg (2002: 62)
put it: “Faced with the decline of stable social alliances and the receding
capability to formulate unambiguous political alternatives, the electoral
appeal of traditional parties depends progressively on their leaders’ capability
as media performers.”

Such perceptions can also be found when looking at the role of parties
within different types of models of democracy. Mair (2002) pitches “populist
democracy,” a regime in which parties do not exist and the leaders are in
direct, unmediated relationship with the voters, as the model opposite to
“party democracy.” Meanwhile, one of the three alternative models that
Katz (1987) proposes for party democracy is a personalized type (pluralist
democracy). Both Katz and Mair, interestingly, propose these models without
using the concept of personalization even once.
The claim that there is a relationship between party change and political
personalization, it should be stressed, does not have to be framed in terms of
party decline. It can also be seen as a manifestation of gradual party evolu-
tion, which can involve adaptation as well (Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny
2012). That is, first, parties may have lost something to other competing
actors (including individual politicians) but are still perceived as central to
politics, as long as we accept that they are not as dominant as they were in
their heyday. Second, the very adaptation of parties, their shift from the mass
party to the catch-all and then to the cartel type—expressed in a change in the
power balance within existing parties, between party institutions and “their”
politicians—may point to their personalization. In other words, what changes
is the power balance within established parties themselves, not the power of
these parties vis-à-vis competing institutions. Here, for instance, the political
leader becomes more powerful (centralized personalization). This is the case
when a process of presidentialization of established parties is identified
(Hloušek 2015; Musella 2015; Passarelli 2015). Changes of this kind can
also take the form of parties becoming less hierarchical or more stratarchical
(Carty 2004), or giving greater autonomy to the individual representative
(decentralized personalization).
The success and growing presence of personalized parties would also be
part of the phenomenon. Party change or decline may involve the emergence
of new parties that have different properties from those of their older coun-
terparts (Ignazi 1996). Some of these new parties add to political personaliza-
tion by typically being leaders’ parties. They are inherently about centralized
institutional personalization. While this is especially true of radical right-wing
parties (Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party), the pattern is increasingly apparent
among parties of the center (Emmanuel Macron’s La République En Marche!
and Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement) and even of the left (Alexis Tsipras’s
Syriza). On the other side, we meet the green parties that intentionally block
centralized institutional personalization and oligarchic tendencies by adopt-
ing rules about rotation in leadership and in other positions, by insisting on
dual or collective leadership, and by emphasizing intraparty democracy.
These characteristics can be seen as expressing decentralized personalization.
Thus, alongside changes in the organization of the existing parties, the emer-
gence of new parties, too, can be seen as a sign of personalization.

It would be a mistake, however, to treat personalization as just another
competing outcome of party change or decline. Personalization is not just an
alternative to party politics. The nonpartisan mass media may have taken
over the communication function (although the politicians and the parties
regained some of it through new media; see Chapter 8). They may even,
sometimes, fulfill important aspects of the representation function. But at
the end of the day the media do not aggregate interests or make policies.
At most, they help in promoting individual politicians, especially leaders, vis-
à-vis their parties. As scholars of political personalization demonstrate,
mediatization may actually encourage personalization by putting individual
politicians rather than parties at the center of the political coverage. That is,
the mass media not only take on some of the roles of political parties but also
contribute to weakening them from within by encouraging personalization.
Neo-corporatism—whereby interest groups become more central in gov-
ernment decision-making—did not develop in most democracies beyond a
limited level, and in any case its peak was in the 1970s (Strøm 2000). Interest
groups may, in some limited areas in specific countries, have a direct say in
policymaking, but mostly they need to convince politicians and to pressure
them to chalk up achievements. Indeed, both Thomas’s (2001) cross-national
study of party–interest group relations and Allern and Bale’s (2017) cross-
national study of left-of-center parties–interest group relations find these
relationships to be much more complex than a mere zero-sum competition.
While interest groups may be seen to compete, in some instances they cooper-
ate while in others they do not play in the same arenas. As Whiteley and Seyd
(2002: 212) explain, interest groups cannot replace parties because the former
aim at concentrating “benefits on a minority group while distributing the costs
among the wider society” while the latter need to address “wider society if
they hope to win office.” The same is true of social movements and promo-
tional interest groups that cannot compromise their agendas, while parties’
main function is to aggregate interests (Yanai 1999). In addition, it was found
that activism within social movements and promotional interest groups does
not come at the expense of partisanship (Reiter 1993).
Parties and interest groups may even wither together rather than take each
other’s place. As van Biezen and Poguntke (2014) note, membership in
interest groups does not increase in parallel with a decline in party member-
ship; the two decline together. Besides, as the distance of interest groups from
parties increases, a likely strategy would be to work with individuals from
several parties—which of course would enhance personalization (Mandelkern
and Rahat 2017).
As for direct citizens’ participation, it is necessarily limited and can serve as
an addition, but not as a substitute for representative democracy (Scarrow
2003; Strøm 2000; Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Referendums are sometimes
actually used to sustain the health of parties. When parties are divided on a

significant issue, they can choose to put it in a referendum. By granting people
the power to decide, they neutralize the issue and avoid a strong internal
conflict, or even a split (Rahat 2009a).
Instead of parties and individual politicians, the judiciary and the bureau-
cracy may sometimes serve the citizens as channels for expressing their griev-
ances and interests. Yet, even with the judicialization of politics (Hirschl 2008;
Tate and Vallinder 1995), courts are limited in their ability to process grievances
and to aggregate interests into policies. The bureaucracy, for its part, may be
able to supply answers to routine issues, but it is not the ideal institution for
responding to intensively changed realities.
To summarize, all these actors and mechanisms are limited in their fields of
activity and in their capabilities and cannot serve as substitutes for political
parties. Indeed, there is “no obvious alternative to political parties” (Dalton,
Farrell, and McAllister 2011: 231).
On the other hand, when it comes to personalization, to the option that
individual politicians will replace parties or at least take the front seat, the
story is very different. Parties are organizations that enable the coordination
of the behavior of individual politicians in a way that helps the latter effect-
ively promote their goals and serve as effective shortcuts for their voters. But if
parties lose their ability to supply these goods (that is, if they decline), then
each individual politician will find herself increasingly on her own. As Strøm
(2000: 181) puts it:
The fundamental assumption that underlies my analysis of political par-

ties is that parties form and survive when some decisive set of political
actors find them useful for their own purposes. Parties were formed
because parliamentarians and activists found them useful for whatever
tasks they wanted to accomplish. They will decline if they no longer serve
these purposes efficiently. It is not sufficient that parties perform some
political function if the benefits of this function are not worth the costs of
those who sustain the party.
Politicians, whether they seek votes, offices, or policies, will not tend to
cooperate on a stable (i.e., party) basis if doing so does not pay off. Masket
(2016: 19), who studied nonpartisan politics in the United States, stresses that
this is not just a theoretical possibility, that “in numerous cases, as it turns out,
politicians appear to not have much of a problem with weak or nonexistent
parties, and indeed they seem to prefer weak parties to strong ones.” Voters,
for their part, may focus on leaders as their electoral cues, not on the party
brand name (Bjerling 2012; Blais 2011; Marinova 2016).
In his book Contemporary Party Politics, Pettitt (2014: 206) argues that
“there is no evidence to suggest that parties are being threatened by a rise in
non-party independents.” He is right: almost all politicians in democracies,
and sometimes all of them, belong to a party. The question is whether the

party is more than just a formal label that is required (or incentivized) for legal
reasons. Perhaps the party label is even still worth something for the individ-
ual politician beyond such considerations, yet the party is clearly a vehicle, a
platform, or an empty vessel rather than an autonomous collective actor.
It is thus not the case that highly personalized political systems necessarily
lack parties. Even in a personalized political environment, politicians need to
coordinate and cooperate if they are to promote their goals and comply with
any formalities required by party laws. But this can be done on the basis of
unstable and even ad hoc alliances. As Katz (1987) claims, even in a “pluralist
democracy” that is based on individual representation, parties will exit; and
they will not flee the scene. Parties will be there because they have an entrenched
legal status and because they are effective in solving problems of collective
action. If they lack a minimal level of stability, continuity, and cohesion,
however, if they have hardly any significance beyond serving the political
aspirations and goals of individuals, then we can talk about a personalization
of politics that is concomitant with party decline (Tormey 2015).
The literature on political parties largely ignores the possibility that indi-
viduals could take over. Cases of leaders’ dominance are sometimes even seen
as indicating a specific type of party (Gunther and Diamond 2001) rather than
a lack of partyness. This may result from the problem of distinguishing
between individual politicians and their parties. The literature looks at threats
from other external organizations but stops short of detecting threats “from
within” (that is, from politicians within parties). As Garzia (2014) demon-
strates in his study of the impact that the evaluation of party leaders has on
voting, it is a methodological challenge to distinguish between the two (on this
matter, see also Mughan 2015). Because it is hard to distinguish between
parties and their components, the individual politicians, we suspect that some
developments that are presented as evidence of the adaptation of parties
actually reflect personalization and may even imply decline. A case in point
is the use of augmented numbers of party staff as a sign of party strengthening
in the government realm (Farrell and Webb 2000). We should not rule out the
possibility that additional parliamentary staff may enhance personalization if
these human resources are allocated mainly to individual MPs rather than to
the parliamentary party group as a whole. An increase in central party funds
and staff may relate to the leader more than to the party; an increase in
parliamentary party funds and staff may relate to individual MPs more
than to the party. Such resources may boost the autonomy of individuals
vis-à-vis their parties and weaken the party as a group.
Another reason for ignoring the possibility of a personalized takeover of
parties has to do with the claim of the party adaptation school that parties
compensate for losses in their linkage with society by getting more and more
from the state. In other words, parties get supplementary resources from the
state and increasingly benefit from a preferred status, perhaps even enjoying a

monopoly when it comes to electoral competition. Party funding may compensate
for the party’s decline in society—from a drop in the income derived from
membership fees and in available active volunteers to the need to spend more
money in order to communicate with a growing number of independent
voters. The increase in the amount of legislation and regulation concerning
political parties (van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; van Biezen 2008) enhances
their legal status and creates a reality in which only entities that are recognized
as “parties” are able to successfully compete in elections.
Yet indicators of aggregative electoral volatility and established parties’
electoral decline (see “Indicator: Electoral Volatility” and “Indicator: Con-
tinuity of Parties/Emergence of New Parties” in Chapter 3) seem to testify that
public financing does not compensate for the loss of a solid and loyal base of
voters. Having legal status might lead to more regulation that seems to hurt
parties rather than help them (Rashkova and van Biezen 2014; Whiteley
2014). As the American experience teaches us, legal status and high regulation
do not protect parties from becoming platforms for individuals (Wattenberg
1991, 1994). And, in any case, formal status, on its own, cannot prevent
parties from becoming platforms for ambitious individuals.
Finally, scholars of political parties largely ignore variance in party change
and prefer to make rough generalizations. In Chapters 4 and 5 we demon-
strated that in all countries there are various signs of decline in the party–
society linkage and that in most of them decline is indeed the general trend. At
the same time, we identified large differences in the level of decline among
countries. In some it was rather low. If we see the 1960s as an outlier peak, as a
“golden age” from which a party may decline but still remain central in the
political game, then the cases of slight and even moderate decline may largely
appear as instances of adaptation. This is clearly the case for Norway, for
example, as both its expert scholars (Allern, Heidar, and Karlsen 2016; Strøm
and Svåsand 1997a) and our analysis demonstrate. Yet in other countries the
change is of a significantly larger magnitude, which will usually result in the
blunt labeling of party decline. This is clearly the case in Israel, for example, as
both its expert scholars (Kenig and Tuttnauer 2017) and our analysis demon-
strate. When variance in party change is pushed aside for the sake of rough
generalizations, it is impossible to look beyond the simplistic general claims of
adaptation versus decline. These, in turn, either constrain the interpretation of
personalization to the intraparty realm (adaptation) or enforce an unrealistic
expectation to find personalization all over (decline).
We end this section by returning to our emphasis on variance. Because
personalization is not just another result of party change but is “the threat
from within,” we expect to find a correlation between the varying levels of
party decline and the varying levels of political personalization. But we do not
expect it to be perfect, as will be elaborated below in “Parties and Personal-
ization: Maybe Not a Zero-Sum Game?”

THE PERSPECTIVE FROM THE STUDY OF
POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION
As our discussion in Chapter 6 showed, scholars of political personalization

explain it as the result of three main causes: the mediatization of politics,
especially the rise of television, with its visual emphasis; the decline in the
party–society linkage; and cultural changes, specifically individualization.
Here we will focus on party change. Indeed, almost all studies of political
personalization use processes or aspects of party change (some prefer labeling
it party decline) as justifications for expecting to find personalization. If a
party changes its mode of organization and its relationship with citizens, they
argue, then it is reasonable to surmise that individual politicians will step in:
they will evolve as the centers of power within government and parties, they
will be the focus of campaigns and media coverage, and they will become
central factors in shaping voters’ behavior.
Calise’s (2015: 303) words clearly make the case for the party being, by
definition, a collective body:
a distinctive feature of political parties has been its corporate character;
that is, the fact that its existence depended on the collective nature of its
organization. In the myriad definitions one may find in the literature—
from Hume to Burke and up to more recent authors as Ostrogorski,
Michels, Duverger, and Panebianco—the party is indicated as a body of
men, whatever the principle, interest, logic binding them together. The
internal composition of this body would vary greatly, reflecting—by and
large—different organizational structures. Nonetheless, the party has been
characterized, from its inception, by the key trait of being an autonomous
and self-perpetuating collective entity. The English language identifies this
body with the self-revealing term of corporation. A body turned into an
institution.
From this perspective, it is obvious that personalization implies that the party
as a corporation will decline. And indeed, by definition, personalization—“a
process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political
process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e.,
political party) declines” (Rahat and Sheafer 2007: 65)—implies a decline in
the role of parties. As Balmas et al. (2014: 47) put it:
Personalization implies a decline in the role of parties—a decline that is
likely to be pronounced in some or all of the functions performed by
political parties: People identify with personalities rather than with par-
ties; individual politicians, rather than parties, become the representatives
of specific policies; interest aggregation occurs more on an ad hoc basis
rather than within parties; individuals rather than parties communicate
with the public; policy emerges from interaction between individuals in

government rather than as a product of debate and deliberation within the
party; and, to a certain extent, candidates and leaders select parties rather
than the other way round.
Scholars of political personalization offer a variety of approaches to make the

case for a connection between party decline and political personalization.
First, a behavioral connection. The evident weakening of the party–voters
linkage (expressed, for example, in the decline in party identification and
increase in electoral volatility) should lead to an increase in personalized voting,
which includes the use of images of party leaders as electoral cues (Karvonen
2010; McAllister 2007; Bjerling 2012). As McAllister (2007: 582) opines (and
for similar claims, see Bjerling 2012; Blais 2011; Dalton, McAllister, and
Wattenberg 2000; Poguntke 2002):
With weaker partisan loyalties, and in the absence of strong social links to
specific parties, such as class or religion, voters are more likely to switch
their vote between elections, or to abstain. In these circumstances, weaker
voter attachments to parties should enhance the role of the leader in both
the mobilization and conversion of the vote. In the absence of party cues,
voters will rely more heavily on the appeal of the candidates’ personalities
in order to decide their vote.
Gidengil (2011: 149) adds: “The assumption that weak partisan ties will increase
the electoral salience of party leaders is consistent with the classic Michigan
understanding of party identification.” Curtice and Hunjan (2011: 102) find
that “leadership evaluations matter more in countries where there is a relatively
low proportion of strong identifiers.” Lobo and Curtice (2015a: 243) relate to a
chapter in their collection claiming: “The authors also found that the impact of
leaders [on voting] is stronger in countries with lower levels of partisanship and
social cleavages . . . these findings are in line with the association between parti-
san dealignment and the increasing importance of leader evaluations in electoral
campaigns.” Yet they also claim that “the results seem at odds with some
analysis developed in this book.” Indeed, Gidengil (2011), for example, found
that leaders, if anything, carry more weight for strong partisans and that late
deciders, if anything, are less affected by leadership evaluations.
As Lobo (2015: 164) puts it, the finding of a positive correlation between the
impact of leader evaluation on voting and voters’ level of dealignment—
which is expressed in decreased party loyalty and an increase in late deciders
and swing voters—would logically indicate that, “considering the tendency
for a greater number of dealigned voters in democracies, there will likely be
more leader effects in the future.” But in many cases such expectations are not
fulfilled, and, as we saw in Chapter 7 (“Additional Expressions of Voters’
Personalized Behavior”), even studies that acknowledge the significance of the
influence of leaders’ evaluations on the vote are divided when it comes to
change over time. Aardal and Binder (2011: 122) go so far as to claim:

The weakening of traditional bonds between voters and parties, and the
increasing influence of person-oriented mass media, would lead us to
believe that leadership effects would be stronger now than they were in
the “good old days.” This is not the case. Our analysis shows the opposite.
The effect of leader evaluations on the vote is actually weaker now than
before. (See also Nadeau and Nevitte 2011).
We thus have good reason to expect change due to the logic of the causal
relationship between party dealignment and personalization, but the empir-
ical findings are, at best, mixed if not weak. This may be explained by
considering that the behavioral aspect is the last stage in the chain of perso-
nalizations (Rahat and Sheafer 2007), and only in the future might we expect
to witness its full magnitude. At this point in time we can only claim that,
while the theoretical linkage between party decline and political personalization
is plausible and convincing and the empirical findings concerning the impact
of leaders’ evaluations on voting become more readily accepted, the evidence
for an overall trend of personalization of voting remains rather weak.
Second, some scholars offer an evolutionary claim on this relationship.
Bowler and Farrell (1992: 233) argue, on the basis of Panebianco (1988), that
party change—the move from mass parties to catch-all parties or to electoral–
professional parties—implies, among other things, the “pre-eminence of a
‘personalized leadership’.” Webb, Poguntke, and Kolodny (2012) suggest
that the evolution of the party organization—that is, the replacement of the
mass party model with the catch-all and electoral professional models, and
later also with the cartel and business party models—implies the presidentiali-
zation of party leadership. The evolution of parties, specifically the empower-
ment of the party in office, created a process of personalization (Musella
2014a). Hloušek’s (2015: 279) comparative observation on Western Europe
versus Central and Eastern Europe nicely summarizes this approach:
A number of factors that have played a leading role in the presidentializa-

tion of politics in Western Europe are having an even stronger impact in
Central and Eastern Europe; they include influences traceable directly to
party functioning of party competition, such as the weak anchoring of
cleavages and the relatively low stability of party competition paradigms,
along with the low levels of party institutionalization and resulting greater
electoral volatility, the pre-dominance of cartel parties, and the origin
and evolution of parties whose structures model commercial enterprises
(business firm parties).
Third is an historical link. According to this approach, political personalization

and party change are correlated in a negative manner. That is, an increase in
one means a decrease of the other. The starting point was personalized politics,
as Karvonen (2010: 2–3) points out: “studies of the early phases of representa-
tive democracy have emphasized that political representation largely centered

on local notables rather than nationally-identifiable collective interests and
loyalties.” Then parties took center stage, in a long process that started in the
nineteenth century and culminated in the golden age of the mass parties around
the mid-twentieth century. Thus, if indeed the personalization of politics has
taken place in recent decades, then it implies the decline of parties.
Finally, we may add a connection between party decline and political
personalization that is built around the answer to the question “Why parties?”
from both rational choice and functional perspectives. That is, we may answer
the question “Why personalization?” by reexamining the “Why parties?”
issue, but this time from the other side. When explaining why parties were
created, the story is about individuals who formed a group because that served
the system in which they were working (functional approach) or because it
served their goals (rational choice approach) as individual rational actors
(Aldrich 2011; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014). Parties are organizations that enable
the coordination of the behavior of individual politicians among themselves
and vis-à-vis their voters. But, if parties lose their ability to supply the
collective goods (functional approach), then each individual politician will
find herself increasingly on her own. Politicians, whether vote-, office-, or
policy-seeking, will not cooperate if doing so is not likely to pay off (rational
choice approach). We can thus expect personalization to occur when parties
no longer serve these goals, when the individual politician is better off by
fulfilling her systematic roles (functional approach) or by achieving her per-
sonal goals (rational choice approach) independently.
In his book Why Parties, which presents the rationale for the creation of
parties by ambitious politicians, Aldrich (2011: 24) claims:
The party may even be part of the problem. In such cases politicians turn
elsewhere to seek the means to win. Thus this theory [on “Why parties?”]
is at base a theory of ambitious politicians seeking to achieve their goals.
Often they have done so through the agency of the party, but sometimes,
this theory implies, they will seek to realize their goals in other ways.
It seems that Aldrich (2011: 309) belongs to the adaptation school when he
claims that, if the mass party was more important than the people who
composed it, in the current parties “the party is the women and men in it.”
So, while he does not refer to personalization and holds that parties change
but still serve the goals of ambitious politicians, he does open the (theoretical)
door to the possibility that politicians will abandon the party when it is in their
interest to do so.
But then the cruel empirical reality reemerges. The decline in the party–
society linkage is well established empirically, even if its interpretation differs
between the party adaptation school and the party decline school. But in the
case of personalization a review of the literature found almost no evidence
for personalization (Adam and Maier 2010), while a cross-national study of

the various faces of the phenomenon came up with only mixed findings
(Karvonen 2010). Thus it seems that, while the expectation for a strong
negative relationship between party change and political personalization is
well established in theory, it is steeped in doubt when examined empirically.
Some may argue that this gap between theory and findings is the result of
using the wrong research tools (Garzia 2014). Our line of investigation is
about variance, and the expectation is that the scope of party change will
correlate with the degree of personalization. We do not, however, see them
merely as two sides of the same coin. Their negative relationship should not be
expected to be perfect.
This takes us to the next two sections. One deals with the works of
Wattenberg (1991, 1994), which are unique by emphasizing both phenomena
and by linking them in a somewhat more sophisticated manner than by a
simple negative relationship or a zero-sum game. We then raise the possibility
that the relationship between party decline and political personalization is not
necessarily a perfect, negative zero-sum relationship.
WATTENBERG’S APPROACH TO PARTY DECLINE

AND POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION
Many studies of party change and political personalization connected the two
phenomena; but they focused on one and treated the other as a peripheral
subject. The only scholar who examined both and assigned them equal
importance was Wattenberg (1991, 1994).
For Wattenberg, who studied party decline and political personalization in
the United States, party decline implies personalization. In his book on the
decline of American political parties (Wattenberg 1994), he theorizes, and
also demonstrates, that party decline means that candidates are becoming the
central driving force in electoral politics. His analysis concerns mainly the
decline of partisanship. However, he does not limit it to voters’ behavior and
attitudes, but rather argues and demonstrates how party decline is manifested
in the personalization of institutions (primaries), of the controlled and uncon-
trolled media (campaigns and news coverage of politics), and of the attitudes
and behavior of politicians.
In his analysis of what might be seen as the archetypical case of political
personalization, the United States, Wattenberg (2011) suggests a two-stage
process of personalization. First, the politician distances herself from her
party and presents herself as a separate entity with her own specific stand
and worldview and as an individual with her own unique traits. Second,
the politician “returns” and basically takes over the party, using it as her

political, and especially electoral, platform. This two-stage process implies that
in the first stage there is a clear negative relationship, or a zero-sum game,
between two separate entities, the party and the politician. But in the second
stage, after the politician has won the battle, she returns and takes over the
party. At this stage, the relationship is no longer a zero-sum game. Yet, from
this perspective, only after the loss and surrender of the party is it possible to
enter such a relationship. The next section raises the possibility that, even in a
situation where one side does not surrender to the other, parties and person-
alized politics may be in a non-zero-sum relationship.
PARTIES AND PERSONALIZATION: MAYBE

NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME?
Until now, the approaches that we examined treated the relationship between
the two phenomena as strongly negative and even, as discussed, as a zero-sum
game. However, there are several possible scenarios in which this is not
necessarily the case; and we now turn to address them.
First, the political arena might shrink, through a process of depoliticization
(Mair 2013), and no extra room would be created for individual politicians.
That is, the bureaucracy will move in and occupy the deserted domains. As
claimed above, in “The Perspective of the Study of Political Parties,” the
bureaucracy may take on some of the roles previously performed by parties;
but it cannot take them all on. In addition, even if many areas or fields are
depoliticized, parties or politicians (or parties and politicians) will still be there
to answer the grievances of those who feel that the system does not work as
they expect it to.
Second, party decline may not lead to personalization because other col-
lective actors—and not individual politicians—could exploit the situation and
capture abandoned power strongholds. This scenario was elaborated on
earlier (see “The Perspective from the Study of Political Parties”); here it
will suffice to argue that this is indeed the case. For example, it is almost
obvious that, over time, nonpartisan media outlets replaced partisan media
outlets. Yet this does not imply that some of these strongholds may not still
fall into the hands of individual politicians. And, if and when that happens,
the event will be one of party decline from this competitive zero-sum perspec-
tive, because it will be about parties that stopped behaving as team players
and thus stopped being perceived as such.
Another, third possibility is that parties will not decline but personalization
will increase nevertheless. An historic and even somewhat deterministic ver-
sion of this approach is Calise’s (2015: 312) claim: “The personal party may be

seen as the latest, albeit extreme, case in this Darwinian evolution of the species.”
This would allegedly occur if more and more “personalistic parties”—parties
whose “only rationale is to provide a vehicle for the leader to win an
election and exercise power” (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 28)—enter the
scene. Yet, as Ignazi (1996) contends, this specific case is more of a challenge to
parties as such than a synthesis between the group and the individual. Person-
alist parties are, by definition, exclusively about their leader.2 Moreover, the
main characteristic of this kind of party—apart from the dominance of
the leader—is its weak organization (Kostadinova and Levitt 2014). And,
even if we regard personalist parties as a necessary and adaptive solution to
changes in the environment, one that may succeed electorally in the short run,
once the leader, for whatever reason, is gone, the party is likely to go with him
(Bolleyer 2013).
Another scenario that challenges to the notion of a zero-sum relationship
pertains to the possibility that both sides, the party and the individual,
sometimes chalk up gains—or at least no side loses. Karvonen (2010: 107)
suggests: “It may, however, be incorrect to view person and party as opposites
at all.” For example, he found that a strong opinion about party leaders is
positively correlated with party identification and loyalty. Arter (2014: 467)
argues, on the basis of his analysis of the situation in Finland, that political
parties may adopt a personalization strategy of nominating celebrity candi-
dates who attract personal votes and that, “despite the appearance of reduced
partyness in the electoral process, the personal vote of celebrity candidates has
ultimately been a resource in party political hands and has served to consoli-
date rather than attenuate party-based representative democracy. Simply put,
parties have remained firmly in control.” Hayes (2009) suggests that an
increase in partisanship in the United States has countered the expected
personalization trend of the TV era.
The idea that parties and individuals may create an equilibrium that will
benefit both is appealing, and can surely look plausible in the short run. After
all, the party is composed of its leader and other politicians. If the leader and
other individuals succeed in being electoral assets, the party is strengthened.
However, not all scholars expect them to live happily together for a long time.
Cabada and Tomšic (2016) suggest that the rise of person-based politics and
the decline of parties in new democracies can be seen as a “vicious circle” that
consolidates on the one hand the inability of parties to articulate relevant
social interests and, on the other, the focus on leaders as temporary successful
mobilizers of electoral support. As Swanson and Mancini (1996: 272) claim:
“Ironically, the strategy which has been adopted in part because of the
2
Another scenario is described in Key’s (1949) account of the politics of the South. One party’s
long-time dominance leads to personalization that is expressed in intraparty political competition.

weakened condition of political parties does not strengthen the position of
parties.” They assert that this strategy rather weakened them:
Personalization undermines political parties because it engenders support
for an appealing leader, not for the ideas and programs of the party as an
institution . . . As the basis of political support, personalization is transi-
tory and fragile. Massive shifts in support occur when leaders change or
lose their novelty or reveal previously unpublicized qualities.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6 (see “Personalization Breeds More

Personalization”), some types of personalization generate other types or
encourage them to develop still further. Thus, even when parties cope success-
fully with certain types of personalization—or maybe even create them, in order
to survive and strive in a more personalized society and culture—they pay a
price. Personalized parties may enjoy electoral gains initially, but in the long
run they will actually destroy themselves by ultimately becoming empty shells.
It is also possible to make the case for the nonnegative or non-zero-sum
game relationship by pointing on the one hand to the strong empirical
evidence for the decline of parties (at least where the party–society linkage is
concerned) and, on the other, to the generally weak (Adam and Maier 2010)
or at best mixed (Karvonen 2010) finding regarding personalization. The
claim would be that, if indeed the relationships are negative, we would expect
to see clearer evidence of personalization.
In general, our findings do not seem to support this approach, because we
did identify general trends of party decline and political personalization and
because there are enough good reasons, as we saw, to assume that they are
connected. But the nuanced analysis presented in Chapter 11 does leave room
for the expectation that personalization will not always correlate with high
levels of party decline.
Taking this idea further, we may interpret the story of the relationship
between parties and individuals in a dialectical manner rather than as a story
of personal occupation, as Wattenberg (1991) does. Maybe this is what
Duverger (1965: 177) implied when he wrote: “[A] double evolution can be
seen. The first phase is one of a slow change from personal to institutional
government. In the second phase a certain reversal of the process can be seen.
Authority has taken on a personal character again, while retaining the frame-
work of the institutions.”
In the first stage of (pre)modern politics, so the story would go, politics was
highly personalized and was about kings and queens and powerful individ-
uals. The realization of this stage was the absolute monarchy (centralized
personalization); but the stage may also have been expressed in a politics of
shifting personal alliances and court intrigues (decentralized personaliza-
tion). In the second stage, when modern democratic politics developed,
political parties entered the scene and became the dominant political actors,

and politics became depersonalized. The personal representation of electoral
districts was largely replaced by party representation, coordinated by a cohesive
national organization. In addition, the seemingly democratic alternative, the
personalized Napoleonic version of democracy, was defeated. Then, in
the third stage, the party declined by comparison to the era when the mass
party was at its peak. Yet we do not see a return to pure personal politics.
Instead, we may now witness a move that achieves a synthesis of party and
personal representation.
Colomer (2011) introduces this claim concerning electoral formulas
when he argues about a trend of integrating the partisan and the personal.
Here we may use it to suggest another, more general claim: maybe any
kind of personalization can be seen as part of a dialectical rather than linear
process. This description seems to be accurate for most countries where
small or moderate change occurred in both forms—namely party change
and personalization.
There is also an essential theoretical reason to expect that party decline will
not correlate strongly with political personalization. This reason springs from
the parties’ core character. Parties represent, after all, a successful attempt to
stream the energies of individuals in a direction that will benefit the common
interest. If these energies change over time toward personalization, at least
some may still be restreamed and serve the group (i.e., the party)—or at
least not undermine it. Thus, while the theoretical default is that by definition
personalization would lead to party decline, specific circumstances or actions
in response to it may block its influence and may even make it serve the
common good of the party.
In the face of the evident variance, factors that may have their own
independent influence on the degree of personalization at the state level
should be mentioned here. It is possible that parties will decline; but person-
alization will not concomitantly bloom, because some factors will be able to
restrict or block its growth. Alternatively, personalization could rise, yet
parties will not decline, because they will be able to absorb and contain the
change. These factors include, first, political culture. The way the main actors
and the people perceive politics may be more open or more resistant to
personalization. Indeed, Hermans and Vergeer (2013) find that political cul-
ture influenced the levels of personalization of the websites of candidates for
the 2009 European elections.
Second, political institutions should also be considered. Some may be more
personalized than others to begin with, and would thus more easily allow
personalization to be pronounced.3 Relevant personalized institutions in this
3
We distinguish between static personalized infrastructure and political institutional
personalization that is part of the general personalization phenomenon; and the latter means
change over time.

category are, for example, electoral systems that allow voters to choose
directly the candidates they prefer, and thus encourage politicians to seek
the personal vote (Carrey and Shugart 1995). The overall influence of the
general institutional structure, whether it is consensual, majoritarian, federal,
or unitary (Lijphart 2012), may also be relevant.
Third, types of media systems may influence levels of personalization.
Differences in levels of competition in this arena are expected to influence
the level of political personalization of the mass media (van Aelst et al.
2017), which, in turn, may affect the behavioral political personalization of
both politicians and voters (Rahat and Sheafer 2007). Additional concerns
include the size of the polity and the population density: one may expect
that personalization might develop more easily in smaller and more intim-
ate polities.
Finally, to all of these circumstances we may add party response—that
is, if, when, and how the party tries to face the challenge of personaliza-
tion. This response may be influenced by all the factors discussed so far,
and perhaps by party-level factors as well. Yet there is still the possibility
of an initiative from the side of a party, one that may be found successful
and would then be imitated by other parties within the same system. Or
there is the possibility of a system-level initiative that may help all parties.
One can theorize, for example, that the adoption of a semi-open list system
may help channel the personalized energies toward the common good of
the party.
It is beyond the scope of this book to examine all possible factors; but, given
these possible influences, it should be expected that the linkage between party
decline and political personalization will not be “perfect” or very strong.
Being aware of variance may allow us a more nuanced look at this relation-
ship. Returning to the logic of Weber’s categorization of sources of authority,
it is plausible that one source would dominate, and therefore would not allow
the others to fully bloom. At the same time, an institution with a legal–
rational authority may still benefit from having a charismatic leader. Thus,
if, at the two poles, the relationship between partyness and political person-
alization is of the zero-sum nature, closer to the middle there may well be
possibilities of coexistence, even of constructive coexistence, for both sides.
This is reflected for instance in Shugart’s (2001) typology of electoral systems.
The extremes have only the properties of either candidate-centered or party-
centered systems, while in the middle there is room to enjoy an optimal
balance between both worlds.
The last issue to be addressed here, before we turn to the empirical analysis
of the relationship between party change and political personalization, is the
direction of these relationships. Did party decline lead to political personal-
ization, or was it the other way round? Here we will look at the approaches

that are apparent in the literature, while in Chapter 11 we will try to answer
this question using the data that we have gathered.
CAUSAL DIRECTION: WHICH CAME FIRST?
It seems that most of the literature, if not all, implicitly assumes that party
change came first and that it was a cause rather than a consequence of political
personalization. As elaborated in this chapter, for political personalization
scholars, party change is the primary cause of personalization; for party
scholars, it is one of several possible outcomes.
Some scholars, meanwhile, identified the possibility of mutual influence.
McAllister (2007) claimed that, while personalization does not seem to be
the cause of party decline, it can exacerbate the decline of political parties.
Garzia (2014) even went so far as to argue that the transformations of parties
during the last decades should be seen as both a cause and a consequence of
personalization. In addition, the two processes of party change and politi-
cal personalization may be claimed to start around the same time, in the early
1960s. Among party scholars it is common to find the 1960s designated as the
end of the era of the mass party and the beginning of a transition to the catch-
all type (Katz and Mair 1995). This decade is also a milestone for personal-
ization, because that was the time when television—which is considered to be
a major cause of the personalization of politics—became central to politics.
When it is difficult to determine which came first, the possibility that mutual
influences characterize the relationship between party change and political
personalization should be seen as a viable alternative.
To summarize, although party decline is generally seen as a cause of
political personalization, it seems that this claim is taken for granted without
having really received its scholarly due. When attention is given to this issue,
the direction of the relationship does not seem to be that obvious. While we
accept the claim that these developments interact, we still want to attempt to
determine which came first. We will thus dedicate a section in Chapter 11 to
mapping the starting points of significant changes in our indicators of party
change and political personalization.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we examined critically the relationship between party change

and political personalization, on the basis of the existing research literature.

We saw that in most cases studies that focused on party change and
on political personalization assumed that there is a negative zero-sum rela-
tionship between the two. Yet several scholars proposed a more nuanced
look. We emerge from this chapter with a more refined expectation—for
a negative yet imperfect relationship between the two. The question con-
cerning the direction of this relationship was also raised. The next chapter
will examine this relationship empirically and will try to come up with
answers concerning its properties.
11

An Empirical Analysis
Chapter 10 explored the expectation that partyness and political personalization

would correlate negatively. It also suggested that party decline and person-
alization may not always be in a zero-sum relationship. In addition, it
considered the direction of causation between the two. The present chapter
will continue to address these issues by applying the analyses of party change
and personalization presented earlier, especially in Chapters 5 and 9.
This chapter starts with an empirical analysis of the relationship between
the two processes of party change and political personalization. It demon-
strates that there is indeed a moderate negative correlation between partyness
and personalization when we leave out the online environment and focus on
the more veteran democracies. It also explains why, in some cases, partyness
and personalization will not be in zero-sum relationships. It then addresses the
question of the causal direction of this relationship: does party decline cause
personalization, or is it the other way round? While it makes sense that the
two should interact, we support the view that decline in partyness occurred
first and was in fact one of the causes for personalization.
PARTYNESS AND POLITICAL PERSONALIZATION:

A NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP?
On the basis of a critical evaluation of the literature and of a theoretical

discussion concerning the relationship between partyness and political person-
alization, we advanced two propositions. First, a negative relationship can be
expected, generally or by default, because personalization is about the rise of
individuals and the decline of groupings. Second, personalization does not
necessarily develop at the expense of partyness; at least some of the individual-
ized energies may be used by the parties. After all, parties were, are, and always
will be channeling the energies of individuals for the benefit of the group.

From the outset, this book promised to take a different path from that
followed by most studies and to review the two phenomena in focus—party
change and political personalization—from the widest possible perspective (see
Chapter 1). This broad-brush strategy implies that the emphasis was going to be
on the relationship between the two. Nevertheless, along the way, we also looked
at the relationship between the indicators of the two phenomena. An overview of
all 132 paired correlations between the indicators of partyness and those of
personalization revealed that most relationships are weak and insignificant (see
Appendix 21). Moderate and significant correlations were found only between
nine pairs of indicators. A closer look at these pairs did not indicate that the
properties of their relationship warrant special attention. The nature of large
swaths of the data, as well as the lack of much variance in many of the cases
under study, should lead us to refrain from making too much of these relation-
ships. In short, only a broad examination of such data makes much sense.
We thus now turn to look the general relationship between the two phenomena.
Figure 11.1 describes the relationship between changes in partyness (aver-
age for all indicators) and personalization (average for its three dimensions) in
twenty-six democracies. Out of all twenty-six cases, nineteen indicate decline
in partyness and personalization. So, from a simplistic binary perspective,
nineteen cases fulfill the expectation that both phenomena will occur together,
while seven cases do not. Three cases indicate increase in partyness and
personalization, while four indicate decrease in partyness and depersonaliza-
tion. There is no case of increase in partyness and depersonalization. This is
noteworthy because, if indeed the two phenomena are correlated, their “other
2.00
ITA ISR
1.50
1.00
AUS
Personalization
AUT BEL POL
NZ DEN
GRE 0.50
NET
JAP SPA
GER
IRE FRA NOR
CAN
CZ UK
LUX POR 0.00 HUN
–2.00 –1.50 ICE –1.00 –0.50 0.00 0.50
SWE FIN
–0.50
SWI
–1.00
Change in Partyness
F I G U R E 1 1 . 1 The Relationship between Changes in Partyness and Political Personalization

Party Change and Political Personalization: An Empirical Analysis 245

side” (that is, the expectation that increase in partyness would develop with
depersonalization) clearly does not.
Indeed, the trend line points to a negative relationship. But, if we exclude
Italy and Israel, the trend line becomes flat. Thus we should not see the
relationships that are mapped in Figure 11.1 as lending support to the expect-
ation of a linear negative relationship between the two phenomena. Neverthe-
less, Italy and Israel—which show negative relationships of similar magnitudes,
in an almost perfect symmetry—give us some perspective on most of the other
cases. The fact that in most cases the absolute values of party decline are higher
than those of personalization raises the possibility that individual politicians
are not the only actors that enhanced their power as a result of party decline.
The cases of Australia and Denmark—where the level of personalization was
much higher than that of party decline—tell us that there is also a possibility
that personalization is beneficial to parties.1 These implications need, however,
to be qualified by other, more focused studies.
Table 11.1 collapses the countries into several categories of change (high,
moderate-high, moderate, low) and one of no trend. We come across seven-
teen cases of both decline in partyness and personalization and five in which
the trends are not as expected. In an additional four cases, we have no trend,
either in personalization or in partyness. So the two processes tend to occur
together but we cannot identify any clear pattern concerning their magnitude.
To discover that there is no evident relationship between the two phenom-
ena beyond fulfillment of the expectation that they frequently occur together
may be surprising. But it is not noteworthy, unless it is compared to a different
set of findings in which this relationship is evident. And, indeed, a somewhat
stronger correlation was found when the two indicators of online personal-
ization were omitted. A look at Figure 11.2, which addresses the relationship
between change in partyness and personalization, reveals a clearer picture.
Out of twenty-six cases, twenty-two show decline in partyness and personal-
ization. In this case, even if we exclude Israel and Italy, the trend line survives.
Table 11.2, which collapses the countries into categories in the same man-
ner as Table 11.1, supports the notion that there is a pattern in the relationship
between partyness and offline personalization. The overall picture reflects
much more symmetry between the average change in partyness and average
personalization. Only five countries do not fit this pattern—they diverge from
it by two or more categories of change. These countries are Iceland, Poland,
Hungary, Denmark, and Switzerland.
Therefore it is worth comparing directly the relationship between change
in partyness and personalization, with and without the online indicators.
1
The case of Poland is put aside because this is a country with a low starting point in terms of
partyness and it would thus be unreasonable to speculate about its success at preserving a feature
it never acquired.
T A B L E 1 1 . 1 Levels of Change: Partyness by Personalization*
Personalization** No trend Depersonalization**
High Moderate-high Moderate Low Low Moderate
Partyness** High decline Italy Austria

( 1.67, 1.52) ( 1.50, .76)
Israel
( 1.50, 1.59)
Moderate-high decline New Zealand Japan Iceland
( 1.29, .52) ( 1.35, .32) ( 1.42, .04)
Belgium Ireland Czech Rep.
( 1.18, .77) ( 1.25, .22) ( 1.11, .08)
Moderate decline Greece Canada Sweden Switzerland
( .64, .50) ( .94, .24) ( .77, .23) ( .89, .61)
France
( .91, .26)
Germany
( .91, .33)
Netherlands
( .79, .44)
UK
( .65, .11)
Low decline Australia Luxembourg Finland
( .33, .92) ( .43, .11) ( .23, .23)
Portugal
( .23, .12)
Spain
( .18, .29)
No trend Poland Norway
(.08, .78) ( .08, .19)
Low increase Denmark Hungary
(.17, .52) (.21, .06)
* In brackets: the values of partyness (average of indicators) and of personalization (average of dimensions).
** Key:
· high increase in partyness/personalization 1.5 to 2
· moderate-high increase in partyness/personalization 1 to 1.49
· moderate increase in partyness/personalization 0.5 to 0.99
· low increase in partyness/personalization 0.1 to 0.49
· no trend in partyness/personalization 0.09 to 0.09
· low decline in partyness/depersonalization 0.1 to 0.49
· moderate decline in partyness/depersonalization 0.5 to 0.99

· moderate-high decline in partyness/depersonalization 1 to 1.49
· high decline in partyness/depersonalization 1.5 to 2.

2
ITA ISR
1.5
BEL POL
AUT NEL
NZ
Personalization
IRE CZ 1
AUS HUN
JAP
GER
POR
UK GRE NOR
0.5
CAN
ICE FRA
FIN DEN
SWE LUX
SPA
0
–2.00 –1.50 –1.00 –0.50 0.00 0.50
SWI
–0.5
Change in Partyness
F I G U R E 1 1 . 2 The Relationship between Changes in Partyness and Offline

Table 11.3 presents the Pearson correlations between personalization and

change in partyness for various sets of countries.2 Evidently the relationship
between decline in partyness and offline personalization is stronger in all
instances. When we omit Israel and Italy, this relationship becomes much
weaker (seventh row). However, in offline personalization, even without Italy
and Israel, this relationship still holds when we exclude all or just the late
third-wave democracies.
We thus end up finding a moderate but significant negative relationship
between partyness and personalization when we focus on older democracies
and the older offline environment. From the comparison between the two
versions—with and without indicators of online personalization—of the rela-
tionship between partyness and personalization, it is clear that the Internet is
a game changer. Because we looked at Facebook, the change was toward
depersonalization. This is interesting and countervails most of the claims
that scholars have made about the personalizing impact of the Internet in
general and the social media in particular. The few scholars who argued that
parties can benefit from the new features of the online environment seemed to
be right (see “A Brave New Personalized World?” in Chapter 8). But this
should not be taken to mean that the Internet or the new media are all about
2
The cross-national analysis is not of a sample but of a population. We nevertheless present the
level of significance for each correlation because we are aware of the debate around this issue and
prefer to let readers decide whether this element is important to them.
T A B L E 1 1 . 2 Levels of Change: Partyness by Offline Personalization*

Partyness** High decline Italy Austria
( 1.67, 1.72) ( 1.50, 1.20)
Israel
( 1.50, 1.70)
Moderate-high decline Ireland Japan Iceland
( 1.25, 1.00) ( 1.35, .85) ( 1.42, .23)
New Zealand Czech Rep.
( 1.29, 1.10) ( 1.11, .92)
Belgium
( 1.18, 1.27)
Moderate decline Netherlands Greece Canada Switzerland
( .79, 1.17) ( .64, .50) ( .94, .30) ( .89, .25)
Germany France
( .91, .67) ( .91, .37)
UK Sweden
( .65, .50) ( .77, .18)
Low decline Australia Luxembourg
( .33, .78) ( .43, .14)
Portugal Spain
( .23, .57) ( .18, .10)
(continued )
T A B L E 1 1 . 2 Continued

Finland
( .23, .18)
No trend Poland Norway
(.08, 1.39) ( .08, .47)
Low increase Hungary Denmark
(.21, .89) (.17, .30)
* In brackets: the values of partyness (average of indicators) and of personalization (average of dimensions).
** Key:
· high increase in partyness/personalization 1.5 to 2
· moderate-high increase in partyness/personalization 1 to 1.49
· moderate increase in partyness/personalization 0.5 to 0.99
· low increase in partyness/personalization 0.1 to 0.49
· no trend in partyness/personalization 0.09 to 0.09
· low decline in partyness/depersonalization 0.1 to 0.49
· moderate decline in partyness/depersonalization 0.5 to 0.99
· moderate-high decline in partyness/depersonalization 1 to 1.49
· high decline in partyness/depersonalization 1.5 to 2.

T A B L E 1 1 . 3 Pearson Correlations between Change in Partyness (Average of Indicators)
and Political Personalization (Average of Dimensions)
Population Partyness and Partyness and

personalization offline
(all indicators) personalization
26 countries: all .303 .404*

25 countries: all without Switzerland .350 .454*
25 countries: all without Australia .355 .415*
24 countries: all without Australia and Switzerland .406* .463*
23 countries: all without the Czech Republic, Hungary, .385 .626**
Poland (= late third-wave democracies)
20 countries: all without the Czech Republic, Hungary, .392 .596**
Poland, Greece, Portugal, Spain (= third-wave
democracies)
24 countries: all without Italy and Israel (= extreme .001 .209
cases of personalization)
21 countries: all without Italy and Israel (= extreme .074 .485*
cases of personalization) and the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland (= late third-wave democracies)
18 countries: all without Italy and Israel (= extreme .091 .445
cases of personalization) and the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Greece, Portugal, Spain (= third-
wave democracies)
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
depersonalization. While the Internet supplies parties with a chance to revive

and re-engage, some platforms (such as Twitter) may be more conducive to
personalization.
Wattenberg (2011) suggests two scenarios for the personalizing relationship
between parties and individual politicians. One scenario is of competition
between them; in the other the leader takes the party over. Our findings
support the claim for a negative relationship, as both these scenarios imply,
though the correlation is moderate. It is not a perfect zero-sum game.
On the one hand, in most cases the changes at the level of partyness were
more profound than those at the level of personalization. As noted, Italy and
Israel teach us that this result may not be a mere product of measurement
issues. It may reflect that other (collective) actors have been empowered at the
same time as parties declined. But, if this is the case, individual politicians still
seem to be the main beneficiaries of party decline.
On the other hand, cases in which the levels of personalization are higher
than the levels of party decline reveal that not all the individualized energies
that are increasing presuppose party decline. A wise channeling of some of
these energies may avoid either harming or benefiting the party. After all,

what is the point of a party, if not to (re)direct individual energies to the
benefit of all?
The possibility that personalization does not undermine parties and maybe
even strengthens them, or helps them to adapt to the more hostile conditions
of an individualized society, calls for further research (see Gauja 2017a for
promising first steps in this direction). Here it will suffice to say something
about the logic of this possibility.
Having a zero-sum relationship at the extremes and an optimal balance in
the middle is the basis of Shugart’s (2001) approach to the categorization of
electoral systems and, more specifically, to candidate-centered versus party-
centered systems. For him, the extremes enjoy only the benefits of being either
candidate-centered or party-centered. Electoral systems that combine the two
would enjoy a balance that is optimal for both features, not just for one at the
expense of the other. A perfectly mixed electoral system is more than the sum
of its parts: it does not enjoy half of the benefits of being candidate-centered
and half of the benefits of being party-centered but enjoys more than half from
each side. This logic can be extended beyond the specific institutional context
of Shugart’s ideas and applied to surveying the relationship between partyness
and personalization in the wider sense.
THE QUESTION OF THE DIRECTION OF THE

RELATIONSHIP: EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
We saw that there is a moderate but significant negative correlation between

partyness and offline personalization. But what is the direction of this rela-
tionship? Of course, once the two processes are in place, it is plausible that
they interact and exacerbate each other (McAllister 2007). But which one
came first? Which one was among the original causes of the other? Most
scholars of personalization argue that party change came first and was one of
the main causes for personalization. Scholars of party change, for their part,
do not mention personalization as its cause.
Here we should discuss first of all the possibility that both processes began
at the same time and were determined by the same causes—in other words,
that a third factor influenced both. Two explanations for party change are
also used to explain political personalization: mediatization and individual-
ization. Concerning the latter, no relationship was found between change in
partyness and the proportion of those who hold self-expression values (see
Table 5.8), and a negative relationship was found between offline personal-
ization and the proportion of those who hold self-expression values (see
Table 9.5). We can thus cautiously set aside individualization in the cultural

sense. If we look at individualization as a result of decline in cleavage-based
politics as well as in other aspects of party politics, then of course we can argue
that change in partyness came first.
Mediatization is a process that convincingly explains both party change
and political personalization. The claims that nonpartisan media took over
from parties the communication function, and even some of the representa-
tion function, and that the media, especially television, caused both uncon-
trolled and controlled media personalization are convincing. If mediatization
is indeed “always a matter of degree” (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014: 23), then
we could have tried to correlate it with both party change and personalization
in order to examine the relationship between the three. Unfortunately we do
not have ready-made indicators for mediatization (as a process) that will
allow us to correlate the three factors. Taken together, the adoption and
spread of television may be seen as a possible proxy for mediatization, but
they do not fit here because not enough cross-country variance can be found in
this respect.3
We may try to argue that, at least roughly, the timing of the three
processes—mediatization, party change, and personalization—fits the gen-
eral line of our story. But, while our claims for party decline are quite strong
on almost all fronts, our indicators of media personalization not only are
weaker but concern developments that took place, in most instances, in later
decades. The only place where personalization seems to arrive quite early is
the election campaign.
Thus there are good reasons to adopt the stance that most of the expressions
for party change were there first. Party change was identified already in the
1960s (Kirchheimer 1966) and, retrospectively, the timing for a change from
the mass party model to the catch-all model is indeed the 1960s (Katz and
Mair 1995). It is not just that personalization was identified much later, but
those indicators for which we can clearly determine a start date—institutional
reforms at the state and party levels, adding the name of the leader to the
party name—are based mainly on changes that have occurred since the 1990s.
Indeed, these personalizing reforms are presented as the responses of govern-
ments (Renwick and Pilet 2016) and parties (Gauja 2017b) to a gradual loss of
trust in political institutions and in party membership. In other words, insti-
tutions were personalized in reaction to party change (be it labeled decline or
adaptation).
One main cause of party change—and one that is not directly relevant to
personalization—is the post-World War II development of the welfare state.
3
Downey and Stanyer (2010) examined various causes (institutional and media variables) for
cross-country differences in levels of personalized media. Their study cannot be used here because
it looks at a specific point in time and is not concerned with processes. Their conclusions, however,
may guide a future analysis of the relationship between the processes.

This occurred in the 1950s and freed people from their dependence on parties
and their affiliated organizations for the supply of material goods (e.g., social
insurances) and for a social and political identity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter demonstrated that party change and political personalization are
indeed linked, as most (if not all) scholars assume. But it is not necessarily a
zero-sum game. In addition, we saw that is plausible to perceive party change
as a cause of personalization, although over time the two are likely to interact.
This interaction, we hold, may by default reflect a situation where parties are
losing and individuals are gaining weight. There is nevertheless the possibility
of creating a healthy balance.
12
Summary and Conclusions
This book is a comprehensive examination of party change, political

personalization, and the relationship between them. In its pages we attempted
to analyze processes that occurred in twenty-six countries and cover about
fifty years; and we did this with the help of more than twenty indicators. This
concluding chapter starts by presenting a summary of our main findings. It
then proposes directions for future research on these topics. It ends with a
brief argument to the effect that the combination of party decline and per-
sonalization should be seen as a potential threat to the quality of modern
representative democracy (if not to democracy per se) and offers preliminary
suggestions for rechanneling personalized energies into the party.
MAIN FINDINGS
The present section discusses the main findings of the analyses that constitute
the backbone of this study: the analysis of party change, that of political
personalization, and that of their relationship—in this order.
Party Change
The analysis of changes in partyness yielded five main results. First a clear trend
of party decline is generally evident. This statement is valid for almost all
indicators and almost all countries. Nevertheless, in 2015, parties had not passed
the threshold that should lead us to pronounce their demise. Political parties still
exist; they are not merely formal and nominal entities. But within this rough
generalization there is much variance (and this takes us to the next four findings).
Second, there is high variance among countries at the level of party change; it
ranges from a high decline to a low increase in partyness. This variance may be
seen as encompassing both party decline and party adaptation. Low levels of
decrease in partyness from the golden age of the mass party, when partyness
peaked, can be interpreted as adaptation; high levels of decrease in partyness can
be interpreted as decline. Many explanations for this variance, from regime
structure to political culture, were ruled out. This leaves ample room for the

possibility that human agency—that is, the different reactions of parties in
different countries to their similarly changing environments—explains variance.
Third, when looking at the situation per dimension, decline was clearly
evident in the relationships between parties and their mediators and between
parties and their voters; there was no obvious overall trend in the relationship
between the party in government and the party organization. When looking at
the situation per indicator, most indicators pointed clearly to a decrease in
partyness. Three indicators stood out as being different. Many instances of
stability were found in the effective number of electoral parties; the number of
cases of decrease in the partyness of ministers was almost equal to the number
of those of increase; and increase in the partyness of legislators was recorded
in a majority of cases. The relative stability of the effective number of electoral
parties seems to demonstrate that the decline of older, established parties is
often related to their partial (or, rarely, full) replacement by new ones. The
indicators for the partyness of ministers in government and in the legislature
seem to suggest that the party in government indeed holds on and does not
present a general declining trend in its levels of partyness, yet its links with
society, both mediated and direct, are weakening. This finding falls well
within the scope of one of the main claims of the cartel party theory.
Fourth, the more detailed and focused examination of the performance of
national-level parties at the regional and local levels demonstrated that there
are indeed developments on this front. Most of them point to decrease, as do
most other indicators for partyness. Variance in the level of change in party-
ness was found at these levels. It ranged from high decrease to no change, and
even to increase (a few times). As for the regions, the overall trend reveals an
increase in the gap between patterns of partisan voting at the regional level
and at the national level.
Finally, there were good theoretical reasons to expect to find close relation-
ships between the indicators of party change, especially within each group
(socialization of representatives, mediators, voters). Yet, apart from sharing
the same trend of decline, they appear to be independent of each other. This
might suggest that parties in different countries invest differing efforts into
reacting to challenges on the different fronts. Some parties may invest in
maintaining a relatively close relationship with some or all of the mediators;
others may decide to concentrate on voters and to approach them directly.
Framing the claim in a more focused manner, when investing in the medi-
ators, for example, some parties may prefer to invest in their members, others
in their relationship with interest groups or in local or regional government.
Some parties may spread their investments, others may concentrate them.
Personalization
Five main findings arise from the analysis of political personalization. First,
we did identify a general trend of personalization in most countries and in
Summary and Conclusions 257

most indicators. Unlike in previous cross-national attempts to identify the
phenomenon, our findings are not weak (Adam and Maier 2010, Kriesi 2012)
or mixed (Karvonen 2010). They clearly testify to the existence of a general
trend that covers all three dimensions of personalization.
Second, putting aside the extreme cases of personalization in Israel and Italy
and the few cases of depersonalization (especially Switzerland), the range of
variance in the national levels of personalization is quite narrow. Institutional
factors were not found to account for this variance. A moderate negative
correlation was found between offline personalization and the strength of
self-expression values. In other words, the more individualized countries experi-
enced less personalization than did the less individualized ones. This may imply
that autocratic tendencies provide more fertile ground for the development of
personalization than does individualism—or maybe they do not cause this
development but rather go hand in hand with it in an interactive manner.
Third, personalization is more evident in the institutional realm than in the
media and in behaviors. While there were expectations to find relationships
between these three dimensions of personalization, the evidence did not give
them much support. No systematic patterns were identified in the relationship
between the dimensions or the indicators.
Fourth, personalization was found to be the dominant pattern in almost all
the offline indicators (eight out of ten). In the two instances where the pattern
in the majority of cases was no change or no trend (electoral reform and the
inclusion of the name of the leader in the party name), if there was change, it
was almost always toward personalization.
Fifth, the online environment was found to be somewhat personalized when
it comes to the consumption of party leaders’ Facebook pages. Yet, in
general, this environment was not found to be as biased toward personaliza-
tion as its counterpart off line. Rather it offered parties an opportunity to
revive, an opportunity that seemed to be facilitated in most countries. This
finding is surprising for two reasons. For one thing, it goes against the
assumption and expectation of many scholars that an online environment
will enhance personalization. For another, it does not support the normaliza-
tion approach (which is accepted by more studies than its rival, the innovation
or equalization approach), which expects trends in power relations in the off-
line world to be reflected in what happens online.
Party Change and Personalization

Three main findings emerged from the analysis of the relationship between
party change and personalization. First, leaving out the three youngest dem-
ocracies, there is a moderate negative correlation between partyness and off-
line personalization. In general, the more partyness declined off line, the more
was personalization found. The inclusion of online indicators of personaliza-
tion weakened this correlation. Even if we acknowledge that this finding may

be limited to the use and consumption of Facebook, or that our measurement
should be refined, the online environment seems to be a game changer for
political parties.
Second, in many cases the levels of party decline are higher than those of
personalization. This may suggest that other, alternative actors took over
some of the domains that political parties had lost. By contrast, in a few cases
personalization was higher than party decline. This invites closer scrutiny,
because it could be that personalization was used for the benefit of the party.
If indeed the relationship between partyness and personalization is not
necessarily a zero-sum game, then perhaps there is an optimal balance, a
“sweet point” that would allow the two to command a mutual symbiotic
relationship.1
Third, it was found that it makes much sense to claim that party decline was
there first, before personalization, and can therefore be seen as one of its
causes. But, once personalization was in place, the two processes appeared to
feed each other, unless personalization was contained within the party or was
tapped for the sake of strengthening it.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This section starts with a look at the methodology employed in this study. It
then suggests future directions for research on party change, political person-
alization, and the relationship between the two.
Methodology
We may need to ask the gods of the social sciences, particularly the gods of
political science, to forgive us for our methodological sins. For we hold that
our broad-brush analysis, the attempt to capture the two phenomena in a
wider perspective rather than through a proxy, proxies, or a few selected
indicators is a path worth pursuing. The recognition that our data (even
those parts of them that look quite fancy) are far from ideal and that often
the better data do not cover enough ground justifies this path. This is espe-
cially true of studying processes. We study the past with what we have; we
1
The case of Denmark is prominent in this respect. Partyness was sustained even though a
moderate level of personalization was evident. This adaptation may have resulted from the
development of an early and urgent need for the Danish parties to cope with decline in
partyness and political personalization in the “earthquake elections” of 1973.

cannot produce data that do not already exist. These include answers to
survey questions that were not asked in the past (or were asked in a way
that does not serve our goals), and other pieces of evidence that were not
collected, were lost, or are of a highly problematic quality. Having said that,
transparency is a must when taking this path, and so we were very strict about
making available the data, the calculations, and the operationalization of
indicators. This will hopefully contribute to improving the research. After
all, when studying general processes, we are not really better off using fancy
proxies that cover short periods or small parts of the phenomena.
On Party Change
Our research looked solely at developments at the country level. Such an
analysis has good theoretical and empirical justifications. But this does not
mean that analysis at the party level is not a fruitful option—in particular a
cross-national study that will perceive countries as important control vari-
ables (Kölln 2016). Another element that this study did not address is fluctu-
ations over time. Our experience tells us that it may be impossible to make a
cross-national, multi-variable study of these fluctuations. Yet in some cases it
is possible (see van Haute, Paulis, and Sierens forthcoming, on party mem-
bership), while in others case studies and focused comparisons may be more
appropriate.
An element missing from this study is material resources. It would be
important to know whether changes and stability in the aspects of finance
and staff are about party persistence or personalization (and which type,
centralized or decentralized). Cross-national research would be a challenge
that requires much investment in terms of data collection and the standard-
ization of income and spending. Nevertheless, additional case studies and
focused comparisons may also serve the goal.
Finally, if the path we took is indeed fruitful, then we propose it as an
open call to improve on this research, to add indicators, and to develop
better and more sophisticated ways of examining party change. After all,
this study is neither the first word nor the last on the topic of party change.
While we mapped variance in changes in partyness, we failed to identify
convincing explanations for it. Future studies will hopefully move closer to
solving this puzzle.
On Personalization
This work was dedicated to research at the country level. There are many
good reasons, however, to expect that the study of personalization at the party
level would be found to be fruitful too. In that context, we would expect

parties with different ideologies to encourage or discourage personalization.
For example, radical or extreme right-wing parties often are parties in
which the leader is highly dominant—sometimes the party is him or her. At
the other end of the political spectrum, green parties’ rules of applying dual
or rotating leadership are expected to discourage personalization. Other
factors, such as the general organizational structure (“party model”), the
properties of the leadership, the candidate selection methods that the party
uses, or party age and size may also express and influence personalization.
Individual-level factors can impact personalization as well—gender, for
example. Following claims of feminist theory concerning the feminine
style of politics, we would expect women to be team players more than
men. On the other hand, in a “man’s world,” women’s candidacy may receive
more attention either because of its uncommonness or because of media
gender bias (Adam and Maier 2010).
Contextual factors might also be at work, and not only in the short run. For
example, Germany emphasizes the role of parties and appears to be reluctant
about personalization after the negative experience of the Weimar Republic
and of the Nazi period. As has been suggested, the position of Denmark—
with its unique combination of a small increase in partyness and moderate
levels of personalization—can be explained by looking at the “earthquake
elections” of 1973.
As we saw in Chapter 7 (see “The Voters” there), the study of the impact of
leader evaluation on the vote, and also that of the impact of personalized
electoral systems on voter behavior, are quite extensive. Yet the study of
personalization as reflected in citizens’ perceptions and behaviors can be
further developed. One way to do this is to bring voter personality into the
analysis. As Caprara (2007: 153) claims, “personalization of politics does not
only concern the significant impact of politician’s personality characteristics
on voter’s preferences but also relates to the role of voters’ personality with
respect to their own decision making. Thus, the same concept encompasses
diverse phenomena that reflect two distinct groups of related factors; politi-
cians’ personality as perceived and voters’ personality as operating.”
Another direction is to regard citizens not only as reacting voters but also
as active players in their own right. Gauja (2017a) suggests going beyond the
top-down approach (which puts the spotlight on politicians) and looking at
things from the bottom up, that is, examining the impact of personalization
on the behavior of party members and supporters. This idea is valuable
because it raises the possibility that individualized party politics—that is,
the involvement of individual members in candidate and leader selection as
well as in designing policies—may not only fit better the spirit of our times
but also be the way to revive party politics. Further elaborating in this
direction, Gauja raises the question of whether “individualized collective
action” is at all possible.

Political personalization is about a process, while personalized politics is
about a situation at a specific point in time. Too often, research that is labeled
“personalization” covers only one specific point in time.2 The need for longi-
tudinal data and different research designs differentiate these two areas of
enquiry. But the study of political personalization and that of personalized
politics will always be close relatives. Findings in each field can be easily
translated into expectations concerning the other. It is very likely that we will
never recover from the past the data that would allow us to study various
aspects of personalization. This is almost certainly true for survey-based
research. Thus, on various fronts (e.g., legislators’ and voters’ attitudes and
behaviors) further developments will occur mainly at the front of the study of
personalized politics. Nevertheless, there are still many data out there that
may be dug up and codified for the study personalization; aspects of legislative
behavior that are recorded in the protocols of legislatures serve as one useful
example in this context.
Our study focuses on political personalization in democracies. Yet per-
sonalization seems to be a universal phenomenon; it can also be encountered
in nondemocratic regimes. Many military and one-party regimes have
changed, and usually in the same direction: the status of their ruling insti-
tutions (party, military) declined, while that of the ruler increased—and
sometimes his family, too (Brooker 2009).3 It would be interesting to look
at the commonalities of and differences between democratic and nondemo-
cratic personalizations.
On Party Change and Personalization

The change in the status of parties vis-à-vis individual politicians can have a
host of implications. Some of these, such as the change in the model of
democracy, have been examined (see “Models of Democracy: Between
Party Democracy and Personalized Democracy” in Chapter 9), others still
need to be spelled out. Take for example different notions of representation
(say, the representative as delegate vs. the representative as trustee). How are
they linked to party change and personalization? Is the party more like a
delegate, given that its brand name identifies its stand on central issues and its
manifesto details its ideology and policy? And are individuals, who can be
2
In this study the two indicators of personalization in the online environment were based on
measurements made at one point in time. We gave justifications for including them in a general
study of personalization, alongside indicators of offline personalization that looked at change
between two points in time. It is now possible to measure change over time in online space, too,
by observing two points in time, and this is an interesting direction for research.
3
At least until recently, China clearly was an important exception with its process of
depersonalization since the rule of Mao Zedong.

elected for perceived competence, more like trustees? Or maybe it is the other
way around: parties are mainly brand names, which provide an identity and a
general package and can thus act more easily as trustees, while individuals
must adopt the populist stand of delegates who represent the people at all
times. And what about the principal–agent relationship? Is it with a party or
an individual? What are the implications of having a partisan agent rather
than an individual one?
Musella and Webb (2015: 225) argue that “political science thus far failed
to reflect sufficiently” on “the connection between personalization of politics
and the degree of instability of party systems.” In this book we did discuss
some properties of the party system, but only by viewing them as a result of
aggregative voters’ behavior. Party systems could be the focus of research that
examines the relationship between personalization and party system stability
and change. Highly personalized politics is expected to create instability in the
party system if voters change their vote each time a new leader enters and
builds a new political platform around his personality.
Populism and personalization are two prominent trends in the politics of
the first decades of the twenty-first century. Questions about their relationship
are crucial for understanding both: are they almost identical twins, since they
are against institutions and in favor of strong charismatic leaders? Or maybe
only centralized personalization is the twin of populism, while decentralized
personalization does not belong in the family? Can personalization serve
antipopulist forces (e.g., France’s Macron), or is it a double-edged sword?
Another interesting direction of research is history-based. Instead of start-
ing the story around 1960, as we did, one may go much further back in time,
to explore the status of parties vis-à-vis politicians in the early days of
democracy and its development since. Did parties and democracies always
go hand in hand? Is the development of this relationship a dialectical story in
Hegel’s sense, one in which a thesis (individuals dominate democratic politics)
was followed by the antithesis (parties dominate democratic politics) and then
by synthesis (a balance is created between parties and politicians)?
IF SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE, WHAT IS THAT?
Personalization has implications for democratic institutions. For example,

some electoral systems do not fit a personalized polity. Without cohesive
parties, in a totally personalized polity one can no longer assume that those
who voted for losing candidates in countries with single-member districts are
somehow compensated in the representation of their values and interests by
the election of candidates of the party they supported from other districts

(Powell 2004). Closed-list systems cannot be justified in a personalized polity.
In such a case, the best option seems to be a personalized proportional
representation (PR) system: the single transferable vote. But, if the aim is to
balance personalization with partyness, one should better choose open-list (or
semi-open-list) PR systems, or a mixed-member electoral system.
As we saw in Chapter 9, scholars are divided about the consequences of
political personalization. Some see it as a threat to democracy, others as an
opportunity to revive it, and still others as neither. While the optimists in the
second category may sometimes be right in specific contexts, there are two
reasons to be worried about personalization. First, we know that modern
representative democracy has developed in the form of party democracy, but
we have hardly any examples of viable personalized democracies beyond
(arguably) the United States. Furthermore, personalization and personalism
are evident in the less democratic and nondemocratic regimes, be they illiberal
democracies, electoral autocracies, or just autocracies. The shifting of Turkey
and Hungary in the 2010s toward illiberal models of democracy is concomi-
tant with the leadership dominance of Erdogan and Orbán respectively.
Parties also seem to be playing a declining role in illiberal and nondemocratic
regimes. The one-party rule tends to be in decline, perhaps only with the very
important exception of China.
Second, some of our findings point to the problematic nature of personal-
ized democracies. Our two extreme cases of party decline and personalization,
Israel and Italy, are far from constituting an optimal model of democracy. If
personalization is the key to success, they should have been ranked higher in
aspects related to democratic performance, governance, rule of law, and so
on. In addition, personalization was found to be linked to authoritarian rather
than individualistic tendencies.
Thus there are good reasons to be alarmed at the combination of party
decline and personalization. But those who face the challenge had better
forget about the good old days when parties were parties. Political parties
are way beyond their peak; personalization is here to stay. The goal should be
to redirect the personal energies of both leaders and other elected representa-
tives so as to make them serve the group.
There are several mechanisms that come to mind as potential generators of
a healthy balance between the personal and the partisan. One is the semi-
open- list electoral system. In countries where this system is used, politicians
need parties in order to feature on their candidate lists, and their position on
those lists is crucial to their chances of being elected. On the other hand, they
have an incentive to seek a personal vote, which is also, in fact, a party vote.
The balance in open-list electoral systems may tip further toward personal-
ization, but the party is still the gatekeeper through its power to include or
exclude candidates. When it presents a predetermined ordered list, it also
influences each candidate’s chance of being elected (e.g., in the Netherlands).

The same is true for intraparty multistage selection methods that balance the
partisan with the personal (Rahat 2009b).
Another mechanism is that of allocating areas of expertise to individuals
within the parliamentary party group, then nominating those individuals as
spokespeople for the party in their designated fields of expertise. In this way
MPs gain some individual prominence, even a certain autonomy within the
boundaries of a specifically defined subject, yet they do not step on the toes of
their co-partisans, because each has her own area and as a whole they present
a cohesive party. In everyday politics there are many such fields and subfields
of expertise, which allow for individual initiative, creativity, and prominence
in a way that brings credit to the whole party. Such a mechanism is almost
built into parliaments with committee systems, yet it requires party coordin-
ation and calculated optimal distribution of the “battlefields.”
The online environment, with its interactive and interconnected tools, is
another area where personal energies may be channeled toward the benefit
of both party and individuals. If the party’s and the politicians’ Facebook
pages, Twitter accounts, or any other platform are somehow connected and
synchronized, then the personal can help the partisan. If they are separate
entities, then they compete for the same crowd. Moreover, the content of
websites and social network sites is important well beyond the question of
whom a site belongs to and who operates it. Personal social network, sites and
websites that relate to the party, and party sites that relate to the team of
individuals may do the trick here.
These are just four mechanisms that may work to the benefit of the party
while still allowing politics to be personalized. We believe that there are many
more out there. They should be identified by those who are worried that
personalization is on the rise at the expense of parties, but nevertheless accept
that the wheel cannot roll back and that today we live in a personalized world.
As the famous line in the movie Life of Brian goes, “we are all individuals.”
Nevertheless, there is no reason why parties should not revitalize their abilities
to reorient personal energies toward collective action. After all, that is what
they were—and still are—about.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
Supplement to Table 3.1: Change in the Party

Background of Ministers
The table presents data on changes in the partisan background of ministers and the
resulting calibrated indices of change in partyness in eighteen countries.
Columns 2 to 5 present data from Krouwel (2012: 118). The second column shows
the points in time that the change is measured against. The third column presents the
proportion of ministers with partisan background in the earliest and the latest years.
The fourth column presents the values of absolute change: the calibrated value, and in
brackets the absolute change (calculated by subtracting the proportion of ministers
with party background in the earliest period from the proportion of ministers with
party background in the latest period) and the absolute change per annum. The change
per annum is calculated by dividing absolute change by the number of years (mid-year
for each period, for example 1963 for 1961–5 and 2008 for 2006–10). The fifth column
presents the values of relative change: the calibrated value, and in brackets the relative
change (calculated by dividing the proportion of ministers with party background in
the latest period by the proportion in the earliest period and then subtracting 1 and
multiplying by 100) and the relative change per annum. The relative change per annum
is calculated by dividing the relative change by the number of years.
Columns 6–10 present data from other sources. The sixth column outlines the
sources from which the data are taken. The seventh presents the points in time against
which the change is measured. The eighth presents the proportion of ministers with
partisan background at the earliest and latest points in time. The ninth presents the
values of absolute change: the calibrated value, and in brackets the absolute change and
the absolute change per annum. Absolute change and absolute change per annum are
calculated just as they were in the fourth column. The tenth column presents the values
of relative change: the calibrated value, and in brackets relative change and relative
change per annum. Relative change and relative change per annum are calculated as
they were in the fifth column.
The last column presents the calibrated value for each country. It is based either on
an average between the calibrated values from Krouwel (fourth and fifth columns) and
the average calibrated value of all other sources, or, when we have only one of them, on
that one. All values are rounded off to fit a scale with 0.5 values.
Some of the data were mined from not so detailed figures, so they may be inaccurate
by up to 2–3 points. However, our calibrated scale accommodates such limitations.
Country Share of ministers with parliamentary experience Other sources Partyness
(Krouwel 2012: 118) index
Years Earliest and Absolute Relative Source Years Earliest and Absolute Relative
latest change** change*** latest change** change***
values* values*

Austria 1961–5 vs. 80%–62% –2 (–18; –.40) –1 (–22.5; –.50) –1.5
2006–10
Belgium 1961–5 vs. 97%–80% –2 (–17; –.43) –1 (–17.5; –.44) –1.5
2001–5
Italy 1961–5 vs. 100%–92% –1 (–8; –.18) 0 (–8; –.18) Verzichelli 2009: Share 1960 vs. 2006 68%–12% –2 (–56; –1.22) –2 (–82.4; –1.79) –1.5 (–.5/–2)
2006–10 of cabinet ministers with
experience as junior
ministers
Share of cabinet 1960 vs. 2006 100%–73% –2 (–27; –.59) –2 (–27; –.59)
ministers with
parliamentary origin
Share of “outsiders” in 1948–92 vs. 16.5%–39% –2 (22.5; .70) –2 (136.4; 4.26)
government 1996–2006
Japan Masuyama and Nyblade 1960–72 vs. 1.3%–5.5% –1 (4.2; .11) –2 (323.1; 8.08) –1.5
2015: Average 2001–12
proportion of non-
politicians in cabinet
New Curtin 2015: Average 1960s vs. 22.7% –16.3% –1 (–6.4; –.16) –2 (–28.2; –.71) –1.5
Zealand proportion of cabinet 2000s
ministers with prior
political experience in
local government
France 1961–65 vs. 85%–55% –2 (–30; –.67) –2 (–35.3; –.78) Knapp 2002: Average 1960s vs. 10.7%–11.3% 0 (.6; .02) 0 (5.3; .17) –1 (–2/0)
2006–10 proportion of ministers 1990s
without a parliamentary
seat upon their
appointment
Kam and Indridason 1962–76 vs. 75.0%–63.4% –2 (–11.6; –.40) –1 (–15.5; –.53)
2009: Share of ministers 1991–2005
with parliamentary
experience
Share of ministers with 1.8%–9.7% 2 (7.9; .27) 2 (438.9; 15.13)
local political experience
Share of ministers with 7.1%–8.6% 0 (1.5; .05) 2 (21.1; .73)
ministerial cabinet
experience
Share of ministers with 5.4%–3.2% 0 (–2.2; –.08) –2 (–40.7; –1.40)
party position
Share of ministers with 10.7%–11.8% 0 (1.1; .04) –1 (10.3; .36)
no political experience
Iceland Kristjánsson and 1945–75 vs. 12.0–12.5 NA 0 (4.2; .11) –1
Indridason 2011: Mean 1991–2007
years of parliamentary

experience
Share of ministers with 74%–79% 1 (5; .13) 0 (6.8; .18)
prior high-ranking party
position
Share of ministers 65%–36% –2 (–29; –.76) –2 (–44.6; –1.17)
previously holding major
elected office at local/
regional level
Share of ministers with 13%–0% –2 (–13; –.34) –2 (NA)
prior salaried
employment in party
Share of ministers who 97%–100% 0 (–3; –.08) 0 (–3.1; –.08)
were members of
parliament at time of
appointment
Spain 1976–85 vs. 75%–84% 2 (9; .32) 1 (12.0; .43) Real-Dato and Jerez- 1977–80 vs. 4.7%–17.5% –2 (12.8; .49) –2 (272.3; 10.47) –.5 (1.5/–2)
2006–10 Mir 2009: Share of 2004–07
ministers with no prior
political experience
Netherlands 1961–65 vs. 55%–55% 0 (0; 0) 0 (0; 0) 0
2006–10
(continued )

values* values*
Portugal Pinto and Almeida 2009: 1976–99 vs. 76.7%–77.1% 0 (.5; .03) 0 (.0; 0) 0
Share of ministers with 1999–2005
political experience
Pinto and Almeida 2014: 1976–81 vs. 52.7%–50.0% 0 (–2.7; –.09) 0 (–5.1; –.18)
Share of ministers with 2005–12
no political experience
UK 1961–65 vs. 88%–86% 0 (–2; –.04) 0 (–2.3; –.05) 0
2006–10
Ireland 1961–65 vs. 93%–100% 1 (7; .16) 0 (7.5; .17) .5
2006–10
Israel Kenig and Barnea 2015: 1960–69 vs. 19%–4% 2 (15; .33) 2 (375.0; 8.33) .5
Share of ministers who 2006–15
were not MKs when first
appointed
Share of ministers with 1974–95 vs. 93%–92% 0 (–1; –.06) 0 (–1.1; –.06)
legislative experience 1995–2011
upon first appointment
Share of cabinet 71%–65% –1 (–6; –.33) –1 (–9.2; –.51)
ministers whose career
starting point was the
party
Sweden 1961–65 vs. 65%–65% 0 (0; 0) 0 (0; 0) Bergman and Bolin 1945–75 vs. 4.9–8.0 NA 2 (63.3; 1.67) .5 (0/1)
2006–10 2011: Mean years of 1991–2006
parliamentary
experience
position
Share of ministers 31%–67% 2 (36; .95) 2 (116.1; 3.06)
regional level
Share of ministers with 31%–53% 2 (22; .58) 2 (71.0; 1.87)
prior salaried
employment in party
Share of ministers who 77%–47% –2 (–30; –.79) –2 (–39.0; –1.03)
were members of
appointment

Bäck, Persson, Vernby 1960 vs. 56%–58% 0 (2; .04) 0 (3.6; .08)
and Wockelberg 2009: 2007+
Share of ministers with
parliamentary
background
Share of ministers with 1960 vs. 67.5%–76.5% 1 (9; .19) 1 (13.3; .28)
party background 2007+
Bäck, Dumont, Meier, 1960s vs. 78%–71% 1 (–7; .18) 1 (–9.0; .23)
Persson and Vernby 2000s
2009: Share of ministers
who were MPs or held
party office
Beckman 2007: Share of 1960 vs. 2004 67%–70% 0 (3; .07) 0 (4.5; .10)
ministers holding leading
positions in political
parties
Germany 1961–65 vs. 72%–85% 2 (13; .33) 1 (18.1; .45) Fleischer and Seyfried 1983 vs. 45.8%–62.8% 2 (17.8; .69) 2 (37.1; 1.43) 1 (1.5/.5)
2001–05 2015: Share of ministers 2009+
with party political
career
Share of ministers with 1983 vs. 69.5%– 62.2% –1 (–7.1; –.27) –1 (–10.4; –.40)
parliamentary career 2009+
(continued )

values* values*
Denmark 1961–65 vs. 60%–97% 2 (37; .82) 2 (61.7; 1.37) Damgaard 2011: Mean 1945–75 vs. 8.6–11.4 NA 2 (32.6; .86) 1.5 (2/1)
2006–10 years of parliamentary 1991–2005
experience
Share of ministers with 56%–50% –1(–6; –.16) –1 (–10.7; –.28)
position
Share of ministers 25%–30% 1 (5; .13) 2 (20; .53)
regional level
prior salaried
employment in party
Share of ministers who 92%–100% 2 (8; .21) 1 (8.7; .23)
were members of
appointment
Norway 1961–65 vs. 63%–80% 2 (17; .38) 2 (27.0; .60) Narud and Strøm 2011: 1945–75 vs. 3.8–6.7 NA 2 (76.3; 2.01) 1.5 (2/1)
2006–10 Mean years of 1991–2005
parliamentary
experience.
Share of ministers with 63%–65% 0 (2.0; .05) 0 (3.2; .08)
position
Share of ministers 63%–45% –2 (–18; –.47) –2 (–28.6; –.75)
regional level
Share of ministers with 25%–30% 1 (5; .13) 2 (20; .53)
prior salaried
employment in party
Share of ministers who 34%–65% 2 (31; .82) 2 (91.2; 2.40)
were members of
appointment
Kolltveit 2012: Share of 1983 vs. 61%–72% 2 (11; .42) 2 (18.0; .69)
ministers with prior 2009+
parliamentary

experience
Share of ministers with 1983 vs. 73%–75% 0 (2; .08) 0 (2.7; .10)
high-ranking party 2009+
position
Share of ministers with 1983 vs. 64%–75% 2 (11; .42) 2 (17.2; .66)
experience at elected 2009+
local/regional level
Average years of 1983 vs. 6.3–6.55 NA 0 (4.0; .15)
parliamentary 2009+
experience
Finland 1961–65 vs. 65%–90% 2 (25; .56) 2 (38.5; .86) Raunio 2011: Mean 1945–75 vs. 6.0–10.2 NA 2 (70.0; 1.56) 2 (2/1.5)
2006–10 years of parliamentary 1991–2005
experience
position
Share of ministers 50%–80% 2 (30; .67) 2 (60.0; 1.33)
(continued )

values* values*

regional level
prior salaried
employment in party
Share of ministers who 54%–87% 2 (33; .73) 2 (61.1; 1.36)
were members of
appointment
NA = Not applicable
* The data were mined from a not so detailed figure in the case of Krouwel (2012) and also for some of the additional sources, so they may be inaccurate by up to 2–3 points.
** Key for the calibrated absolute index:
–2 more than 0.2 annual decrease
–1 between 0.1 and 0.2 annual decrease
*** Key for the calibrated relative index:
+ Average of the two earliest and two latest cabinets.
APPENDIX 2
Supplement to Table 3.2: Change in

the Party Background of Legislators
The table presents data on changes in the partisan background of legislators and the
resulting calibrated indices for the change in partyness in fifteen countries.
The table includes data that cover various periods and are taken from various
sources (second column), on elements in the background of legislators that are seen
as attesting to partisan background (third column). The fourth column presents the
proportion of MPs with partisan background at the earliest and the latest points in
time. The fifth column presents the values of absolute change: the calibrated value, and
in brackets the absolute change (calculated by subtracting the proportion of MPs with
partisan background in the earliest period from the proportion in the latest period) and
the absolute change per annum. The absolute change per annum is calculated by
dividing absolute change by the number of years. The sixth column presents the values
of relative change: the calibrated value, and in brackets relative change (calculated by
dividing the proportion of MPs with partisan background in the latest year by the
proportion in the earliest year and then subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100) and
relative change per annum. The relative change per annum is calculated by dividing
relative change by the number of years. The last column presents a calibrated value
that is based on the average of all calibrated values, rounded to fit a scale with
0.5 values.
Some of the data were mined from not very detailed figures, so they may be
inaccurate by up to 2 or 3 points. However, our calibrated scale accommodates such
limitations.
Country Source and years of Indicator Earliest and latest Absolute Relative Partyness

comparison values (%) change* change** index
Switzerland Pilotti, Mach, and Share of professional 41.1–26.4 –2 (–14.7; –.34) –2 (–35.7; –.83) –2
Mazzoleni (2010) politicians
1957 vs. 2000
Finland Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 59–26 –2 (–33; –1.07) –2 (–55.9; –1.80) –1.5
1972 vs. 2003
Ruostetsaari (2003) Local politics 81–78 0 (–3; –.09) 0 (–3.7; –.11)
1960 vs. 1995
Leading party positions 44–25 –2 (–19; –.54) –2 (–43.2; –1.23)
Other national positions 70–40 –2 (–30; –.86) –2 (–42.9; –1.23)
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 48–27 –2 (–21; –.53) –2 (–43.7; –1.09)
(2007) party office background
1960s vs. 2000s before election
Italy Cotta, Mastropaolo and Local politics 60–50 –2 (–10; –.26) –1 (–16.7; –.43) –1.5
Verzichelli (2000) background
1960 vs. 1999
Leading party position 80–30 –2 (–50; –1.28) –2 (–62.5; –1.60)
Party and pressure group 28–18 –2 (–10; –.26) –2 (–35.7; –.92)
officials
Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 83–77 –1 (–6; –.15) –1 (–7.2; –.18)
1960 vs. 2001
Share of party 28–18 –2 (–10; –.26) –2 (–35.7; –.87)
functionaries
Recchi and Verzichelli MPs with party 90–78 –2 (–12; –.32) –1 (–13.3; –.35)
(2003) background
1963 vs. 2001
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 87–75 –2 (–12; –.30) –1 (–13.8; –.35)
Denmark Pedersen (2000) Local political 49–48 0 (–1; –.04) 0 (–2.0; –.08) –0.5
1966 vs. 1990 experience
Politics and 20–11 –2 (–9; –.38) –2 (–45.0; –1.88)
organizations
Employer, labor 19–20 0 (1; .04) 1 (5.3; .22)
movement
Politics, elective position 17–7 –1 (–10; –.42) –2 (–58.9; –2.45)
Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 53–50 0 (–3; –.07) 0 (–5.7; –.14)
1960 vs. 2001
Share of party 12–6 –1 (–6; –.15) –2 (–50.0; –1.22)
functionaries
Jensen (2003) Share of those with 70.9–69.8 0 (–1.1; –.05) 0 (–1.6; –.07)

1979 vs. 2001 employment or political
assignments in the party
organization
Share of those with 40.2–49.2 2 (9.0; .41) 2 (22.4; 1.02)
political assignments in
local politics
Share of those with 38.0–30.7 –2 (–7.3; –.33) –2 (–19.2; –.87)
assignments or
employment in interest
groups
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 58–48 –2 (–10; –.25) –1 (–17.2; –.43)
France Best and Gaxie (2000) Local politics 80–87 1 (7; .18) 1 (8.8; .22) –0.5
1960 vs. 1999 background
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 27–20 –2 (–7; –.7) –2 (–25.9; –2.59)
Israel Own calculation Local politics 22.5–22.5 0 (0; .00) 0 (0; .00) 0
(continued )

Poland Semenova, Edinger, and Experience in political 20.0–69.6 2 (49.6; 3.31) 2 (248.0; 14.59) 0.5
Best (2014) offices in local/regional
1994 vs. 2009 politics
Experience in political 79.4–64.6 –2 (–14.8; –.99) –1 (–18.6; –1.24)
offices in party politics
Germany Best, Hausmann, and Local politics 45–55 2 (10; .26) 2 (22.2; .57) 0.5
Schmitt (2000) background
1960 vs. 1999
Other parliamentary 30–24 –1 (–6; –.15) –2 (–20.0; –.51)
experience
Leading party position 22–45 2 (23; .59) 2 (104.5; 2.68)
Party and pressure group 14–14 0 (0; 0) 0 (0; 0)
officials
Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 22–51 2 (29; .69) 2 (131.8; 3.14)
1960 vs. 2002
Share of party 24–18 –1 (–6; –.14) –2 (–25.0; –.60)
functionaries
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 23–53 2 (30; .75) 2 (130.4; 3.26)
Norway Eliassen and Marino Local politics 90–75 –2 (–15; –.42) –1 (–16.7; –.46) 0.5
(2000) background
1960 vs. 1996
Party and pressure group 7–11 1 (4; .11) 2 (57.1; 1.59)
officials
Share of party 8–7 0 (–1; –.03) –1 (–12.5; –.35)
functionaries
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 46–97 2 (51; 1.28) 2 (110.9; 2.77)
Netherlands Secker (2000) Local politics 50–48 0 (–2; –.05) 0 (–4.0; –.11) 1
Leading party position 52–64 2 (12; .32) 2 (23.1; .61)
Party and pressure group 22–24 0 (2; .05) 1 (9.1; .24)
officials
Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 56–63 1 (7; .19) 1 (12.5; .34)
1960 vs. 1997
Share of party 22–31 2 (9; .24) 2 (40.9; 1.11)
functionaries
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 67–68 0 (1; .03) 0 (1.5; .05)

Portugal Magone (2000) Political employees 5.2–3.0 0 (–2.2; –.28) –2 (–42.3; –5.29) 1
1987–91 vs. 1995–99
1985–87 vs. 1995–9 Local executive 10.4–20.4 2 (10.0; .91) 2 (96.2; 8.75)
Local assembly 10.8–22.8 2 (12.0; 1.09) 2 (111.1; 10.1)
Central party office 19.2–38.3 2 (19.1; 1.74) 2 (99.5; 9.05)
Local party office 33.2–17.8 –2 (–15.4; –1.4) –2 (–46.4; –4.22)
Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 24–57 2 (33; 1.65) 2 (137.5; 6.88)
1974 vs. 1994
Australia Miragliotta and Pre-parliamentary 6–9 1 (3; .17) 2 (50.0; 2.63) 1.5
Errington (2012) occupation: Legislator
1970–90 vs. 1991–2007
Pre-parliamentary 8–28 2 (20; 1.05) 2 (250.0; 13.16)
occupation: Political
Pre-parliamentary 7–9 1 (2; .11) 2 (28.6; 1.51)
occupation: Union
Czech Republic Semenova, Edinger, and Experience in political 16.5–53.5 2 (37; 2.47) 2 (224.2; 14.95) 2
Experience in political 16.5–37.0 2 (20.5; 1.37) 2 (124.2; 8.28)
(continued )

Hungary Fiers and Secker (2007) Share of party officials 6–37 2 (31; 2.58) 2 (516.7; 43.06) 2
1990 vs. 2002
Cotta and Verzichelli Share of MPs with a 15–37 2 (22; 2.20) 2 (146.7; 14.67)
Semenova, Edinger, and Experience in political 44.8–58.1 2 (13.3; .89) 2 (29.7; 1.98)
Experience in political 18.7–27.6 2 (8.9; .59) 2 (47.6; 3.17)
UK Rush and Cromwell Local politics 38–55 2 (17; .46) 2 (44.7; 1.21) 2
(2000) background
1960 vs. 1997
* Key for the index:
APPENDIX 3
Supplement to Table 3.3: Change in

the Proportion of Party Members in
the Electorate (M/E in %)
The table presents data on changes in the party membership and the resulting cali-
brated indices for the change in partyness in twenty-three countries. It examines
changes in membership density by looking at the proportion of party members in the
population of voting age (membership/electorate, or M/E) in each country at the
beginning of the earliest available (or relevant, for late democracies) decade since
1960 (data in columns 2–6) and around 2010 (data in seventh column). Columns 8–9
present absolute change. The values in the eighth column present absolute change
(calculated by subtracting the M/E proportion in the earliest period from the M/E
proportion in the latest period) and absolute change per annum. Absolute change per
annum is calculated by dividing absolute change by the number of years. The values
for the calibration of absolute change per annum appear in the ninth column. Columns
10–11 present relative change. The values in the tenth column present relative change
and relative change per annum. Relative change is calculated by dividing the M/E
proportion in the latest period by the M/E proportion in the earliest period and then
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100. The relative change per annum is calculated by
dividing relative change by the number of years. The value for the calibration of
relative change per annum appears in the eleventh column. The last column presents
the average value for the calibrated values of absolute and relative change.
Country ~1960s* ~1970* ~1980* ~1990* ~2000* ~2008* Absolute change Index absolute Relative change Index relative Partyness
and absolute change** and relative change*** index
change per annum change per annum
New Zealand 20.2 14.6 8.2 2.3 1.7 –18.5; –.46 –2 –91.6; –2.29 –2 –2
Israel 17.0 12.2 4.8 –12.2; –.44 –2 –71.8; –2.56 –2 –2
Switzerland 23.4 10.4 9.1 8.0 6.4 4.8 –18.6; –.39 –2 –79.5; –1.66 –2 –2
Czech 7.0 3.4 2.0 –5.0; –.28 –2 –71.4; –3.97 –2 –2
Republic
Norway 16.0 12.8 15.4 13.1 7.3 5.0 –11.0; –.23 –2 –68.9; –1.44 –2 –2
Finland 19.1 17.2 15.7 13.5 9.7 8.1 –11.0; –.23 –2 –57.6; –1.20 –2 –2
Denmark 14.3 14.0 7.3 5.9 5.1 4.1 –10.2; –.21 –2 –71.3; –1.49 –2 –2
Austria 26.2 25.9 24.2 23.7 17.7 17.3 –8.9; –.19 –1 –34.0; –.71 –2 –1.5
Canada 3.6 3.9 .8 –2.8; –.16 –1 –77.8; –4.32 –2 –1.5
UK 9.0 6.2 3.8 2.6 1.9 1.2 –7.8; –.16 –1 –86.7; –1.81 –2 –1.5
Sweden 11.7 7.7 8.4 8.0 5.5 3.9 –7.8; –.16 –1 –66.7; –1.39 –2 –1.5
Netherlands 9.5 4.4 4.3 3.2 2.5 2.5 –7.0; –.15 –1 –73.7; –1.54 –2 –1.5
Italy 12.7 12.8 9.7 9.1 4.1 5.6 –7.1; –.15 –1 –55.9; –1.16 –2 –1.5
Belgium 9.8 10.0 9.0 9.2 6.6 5.5 –4.3; –.09 0 –43.9; –.91 –2 –1
Ireland 4.6 5.0 4.7 3.1 2.0 –2.6; –.07 0 –56.5; –1.49 –2 –1
Australia 3.7 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.4 –2.3; –.06 0 –62.2; –1.64 –2 –1
Poland 1.2 1.0 –.2; –.03 0 –16.7; –2.09 –2 –1
Hungary 2.1 2.2 1.5 –.6; –.03 0 –28.6; –1.59 –2 –1
Portugal 4.3 5.1 4.4 3.8 –.5; –.02 0 –11.6; –.41 –1 –.5
Germany 2.7 3.7 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.3 –.4; –.01 0 –14.8; –.31 –1 –.5
France 2.2 1.9 3.6 3.0 1.6 1.9 –.3; –.01 0 –13.6; –.28 –1 –.5
Spain 1.2 2.1 3.4 4.4 3.2; .11 1 266.7; 9.53 2 1.5
Greece 3.2 6.3 6.8 6.6 3.4; .12 1 106.3; 3.80 2 1.5
* Data for the closest available membership figures within three years of decennial year—except for Ireland, where 1960 = 1967 and 1980 = 1986.
** Key for the index of absolute change:
*** Key for the index of relative change:

Source: Data from Scarrow (2015: 97) except for: the Czech Republic 1990, 2000, 2008, Hungary 1990, 2000, 2008 and Poland 2000, 2008 (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012); Australia 2000,
Canada 2000 (Weldon 2006); Israel (Kenig, Philippov, and Rahat 2013); Canada 1990 (Carty 2002); Canada 2008 (Poguntke, Scarrow, and Webb 2015); Australia 2008 (MAPP 2015).
APPENDIX 4
Supplement to Table 3.5: Change

in Party Identification
The table presents the data on changes in the party identification and the resulting
calibrated indices for the change in partyness in twenty-six countries.
Columns 2–6 present an analysis of the earlier period; that is, the decades before
2000. First come Dalton’s (2004) data on the change of party identifiers per annum
(third column) and on strong party identifiers (fourth column) for the two or three
decades preceding 2001 (see the second column for the relevant years for each country).
Second, columns 5–6 present our own analysis of annual change in the proportion of
those without party identification. It is based on answers to an identical question that
was asked in the Eurobarometer surveys (Eurobarometer 2016: 10, 11, 15, 16, 24, 25,
34, 36) in 1978–96 and reflects the proportion of those who claimed that they are “close
to no particular party.” The calculations are based on averages for the two earliest and
two latest surveys (see fifth column for the relevant years for each country). The value
in the sixth column is of change per annum that is calculated by dividing change in the
given period by the number of years.
The next two columns present an analysis of data from the European Social Survey
(ESS) from 2002 to 2014. The seventh column presents the years compared. The eighth
column presents change per annum, which is calculated by dividing the difference
between the values of the earliest and those of the latest available surveys by the
number of intervening years. The ninth column presents supplementary sources and
data for both periods. The last three columns present the calibrated partyness index of
change in party identification over time for the earlier period, that is, the decades
before 2000 (tenth column), for the latest period, that is, after 2000 (eleventh column),
and an index of the two, roughly weighted by years (last column).
Given the nature of the available data, we did not attempt to calculate relative
change for this indicator.
Country Trends in party identification (Dalton Eurobarometer European Social Survey Other supplementary Change in party Change in Partyness
2004: 33) (ESS) sources identification party index
early period*** identification
late period***
Years % % strong Years Change Per Years Change per

identifiers identifiers Annum for annum for
change change per those who those who feel
per annum feel closer to closer to
annum no party* particular
party**
Czech 2002 vs. –1.24 –2 –2

Republic 2014

Hungary 2002 vs. –1.60 –2 –2
2014
Ireland 1978 vs. –1.51 –.767 1978/9 vs. 1.32 2002 vs. –1.25 –2 –2 –2
1999 1994/6 2014
Israel 2002 vs. –.58 Arian, Atmor, and Hadar –2 –2 –2
2014 (2006): 1969 vs. 2006
Increase of those with no
party attachment from
38% to 68% (.81)
Italy 1978 vs. –.98 –.770 1978/9 vs. .99 2002 vs. –.81 –2 –2 –2
1999 1994/6 2012
Japan 1962 vs. –.59 –2 –2
2000
New 1975 vs. –1.53 –1.27 –2 –2
Zealand 1999
Iceland 1983 vs. –.68 –.25 2004 vs. –1.25 –1.5 –2 –2
1999 2012
Austria 1969 vs. –.92 –.66 2002 vs. –.22 –2 –1 –1.5
1999 2014
(continued )
Country Trends in party identification (Dalton Eurobarometer European Social Survey Other supplementary Change in party Change in Partyness
2004: 33) (ESS) sources identification party index
early period*** identification
late period***

Greece 1981 vs. .18 2002 vs. –3.0 Teperoglou and Tsatsanis –1 –2 –1.5
1994/6 2010 (2014): 1985 vs. 2011
Proportion of those with
party ID: 83% (1985) to
61% (2011), (–.85)
France 1975 vs. –.71 –.33 1978/9 vs. .88 2002–2014 –.02 –2 0 –1.5
1999 1994/6
Netherlands 1971 vs. –.33 –.13 1978/9 vs. .81 2002–2014 –.50 –1.5 –1 –1
1998 1994/6
Finland 1975 vs. –.29 –.15 2002 vs. –.38 –1 –1 –1
1991 2014
Luxembourg 1975 vs. –.32 –.32 1978/9 vs. .39 –1 –1
1999 1994/6
Poland 2002 vs. –.30 –1 –1
2014
UK 1964 vs. –.20 –.88 1978/9 vs. .91 2002 vs. .28 –1.5 1 –1
2001 1994/6 2014
Australia 1967 vs. –.18 –.59 McAllister and Cameron –1.5 1 –.5
1998 (2014): 1998 vs. 2013
Increase in the proportion
of those with very strong
party ID from 18% to 21%
(.2); Stability in fairly
strong ID on 50%(.0);
Decline in not very strong
party ID from 32% to 29%
(.2).
Belgium 1975 vs. .09 –.29 1978/9 vs. .64 2002 vs. .06 –1 0 –.5
1999 1994/6 2014
Sweden 1968 vs. –.73 –.54 2002 vs. .56 –2 2 –.5
1998 2014
Canada 1965 vs. –.39 –.15 Canadian Opinion –1 1 –.5
1997 Research Archive (2015):
1997 vs. 2011
Share of those with no
party ID declined from
25.3% to 19.8%; With
very strong Party ID
increased from 22.3% to
27.7% (.39; .39)
Switzerland 2002 vs. .23 Selects (2013): 1971 vs. –1 1 –.5
2014 2011
Decline in the average
strength of party ID from
.77 to .45 and decline of

those with party ID from
60% to 40% (.50)
Germany 1972 vs. –.57 –.57 1978/9 vs. .44 2002 vs. .58 –1.5 2 0
1998 1994/6 2014
Portugal 1985/6 vs. –.13 2002 vs. –.67 1 –2 0
1994/6 2014
Denmark 1971 vs. .00 –.21 1978/9 vs. –.13 2002 vs. .23 0 1 .5
1998 1994/6 2014
Norway 1965 vs. –.54 –.45 2002 vs. .60 –1.5 2 .5
1997 2014
Spain 1985/6 vs. –1.18 2002 vs. .28 2 1 1.5
1994/6 2014
ID = Identification
* Change in the proportion of those who answered that they are close to no particular party.
** Change in the proportion of those who feel closer to a particular party than to any other party (% Yes).
*** The data are interpreted according to the following rules:
2 more than 0.51 change (increase in those with party identification, decrease in those without party identification);
1 between 0.11 and 0.5 change (increase in those with party identification, decrease in those without party identification);
0 less than 0.1 change;
–1 between 0.11 and 0.5 change (decrease in those with party identification, increase in those without party identification);
–2 more than 0.51 change (decrease in those with party identification, increase in those without party identification).
APPENDIX 5

in Net Electoral Volatility
The table presents the data on changes in net electoral volatility (according to the
Pedersen index) and the resulting calibrated indices of change in partyness in twenty-
six countries.
Columns 2–6 present the average level of electoral volatility for each decade. Most
data are from Dassonneville (2015). For the cases that her work did not cover, we did
our best to ensure that we follow her rules in the treatment of mergers, splits, and
definition of new parties. The seventh column presents the value of absolute change
(calculated by subtracting the volatility value in the earliest period from the value in
the latest period) and then the absolute change per annum, which is calculated by
dividing absolute change by the number of years (mid-years for each decade). The
eighth column presents the values of the calibrated index for absolute change. The
ninth column presents the value of relative change (calculated by dividing the volatility
value in the latest period by the value in the earliest period and then subtracting 1 and
multiplying by 100) and relative change per annum. The relative change per annum is
calculated by dividing relative change by the number of years (mid-years for each
decade). The tenth column presents the values of the calibrated index for relative
change. The last column presents the summary partyness index, which is a simple
average of the absolute and relative change indices from columns 8 and 10.
Country 1966–75 1976–85 1986–95 1996–2005 2006–15 Change in Partyness Partyness
averages averages averages averages averages index
Absolute change and Index Relative change and Index
absolute change per absolute relative change per relative
annum change* annum change**
Japan 2.8 22.5 19.7; .66 –2 703.6; 23.45 –2 –2

Poland*** 32.7 37.9 5.2; .52 –2 15.9; 1.59 –2 –2
Israel 5.2 15.8 11.0 22.4 20.4 15.2; .38 –2 292.3; 7.31 –2 –2
Ireland 2.7 5.7 12.3 9.5 17.3 14.6; .37 –2 540.7; 13.52 –2 –2
Iceland 8.3 15.5 16.0 12.7 22.4 14.1; .35 –2 169.9; 4.25 –2 –2
Italy 6.9 7.5 22.0 17.9 18.3 11.4; .29 –2 165.2; 4.13 –2 –2
Austria 3.8 3.2 8.6 14.7 13.7 9.9; .25 –2 260.5; 6.51 –2 –2

Germany 6.2 5.5 5.9 7.5 14.6 8.4; .21 –2 135.5; 3.39 –2 –2
Netherlands 11.9 9.0 13.0 21.0 19.3 7.4; .19 –1 62.2; 1.56 –2 –1.5
Canada 6.1 9.6 24.4 9.7 11.9 5.8; .15 –1 95.1; 2.38 –2 –1.5
Belgium 7.1 8.8 7.4 12.6 12.5 5.4; .14 –1 76.1; 1.90 –2 –1.5
UK 6.9 5.4 4.3 7.4 11.9 5.0; .13 –1 72.5; 1.81 –2 –1.5
France 11.7 11.7 15.2 17.9 16.5 4.8; .12 –1 41.0; 1.03 –2 –1.5
Sweden 7.6 6.5 11.3 15.0 11.7 4.1; .10 –1 53.9; 1.35 –2 –1.5
New Zealand 6.7 10.3 14.7 17.5 8.5 1.8; .05 0 26.9; .67 –2 –1
Australia 5.4 5.3 5.6 7.4 6.7 1.3; .03 0 24.1; .60 –2 –1
Switzerland 6.0 4.8 7.7 8.4 7.7 1.7; .04 0 28.3; .71 –2 –1
Finland 9.0 7.9 10.2 7.6 9.7 .7; .02 0 7.8; .20 –1 –.5
Portugal 11.5 16.2 7.4 11.4 –.1; .00 0 –.9; –.03 0 0
Denmark 14.1 13.1 9.6 10.9 13.4 –.7; –.02 0 –5.0; –.13 0 0
Norway 11.2 10.1 15.0 17.2 10.4 –.8; –.02 0 –7.1; –.18 0 0
Greece 17.7 6.4 7.0 16.1 –1.6; –.05 0 –9.0; –.30 1 .5
Luxembourg 13.2 13.8 11.9 8.7 7.2 –6.0; –.15 1 –45.5; –1.14 2 1.5
Spain 26.3 10.4 8.0 16.9 –9.4; –.31 2 –35.7; –1.19 2 2
(continued )
Country 1966–75 1976–85 1986–95 1996–2005 2006–15 Change in Partyness Partyness
Absolute change and Index Relative change and Index
absolute change per absolute relative change per relative
annum change* annum change**
Czech Republic*** 32.3 21.7 –10.6; –1.06 2 –32.8; –3.28 2 2

Hungary*** 38.1 20.6 –17.5; –1.75 2 –45.9; –4.59 2 2
* Key for the index for absolute change:
–2 more than 0.2 annual increase
–1 between 0.1 and 0.2 annual increase
** Key for the index for relative change:
*** For the three youngest democracies, the data in the fifth column are for the 1990s and those in the sixth column for the period 2000–10.
Sources: Most data are from Dassonneville 2015, supplemented with our own calculations in cases of elections in 2015. The exceptions are Canada 1966–2005 (Carty 2002); Australia
1966–2005 (McAllister 2002); New Zealand 1966–2005 (Vowles 2002); Israel 1966–2005 (Kenig and Tuttnauer 2017); Japan 1976–85; and Canada, Japan, and New Zealand 2006–15
(our own calculations).
APPENDIX 6

in Electoral Turnout
The table presents the data on changes in electoral turnout and the resulting calibrated
indices for the change in partyness in twenty-six countries.
Columns 2–6 present the average electoral turnout for each decade in percentages.
The seventh column presents the values of absolute change (calculated by subtracting
the turnout value in the earliest period from the value in the latest period) and absolute
change per annum. The latter is calculated by dividing the value of absolute change by
the number of years (mid-years are used for each decade). The eighth column presents
the values of the calibrated partyness index for absolute change. The ninth column
presents the values of relative change (calculated by dividing the turnout value for the
latest period by that of the earliest period, and then subtracting 1 and multiplying by
100) and relative change per annum. The latter is calculated by dividing the value of
relative change by the number of years (mid-years are used for each decade). The tenth
column presents the values of the calibrated partyness index for relative change. The
last column presents the final partyness index for electoral turnout, which is simply the
average for the index for absolute change and the index for relative change.
Country 1966–75 1976–85 1986–95 1996–2005 2006–15 Change in partyness Partyness
Absolute change Index Relative change Index
and absolute change absolute and relative change relative
per annum change* per annum change**
Czech Republic 69.4 61.1 –8.3; –.83 –2 –12.0; –1.20 –2 –2

Portugal 82.1 69.0 62.7 57.8 –24.3; –.81 –2 –29.6; –.99 –2 –2
France 80.8 71.3 71.2 64.2 57.7 –23.1; –.58 –2 –28.6; –.72 –2 –2
Greece 82.1 83.8 76.0 65.2 –16.9; –.56 –2 –20.6; –.69 –2 –2
Germany 88.9 89.5 80.4 79.7 71.2 –17.7; –.44 –2 –19.9; –.50 –1 –1.5
Austria 92.7 92.4 86.3 82.4 77.4 –15.3; –.38 –2 –16.5; –.41 –1 –1.5
Finland 80.6 75.5 69.7 66.0 66.4 –14.2; –.36 –2 –17.6; –.44 –1 –1.5
Italy 93.0 90.9 87.5 82.2 79.8 –13.2; –.33 –2 –14.2; –.36 –1 –1.5
Israel 79.9 78.8 78.6 75.3 67.1 –12.8; –.32 –2 –16.0; –.40 –1 –1.5
Japan 71.4 71.0 68.1 61.9 60.4 –11.0; –.28 –2 –15.4; –.39 –1 –1.5
Canada 74.6 73.4 72.5 63.0 63.4 –11.2; –.28 –2 –15.0; –.38 –1 –1.5
New Zealand 87.4 90.0 86.5 82.6 76.9 –10.5; –.26 –2 –12.0; –.30 –1 –1.5
UK 75.0 74.4 76.6 64.1 66.0 –9.0; –.23 –2 –12.0; –.30 –1 –1.5
Netherlands 85.9 85.0 81.6 77.4 76.8 –9.1; –.23 –2 –10.6; –.27 –1 –1.5
Switzerland 57.5 48.5 45.3 44.2 48.6 –8.9; –.22 –2 –15.5; –.39 –1 –1.5
Ireland 76.8 74.8 70.1 64.3 68.5 –8.3; –.21 –2 –10.8; –.27 –1 –1.5
Iceland 91.1 89.4 88.4 85.9 83.4 –7.7; –.19 –1 –8.5; –.21 –1 –1
Sweden 89.5 91.0 86.5 80.8 84.1 –5.4; –.14 –1 –6.0; –.15 0 –.5
Norway 82.0 83.0 79.6 77.1 77.3 –4.7; –.12 –1 –5.7; –.14 0 –.5
Spain 75.0 72.5 74.2 72.5 –2.5; –.08 0 –3.3; –.11 0 0
Denmark 88.4 87.6 84.9 85.9 86.7 –1.7; –.04 0 –1.9; –.05 0 0
Australia 95.3 94.6 95.0 95.0 93.7 –1.6; –.04 0 –1.7; –.04 0 0
Belgium 90.7 94.6 92.4 91.1 89.9 –.8; –.02 0 –.9; –.02 0 0
Luxembourg 89.4 88.8 87.8 89.1 91.0 1.6; .04 0 1.8; .05 0 0
Hungary 63.8 64.6 .8; .08 0 1.3; .13 0 0
Poland 44.9 51.2 6.3; .63 2 14.0; 1.40 2 2
–2 more than .5 annual decrease

2 more than 0.5 annual increase.Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IDEA 2015.
APPENDIX 7

in the Effective Number of Parties
among Voters (ENPV)
The table presents the data on changes in the effective number of parties among voters
(ENPV) and the resulting calibrated indices for the change in partyness in twenty-six
countries.
Columns 2–6 present the average ENPV for each decade. The seventh column
presents the values of absolute change (calculated by subtracting the ENPV value in
the earliest period from that in the latest period) and absolute change per annum. The
latter is calculated by dividing absolute change by the number of years (mid-years are
used for each decade). The eighth column presents the calibrated partyness index for
absolute change. The ninth column presents the values of relative change (calculated
by dividing the ENPV value for the latest period by that of the earliest period and then
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100) and relative change per annum. The latter is
calculated by dividing the value of relative change by the number of years (mid-years
are used for each decade). The tenth column presents the calibrated partyness index for
absolute change. The last column presents the final partyness index of ENPV, which is
simply the average of the index for absolute change and of the index of relative change.
and absolute absolute and relative relative
change per annum change* change per annum change**
Israel 3.73 4.31 4.98 7.76 8.19 4.46; .12 –2 119.6; 2.99 –2 –2
Czech 4.95 6.09 1.14; .11 –2 23.0; 2.30 –2 –2
Republic
Belgium 5.77 7.59 9.14 9.56 9.57 3.80; .10 –2 65.9; 1.65 –2 –2
Austria 2.31 2.34 3.34 3.42 4.55 2.24; .06 –2 97.0; 2.43 –2 –2
Greece 3.00 2.64 2.79 4.88 1.88; .06 –2 62.7; 2.09 –2 –2
Germany 2.94 3.08 3.69 4.11 5.20 2.26; .06 –2 76.9; 1.92 –2 –2

Ireland 2.82 2.76 3.60 4.08 4.27 1.45; .04 –1 51.4; 1.29 –2 –1.5
Sweden 3.39 3.53 4.05 4.53 4.95 1.56; .04 –1 46.0; 1.15 –2 –1.5
UK 2.79 3.17 3.20 3.38 3.82 1.03; .03 –1 36.9; .92 –1 –1
Iceland 3.78 4.12 4.77 3.75 4.81 1.03; .03 –1 27.2; .68 –1 –1
Australia 2.79 2.85 3.06 3.32 3.71 .92; .02 –1 33.0; .83 –1 –1
Italy 4.01 3.99 6.28 6.75 4.95 .94; .02 –1 23.4: .59 –1 –1
New Zealand 2.51 2.92 2.88 3.84 3.16 .65; .02 0 25.9; .65 –1 –.5
Japan 3.30 3.75 4.05 3.79 4.05 .75; .02 0 22.7; .57 –1 –.5
Luxembourg 3.89 3.87 4.68 4.49 4.55 .66; .02 0 17.0; .43 0 0
Canada 3.06 2.92 3.49 3.88 3.60 .54; .01 0 17.6; .44 0 0
Norway 4.27 3.75 4.79 5.41 4.71 .44; .01 0 10.3; .26 0 0
Finland 5.81 5.60 5.99 5.79 6.31 .50; .01 0 8.6; .22 0 0
Denmark 5.20 5.31 5.32 4.87 5.66 .46; .01 0 8.8; .22 0 0
Spain 3.91 3.75 3.11 3.99 .08; .00 0 2.0; .07 0 0
Switzerland 5.81 5.78 7.00 5.66 5.93 .12; .00 0 2.1; .05 0 0
Portugal 3.68 2.91 3.10 3.69 .01; .00 0 .3; .01 0 0
France 4.85 4.61 5.31 5.89 4.80 –.05; .00 0 –1.0; –.03 0 0
(continued )
and absolute absolute and relative relative
change per annum change* change per annum change**
Netherlands 6.72 4.25 4.46 5.39 6.24 –.48; –.01 0 –7.1; –.18 0 0
Hungary 4.06 2.95 –1.11; –.11 1 –27.3; –2.73 2 1.5
Poland 4.98 3.84 –1.14; –.11 2 –22.9; –2.29 2 2
–2 more than 1.0% annual increase
–1 between 0.5% and 1.0% annual increase
0 less than 0.5% change
1 between 0.5% and 1.0% annual decrease
2 more than 1.0% annual decrease.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Gallagher, 2017.
APPENDIX 8

in Party System Innovation
The table presents the data on changes in party system innovation and the resulting
calibrated indices for the change in partyness in twenty-four countries.
Columns 2–6 present the level of party system innovation for each decade. This
expresses the average of the total proportion of votes that new parties won in elections
that took place during a given decade. The seventh column presents the value of
change and the value of change per annum. The value of change was calculated by
subtracting the proportion of votes in the earliest period from the proportion of votes
in the latest period. The value of change per annum was calculated by dividing change
by the number of years from the earliest to the latest period (mid-years are used for
each decade). The last column presents the calibrated partyness index for this
indicator.
Country 1966–75 1976–85 1986–95 1996–2005 2006–15 Absolute Partyness

averages averages averages averages averages change and index*
change per
annum
Czech Republic 3.0 16.9 13.9; 1.390 –2

Spain 1.4 1.1 1.6 12.4 11.0; .367 –2
Italy 0 1.3 11.7 5.8 12.5 12.5; .313 –2
Iceland 1.0 2.2 1.4 2.6 10.7 9.7; .243 –2
Japan 1.8 0 2.7 4.3 10.2 8.4; .210 –2
Greece .6 0 .7 6.0 5.4; .180 –2
Israel 2.7 9.6 2.3 8.3 8.8 6.1; .153 –2
Austria .3 1.7 .8 .5 4.5 4.2; .105 –2
Germany 0 .5 1.9 .4 3.9 3.9; .098 –1
Luxembourg 0 5.4 5.1 2.2 2.9 2.9; .073 –1
Australia .5 2.4 .6 2.6 2.2 1.7; .043 –1
Sweden 0 .4 2.3 .7 1.0 1.0; .025 –1
Belgium 1.0 2.2 1.4 1.1 1.8 .8; .020 –1
Netherlands 2.5 .4 2.8 6.2 3.2 .7; .018 0
New Zealand .5 4.1 7.5 3.2 1.2 .7; .018 0
Ireland .6 .6 1.1 .6 1.1 .5; .013 0
UK .5 0 0 1.7 1.0 .5; .013 0
(continued )
296 APPENDIX 8
Country 1966–75 1976–85 1986–95 1996–2005 2006–15 Absolute Partyness

averages averages averages averages averages change and index*
change per
annum
Canada 0 .3 8.5 1.4 0 0; .000 0

Finland .4 .8 1.7 1.1 0 –.4; –.010 0
Norway 2.5 0 1.1 .6 1.4 –1.1; –.028 1
Denmark 4.1 0 .9 0 2.5 –1.6; –.040 1
Switzerland 2.8 1.5 1.3 0 1.2 –1.6; –.040 1
France 5.2 1.1 9.2 3.2 0 –5.2; –.130 2
Portugal 5.4 .6 .8 1.0 –4.4; –.147 2
* Index for the interpretation of the gaps between the earliest and the latest period:
–2 Increase of more than 0.1
–1 Increase between 0.02 and 0.1
0 Change of less than 0.02
1 Decline between 0.02 and 0.1
2 Decline of more than 0.1.
Sources: For eighteen countries, the list of new parties was taken from Emanuele (2016); for Australia, Canada,
Czech Republic, Israel, Japan, and New Zealand we constructed the list of new parties relying on the same
criteria.
APPENDIX 9
Supplement to Table 4.1: Local Parties’

Shares of Votes and Seats
The table presents the data on changes in the proportion of votes or seats of national-
level parties in local elections and the resulting calibrated indices for the change in
partyness in fourteen countries.
Columns 2–6 present the proportion of votes or seats for local parties and inde-
pendents in one election in each decade (closest to the years that appear in the top row
of the column). The seventh column presents the values of absolute change per annum,
which are calculated by dividing the gap between the values for the earliest and for the
latest available points in time by the number of years. The eighth column presents
the calibrated index for absolute change. The ninth column presents the values of
relative change per annum, which are calculated by dividing the value for the latest
available point in time by that of the earliest point in time, then subtracting 1 and
multiplying by 100, and then dividing the result by the number of years. The tenth
column presents the calibrated index for relative change. The last column presents the
final index for this indicator, which is simply the average for the index for absolute
change and the index for relative change.
Country ~1975* ~1985* ~1995* ~2005* ~2015* Absolute change+ Relative change++ Partyness
index

Per annum+++ Partyness Per annum+++ Partyness
index index
Israel 8.9 16.5 35.0 52.0 75.0 1.65 –2 18.57 –2 –2

Italy 13.0 34.1 1.41 –2 10.82 –2 –2
Belgium ~23 ~20 ~18 ~46 .96 –2 4.17 –2 –2
Netherlands 8.4 11.7 16.4 22.1 27.8 .49 –2 5.77 –2 –2
Czech 8.5 11.9 15.0 .33 –2 3.82 –2 –2
Republic
Ireland 7.9 8.7 9.9 20.3 .31 –2 3.93 –2 –2
Spain** 7.4 3.3 6.6 15.4 .25 –2 3.60 –2 –2
Sweden 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.5 .13 –1 7.45 –2 –1.5
Luxembourg 2.4 2.5 2.5 .01 0 .23 –1 –.5
Japan*** 61.0 56.9 63.6 65.6 61.7 .01 0 .03 0 0
Finland 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.3 1.7 –.03 0 – .96 2 1
Portugal 4.0 1.4 2.3 2.5 –.05 0 –1.29 2 1
Norway 8.0 5.0 9.0 4.0 4.6 –.09 0 –1.06 2 1
Denmark 14.5 10.0 10.0 6.0 4.1 –.27 2 –1.84 2 2
* In roman type, the proportion of support (votes) for local parties; in italics, the proportion of seats for local parties.
** Refers to local elections that are held on the same day in thirteen out of the seventeen regions.
*** Refers to cities (as opposed to villages and towns).
+ Key for the index of absolute change:
2 more than 0.2 decrease
1 between 0.1 and 0.2 decrease
–1 between 0.1 and 0.2 increase
–2 more than 0.2 increase.
++ Key for the index of relative change:
2 sharp increase more than 0.5 decrease
1 moderate increase between 0.2 and 0.5 decrease
0 no change less than 0.2 change
–1 moderate decline between 0.2 and 0.5 increase
–2 sharp decline more than 0.5 increase.
+++ The following are, country by country, the exact election years on the basis of which annual change was computed:
Country Early Late
Israel 1973 2013
Italy* 1995–9 2010–14
Belgium 1976 2000
Netherlands 1974 2014
Czech Republic 1994 2014
Ireland 1974 2014
Spain 1983 2015
Sweden 1976 2006
Luxembourg 1987 2005
Japan 1975 2011
Finland 1976 2012

Portugal 1976 2005
Norway 1975 2015
Denmark 1974 2013
* In Italy, local elections are not held nationally in the same year.
Sources:
Israel: Values in first four rows from Brichta, Vigoda-Gadot, and Pade (2010); last value is our own calculation;
Italy: Vampa 2016;
Belgium: Steyvers et al. 2008 (this source presents separate values for Flanders and Wallonia; we averaged the two values);
Netherlands: our own calculation, based on Databank Verkiezingsuitslagen, http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl;
Czech Republic: our own calculation, based on Czech Statistical Office, http://www.volby.cz/index_en.htm;
Ireland: our own calculation, based on Wikipedia series on Irish local elections;
Spain: our own calculation, based on the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs, http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html;
Sweden: Worlund 2008;
Luxembourg: Dumont, Kies, and Poirier 2011;
Japan: Hijino 2013;
Finland: the two earliest values from Sundberg and Gylling 1992, other three values from Sjoblom 2011;
Norway: the four earliest values from Aars and Ringkjob 2008, the latest value from Wikipedia (which is based on Norway election commission), https://no.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Kommunestyre-_og_fylkestingsvalget_2015;
Denmark: the four earliest values from Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2011, the latest value from Wikipedia, https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kommunal-_og_regionsr%C3%
A5dsvalg_2013.
APPENDIX 10
Supplement to Table 4.4: Dissimilarity Index:

Vote in the Region for National Elections vs.
Vote in the Region for Regional Elections:
Averages by Decade
The table presents data on changes in the values of the dissimilarity index and the
resulting calibrated indices for the change in partyness in fourteen countries.
Columns 2–5 present the average values of the dissimilarity index for elections for
each decade. The sixth column presents the values of absolute change per annum,
which are calculated by first subtracting the value of the dissimilarity index from the
earliest decade from that of the latest decade, and then dividing it by the number of
years (mid-years are used for each decade). The seventh column presents the calibrated
index for absolute change. The eighth column presents the values of relative change per
annum, which are calculated by dividing the value for the latest period by that of the
earliest period, subtracting 1, multiplying by 100, and then dividing the result by
the number of years (mid-years are used for each decade). The ninth column presents
the calibrated index for relative change. The last column presents the final partyness
index for this indicator, which is simply the average for the index for absolute change
and for the index for relative change.
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Absolute change+ Relative change++ Partyness
index
Per Partyness Per Partyness
Japan 12.3 12.9 22.1 28.1 .53 –2 4.28 –2 –2

Italy 7.9 5.6 17.2 22.4 .48 –2 6.12 –2 –2
Belgium 10.7 15.4 .47 –2 4.39 –2 –2
Austria 4.7 7.8 11.2 14.7 .33 –2 7.09 –2 –2
Canada 18.9 16.3 29.9 26.5 .25 –2 1.34 –2 –2
France 16.7 18.2 21.4 .24 –2 1.41 –2 –2
Germany 5.3 6.1 7.3 11.4 .20 –2 3.84 –2 –2
Norway 6.6 11.9 10.5 .20 –1 2.95 –2 –1.5
Switzerland 16.6 16.4 18.1 20.5 .13 –1 .78 –2 –1.5
Sweden 1.8 2.0 5.1 4.0 .07 0 4.07 –2 –1
Australia 11.1 6.7 12.0 10.4 –.02 0 –.21 1 .5
Netherlands 12.3 7.9 12.1 11.5 –.03 0 –.22 1 .5
APPENDIX 10 301
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Absolute change+ Relative change++ Partyness
index
Per Partyness Per Partyness
Spain 10.1 9.4 9.2 –.05 0 –.45 1 .5

Denmark* 14.1 14.2 8.5 10.3 –.13 1 –.90 2 1.5
* The data set does not include the regions of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, whose party systems are completely
incongruent with the party system of the rest of Denmark.
+ Key for the index of absolute change:
–2 more than 0.2 increase
2 more than 0.2 decrease.
++ Key for the index of relative change:
–2 more than 0.5 increase
2 more than 0.5 decrease.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Schakel 2013b.
APPENDIX 11
Supplement for Table 5.6: Partyness

at Starting Point and Change in
Partyness for the Selected Indicators
The first table details the way in which we calculated the ranking of each country in
terms of its level of partyness at the starting point (that is, the earliest point in time for
which we had data). The seven indicators that were selected were the ones that were
suited to the calculation of partyness at the starting point. For each, the value of the
indicator at the earliest available time is presented first, and then the country ranking in
terms of the value of the indicator (columns 2–8). The average ranking was calculated
(ninth column), and the ranking of each country at the starting point was determined
according to it (tenth column). The higher the average ranking, the higher the level of
partyness in the country at the starting point.
The second table presents the calibrated indices on change in partyness for the same
seven indicators according to which we ranked change in partyness for each country.
Columns 2–8 present the values of the calibrated index of partyness for each of the
seven indicators. The ninth column presents the average value for the seven calibrated
indicators. The last column presents the ranking of each country on the basis of its
average. The higher the ranking, the more change the country experienced.
Partyness at Starting Point
Country Party Electoral Electoral ENPV Party system Performance of National– Average Rank of level
membership volatility turnout innovation local parties (5 regional rank of partyness
density largest cities) dissimilarity at starting
point
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
Austria 26.2 1 3.8 3 92.7 3 2.31 1 .3 6 7.4 15 4.7 2 4.4 1

New Zealand 20.2 3 6.7 9 87.4 10 2.51 2 .5 8 6.4 2
Germany 2.7 19 6.2 8 88.9 8 2.94 6 0 1 0 1 5.3 3 6.6 3
Australia 3.7 16 5.4 5 95.3 1 2.79 3 .5 8 11.1 8 6.8 4
Sweden 11.7 9 7.6 13 89.5 6 3.39 10 0 1 1.5 11 1.8 1 7.3 5
Italy 12.7 8 6.9 10 93.0 2 4.01 16 0 1 .5 8 7.9 5 7.3 5

Belgium 9.8 10 7.1 12 90.7 5 5.77 23 1.0 13 0 1 10.7 7 10.1 7
UK 9.0 12 6.9 10 75.0 19 2.79 3 .5 8 1.4 10 10.3 8
Luxembourg 13.2 20 89.4 7 3.89 14 0 1 10.5 9
Ireland 4.6 14 2.7 1 76.8 18 2.82 5 .6 11 8.3 16 10.8 10
Iceland 8.3 14 91.1 4 3.78 13 1.0 13 11.0 11
Norway 16.0 6 11.2 16 82.0 14 4.27 18 2.5 17 1.0 9 6.6 4 12.0 12
Japan 2.8 2 71.4 22 3.30 9 1.8 16 3.6 14 12.3 9 12.0 12
Canada 3.6 17 6.1 7 74.6 21 3.06 8 0 1 100 18 18.9 14 12.3 14
Israel 17.0 5 5.2 4 79.9 17 3.73 12 2.7 19 26.8 17 12.3 15
Finland 19.1 4 9.0 15 80.6 16 5.81 24 .4 7 3.5 13 13.2 16
Denmark 14.3 7 14.1 21 88.4 9 5.20 22 4.1 22 0 1 14.1 11 13.3 17
Portugal 4.3 15 11.5 17 82.1 12 3.68 11 5.4 24 0 1 13.3 17
Netherlands 9.5 11 11.9 19 85.9 11 6.72 26 2.5 17 0 1 12.3 9 13.4 19
Greece 3.2 18 17.7 22 82.1 12 3.00 7 .6 11 14.0 20
Spain 1.2 22 26.3 23 75.0 19 3.91 15 1.4 15 0 1 10.1 6 14.4 21
Switzerland 23.4 2 6.0 6 57.5 25 5.81 24 2.8 20 16.6 12 14.8 22
France 2.2 20 11.7 18 80.8 15 4.85 19 5.2 23 0 1 16.7 13 15.6 23
Czech Republic 7.0 13 32.3 24 69.4 23 4.95 20 3.0 21 2.8 12 18.8 24
Hungary 2.1 21 38.1 26 63.8 24 4.06 17 22.0 25
Poland 1.2 22 32.7 25 44.9 26 4.98 21 23.5 26
Change in Partyness for the Seven Indicators That Were Used to Rank Countries’ Starting Points

Country Party Electoral Electoral ENPV Party Performance of National–regional Average Ranking
membership volatility turnout system local parties dissimilarity
density innovation (5 largest cities)
Israel –2.0 –2.0 –1.5 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –1.92 1

Austria –1.5 –2.0 –1.5 –2.0 –2.0 –1.0 –2.0 –1.71 2
Italy –1.5 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –1.71 2
Japan –2.0 –1.5 –.5 –2.0 –1.5 –2.0 –1.58 4
Germany –.5 –2.0 –1.5 –2.0 –1.0 –1.5 –2.0 –1.50 5
Iceland –2.0 –1.0 –1.0 –2.0 –1.50 5
Czech Republic –2.0 2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –1.33 7
Ireland –1.0 –2.0 –1.5 –1.5 0.0 –2.0 –1.33 7
Belgium –1.0 –1.5 .0 –2.0 –1.0 –1.0 –2.0 –1.21 9
UK –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –1.0 0.0 –1.0 –1.08 10
New Zealand –2.0 –1.0 –1.5 –.5 0.0 –1.00 11
Canada –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 .0 0.0 .0 –2.0 –.93 12
Sweden –1.5 –1.5 –.5 –1.5 –1.0 .5 –1.0 –.93 12
Netherlands –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 .0 0.0 –2.0 .5 –.86 14
Switzerland –2.0 –1.0 –1.5 .0 1.0 –1.5 –.83 15
Greece 1.5 .5 –2.0 –2.0 –2.0 –.80 16
France –.5 –1.5 –2.0 .0 2.0 –1.0 –2.0 –.71 17
Australia –1.0 –1.0 .0 –1.0 –1.0 .5 –.58 18
Norway –2.0 .0 –.5 .0 1.0 .0 –1.5 –.43 19
Finland –2.0 –.5 –1.5 .0 0.0 1.5 –.42 20
Portugal –.5 .0 –2.0 .0 2.0 –2.0 –.42 20
Spain 1.5 2.0 .0 .0 –2.0 –2.0 .5 .00 22
Denmark –2.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 1.5 .07 23
Luxembourg 1.5 .0 .0 –1.0 .13 24
Poland –1.0 –2.0 2.0 2.0 .25 25
Hungary –1.0 2.0 .0 1.5 .63 26
APPENDIX 12
Supplement for Table 5.8: Partyness

at End Point
The table details the way we calculated the ranking of each country in terms of its
level of partyness at the end point (that is, the latest point in time for which we have
data). The indicators that were selected were the same seven that were used for the
calculation of partyness at the starting point. For each, the value at the latest available
time is presented, then followed by the country’s ranking in terms of the indicator
(columns 2–8). The average ranking was calculated and presented next (ninth column);
the ranking of each country at the end point was determined according to it (tenth
column). The higher the ranking, the higher the level of partyness of the country at the
end point.
Country Party Electoral Electoral ENPV Party system Performance of National– Average Rank of level
membership volatility turnout innovation local parties regional rank of partyness
density (5 largest cities) electoral at end point
dissimilarity
Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
Australia 1.4 20 6.7 1 93.7 1 3.71 5 2.2 12 10.4 4 7.2 1

Luxembourg 7.2 2 91.0 2 4.55 11 2.9 14 7.3 2
Sweden 3.9 11 11.7 8 84.1 5 4.95 17 1.0 4 1.3 6 4.0 1 7.4 3
Norway 5.0 6 10.4 6 77.3 9 4.71 13 1.4 10 1.0 4 10.5 5 7.6 4
Finland 8.1 2 9.7 5 66.4 16 6.31 24 0 1 .3 2 8.3 5
New Zealand 1.7 18 8.5 4 76.9 10 3.16 2 1.2 8 8.4 6
Denmark 4.1 10 13.4 12 86.7 4 5.66 20 2.5 13 0 1 10.3 3 9.0 7
Belgium 5.5 5 12.5 11 89.9 3 9.57 26 1.8 11 .4 3 15.4 9 9.7 8
Austria 17.3 1 13.7 13 77.4 8 4.55 11 4.5 17 9.0 11 14.7 8 9.9 9
UK 1.2 21 11.9 9 66.0 17 3.82 6 1.0 4 2.4 7 10.7 10
Portugal 3.8 12 11.4 7 57.8 23 3.69 4 1.0 4 20.0 15 10.8 11
Spain 4.4 9 16.9 17 72.5 12 3.99 8 12.4 22 23.8 16 9.2 2 12.3 12
Canada .8 23 11.9 9 63.4 20 3.60 3 0 1 100 18 26.5 13 12.4 13
Switzerland 4.8 7 7.7 3 48.6 26 5.93 21 1.2 8 20.5 10 12.5 14
France 1.9 17 16.5 16 57.7 24 4.80 14 0 1 1.1 5 21.4 11 12.6 15
Germany 2.3 14 14.6 14 71.2 13 5.20 19 3.9 16 4.5 8 11.4 6 12.9 16
Ireland 2.0 15 17.3 18 68.5 14 4.27 10 1.1 7 18.5 14 13.0 17
Italy 5.6 4 18.3 19 79.8 7 4.95 17 12.5 23 11.1 12 22.4 12 13.4 18
Greece 6.6 3 16.1 15 65.2 18 4.88 16 6.0 18 14.0 19
Netherlands 2.5 13 19.3 20 76.8 11 6.24 23 3.2 15 17.3 13 11.5 7 14.6 20
Hungary 1.5 19 20.6 22 64.6 19 2.95 1 15.3 21
Japan 22.5 25 60.4 22 4.05 9 10.2 20 8.6 9 28.1 14 16.5 22
Iceland 22.4 24 83.4 6 4.81 15 10.7 21 16.5 22
Israel 4.8 7 20.4 21 67.1 15 8.19 25 8.8 19 56.4 17 17.3 24
Czech Republic 2.0 15 21.7 23 61.1 21 6.09 22 16.9 24 8.9 10 19.2 25
Poland 1.0 22 37.9 26 51.2 25 3.84 7 20.0 26
APPENDIX 13
Supplement for Table 7.3: Prime Minister’s

Influence and Presidentialization
The table presents data on changes in the prime minister’s influence and the resulting
calibrated personalization index (columns 2–4), as well as estimations concerning
changes in the levels of presidentialization in each country and the resulting calibrated
personalization index (columns 5–7). The second column presents Karvonen’s (2010:
28–9) calculations of the gaps between experts’ estimations of the influence of prime
ministers at an early point in time and experts’ estimations of the influence of prime
ministers at a later point in time, on the basis of O’Malley’s (2007) work. In that case,
values represent changes in levels of influence in a range from 1 to 9 over approxi-
mately twenty years, from the beginning of the 1980s to the beginning of the millen-
nium (third column). The logic of our translation of the data to our calibrated scale
(fourth column) is based on the range and variance of the values of this calculation.
The fifth column presents Webb and Poguntke’s (2005: 338–9) estimations on
presidentialization in thirteen countries on the basis of country experts’ analysis in
their collection. For six other countries, we added our own estimations, which are
based on other accounts (sources appear in brackets in the fifth column). The sixth
column presents a reanalysis of Poguntke and Webb (2005) that was conducted by
Karvonen (2010). The final column presents an estimation of change on the basis of
averaging the index for the change in prime ministerial power and the index of
presidentialization. In case we have only one of them, the final index is identical to it.
Country Changes in the powers Pers. index** Presidentialization Karvonen (2010: 34) Pers. index*** Pers. index
of the prime minister (Power of PM) (Poguntke and Webb reanalysis of (presidentialization)
2005: 338–9), unless Poguntke and Webb
Change Years* otherwise noted 2005a
Germany +1.18 1980 vs. 2002 2 Strong + 2 2

Iceland +3.50 1983 vs. n.a. 2 2
Luxembourg +2.50 1979 vs. 2001 2 2
New Zealand +2.43 1984 vs. 2002 2 2
Poland Strong (Hloušek 2015) 2 2
Belgium +1.02 1981 vs. n.a. 2 Moderate + 1 1.5
Denmark +1.08 1984 vs. 2001 2 Moderate; strong party + 1 1.5
constraints
Australia +.75 1984 vs. 2001 1 Moderate (Kefford 2013) 1 1
Czech Republic Moderate (Hloušek 2015) 1 1
Finland +.83 1983 vs. n.a. 1 Moderate + 1 1
Ireland +.70 1982 vs. 2002 1 1
Italy +.44 1989 vs. 2000 1 Strong + 1 1
Sweden +.90 1986 vs. 2002 1 Moderate + 1 1
UK +.88 1979 vs. 2001 1 Moderate + 1 1
Portugal –.29 1983 vs. 2001 0 Moderate + 1 .5
Austria –.14 1983 vs. 2000 0 0
Canada –.36 1980 vs. 2000 0 Small; high level of 0 0 0
presidentialization
throughout
France Small; high level of 0 0
presidentialization
throughout 5th republic
Hungary High level at beginning; 0 0
not much change (Hloušek
2015)
Netherlands –.67 1982 vs. 2002 –1 Moderate + 1 0
Israel –.77 1984 vs. 2001 –1 Strong 0 0 –.5
Norway –2.17 1983 vs. 2000 –2 Moderate (Kolltveit 2012) 1 –.5
Greece –1.35 1981 vs. 2004 –2 None (Featherstone and 0 –1
Papadimitriou 2013)
Japan –.79 1987 vs. 2000 –1 –1
Spain –1.25 1982 vs. 2000 –2 Moderate 0 0 –1
* n.a. implies that the last PM was still in power at the time when O’Malley wrote his article; hence n.a. means that the period ends around 2000.
** Key for the index of change in the PM power:
–1 and below = –2
–1 to -0.4 = –1

0.39 to -0.39 = 0
1 to 0.4 = 1
1 and above = 2
*** Key for presidentialization:
· strong depresidentialization = –2
· moderate depresidentialization = –1
· no trend = 0
· moderate presidentialization = 1
· strong presidentialization = 2
APPENDIX 14
Supplement for Table 7.5: Party

Abbreviations
ALP Australian Labour Party

BQ Bloc Quebecois
BSP-PSB Belgische Socialistische Partij-Parti Socialiste Belge
CD&V Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl
CDS Centro Democrático e Social
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union
CVP Christelijke Volkspartij
D66 Democraten 66
DC Democrazia Cristiana
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
FI Forza Italia
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
IU Izquierda Unida
JCP Japanese Communist Party
KOK Kansallinen Kokoomus
KRF Kristelig Folkeparti
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LN Lega Nord
M5S Movimento 5 Stelle
MR Mouvement Réformateur
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano
ND Nea Dimokratia
NDP New Democratic Party
NRP National Religious Party
N-VA Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei
Open-VLD Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano
PP Partido Popular
PRL Parti Réformateur Libéral
PSD Partido Social Democrata
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano
APPENDIX 14 311
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid
PVV-PLP Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang-Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès
RV Radikale Venstre
SDA Social Democratic Alliance
SFP Svenska Folkpartiet i Finland
SP Socialistische Partij
SP.A Socialistische Partij Anders
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
SV Sosialistisk Venstreparti
UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
APPENDIX 15
Supplement for Table 7.9: Changes in the

Submission of Private Member Bills
The table presents data on changes in the submission of private member bills and the
resulting personalization index. Except for the cases of a clear lack of trend (Germany
and the United Kingdom), we computed the absolute (columns 4–6) and relative
(columns 7–9) levels of change from the earliest to the latest available points in time.
The second column presents the periods for which we have the earliest and the latest
data. The third column presents the ratios—normalized to percentages—between
government and private member bills in the two periods (the number of bills is in
brackets). The fourth column presents the values of absolute change that are calculated
by subtracting the value of the ratio of private member bills for the earliest period from
the value of the same for the latest period. The fifth column presents the absolute
change per annum, which is calculated by dividing the value of absolute change by the
number of years that passed from the earliest to the latest period (mid-years). The sixth
column presents the values of the calibrated personalization index for absolute change.
Positive values mean personalization; negative ones mean depersonalization.
The seventh column presents the relative change in the proportion of private
member bills. It is computed by dividing the proportion of private member bills in
the latest period by the same value for the earliest period, then subtracting 1 and
multiplying by 100. The eighth column presents the relative change per annum, which
is calculated by dividing the value of relative change (seventh column) by the number
of years that passed from the earliest to the latest point in time (mid-years). The ninth
column presents the values of the calibrated personalization index for relative change.
Positive values mean personalization; negative ones mean depersonalization. The last
column presents the final personalization index for private member bill submissions
and is based on an average of the calibrated indices for relative and absolute change.
Country Years Ratio Absolute Absolute Absolute Relative change Relative Relative Other data Pers.
government change in change per change in private change change index
bills/private private member annum Pers. member bill per Pers.
member bills* bill submission index** submission annum index***
Norway 1984–8 88.0:12.0 28.3 1.415 2 236 11.8 2 2

(847:115)
2004–8 59.7:40.3
(706:476)
Ireland 1997–2002 68.4:31.6 26.3 1.879 2 83 5.93 2 2
(197:91)
2011–15 42.1:57.9
(184:253)
Israel 1961–9 59.8:40.2 53.1 1.130 2 132 2.81 2 2
(523:352)

2009–15 6.7:93.3
(540:7535)
Hungary 1990–4 57.8:42.2 18.1 .905 2 43 2.15 2 2
(428:312)
2010–14 39.7:60.3
(603:914)
Belgium 1961–65 64.0:36.0 40.6 .829 2 113 2.31 2 2
(613:345)
2010–14 23.4:76.6
(761:2485)
Italy 1958–68 27.9:72.1 21.1 .515 2 29 .71 1 1.5
(3138:8102)
2001–8 6.8:93.2
(992:13,699)
Japan 1960–5 76.9:23.1 16.4 .328 1 71 1.42 2 1.5
(1329:399)
2010–15 60.5:39.5
(503:328)
New Zealand 1973–9 90.1:9.9 7.5 .214 1 76 2.17 2 1.5
(746:82)
2008–14 82.6:17.4
(369:78)
(continued )
Country Years Ratio Absolute Absolute Absolute Relative change Relative Relative Other data Pers.
government change in change per change in private change change index
bills/private private member annum Pers. member bill per Pers.
member bills* bill submission index** submission annum index***

Australia 1960–5 99.3:.7 8.3 .166 1 1186 23.72 2 1.5
(669:5)
2010–15 91.0:9.0
(1136:113)
Portugal 1976–80 38.6:61.4 16.3 .466 1 27 .77 1 1
(389:618)
2011–15 22.3:77.7
(367:1279)
Canada 1960–5 32.2:67.8 18.3 .366 1 27 .54 1 1
(267:562)
2010–15 13.9:86.1
(199:1230)
Netherlands 1980–4 97.5:2.5 2.8 .090 0 112 3.73 2 1
(1021:26)
2011–15 94.7:5.3
(1262:70)
Austria 1959–66 65.9:34.1 6.5 .138 1 19 .40 1 1
(747:387)
2006–13 59.4:40.6
(931:636)
Sweden 1979–83 7.8:92.2 3.4 .136 1 3.6 .14 0 .5
(792:9309)
2004–8 4.4:95.6
(694:15,185)
Czech Republic 1996–2002 59.5:40.5 .5 .050 0 1.2 .12 0 0
(539:367)
2006–13 59.0:41.0
(661:460)
Poland+ 1991–5 58.2:41.8 1.0 .050 0 2.4 .12 0 0
(422:303)
2011–15 57.2:42.8
(759:568)
Germany++ See ++ below 0
table
UK 1979–2006 0
“Fairly
constant”
Luxembourg 1959–64 94.4:5.6 –.8 –.016 0 –14 –.28 –1 –.5
(287:17)
2010–14 95.2:4.8
(393:20)
Iceland 1960–4 51.4:48.6 –8.1 –.184 –1 –17 -.39 –1 –1
(350:331)
2004–8 59.5:40.5
(511:348)

Switzerland 1996–8 89.5:10.5 –3.0 –.176 –1 –29 –1.71 –2 –1.5
(317:37)
2013–15 92.5:7.5
(334:27)
Finland 1960–4 31.4:68.6 –29.4 –.668 –2 –43 –.98 –1 –1.5
(933:2035)
2004–8 60.8:39.2
(1211:781)
Denmark 1972–6 72.5:27.5 –21.9 –.684 –2 –80 –2.50 –2 –2
(842:319)
2004–8 94.4:5.6
(971:58)
* In brackets, the number of bills.
** Key for the index of absolute change:
–2 decrease in ratio per annum of 0.5 or more;
–1 decrease in ratio per annum of less than 0.5 and more than 0.1;
0 change of less than 0.1;
1 increase in ratio per annum of less than 0.5 and more than 0.1;
2 increase in ratio per annum of 0.5 or more.
*** Key for the index of relative change:
–2 decrease in ratio per annum of 1 or more;
–1 decrease in ratio per annum of less than 1 and more than 0.2;
0 change of less than 0.2;
1 increase in ratio per annum of less than 1 and more than 0.2;
2 increase in ratio per annum of 1 or more.
+ In Poland (as in Germany) a bill cannot be submitted by a single MP but needs to be submitted by fifteen or more. The data compare the number of government bills to the
number of group bills.
++ No trend was identified in regard to the submission of interfactional bills in 1976–2009.

Sources:
Australia: Correspondence with Chamber Research Office, House of Representatives, May 9, 2016.
Austria: Correspondence with Parliamentary Administration, Vienna.
Belgium: Correspondence with Documentation and Archives Department, Belgian Federal Parliament, Brussels, September 20, 2016.
Canada: Correspondence with Information Service, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, July 18, 2016.
Czech Republic: Correspondence with Parliamentary Institute, Department of Communication and Education.
Denmark: Damgaard 2011: 82.
Finland: Raunio 2011: 128–9.
Germany: Bundestag website, http://www.bundestag.de/blob/196202/3aa6ee34b546e9ee58d0759a0cd71338/kapitel_10_01_statistik_zur_gesetzgebung–data.pdf http://www.bun
destag.de/blob/283210/8c97b35e267a3ba3db6994e8fa7dfe99/datenhandbuch_1949_1999-data.zip
Hungary: Correspondence with National Assembly of Hungary, Directorate of Legislation, Information and Document Management Department, August 16, 2016.
Iceland: Kristjánsson and Indridason 2011: 174–5.
Ireland: House of Oireachtas, http://www.oireachtas.ie/ViewDoc.asp?DocId=-1&CatID=59&m=b.
Israel: Blander and Klein 2002: 44 and correspondence with the Judicial Bureau of the Knesset, January 2, 2017.
Italy: Musella 2014b: 13.
Japan: Correspondence with Public Information Division, General Affairs Department, Secretariat, House of Representatives, Tokyo, August 29, 2016.
Luxembourg: Correspondence with Chambre Des Députés, Service Gestion des Connaissances and with Compte Rendu des Travaux de la Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché
de Luxembourg 2010–2014, September 5, 2016.
Netherlands: Tweede Kamer, Der Staten-General, Historische Jaarcijfers Werkzaamheden Tweede Kamer, March 7, 2016.
Norway: Narud and Strøm 2011: 218.
New Zealand: Correspondence with Research Client Services Officer, Parliamentary Information Service, August 24, 2016.
Poland: Correspondence with Kancelaria Sejmu, Biuro Komunikacji Społecznej, Warsaw, September 21, 2016.
Portugal: Correspondence with Assembly of the Republic Directorate of Documentation, Information and Communication Services, Legislative and Parliamentary Information
Division, Lisbon.
Sweden: Bergman and Bolin 2011: 268.
Switzerland: Correspondence with Scientific Collaboration, Parliamentary Library Research and Statistics Unit, Bern, September 7, 2016.
United Kingdom: Bowler 2010: 482.
APPENDIX 16
Supplement for Table 7.10: Change

in the Number of Coalition
Members per Minister
The table presents the data for the calculation of annual changes in the number of
coalition members per minister and the resulting personalization indices.
The second column presents the period (first and last year) for which we gathered
data on each case. The third column presents the number of coalition members per
minister in the earliest available period; the value is an average of number of coalition
members per minister in the three earliest cabinets since the starting year. The fourth
column presents the average number of coalition members per minister in the three
latest cabinets before the end year.
The fifth column presents the absolute change over the years, which is calculated by
subtracting the values in the fourth column (latest point in time) from those in the third
column (earliest point in time). The sixth column presents relative change, calculated
by dividing the values in the fourth column by those in the third column and then
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100. The values of the absolute and relative changes
per annum, which appear in the seventh and eighth columns, are calculated by dividing
the values in the fifth and sixth columns by the number of years covered (the difference
in years between the second earliest and the second latest cabinets during the period of
interest appears in brackets in columns 7–8). Columns 9–10 present the values of the
absolute and relative calibrated personalization indices; the last column presents the
final index, which is based on their average.
Country Years Number of Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Pers.
coalition members change change change per change per change per change per index
per minister annum annum annum+ annum++
Earliest Latest
point point
Austria 1960–2007 13.08 8.77 4.31 49.1 .103 (42) 1.2 (42) 2 2 2
Luxembourg 1964–2004 5.11 3.05 2.06 67.5 .064 (32) 2.1 (32) 2 2 2
Hungary 1990–2006 15.41 13.43 1.98 14.7 .180 (11) 1.3 (11) 2 2 2
Portugal 1976–2005 8.49 6.56 1.93 29.4 .074 (26) 1.1 (26) 2 2 2
Finland 1961–2007 8.58 6.43 2.15 33.4 .052 (41) .8 (41) 2 1 1.5
Denmark 1960–2007 5.48 3.68 1.80 48.9 .040 (45) 1.1 (45) 1 2 1.5
Israel 1961–2006 4.36 2.81 1.55 55.2 .034 (45) 1.2 (45) 1 2 1.5
Iceland 1963–2007 4.57 3.11 1.46 47.0 .037 (39) 1.2 (39) 1 2 1.5
Belgium 1960–2007 7.43 5.68 1.75 30.8 .042 (42) .7 (42) 1 1 1
Netherlands 1963–2007 6.50 4.79 1.71 35.7 .042 (41) .9 (41) 1 1 1
Norway 1961–2005 4.93 3.75 1.18 31.5 .031 (38) .8 (38) 1 1 1
Australia 1961–2007 5.72 4.70 1.02 21.7 .025 (41) .5 (41) 1 1 1
Czech Republic 1992–2007 5.96 5.52 .44 8.0 .034 (13) .6 (13) 1 1 1
Sweden 1960–2006 7.52 7.06 .46 6.5 .012 (38) .2 (38) 0 0 0
Greece 1974–2007 8.63 8.21 .42 5.1 .016 (27) .2 (27) 0 0 0
Canada 1962–2004 5.63 5.25 .38 7.2 .010 (40) .2 (40) 0 0 0
Switzerland 1960–2007 24.57 24.24 .33 1.4 .007 (45) .0 (45) 0 0 0
New Zealand 1960–2005 2.81 2.69 .12 4.5 .003 (39) .1 (39) 0 0 0
Japan 1960–2007 18.40 18.44 –.04 –.2 .000 (47) .0 (47) 0 0 0
Italy 1960–2006 12.11 13.20 –1.09 –8.3 –.024 (45) –.2 (45) –1 0 –.5
UK 1963–2007 15.14 16.49 –1.35 –8.0 –.033 (41) –.2 (41) –1 0 –.5
Ireland 1961–2007 4.76 5.64 –.88 –15.6 –.024 (37) –.4 (37) –1 –1 –1
Poland 1991–2007 9.16 10.41 –1.25 –12.0 –.083 (15) –.8 (15) –2 –1 –1.5
France 1962–2007 13.49 21.65 –8.16 –37.7 –.181 (45) –.8 (45) –2 –1 –1.5
Germany 1960–2005 14.95 24.43 –9.48 –38.8 –.231 (41) –.9 (41) –2 –1 –1.5
Spain 1977–2004 8.58 10.83 –2.25 –20.8 –.107 (21) –1.0 (21) –2 –2 –2
+ Key for index of absolute change:
–2 below –0.050 annual decrease
–1 between –0.020 and –0.049 annual decrease
0 less than 0.019 annual change
2 above 0.050 annual increase.
++ Key for index of relative change:
–2 below –1 annual decrease
–1 between –0.9 and –0.4 annual decrease

0 less than 0.03 annual change
2 more than 1 annual increase.
Source: Calculations are based on Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2011).
APPENDIX 17
Supplementary Material for Chapter 8:

The Research Population
The table presents the list of parties that are included in our analysis of twenty-five
countries (parties that received at least 4 percent of the votes in the two last general
elections up until February 2013), their leaders, and three prominent politicians from
each (for twenty-three of them). The identity of these politicians was determined by
country experts, in a survey conducted in early 2015. The names of the experts are
listed under the table.
Country (latest Party Party leader Three most prominent

elections up until (end of 2014) politicians excluding party
2014)* leader
Australia (2013) Labor (ALP) Bill Shorten Tanya Plibersek, Penny Wong,
Chris Bowen
Liberal Party Tony Abbott Julie Bishop, Joe Hockey,
Malcolm Turnbull
National Party Warren Truss Barnaby Joyce
Australian Greens Christine Milne Adam Bandt
Austria (2013) Social Democrats (SPÖ) Werner Faymann Michael Häupl, Rudolf
Hundsdorfer, Andreas
Schieder, Erich Foglar
People’s Party (ÖVP) Reinhold Erwin Pröll, Josef Ratzenböck,
Mitterlehner Günther Platter
Freedom Party (FPÖ) Heinz-Christian Herbert Kickl, Norbert Hofer,
Strache Harald Vilimsky
Greens Eva Glawischnig Werner Kogler, Maria
Vassilakou, Rudolf Anschober
Belgium (2014) N-VA Bart De Wever Siegfried Bracke, Jan Jambon,
Geert Bourgeois
Socialist Party (PS) Paul Magnette Elio Di Rupo, Laurette
Onkelix, Rudi Demotte
CD&V Wouter Beke Kris Peeters, Koen Geens,
Pieter De Crem
Open VLD Gwendolyn Alexander De Croo, Vincent
Rutten Van Quickenborne, Maggie De
Block
Reformist Movement Olivier Chastel Charles Michel, Didier
(MR) Reynders, Willy Borsus

2014)* leader
Canada (2011) Conservative Party Stephen Harper Jason Kenney, John Baird,
Peter McKay
Liberal Party Justin Trudeau Marc Garneau, Ralph
Goodale, Dominic Leblanc
New Democrats (NDP) Thomas Mulcair Nycole Turmel, Nathan Cullen,
Pat Martin
Bloc Québécois Mario Beaulieu
Czech Republic Social Democrats Bohuslav Lubomir Zaorálek, Jan
(2013) (ČSSD) Sobotka Mládek, Jiři Dienstibier
Top 09 Karel Miroslav Kalousek, Leoš
Schwarzenberg Heger, Marek Ženišek
Communist Party Vojtěch Filip Jiří Dolejš, Miroslav Ransdorf,
(KSČM) Zuzka Bebarová
Civic Democratic Party Peter Fiala Miroslava Němcová, Jan
Zahradil, Evžen Tošenovský
Denmark (2011) Liberals Lars Løkke Kristian Jensen, Inger Støjberg,
Rasmussen Claus Hjort Frederiksen
Social-Democrats Helle Thorning- Mette Frederiksen, Bjarne
Schmidt Corydon, Ole Hækkerup
Danish People’s Party Kristian Thulesen Pia Kjærsgaard, Søren
Dahl Espersen, Peter Skaarup
Danish Social Liberal Morten Marianne Jelved, Rasmus
Party stergaard Helveg Petersen, Camilla
Hersom
Socialist People’s Party Pia Olsen Dyhr Özlem Sara Cekic, Jonas Dahl,
Lisbeth Bech Poulsen
Finland (2011) National Coalition Alexander Stubb Jan Vapaavuori, Ben
Party Zyskowicz, Paula Risikko
Social-Democrats Antti Rinne Erkki Tuomioja, Eero
Heinäluoma, Krista Kiuru
Finns Party Timo Soini Jussi Niinistö, Jari Lindström,
Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner
Centre Party Juha Sipilä Mauno Pekkarinen, Seppo
Kääriäinen, Paula Lehtomäki
Left Alliance Paavo Arhinmäki Annika Lapintie, Silvia Modig,
Risto Kalliorinne
Greens Ville Niinistö Outi Alanko-Kahiluoto, Pekka
Haavisto, Oras Tynkkynen
Swedish People’s Party Carl Haglund Anna-Maja Henriksson,
Mikaela Nylander, Thomas
Blomqvist
Christian-Democrats Päivi Räsänen Peter Östman, Leena Rauhala,
Sauli Ahvenjärvi
(continued )

2014)* leader
France (2012) Socialist Party Jean-Christophe François Hollande, Manuel

Cambadélis Valls, Martine Aubry
UMP Nicolas Sarkozy Alain Juppé, François Fillon,
Bruno Le Maire
National Front (FN) Marine Le Pen Jean-Marie Le Pen, Bruno
Gollnisch, Florian Philippot
Germany (2013) Social-Democrats Sigmar Gabriel Frank-Walter Steinmeier,
(SPD) Andrea Nahles, Heiko Maas
Christian-Democrats Angela Merkel Ursula von der Leyen, Thomas
(CDU) de Maizière, Wolfgang
Schäuble
Christian-Social Union Horst Seehofer Hans-Peter Friedrich,
(CSU) Alexander Dobrindt, Ilse
Aigner
Die Linke Katja Kipping, Gregor Gysi, Bodo Ramelow,
Bernd Riexinger Sahra Wagenknecht
Alliance ’90/Greens Simone Peter, Katrin Göring-Eckardt, Anton
Cem Özdemir Hofreiter, Winfried
Kretschmann
FDP Christian Lindner Wolfgang Kubicki, Katja
Suding
Hungary (2014) Fidsez Viktor Orbán László Kövér, Márta Mátrai,
Mihály Varga
Socialists (MSZP) József Tóbiás Attila Mesterházy, László
Botka, Nándor Gúr
Jobbik Gábor Vona Gabor Vona
Politics can be Different András Schiffer Sallai Róbert Benedek
(LMP) Bernadett Szél
Iceland (2013) Independence Party Bjarni Hanna Birna Kristjánsdóttir,
Benediktsson Illugi Gunnarsson, Ragnheiður
Elín Árnadóttir
Progressive Party Sigmundur Vigdís Hauksdóttir, Gunnar
D. Gunnlaugsson Bragi Sveinsson, Eygló
Harðardóttir
Social-Democrat Árni Páll Katrín Júlíusdóttir, Sigríður
Alliance Árnason Ingibjörg Ingadóttir, Helgi
Hjörvar
Left-Green Movement Katrín Steingrímur J. Sigfússon,
Jakobsdóttir Svandís Svavarsdóttir,
Ögmundur Jónasson
Ireland (2011) Fine Gael Enda Kenny Leo Varadkar, Simon Coveney,
Frances Fitzgerald
Fianna Fail Michael Martin Éamon Ó Cuív, Michael
McGrath, John McGuinness
Irish Labour Party Joan Burton Alan Kelly, Brendan Howlin,
Kathleen Lynch
Sinn Fein Gerry Adams Mary Lou McDonald, Pearse
Doherty, Padraig
MacLochlainn

2014)* leader
Israel (2015) Zionist Union Isaac Herzog Tzipi Livni, Shelly

Yachimovich, Eitan Cabel
Likud Benjamin Gilad Erdan, Moshe Yaàlon,
Netanyahu Yisrael Katz
Yisrael Beytenu Avigdor Sofa Landver, Orly Levi-
Lieberman Abekasis, Sharon Gal
Shas Aryeh Deri Yitzhak Cohen, Meshulam
Nahari, Yakov Margi
Jewish Home Naftali Bennett Ayelet Shaked, Nissan
Slomiansky, Uri Ariel
Joint List Ayman Odeh Masud Ganaim, Jamal
Zahalka, Ahmad Tibi
United Torah Judaism Yakov Litzman Moshe Gafni, Meir Porush, Uri
Maklev
Yesh Atid Yair Lapid Ofer Shelah, Shai Piron, Yael
German
Italy (2013) Democrats (PD) Matteo Renzi Pierluigi Bersani, Massimo
D’Alema, Giuseppe (Pippo)
Civati,
Forza Italia Silvio Berlusconi Denis Verdini, Gianni Letta,
Raffaele Fitto
Five Star Movement Beppe Grillo Gianroberto Casaleggio, Luigi
(M5S) di Maio
New Center-Right Angelino Alfano Maurizio Lupi, Gaetano
(NCD) Quagliariello
Lega Nord Matteo Salvini Roberto Maroni, Luca Zaia
Japan (2014) Liberal Democrats Shinzo Abe Ishiba Shigeru, Tanigaki
(LDP) Sadakazu, Aso Taro
Democrats (DPJ) Katsuya Okada Hosono Goshi, Noda
Yoshihiko, and Maehar Seiji
Komeito Natsuo Hamayotsu Toshiko, Kanzaki
Yamaguchi Takenori and Akihiro Ota
Communists (JCP) Kazuo Shii Kokuta Keiji, Yoshiki
Yamashita, and Ichida
Tadayoshi
Luxembourg Christian Social Marc Spauz Jean-Claude Juncker, Claude
(2013) People’s Party (CSV) Wiseler, Viviane Reding
Socialist Workers Party Claude Haagen Jean Asselborn, Etienne
(LSAP) Schneider, Mars di Bartolomeo
Democrats (DP) Xavier Bettel Claude Meisch, Charles
Goerens, Pierre Gramegna
Greens Christian François Bausch, Félix Braz,
Kmiotek, Sam Camille Gira, Claude Turmes
Tanson
Alternative Dem. Robert Mehlen Gast Giberyen, Roy Reding,
Reform (ADR) Fernand Kartheiser
(continued )

2014)* leader
Netherlands Liberals (VVD) Mark Rutte Edith Schippers, Halbe Zijlstra,

(2012) Loek Hermans,
Labour (PvdA) Diederik Samsom Lodewijk Asscher, Jeroen
Dijsselbloem, Hans Spekman,
Freedom Party (PVV) Geert Wilders Fleur Hagema, Martin Bosma,
Sietse Fritsma
Socialist Party (SP) Emile Roemer Jan Marijnissen, Tiny Kox,
Harry van Bommel
Christian-Democrats Sybrand v. Elco Brinkman, Mona Keijzer,
(CDA) Haersma Buma Pieter Omzigt
D66 Alexander Roger van Boxtel, Thom de
Pechtold Graaf, Gerard Schouw
New Zealand National Party John Key Bill English, Steven Joyce,
(2014) Gerry Brownlee
Labour Party Andrew Little Grant Robertson, Jacinda
Ardern, Chris Hipkins
Green Party Russel Norman, Kevin Hague, Eugenie Sage,
Metiria Turei Kennedy Graham
New Zealand First Winston Peters Ron Mark, Tracey Martin
Norway (2013) Labour Party (Ap) Jonas Gahr Støre Helga Pedersen, Raymond
Johansen, Trond Giske,
Anniken Huitfeldt, Hadia Tajik
Conservatives (H) Erna Solberg Jan Tore Sanner, Bent Høie,
Trond Helleland
Progress Party (FrP) Siv Jensen Per Sandberg, Ketil Solvik-
Olsen, Harald T. Nesvik
Christian Democrats Knut Arild Dagrun Eriksen, Bjørg Tysdal
(KrF) Hareide Moe, Hans Olav Syversen
Socialist Left Party (SV) Audun Inga Marte Thorkildsen, Bård
Lysbakken Vegar Solhjell, Kirsti Bergstø
Centre Party (Sp) Trygve Slagsvold Ola Borten Moe, Anne Beathe
Vedum Kristiansen Tvinnereim, Marit
Arnstad
Poland (2011) Civic Platform (OS) Ewa Kopacz
Law and Justice (PiS) Jarosław
Kaczyński
People’s Party (PSL) Janusz
Piechociński
Democrat Left Alliance Leszek Miller
(SLD)
Portugal (2011) Social Democrats Pedro Passos
(PSD) Coelho
Socialists (PS) Carlos César
CDS-PP Paulo Portas
Unitary Democratic Jerónimo de
Coalition (CDU) Sousa

2014)* leader
Spain (2011) Socialists (PSOE) Pedro Sánchez Susana Díaz, Alfredo Pérez
Rubalcaba, Eduardo Madina
People’s Party (PP) Mariano Rajoy María Dolores de Cospedal,
Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría,
Esperanza Aguirre
United Left (IU) Cayo Lara Alberto Garzón, Gaspar
Llamazares, José Luis Centella
Sweden (2014) Social-Democrats Stefan Löfven Magdalena Andersson, Margot
Wallström, Ylva Johansson
Moderate Party Anna Kinberg Fredrik Reinfeldt, Ulf
Batra Kristersson, Karin Enström
Sweden Democrats Jimmie Akesson Mattias Karlsson, Björn Söder,
Linus Bylund
Greens Gustav Fridolin, Isabella Lövin, Mehmet
Asa Romson Kaplan
Centre Party Annie Loof Fredrik Federley, Lena Ek,
Eskil Erlandsson
Left Party Jonas Sjostedt Ali Esbati, Rossana
Dinamarca, Ulla Andersson
Liberal People’s Party Jan Bjorklund Birgitta Ohlsson, Erik
Ullenhag, Fredrik Malm
Christian Democrats Ebba Busch Thor Göran Hägglund, Lars
Adaktusson, Emma
Henriksson, Sara Skyttedal
Switzerland People’s Party (SVP) Toni Brunner Christoph Blocher, Ueli
(2011) Maurer, Adrian Amstutz
Social Democrats (SPS) Christian Levrat Simonetta Sommaruga, Alain
Berset, Andy Tschümperlin
Liberals (FDP) Philipp Müller Didier Burkhalter, Johann
Schneider-Ammann, Gabi
Huber
Christian Democrats Christophe Doris Leuthard, Filippo
(CVP) Darbellay Lombardi, Ida Glanzmann-
Hunkeler
Green Party (GPS) Adele Thorens, Balthaser Glättli, Bastien
Regula Rytz Girod, Robert Cramer
UK (2010) Conservatives David Cameron George Osborne, Theresa May,
Boris Johnson
Labour Ed Miliband Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper, Alan
Johnson.
Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg Vince Cable, Danny
Alexander, Tim Farron
* For Israel we used March 2015 elections.
Country experts: Elin Haugsgjerd Allern (Norway), Nicholas Aylott (Sweden), Gianfranco Baldini (Italy),
Oscar Barbera (Spain), William Cross (Canada), Patrick Dumont (Luxembourg), David Farrell (Ireland),
Anika Gauja (Australia), Indridi H. Indridason (Iceland), Laurie Karvonen (Finland), Petr Kopecký (Czech
Republic), Ruud Koole (the Netherlands), Stephen Levine (New Zealand), Georg Lutz (Switzerland), Wolf-
gang C. Müller (Austria), Csaba Nikolenyi (Hungary), Nissim Otmazgin (Japan), Karina Pedersen (Denmark),
Jean-Benoit Pilet (Belgium), Thomas Poguntke, Sophie Karow (Germany), Gideon Rahat (Israel), Olivier
Rozenberg (France), Paul Webb (United Kingdom).
APPENDIX 18
Supplement for Chapter 9: New

Media Indicators
A preliminary step, before presenting a comprehensive index for personalization, is to

standardize the values for the indicators of personalization of the new media. This table
presents standardized values for two indicators. The first is a measure of the supply side
(production) that compared the intensity of parties’ and politicians’ Facebook updates.
This will be included as an indicator of personalization in the controlled media. The
second value measures consumption. It compared the number of Facebook “likes” for
parties and politicians. This will be included as an indicator of personalization in voters’
behavior. The data on which the table is based are taken from Table 8.5 and the way in
which it was produced is explained in “The Indicators of Controlled Media Personaliza-
tion and Personalization in Voters’ Behavior” in Chapter 8.
Columns 2–5 present country averages and medians for the comparisons of
Facebook production (number of updates per a given month) of parties vis-à-vis
party leaders and of parties vis-à-vis prominent politicians. The sixth column shows
the average of the values from the previous four columns, while the seventh presents
the calibrated personalization index for production. Columns 8–11 present country
averages and medians for the comparisons of Facebook “likes” (accumulated for page)
of parties vis-à-vis party leaders and of parties vis-à-vis prominent politicians. The
twelfth column comprises the average of the values from the previous four columns,
while the last one presents the calibrated personalization index for consumption.
Country Production (Facebook updates in a given month) Consumption (Facebook “likes”)
Party leader/party Prominent politicians/ Average Pers. index* Party leader/party Prominent politicians/ Average Pers. index*
(= ratio) party (= ratio) (= ratio) party (= ratio)
Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
Australia .2 .4 –.1 .0 .13 2 –.6 –.4 –1.1 –2.8 –1.23 1

Austria –.6 –1.6 –.5 –1.6 –1.08 1 –2.8 –2.2 –11.8 –12.4 –7.30 –2
Belgium –8.6 –3.5 –.5 –1.7 –3.58 –1 –1.6 –1.6 –4.8 –1.5 –2.38 –1
Canada –1.0 –1.2 –2.3 –1.6 –1.53 1 .4 .2 –7.5 –7.0 –3.48 –1
Czech Republic –26.6 –8.1 –2.6 –2.6 –9.98 –2 –2.9 –2.8 –7.7 –9.3 –5.68 –2
Denmark –.6 1.2 –2.2 –1.5 –.78 1 1.0 1.1 –1.8 –2.1 –.45 1
Finland –20.1 –2.8 –4.6 –3.6 –7.78 –2 –.8 –1.7 –5.6 –3.8 –2.98 –1
France –3.4 –3.6 –6.0 –5.3 –4.58 –2 .8 2.9 –2.1 –1.8 –.05 1

Germany –5.4 –.3 –3.8 –1.4 –2.73 –1 .4 –1.5 –6.5 –3.8 –2.85 –1
Hungary –1.9 –2.0 –4.6 –4.5 –3.25 –1 –2.0 –1.3 –8.8 –11.7 –5.95 –2
Iceland –7.7 –8.6 –13.9 –3.6 –8.45 –2 .1 .1 –3.7 –3.6 –1.78 0
Ireland –8.2 –8.2 –1.9 –2.4 –5.18 –2 –7.7 –5.7 –3.3 –3.1 –4.95 –2
Israel –.3 –1.1 –2.2 –2.0 –1.40 1 21.4 8.7 –13.1 .2 4.30 2
Italy –1.6 –1.6 –2.2 –1.9 –1.83 0 6.8 5.2 –3.1 –2.3 1.65 2
Japan –1.9 –2.7 –3.2 –1.0 –2.20 0 –1.2 –1.7 –6.7 –7.2 –4.20 –2
Luxembourg –.6 –.4 .3 –2.3 –.75 1 –35.6 –1.1 –.4 1.2 –8.98 –2
Netherlands –9.0 –2.7 –12.1 –2.8 –6.65 –2 –12.0 –5.0 –69.4 –30.6 –29.25 –2
New Zealand –1.1 –1.8 –1.2 –1.8 –1.48 1 –2.4 1.0 –93.4 –6.5 –25.33 –2
Norway –1.7 –1.7 –2.7 –2.0 –2.03 0 .7 1.6 –8.0 –8.3 –3.50 –1
Poland –2.1 –2.1 –2.10 0 –8.4 –6.8 –7.60 –2
Portugal –106.6 –21.0 –63.80 –2 –5.1 1.7 –1.70 0
Spain –3.9 –3.3 –3.0 –1.4 –2.90 –1 –.6 –1.1 –2.0 –2.2 –1.48 1
Sweden –3.7 –1.3 –11.0 –1.5 –4.38 –2 –5.6 –2.9 –12.9 –12.7 –8.53 –2
Switzerland –25.6 –7.0 –10.1 –7.5 –12.55 –2 –55.5 –3.8 –5.3 –5.6 –17.55 –2
UK –1.4 –2.6 –9.8 –1.5 –3.83 –1 –1.0 –1.2 –39.6 –50.2 –23.00 –2
* Key:
–2 less than –4
–1 between –2.31 and –4
0 between –1.7 and –2.3
1 between –1.71 and 0
2 more than 0.
APPENDIX 19
Supplement to Chapter 9: Pearson Correlations

between the Indicators of Personalization
Indicator Electoral PM Direct Leadership Candidate Media Leader’s New media Legislators’ Voters’
reform power elections selection selection coverage name production behavior behavior
PM power .03
Direct elections .11 .05
Leadership selection –.04 –.07 .03
Candidate selection .00 .39 .26 –.02
Media coverage –.45 –.32 .34 –.04 .51
Leader’s name .28 .19 .48* .17 .22 .32
New media supply –.39 .00 .09 –.08 .00 .12 .32
Legislators’ behavior –.06 –.52* .19 .34 –.25 .14 .28 .22
Voters’ behavior –.20 –.29 .30 .25 .22 .31 .31 .25 .47*
New media –.22 –.18 .12 .27 .35 .34 .07 .23 .05 .21
consumption
* P < 0.05
** p < 0.01.
APPENDIX 20
Summary of the Indicators of Personalization
Country Institutional personalization Media personalization Behavioral personalization

Government institutions Nongovernment Uncontrolled Controlled Politicians Voters
institutions
Electoral PM Direct Leadership Candidate Media Leader’s New media Legislators’ Voters’ New media Total
reform power elections selection selection coverage name production behavior behavior consumption average
Australia .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 .0 1.0 .86
Austria 1.0 .0 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 –2.0 .73
Belgium 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 .0 .0 1.0 –1.0 2.0 2.0 –1.0 .86
Canada .0 .0 .0 2.0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 –1.0 .27
Czech 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 –2.0 .0 –1.0 –2.0 .22
Republic
Denmark .0 1.5 .0 1.0 2.0 1.0 .0 1.0 –2.0 1.0 1.0 .59
Finland .0 1.0 1.0 .0 2.0 .0 –2.0 –1.5 1.0 –1.0 .05
France .0 .0 1.0 2.0 .0 1.0 .0 –2.0 .0 1.0 .30
Germany .0 2.0 2.0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 –1.0 .0 1.0 –1.0 .45
Greece 2.0 –1.0 2.0 1.0 .0 .80
Hungary .0 .0 2.0 .0 –1.0 2.0 –2.0 .14
Iceland 1.0 2.0 .0 1.0 2.0 .0 –2.0 –1.0 .0 .0 .30
Ireland .0 1.0 .0 2.0 2.0 .0 –2.0 2.0 2.0 –2.0 .50
(continued )
Country Institutional personalization Media personalization Behavioral personalization
Government institutions Nongovernment Uncontrolled Controlled Politicians Voters

institutions
Electoral PM Direct Leadership Candidate Media Leader’s New media Legislators’ Voters’ New media Total
reform power elections selection selection coverage name production behavior behavior consumption average
Israel .0 –.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.50
Italy .0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 .0 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.50
Japan –1.0 –1.0 .0 1.0 .0 2.0 .0 .0 1.5 2.0 –2.0 .23
Luxembourg .0 2.0 .0 .0 1.0 –.5 .0 –2.0 .06
Netherlands 2.0 .0 .0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –2.0 1.0 2.0 –2.0 .55
NZ –1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 –2.0 .61
Norway .0 –.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 2.0 1.0 –1.0 .15
Poland 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 .0 .0 1.0 –2.0 .75
Portugal .0 .5 .0 2.0 1.0 .0 –2.0 1.0 1.0 .0 .35
Spain .0 –1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 –1.0 –1.0 1.0 .11
Sweden 2.0 1.0 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 .0 –2.0 .5 –2.0 –2.0 –.05
Switzerland .0 .0 .0 1.0 .0 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –2.0 –.61
UK .0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 .0 –1.0 .0 .0 –2.0 .27
APPENDIX 21
Supplement to Chapter 11: Pearson Correlations between the

Indicators of Partyness and the Indicators of Personalization

Indicator Electoral PM Direct Leadership Candidate Media Leader’s New media Legislators’ Voters’ New media
reform power elections selection selection coverage name production behavior behavior consumption
Party background of –.04 .06 –.12 –.36 .32 –.05 –.37 –.16 –.43 –.22 .02
ministers
Party background of .36 –.08 .02 .18 –.14 –.34 .07 .07 .45 –.16 –.36
legislators
Party membership density .16 –.43* .13 .05 –.13 –.15 –.41* –.19 .31 .13 .26
Party-interest groups .23 –.10 .17 –.47* .00 .02 –.17 –.43 –.41 –.11 –.22
relationship
Performance of local –.48 .07 –.37 –.49 –.03 .05 –.46 .24 –.54 –.04 .03
parties (national total)
Performance of local .00 .19 –.21 –.55* –.07 –.52 –.33 .08 –.52* –.39 –.18
parties (five largest cities)
National–regional .09 .05 –.53 .00 .53 .00 –.22 .16 –.42 –.08 .31
dissimilarity
Party identification –.03 –.07 –.40* –.27 –.25 –.52* –.48* .04 –.28 –.19 .19
Electoral volatility .05 –.19 –.07 –.18 –.05 –.20 –.30 –.06 –.15 –.39 –.06
Electoral turnout .07 .31 .00 –.25 .00 –.32 .05 .32 –.06 .03 –.04
ENPV –.33 .01 –.11 .11 –.23 –.09 –.23 .00 –.18 –.07 –.12
Party continuity –.18 .02 –.37 .22 –.37 –.58* –.35 –.17 –.05 –.15 –.09
* P < 0.05
** p < 0.01.
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Author Index
Aardal, Bernt 166, 232 Bertana, Xavier 82

Aars, Jacob 75, 77, 102, 299 Best, Heinrich 28, 46, 275, 276, 277, 278
Abedi, Amir 41 Bibby, John F. 17
Åberg, Martin 2, 78 n. 5 Bille, Lars 40 n. 7, 153
Adam, Silke 3, 116, 122, 173, 192, 202, Binder, Tanja 166, 232
212, 217, 234, 238, 257, 260 Bittner, Amanda 166, 166 n. 11, 169, 211
Aharony, Noa 178 n. 7 Bjerling, Johannes 116, 120, 211, 213,
Ahlberger, Christer 2, 78 n. 5 228, 232
Aizenberg, Ellis 156 Blais, André 4, 151, 152, 202, 203,
Akzin, Benjamin 104 228, 232
Alderman, Keith 53 Blander, Dana 316
Aldrich, John H. 25, 27, 109, 225, 234 Blom-Hansen, Jens 299
Allern, Elin H. 4, 26, 28, 33, 40 n. 7, 51, Blondel, Jean 116, 127, 130, 148, 148 n.
52, 53, 102, 153, 227, 230 4, 166 n. 11
Almeida, Pedro T. D. 268 Blumler, Jay G. 5, 127
Anderson, Christopher J. 31 Bobba, Giuliano 149
Andeweg, Rudy B. 160, 162 Bolin, Niklas 40 n. 7, 153, 268, 316
André, Audrey 132, 141 Bolleyer, Nicole 64, 237
Appleton, Andrew 52 Boogers, Marcel 69, 74, 75
Arian, Asher 283 Boomgaarden, Hajo G. 116, 156
Arter, David 63, 112, 219, 237 Bottom, Karin 75
Atmor, Nir 149, 153, 283 Boumans, Jelle W. 116, 156
Aylott, Nicholas 52, 53 Bowler, Shaun 26, 162, 163, 164,
233, 316
Bäck, Hanna 269 Brettschneider, Frank 127, 169, 209
Bakvis, Herman 169 Brichta, Avraham 2, 78, 219, 299
Baldini, Gianfranco 19, 58 Bronstein, Jenny 178 n. 7
Bale, Tim 4, 26, 28, 33, 51, 52, 53, 227 Brooker, Paul 261
Balmas, Meital 116, 118, 123, 150 n. 6, Budge, Ian 165, 319
155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 169, 177, 201, Butler, David 157
215, 217, 231
Bar-Ilan, Judith 178 n. 7 Cabada, Ladislva 219, 237
Barbera, Oscar 151, 152 Cain, Bruce E. 4, 225
Bardi, Luciano 18 n. 1 Calise, Mauro 1, 129, 175, 218, 231, 236
Barisione, Mauro 166 n. 11 Cameron, Sarah M. 40 n. 7, 169, 284
Barnea, Shlomit 8, 33, 56, 63, 268 Campbell, Rosie 213
Bartolini, Stefano 17, 18 n. 1, 19, 20, 24, Caprara, Gian V. 130, 211, 260
37, 56 n. 5, 63 Caramani, Daniele 84
Beckman, Ludvig 269 Carrey, John M. 141, 240
Bedock, Camille 4, 82, 119, 139, 146, 147 Carrieri, Mimmo 52
Bengtsson, Åsa 40 n. 7, 169 Carter, Neil 53
Bennett, Michael 72 Carty, R. Kenneth. 72, 89, 226, 281, 288
Bennett, W. Lance 129, 175 Caul, Miki L. see Caul-Kittilson, Miki
Bergman, Torbjörn 24, 25, 28, 39, 40 n. Caul-Kittilson, Miki 18, 22, 38, 58, 153
7, 102, 103, 111, 153, 225, 268, 316 Charlot, Jean 157
370 Author Index

Charlot, Monica 157 Dumont, Patrick 44, 269, 299
Chiaramonte, Alessandro 63, 64 Duverger, Maurice 231, 238
Christiansen, Flemming J. 52, 53
Cichowski, Rachel A. 225 Edinger, Michael 276, 277, 278
Clark, Alistair 72, 75 Eliassen, Kjell A. 276
Coleman, John J. 17 Elklit, Jørgen 89
Colomer, Josep M. 133, 141, 239 Emanuele, Vincenzo 63, 64, 65, 296
Constantelos, John 52 Endo, Mashisa 169
Copus, Colin 75 Enli, Gunn Sara 174, 175
Cotta, Maurizio 28, 46, 102, 115, 201, Enyedi, Zsolt 20 n. 3
274, 275, 276, 277, 278 Epstein, Leon 127
Crewe, Ivor 156 Erne, Roland 52
Cromwell, Valerie 278 Errington, Wayne 277
Crook, Malcolm 140 Esaiasson, Peter 157
Crook, Tom 140 Esser, Frank 156, 253
Cross, William P. 4, 23, 120, 146, 149, Evans, Matt 72
151, 152, 153, 213
Curtice, John 127, 129, 132, 166, 166 n. Fabbrini, Sergio 115, 116, 127, 212
11, 169, 203, 210, 212, 232 Farrell, David 2, 18, 20, 21, 22, 27, 35,
Curtin, Jennifer 266 36, 37, 38, 39, 47, 72, 111, 153, 225,
Curtis, Gerald L. 157 228, 229, 233
Featherstone, Kevin 309
Daalder, Hans 105, 107, 225 Ferreira da Silva, Frederico 169
Daemen, Harry 147 Fiers, Stefaan 46, 274, 275, 276,
Dalton, Russell 1 n. 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 18, 20, 277, 278
21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, Fiorelli, Chiara 139
40 n. 7, 41, 47, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61, 67, Fleischer, Julia 269
100, 101, 111, 155, 156, 169, 225, 228, Foa, Roberto Stefan 214
232, 282, 283, 284 Foley, Michael 123 nn. 4, 5
Damgaard, Eric 40 n. 7, 270, 316 Franklin, Mark N. 18, 19, 24, 58
Dandoy, Régis 2, 85 Freire, André 132, 151, 153
Dassonneville, Ruth 31, 32, 56, 56 n. 5,
58, 63, 286, 288 Gabriel, Oscar W. 169
De Beus, Jos 127, 216, 217 Gallagher, Michael 32, 140, 153, 294
De Ceuninck, Koenraad 75 Gallego, Aina 18, 58
De Luca, Marino 149, 152 Galnoor, Yitzhak 104
Denemark, David 143 Gamson, William A. 163
Depauw, Sam 26, 132, 141, 160, 162 Garrett, Geoffrey 22
Deschouwer, Kris 25, 26, 100, 160, 162 Garzia, Diego 116, 129, 166, 166 n. 11,
Detterbeck, Klaus 2, 70, 84, 153 169, 211, 229, 235, 241
Diamond, Larry 213, 214, 229, 237 Gauja, Anika 4, 19, 48, 153, 252,
DiMaggio, Paul J. 131 253, 260
Dolezal, Martin 174 Gaxie, Daniel 275
Donges, Patrick 127 Gellner, Winand 52
Doron, Gideon 132, 174 n. 2, 176 Gendźwiłł, Adam 69
Dowding, Keith 44, 123 n. 5 Geser, Hans 74
Downey, John 2, 8, 132, 203, 253 n. 3 Geys, Benny 31
Driessens, Olivier 127 Gezgor, Burcu 49, 51, 52
Druckman, James 123, 163, 176 Gibson, Rachel K. 171, 172, 174, 175,
Drummond, Andrew J. 56 n. 4 176, 190
Dudzińska, Agnieszka 132 Gidengil, Elisabeth 232
Author Index 371

Giger, Nathalie 148 Jansson, Jenny 52
Gomez, Brad T. 31 Jarren, Otfried 127
Gray, Mark M. 18, 22, 38, 58 Jeffery, Charlie 69, 70, 72, 85
Gumbrell-McCormick, Rebecca 52 Jensen, Torben K. 52, 275
Gundle, Stephen 157 Jerez-Mir, Miguel 267
Gunther, Richard 17, 213, 229, 237 Johnston, Richard 32, 70, 84
Gylling, Christel 75, 299 Jordan, Grant 52
Jou, Willy 169
Hadar, Yael 283
Hainmueller, Jens 69 Kaase, Max 127, 132, 155, 169
Haleva-Amir, Sharon 190 Kaid, Lynda Lee 127, 154
Hamann, Kerstin 52 Kalsnes, Bente 190
Hansford, Thomas G. 31 Kam, Christopher J. 162, 266
Harmel, Robert 16, 27, 219 Karlsen, Rune 40 n. 7, 120 n. 2, 132, 153,
Hausmann, Christopher 276 172, 173, 174, 176, 183, 230
Hayes, Danny 133, 237 Karvonen, Lauri 2, 3, 23, 28, 63, 116,
Hazan, Reuven Y. 4, 143, 149, 151, 117, 125, 129, 137, 141, 142, 142 n. 3,
153, 163 143, 144, 145, 153, 156, 157, 166, 167,
Heath, Oliver 31 168, 169, 173, 176, 192, 205, 206, 232,
Heeager, Anne 299 233, 235, 237, 238, 257, 307, 308
Heffernan, Richard 123 n. 5 Katz, Richard S. 1 n. 1, 4, 17, 19, 21, 35,
Heidar, Knut 40 n. 7, 153, 230 36, 37, 46, 48, 103, 110, 148, 149, 215,
Hejtmánek, Jan 147 225, 226, 229, 241, 253
Hemmer, Katharina 156 Kavanagh, Dennis 5, 127, 156, 157
Hermans, Liesbeth 121, 133, 172, 173, Kefford, Glenn 308
174, 175, 176, 239 Keman, Hans 165, 319
Heyndels, Bruno 31 Kenig, Ofer 26, 38 n. 6, 75, 102, 151, 152,
Hijino, Ken Victor L. 74, 299 230, 268, 281, 288
Hirschl, Ran 225, 228 Kestilä-Kekkonen, Elina 112
Hloušek, Vít 148, 226, 233, 308 Key, Vladimir O. 212, 216, 237 n. 2
Holliday, Ian 39 Kies, Raphael 299
Holmberg, Soren 17, 166, 166 n. 11, Kifer, Martin 123, 176
169, 203 Kim, Mi-son 40
Holtmann, Everhard 2, 4, 28, 69, 75 King, Anthony 156, 166 n. 11
Holtz-Bacha, Christina 129 Kirchheimer, Otto 21, 253
Hooghe, Marc 31, 56 n. 5, 58, 63 Kitschelt, Herbert 37, 223
Hopmann, David N. 156 Kjær, Ulrik 89
Hough, Daniel 69, 70, 85 Klein, Eran 316
Hrebenar, Ronald J. 52 Knapp, Andrew 266
Huber, Evelyne 22 Koc-Michalska, Karolina 174
Huber, Sascha 211 Kölln, Ann-Kristin 4, 23, 26, 89, 108,
Hunjan, Sarinder 127, 203, 232 112, 216, 259
Hyman, Richard 52 Kolltveit, Kristoffer 271, 309
Kolodny, Robin 3, 4, 116, 148, 190, 215,
Ignazi, Piero 17, 18, 63, 226, 237 226, 233
Indridason, Indridi H. 8, 40 n. 7, 49, Koole, Ruud 225, 325
102, 152, 153, 163, 164, 266, Kopeckyí, Petr 18, 37, 230
267, 316 Körösényi, Andras 131, 217, 219,
Inglehart, Ronald 24, 106, 106 n. 5 223 n. 1
Inkeles, Alex 25, 104 Koskimaa, Vesa 148
Invernizzi-Accetti, Carlo 24 Kostadinova, Tatiana 237
372 Author Index

Krauss, Ellis S. 156, 157, 169 Maier, Michaela 3, 116, 122, 173, 192,
Kriesi, Hanspeter 116, 129, 131, 132, 202, 212, 217, 234, 238, 257, 260
137, 155, 156, 192, 202, 257 Mainwaring, Scott 25, 26, 31, 219
Kristinsson, Gunnar Helgi 8, 49, Mair, Peter 2, 4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 20 n. 2,
152, 153 21, 22, 24, 35, 36, 37, 46, 47, 49, 56 n. 5,
Kristjánsson, Svanur 40 n. 7, 102, 58, 60, 63, 67, 82, 91 n. 1, 103, 108, 109,
267, 316 110, 111, 119, 129, 139, 146, 147, 148,
Krouwel, André 2 n. 2, 27, 28, 44, 45, 49, 225, 226, 236, 241, 253, 281
63 n. 6, 64, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272 Maloney, William A. 52
Kruikemeier, Sanne 174, 175, 176, 210 Mancini, Paulo 117, 127, 129, 131, 134,
Kubo, Keiichi 152 225, 237
Mandelkern, Ronen 52, 241
Laakso, Markku 60 Manin, Bernard 127
Laine, Niko 52 March, James G. 131
Langer, Ines Ana 129, 134, 155, 156, Marino, Marit S. 276
209, 213, 215 Marinova, Dani 63, 210, 228
LaPalombara, Joseph 17, 68, 225 Marsh, Michael 153
Larkin, Phil 52 Masket, Seth 209, 212, 217, 228
Larsson, Anders 175, 176, 190 Mastropaolo, Alfio 274
Lawson, Kay 17, 22, 26, 91 n. 1, 103, 225 Masuyama, Mikitaka 266
Lengaur, Gunther 127 Mattina, Liborio 52
Lees, Charles 52 Mazzoleni, Gianpietro 210
Lev-On, Azi 132, 174 n. 2, 176, 190 Mazzoleni, Oscar 49, 274
Levitt, Barry 237 Meier, Henk Erik 269
Lidström, Anders 72 Merkl, Peter H. 17, 22, 26, 91 n. 1,
Lightbody, James 71 103, 225
Lijphart, Arend 6, 202, 203, 240 Merkle, Susanne 129
Lilleker, Darren G. 174 Mershon, Carol 109, 136
Linz, Juan 17 Michels, Robert 148
Lipset, Seymour M. 20 Miller, Raymond 153
Lisi, Marco 104, 151, 152 Miragliotta, Narelle 277
Livak, Lior 132, 174 n. 2, 176 Montero, José Ramón 17
Lobo Marina C. 116, 129, 131, 132, 146, Mounk, Yascha 214
166, 166 n. 11, 169, 210, 212, 232 Mughan, Anthony 116, 123 n. 4, 134,
Lovenduski, Joni 52 155, 156, 166 n. 11, 169, 210, 229
Lucht, Jens 155, 156 Müller, Wolfgang C. 17, 116, 129, 148
Lusoli, Wainer 171 Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand 35
Luther, Kurt Richard 35, 52, 104 Musella, Fortunato 1, 118 n. 1, 121, 148,
Lutz Kern, Holger 69 150, 153, 160, 201, 212, 226, 233,
262, 316
Mach, André 274
Mackie, Thomas T. 19, 24, 26 Nadeau, Richard 233
McAllister, Ian 2, 3, 18, 20, 21, 22, 27, Nakai, Ryo 152
35, 36, 38, 40, 40 n. 7, 41, 47, 55, 58, 60, Narita, Yohei 152
61, 111, 116, 125, 127, 155, 156, 169, Narud, Hanne Marthe 40 n. 7, 102,
176, 190, 225, 228, 232, 241, 252, 270, 316
284, 288 Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz 36, 37
McAteer, Mark 72 Nevitte, Neil 233
Magone, José M. 277 Newton, Kenneth 25
Magre, Jaume 82 Norris, Pippa 52, 56
Maguire, Maria 17 Nyblade, Benjamin 156, 157, 169, 266
Author Index 373

Ohr, Dieter 124, 128, 134, 155, 156, 175, 135, 143, 147, 149, 149 n. 5, 150, 151,
202, 203, 210 152, 153, 155, 156, 163, 166, 180, 183,
Olsen, Johan P. 131 193, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 227, 228,
Olson, Mancur 73 231, 233, 240, 264, 281
O’Malley, Eoin 137, 143, 144, 145, Ramiro, Luis 153
307, 309 Randall, Vicky 219
Oscarsson, Henrik 166 n. 11, 169, 203, 210 Ranney, Austin 157
Otjes, Simon 52 Rashkova, Ekaterina R. 23, 230
Rasmussen, Anne 52
Pade, Guy 299 Raunio, Tapio 40 n. 7, 52, 271, 316
Pakulski, Jan 131, 217, 219, 223 n. 1 Real-Dato, José 267
Panebianco, Angelo 24, 219, 225, 233 Recchi, Ettore 274
Papadimitriou, Dimitris 309 Reidy, Theresa 153
Papp, Zsófia 132 Reif, Karlheinz 69
Pappalardo, Adriano 19, 58 Reinemann, Carsten 36, 127, 155, 156
Parkin, Michael 123, 176 Reiser, Marion 2, 4, 28, 69, 75, 78
Parsons, Nick 52 Reiter, Howard L. 24, 227
Passarelli, Gianluca 149 n. 5, 226 Renwick, Alan 2, 4, 116, 119, 129,
Paulis, Emilien 34, 49, 259 129 n. 7, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 167,
Paun, Akash 153 168, 169, 214, 253
Pedahzur, Ami 219 Reynaert, Herwig 75
Pedersen, Karina 40 n. 7 Richardson, Jeremy 225
Pedersen, Mogens 8, 17, 56, 85, 275 Ringeling, Arthur 147
Persson, Thomas 269 Ringkjøb, Hans-Erik 75, 77, 102, 299
Pettitt, Robin T. 17, 108, 112, 228 Robertson, James R. 140
Philippov, Michael 281 Robertson, John D. 52
Pierce, Roy 169 Rokkan, Stein 20
Pierre, Jon 37 Römmele, Andrea 171, 176
Pilet, Jean-Benoit 2, 4, 116, 119, 129, Rose, Richard 26, 56 n. 4
129 n. 7, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 146, Ruostetsaari, Ilkka 274
151, 152, 167, 168, 169, 214, 253 Rush, Michael 278
Pilotti, Andrea 274
Pink, Michal 147 Saalfeld, Thomas 26, 234
Pinto, Antonio C. 268 Saiz, Martin 74
Plasser, Fritz 17, 127, 129, 148 Sams, Steven 133, 172, 175
Plescia, Carolina 168 n. 12 Samuel-Azran, Tal 178 n. 7
Poguntke, Thomas 3, 4, 19, 21, 23, 25, Samuels, David J. 5, 5 n. 3, 6, 131, 140,
29, 31, 36, 41, 48, 49, 51, 116, 123, 140 n. 2, 148, 202
123 nn. 4, 5, 124, 125, 131, 143, 144, Sandri, Giulia 115, 152, 153
145, 148, 149, 176 n. 3, 190, 210, 212, 215, Savage, Larry 52
220, 226, 227, 232, 233, 281, 307, 308 Scarrow, Susan E. 4, 8, 19, 24, 32, 33, 39,
Poirier, Philippe 299 48, 49, 49 n. 3, 51, 52, 63, 82, 146, 147,
Powell, Bingham G. Jr. 263 153, 176, 225, 227, 281
Powell, Walter W. 131 Schaap, Linze 147
Pratchett, Lawrence 72 Schakel, Arjan H. 2, 69, 85, 301
Pruysers, Scott 71, 120, 213 Schief, Sebastian 52
Putnam, Robert 24, 129 Schmidt, Manfred G. 22
Schmitt, Hermann 17, 69
Ragin, Charles C. 33 n. 4 Schmitt, Karl 276
Rahat, Gideon 4, 8, 26, 33, 52, 56, 63, Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger 225
116, 117, 118, 120 n. 2, 122, 131, 133, Schmitter, Philippe C. 18
374 Author Index

Schneider, Jörg 156 Tate, Neal 228
Schumacher, Gijs 148 Tavits, Margit 26
Schütz, Astrid 127 Teixeira, Conceicao P. 153
Schweitzer, Eva Johanna 123, 173, 176, 180 Teperoglou, Eftichia 284
Secker, Ineke 46, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278 Teruel, Juan Rodriguez 152
Secker, Wilhelmina P. 277 Thiébault, Jean-Louis 116, 127, 130,
Seddone, Antonella 115, 152, 153 148, 148 n. 4, 166 n. 11
Selle, Per 17, 72 Thies, Michael F. 26
Sellers, Jefferey M. 72 Thijssen, Peter 132
Semenova, Elena 276, 277, 278 Thomas, Clive S. 51, 227
Seyd, Patrick 31, 48, 227 Thomassen, Jacques 160, 162
Seyfried, Markus 269 Tindal, Richard C. 71
Sheafer, Tamir 116, 117, 118, 120, Tindal, Susan Nobes 71
120 n. 2, 122, 127, 129, 131, 133, 149, Tkach-Kawasaki, Leslie M. 171
149 n. 5, 155, 156, 166, 193, 197, 198, Tomšič, Matevž 219, 237
199, 201, 215, 231, 233, 240 Torcal, Mariano 26, 219
Shenhav, Shaul R. 201 Tormey, Simon 175, 229
Shugart, Matthew S. 5, 5 n. 3, 6, 131, Trechsel, Alexander H. 18 n. 1
132, 133, 136, 140, 140 n. 2, 141, 142 n. Tsatsanis, Emmanouil 284
3, 143, 202, 240, 252 Tsutsumi, Hidenori 153
Shvetsova, Olga 109, 136 Tufte, Edward R. 69
Sierens, Vivien 34, 49, 259 Tuttnauer, Or 26, 75, 102, 152,
Simms, Marrian 153 230, 288
Sjöblom, Stefan 299
Skogerbø, Eli 174, 175 Udris, Linards 155, 156
Small, Tamara A. 175, 176, 203 Umbricht, Andrea 156
Smith, Daniel M. 53 Urwin, Derek W. 56 n. 4
Smith, Gordon 17 Uslaner, Eric M. 225
Solt, Frederick 40
Spano, Sebastian 140 Vaccari, Cristian 173, 175, 176, 184
Spier, Tim 52 Valcke, Tony 75
Stanyer, James 2, 8, 116, 117, 120, 122, Valen, Henry 19, 24
127, 129, 132, 155, 156, 203, 213, Vallinder, Torbjörn 228
215, 253 n. 3 Vampa, Davide 69, 74, 75, 299
Stephens, John D. 22 Van Aelst, Peter 116, 117, 120, 127, 129,
Steyvers, Kristof 75, 299 132, 137, 155, 203, 209, 215, 240
Street, John 122 n. 3 Van Biezen, Ingrid 18, 19, 20 n. 2, 22, 23,
Strøm, Kaare 24, 25, 26, 28, 38, 39, 37, 49, 51, 227, 230, 281
40 n. 7, 45, 61, 64, 100, 102, 103, Van Erkel, Patrick F.A. 132
109, 111, 128, 225, 227, 228, 230, Van Haute, Emilie 4, 19, 34, 48, 49, 259
234, 270, 316 Van Santen, Rosa 117, 128, 155, 156
Strömbäck, Jesper 127, 154, 253 Van Vonno, Cynthia M. C. 43
Sundberg, Jan 75, 299 Van Zoonen, Liesbet 117, 128, 155, 156
Svåsand, Lars 17, 37, 102, 103, 219, 230 Venturino, Fulvio 115, 152
Swanson, David L. 117, 127, 129, 132, Vergeer, Maurice 121, 133, 172, 173,
134, 225, 237 174, 175, 176, 239
Sweet, Alec Stone 225 Vernby, Kåre 269
Swianiewicz, Pawel 147 Verzichelli, Luca 28, 46, 266, 274, 275,
276, 277, 278
Taagepera, Rein 60 Vigoda-Gadot, Eran 299
Takens, Janet 133, 156, 166 n. 11, 169 Vliegenthart, Rens 116, 156, 157
Author Index 375

Voerman, Gerrit 49, 69, 74 Whiteley, Paul F. 23, 31, 48, 227, 230
Vowles, Jack 288 Widfeldt, Anders 37, 52
Wilke, Jürgen 36, 127, 155, 156
Ward, Stephen 171, 172, 174, 175, 176 Williams, Rhys 153
Warwick, Paul V. 163 Wilson, Alex 82, 119, 139, 146, 147
Wattenberg, Martin P. 1 n. 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, Wockelberg, Helena 269
17, 18, 20, 24, 27, 28, 37, 40, 40 n. 7, 41, Woldendorp, Jaap 165, 319
55, 58, 60, 61, 67, 100, 101, 126, 129, Wolfsfeld, Gadi 131, 178 n. 7
135, 141, 155, 156, 169, 210, 212, 213, Wolinetz, Steven B. 169
224, 225, 230, 232, 235, 238, 251 Wolkenstein, Fabio 24
Wauters, Bram 116, 118 n. 1, 137, 152, 173 Worlund, Ingemar 75, 299
Webb, Paul 1, 3, 4, 17, 18, 21, 35, 36, 37,
39, 40 n. 7, 52, 72, 116, 123, 123 n. 5, Yanai, Nathan 227
124, 125, 131, 143, 144, 145, 148, 149, Yarchi, Moran 178 n. 7
153, 190, 210, 212, 215, 220, 226, 229, Yishai, Yael 52, 104
233, 262, 281, 307, 308
Weber, Max 218 Zamir, Shahaf 180, 183, 203
Weldon, Steven A. 1 n. 1, 73, 281 Zeh, Reimar 156
Welzel, Christian 106 Zittel, Thomas 225
Wessels, Bernhard 52, 366 Zoco, Edurne 25, 31, 219
Index
accountability 90, 146, 211, 212, authoritarianism 215, 219

216, 217 authority, source of 206, 218–20,
Adenauer, Konrad 115, 192 223–4, 240
Ahora Madrid 79, 81 n. 8
Alfio Marchini for Mayor 83 Baden Wurtemburg 82
Anti-immigration see immigration ballots 140, 141, 167, 168
anti-partisan sentiments 41 Barcelona 78, 79, 81
anti-party parties 25, 41 Bavaria 82
audience democracy 127, 216–17 Bayern Partei 78
Australia 5, 15 behavioral personalization see
indicators of partyness 47, 50, 52, personalization, behavioral
55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 69 n. 1, Belgium 5, 15, 214
74, 84, 85, 87, 88, 276, 280, 281, indicators of partyness 45, 50, 52, 55,
284, 287, 288, 290, 293, 295, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 75,
296, 300 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 266, 280,
indicators of political 284, 287, 290, 293, 295, 298, 299, 300,
personalization 143, 144, 147, 152, indicators of political
153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 169, personalization 119, 141, 143, 144,
182, 183, 186, 189, 308, 314, 316, 147, 152, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165,
318, 320, 325, 327, 329 167, 169, 182, 186, 308, 313, 316,
partyness 96, 102, 104, 105, 107, 303, 318, 320, 325, 327, 329
304, 306 partyness 96, 102, 105, 107, 111, 303,
partyness and personalization 244, 304, 306
245, 246, 248, 249, 251 partyness and personalization 244,
personalization 198, 200, 201, 204, 246, 248, 249
207, 208 personalization 198, 200, 201, 204,
Austria 5, 5 n. 3, 69 n. 1 205, 207, 208
indicators of partyness 45, 50, 52, 55, Ben-Gurion, David 115, 192
57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 70, 79, 81, 82, 83, Berlusconi, Silvio 115, 189, 323
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 266, 280, 283, 287, Bettel, Xavier 73, 323
290, 293, 295, 300 Brexit 16
indicators of political Bureaucracy 225, 228, 236
personalization 143, 144, 146, 147, Bush, George W. 220
152, 153, 156, 158–9, 162, 165, 167, business firm parties 49, 148, 233
169, 182, 186, 308, 314, 316, 318,
320, 325, 327, 329 campaigns 25, 30, 36–7, 40, 41, 48, 172,
partyness 96, 102, 104, 105, 107, 111, 178 n. 6
303, 304, 306 candidate selection 149, 150
partyness and personalization 244, e-campaigning 121, 123, 132, 172,
246, 248, 249 174, 175
personalization 116, 119, 198, 200, finance 35–6, 139
201, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208 personalization of 120, 124, 129,
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 116, 131–4, 154, 155, 157, 158, 174, 175,
152, 320 209, 213, 231, 232, 235, 253
Index 377
Canada 5, 15 Czech Republic 5, 27, 214
indicators of partyness 50, 52, 55, indicators of partyness 47, 50, 55, 57,
57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69 n. 1, 71, 58, 59, 62, 64 n. 7, 65, 66, 76, 79, 88,
74, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 277, 280–1, 283, 288, 290, 293,
280–1, 285, 287–8, 290, 293, 295–6, 298–9
296, 300 indicators of political
indicators of political personalization 142–4, 147, 153,
personalization 140, 143, 144, 147, 158–9, 162, 165, 167, 169, 182, 187,
152, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 167, 308, 314, 316, 318, 321, 325, 327, 329
169, 176, 182, 186, 308, 314, 316, partyness 96, 102, 104, 105, 107, 303,
318, 321, 325, 327, 329 304, 306
partyness 96, 102, 105, 107, 303, partyness and personalization 244,
304, 306 246, 248, 249, 251
partyness and personalization 244, personalization 125, 198, 200, 201,
246, 248, 249 204, 207, 208
personalization 198, 200, 201, 205,
207, 208, 213 D66 64, 152, 301, 324
candidate selection 4, 115, 119, 132, 133, De Gaulle, Charles 192
138, 146, 147–54, 177, 194, 196, 260, dealignment 8, 37, 61, 100, 209, 232, 233
328, 329, 330, 331 debates (televised) 36, 127, 156
cartel party 21, 35, 110, 129, 148, 226, decentralization 72, 89, 139
233, 256 deliberative democracy 136, 217, 225
Catalonia 83, 85 Democratic Party (Italy) 115
catch-all party 21, 125, 129, 148, 226, Denmark 5, 6, 34, 214, 258 n. 1
233, 253 1973 “earthquake elections”
charismatic authority 206, 218, 223–4 indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52,
China 261 n. 3, 263 53, 55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 73,
Churchill, Winston 115, 192 76–7, 79, 80, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 270,
city council 69, 70, 78, 79, 88 275, 280, 285, 287, 290, 293, 296,
city mayor(s) 10, 70, 75, 80–2, 83, 88, 298, 299, 301
Ciudadanos 15 personalization 143, 144, 147, 152,
Civic List Marino for Mayor 83 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169,
closed-list electoral system 141, 167, 182, 186, 308, 315–16, 318, 321, 325,
178 n. 6, 263 327, 329
coalition members per minister partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 105, 106,
collective action 39, 109, 110, 217, 229, 107, 111, 303, 304, 306
260, 264 partyness and personalization 244,
consensus regime 6, 103, 202–3 245, 247, 248, 250, 258 n. 1, 260
Conservative Party (United Kingdom) personalization 198, 200, 201, 203,
16, 81, 321 204, 205, 207, 208
continuity of parties 9, 29, 31, 40, 42, 48, depersonalization 110, 117, 119, 122,
54, 61, 63, 65, 230, 331 124, 125, 136, 207, 220, 245, 257,
controlled media personalization 261 n. 3
see personalization, controlled countries 201–3, 206, 244, 249–51
media electoral systems 133, 142, 143
Corbyn, Jeremy 16 indicators 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 149,
corruption 22, 56 151, 153, 154, 154 n. 8, 155, 157, 158,
Corsica 83 161, 164, 167, 170, 194, 195, 196,
Costa, António 73 197, 199, 312
courts 2, 23, 220, 225, 228 online 175, 193, 246, 248
378 Index
depoliticization 209–10, 225, 236 indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52,
devolution 72, 84, 90 55, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 73, 75, 76, 79,
direct elections of chief executives 119, 80, 88, 89, 271, 274, 280, 284, 287,
135, 139, 145–7, 170, 194, 196, 290, 293, 296, 298–9, 303, 304, 306
328–31 indicators of political
local chief executives 70, 72, 83 personalization 133, 141, 143, 144,
national chief executives 140 146, 147, 152, 153, 159, 162, 165,
regional chief executives 69 n. 1, 119, 167–9, 182, 183, 186, 308, 311,
145, 147 315–16, 318, 321, 325, 327, 329
dissimilarity index 70, 85–7, 95, 300–1 partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 105,
107, 111
Eastern Europe 233 partyness and personalization 244,
Effective Number of Parties among 246, 248, 250
Voters (ENPV) 54, 60–2, 92, 96, 98, personalization 198, 200, 202, 204,
99, 101, 106, 292–3, 303, 304, 205, 207, 208, 220, 237
306, 331 Five Star Movement 15, 115, 152, 189,
election campaigns see campaigns 310, 323
electoral campaigns see campaigns Forza Italia 115, 310, 323
electoral (system) reform 4, 15, 69, 116, France 5, 5 n. 3, 47, 214
119, 129, 129 n. 7, 132–3, 138, 139, Fifth Republic 119, 131
141–3, 170, 194, 196, 197 n. 3, 257, Fourth Republic 119
303, 304, 306, 328–31 indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52,
electoral turnout 1, 8, 9, 18, 29, 30, 42, 55, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 79, 83, 84, 87,
54, 58–60, 96, 99, 101, 106, 289, 303, 88, 266, 275, 281, 284, 287, 290, 293,
304, 306 296, 300
electoral volatility 1, 8, 9, 18, 29, 30, 31, indicators of political
42, 54, 56–8, 84, 85, 90, 96, 99, 101, personalization 140, 143, 144, 147,
106, 136, 230, 232, 233, 286 152, 153, 156, 159, 165, 168, 169,
ENPV see Effective Number of Parties 182, 186, 189, 220, 308, 319, 322,
among Voters 325, 327, 329
environmentalism 24, 106 n. 5, 225 partyness 93, 96, 102, 105, 107, 111,
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 263 303, 304, 307
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya partyness and personalization 244,
(ERC) 78 246, 248, 249, 262
Eurobarometer 7, 32, 40, 51, 52, 54, personalization 116, 131, 198, 200,
127 n. 6, 171, 282, 283, 284 201, 202, 204, 207, 208, 211
European Social Survey 7, 32, 213, 214, Freedom Party (PVV) 64, 123, 226,
282–4 320, 324
European Union 22, 68
extreme electoral systems 136 Gandhi, Indira 220
extreme right-wing parties 4, 123, 151, Gandhi, Mahatma 192
226, 260 Germany 5, 6, 15, 214
indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52,
Facebook 11, 120, 158, 171, 173–91, 195, 55, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69 n. 1, 70, 79,
199, 203, 204 n. 6, 248, 257, 258, 264, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 269, 276, 280,
326, 327 285, 287, 290, 293, 295, 300
federal states see federalism indicators of political
federalism 6, 68, 71, 81, 84, 132, personalization 143, 144, 147, 152,
203, 240 153, 156, 159, 161–2, 165, 168–9,
feminist theory 260 182, 186, 189, 308, 312, 315, 316,
Finland 5, 23, 214 319, 322, 325, 329
Index 379
partyness 93, 96, 102, 105, 107, 111, partyness 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 303,
303, 304, 305 304, 306
partyness and personalization 244, partyness and personalization 244,
246, 248, 249, 260 245, 246, 248, 249
personalization 119, 198, 200, 201, personalization 198, 200, 202, 204,
204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 327 207, 208, 329
globalization 4, 21, 25, 104, 131 illiberal democracy 220, 263
Golden Dawn 15 immigration 22, 123
Grande Sud 78 independents 15, 53, 70, 72, 74–83, 88,
Greece 5, 15, 49, 125 89, 109, 228, 297
indicators of partyness 49, 50, 52, 55, index of dissimilarity see dissimilarity
57, 58, 59, 62, 64 n. 7, 65, 66, 281, index
284, 287, 290, 293, 295 individualization 2, 20, 24, 126, 129–30,
indicators of political 137, 175, 192, 223, 231, 252, 253
personalization 142, 143, 144, 147, Innsbruck 79, 81
152, 159, 165, 167, 177 n. 4, institutionalization 25, 26, 112, 132,
309, 318 219, 233
partyness 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 110, interest groups 1 n. 1, 2, 9, 10, 24, 29, 30,
111, 303, 304, 306 32, 42, 47, 51, 53, 91, 92, 94, 98–101,
partyness and personalization 244, 109, 225, 227, 256, 275, 331
246, 248, 249, 251 intraparty democracy 226
personalization 198, 200, 201, 204, intraparty politics 149
207, 208, 329 institutional personalization see
green parties 151, 226, 260 personalization, institutional
Grillo, Beppe 115, 189, 226, 323 Internet see also World Wide Web 36,
Guanyem Barcelona 81 n. 8 128, 130, 171, 172, 181, 195, 248, 251
intimization 122–3, 155, 209, 210,
Hungary 5, 27, 214 211, 213
indicators of partyness 47, 50, 55, 57, irrationality 209, 210
58, 59, 61, 62, 64 n. 7, 66, 278, 280, Ireland 5, 15, 214
281, 283, 288, 291, 294 indicators of partyness 45, 50, 52, 55,
indicators of political 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 76, 79, 83, 88, 268,
personalization 143, 144, 147, 159, 280–1, 283, 287, 290, 293, 295, 298–9
162, 165, 182, 186, 189, 308, 313, indicators of political
316, 318, 322, 325, 327, 329 personalization 140, 141, 143, 144,
partyness 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 147, 152, 153, 159, 162, 165, 168,
303, 304, 306 169, 182, 186–7, 308, 313, 316, 318,
partyness and personalization 244, 322, 325, 327, 329
245, 247, 248, 250, 251 partyness 96, 102, 105, 107, 111, 303,
personalization 125, 198, 200, 201, 304, 306
204, 207, 208, 263 partyness and personalization 244,
246, 248, 249
Iceland 5, 6 n. 3, 8, 214 personalization 198, 200, 201, 202,
indicators of partyness 45, 49, 55, 57, 204, 205, 207, 208
59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 267, 283, 287, 290, iron law of oligarchy 146, 148, 178, 231
293, 295 Israel 5, 5 n. 3, 15, 214
indicators of political indicators of partyness 38, 45, 47, 50,
personalization 143, 144, 147, 152, 52, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 73 n. 3,
153, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, 182, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82–2, 88, 268,
186, 308, 315–16, 318, 322, 275, 280–1, 283, 287–8, 290, 293,
325, 327 295, 296, 298–9
380 Index
Israel (cont.) Johnson, Boris 71, 189, 325
indicators of political Journalists 172
personalization 140, 141, 143, 144, judicialization 225, 228
146, 147, 150, 151 n. 7, 152, 153, 156,
158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 167, 169, Khan, Sadiq 81
178 n. 6, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 189, Knesset 115
309, 313, 316, 318, 323, 325, 327, 330 Kurz, Sebastian 116
partyness 93, 96, 102, 104, 105, 107,
111, 303, 304, 306 La République En Marche! 226
partyness and personalization 230, Labor Party (Australia) 15
244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251 Labour Party (United Kingdom) 16, 53,
personalization 115, 116, 119, 131, 68, 81, 152, 179, 180, 325
132, 133, 193, 197, 198, 200, 201, Lapid, Yair 115, 116, 189, 323
204, 205, 207, 208, 220, 257, 263 leader effect 166, 232
Italy 5, 15, 38, 214 leader evaluation see leader effect
indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52, leadership selection 26, 53, 129, 138, 146,
55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 69, 69 n. 1, 149–54, 170, 194, 224, 328–31
73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, Left Ecology Greens – SEL (Italy)
87, 88, 266, 274, 280, 283, 287, 290, 81 n. 6
293, 295, 298–9, 300 legal–rational authority 218, 223,
indicators of political 224, 240
personalization 143, 144, 146, 147, legislation see private member bills
151, 151 n. 7, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, legislative behavior 10, 194, 261,
162, 165, 169, 182, 186, 189, 308, 328–31
313, 316, 318, 323, 325, 327, 330 legislators behavior see legislative
partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, behavior
107, 110, 111 legislators, partyness of see party
partyness and personalization 244, background of legislators
245, 246, 248, 249, 251 Liberal democracy 25, 214, 215, 218,
personalization 115, 116, 118 n. 1, 220, 224
119, 121, 136, 193, 198, 200, 201, Liberal Party (Australia) 15, 320
204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 220, 257, Liberal Party (Canada) 15–16, 321
263, 303, 304, 306 Life of Brian 264
Likud 152, 323
Japan 5 Likud-Yisrael Beytenu 115
indicators of partyness 45, 49, 52, 55, List Sebastian Kurz – the New People’s
57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 69 n. 1, 74, 76, Party 116
79, 87, 88, 266, 283, 287–8, 290, 293, Livable Rotterdam 80
295, 296, 298–9, 300 Livingstone, Ken 81
indicators of political Local councils see municipal councils
personalization 140, 143, 144, 147, local elections 10, 69, 70, 73–82, 87, 89,
152, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 167, 297–9
169, 182, 186, 189, 309, 313, 316, local lists see local parties
318, 323, 325, 327 local parties 29, 69, 70, 72, 74, 76–83, 88,
partyness 96, 102, 104, 105, 107 89, 90, 94, 99, 101, 106, 297, 298,
partyness and personalization 244, 303, 304, 306, 331
246, 248, 249 local politics see also local parties 4, 7,
personalization 119, 136, 197 n. 3, 70–83, 87–90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 274–8
198, 200, 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, localism 72, 89, 90
303, 305, 306, 309, 330 London 79, 81, 83, 84, 86 n. 11,
Jobbik 189, 322 119, 147
Index 381
Luxembourg 5, 6 n. 3 Nazi period 260
indicators of partyness 49, 52, 55, 57, neo-corporatism 225, 227
59, 62, 65, 66, 73, 76, 88, 284, 287, Netherlands 5, 214
290, 293, 295, 298–9 indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50,
indicators of political 52, 55, 57, 59, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69,
personalization 141, 143, 144, 147, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 87, 88, 267,
159, 162, 165, 167, 168, 169, 182, 277, 280, 284, 287, 290, 294, 295,
186, 308, 315–16, 318, 323, 325, 298–9, 300
327, 330 indicators political
partyness 96, 102, 105, 107, 303, personalization 133, 140, 141, 143,
304, 306 144, 147, 151 n. 7, 152, 153, 155,
partyness and personalization 244, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 169, 176,
246, 248, 249 182, 187, 309, 314, 316, 318, 324–5,
personalization 198, 200, 201, 327, 330
204, 207 partyness 93, 96, 102, 105, 107, 111,
303, 304, 306
M5S see Five Star Movement partyness and personalization 244,
Macron, Emmanuel 47, 116, 226, 262 246, 248, 249
Madisonian democracy 225 personalization 123, 198, 200, 201,
majoritarian electoral system 119, 141, 204, 205, 207, 208, 263
149, 192 new parties 15, 33, 48, 51, 56, 61, 63–7,
majoritarian regime 6, 202–3, 212, 240 96, 100, 148, 151, 151 n. 7, 210,
Mandatory Palestine 115 226, 286
Mandela, Nelson 115, 219 New Democratic Party (Canada) 71, 310
Mao Zedong 261 n. 3 New Localism 72, 90
Mapai 115 New South Wales 85
mass party 5, 20, 21, 71, 72, 104, 108, New Zealand 5
148, 226, 233, 234, 239, 241, indicators of partyness 45, 50, 55, 59,
253, 255 61, 65, 66, 73, 74, 266, 280, 283,
May, Theresa 73, 325 287–8, 290, 293, 295–6
media personalization see indicators of political
personalization, media personalization 143, 144, 147, 152,
mediatization 2, 125, 126, 127, 137, 173, 153, 162, 165, 168, 182, 186, 308,
192, 223, 225, 227, 231, 252, 253 313, 316, 318, 324–5, 327
Merkel, Angela 189, 322 partyness 96, 102, 104, 105, 107, 303,
Michel, Charles 73, 320 304, 306
Michels, Robert see iron law of oligarchy partyness and personalization 244,
Milan 79, 81 n. 6, 83 246, 248, 249
Milano Civica per Pisapia Sindaco 83 personalization 197 n. 3, 198, 200,
ministers, partyness of see party 201, 204, 205, 208
background of ministers newspapers 128, 154, 155, 157, 172
mixed member majoritarian electoral nonpartisan politics 228
system 119 Nordic (countries) 102, 103, 111,
modernization 24, 130 160, 203
Munich 78, 79 Northern Territory 85
municipal councils 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82 Norway 5, 214
municipal elections see local elections indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 51,
52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 73,
Naples 79, 83 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 84, 87, 88, 270,
National Front (France) 152, 220, 322 276, 280, 285, 287, 290, 293, 296,
National Party (Australia) 15, 320 298–9, 300
382 Index
Norway (cont.) party activists 23, 30, 31, 35, 48, 73,
indicators of political 150, 176
personalization 143, 144, 145, 147, party adaptation 2, 3, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21,
152, 153, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, 23, 25, 26, 28, 35, 39, 53, 91, 92, 97,
176, 182, 183, 186, 189, 190, 313, 103, 108, 111, 125, 226, 229, 230,
316, 318, 324, 325, 327, 330 234, 253, 255
partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 105, 106, party change see also partyness
107, 111, 230, 303, 304, 306, 309 and political personalization 1, 3,
partyness and personalization 244, 223–54, 257–8, 261–4, 331
247, 248, 250 by indicator 97–100, 108
personalization 132, 198, 200, 201, cross-national comparison 91–112
204, 205, 207, 208 dimensions of 3, 10, 29, 91, 92–6, 100–1
indicators 7, 8, 9–10, 17, 27, 28–32,
OECD nations 18 33–4, 35–41, 42–67, 68–90, 91–114,
old parties, survival of 31, 63–7 230, 241, 255–6, 265–306
One Osaka 78 party cohesion 16, 39, 163, 229
online campaigning see e-campaigning party continuity 9, 17, 29, 31, 40, 42, 48,
online personalization 3, 5, 11, 170, 54, 61–5, 216, 229, 230, 331
171–92, 193, 195, 199, 203–6, party decline 2, 3, 6, 9, 16, 17–19, 20, 21,
245, 248 22–4, 25, 38, 39, 53, 91–2, 97, 105, 108,
consumption 11, 120, 138, 170, 172, 110–12, 125, 129, 136, 223, 224, 226–7,
173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 185–90, 229, 230, 232–4, 235, 236, 238–41,
194, 196, 257, 258, 326–7, 328, 243, 245, 251, 253, 255, 261, 263
329–30, 331 party democracy 20, 22, 46, 90, 112, 127,
index 179–81, 185, 186 215–18, 226, 263
supply 120, 138, 170, 172, 174, 177–9, party finance 35–7, 139, 139 n. 1, 148,
181, 185–90, 196, 326, 328 150, 259
open-list electoral system 133, 135, 141, party identification 18–19, 28, 29, 30, 31,
167, 168, 263 32, 35, 54–6, 58, 90, 92, 95, 96, 99,
Orbán, Viktor 189, 263, 322 101, 103, 109, 123, 166, 211, 232,
Osaka 78, 79 237, 282–5, 331
ÖVP see Austrian People’s Party party–interest group relationships 1, 26,
29, 42, 47, 51–3, 99, 101, 227, 331
Palermo 78, 83 party leader(s) 26, 38, 44, 119, 120, 121,
Papandreou, George 220 123, 129, 134, 135, 139, 145, 148,
Participa Sevilla 81 n. 8 148 n. 4, 154, 156, 213, 232, 233, 237
participatory democracy 217 candidate selection 149–51
parties’ continuity see continuity of names in party name 158–9
parties online 11, 120, 173, 176, 177, 179–91,
parties’ name 138, 158, 159, 253, 257 257, 320–5, 326–7
parties, trust see trust in political parties selection 151–2
party background 1, 1 n. 1, 10, 73, 91, influence on voting 157, 166–7, 169, 229
92, 93, 100 party members 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 18–19, 21,
of legislators 29, 46–8, 73, 73 n. 3, 23, 26, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 42,
93, 97, 99, 100, 101, 110, 256, 43, 48–51, 51, 52–3, 72, 73, 91, 92,
273–8, 331 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 109, 112,
of ministers 1 n. 1, 9, 29, 39, 42, 43, 119, 137, 149–51, 152, 176, 227, 230,
44–6, 47, 73, 73 n. 3, 92, 93, 98, 256, 259, 260, 279–81
99, 100, 101, 110, 256, density 1, 29, 30, 31, 49, 51, 52, 53, 99,
265–72, 331 101, 106, 279–81, 303, 304, 306, 331
party activism see party activists party membership see party members
Index 383
party resources 19, 35–8, 72, 97, 123, institutional 10, 118, 119, 124, 129,
148, 175, 176, 184, 211, 229, 259 130, 131–3, 135, 137, 138–54, 193,
also see party staff and party finance 198, 226, 239 n. 3, 329, 330
party staff 23, 35–8, 148, 176, 184, media 10, 118, 120, 123, 124, 129, 131,
229, 259 132, 133–5, 137, 154–60, 170, 173,
party–society linkage 1, 2, 3, 18, 19, 28, 177, 192 n. 1, 193, 195 n. 2, 197–9,
29, 30, 44, 67, 89, 99, 126, 129, 191, 253, 329, 330
224, 230, 231, 234, 238 negative 120, 213
party switching 10, 38, 39, 110–11 nongovernment institutions 119, 130,
party system fragmentation 15, 31, 60–1 133, 137, 138–9, 146–54
see also Effective Number of Parties online see personalization online
among Voters politicians’ behavior 10, 118, 131, 132,
party system innovation 63–6, 92, 96, 99, 133, 135, 137, 160–4, 176, 235
106, 295, 303, 304, 306 subtypes 10, 117–22, 126, 131, 133,
party–voters relationship 40, 53–67, 96 136, 137, 170, 172, 193, 223
Partyness see also party change types 11, 118–22, 126, 131, 136, 170,
definition 1, 1 n. 1 172, 193, 194, 199, 223, 238
starting point 5, 6, 27, 34, 42, 43, 71, typology 10, 115, 117–23, 136, 170
104–5, 206, 207, 224, 241, 245 n. 1, uncontrolled media 118–20, 120 n. 1,
302–3, 304, 305 124, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138,
Pedersen index 56–7, 286 154–7, 235, 253
personal parties see personalistic parties voters’ behavior 118, 129, 133, 134,
personalistic parties 115, 160, 213, 237 164–70, 173, 177, 196, 203, 211, 231,
Personalization 235, 262, 326, 328, 329, 330, 331
and party change see party change and personalized democracy 215, 217, 261
political personalization personalized politics 1, 6, 124, 146, 174,
as a process 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 117–18, 122, 178, 202, 212, 213, 225, 233, 236,
123, 124–5, 261 261, 262
behavioral 118, 121, 124, 132, 133, Pisapia, Giuliano 81 n. 6, 83
135, 160, 161, 170, 192 n. 1, 193, Plaid Cymru 68
197–9, 329, 330 pluralist democracy 216, 226, 229
by country 200 PMP see Politics-Media-Politics
by indicator 194–5 Podemos 15, 78, 80, 81, 81 n. 6
causes 125–36, 223–42, 243–54, Poland 5, 27, 214
257–8 indicators of partyness 47, 50, 55, 57,
centralized 118, 118 n. 1, 119, 120, 59, 60, 61, 62, 69, 276, 280–1, 284,
121, 123, 124, 128, 130, 150 n. 6, 167, 287, 291, 294, 303, 304, 306
178, 188, 191, 226, 238, 262 indicators of political
consequences 122, 208–20, 241, 263 personalization 125, 143, 144, 147,
controlled media 118–20, 120 n. 1, 158, 158 n. 10, 159, 162, 165, 168,
123, 131, 134, 135, 145, 154, 157–60, 169, 182, 186–7, 308, 314, 316, 318,
172, 173, 177, 235, 253, 326 324, 327, 330
cross-national analysis 192–220 partyness 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107
decentralized 118 n. 1, 119, 120, 121, partyness and personalization 244,
123, 150 n. 6, 177, 178, 185, 188, 245, 245 n. 1, 247, 248, 250, 251
226, 238, 262 personalization 198, 200, 201, 202,
definition 117–18, 122–5 204, 206, 207, 208
dimensions 119–22 political personalization see
government institutions 119, 130, 133, personalization
137, 138–9, 139–46 political trust see trust in politics and also
indicators 137–70, 171–91, 307–30 trust in parties, trust in politicians
384 Index
politicians, trust in see trust in politicians regional politics see also regional
politics-media-politics 131 elections
Populism 15, 89, 151, 210, 220, 226, 262, regionalism 89
Populist see Populism Renzi, Matteo 73, 189, 323
Portugal 5, 214 Republican (Party, USA) 47, 116
indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 52, Responsiveness 90, 211–12, 216
55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 64 n. 7, 65, 66, 73, Rome 79, 83
76, 79, 88, 268, 277, 280, 285, 287,
290, 293, 296, 298–9 Scandinavia 15
indicators of political Scottish National Party (SNP) 68
personalization 141, 143, 144, 147, Scotland 68, 69 n. 1, 84, 86 n. 11
152, 153, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, second-order elections 69, 83
182, 187, 308, 314, 316, 318, 324, selectorate(s) 149–51
327, 330 self-expression values 106–7, 193, 206,
partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 208–9, 252, 257
303, 304, 306 semi-open list electoral system 132,
partyness and personalization 244, 240, 263
246, 248, 249, 251 semi-presidential (regime) 119, 140
personalization 125, 198, 200, 201, Shas 152, 181, 183, 323
202, 204, 207, 208 Sicily 70
postmaterialism 206 Single Nontransferable Vote 119
power dispersion 202, 214–15 Single Transferable Vote 168, 263
PR see Proportional Representation social media see also Facebook and
presidential (regime) 5–6, 5–6 n. 3, 116, Twitter 25, 128, 133, 171–3, 175,
123, 132, 139, 140, 202, 210, 212, 215 180, 183–4, 203
presidentialization 4, 116, 117, 118 n. 1, social networks 25
123–6, 130–1, 144–5, 190, 212, 215, socialization 10, 29–31, 46, 67, 91, 100,
226, 233, 307–9 101, 256
prime ministerial power 138, 142–5, Solberg, Erna 73, 324
197 n. 3, 307–9 South Africa 219
primaries 115, 119, 133, 152, 235 South Europe 160
privatization 122, 209, 210, 211 Spain 5, 15, 214
private member bills 121, 138, 160, indicators of partyness 45, 49, 50, 52,
161–3, 170, 312–16 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64 n. 7, 65, 66,
Proportional Representation electoral 69 n. 1, 73, 76, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85,
system 141, 263 87, 88, 267, 281, 285, 287, 290, 293,
PVV see Freedom Party 295, 298–9, 301
indicators of political
Quebec 83 personalization 141, 143, 144, 147,
152, 153, 156, 158 n. 10, 159, 160,
radical right-wing parties see extreme 165, 167, 182, 186, 309, 319, 325,
right-wing parties 327, 330
radio 154, 172 partyness 96, 102, 103, 105, 107, 110,
Rajoy, Mariano 15, 73, 325 111, 303, 304, 306
Rasmussen, Lars Lkke 52, 73, 321 partyness and personalization 244,
Reagan, Ronald 21 246, 248, 249, 251
Referendum 16, 157, 227, 228 personalization 125, 198, 200, 201,
regional elections 68–70, 83–9, 94, 300 204, 207, 208
regional government 10, 29, 46, 47, 71, STV see Single Transferable Vote
84, 140, 256 Sweden 5, 214
Index 385
indicators of partyness 45, 50, 51, in politicians 213–14
52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, political 23, 58, 211–14, 219, 253
73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 88, Tsipras, Alexis 226
268, 280, 284, 287, 290, 293, 295, Turkey 263
298–9, 300 turnout see electoral turnout
indicators of political TV 2, 5, 25, 36, 115, 125, 127, 127 n. 6,
personalization 143, 144, 147, 152, 128, 130, 134, 154, 155, 237
153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 167, 169, Twitter 120, 120 n. 2, 158, 171, 174–8,
182, 186, 189, 190, 308, 314, 316, 182–5, 189, 190, 203, 204 n. 6,
318, 325, 328, 330 251, 264
partyness 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
107, 303, 304, 306 uncontrolled media personalization see
partyness and personalization 244, personalization, uncontrolled media
246, 248, 249 unitary regime 6, 84, 203, 240
personalization 119, 198, 200, 202, UK 5, 16, 21, 31, 214
204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211 indicators of partyness 45, 47, 50, 51,
Switzerland 5, 6 n. 3, 214 52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68,
indicators of partyness 47, 50, 52, 73, 79, 81, 81 n. 7, 84, 86 n. 11, 88,
55, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 84, 87, 88, 268, 278, 280, 284, 287, 290,
274, 280, 285, 287, 290, 293, 293, 295
indicators of political personalization 140, 143, 144, 146,
personalization 141, 143, 147, 153, 147, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161,
156, 159, 162, 165, 167, 168, 169, 162, 165, 167, 169, 179–80, 182,
182, 187, 315–16, 318, 325, 186, 189, 201, 308, 312, 315, 316,
327, 330 318, 325, 325, 327, 330
partyness 96, 102, 105, 107, 110, 111, partyness 93, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107,
303, 304, 306 111, 303, 304, 306
partyness and personalization 244, partyness and personalization 244,
245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 246, 248, 249,
personalization 193, 198, 200, 201, personalization 123 n. 4, 198, 200,
202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 204, 207, 208, 209
220, 257 United Kingdom see UK
Syriza 15, 226 United States 3, 5, 21, 116, 126, 128, 129,
134, 158, 213, 217, 228, 230, 235,
televised debates see debates (televised) 237, 263
television see TV USA see United States
Thatcher, Margaret 21
third-wave democracies, València en Comú 81 n. 8
see also Czech Republic, Greece, VOD 36
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Spain 5, volatility see Electoral volatility
26, 49, 56, 58, 142, 159, 203, 204, voting behavior see voters’ behavior
248, 252 voting, timing of 40
trade unions 4, 30, 51–3 voters’ behavior 30, 40, 41, 83, 118,
traditional authority 220, 224 129, 133, 134, 166, 167, 170, 172,
True Finns 63–4, 220 173, 177, 195 n. 2, 196, 203, 211,
Trudeau, Justin 220, 321 231, 235, 262, 326, 328, 329,
Trump, Donald 47, 116 330, 331
trust voters’ personalized behavior 138,
in parties 36, 40, 56, 214 167–70
386 Index
Wales 68, 69 n. 1, 84, 86 n. 11 Wilders, Geert 123, 226, 324
Wallonia 15, 82, 147, 299 World Value Survey 7, 32, 40,
Web 1.0 172, 172 n. 1, 190 107, 208
Web 2.0 133, 171, 172, 172 n. 1, 175, World Wide Web
183, 190 see also Internet 25, 124, 128, 171,
Websites 120, 123, 132, 154, 158, 171, 172, 172 n. 1, 180
174, 176–85, 204 n. 6, 210, 239, 264 WWW see World Wide Web
Weimar Republic 260
Western Europe 19, 32, 233 Yesh Atid 115, 152, 323
Westminster democracies 103, 160,
203, 225 Zaragoza En Común 81 n. 8

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FROM PARTY POLITICS TO

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Multi-Level Electoral Politics

From Party Politics to

GIDEON RAHAT AND OFER KENIG

Part I. Party Change

Part II. Political Personalization

Part III. Party Change and Political Personalization

2.1 A Graphic Illustration of the Coverage of the Indicators

2.1 The Selected Dozen Indicators of Partyness 29

xii List of Tables

List of Tables xiii

2 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

THE GOALS OF THE BOOK

In these pages we endeavor to take the cross-national comparative study of party

THE SCOPE AND LEVEL OF THE ANALYSIS

Current comparative politics literature points to an array of recent develop-

4 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

One important result common to most of the chapters in this volume is to

THE RESEARCH POPULATION: COUNTRIES

6 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

IMPORTANT NOTE: LET’S NOT FORGET THAT

parliamentary de facto dynamic, is an outlier in their group. Switzerland, Iceland, and

Due to lack of comprehensive data, many studies in political science (includ-

8 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

10 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

In October 2016, Spain completed a ten-month period under a caretaker

16 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 17

THE AGREEMENT AND THE DEBATE IN RESEARCH

As noted earlier, we can point to a substantial variance, at the country

18 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 19

20 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 21

it is in the main an exaggeration to speak of “the decline,” or the “crisis,”

22 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 23

THE LITERATURE: LARGELY IGNORING VARIANCE

No study, to the best of our knowledge, has proposed a large n comparative

24 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 25

26 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Political parties, as formal institutions that place candidates in elections for

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 27

28 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

The Selected Dozen

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 29

Dimension (Face of Indicator: Change in . . . Linkage with . . .

Socialization of 1) Party background of ministers Party organization

30 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party in Party Party in the

(Socialization of) Mediators: Voters:

F I G U R E 2 . 1 A Graphic Illustration of the Coverage of the Indicators

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 31

Coping with the Challenges of Measuring Variance in Party Change

32 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 33

34 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?

INDICATORS THAT WERE LEFT OUT

Party Change: The Variance Hiding behind the General Trend 35

36 From Party Politics to Personalized Politics?