RE V IE W E S SAY

Moishe Postone and the Essay as Form

Robert Hullot-Kentor q1, q2

In affectionate memory

W
hen many of us here today were talking about Moishe—this past q3
spring—Marty Jay and Cathy Gallagher were in New York visiting
and we were having just that discussion among ourselves when
I asked Cathy what had made Moishe so lovable.1 She had already thought it over,
I am sure, because a moment later, to know what she had said, I had to think back
on what I had just heard, “Well, he was so present.” Cathy speaks very quickly. But,
it is true, I decided, catching up with her after another moment. Moishe was right
there. One thinks of the urgent, parsing, orderliness of mind; of an innately delib-
erative politeness, which he somehow joined with a refusal hands-down of any mis-
understanding; and one thinks, especially, of the focused clarity of his voice, as if
he might have been more the son of the cantor than of the rabbi. The first time
I heard Moishe give a talk, when I was by no means young, was also the very first
time I understood an hour-long lecture from first to last syllable and was able to con-
clude, as well, that having heard it might have done me some good. When I spoke
about the lecture afterward with Moishe, appreciatively, and to introduce myself,
he somehow gave me to understand that the achievement had been mine entirely.
But what I most sensed in the presence of Moishe, what we must all have recognized
in him, consciously or not, was some part of fleeing humanity that, long before
Moishe arrived here in the United States from Canada, had already covered many
more miles than that, and not just in this direction, and not just as one person flee-
ing. One listened to Moishe’s exacting diction, closely, wondering what language
was actually being spoken. I would not have told him so—and I hesitate to say it
now—but I considered him a relative at the remove of some quantum considerably
greater than six million. Moishe Postone’s commitment was to a monotheism of the

1. Moishe Postone, April 17, 1942–March 19, 2018. This article was read in considerable abbreviation
at the conference on “Capitalism and Social Theory: A Conference in Memory of Moishe Poston,” orga-
nized by William Sewell and Jonathan Levy at the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory, University
of Chicago, April 12–13, 2019.

Critical Historical Studies (Spring 2020). © 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
2326-4462/2020/0701-0003$10.00

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text, as if this world could not possibly exist without a book to know it by, sentence
for sentence, as if, could we only read the book right and know it cold, we would be
able to settle out the many false traditions—beginning foremost with what he char-
acterized as “traditional Marxism.” Moishe’s effort to salvage the “mature” Marx
from traditional Marxism was pursued with nothing less than the intention of can-
celing outright History’s demand for its hecatombs. What it has been, he took on
himself. In the penultimate note that I have from Moishe, written from Vienna
on November 6, 2017, he did not mention the condition of his illness, but he made q4
it more than clear that he did not feel well, “I have never felt so bleak. The US is a
horror show and as you know things are looking bad in Austria. I think in part it is a
failure of the Left.”2
I wrote Moishe that night and the following morning he was right there, “When
you say that we [meaning, the Left] were a bowling club [which is what I had writ-
ten him in my note]—that is what I meant by a failure of the Left—to imagine ideas
that would appeal to many people outside of our circles.”3 At the moment of that cor-
respondence, as we all now know, many people, some here included, were indeed
construing ideas of the Left, especially at the level of political platform, meaning the
vigorously engaged struggle over who gets what. A movement is taking shape. But,
setting aside Minerva’s inevitable ironies, setting aside as well my tawdry image of
the bowling club, I would like to take Moishe’s remark as a starting point today.
Many other passages from his work might be better chosen, I am sure. But I choose
this comment, written both seriously and informally, because we are here remem-
bering Moishe, and this was the last note that I had from him. His remark that the
Left has to date been unable “to imagine ideas that would appeal” to those many
“outside our circles” remains acutely germane to a Left that must now comprehend
and shape what it means by socialism. For the need for theory as theory, meaning
thought that grasps the new—as what is seen for the first time—is by no means di-
minished; neither is the concentrated organizing activity in itself proof that the
claustrum of the Left’s most important perceptions has been breached.
In this regard, Moishe’s comment has reason to be preoccupying. For it presents
the experience of thought, hardly unfamiliar, as it encounters a limit, a barrier or
block, a kind of fence materializing inexplicably, on the other side of which thought
is obliged to recognize that its own object has been displaced and escapes it, some-
how continuing to recede out of reach. We are all aware that this puzzle is not just
one for the contemporary Left, but is as old as the origin of Marxism, which has at

2. Moishe Postone to Robert Hullot-Kentor, email correspondence, November 16, 2017.

3. Ibid., November 17, 2017 (emphasis added, here and in the following quotes).

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every point in its history sought to provide manifestos and popularizations, Red
Books and popular economics, and whole landscapes of stick figures drawn on black-
boards to demonstrate the supposed simplicity of its reasoning to those whom it
most concerns, the actual object of its reflections. This puzzle, never really off of
our minds, is worth considering out loud for a moment. For if it is true, as Moishe
repeatedly seeks to show in his elucidation of the mature Marx, that this thinking
brings us to the exact point where we are able to witness what is as it yawns broadly
apart from what might be and (as Moishe no less insists) does so in concepts that are
in themselves said to be concepts of a praxis that would span this chasm, why is it—
in Moishe’s own words in his note—that imagination and appeal must somehow be
added in to this reasoning almost as an afterthought, as if, otherwise, it will not
speak alluringly and convincingly to those to whom it is addressed?4 What would
it mean, even to a degree, to seek to obviate this block rather than end up, at the
far end of the social science disquisition, seeking to make amends for it, perhaps
with the addition of a sprinkling of imagery, light humor, and a narrative line to
move the talking points along?
To reflect on this question, I would like briefly to sketch out the relation of
Moishe’s major work to a philosophical development with which, as critical theory,
it is inherently allied. Critical theory, as such, distinguishes a substantial history of
thought that, at a minimum, seeks to examine concepts insofar as they possibly
overreach and exceed themselves, and that, in one of its developments is itself es-
sentially concerned with understanding “the block.”5 This is the work of Theodor
Adorno as it is paradigmatically given in the “essay as form,” here a phrase apostro-
phizing Adorno’s way of proceeding altogether, not strictly citing the much studied
eponymous essay, which, prior to writing Negative Dialectics, Adorno held to be the
preeminent statement of his philosophy along with the introduction to the Meta-
critique of Epistemology.6 The essay as form is a work in fragments. Every element, in-
cluding elements of theory, is to be equidistant from the middle point, paratactically.
As a critique of the block, the essay form, as form itself, engages each aspect of the
obligation that Moishe presents to us in the last note I have from him, that of imag-
ining ideas that would appeal to many people outside of our circles, a statement that in

4. See Moishe Postone, with Timothy Brennan, “Labor and the Logic of Abstraction: An Interview,”
South Atlantic Quarterly 108, no. 2 (2009): 325.
5. T. W. Adorno, “Society,” in “The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals,” trans. Frederic Jame-
son, special issue, Salmagundi (Fall 1969–Winter 1970): 153, and “Rescuing Urge and Block,” in Negative
Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1981), 384–90.
6. T. W. Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, New German Cri-
tique no. 32 (Spring–Summer 1984): 151–71, and, Against Epistemology, trans. Willis Domingo (London:
Polity, 2013).

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considerable condensation evokes the integument of idea, imagination, and desire

in which much of the whole of Western thought is written. In Adorno’s work, this
constellation of thought fans out from his development of concept and mimesis. The
intention of the essay as form is to reconcile ratio and mimesis, discursivity and
likeness, without reducing their opposition to each other. The desideratum of this
paradoxically conflictual reconciliation is, as Adorno writes, to deduce the concept
from its object rather than the object from its concept. The latter, deducing the object
from its concept, would amount to the establishment of the soi-disant fence. Its cri- q5
tique—the critique of the block—by contrast, would be acknowledged in the recog-
nized insufficiency of the concept to its object as the experience of the primacy of the
object, perceived in the transience of the concept. In Adorno’s notion of imagina-
tion, this would be an instantiation of exact fantasy—here the conceptualized expe-
rience of the possibility inhering in its object—as “right wishing,” an act of determi-
nate negation.7 q6
I am aware that these few sentences are both old hat and less than ersatz; as a
dogmatic if perhaps evocative presentation of the essay as form—and nothing at
all that can be understood when heard as read from the front of a room if one is
not already familiar with it—it is directly opposed to the form of presentation that
is to be elucidated, and it is difficult to proceed otherwise, as witnessed by much
of the literature on Adorno. Although Adorno, whose philosophical thinking orig-
inates in epistemology, himself wrote at great length about his approach, he consid-
ered semi-methodological statements such as that being sketched here delusive. In
opposition to it—and with increasing insistence in his later works—he held that the
critique of reification could only be meaningful as a critique of language. The inten-
tion of the essay as form is nothing less than the word made flesh, though not in the
sense of creatio ex nihilo, but as natural history. If at their extremes—as Adorno’s
well-known philosopheme of natural history reads—history is to be recognized as
nature and nature as history, then this thesis meets its crucial test, if not its experi-
mentum crucis, in discursive reason, at the extreme of convention.8 Where the un-
diminishedly conceptual is, there natural history shall be articulated, in closest affin-
ity with psychoanalysis and at an absolute distance from it. The interpreted transience
of the concept, registering negatively the longing of its object, is the element of na-
ture to be recognized in discursive reason. I do not need to say that this is immanent

7. T. W. Adorno, “Kleine Häresie,” Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 17, p. 301. On “right wishing,” see “Richtig
wünschen ist die schwerste Kunst von allen, und sie wird uns seit der Kindheit abgewöhnt” (Prolog zum
Fernsehen, GS 10.2, S. 516) and “Wahr wäre der Gedanke, der Richtiges wünscht” (Negative Dialektik,
GS 6, S. 100, cf. S. 399).
8. T. W. Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History,” trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Telos no. 60 (1984): 111–24.

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criticism. These concepts themselves are, no less, words whose ideal, in the essay as
form, is to speak for themselves, rather than to appropriate the stance of a perspective
on something external to themselves, or comment argumentatively on staged ratio-
cination, or establish a narrative account of subject matter.
Moishe Postone’s work is, as critical theory, every bit as much categorial analysis
as is Adorno’s, but the essay as form would in almost no regard properly depict
Moishe’s many essays, and certainly not his main work. Moishe had excellent rea-
sons for this. He wanted to formulate a theory that would be as internally consistent
as possible and—as by his repeated invocation—powerful, adequate, and sophisticated.9
Time, Labor, and Social Domination is that; and although it considers the goal remote, it
seeks nothing less than to understand capitalism completely and without remain-
der. The work is ruled by the principal of non confundar in aeternum: let me not lose
my way. If Moishe’s namesake was a figure with a considerable sense of law and an
equally poor sense of direction, needing 40 years in the desert to get oriented to
providence, Moishe’s sense of the urgency of twentieth-century history was by
no means providential. Whatever his monotheism of the text, it did not provide
for the leisure of Old Testamental wandering. Thus, the writing of his magnum opus
is throughout consecutive reasoning, a vigilant construction in hypotactic periods
organized to the exclusion of any fragmentary thought. The categorial study he de-
veloped is presented without rumination on the philosophy of language, in the pre-
sumption, shared with Hegel, that word is fully transparent to concept.10 His eluci-
dation of the concept of the “fetish,” for instance, serves as a term of art, undistracted
by its ironic tone in Marx or by the profound deepening of the concept in the twen-
tieth century with the discovery of the primitive in ourselves. Likewise, although re-
buking “traditional” Marxism for having displaced a rightful understanding of the
mature Marx and in its stead having asserted the standpoint of labor, he elsewhere
in his text defines the idea of tradition—as when he discusses “traditional society”—
as one in which labor is “immanent to society,” in other words, as the exact contrary
of a society built on commodity labor or the thinking that characterizes “traditional
Marxism.”11 It is only because concept and word are presumed methodologically
dirempt, even to the point that a close textual study of Time, Labor, and Social Dom-
ination would demonstrate that the author shuns synonym as a terminological dis-
traction, that it is possible for Moishe to prescind from reflecting on the complexity

9. Compare for instance, the last sentence of Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Re- q7
interpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory, “Marx’s critical theory . . . is . . . a powerful argument, regarding the
nature of an adequate social theory” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 399.
10. See Gerard LeBrun, La patience du concept: essai sur le discours hégélien (Paris: Gallimard, 1972).
11. Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 171.

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in the concept of tradition that his usage of the term implicitly engages. Heard for
what it has to say, the word “tradition” itself asks for more than any technical use
of the concept is ready to admit when it is employed in the service of clarity. The im-
plications of the treatment of this one word are far-reaching in Moishe’s work, for it
abruptly untethers the human struggle from the research that the study no doubt
means to engage. For even when viewed under the optic of the most partial pano-
rama, the “tradition” of “traditional Marxism,” has been a frantically bloody struggle.
Thus, although Moishe’s study means to be and is dialectical reflection, it never-
theless seeks univocality. And in pursuing this tack, in holding the compass straight
and repudiating divagation, as a form of categorial analysis, it differentiates itself
decisively from the essay as form by rejecting immanent criticism. As Moishe ex-
plained on a number of occasions, he arrived at his key understanding of the late
Marx by way of the Grundrisse, which successfully clarified for him aspects of Marx
only and exactly because the Grundrisse is not laid out as immanent criticism, as is
Kapital.12 Moishe was convinced, perhaps rightly, that it is the ambiguities inherent
in immanent criticism, the fact that immanent criticism eschews perspective, that
allowed the late Marx to be appropriated, paradoxically, by the perspective of tra-
ditional Marxism. It is consistent, then, that Moishe references the mature Marx
throughout his study—in his words—as “the critique of labor” and never as an al-
ternative perspective to the perspective of traditional Marxism. But these methodo-
logical efforts, seeking a certitude of clarity, produce obscurities of their own. For
involuntarily a hybrid emerges in which traditional Marxism, identified as a per-
spective, itself becomes freighted with Moishe’s rejection of immanent criticism
in the presentation of his own work. And on the other hand, his study seeks to come
to the rescue of a work of immanent criticism—Das Kapital—repeatedly explaining
the importance of immanent criticism and explicating it, by means of a forcefully
argued perspectival stance, which is asserted as his own.13
This perspectival stance is carried through with self-restraint and tolerance,
which is the civilizing forte of this style—its “I, he, and she thinks.” The categorial
studies are themselves presented at every turn as a set of arguments open for rea-
soned discussion and examination. The lucidity of the analysis is stunning and at

12. Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 21; see also Postone (with Brennan), “Labor and the
Logic of Abstraction,” 307.
13. See, e.g., “Capital . . . is an attempt to construct an argument that does not have a logical form in-
dependent of the object being investigated.” Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, 141. As he explains
a few pages later, this theory is not meant to be a standpoint exterior to its object. This is not, however, the
form of presentation that Postone himself wanted to develop. If Postone’s description of Capital is accurate,
it is something else than, as he writes, an argument.

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points amounts to a work of unrivaled clarification. One learns enormously what

one never would have sorted out for oneself, and certainly not by reading Adorno,
who demands a virtually anamnestic understanding of Marx of his readers, rather
than providing it. Where Moishe knew and could explain the Grundrisse in every de-
tail, there is no indication, other than as in Negative Dialectics the occasional citation
of well-known passages, that Adorno ever fully read it. Under careful study,
Moishe’s interpretation of Marx and social structure becomes a part of one’s mind
and illuminates the world in sharpening focus, even to a degree that at points be-
comes too bright and too close for comfort. For instance—although thanking Bill
Sewell sincerely for convening this colloquium, as I now mean to do—if we all
the same consider the conference organization in its 20-minute increments, which
I am speaking as quickly as I can to oblige, it is the work being honored here whose
logic leads us to acknowledge that the extraneousness of this temporality to what
each of us has to say is hardly of our own manufacture, let alone of Bill Sewell’s,
even while we are reproducing it. What affixes the stopwatch of necessity high and
at an inscrutable remove from where we act—in Moishe’s words—is the manifesta-
tion of the total mediation of society by labor through the commodity form. If the intention
of this conference is to remember Moishe Postone’s work, we find ourselves instead
outspokenly demonstrating the principle of time as necessity that the whole of his
work was devoted to discerning and somehow parrying. We stand up by turn to take
ourselves prisoners. Functionally considered—as Moishe shows—our role in our days
is to exhaust our lives producing what should not be; we struggle to arrive on time
wanting to prove it. All the same, it is implicit to this reasoning that whatever claim
may be made as to the totality of the mediation of society by labor, this colloquium
and Moishe’s work itself prove that not every last thing that we do merely exhausts
our lives in producing what should not be.
It is, then, in following the logic of Moishe’s work, his analysis of a society as to-
tally mediated by labor, that we are brought to consider philosophy’s uttermost con-
cern as the question of totality: What is all of what there is? Or, to restate this ques-
tion, as does Adorno, and as it has been handed back to us from antiquity drastically
reconstrued by the experience of the twentieth century: Is this all of what there is?14 q8

14. See T. W. Adorno, Zur Lehre von der Geschichte und von der Freiheit, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 2001), 185, as well as in his lectures on metaphysics, Metaphysik. Begriff und Probleme, ed. Rolf
Tiedemann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), 224; and then again in Negative Dialectics, “Meditationen zur
Metaphysik” (GS 6, p. 368): “Unverkennbar wird reine metaphysische Erfahrung blasser und desultorischer
im Verlauf des Säkularisierungsprozesses, und das weicht die Substantialität der älteren auf. Sie hält sich
negativ in jenem Ist das denn alles?, das am ehesten im vergeblichen Warten sich aktualisiert.” See also
Adorno’s lectures on epistemology in Erkenntnistheorie (1957–58), ed. Karel Markus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
2018), 164f and 168f. The author thanks Karel Markus kindly for his assistance with these references.

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Moishe’s remarks with which I began today implicitly reflect on this question in
its poignancy when he wrote, “I have never felt so bleak. The US is a horror show q9
and as you know things are looking bad in Austria.” It is in the face of historical
despair—the terror that this really may be all that there is to it, a world that has
now engaged a rhythm of catastrophe that it will never overtake let alone
match—that the works of Moishe Postone and Theodor Adorno are fundamentally
allied. But however we might wish to combine what there is to learn about social
structure from Moishe’s work with the freedom to the object sought in Adorno’s phi-
losophy, thought is not additive, least of all Postone’s and Adorno’s. Coming from op-
posite poles of critical theory, their thinking cannot be stirred together syncretically, as
so many good ideas tossed together at once. As I discovered when I once sat down
with Moishe to interview him on the matter, he felt a visceral aversion to Adorno,
though in that spirit of toleration he would not ever have wanted to say so. Moishe
had hardly read Adorno, and I turned the discussion elsewhere. Still, had he been able
to construe the latter’s studies of musical time, he would have discovered there an en-
gagement in the single question that the whole of his own work in fact concerned,
that of the necessitarianism in the temporality of capitalist production. For music is,
after all, a reorganization of time that succeeds or fails by the achievement or absence
of meaningful time. How to conceive this distinction other than in the trivially toe-
tapping sense, or better, as its critique, might in a rudimentary way be called the topic
of Adorno’s musicology—a distinction that Moishe Postone’s work assumes and to
which it most of all aspires, but it never actually develops and had not the resources
to develop. But although in Adorno’s work, Moishe would have located Ovidian
metamorphoses in conceivable temporality, had he done so, there would have been
no Time, Work, and Social Domination. Yet, even as we recognize the extent of the mu-
tual exclusivity of the essay as form as immanent criticism and a systematic categorial
analysis of totality, this antipathy is not to be understood as obligatorily unproductive.
Pursued, it might well have implications for the release of all that is bound up as a hy-
brid in the phrase “traditional Marxism,” extricating the historical experience and
even the words lodged within it from scare quotes, without endangering the system-
atic insight of the mature Marx that Moishe rightly wanted to discern and elucidate.15

15. There would of course be a great deal more to say at this point, because Adorno considered his own
work immanent, transeunt, and systematic—and necessarily fragmentary. Adorno discusses these ques-
tions at length in one of his most provocative lecture series—T. W. Adorno, Philosophische Elemente einer
Theorie der Gesellschaft, ed. Tobias ten Brink and Marc Phillip Noguerira (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008). Al-
though I have not reproduced Adorno’s reasoning at this point, this article throughout draws so broadly on
Adorno’s text that it would not be possible to note the many references to it, explicitly and implicitly. All
the same, what there is to learn from Postone’s study of capitalism is, as mentioned, not to be found in
Adorno’s work.

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I hardly claim to have the answer to how this might be achieved. But I do have
one thought on it that can be indicated by recurring to the responsibility that Moishe
apportioned to the Left for having “failed to imagine ideas that would appeal to many q10
people outside of our circles.” Perhaps, contrary to all appearances, possibility is
lodged precisely here, if exclusively by determinate negation. There is, after all,
something worth noticing in the way that Marxism, over what is now centuries, al-
ways and again seems to be settling down at the great library table, as it prepares to
write the next popularization of political economy wondering, distressed, how to
communicate the mechanism of totality to that remote population, lodged in those
ever distant circles. It is the sight lines from this table that deserve examination and
perhaps revision. For notice that from where that table is situated the unreachable
peuple stand at the exact same distance from the thinker as does the incriminated to-
tality. The two, the peuple and the totality, are in fact located at so precisely the same
triangulated point on the other side of the barrier or block or fence that the two to-
gether are, as it were, asking to be recognized as two aspects of one object, its visage
shifting momentarily as does the thinker’s tack toward it, from triumphal mastery of
the whole to the painful recognition of having been expulsed by the totality that it
claims to comprehend. Systematic reason, in fact, in seeking to know its object with-
out remainder, has no choice but implicitly to posit this totality as absolute. As is
sometimes said, love may be in the eyes of the beholder, but without a doubt, totality
per se is strictly and exclusively in the mind of the beholder. If so, it may well be that it q11
is the labor of the thinker that is constantly and systematically in the process of recon-
structing the fence on the other side of which its object is ever and again espied van-
ishing over the horizon. But this only begins to indicate the complexity. For the block
is as real and objective as is the thinker’s labor—as social labor—as Moishe has so bril-
liantly shown, in tracing the mediation of society by the commodity form. In other
words, the block is the establishment of a thought object that is both real and illusory.
One can get killed challenging it. Moishe and Adorno agree in this. And it is in com-
prehending the illusory and the coercive at one and the same wrenching moment, of
a society that tears itself apart by the same dynamic that holds it together, that the
essay as form and the systematic presentation of totality might present what possibil-
ity there is, as it exists along this difficult and ragged boundary. For the critique of
domination, in wanting by the capacity of subjectivity, not by its subtraction, to be
anything but another perspective—not a narrative, not a story—is all the same faced
at every angle by the question of how reality can be made to break in on the mind
that masters it.16 The question must not be conceived too proudly, as if it were strictly

16. Robert Hullot-Kentor, “A New Type of Human Being and Who We Really Are,” Brooklyn Rail, No-
vember 10, 2008, 23–28.

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an accusation. Neither is the distance between is and might be anything on the order
of the proverbially yawning chasm, awaiting further reflection on the conundrum
of theory and practice before giving the salto mortale one more try, perhaps next time
with better media coverage. On the contrary, that chasm is an optical illusion, itself
thought waiting “to be woken one day by the memory of what has been missed and
to be transformed into teaching.”17 This pedagogy would be a social theory of what is
more than what simply is, in making requisite the experience of the insufficiency of
the mind—not skeptically, again, not as a narrative—but in the actual determination
of the real as experience itself. However off and wrong the phrase sounds in English,
it would be right wishing.

17. T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2006), 81.

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made by the typesetter.
Q4. AU: In sentence “In the penultimate note that. . . ,” should “November 6,
2017,” say “November 16, 2017,” per footnote 2?
Q5. AU: Italics have been removed for “soi-disant” per journal style. This term is
listed in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary.
Q6. AU: Please double check the first citation for note 7. Should it be:
T. W. Adorno, “Kleine Häresie,” Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 17, ed. Rolf Tiedemann
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 301?
Is this the correct publication/edition? If not please clarify.
And, are the subsequent parenthetical citations to “GS” also to parts of Gesammelte
Schriften?
Q7. AU: Is footnote 9 okay as revised? By “cf.” did you intend “See” or “Compare”?
Q8. AU: In footnote 14, should “164f and 168f ” say “164–65, 168–69”?
Q9. AU: Please include a source for the quoted text “I have never felt so bleak. The
US is a . . .” in a footnote with complete details along with its cited page number, if
applicable.
Q10. AU: Please include a source for the quoted text “failed to imagine ideas that
would appeal . . .” in a footnote with complete details along with its cited page
number, if applicable.
Q11. AU: Italics emphasis has been removed for text “per se,” because it is a com-
monly used term that is found in the dictionary.

175.proof.3d 11 Achorn International 02/27/20 09:03