“You shall not muzzle an ox when it is treading out the grain”

(Deut. 25:4).

This command, which appears only once in the Old Testament,

would garner little attention except for the fact that the apostle Paul
cites it not once but twice (1 Cor. 9:9; 1 Tim. 5:18), making
apostolic application to his right to be supported financially as a
minister of the gospel. And he does so in such a way that it makes it
sound like he is bypassing what the command was originally about.

Moses (serving as the covenant mediator for Yahweh) seems

compassionately concerned about the oxen getting enough to eat,
getting their fair share when working hard.

Paul, on the other hand, seems to say that God isn’t primarily
concerned about oxen. In 1 Corinthians 9:9-10 he asks rhetorically:

 Is it for oxen that God is concerned? [The Greek wording

implies an emphatic “No!”]
 Does he [=Moses] not certainly speak for our sake?
This raises lots of questions, like:

 Is Paul saying that Moses never meant this to be applied to

literal oxen?
 Is he merely referring to the ultimate intention of the passage?
 Is he focusing on contemporary application rather than original
meaning?
 Is he quoting this verse out of context?
We can answer questions like this by going back to the text and
asking some questions of our own.

Are There Issues with the Original Text and Grammar?

There are no disputed textual or grammatical issues at play in
this Deuteronomy 25:4. A good literal translation would be: “do not
muzzle an ox in its threshing.” (“Out/of the grain” is added in many
English translations for clarification; Paul himself adds it to his
quotation for the same reason.) Contra the NET Bible, there is no
specification of the owner of the ox; in other words, there is no
indication of possession (e.g., “your ox” or “his ox”). Whether the
ox is owned or borrowed by the recipient of this command must be
determined from context (both textually and historically) and logic.
In my opinion, this is a more significant consideration than it
appears at first glance.

What Did It Originally Mean?

The terseness of the command means that the motivation, the

ground, and the application must all be inferred.

The surface issue is that of muzzling. If an ox wears a muzzle

during the process of tramping the grain on the threshing floor, then
it cannot eat the grain. Yahweh through Moses is saying that this is
wrong. But the reason is not specified.

Virtually all interpreters have recognized the upshot: if an ox is

without muzzle, then it can partake of the fruit of its own labor, and
this is regarded as a good thing. But many interpreters stop at this
point and fail to press in more deeply.

Who Is the Command Really For?

One question that commentators rarely ask or answer is this: Is it the

owner of the ox, or it is someone who is renting or borrowing it?
And what is the motivation behind the command? Is the primary
issue Yahweh’s compassion and protection for animals (cf. Prov.
12:10; Jonah 4:11), or is there an element of human justice and
protection at play (cf. Deut. 22:14)?

There are two basic options for the identity of the man to whom this
command is directed: he is either (1) the owner of the ox, or (2)
someone borrowing or renting the ox. Each option could then be
subdivided based on the location of the threshing: the owner of the
ox could be (1a) threshing his own grain, or (1b) threshing someone
else’s grain; likewise, the borrower/renter could be (2a) threshing
his own grain, or (2b) threshing someone else’s grain. Schematically
we could represent the possible logical options as follows:

Owner of Renter/Borrower of
Ox Ox
Own grain 1a 2a
Someone else’s 1b 2b
grain
There is nothing in the Hebrew grammar to answer these questions
for us. All four options are perfectly compatible with the
terminology and structure of this short command.

The option of a man renting or borrowing an ox to thresh someone

else’s grain, while possible, seems historically unlikely. It is more
likely that an owner of the ox is threshing his own grain or someone
else’s, or that a renter/borrower of the ox is threshing his own grain.
We must reason our way through the situation, asking if one or more
of these three remaining options makes more sense of the
surrounding literary context, the cultural situation, and the divine
motivation.

If the command is directed to the owner of the ox—whether

threshing in his own field or in another’s—it is difficult to
understand why the stipulation is required in the first place. Oxen
were viewed as property, and there was a built-in motivation for
maintaining one’s property to perform at a maximal level. It is
difficult to see why the command would make it into the Mosaic
law given the self-interest that would already ensure such actions.
As Jan Verbruggen notes in his excellent article on this verse, “The
economic value of the ox far outweighs the value of the threshed
grain that an ox could eat while it is threshing. . . . Economically, it
would not make sense if the owner of the ox muzzled his own ox
while it is doing hard labor.”

By process of elimination, this leaves us with the situation of a man

borrowing or renting an ox to thresh his own grain. In that event, his
self-interest would entail preserving as much of his threshed grain as
possible; on the other hand, he would have no intrinsic motivation to
let the ox eat of his grain. If the animal ended up in a weakened state
or unhealthy as a result, the situation does not result in any
economic loss on his end. This, then, seems like the most plausible
situation for requiring a command. The covenant stipulation works
against the selfish motive for a man to take advantage of another
man’s property. (To use a modern analogy, at the risk of
anachronism, this is the reason that rental stores today have
agreements about returning rented equipment in good working
order; they know that when someone doesn’t own something there
is an increased propensity for recklessness and lack of diligent care.)

If this line of reasoning is correct, it cuts against the interpretive

strategy taken by commentators like Raymond Brown: “Although
all the other laws in this passage concern human rights, a
commandment is suddenly introduced which protects animals from
owners who are more concerned about working them hard than
feeding them well.” This interpretation assumes (without argument,
or without considering any other alternative) that it is the owner of
the oxen who is receiving this command. Further, it assumes that the
primary motivation is the protection of the animal. While not
wanting to deny Yahweh’s compassion for animals as part of his
created order and in accordance with his attributes, it is difficult to
account for this interpretation in the context. It seems that
Verbruggen is on more solid footing here: “If it was just a
humanitarian law for the ox, the law is clearly at odds with its
context. However, if it is a law dealing with the economic
responsibility of someone using someone else’s property, the law
fits nicely in the context.” In other words, Deuteronomy 25:4 in
context is not fundamentally a law about how to treat animals
humanely but rather a law about how to treat properly treat the
property you are borrowing or renting from someone. Seen in this
light, v. 4 fits the original context quite well. Otherwise the verse is
an anomaly which seems to stand out.

So What’s Going on in the New Testament?

In 1 Timothy 5:17 Paul writes, “Let the elders who rule well be
considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in
preaching and teaching.” In v. 18 Paul grounds this teaching with
two quotations: “You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the
grain” (Deut. 25:4) and “The laborer deserves his wages” (Luke
10:7; cf. Matt. 10:10). Paul’s point is that pastor-elders should not
be taken for granted or taken advantage of, but rather should be
adequately compensated for their gospel labors.

Paul’s citation of Deuteronomy 25:4 in 1 Corinthians 9:9 is more

complicated and has generated more discussion. At the end of the
day, the function and argument is the same. What was a general
principle in 1 Timothy 5:18 now becomes a personal and specific
instantiation of this idea. Here Paul is arguing that he and Barnabas
have the right to receive adequate compensation for their ministry
labors. The most striking feature for our purposes is that Paul seems
to say that God is really not concerned about the oxen after all,
which is in tension with the traditional interpretation that the
primary purpose of Deuteronomy 25:4 is to protect the oxen (that is,
the one doing the work).

Numerous interpretations have been put forth. For example, Fee

argues that laws, by their very nature, “do not intend to touch all
circumstances; hence they regularly function as paradigms for
application in all sorts of human circumstances. . . . Paul does not
speak to what the law originally meant. . . . He is concerned with
what it means, that is, with its application to their present situation.”

More specifically, Ciampa and Rosner argue, “Paul’s statement

need not (and should not) be taken as an absolute denial that the law
was given for the sake of animals, but as a strong assertion that God
is even more concerned about humans (and that he was particularly
concerned to give guidance for the eschatological community of the
church).”

Luther, in a typically humorous but insightful aside, says that this

command can’t be for the oxen because “oxen can’t read!”

Calvin elaborates:

 [T]hough the Lord commands consideration for the oxen, He does

so, not for the sake of the oxen, but rather out of regard for men, for
whose benefit even the very oxen were created. Therefore that
humane treatment of oxen ought to be an incentive, moving us to
treat each other with consideration and fairness. . . . God is not
concerned about oxen, to the extent that oxen were the only
creatures in His mind when He made the law, for He was thinking
of men, and wanted to make them accustomed to being considerate
in behaviour, so that they might not cheat the workman of his
wages. For the ox does not take the leading part in ploughing and
threshing, but man, and it is by man’s efforts that the ox itself is set
to work. Therefore, what he goes on to add, ‘he that plougheth ought
to plough in hope’ etc., is an interpretation of the commandment, as
though he said, that it is extended, in a general way, to cover any
kind of reward for labour.
These interpretations are legitimate so far as they go, but they lack
nuance by focusing only on the “compassion” aspect of original
while ignoring the “economic justice” factors that likely provided
the motivation and impetus for the command in the first place.

To review my argument: Moses gave the command to provide for

the ox, but ultimately to protect an Israelite from being unjustly
treated at the hand of one who borrows or rents his ox. The one
benefiting from the labor of an ox should not take economic
advantage of the owner of the ox.

Once this is seen, rich texture is added to Paul’s use of this verse.
His point is not really that the Corinthians should
have compassion or mercy for him and Barnabas, but that this is a
matter of fundamental justice. The issue is not really kindness, but
rights. When Paul says this is not really about the oxen, he is
pointing to this wider and deeper reality at play in this verse as it
was originally to be understood. Therefore the Corinthians should
want to provide appropriate compensation as an expression of
justice, even if Paul ultimately rejects the offer.

Help on the New Testament Citing the Old

If this minority interpretation—which is indebted to

Verbruggen’s helpful work—is correct, then there are at least two
implications for understanding how the New Testament cites the
Old Testament: (1) never ignore the original OT context; (2) be slow
to assume that the NT writers are quoting things out of context. And
even if my view is wrong, these two principles still apply!