RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the
figure, Complainant filed an action against said
accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the
message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers
that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have
boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened
to spread the picture he sent through the internet. 
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the
violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter
rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The
CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed
the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the
CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by
means of an electronic signature, as provided
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before the Supreme Court. The objection is
too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for
objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution
has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI,
Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND HOMER T.
SAQUILAYAN, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was
proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor
of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus,
Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in
the counting of votes in 209 clustered
precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a
revision of the votes, and, based on the results
of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing
the functions of said office. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile,
the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed
as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving
notice to the parties, decided to recount the
ballots through the use of the printouts of the
ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued
an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit
the amount necessary to defray the expenses
for the decryption and printing of the ballot
images. Later, it issued another order for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the
RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of
the decryption proceedings. He argued that the
resort to the printouts of the ballot images,
which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that
the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for
certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images without prior notice to him, and
to the use of the printouts of the ballot images
in the recount proceedings conducted by the
First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari
dismissed the same. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not
abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot
images instead of the paper ballots, explaining
that the printouts of the ballot images were not
secondary images, but considered original
documents with the same evidentiary value as
the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic
Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding
that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been
tampered had been fully established by the
large number of cases of double-shading
discovered during the revision.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in
dismissing the instant petition despite a clear
violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process of law considering that
decryption, printing and examination of the
digital images of the ballots were done
inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of
the COMELEC First Division sans any notice
to the petitioner and for the first time on
appeal.
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is
granted.
POLITICAL LAW notice to parties
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of
Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on
Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt
procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised
only after giving to all the parties the
opportunity to be heard on their opposing
claims. The parties right to be heard upon
adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly
because of the possibility of the substantial
prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or
to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc
should not have upheld the First Divisions
deviation from the regular procedure in the
guise of speedily resolving the election protest,
in view of its failure to provide the parties with
notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to
be heard, the most basic requirements of due
process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic
documents that are regarded as the equivalents
of the original official ballots themselves.In
Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January
22, 2013the Court held that "the picture images
of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled
out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral
protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and
its picture image are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them
are given equal probative weight. In short,
when either is presented as evidence, one is not
considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the
courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to
the printouts of the picture images of the
ballots in the proceedings had before them
without notice to the parties. Despite the equal
probative weight accorded to the official ballots
and the printouts of their picture images, the
rules for the revision of ballots adopted for
their respective proceedings still consider the
official ballots to be the primary or best
evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the
picture images of the ballots are to be used only
when it is first shown that the official ballots
are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.
PEOPLE V ENOJAS (GR No. 204894, March 10,
2014)
Facts: PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were
patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously parked
taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and
asked for his documents. Having entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown
them, they invited him in their mobile car to the
police station for further questioning. Enojas
complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-
11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As
he approached the store’s door, however, he came
upon two suspected robbers and a shootout
ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and
hit the other who still managed to escape. But
someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with
two more armed robbers who managed to escape.
He then went back to the patrol car and noticed
that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas was
involved in the attempted robbery, they searched
his abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers
monitored the incoming messages and posed as
Enojas. The accused appellants were later on
arrested in an entrapment operation and were
convicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having
been properly identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence
alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.
Held:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages,
the RTC admitted them in conformity with
the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions. Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party
to the same or has personal knowledge of
them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify
and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.
2. This may be true but the prosecution could
prove their liability by circumstantial
evidence that meets the evidentiary
standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial
evidence the prosecution presented
 sufficiently provides basis for the conviction
of all the accused.
ANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner  letter to respondents.
vs AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS
VDA. DE MENDOZA, Respondents
G.R. No. 198799
YEAR: 2012
TOPIC: Negotiable Instruments
DOCTRINE
Facts: This case stemmed from a Complaint for
Sum of Money with Application for Writ of
Attachment filed by BPI against respondents
before the RTC. BPI alleged that on April 8, 1997,
respondents opened a foreign currency savings
account (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan
Branch and deposited therein the total amount
of US$l6,264.00, broken down as follows:
US$100.00 in cash and US$16,164.00 in US
Treasury Check with No. 3149-09693369
payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza"
(subject check) and placed the amount of
US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account. After the
clearing period, respondents withdrew the
amount of US$16,244.00 from the US savings
account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank
charges. However, on June 26, 1997, BPI
received a notice from its correspondent bank,
Bankers Trust Company New York (Bankers
Trust), that the subject check was dishonored
due to "amount altered" as evidenced by (1) an
electronic mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers
Trust, and (2) a photocopy of the subject check
with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by
Bankers Trust.
This prompted BPI to inform respondents of
such dishonor and to demand reimbursement.
BPI then claimed that on July 18, 1997,
respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds
of their time deposit account in the amount
ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding obligation
and that upon the exhaustion of the said time
deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory
note dated September 8, 1997 containing his
promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of
₱1,000.00 monthly. When respondents failed to
fulfill their obligation despite repeated demands,
BPI was constrained to give a final demand
Respondents maintained that Amado only
affixed his signature in the letter dated July 18,
1997 in order to acknowledge its receipt, but not
to give his consent to the application of the
proceeds of their time deposit account to their
purported obligations to BPI.
Issue: Whether or not BPI failed to prove the
dishonor of the subject check
Held: Yes.
Ratio: It is settled that in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon. Records
evince that BPI was able to satisfactorily prove by
preponderance of evidence the existence of
respondents' obligation in its favor. Verily, Amado
acknowledged its existence and expressed his
conformity thereto when he voluntarily: (a) affixed
his signature in the letters dated June 27, 1997 and
July 18, 1997, where he acknowledged the
dishonor of the subject check, and subsequently,
allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their US time
deposit account to partially offset their obligation
to the bank; and (b) executed a Promissory
Note dated September 8, 1997 wherein he
undertook to pay BPI in installments of ₱l,000.00
per month until the remaining balance of his
obligation is fully paid.
FACTS:
On April 8, 1997, respondents: (a) opened a foreign
currency savings (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan
Branch and deposited therein the total amount of
US$ 16,264.00, in US Treasury Check payable to
"Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza" (subject check);
and (b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time
deposit account. After the lapse of the thirty (30)
day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997,
respondents withdrew the amount of
US$16,244.00 from the US savings account, leaving
only US$20.00 for bank charges.
On June 26, 1997, BPI received a notice from its
correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New
York (Bankers Trust), that the subject check was
dishonored due to "amount altered", as evidenced
by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from
Bankers Trust, and (2) a photocopy of the subject
check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by
Bankers Trust as the original copy of the subject
check was allegedly confiscated by the government
of the United States of America (US government).
This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such
dishonor and to demand reimbursement. BPI then
claimed that: (a) on July 18, 1997, respondents
allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their time
deposit account in the amount of US$2,015.00 to
their outstanding obligation; (b) upon the
exhaustion of the said time deposit account,
Amado gave BPI a promissory note dated
September 8, 1997 containing his promise to pay
BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of P1,000.00
monthly; and (c) when respondents failed to fulfill
their obligation despite repeated demands, BPI was
constrained to give a final demand letter to
respondents on November 27, 1997.
In a Decision dated May 9, 2007, the RTC ruled in
BPI's favor. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the CA. In a Decision dated February 4, 2011, the
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and
consequently, dismissed BPI's complaint for lack of
merit. It held that BPI failed to prove the dishonor
of the subject check, since: (a) the presentation of
a mere photocopy of the subject check is in
violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and (b) the e-
mail advice from Bankers Trust was not properly
authenticated in accordance with the Rules on
Electronic Evidence as the person who sent the e-
mail advice was neither identified nor presented in
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BPI had proven its cause
of action by preponderance of evidence.
FACTS: Yes. The Supreme Court finds the petition
meritorious. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads: Section 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (a)
When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror; In order to fall under the
aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror
proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original,
or the reason for its non-production in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. In this case, BPI sufficiently
complied with the foregoing requisites.
First, the existence or due execution of the subject
check was admitted by both parties. Second, the
reason for the non-presentation of the original
copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was
confiscated by the US government for being an
altered check. The subject check, being a US
Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and
practically speaking, the same could not be easily
obtained. Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary
and for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can
be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the
original of the subject check. Thus, applying the
exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the
presentation of the photocopy of the subject check
as secondary evidence was permissible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 4, 2011 and the
Resolution dated August 26, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91704 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May
9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 in Civil Case No. 1913 is
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, adjusting the
interest imposed on the amount ordered to be
returned, i.e., P369, 600.51, to six percent (6%) per
annum reckoned from the date of extrajudicial
demand on June 27, 1997, until fully paid.