A.C. No. 10557 (canon 2.

03) JULY 10, 2018

JERRY M. PALENCIA, Complainant

vs.

Atty. PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Atty. GERARD M. LINSANGAN, and Atty. GLENDA M.

LINSANGAN-BINOYA, Respondents

PONENTE: Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

FACTS:

Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was seriously

injured during work when he fell into the elevator shaft of the vessel M/T "Panos
G" flying a Cyprus flag. After initial treatment in Singapore, complainant was
discharged and flown to the Philippines to continue his medical treatment and
rehabilitation.

While confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, one "Moises," and later
Jesherel L. Millena (Jesherel), paralegals in respondents' law office, approached
complainant. They convinced him to engage the services of respondents' law
office in order to file a suit against his employers for indemnity. After several visits
from the paralegals and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan, complainant executed
(1) an Attorney-Client Contract, and (2) a Special Power of Attomey, where he
engaged the legal services of respondents and Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in
Singapore, and agreed to pay attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement
obtained for both. After execution of the contract, complainant, through the
efforts of respondents, was paid by his employer the following amounts:
US$60,000.00 as indemnity and US$20,000.00 under their collective bargaining
agreement. From these amounts, respondents charged complainant attorney's
fees of 35%.

Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the owners of
"Panos G" before the High Court of Singapore (Singapore case). For this case,
respondents engaged the services of Papadopoulos, Lycourgos & Co., a law firm
based in Cyprus, to draft a written opinion on the issues involving Cyprus law,
among others. They also engaged the services of retired Justice Emilio Gancayco
(Justice Gancayco) for his expert opinion regarding various issues raised by
defendant's lawyer and representatives. Thereafter, negotiations led to a
settlement award in favor of complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00.
Gurbani & Co. remitted to respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. From this
amount, respondents deducted: (1) US$5,000.00 as payment to Justice Gancayco;
(2) their attorney's fees equivalent to 35%; and (3) other expenses, leaving the net
amount of US$ l 8, 132.43 for complainant.
 Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 (representing the
US$18,132.43) to complainant, which the latter refused. As complainant
contested the amount comprised of the expenses and attorney's fees deducted.

Complainant filed a subject letter-complaint with the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). He requested that an
investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed
upon respondents for committing the unethical act of engaging in "ambulance
chasing" by deploying their agents to convince complainant to hire respondents'
services while the former was still bedridden in the hospital. In their answer,
respondents explained that, as to the allegations of ambulance chasing,
respondents averred that they provide free legal advice to the public. It was in the
course of this public service when they met complainant.

After proceedings, the IBP-CBD in its Report and Recommendation ruled

that respondents violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) by soliciting legal business through their agents while complainant was in
the hospital. The IBP-CBD found that all three respondents connived and thus
recommended that all respondents be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommendation. After respondents' motion for reconsideration and
complainant's opposition thereto, the IBP Board of Governors modified the
penalty and increased respondents' suspension from the practice of law to two
years with warning, and ordered respondents to return the 5% of the amount
assessed to complainant as attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

WON Respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) by

soliciting legal business.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the IBP on the unethical
conduct of respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and, Gerard M. Linsangan. they,
however, absolve respondent Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya for lack of any
evidence as to her participation in the acts complained of.

RATIO:

The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers are

reminded to avoid at all times any act that would tend to lessen the confidence of
the public in the legal profession as a noble calling, including, among others, the
manner by which he makes known his legal services. A lawyer in making known
his legal services must do so in a dignified manner. They are prohibited from
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business." Corollary to this duty is
for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive or
interest. Thus, "ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain
employment, is proscribed.

Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated these

rules. No less than their former paralegal Jesherel admitted that respondent Atty.
Pedro Linsangan came with her and another paralegal named Moises, to Manila
Doctors Hospital several times to convince complainant to hire their services. This
is a far cry from respondents' claim that they were merely providing free legal
advice to the public. Moreover, while respondents deny Jesherel's connection
with their law firm, this was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when he
presented Jesherel's resignation letter as received by respondents' firm. In
employing paralegals to encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his
employers, respondents indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the
filing of suit. These constitute malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions.

While we find respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan and Gerard Linsangan to

have violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03
of the CPR, the records do not support respondent Atty. Glenda Linsangan-
Binoya's participation in their unethical activities. Complainant himself admits
that he only dealt with respondents Attys. Pedro and Gerard Linsangan. Thus, we
hold that the case against Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, we find respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and Gerard M.

Linsangan GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan
and Gerard Linsangan from the practice of law for TWO YEARS effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The complaint against Atty.
Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 210554 (Rule 3.02) August 05, 2015

DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L. YU, ROSA GAN, LILIAN
CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG, SANTOS YU, MARCELO YU, AND SIN CHIAO YU LIM,
Petitioners

vs.

ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL,

AND ATTY. DAN REYNALD R. MAGAT, practicing law under the Firm name, Young
Revilla Gambol & Magat, and JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO, Presiding Judge of Branch
211 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Respondents

PONENTE: Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

FACTS:

David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian
Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim are the
majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation. In a previously resolved case
the Supreme Court ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation and
transferred the case to the appropriate Regional Trial Court branch to supervise
the liquidation.

The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City, presided by Judge Calo. Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito
Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers
practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. They entered their
appearance in the liquidation proceedings as counsels for the liquidator. An
Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on
the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009.

Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply to the Opposition stating that
the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name even after he had been
disbarred, with the retention serving as an act of charity. Judge Calo overruled the
opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that
Atty. Young could still appear for the liquidator as long as his appearance was
under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. Young
Law Firm does not exist. Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L.
Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu,
and Sin Chiao Yu Lim filed this Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents Atty.
Walter T. Young, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R.
Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo in contempt. Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pined and
United States v. Ney, et al.26 to support their argument that the use of a
disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to contempt of court.
 Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they
maintained Revilla's name in the firm name for sentimental reasons. Atty. Young
and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to deceive the public and that
in any case, the retention of Revilla's name "does not give added value to the [law
firm] nor does it enhance the standing of the member lawyers thereof. They
further argue that the non-deletion of Anastacio E. Revilla's name in the Young
Law Firm's name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or
retired partners in a law firm's name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a
fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private
Respondents fully understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled albeit quixotic
advocacy.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol,

and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they continued to
use respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s name in their firm name even after his
disbarment.

HELD:

YES. Respondents disregarded the Code of Professional Responsibility

when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name.

RATIO:

Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:

Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed

name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased. Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name
is "no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a
law firm's name."

Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from

using a deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the
use of a deceased partner's name as long as there is an indication that the partner
is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the
retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public
into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law. The use of a
deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was allowed upon the effectivity of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that "the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased."

WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R.

Magat are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their
firm name and are meted a fine of ₱30,000.00 each.
A.C. No. 10132 (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice) March 24, 2015

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO represented by DAVID ALILANO, Complainants,

vs.

ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN,Respondent .

PONENTE: Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, jr.

FACTS:

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.
Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute
Deeds of Sale were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen
and his wife, Edna. Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto
Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen
obtained possession of the property.

On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen
and Atty. Roberto Examen. It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen
introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute
Deeds of On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint
alleging that Atty. Examen, based on Barretto v. Cabreza, violated the notarial law
when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited
from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also
alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or
residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the
residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely
acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when they
did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these
documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his
oath as a lawyer and the CPR.

In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any
prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize
a document where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and
affinity. With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s,
Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the
secretary type details without him personally examining the output. In any event,
he reasoned that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for
disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13
dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule
VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct:
within two years from the date of the act.

In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

(CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing
false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. The IBP Board of
Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution adopted the IBP CBD’s report but
modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two
years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a period of two
years.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Examen is liable for breach of the Notarial Law.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP that Atty. Examen is
administratively liable and imposed a modified penalty.

RATIO:

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the
Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is
changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code,
which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice was
passed by the Supreme Court. In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of
Appeals,the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the Revised
Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to
notarize the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still
applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However,
following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was
the Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty.
Examen was not incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties
to the deed was a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP CBD:

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was

Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there
was no prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when
one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity.
 Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV,
Section 3(c), a notary public is disqualified among others to perform the
notarial act if he is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within
the fourth civil degree, to wit:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a

notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by

affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present
case does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in
conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to

discharge with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements
and solemnities of the Notarial Law. Here, based on the submission of the
complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number used by Ramon
Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not
in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate
number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office
practice to have his secretary type up the details of the documents and
requirements without him checking the correctness of same.

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the

residence certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty.
Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of
Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number. Atty. Examen interposes
that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type
up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the
correctness of same.

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed
with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a mitigating
circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is
personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen
diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the
documents. To say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness
to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who personally
acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented
and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct
details. This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It
is imbued with substantive public interest owing to the public character of his
duties

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial
commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this
Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 5951 (lawyer's oath) July 12, 2016

JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant

vs.

ATTY. LORENZA A. ABION, Respondent

PONENTE: PERCURIAM

FACTS:

Complainant alleges that she engaged the services of respondent to assist

her in filing a case against Robinsons Savings Bank - Ermita Branch and its officers,
in relation to the bank's illegal withholding/blocking of her account. In March
2002, respondent filed, on complainant's behalf, a complaint against Robinsons
Savings Bank and its officers before the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas for "Conducting Business in an Unsafe and Unsound Manner in violation
of Republic Act No. 8791 [.]"

Without complainant's knowledge, respondent withdrew the complaint

with prejudice through a letter dated April 15, 2002 addressed to the Monetary
Board. Complainant claims that respondent forged her signature and that of a
certain William Randell Coleman (Coleman) in the letter. She adds that she never
authorized nor acceded to respondent's withdrawal ofthe complaint. Complainant
was further surprised to discover two (2) Special Powers of Attorney dated March
7, 20028 and March 24, 2002,9 which appear to have her and Coleman's
signature as principals. The documents constituted respondent as their attorney-
in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts
receivables, wired remittances, in their legal and extra legal effort:s to retrieve
and unblock the peso and dollar savings accounts opened up with the Robinsons
Savings Bank at its branch office at Ermita, Manila, in order for her to withdraw
and to encash all their accounts, receivables, checks, savings, remittances. Again,
complainant claims that the signatures were forged. She denies ever having
executed a special power of attorney for respondent.

Complainant further alleges that on March 24, 2002, respondent filed

before this Court a Complaint for "Writ of Preliminary Prohibitive and Mandatory
Injunction with Damages[.]"13 For such services, respondent demanded and
received the following amounts on May 7, 2002:

Php 225,000.00 - For filing fee to the Supreme Court

Php 55,000.00 - For Sheriff's Service Fee
 Php 50,000.00 - For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court, to expedite matters
Php 330,000.00 - Total

Respondent failed to account for these amounts despite complainant's demands

for a receipt.

Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002, while she was sick and in the
hospital, respondent asked for complainant's German passport to secure its
renewal from the German Embassy. For this service, respondent asked for the
total amount of ₱440,000.00 to cover the following expenses:

May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 -For Processing of Travel Papers

May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 -For Additional Fee for the Travel Papers

June 3, 2002 - Php 350,000.00 - For the release of Travel Papers as required by
Atty. O. Dizon, BID

Php 440,000.00- (Emphasis in the original)

These sums were allegedly not properly accounted for despite complainant's
demand. Respondent eventually presented a purportedly renewed German
passport, which complainant rejected because it was obviously fake. Complainant
later found out that her original German passport was in the possession of
Robinsons Savings Bank.

Complainant avers that respondent's malicious acts warrant her removal from the
roster of lawyers. She adds that she and Coleman filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City a criminal Complaint against respondent for the
unlawful acts committed against them.

In his Report and Recommendation dated July 6, 2013, Investigating

Commissioner Peter Irving C. Corvera recommended that respondent be
disbarred for fabricating and forging Special Powers of Attorney and an order
from this Court, coupled with her exaction of money from complainant without
receipt or accounting despite demands.39 These acts are in culpable violation of
Canon l;Rule 1.01; Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In the Resolution dated October 10, 2014, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent
did not file a motion for reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading. On
October 13, 2015, the Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to this Court
for final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent should be disbarred for committing forgery,

falsification, and swindling.
HELD:

YES. The Court finds respondent Atty. Lorenza A. Abion GUILTY of gross
misconduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RATIO:

In Sebastian v. Calis:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and

dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable
practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the
lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of
an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Respondent's deception constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a
breach of her fiduciary duty to her client, subjecting her to disciplinary action.
G.R. No. 10145 (good moral character) Jun 11, 2018

OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant

vs.

ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR., Respondent

PONENTE: Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo

FACTS:

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay. then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais
(Marie Nicole), daughter of complainant, alleged that sometime in October 2006,
she, along with her mother, Annaliza, Ate Mimi (Michelle Lagasca), and a certain
Ate Ada (Ada Marie Campos), stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-Sibugay, that
belonged to respondent lawyer, whom Marie Nicole referred to as "Tito
Attorney." Marie Nicole said that when night-time fell, respondent lawyer slept in
the same bed with her and her mother and that she saw respondent lawyer
embracing her mother while they were sleeping. Marie Nicole further recounted
that the next morning, while she was watching television along with her mother,
Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, respondent lawyer who just had a shower, and clad only in
a towel or "tapis," suddenly entered the room; that she (Marie Nicole) along with
her Ate Mimi and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside the room (either by
respondent lawyer, or by her mother Annaliza), while her mother and respondent
lawyer remained inside the room.

Because of these developments, Oliver Fabugais (complainant) filed a case

for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Annaliza, with prayer for the
custody of their minor children. In said case, respondent lawyer entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel for Annaliza.

Respondent lawyer denied that he had had any immoral relations with
Annaliza. He claimed that he was merely assisting Annaliza in her tempestuous
court battle with complainant for custody of her children. Respondent lawyer
asserted that when Marie Nicole's maternal grandmother, Ma. Eglinda L. Bantoto,
sought out his help in this case, he told them that they could hide in his
(respondent lawyer's) parents' house in Ipil. Respondent lawyer claimed that the
cordial relationship he had had with Annaliza could be traced to her being the
stepdaughter of his (respondent lawyer's) late uncle, and also to her having been
his former student at the Western Mindanao State University in Zamboanga City.
Respondent lawyer insisted that he was incapable of committing the misconduct
imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit: because he is a good father to his
three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and because he had never
been the subject even of a complaint with the police. He claimed that
complainant tiled the instant complaint simply "to harass him from practicing his
legitimate profession, and for no other reason.

Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this case

was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
(BOG) in April 26, 2007. And, in an Order dated August 2, 2007 this case was then
consolidated with a similar case filed by the same complainant against the same
respondent. Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this
case was forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors (BOG) in April 26, 2007. 11 And, in an Order dated August 2, 2007 this
case was then consolidated with a similar case filed by the same complainant
against the same respondent.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer to have acted

inappropriately with Annaliza which created the appearance of immorality, viz.:

As can be gleaned from the records or the hearing, no categorical

sexual activity took place between respondent und complainant's wife. One
would need to inject a bit of imagination to create an image of something
sexual. But as can be read, no sexual activity took place based on the
witness' account.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that respondent's

behavior was in total and complete accord with how a lawyer should
behave, particularly in the presence or a minor. Was respondent's behavior
toward a woman, in the presence of her minor daughter or 11 years,
proper and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession? It is clear
that there was impropriety on the part of respondent.

In this case, while sexual immorality was not established, respondent

should be held to account for his inappropriate behavior which created the
image or appearance or immorality especially in the presence or a minor
girl. Respondent's act of lying in bed with another married woman, while he
himself is a married man, in the presence of the woman's daughter could
raise suspicions, as in fact it did. x x x.

Respondent should have been considerate of the feelings and

perceptions of other people, particularly of' minor children.

The Investigating Commissioner, thus, recommended respondent

lawyer's suspension for one (1) month for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP-BOG in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-
30216 adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

ISSUE:
 Did respondent lawyer in fact commit acts that are grossly immoral, or acts
that amount to serious moral depravity, that would warrant or call for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law?

HELD:

YES. The acts of respondent lawyer are grossly immoral, or acts that
amount to serious moral depravity, however he should only be suspended from
the practice of law.

RATIO:

"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,

flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. This Court has held that for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree."

It is not easy to stale with accuracy what constitutes "grossly immoral conduct,"
let alone what constitutes the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a
lawyer unfit or unworthy to continue as a member of the bar in good standing. In
the present case, going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant's daughter
Marie Nicole, raw or explicit sexual immorality between respondent lawyer and
complainant's wife was not established as a matter of fact. Indeed, to borrow the
Investigating Commissioner's remark:"[o]ne would need to inject a bit of
imagination to create an image of something sexual."

"There is perhaps no profession alter that of the sacred ministry in which a

high-toned morality is more imperative than that of the law." As officers of the
court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They must
moreover also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or
appear to - live a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. Members of the bar can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends
to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty,
and the integrity of the legal profession. The Courts require adherence to these
lofty precepts because any thoughtless or ill-considered actions or actuations by
any member of the Bar can irreversibly undermine public confidence in the law
and, consequently, those who practice it.

The acts complained or in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral
in its rawness or coarseness, but they were without doubt condemnable.
Respondent lawyer who made avowals to being a respectable father to three
children, and also to being a respected leader of his community apparently had
no qualms or scruples about being seen sleeping in his own bed with another
man's wife, his arms entwined in tender embrace with the latter. Respondent
lawyer's claim that he was inspired by nothing but the best of intentions in
inviting another married man's wife and her 10-ycar old daughter to sleep with
him in the same bed so that the three of them could enjoy a good night's rest in
his air conditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor.

And in aggravation of the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent

lawyer apparently experienced neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding
into the room occupied by n married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter
and their two other women companions clad with nothing else but a "tapis" or a
towel. Of course, respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety
by saying in his Motion for Reconsideration that he was wearing a malong and not
tapis at that time. And, of course, this plea will not avail because his scanty
trappings gave him no license to intrude into a small room full of women.
Respondent lawyer could have simply asked everyone in the room to step outside
for a little while. Or he could have donned his clothing elsewhere. But these
things seemed to have been totally lost to respondent lawyer's density. Indeed,
respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that there are rules other men -
decent men, - live by.

In deciding upon the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent

lawyer in this case, this Court is ever mindful that administrative disciplinary
proceedings are essentially designed to protect the administration of justice and
that this lofty ideal can be attained by requiring that those who are honored by
the title "Attorney" and counsel or at law are men and women of undoubted
competence, unimpeachable integrity and undiminished professionalism, men
and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.This Court
moreover realizes only too well that the power to disbar or suspend members of
the bar ought always to be exercised not in a spirit or spite, hostility or
vindictiveness, but on the preservative and corrective principle, with a view to
safeguarding the purity of the legal profession. Hence, that power can be
summoned only in the service of the most compelling duty, which must be
performed, in light of incontrovertible evidence of grave misconduct, which
seriously taints the reputation and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and as a member of the Bar. It goes without saying moreover that it should
not be exercised or asserted when a lesser penalty or sanction would accomplish
the end desired.

In the context of the circumstances obtaining in this case, and hewing to

jurisprudential precedence, and considering furthermore that this is respondent
lawyer's first offense, this Court believes that a one-month suspension from the
practice of law, as recommended by the IBP, would suffice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent lawyer Atty. Berardo C.

Faundo, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month,
reckoned from receipt of a copy of this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be
more careful and more circumspect in all his actions, and to be mindful of the
kind of example he holds up, especially to impressionable young people, lest he
brings upon himself a direr fate the second time around.

A.C. No. 10911 (Bar Matter No. 850, The Lawyer's Oath) June 6, 2017

VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant

vs.

ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent

PONENTE: Associate Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and

Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction docketed as Civil Case
No. 1635-1-784 before the Municipal Trial Court in Santiago City, Isabela,
complainant was one of the plaintiffs while respondent was the defendants'
counsel therein. As the said case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 22, 2009, in which respondent indicated his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038
without indicating the date of issue thereof.  On appeal, respondent filed the
appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE Compliance Number. 

In another case docketed as Special Civil Action No. 3573, respondent, for
the same clients, filed a Petition for Injunction wherein he once again only
indicated his MCLE Compliance Number.  Respondent also filed a Motion for
Leave of Court dated July 13, 2009 in the said special civil action, indicating his
MCLE Compliance Number without the date of issue. 

Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that

respondent had no MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a
Certification dated September 30, 2009, stating that respondent had not yet
complied with his MCLE requirements for the First Compliance Period (April 15,
2001 to April 14, 2004) and Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 to April 14,
2007). 6

Hence, this complaint. Complainant argues that respondent's act of

deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties, and counsels
concerned into believing that he had complied with the MCLE requirements when
in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct.  The
complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent's disbarment to
this Court. 

After investigation, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD

rendered a report  dated December 17, 2013 with the following recommending
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ be DISBARRED and that his name be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys upon finality of the decision. On September 28, 2014, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-685, adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner

ISSUE:

Should respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations

in the complaint and evidence on record?

HELD:

YES. Respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. The Lawyer’s Oath in Rule
138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires commitment to obeying laws and
legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity to both court and client,
among others.

RATIO:

First.It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No.
850 . No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that
respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance period of the
MCLE.

Second. Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a

false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial courts.  In
indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law,
not only once but four times, as per records, the respondent acted in manifest
bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts,
litigants - his own clients · included - professional colleagues, and all others who
may have relied on such pleadings containing false information. 

Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false

information is a mockery of the courts, especially this Court, considering that it is
this Court that authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated.
The Lawyer's Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of Court requires
commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting
with fidelity to both court and client, among others

Considering respondent's act of using a false MCLE compliance number in

his pleadings  , his repeated failure to obey legal Orders  , and the fact that he had
already been sanctioned twice by this Court On separate cases  , We are
constrained to affirm the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XXI-2014-685,
recommending his disbarment to prevent him from further engaging in legal
practice.  It cannot be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice.  As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
maintain legal proficiency and a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing.  Also, of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws.  He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world,
to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and ignore the
very bonds of society, is unfaithful to his position and office and sets a
detrimental example to the society. 

WHEREFORE, respondent Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby DISBARRED from

the practice of law, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.