Freedom of Speech and Assembly: Prior Restraint Near v. Minnesota 238 US 697

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY: PRIOR RESTRAINT
Near v. Minnesota
238 US 697
HUGHES, C.J.
Digested by: Precious Joy Y. Santos
FACTS:
The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials. The Press claimed that
the chief of police had “illicit relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained an
injunction in order to abate the publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed
this course of action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court order abated the Press
and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press (Defendants), from publishing or circulating
such “defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.
ISSUE:
Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of the
liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed?
RULING:
No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be abused
by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not effect the requirement that the press has immunity
from previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such
abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege.
Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the
liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The
statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to
show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good
motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of
censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Freedman v. Maryland
380 US 51
BRENNAN, J.
FACTS:
The state of Maryland (Plaintiff) enacted a law that required approval of a State Board of
Censors prior to the public screening of any motion picture. Freedman (Defendant) sought to
oppose the law as unconstitutional and screened a film without first submitting it to the Board of
Censors. Defendant was convicted of violating the censorship statute. The court of appeals
affirmed. Defendant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE:
Whether a film censorship law that requires censor approval prior to public screening is
unconstitutional when it does not afford procedural protections to ensure a timely and impartial
review of censorship decisions
RULING:
Yes. Plaintiff’s conviction is reversed. A film censorship law that requires censor
approval prior to public screening is unconstitutional when it does not afford procedural
protections to ensure a timely and impartial review of censorship decisions.
New York Times Co. v. US
403 US 713
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
The United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post from
publishing contents of a confidential study about the Government’s decision making with regards
to Vietnam policy. The District Court in the New York Times case and the District Court and the
Court of Appeals in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met the requisite
burden justifying such a prior restraint.
ISSUE:
Whether the United States met the heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such a restraint on the New York Times and Washington Post to enjoin them
from publishing contents of a classified study?
RULING:
No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment affirming the
District Court. The stays entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The mandates shall
issue forthwith.
Alexander v. US
113 S. Ct. 2766 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441
REHNQUIST, C.J.
FACTS:
The Petitioner owned 13 adult bookstores throughout Minnesota. He was convicted on 17
obscenity counts and 3 RICO violations. The obscenity convictions were based on the sale of 4
magazines and 3 videotapes. He was sentence to 6 years in prison, fined $100,000 and ordered to
pay the cost of trial and incarceration for the obscenity counts. In addition, he was ordered to
forfeit his businesses and nearly $9 million in profits.
ISSUE:
Is the court order to shut down the adult bookstores an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejected the argument that
the sentence violated Petitioner’s First Amendment constitutional rights but remanded for
reconsideration under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
The items were seized as punishment not a prior restraint.
INC v. CA
GR 119673 July 26, 1996
BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious
group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs
allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its
“attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.
ISSUE:
Did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program?
RULING:
YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the
conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion.
There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
David v. Arroyo
489 SCRA 160
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the
local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and
newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list
Akbayan. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those
petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation,
alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the
dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
RULING:
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of
prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical
seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because
there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
Miriam College Foundation v. CA
G.R No. 127930, December 15, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper
were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of
complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains
obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the
defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints against
them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee
to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue.
Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and
imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said
Discipline Board over the defendants.
ISSUE:
Whether the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants
RULING:
Yes. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression, but it does not rule out disciplinary
actions of the school on the conduct of their students. the court ruled that the power of the school
to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases
filed against respondent students
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY: SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
People v. Perez
45 Phil. 599
MALCOM, J.
FACTS:
Isaac Perez while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters uttered
the following words "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head
for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.” Because of such utterances, he was
charged in the CFI of Sorsogon with violation of Art. 256 of the RPC which has something to do
with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. He was convicted. Hence,
this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether Perez’s remarks are protected by the constitutional protection on freedom of
speech
RULING:
No. It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to
the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Dennis v. US
341 US 494
VINSON, J.
FACTS:
The Petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party including Dennis (Petitioners), were
indicted and convicted for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Act. The Court of
Appeals held that the record supports the following broad conclusions: (i) that the Communist
Party is a highly disciplined organization that is rigidly controlled; (ii) that Communists tolerate
no dissension from the policy laid down by the guiding forces and (iii) that literature of the Party
and statements by its leaders, Petitioners here, advocate the general goal of the Party, which is to
achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Act is constitutional
RULING:
Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed. The Act is constitutional because it is
directed at advocacy rather than discussion. Further, the gravity of evil posed by the Communist
Party justifies such an invasion of free speech in order to avoid danger. Petitioners intended to
overthrow the United States’ Government as soon as the circumstances permitted. Their
conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the
Government by force and violence created a “clear and present danger” of such an attempt.
Therefore, the Act is constitutional.
Gonzales v. COMELEC
27 SCRA 835
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS:
The Revised Election Code under RA 4880 was amended to include two new sections
which prohibits the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period od election
campaign or partisan political activity. Petitioners alleges that RA 4880 is unconstitutional
because its enforcement would prejudice basic rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom
of assembly and the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law,
guaranteed under the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the freedom of expression may be limited
RULING:
Yes. Freedom of expression is not absolute. Two tests may supply an acceptable criterion
for permissible restriction. These are the: “clear and present danger” rule and the “dangerous
tendency” rule. The scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is
not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, the debasement of the electoral process.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr.
137 SCRA 628
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed”
on grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish
factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of
expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner,
through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the
station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the
case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer interested
parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
“RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as
this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of
Freedom of Expression
RULING:
Yes. The closure of the radio station is a violation of the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and expression. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy. The people continue to have the right to be informed on public
affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence on the people being the
most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special protection given
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. v. Judge Capulong
160 SCRA 865
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that
the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech
RULING:
Yes. Senator Enrile cannot object to his inclusion in the movie on the EDSA Revolution
by invoking his right to privacy. "The right of privacy or "he right to be let alone" is not an
absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitutes matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy
cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The right
of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen." As
distinguished from Lagunzad v. Gonzales, which involved a film biography necessarily
including at least his immediate family, the subject matter of the move in this case is one of
public concern and does not relate to the individual or public life of Senator Enrile.
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
527 SCRA 446
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice Nazario of
deciding the case through "considerations other than the pure merits of the case." He averred that
"we will never understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what
forces and influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner
as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a venerable
institution of justice." He then ended by mocking her when he said "sleep well if you still can"
and that her "earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where only the
merits of Your Honor’s life will be relevant and material and where technicalities can shield no
one from his or her wrongdoings."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke his rights to free speech and privacy of
communication
RULING:
No. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already
stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of
the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to
impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence
therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
United States v. O’Brien
391 US 367
US Supreme Court
FACTS:
The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that
made it an offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate” a Selective Service
registration certification. Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on the front steps of the
local courthouse. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law
abridging the freedom of speech.
ISSUE:
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was intended to
“suppress freedom of speech?
RULING:
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be accepted that there is an
endless and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes “speech” whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends to express an idea. However, even if the alleged communicative element
of Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is
constitutionally protected activity. First, a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or
important governmental interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
constitutional freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY: SPEECH AND ELECTORAL PROCESS
Sanidad v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
MARTIN, J.
FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989,
which paved for a call of a plebiscite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from
December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990. The petitioner contends the act is unconstitutional as it
it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press, and it
constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press because of its
penal provisions in case of violation
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19 of resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional
freedom of expression and of the press
RULING:
YES. What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to
supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this
provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist,
commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period if he is a candidate.
National Press Club v. COMELEC
207 SCRA 1
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the use
of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except COMELEC
Petitioners who were representatives of mass media assails its constitutionality on the ground
that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for suppression only publications of a
particular content and it abridges freedom of speech of candidates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid
RULING:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by
Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods. The limiting impact of Section 11 (b)
upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or
unreasonable.
Adiong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers
on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar
as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate,
due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to
the authorized posting areas that it fixes
RULING:
No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile “places whether public
or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution. The unusual circumstances of this year's national
and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation of the freedom to speak and the right to
know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of information on platforms and programs
which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the unfettered interchange of ideas
to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra) The big number of
candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where almost all
voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public
does not know who are aspiring to be elected to public office. There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.
Osmeña v. COMELEC
288 SCRA 447
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to
the Commission on Elections. The law actually fails to provide the equal opportunity for every
candidate. Poor candidates lost their only affordable medium (mass media), while their richer
and more affluent rivals have other means outside the mass media to reach out to the voters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11B of RA 6646 is valid
RULING:
YES. The Court upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. The provision is content
neutral and regulatory. The infringement of the freedom of speech is to merely incidental to
further such interest, and the interest that the state wants to protect be greater than the
infringement of speech or expression. The freedom of speech is not totally suppressed but only
regulated. The argument regarding the right to information is found in the dissent of Justice
Panganiban. He believes that the media is the most effective mode of the candidates to educate
their voters. The people must be accorded every access to information without much effort and
expense on their part.
ABS CBN v. COMELEC
323 SCRA 811
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections
because exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition made by the COMELEC is valid
RULING:
No. Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of
speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot be
justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers.
SWS v. COMELEC
GR 147571, May 5, 2001
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.”
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
G.R No. 205728, January 21, 2015
LEONEN, J.
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form
“Team Buhay.” Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and
rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may
influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is
clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
GMA Network v. COMELEC
G.R No. 205357, September 2, 2014
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections. Section 9 (a) provides for an
“aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
RULING:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Rubin v. Coors Brewing
131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FACTS:
Because 5(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA or Act) prohibits beer
labels from displaying alcohol content, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) rejected respondent brewer's application for approval of proposed labels that disclosed
such content. Respondent filed suit for relief on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Act
violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. The Government argued that
the labeling ban was necessary to suppress the threat of "strength wars" among brewers, who,
without the regulation, would seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their
beer. The District Court invalidated the labeling ban, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Although the latter court found that the Government's interest in suppressing "strength wars" was
"substantial" under the test set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557 , the court held that the ban violates the First Amendment
because it fails to advance that interest in a direct and material way.
ISSUE:
Whether the law violates the freedom of commercial speech
RULING:
Yes. Section 5(e)(2) violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. n
scrutinizing a regulation of commercial speech that concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading, a court must consider whether the governmental interest asserted to support the
regulation is "substantial." If that is the case, the court must also determine whether the
regulation directly advances the asserted interest and is no more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest. Here, respondent seeks to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and no misleading
factual information concerning alcohol content.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 US 748
BLACKMUN, J.,
FACTS:
Appellees, as consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy and its individual members, appellants herein, challenging the validity under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional conduct
for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. A three-judge District
Court declared the statute void and enjoined appellants from enforcing it.
ISSUE:
Whether the restriction in amendment of Virginia statute is violative of freedom
commercial speech
RULING:
Yes. "Commercial speech" is not wholly outside the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the Virginia statute is therefore invalid. That the advertiser's
interest in a commercial advertisement is purely economic does not disqualify him from
protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both the individual consumer and
society in general may have strong interests in the free flow of commercial information. The ban
on advertising prescription drug prices cannot be justified on the basis of the State's interest in
maintaining the professionalism of its licensed pharmacists; the State is free to require whatever
professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists, and may subsidize them or protect them from
competition in other ways, but it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the lawful
terms that competing pharmacists are offering. Whatever may be the bounds of time, place, and
manner restrictions on commercial speech, they are plainly exceeded by the Virginia statute,
which singles out speech of a particular content and seeks to prevent its dissemination
completely. No claim is made that the prohibited prescription drug advertisements are false,
misleading, or propose illegal transactions, and a State may not suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect
upon its disseminators and its recipients.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Duque
G.R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code
was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l
Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.
ISSUE:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is constitutional
RULING:
No. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations
under Article 21 come into force. Legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without
the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Freedom of Speech and Assembly: Prior Restraint Near v. Minnesota 238 US 697

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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY: PRIOR RESTRAINT

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