BANCO CENTRAL DE RESERVA DEL PERÚ

The causes and consequences of informality in

Peru

Norman Loayza*
* The World Bank

DT. N° 2007-018
Serie de Documentos de Trabajo
Working Paper series
Noviembre 2007

Los puntos de vista expresados en este documento de trabajo corresponden a los del autor y no reflejan
necesariamente la posición del Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect necessarily the position of the
Central Reserve Bank of Peru.
 THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMALITY IN PERU

Norman Loayza *
The World Bank

November 2007

Abstract: Adopting a legal definition of informality, this article studies the causes of
informality in general and with a particular application to Peru. It starts with a
discussion on the definition and measures of informality, as well as on the reasons why
widespread informality should be of great concern. Then, the article analyzes
informality’s main determinants, arguing that informality is not single-caused but results
from the combination of poor public services, a burdensome regulatory regime, and weak
monitoring and enforcement capacity by the state. This combination is especially
explosive when the country suffers from low educational achievement and features
demographic pressures and primary production structures. Finally, using cross-country
regression analysis, the article evaluates the empirical relevance of each determinant of
informality. It then applies the estimated relationships to the case of Peru in order to
assess the country-specific relevance of each proposed mechanism.

JEL classification: K20, K30, H11, O40, O17.

Keywords: Regulation, government performance, economic growth, informal economy.

*
Naotaka Sugawara provided excellent research assistance. I have benefited from discussions with Marco
Camacho, Claudia Canales, Mauricio Carrizosa, Juan Chacaltana, Agnes Franco, Vicente Fretes-Cibils,
Javier Illescas, Miguel Jaramillo, Teresa Lamas, Julio Luque, Miguel Morales, Ana María Oviedo, Rossana
Polastri, Renán Quispe, Jamele Rigolini, Jaime Saavedra, Pablo Secada, Luis Servén, Magaly Silva, José
Valderrama, Moisés Ventocilla, and Gustavo Yamada.

1
Definition
The informal sector is the collection of firms, workers, and activities that operate
outside the legal and regulatory frameworks. Therefore, participating in the informal
sector entails escaping the burden of taxation and regulation but, at the same time, not
enjoying the protection and services that the state can provide. This definition was
introduced by De Soto (1989), the classic study of informality. It has gained remarkable
popularity due to its conceptual strength, which allows it to focus on the root causes of
informality rather than merely its symptoms. 1

Measures
Although the definition of informality can be simple and precise, its measurement
is not. Given that it is identified with working outside the legal and regulatory
frameworks, informality is best described as a latent, unobserved variable. That is, a
variable for which an accurate and complete measurement is not feasible but for which an
approximation is possible through indicators reflecting its various aspects. Here we
consider four of these indicators, for which data are available for Peru and a relatively
large collection of countries. Two of them refer to overall informal activity in the
country, and the other two relate in particular to informal employment. Each indicator on
its own has conceptual and statistical shortcomings as a proxy of informality; taken
together, however, they may provide a robust approximation to the subject.
The indicators related to overall informal activity are the Schneider index of the
shadow economy and the Heritage Foundation index of informal markets. Details on
definitions, sources, and samples for these and other variables used in this article are
provided in the Appendix 1. The Schneider index combines the DYMIMIC (dynamic
multiple-indicator-multiple-cause) method, the physical input (electricity) method, and
the excess currency-demand approach for the estimation of the share of production that is
not declared to tax and regulatory authorities. The Heritage Foundation index is based on

1
For an excellent review of the causes and consequences of the informal sector, see Schneider and Enste
(2000). Drawing from a public-choice approach, Gerxhani (2004) provides an interesting discussion of the
differences of the informal sector in developed and developing countries. The World Bank Latin American
and Caribbean 2007 flagship report Informality: Exit and Exclusion, Perry et al. (2007), is the most
comprehensive and in-depth study on informality in the region.

2
 subjective perceptions of general compliance to the law, with particular emphasis on the
role played by official corruption. The indicators that focus on the labor facet of
informality are the prevalence of self employment and the lack of pension coverage. The
former is given by the ratio of self to total employment, as reported by the International
Labor Organization. The latter is given by the fraction of the labor force that does not
contribute to a retirement pension scheme, as given in the World Development Indicators.
Appendix 2 presents some descriptive statistics on the four informality indicators. In
particular, it shows that, as expected, they are significantly positively correlated, with
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.60 to 0.85 –high enough to represent the same
phenomenon but not too high to make them mutually redundant.

Figure 1. Size of Informality, Various Measures

A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP) B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
60

4
3
40

2
20

1
0

PER CHL MEX COL USA PER CHL MEX COL USA

C. Self Employment (% of total employment) D. No Pension (% of labor force)

80
40

60
30

40
20

20
10
0

PER CHL MEX COL USA PER CHL MEX COL USA

Note:
1. Four measures of informality – A. Schneider (2004); B. Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation (range
1-5: higher, more informality); C. ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and D. Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)

3
 Using data on these four indicators, we can assess the prevalence of informality in
Peru and compare it to that in other countries. Figure 1 presents data on the four
informality indicators for Peru, for Colombia and Mexico (two countries with similar
average income levels), for Chile (the Latin American country with the highest sustained
growth rate), and for the USA (the developed country to which Peru and the whole region
are most closely related). All in all, the degree of informality in Peru is alarmingly high,
much worse than in Chile and the USA according to all indicators and worse than in
Mexico and Colombia according to the share of informal production (Schneider) and self
employment. Taking the indicators at face value, in Peru 60% of production is done
informally, 40% of the labor force work is self-employed in informal micro-enterprises,
and even counting those that work for larger firms only 20% of the labor force contribute
to a formal pension plan.

Why should we worry about informality?

Informality is a distorted response of an excessively regulated economy to the
shocks it faces and its potential for growth. It is a distorted, second-best response
because it implies misallocation of resources and entails losing, at least partially, the
advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal credit
institutions, and participation in international markets. Trying to escape the control of the
state induces many informal firms to remain sub-optimally small, use irregular
procurement and distribution channels, and constantly divert resources to mask their
activities or bribe officials. Conversely, formal firms are induced to use more intensively
the resources that are less burdened by the regulatory regime; in particular for developing
countries, this means that formal firms are less labor intensive than they should be
according to the countries’ endowments. In addition, the informal sector generates a
negative externality that compounds its adverse effect on efficiency: informal activities
use and congest public infrastructure without contributing the tax revenue to replenish it.
Since public infrastructure complements private capital in the process of production, a
larger informal sector implies smaller productivity growth. 2

2
See Loayza (1996) for an endogenous-growth model highlighting the negative effect of informality
through the congestion of public services.

4
 Compared with a first-best response, the expansion of the informal sector often
represents distorted and insufficient economic growth. 3 This statement merits further
clarification: Informality is sub-optimal with respect to the first-best scenario that occurs
in an economy without excessive regulations and adequate provision of public services.
Nevertheless, informality is indeed preferable to a fully formal but sclerotic economy that
is unable to circumvent its regulation-induced rigidities. This brings to bear an important
policy implication: the mechanism of formalization matters enormously for its
consequences on employment, efficiency, and growth. If formalization is purely based
on enforcement, it will likely lead to unemployment and low growth. If, on the other
hand, it is based on improvements in both the regulatory framework and the
quality/availability public services, it will bring about more efficient use of resources and
high growth.
From an empirical perspective, the ambiguous impact of formalization highlights
an important difficulty in assessing the impact of informality on economic growth: two
countries can have the same level of informality, but if this depends on different
underlying causes, the countries’ growth rates may also be markedly different. Countries
where informality is kept at bay by drastic enforcement will fare worse than countries
where informality is low because of light regulations and appropriate public services.
We now present a simple regression analysis of the effect of informality on
growth. As suggested above, this analysis must control for enforcement; and a
straightforward, albeit debatable, way to do so is by including a proxy for overall state’s
capacity as a control variable in the regression. For this purpose, we try two proxies: the
level of GDP per capita and the ratio of government expenditures to GDP. The former
has the advantage of also accounting for conditional convergence, and the latter has the
advantage of more closely reflecting the size of the state. 4 Table 1 presents the results of
the regressions having the average growth of per capita GDP over 1985-2004 as

3
This does not necessarily mean that informal firms are not dynamic or lagging behind their formal
counterparts. In fact, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns in both sectors should be similar at the
margin. See Maloney 2004 for evidence on the dynamism of Latin American informal firms. The
arguments presented in the text apply to the comparison between an excessively regulated economy and
one that is not.
4
We also considered as proxy the ratio of tax revenues to GDP. Despite the fact that the number of
observations drops considerably, the results were the same on the negative effect of informality.

5
dependent variable, initial (1985) GDP per capita as control variable, and, in turn, the
four informality indicators as explanatory variables.

Table 1. The Effect of Informality on Economic Growth

Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors

Dependent variable: Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004, country average

Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Initial GDP per capita -0.23 -0.54*** -0.77*** -0.90***

(1985, in logs) -1.45 -2.89 -3.00 -3.52
Initial Government Expenditure -0.03* -0.05*** -0.05 -0.05***
(% of GDP, 1985) -1.80 -2.62 -1.42 -2.52
Schneider Shadow Economy index -2.18*** -1.68***
(% of GDP, in logs) -3.87 -4.44
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index -1.15*** -0.68***
(ranging 1-5: higher, more informality) -5.07 -5.70
Self Employment -0.10*** -0.04**
(% of total employment) -3.43 -2.24
No Pension -0.05*** -0.02***
(% of labor force) -5.01 -3.87
Constant 10.41*** 9.16*** 11.02*** 11.36*** 7.54*** 4.38*** 3.74*** 3.27***
3.53 4.36 3.96 4.40 5.39 8.03 4.34 6.03

No. of observations 120 127 47 92 113 120 45 89

R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.12

Notes:
1. t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients.
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
3. Four types of informality measure used – [1] and [5] Schneider (2004); [2] and [6] Index of Economic Freedom by
The Heritage Foundation; [3] and [7] ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and [4] and [8] Share of labor
force not contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators).
4. All four informality indicators are in country averages while periods vary by indicator.
Source: Author’s estimation

We choose a period of 20 years for the computation of the average growth rate in
order to achieve a compromise between merely cyclical, short-run growth (which would
be unaffected by informality) and very long-run growth (which may actually cause
informality, rather than the other way around). The maintained hypothesis for
identification of the causal relationship between informality and growth is that the level
of informality is related to institutional and structural factors that change little over time
and influence but are not influenced by medium-term growth rates (in our case, covering
the 20-year period leading to 2004).

6
Figure 2. Informality and Economic Growth
Partial regression plots, controlling for initial GDP per capita (1985)
.1

.1
Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004

Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004

CHN CHN
.05

.05
BTN
VNM KOR
BWA
IRL TWN THA BWA VNM
THATWN KOR
INDSGPCHL MOZ
CHL MOZIRL MUSIND
IDN LAO MYSLKA SGP MYS BLZ
HKG
LSO UGA LKA LUX IDN
LAO
BGD PRT DOM TUN UGA HKG LSO MLT
NPLGHA ESP
CRI
PAK
MLI TUR JAM TUN PRTESP CYP BGD
CPV
DOM
NPL
MNG GBR EGY
TCD
KWT
ALB GHA GUY
CRI
PAK
MLI
EGY TUR
AUS NOR
WSM MAR
TON PHL
FJI GRC EST
NGA URY BHR TCD
SWZ FJI ALB
USA AUTSYRNLD
IRN
JPN FRA
SVK DEU
ETH
CAN FINHUN
BFA
SWE
DNK
BEL
ISR
BGR COL
ITA SLV
GTM BOL WSMMNG
ETH AUSNLD
GBR MAR
NOR ESTHUN
AUT BEL
JAM
KWT
NGA
SLV TTO
PHL
URY GRC
0

NZL KIR
OMN PNG ECUSEN LVA PAN FIN
SWE BFA
ISLDEU USABGR
FRA JPNCOL
ITAISR IRN

0
MRT NAM
KEN
MWI ARGMEXHND
BEN BRA PER CAN
PNG SEN
NZL DNK
OMN GTM SVK
BOL
ECU MEXSYR
PANLVA
CHE PRY
SLB AGO
ROM MWI NAM BENMRT KEN HNDPER BRA
GMB ARG SUR
JOR SAU RWA
TGO
NERMHL
VUT ZAFDZA
ZMB NIC
VEN CHE DZA ZAF ROM PRY
MDG ZMB JORNER RWA
SAU
TGO
NIC
BDI SLECAF CIV MDG VEN
CMR ZWE CAF GNB
SLE
CIV GAB
COG ZWE CMR
ARE
HTI COG
ARE HTI
MDA
MDA
-.05

-.05
GEO
ZAR TJK GEO
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -2 -1 0 1 2
Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP, in logs) [1] Heritage Foundation Informal Market index [2]

KOR CHN
.03

.06
TWN IRL
Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004

Per capita GDP Growth, 1985-2004

VNM THA
SGP
.02

.04
CHL LBY
KOR
VNM
IRL THA
MYS HKG MUS
MOZ IND
CHL SGP
MYS
.01

MLT .02 LKA IDN

SDN
CYP PRT UGA BGD
ESP PRTTUNESPGHANPL CRI DOM
TUR
TUN NOR GBR
EGY
EST HUN URYGRCALB
AUS
GBR NOR
PHLJAM PAK MAR
CRI NLD AUT
BEL
FIN
DEU NGA
USAIRN SLV
0

FRA
ITA JPN
ISR COL
USA TTO
AUT
EGYDEUNLD
AUS
JPN GRC
BGR LVA
NZLSVK
SWE
BFA DNK
PAN
ECUSEN
CANGTM
BOL
ISL JAM BRA ARG MEX
ISR
DNK CAN URY
PAK ITA HND
KENCHEBEN MRT PER
PHL
SLVNZL ROM DZA PRY
RWA JOR NIC VEN
COL
-.01

-.02

PANARG TGO NER MDGZMB

CHE MEX SLE GAB
ECU BOL
BRA BDI ZWE CIVCMR
COG
HND PER
-.02

-.04

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50

Self Employment (% of total employment) [3] No Pension (% of labor force) [4]

Note:
1. Four measures of informality – [1] Schneider (2004); [2] Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation
(range 1-5: higher, more informality); [3] ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and [4] Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)

The regression results indicate that an increase in informality leads to a decrease

in economic growth. All four informality indicators carry negative and highly significant
regression coefficients. Figure 2 shows the partial regression plots between growth and
each of the informality measures (that is, partial in the sense that the initial level of per
capita GDP is controlled for). They confirm that the negative connection between
informality and growth represents a general tendency and not the influence of isolated
observations. The harmful effect of informality on growth is not only robust and
significant, but its magnitude makes it also economically meaningful --An increase of

7
one standard deviation in any of the informality indicators leads to a decline of 1-2
percentage points in the rate of per capita GDP growth. 5

The Causes of Informality: conceptual discussion

Informality is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment, shaped both by
the modes of socio-economic organization inherent to economies in the transition to
modernity and by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through
regulation, monitoring, and the provision of public services. As such, informality is best
understood as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon.
Informality arises when the costs of belonging to the country’s legal and
regulatory framework exceed its benefits. Formality entails costs of entry --in the form
of lengthy, expensive, and complicated registration procedures-- and costs of permanence
--including payment of taxes, compliance with mandated labor benefits and
remunerations, and observance of environmental, health, and other regulations. The
benefits of formality potentially consist of police protection against crime and abuse,
recourse to the judicial system for conflict resolution and contract enforcement, access to
legal financial institutions for credit provision and risk diversification, and, more
generally, the possibility of expanding markets both domestically and internationally. At
least in principle, formality also voids the need to pay bribes and prevents penalties and
fees, to which informal firms are continuously subject to. Therefore, informality is more
prevalent when the regulatory framework is burdensome, the quality of government
services to formal firms is low, and the state’s monitoring and enforcement power is
weak.
These benefits and costs considerations are affected by the structural
characteristics of underdevelopment, dealing in particular with educational achievement,
production structure, and demographic trends. A higher level of education reduces
informality by increasing labor productivity and, therefore, making labor regulations less
binding and formal returns potentially larger. Likewise, a production structure tilted

5
To be precise, a one-standard-deviation increase of, in turn, the Schneider index, the Heritage Foundation
index, the share of self-employment, and the labor force lacking pension coverage leads to a decline of,
respectively, 1.0, 1.4, 1.0, and 1.8 percentage points of per capita GDP growth.

8
towards primary sectors like agriculture, rather than to the more complex processes of
industry, induces informality by making legal protection and contract enforcement less
relevant and valuable. Finally, a demographic composition with larger shares of youth or
rural populations is likely to increase informality by making monitoring more difficult
and expensive, by complicating the training and acquisition of abilities, and by making
more problematic the expansion of formal public services.
Often times in popular and even academic discussions, people do not follow this
comprehensive approach, emphasizing instead particular sources of informality. Thus,
some people focus on insufficient enforcement and related government weaknesses such
as corruption; others prefer to emphasize the burden of taxes and regulations; yet others
concentrate on explanations dealing with social and demographic characteristics.
As suggested above, all these possibilities make sense, and there is some evidence
to support them. Take, for instance, Figure 3. It presents scatter plots of each of the four
measures of informality versus proxies for the major proposed determinants of
informality. These are as follows. 6 An index on the prevalence of law and order --
obtained from The International Country Risk Guide-- to proxy for both the quality of
formal public services and government’s enforcement strength. An index of business
regulatory freedom --taken from Fraser Foundation’s Economic Freedom of the World
Report-- to represent the ease of restrictions imposed by the legal and regulatory
frameworks. The average years of secondary schooling of the adult population --taken
from Barro and Lee (2001)-- to represent educational and skill achievement of the
working force. And an index of socio-demographic factors --constructed from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators-- which includes the share of youth in the
population, the share of rural population, and the share of agriculture in GDP. 7

6
Again, details on definitions and sources of all variables are presented in Appendix 1.
7
This is constructed by first standardizing each component (to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
1) and then taking a simple arithmetic average. We use a composite index, rather than the components
separately, given the very high correlation among them.

9
Figure 3. Informality and Basic Determinants
A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP)
80

80
correlation: -0.69*** correlation: -0.67***

BOL BOL
PAN PAN
ZWE ZWE
PER PER
60

60
TZA TZA
HTI HTI
THA THA
GTM
HND URY GTM
HND URY
ZMB ZMB
SLVSEN
LKA NIC SEN NIC LKA SLV
PHL MLI UGA PHL UGA
MLI
COL GHA GHA COL
BRA MOZ MWI MOZ BRA
MWI
40

40
JAM PAK TUN PAK JAM TUN
BGD VENECU EGY BGD
VEN CMRDZAECUKEN
EGY
KEN
CMRDZA DOM
MEX BWA TUR MEX DOM BWA
TUR
MYS MYS
ZAF PRY POL KOR
PRY
POL ZAF
ARG
GRC CRI ITA
ARG KORGRC CRI
ITA
HUN
IND IND HUN
IDN ESP PRT
BEL IDN JOR PRT ESP
BEL
JOR CHL
KWT KWT CHL
20

20
SWE
NOR
FIN NOR SWE
HKG DEU DNK DEU IRLDNK HKG FIN
CHN FRA IRL
CAN CHN FRA CAN
AUS
SGP GBR
NLD
NZL NLD GBRAUS NZLSGP
JPN AUT JPN AUT
CHE
USA CHE
USA
0

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 7 8
Law and Order (index: higher, better) - ICRG Business Regulatory Freedom (index: higher, less regulated) - Fraser Institute
80

80
correlation: -0.68*** correlation: 0.70***

BOL BOL
PAN PAN
ZWE ZWE
PER PER
60

60
TZA TZA
HTI HTI
GTMHNDTHA URY URY
THA
GTM
HND
ZMB ZMB
SLV NIC
SEN LKA SLV NICLKA
SEN
MLI UGA PHL PHL MLIUGA
GHA COL MOZGHA
MOZ
MWI BRA BRA COL MWI
40

40
TUNPAK JAM TUN
JAM PAK
BGD ECU
VEN
EGY VEN ECU DZA EGY BGD
KEN
CMR BWA DZA CMR KEN
DOM
TUR MEX DOMBWA
TUR
MEX MYS
MYS
ZAFPRY ZAF PRY
CRI POL
HUN
ARG GRC
ITA
KOR KORARG
GRC
ITA HUN
POL CRI
IND IND
IDN PRT
JOR ESP
BEL BEL KWTESP PRT JOR IDN
CHL KWT CHL
20

20

DNKFIN HKG NOR SWE SWE

NOR FIN
DEU HKGDNK
DEU
CHN FRA IRL CAN CAN
FRA IRL CHN
SGP NLDAUS
GBR NZL SGP AUS
NLD
GBR NZL
JPN AUT JPN
AUT
CHEUSA CHEUSA
0

0 1 2 3 4 5 -2 -1 0 1 2
Average Years of Secondary Schooling - Barro and Lee (2001) Sociodemographic Factors

B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index (range 1-5: higher, more informality)
5

BGD PRY MLI correlation: -0.83*** HTI

BGD PRY
MLI correlation: -0.91***
HTI IDN
IDN CMR
CMR KEN
KEN
VEN PAK
MOZ NIC
BOL
IND
VEN BOL
MOZ
PAK NIC
IND
ZWE HNDECU GUY
PHL ZMB
UGATZA
4

HND
ZWE PHL ECU
GUY UGA
ZMB TZA GTM
MWICOL
4

COL GTM MWI ARG PER

EGYDOM
SEN CHN BRA
BRA DOM PER
SENARG PAN
PAN
EGY CHN MEX
POL TUR SLV
MEX SLV TUR
POL DZA GHA JAMJOR ZAF
THA
LKA
JAM GHA
ZAFDZA LKA THA
JOR GRC CRI
3

URY
GRC CRI KOR
BWA
TTOMYS TUN
3

URY HUN
TTO KOR TUN
MYS BWA ITA
HUN
ITA KWT
PRT ESP
2

KWT JPN
FRA
BEL
ESP PRT CHL
2

IRL
JPN
FRA DEU AUT USA HKG
BEL DNK
GBR
CHL
IRL NLDNORAUSSWE NZLSGPFIN
CHE
CAN ISL
1

HKG DEU USA AUT

GBR
DNK
CHESGP SWE
NZL
NOR
NLD
ISL
FIN
AUS
CAN
1

1 2 3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 7 8
Law and Order (index: higher, better) - ICRG Business Regulatory Freedom (index: higher, less regulated) - Fraser Institute
5

MLI BGD
HTI
PRY correlation: -0.81*** correlation: 0.83*** PRY BGD MLI
IDN HTI
CMR IDN
KEN CMR
KEN
MOZ BOL
NIC
IND VEN
PAK VEN BOL NICINDPAKMOZ
TZA UGA HNDZMB GUY ECU PHL
ZWE
4

ECU PHL HND ZMB GUY

ZWE UGA
TZA
4

MWI GTM COL

COL GTM MWI
PANPER
SENBRA DOM EGYARG
CHN
SLV POL MEX
ARGBRA PER DOM
CHN EGYSEN
TUR PAN
ZAF DZA JAM JOR LKA
THA
GHA MEX TURSLV
POL
CRI GRC JAMTHA
JOR ZAF DZA LKA GHA
3

URY GRC CRI

TUN TTO KOR
3

BWA MYS URY

HUN KOR TUN TTO
MYS BWA
ITA HUN
ITA
KWT
PRT ESP
2

FRAJPN KWT
ESP PRT
2

BEL
CHL JPN
FRA
IRL
HKGAUT USA DEU BEL
CHL
GBR DNK IRL
HKG DEUUSA
AUT
SGP NZL
NLDAUS FIN
ISL CANNOR
CHE SWE
1

GBR
DNK
SGPSWE
NLD
NOR
CHECANISL
AUS NZL
FIN
1

0 1 2 3 4 5 -2 -1 0 1 2
Average Years of Secondary Schooling - Barro and Lee (2001) Sociodemographic Factors

10
Figure 3. Informality and Basic Determinants (continued)
C. Self Employment (% of total employment) – ILO
50

50
correlation: -0.85*** correlation: -0.81***

PAK PAK
HND PER HND PER
40

40
BOL BOL
JAM
PHL PHL JAM
ECU ECU
COL SLV GRC
THA COL
GRC
THA SLV
BRA PAN BRA
PAN
30

30
MEX KOR EGY CHL MEX EGY
KOR CHL
URY URY
CRIARG ARG CRI
TUN PRT PRT TUN
ITA ITA
TTO TTO
20

20
MYS ESP IRL NZL MYS
ESP IRL NZL
ISL ISL
CAN CAN
CHE AUS AUS
CHE
SGP
JPN GBR JPN GBR SGP
HKG AUT
NLD AUT
NLD HKG
10

10
DEU DEU
USADNK DNK
USA
NOR NOR

2 3 4 5 6 4 5 6 7 8
Law and Order (index: higher, better) - ICRG Business Regulatory Freedom (index: higher, less regulated) - Fraser Institute
50

50
correlation: -0.74*** correlation: 0.82***

PAK PAK
HND PER PER HND
40

40
BOL BOL
JAMPHL JAM PHL
ECU ECU
SLV THA COL GRC GRC COL SLV THA
BRA PAN MEX BRA PAN
30

30
CHL
EGY URY KOR CHL KOR MEX
URY EGY
CRI ARG ARG
PRT
CRI
TUN PRT TUN
ITA ITA
TTO TTO
20

MYS ESP IRL

NZL 20 NZL
ESP IRL MYS
ISL ISL
CAN CAN
AUS CHE CHEAUS
SGP GBR JPN SGP
GBR JPN
NLD AUT
HKG HKG AUT
NLD
10

10

DEU DEU
DNK USA DNK USA
NOR NOR

1 2 3 4 5 -1 0 1 2
Average Years of Secondary Schooling - Barro and Lee (2001) Sociodemographic Factors

D. No Pension (% of labor force) – World Development Indicators

100

100

BGD MOZ TZA MOZ

BGD TZA
SEN
PAK UGA PAKSEN
IDN
UGA correlation: -0.80***
GHA IDN ZMB GHA
ZMB
IND
IND ZWE BOL
ZWE
CMR BOL NIC CMR NIC
CHN THA
KEN
KEN THA CHN HND PRY DOM COL
80

COL HND PRY

DOM GTM
PER SLV
80

GTM
VENPER
SLV VEN
PHL
PHL ECU
MEX LKA
MEX ECU
LKA DZA JOR
DZA JOR
60

TUR
ARG BRA
JAM
60

TUR
JAMBRA ARG MYS
MYS PAN
EGY CRI
PAN TUN
CRI
EGY
40

TUN CHL
40

CHL POL URY

POL KOR CAN SGP
URY HUN
20

KOR SGP CAN

HUN GRC
BEL IRL
20

ITAPRT ESPFRA AUT

FIN
GRC DEU DNK
GBR SWE
NLD NOR USA
AUS
BEL IRL JPN NZL
ITA
ESP PRT
FRA AUT CHE
DEU USA FIN
SWE
DNK
GBR
0

AUS
NLD
NOR
correlation: -0.75*** JPN NZL
CHE
0

1 2 3 4 5 6 3 4 5 6 7 8
Law and Order (index: higher, better) - ICRG Business Regulatory Freedom (index: higher, less regulated) - Fraser Institute
100

MOZ
TZA BGD
SEN
UGA
ZMB IDN
GHA
PAK correlation: -0.82*** correlation: 0.89***
IND
BOL
CMRNIC
ZWE
100

KEN THA CHN MOZ TZA

PRYCOL
GTMHNDDOM BGD
80

VEN PER
SLV SENPAK UGA
IDN IND ZMBGHA
PHL BOL NIC
ZWE
CMR
ECU MEX LKA CHN
DZA COLDOM THA KEN
JOR PRY
HND
80

PER SLV GTM

VEN
60

TUR
BRA ARG
JAM PHL
MYS MEX ECU DZA LKA
PAN JOR
CRI EGY
60

TUN TUR
ARGBRA JAM
40

CHL MYS
POL PAN CRI EGY
URY TUN
SGP KOR
40

HUN
CAN CHL
20

GRC URY POL

BEL IRL SGP CANKOR
PRT ESP ITAFRA AUT
GBR NLDAUSDNKFIN SWE
USA DEU
NOR
HUN
20

NZL
JPN GRC
CHE BEL IRL
0

ITA
ESP
FRA PRT
AUT FIN
SWE
DNK
DEU
GBRNLDUSA
AUS
NOR
JPN NZL
CHE
0

0 1 2 3 4 5 -2 -1 0 1 2
Average Years of Secondary Schooling - Barro and Lee (2001) Sociodemographic Factors

Notes: 1. Sociodemographic Factors: Simple average of share of youth (aged 10-24) population, share of rural population
and share of agriculture in GDP (all three variables are standardized) – World Development Indicators, ILO and UN.
2. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

11
 Remarkably, all 16 correlation coefficients (4 informality measures times 4
determinants) are highly statistically significant, with p-values below 1%, and of large
magnitude, ranging approximately between 0.7 and 0.9. All informality measures present
the same pattern of correlations: informality is negatively related to law and order,
regulatory freedom, and schooling achievement; and it is positively related to factors that
denote incipient socio-demographic transformation.
Therefore, all these explanations may hold some truth in them. What we need to
determine now is whether each of them has independent explanatory power with respect
to informality. Or, more specifically, we need to assess to what extent each of them is
relevant both in general for the cross-section of countries and in particular for a given
country. To this purpose we turn next.

The Causes of Informality: econometric analysis

In what follows, we use cross-country regression analysis to evaluate the general
significance of each explanation on the origins of informality. Then, we apply these
estimated relationships to the case of Peru in order to evaluate the country-specific
relevance of each proposed mechanism.
Each of the four informality measures presented earlier serves as the dependent
variable of its respective regression model. The set of explanatory variables is the same
for each informality measure and represents the major determinants of informality. They
are the same variables used in the simple correlation analysis, introduced above.
The regression results are presented in Table 2. They are remarkably robust
across informality measures. Moreover, all regression coefficients have the expected
sign and are highly significant. Informality decreases when law and order, business
regulatory freedom, or schooling achievement rise. Similarly, informality decreases
when the production structure shifts away from agriculture and demographic pressures
from youth and rural populations decline. The fact that each explanatory variable retains
its sign and significance after controlling for the rest indicates that no single determinant
is sufficient to explain informality. All of them should be taken into account for a
complete understanding of informality.

12
Table 2. Determinants of Informality
Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares with Robust Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Four types of informality measure, country average
Informality measures
Schneider Shadow Heritage Foundation Self
Economy index Informal Market Employment No Pension
(% of GDP, in logs) index (% of total employment) (% of labor force)
[1] [2] [3] [4]

Law and Order -0.1069*** -0.1530*** -2.3941*** -3.4748*

(index from ICRG, range 0-6: higher, better; country average) -3.23 -3.30 -3.52 -1.88

Business Regulatory Freedom -0.1020*** -0.4884*** -2.1587*** -5.8250**

(index from Economic Freedom of the World by The Fraser -2.72 -9.21 -2.62 -2.16
Institute, range 0-10: higher, less regulated; country average)

Average Years of Secondary Schooling -0.0858** -0.1761*** -1.7743** -5.1117***

(from Barro and Lee (2001); country average) -1.92 -3.87 -2.26 -2.96

Sociodemographic Factors 0.1459** 0.3127*** 3.3082** 19.1452***

(simple average of share of youth (aged 10-24) population, share of 2.27 4.38 2.44 6.69
rural population, and share of agriculture in GDP; country average)

Constant 4.5612*** 6.5817*** 51.3973*** 111.2550***

25.03 32.20 11.16 11.35

No. of observations 74 77 42 67
R-squared 0.74 0.93 0.85 0.89

Notes:
1. t-statistics are presented below the corresponding coefficients.
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
3. Four types of informality measure – [1] Schneider (2004); [2] Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage
Foundation (range 1-5: higher, more informality); [3] ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and [4] Share of
labor force not contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators).
4. Variables used to compute sociodemographic factors are all standardized. Sources are World Development Indicators,
ILO and UN.
5. Periods used to compute country averages vary by informality measure.
6. A dummy variable is also included in regression [1] for Indonesia, China, India or Paraguay and in regression [4] for
Greece. The dummy variable controls for anomalous cases.
Source: Author’s estimation

The four explanatory variables account jointly for a large share of the cross-
country variation in informality: the R-squared coefficients are 0.74 for the Schneider
shadow economy index, 0.93 for the Heritage Foundation informal market index, 0.85 for
the share of self employment, and 0.89 for the share of the labor force not contributing to
a pension program. Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of the actual vs. predicted informality
measures. The majority of countries have small residuals (i.e., the unpredicted portion of
informality), a fact which is consistent with the large R-squared coefficients obtained in
the regressions. Is this also the case of Peru?

13
 Figure 4. Predicted and Actual Levels of Informality
Actual
A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP, in logs) B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
4.5

5
PRY MLI BGD
HTI
IDN
PAN BOL CMR
PER TZAHTI
ZWE KEN
BOL
NIC VEN
IND PAK MOZ
URY THA ZMB GTM
4

HND
SLV
NICPHL SEN ECUGUY
ZMB
TZAUGA HNDZWE
PHL

4
LKA UGAGHA
MLI COL GTM
COL MWI
BRA MOZ MWI
TUN JAMPAK
ECU
EGYVENDZA BGD
KEN PER ARG
CHN
PAN
BRA
DOM
EGY SEN
BWA DOM CMR
3.5

TUR MEX SLV

TUR MEX
POL
PRY MYS ZAF JOR JAM
ZAFTHA
LKA DZA
GHA
KOR GRC ARG
POL
CRI
ITA CRI
INDHUN GRC

3
URY
BEL PRT IDN
ESP KOR
TUN TTO BWA
MYS
KWT
CHL JOR
HUN
3

SWE
NOR
FIN
DNK
HKG ITA
DEU
CAN IRL
CHNFRA KWT
AUS
SGP ESP PRT

2
NLD
NZL
2.5

GBR FRA
JPN
BEL
AUT JPN CHL
IRL
CHE HKG USAAUT
DEU
USA DNKGBR
FIN
SWE CAN
CHE
ISLSGP
NZL
NORAUS NLD
2

1
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 1 2 3 4 5

C. Self Employment (% of total employment) D. No Pension (% of labor force)

100
45

MOZ
TZA
BGD
SEN
PAK UGA
PAK IDN
ZMB GHA
PER HND BOL
IND
ZWECMR
40

BOL NIC
JAM CHNTHA KEN
PHL 80 COL
DOM PRY HND
GTM
PER
VEN
SLV
ECU
35

PHL
GRC SLV COL
THA MEX ECU LKA DZA
JOR
PANBRA
30

60

MEX TUR
CHL KOR URY EGY ARG BRA
JAM
ARG MYS
CRI PAN
CRI EGY
25

PRT TUN TUN

ITA
40

CHL
TTO
20

NZL IRL ESP MYS POL

URY
ISL SGP
CAN KOR
CAN HUN
15

20

CHE AUS GRC

SGP
GBR JPN BEL IRL
AUT ITA
FRAESP PRT
HKG AUT
NLD SWE FIN
DNK
DEU GBR
10

DEU USA
NOR AUSNLD
NZL JPN
USA
DNK CHE
NOR
0

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 0 20 40 60 80 100

Predicted
Notes:
1. Four measures of informality – A. Schneider (2004); B. Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation
(range 1-5: higher, more informality); C. ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and D. Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)
2. In each graph, a 45-degree line is drawn to show a distance between predicted and actual levels for each case.

Peru is in the minority of countries for which the residual is relatively large. (For
illustrative purposes, the Peru observation is highlighted in Figure 4). In fact, statistical
tests show that Peru’s unexplained informality is significantly different from zero. Figure
5 compares actual with predicted informality for the case of Peru. For all four measures,
predicted informality falls short of actual informality, with explained fractions of 85% for
the Schneider shadow economy index, 89% for the Heritage Foundation informal market
index, 75% for the share of self employment, and 72% for the share of the labor force not
contributing to a pension program. In summary, the cross-country regression model

14
 explains to an important degree the high level of informality in Peru, but it does not
account for it fully. To complete the story, an in-depth study that focuses on the
specificities of the Peruvian case is needed.

Figure 5. Difference between Predicted and Actual Levels of Informality

A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP, in logs) B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index

4
4.10 3.60
4

3.49 3.21

3
3

85% 89%

2
2

1
1
0

0
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted

C. Self Employment (% of total employment) D. No Pension (% of labor force)

77.57
80

40.91
40

56.22
60

30.67
30

75% 72%
40
20

20
10
0

Actual Predicted Actual Predicted

Note: Four measures of informality – A. Schneider (2004); B. Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation
(range 1-5: higher, more informality); C. ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and D. Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)

Focusing now on the portion of informality explained by the cross-country

regression model, we can evaluate the importance of each explanatory variable for the
case of Peru. In particular, we can assess how each of them contributes to the difference
in informality between Peru and comparator countries, for which we choose Chile (the
highest growing country in the region) and the USA (Peru’s main trading partner). The
contribution of each explanatory variable is obtained by multiplying the corresponding
regression coefficient (from Table 2) times the difference in the value of this explanatory
variable between Peru and the comparator country. (Naturally, the sum of the

15
 contributions equals the total difference in predicted informality between the two
countries). The importance of a particular explanatory variable would, therefore, depend
on the size of its effect on informality in the cross-section of countries and how far apart
the two countries are with respect to the explanatory variable in question.

Figure 6. Explanation of Differences in Informality, Peru and Chile

Peru and Chile
A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP, in logs) B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
60

80
Regulatory Freedom
Law and Order
Regulatory Freedom

60
40

40
Socio-demographics*
20

Law and Order

20

Socio-demographics*
0

Education
Education
-20

-20

C. Self Employment (% of total employment) D. No Pension (% of labor force)

Regulatory Freedom Socio-demographics*

60

40

Law and Order

Regulatory Freedom
30
40

Law and Order

Socio-demographics*
20
20

10
0

Education
-10
-20

Education

Notes:
1. Four measures of informality – A. Schneider (2004); B. Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation
(range 1-5: higher, more informality); C. ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and D. Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)
2. *Sociodemographics: Youth population, rural population and agricultural production are considered.

16
 Figure 6 presents the decomposition of the difference of (predicted) informality
between Peru and Chile. Law and order, regulatory freedom, and socio-demographic
conditions are more advanced in Chile and, thus, contribute positively to explain the
higher level of informality in Peru. Education, at least as measured by years of secondary
schooling, is better in Peru; therefore, by itself the difference in education would predict
lower informality in Peru. Except for the informality measure based on the lack of
pension coverage, the role of education and socio-demographic factors is small in
explaining the informality differences between Peru and Chile. We can combine law and
order and regulatory freedom in a group called “institutional factors” and then combine
education and socio-demographics in another group called “structural factors.” Then, it
is clear that the higher level of informality in Peru is mostly due to Chile’s higher
progress in institutional factors.
Figure 7 presents the decomposition of the difference of (predicted) informality
between Peru and the USA. The first thing to notice is that these differences are
substantially larger than those between Peru and Chile. The second point to realize is that
the relative importance of institutional and structural factors is different in the Peru-USA
comparison than in the Peru-Chile case. Although for the majority of informality
measures institutional factors still play the larger role, structural factors become
quantitatively relevant in the Peru-USA comparison. 8

8
The exception is the lack of pension coverage. It seems that lack of pension coverage differs from the
other informality measures in the much larger role that structural factors play in explaining its cross-
country differences. This was already glimpsed in the Peru-Chile case and is quite evident in the Peru-
USA comparison.

17
Figure 7. Explanation of Differences in Informality, Peru and USA
Peru and USA
A. Schneider Shadow Economy index (% of GDP, in logs) B. Heritage Foundation Informal Market index

Law and Order Regulatory Freedom

50
30

Regulatory Freedom
Education

40
20

30
Socio-demographics*

Education

20
Law and Order
10

Socio-demographics*

10
0

C. Self Employment (% of total employment) D. No Pension (% of labor force)

40

40

Law and Order Socio-demographics*

30

30

Regulatory Freedom Regulatory Freedom Education

Education
Socio-demographics*
20

20

Law and Order

10

10
0

Notes:
1. Four measures of informality – A. Schneider (2004); B. Index of Economic Freedom by The Heritage Foundation (range
1-5: higher, more informality); C. ILO, collected by Loayza and Rigolini (2006); and D. Share of labor force not
contributing to a pension scheme (World Development Indicators)
2. *Sociodemographics: Youth population, rural population and agricultural production are considered.

Conclusion
Informality is alarmingly widespread in Peru. In fact, available measures indicate
that the level of informality in the country is among the highest in the world. This is

18
worrisome because it denotes sharp misallocation of resources (labor in particular) and
grossly inefficient utilization of government services, which can jeopardize the country’s
growth prospects. Cross-country evidence suggests that informality in Peru is the
outcome of a combination of poor public services and a burdensome regulatory
framework for formal firms. This combination is particularly dangerous when, as in the
Peruvian case, education and skills are deficient, modes of production are still primary,
and demographic pressures are strong. Although cross-country evidence explains most of
the high informality in Peru, it is not sufficient to fully account for it. Country-specific
evidence is essential to fill in the gap.

19
References

[1] Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee, “International data on educational attainment:
updates and implications,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 541-63 (2001).
[2] De Soto, Hernando, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World,
HarperCollins (1989).
[3] Gerxhani, Klarita, “The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed
Countries: A Literature Survey,” Public Choice, 120, 267-300 (2004).
[4] Gwartney, James and Robert Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 2006
Annual Report, The Fraser Institute (2006). www.freetheworld.com.
[5] International Labour Organization (ILO), Bureau of Statistics, LABORSTA Internet.
laborsta.ilo.org.
[6] Loayza, Norman, “The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and
Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 45, 129-62 (1996).
[7] Loayza, Norman and Jamele Rigolini, “Informality Trends and Cycles,” World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4078 (2006).
[8] Maloney, William, “Informality Revisited,” World Development, 32(7), 1159-78
(2004).
[9] Miles, Marc, Edwin Feulner and Mary O’Grady, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom,
The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal (2005).
[10] Perry, Guillermo, William Maloney, Omar Arias, Pablo Fajnzylber, Andrew Mason
and Jaime Saavedra-Chanduvi, Informality: Exit and Exclusion, The World Bank
(2007).
[11] The PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). www.icrgonline.com.
[12] Schneider, Friedrich, “The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over
the World: First Results over the Period 1999 to 2003,” IZA DP No. 1431 (2004).
[13] Schneider, Friedrich and Dominik Enste, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and
Consequences,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 77-114 (2000).
[14] United Nations (UN), Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2004
Revision, UN (2005)
[15] The World Bank, World Development Indicators, The World Bank, various years.

20
Appendix 1. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Schneider Shadow Estimated shadow economy as the percentage of official GDP. Average of 2001- Schneider (2004).
Economy index 2002 by country.

Heritage Foundation An index ranging 1 to 5 with higher values indicating more informal market Miles, Feulner and O'Grady
Informal Market index activity. The scores and criteria are: (i) Very Low: Country has a free-market (2005).
economy with informal market in such things as drugs and weapons (score is 1);
(ii) Low: Country may have some informal market involvement in labor or
pirating of intellectual property (score is 2); (iii) Moderate: Country may have
some informal market activities in labor, agriculture, and transportation, and
moderate levels of intellectual property piracy (score is 3); (iv) High: Country
may have substantial levels of informal market activity in such areas as labor,
pirated intellectual property, and smuggled consumer goods, and in such services
as transportation, electricity, and telecommunications (score is 4); and (v) Very
High: Country's informal market is larger than its formal economy (score is 5).
Average of 2000-2005 by country.

Self Employment Self employed workers as the percentage of total employment. Country averages ILO, collected by Loayza
but periods to compute the averages vary by country. Only 47 countries that have and Rigolini (2006).
at least two consecutive pairs of observations are used. For more details, refer to
Loayza and Rigolini (2006).

No Pension Labor force not contributing to a pension scheme as the percentage of total labor World Development
force. Average of 1992-2004 by country. Indicators, various years.

Law and Order An index ranging 0 to 6 with higher values indicating better governance. Law and ICRG. Data retrieved from
Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising 0 to 3 points. www.icrgonline.com.
Assessment of Law focuses on the legal system, while Order is rated by popular
observance of the law. Average of 2000-2005 by country for Schneider Shadow
Economy index, Heritage Foundation Informal Market index and No Pension,
while periods to compute country averages are different by country for Self
Employment.

Business Regulatory An index ranging 0 to 10 with higher values indicating less regulated. It is Gwartney and Lawson
Freedom composed of following indicators: (i) Price controls: extent to which businesses (2006), The Fraser Institute.
are free to set their own prices; (ii) Burden of regulation / Administrative Data retrieved from
Conditions/Entry of New Business; (iii) Time with government bureaucracy: www.freetheworld.com.
senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing with government
bureaucracy; (iv) Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally
easy; and (v) Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with
import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments,
police protection, or loan applications are very rare. Average of 2000-2005 by
country for Schneider Shadow Economy index, Heritage Foundation Informal
Market index and No Pension, while periods to compute country averages are
different by country for Self Employment.

Average Years of Average years of secondary schooling in the population aged 15 and over. Barro and Lee (2001).
Secondary Schooling Average of 2000-2005 by country for Schneider Shadow Economy index,
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index and No Pension, while periods to
compute country averages are different by country for Self Employment.

Sociodemographic Simple average of following three variables: (i) Youth (aged 10-24) population as Author's calculations with
Factors the percentage of total population; (ii) Rural population as the percentage of total data from World
population; and (iii) Agriculture as the percentage of GDP. All three variables are Development Indicators, ILO
standardized before the average is taken. Average of 2000-2005 by country for and UN.
Schneider Shadow Economy index, Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
and No Pension, while periods to compute country averages are different by
country for Self Employment.

21
Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics
Data in country averages; periods vary by informality measure
(a) Univariate (regression sample)

Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum

Schneider Shadow Economy index
74 32.430 15.172 8.550 68.200
(% of GDP)
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
77 2.936 1.206 1.000 4.800
(range 1-5)
Self Employment (% of total employment) 42 23.730 10.494 7.206 42.482

No Pension (% of labor force) 67 51.178 33.394 1.450 98.000

(b) Univariate (full sample)

Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum

Schneider Shadow Economy index
145 34.838 13.214 8.550 68.200
(% of GDP)
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index
157 3.390 1.197 1.000 5.000
(range 1-5)
Self Employment (% of total employment) 47 23.518 10.504 7.206 42.482

No Pension (% of labor force) 112 56.073 32.602 1.450 98.700

(c) Bivariate Correlations between Informality Measures

(upper triangle for regression sample (in italics) and lower triangle for full sample)
Schneider Heritage Fndn. Self
Variable No Pension
Shadow Economy Informal Market Employment
Schneider Shadow Economy index 1.00 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.73***
(% of GDP) 145 | 74 74 40 67
Heritage Foundation Informal Market index 0.65*** 1.00 0.90*** 0.90***
(range 1-5) 132 157 | 77 42 67
0.76*** 0.85*** 1.00 0.85***
Self Employment (% of total employment)
43 47 47 | 42 39
0.60*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 1.00
No Pension (% of labor force)
106 108 41 112 | 67

Notes:
1. Sample sizes are presented below the corresponding coefficients.
2. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

22
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2007

Noviembre \ November

DT N° 2007-017
El mecanismo de transmisión de la política monetaria en un entorno de dolarización
financiera: El caso del Perú entre 1996 y 2006
Renzo Rossini y Marco Vega

Setiembre \ September

DT N° 2007-016
Efectos no lineales de la volatilidad sobre el crecimiento en economías emergentes
Nelson Ramírez-Rondán

DT N° 2007-015
Proyecciones desagregadas de inflación con modelos Sparse VAR robustos
Carlos Barrera

Agosto \ August

DT N° 2007-014
Aprendiendo sobre Reglas de Política Monetaria cuando el Canal del Costo Importa
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DT N° 2007-013
Determinantes del crecimiento económico: Una revisión de la literatura existente y
estimaciones para el período 1960-2000
Raymundo Chirinos

DT N° 2007-012
Independencia Legal y Efectiva del Banco Central de Reserva del Perú
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DT N° 2007-011
Regla Fiscal Estructural y el Ciclo del Producto
Carlos Montoro y Eduardo Moreno

DT N° 2007-010
Oil Shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy
Carlos Montoro
Mayo \ May

DT N° 2007-009
Estimación de la Frontera Eficiente para las AFP en el Perú y el Impacto de los Límites
de Inversión: 1995 - 2004
Javier Pereda

DT N° 2007-008
Efficiency of the Monetary Policy and Stability of Central Bank Preferences. Empirical
Evidence for Peru
Gabriel Rodríguez

DT N° 2007-007
Application of Three Alternative Approaches to Identify Business Cycles in Peru
Gabriel Rodríguez

Abril \ April

DT N° 2007-006
Monetary Policy in a Dual Currency Environment
Guillermo Felices, Vicente Tuesta

Marzo \ March

DT N° 2007-005
Monetary Policy, Regime Shift and Inflation Uncertainty in Peru (1949-2006)
Paul Castillo, Alberto Humala, Vicente Tuesta

DT N° 2007-004
Dollarization Persistence and Individual Heterogeneity
Paul Castillo y Diego Winkelried

DT N° 2007-003
Why Central Banks Smooth Interest Rates? A Political Economy Explanation
Carlos Montoro

Febrero \ February

DT N° 2007-002
Comercio y crecimiento: Una revisión de la hipótesis “Aprendizaje por las
Exportaciones”
Raymundo Chirinos Cabrejos

Enero \ January

DT N° 2007-001
Perú: Grado de inversión, un reto de corto plazo
Gladys Choy Chong
2006

Octubre \ October

DT N° 2006-010
Dolarización financiera, el enfoque de portafolio y expectativas:
Evidencia para América Latina (1995-2005)
Alan Sánchez

DT N° 2006-009
Pass–through del tipo de cambio y política monetaria:
Evidencia empírica de los países de la OECD
César Carrera, Mahir Binici

Agosto \ August

DT N° 2006-008
Efectos no lineales de choques de política monetaria y de tipo de cambio real en
economías parcialmente dolarizadas: un análisis empírico para el Perú
Saki Bigio, Jorge Salas

Junio \ June

DT N° 2006-007
Corrupción e Indicadores de Desarrollo: Una Revisión Empírica
Saki Bigio, Nelson Ramírez-Rondán

DT N° 2006-006
Tipo de Cambio Real de Equilibrio en el Perú: modelos BEER y construcción de
bandas de confianza
Jesús Ferreyra y Jorge Salas

DT N° 2006-005
Hechos Estilizados de la Economía Peruana
Paul Castillo, Carlos Montoro y Vicente Tuesta

DT N° 2006-004
El costo del crédito en el Perú, revisión de la evolución reciente
Gerencia de Estabilidad Financiera

DT N° 2006-003
Estimación de la tasa natural de interés para la economía peruana
Paul Castillo, Carlos Montoro y Vicente Tuesta

Mayo \ May

DT N° 2006-02
El Efecto Traspaso de la tasa de interés y la política monetaria en el Perú: 1995-2004
Alberto Humala

Marzo \ March

DT N° 2006-01
¿Cambia la Inflación Cuando los Países Adoptan Metas Explícitas de Inflación?
Marco Vega y Diego Winkelreid
2005

Diciembre \ December

DT N° 2005-008
El efecto traspaso de la tasa de interés y la política monetaria en el Perú 1995-2004
Erick Lahura

Noviembre \ November

DT N° 2005-007
Un Modelo de Proyección BVAR Para la Inflación Peruana
Gonzalo Llosa, Vicente Tuesta y Marco Vega

DT N° 2005-006
Proyecciones desagregadas de la variación del Índice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC),
del Índice de Precios al Por Mayor (IPM) y del Crecimiento del Producto Real (PBI)
Carlos R. Barrera Chaupis

Marzo \ March

DT N° 2005-005
Crisis de Inflación y Productividad Total de los Factores en Latinoamérica
Nelson Ramírez Rondán y Juan Carlos Aquino.

DT N° 2005-004
Usando información adicional en la estimación de la brecha producto en el Perú: una
aproximación multivariada de componentes no observados
Gonzalo Llosa y Shirley Miller.

DT N° 2005-003
Efectos del Salario Mínimo en el Mercado Laboral Peruano
Nikita R. Céspedes Reynaga

Enero \ January

DT N° 2005-002
Can Fluctuations in the Consumption-Wealth Ratio Help to Predict Exchange Rates?
Jorge Selaive y Vicente Tuesta

DT N° 2005-001
How does a Global disinflation drag inflation in small open economies?
Marco Vega y Diego Winkelreid