Political Law: 2019 Mock-Bar Examinations

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2019 MOCK-BAR EXAMINATIONS

POLITICAL LAW

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating
the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law
followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I).

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522. The


change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic
states like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for
the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose
islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

However, the constitutionality of R.A. No, 9522 was challenged in the SC


on the ground that, in effect, it diminished our national territory.

Will the challenge prosper? (10%)

ANSWER:

It will not. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS
III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United
Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the
world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine
lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by


UNCLOS III States parties to work-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 1


Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States-parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely: the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77). (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16,
2011, En Banc [Carpio])

II

The USS Guardian, an American naval vessel on its way to Indonesia from
its base in Okinawa, Japan ran aground in Tubbataha reef in the Sulu Sea causing
extensive damage to our corrals there. Several environmentalist groups and
individuals filed a petition in the Supreme Court for the issuance of the Writ of
Kalikasan and demand for compensation for damages caused to our corrals there,
naming the Commander of the US Pacific fleet as respondent. Will the petition
prosper? (5%)

ANSWER:

The petition will have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because


of the principle of sovereign equality of all states as well as the doctrine of
state immunity from suit. The suit, in effect, is a suit against the United
States since the USS Guardian, an American naval vessel, is considered an
extension of the territory of the US under customary international law.
Besides, the respondent is the Commander of the American Pacific Fleet.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaint filed against
public officials in the performance of their duties.

The demand for compensation for damages had been rendered moot
and academic in this case because the US government, as expressed by the
US embassy in the Philippines, already signified its intention to pay
damages, the only request, which is a reasonable one, is that a panel of
experts made up of scientists be constituted to assess the total damage
caused to our corrals because of the incident. (Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo,
et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, 735 SCRA 102, September
16, 2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 2


III

When does life begin? (2.5%)

ANSWER:

Life begins at fertilization, i.e., the moment the sperm cell meets the
egg cell, in which event a zygote (fertilized ovum) is produced. That
zygote has life already, and anything introduced to prevent it from being
implanted in the uterus (mother’s womb) is considered abortive, or
abortifacient and, therefore, prohibited.

The argument that life begins at implantation (the stage that the
zygote is implanted in the uterus), which is a later stage, is not backed up
by medical researches and medical science. (James M. Imbong, et al. v.
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc
[Mendoza])

IV

What principles animate the Philippines’ national population program?


(5%)

ANSWER:

The Philippine national population program has always been


grounded on two cornerstone principles: “principle of no-abortion” and
the “principle of non-coercion.” These principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection which expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc
[Mendoza])

What is the Power of Augmentation? Who may validly exercise such?


What are the requisites for such power to be validly exercised? (5%)

ANSWER:

Once the budget (GAA) has been enacted, no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriation (Section 25[5], Article VI, 1987
Constitution). The exception is known as the Power of Augmentation.
However, only the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions, may validly exercise such power
of augmentation.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 3


But, for the power to be validly exercised, the following are the
requisites:

First, there must be a law authorizing them;

Second, the funds to be used to augment must come from


savings in their respective departments (and savings may only be
realized upon the completion of the project, or at the end of the fiscal
year); and

Third, there shall be no cross-border transfer of funds


(following the doctrine of separation of powers).
(Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc
[Bersamin])

VI

When a House of Congress conducts inquiry in aid of legislation, and you


were summoned to appear before that body but you did not appear, or you
refused to cooperate, you may be cited in contempt and may even be sent to
prison. How long must you remain in prison? (5%)

ANSWER:

Until the inquiry is terminated, and the inquiry is terminated upon


the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report, or upon the last
adjournment of Congress. (Arvin R. Balag v. Senate of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018, En Banc [Gesmundo])

VII

During the first visit of then US President Barack Obama to the


Philippines in 2013, the Philippines entered into an Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the USA which, in effect, will allow the
US to preposition its troops and military equipment and facilities, on a rotational
basis, in Philippine military bases. The Senators then urged Malacañang to
forward the EDCA to the Senate for concurrence but the latter refused
contending that the EDCA is merely an executive agreement and, therefore, will
not require concurrence by the Senate.

a. Whose contention should be upheld? Explain. (5%)


ANSWER:

Malacanang’s contention should be upheld following the ruling in


Saguisag v. Ochoa. The EDCA merely seeks to implement the earlier
treaties the Philippines’ entered into with the US, i.e., the 1951 Mutual

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 4


Defense Treaty and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, both treaties were
duly concurred in the Senate, thus, it is a mere executive agreement.

Take note that under the EDCA, the US does not really want to
establish in the Philippines permanent military bases; what it merely want is
to have access to Philippine military bases where it may preposition its
troops and other military facilities, on a rotational basis, so that in case of a
crisis situation in the South China Sea, it can respond immediately. (Rene
A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

b. Is an executive agreement an equally binding international obligation?


(5%)

ANSWER:
b. In international law, there is no difference between a treaty and an
executive agreement as to their binding effect upon the states
concerned for as long as the functionaries have remained within
their powers. International law continues to make no distinction
between a treaty and an executive agreement: they are equally
binding international obligations. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No.
138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])

VIII

Were former President Estrada, former Chief Justice Corona, and former
Chief Justice Sereno impeached? Were all of them removed by impeachment?
(5%)

ANSWER:

Both former President Estrada and former Chief Justice Corona


were impeached, that is why there was an impeachment trial; with respect
to former Chief Justice Sereno, there was no impeachment trial. She was
removed through a quo warranto proceeding.

As to their removal, former Chief Justice Corona was found guilty in


his impeachment trial and thus removed. But with respect to former
President Estrada, he was not removed by impeachment as the
impeachment court that tried his impeachment case was rendered functus
oficio when the prosecutors walked out of that impeachment trial. The
Court later held that he resigned (Estrada v. Desierto). As to former Chief
Justice Sereno, she was removed through a quo warranto proceeding.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 5


IX

What provisions in the Bill of Rights are governed by the exclusionary rule
on evidence (so that any evidence obtained in violation of any such provision
will be inadmissible in any proceeding and for whatever purpose)? Enumerate
and briefly describe each. (5%)

ANSWER:

Section 2 -The right against unreasonable searches, seizures


and arrests.
Section 3 - The right to privacy of communication and
correspondence.
Section 12 - The custodial investigation rights.
Section 17 - The right against self-incrimination.

Briefly explain the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and the “doctrine of


overbreadth.” (5%)

ANSWER:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that the law should be


declared void for being vague as it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of ordinary intelligence will probably have to guess as to its meaning
and differ in its application. Such vague law is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: first, it law violates due process as it fails to
afford persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and second, it gives law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and, in effect,
it becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s muscle. However, for
this doctrine to be invoked, the act must be utterly vague on its face, i.e.,
that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by statutory
construction.

The doctrine of overbreadth meanwhile states that a governmental


purpose to regulate an activity subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly thereby invading
the area of constitutionally protected freedoms like freedom of expression,
freedom of religion and other fundamental rights.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 6


XI

What are “content-based” restrictions on free speech, as distinguished


from “content-neutral” regulations? Is the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) a
“content-based” restriction or “content-neutral?” Explain. (5%)

ANSWER:

Content-based restrictions are restrictions on the speech itself, or the


contents of the speech. They are censorial in character and, therefore,
constitute a prior restraint on freedom of expression. That being the case,
they come to the court with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.
To justify such restriction, it is not enough that the government is able to
point out some compelling interest, but that the measure is narrowly
drawn to preclude abuses, i.e., that the measure is not overbroad; it does
not suffer from the vice of vagueness; it is not unreasonable. In other
words, it is in content-based restrictions that the clear-and-present-test is
applied.

Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, are restrictions not


on the contents of the speech itself but rather, on the incidents of the
speech, i.e., the manner, the time and the place of the speech. That being
the case, to justify such, a deferential approach is required, i.e., not the
clear-and-present-danger test because, as explained in one case, applying
the clear-and-present danger test to content neutral regulations is just like
“using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when all that is required is just an
ordinary hammer.” (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31,
1998 [Mendoza])

The Public Assembly Act is held to be a content neutral regulation as


it does not totally prohibit the holding of rallies and public assemblies; it
merely regulates them. In fact, under said law, there are even instances
when one may hold a rally even without permit from the local authorities.
(BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc
[Azcuna])

XII

The producer and director of the popular local TV drama series “Ang
Probinsiyano” were castigated and threatened by PNP authorities as the show
tended to depict the PNP in a negative light. Subsequently, the director of the
TV show, upon instruction of the TV station management, had to edit certain
portions of the story plot to comply with the demand of PNP authorities. If you
are asked to question this act of PNP authorities, what constitutional issue/s will
you raise? Elaborate. (5%)

ANSWER:

What is involved in this case is a content-based restriction on


freedom of expression since the restriction is directed against the content
of the show itself which the PNP authorities wanted to be “edited” to
Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 7
depict the PNP not in a negative light. This is censorship, a prior restraint
on freedom of expression, and comes to the court with a heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality.

Since the PNP authorities failed to show that the drama series
presents a clear and present danger to public safety and public welfare
that will warrant its “edition” to satisfy their demand, their act cannot be
sanctioned and must be restrained.

XIII

The Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party filed a petition in the COMELEC for it to


participate in Party-List elections. The COMELEC disapproved its application
holding that it is disqualified since its members are “immoral,” citing verses from
the Bible and the Koran. Rule on this decision of the COMELEC, citing legal
reason. (5%)

ANSWER:

The act of the COMELEC is tainted with grave abuse of discretion


as it violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion (Section
5, Article III, 1987 Constitution), and therefore, should be nullified.

The COMELEC, as an agency of the government should not make


use of, or be guided by, religious standards in its decisions and actions.
Under the non-establishment clause, when it comes to religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options; neutrality alone is its
fixed and immovable stance; it should not establish any religion, and
neither should it support one particular religion as against another. (Ang
LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32, April
8, 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])

XIV

In connection with the May 2013 senatorial elections, the Diocese of


Bacolod posted huge tarpaulins in the premises of its Cathedral in Bacolod City
categorizing candidates for Senator into either belonging to “Team Buhay”
(those who opposed the enactment of the Reproductive Health [RH] Law), or
“Team Patay” (those who supported it). In essence, the tarpaulins urged the
Catholic faithful to vote only for candidates belonging to “Team Buhay” in the
election.

The COMELEC ordered the Diocese to remove those tarpaulins as they


are considered unlawful campaign propaganda materials prohibited under the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), otherwise those responsible for their posting
may be prosecuted for violation of election laws.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 8


The Diocese argued that those tarpaulins are part of its religious speech
and, therefore, protected by the Constitution pursuant to the Separation of Church
and State Doctrine.

a. Comment on the merit of the argument raised by the Diocese of


Bacolod. (2.5%)

ANSWER:

a. The argument does not persuade. It was not a religious speech;


it has nothing to do with the creed, doctrine or beliefs of the
church which can be considered “a purely ecclesiastical affair of
the church” that will prohibit the state from intruding into. It
was a political speech by a religious group that may be subject to
the police power of the state. (The Diocese of Bacolod,
Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v.
COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc
[Leonen])

b. Will you uphold the order of the COMELEC under the circumstances?
(2.5%)

ANSWER:

b. No. The power of the COMELEC is to regulate the use of


political campaign propaganda to insure equal opportunity
among candidates and political parties during the elections. The
tarpaulin cannot be considered a campaign propaganda material
which can be regulated by the COMELEC under the police
power; it was an opinion of a voter on an issue of national
significance which is beyond the power of the COMELEC to
regulate as it is protected by the Constitution under the freedom
of expression clause. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR
No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

XV

Why was former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile allowed to post bail despite
that he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense? (5%)

ANSWER:

In Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847,


August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin), the Court held:

“Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari,


the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of
bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 9
mindful of the Philippine’s responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights x x x.

“This national commitment to uphold the fundamental


human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person
has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

“In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his having been
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

“The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another


compelling justification for his admission to bail x x x.

“x x x

“Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of


the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of
the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to
be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying
him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

“Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not


unprecedented. X x x

“It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to


Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

“On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial
to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 10


bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the courts can
already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.” (Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
[3rd Div.], G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, En Banc [Bersamin])

XVI

X was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Later, he became an American


citizen. With the enactment of RA 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003), he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before an officer authorized
to administer an oath in the Philippines. In the May 13, 2013 elections, he filed
his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of his hometown. In compliance with the
requirement of RA 9225, he renounced

his American citizenship at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Later, it was established that he continued to travel to the US using his American
passport. His citizenship qualification was questioned in a petition filed in the
COMELEC. While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, there came the
election and he won and was proclaimed and assumed office as Mayor.

a. Considering the foregoing, was his proclamation and assumption of


office valid? (2.5%)

ANSWER:

a. Not valid. When after renouncing his American citizenship, it


was established that he travelled several times to the US using his
American passport, that was held to be an effective recantation
of his renunciation and, therefore, he reverted to his prior status
as a person having dual citizenship hence, he is disqualified
pursuant to Section 40 par. d of the Local Government Code
(R.A. No 7160) which states that those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. (Casan
Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April
16, 2013, En Banc (Sereno, CJ)

b. Assuming that his proclamation and assumption as Mayor was declared


invalid, who shall assume the position of mayor: the Vice-mayor or his
opponent that obtained the second highest number of votes? (2.5%)

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 11


ANSWER:

b. The opponent who obtained the second highest number of votes


should be proclaimed mayor. Since X was disqualified from
running for mayor in the first place, he having dual citizenship, it
is as if he was not a candidates at all and, therefore, the votes cast
for him should not have been counted. The opponent who
obtained the second highest number of votes actually was not a
second placer; he was, in fact, the first among the remaining
qualified candidates and, therefore, should be proclaimed and
assume the mayorship. (Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc (Sereno, CJ)

c. Is a foundling a natural-born citizen? Reason/s. (2.5%)

ANSWER:

c. Although the Constitution is silent as to the citizenship of a


foundling, there was neither a restrictive language that will
exclude them as such. On the contrary, in the records of the
deliberations of the drafters of the 1934 Constitution, it was
shown that there was an attempt to confer natural-born
citizenship to a foundling; the only reason that the proposal was
not carried out was that the framers considered the possibility
that there will be foundlings will be too few and too far between,
hence, no need for any such provision.

At any rate, even international law and our domestic laws


on adoption subscribe to the proposition that foundlings should
be accorded the status of being natural-born citizens. Otherwise,
it will be downright discriminatory to deny them such a status
because of the unfortunate circumstance not of their own
making. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc [Perez])

XVII

In the more recent case of Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals


(Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-
Bernabe), the Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of condonation although
the abandonment was given prospective application only.

a. What is this doctrine of condonation, and the reason behind this


doctrine? (2.5%)

ANSWER:

a. A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct


committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 12


the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768,
773 [1992])

The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put
him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full
knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct.
If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such
reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
(Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, et al., G.R. No.
139043, Sept. 10, 1999 [Quisumbing])

b. Briefly explain why this doctrine was abandoned. (2.5%)

ANSWER:

b. The Court observed that this doctrine was first applied in the 1959
case of Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija - which ruling
was based on an American case. Upon review of American cases
on the matter, the Court found that even in the US, this doctrine
was not uniformly recognized by American courts.

Besides, Pascual was decided under the 1935 Constitution


which Constitution does not give emphasis to the nature of public
office as a public trust - a novel feature of this 1987 Constitution.

Continuous observance of this doctrine will make a mockery


of the nature of public office as a public trust and the
corresponding accountability of public officers, hence, should be
abandoned.

Moreover, the reason behind the adoption of said doctrine as


expressed in Garcia v. Mojica appears to be based on faulty
reasoning for, indeed, the electorate cannot possibly condone what
it did not know, since it is common knowledge that a misconduct is
committed in secret. (Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals
(Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc
(Perlas-Bernabe)

XVIII

Congressman M was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for


violation of the Anti-Graft law and grave misconduct in connection with certain
governmental contracts he entered into with private entities. While the cases
were being investigated by the Ombudsman, he was placed under preventive
suspension for six months. Was the preventive suspension order validly issued?
Clarify. (5%)

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 13


ANSWER:

Not valid. In a criminal case like anti-graft, the Ombudsman has no


authority whatsoever to impose preventive suspension because that power
belongs to the court where the information is filed. In the administrative
case for grave misconduct, members of Congress are exempt from the
administrative jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 6770 (Section 21, R.A. 6770 - The Ombudsman Act of 1989).

XIX

For three consecutive terms, F was elected Mayor. During his 3 rd term, he
was placed under preventive suspension by the Ombudsman due to
administrative misconduct. Will he still be qualified to run again for Mayor for
the 4th term since his suspension has the effect of interrupting his service as
Mayor for the full term for which he was elected? Reason. (2.5%)

ANSWER:

Not anymore. To constitute an “interruption” of service under Section


8, Article X of the Constitute, it must involve loss of title to the office, not
mere inability to perform the functions appurtenant to an office. When F
was placed under preventive suspension, he still remains to be the mayor;
there was no loss of title. Hence, the vice-mayor will have to assume office
not as mayor, but merely, as acting mayor. (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009, En Banc [Brion])

XX

What is the International Criminal Court (ICC), and what offenses fall
under the jurisdiction of this Court? Distinguish this from the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). (2.5%)

ANSWER:

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which


“shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome Statute) Its jurisdiction
covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the
crime of aggression as defined in the Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute).

It is to be distinguished from the International Court of Justice (ICJ)


which was created pursuant to the United Nations (UN) Charter. In the ICJ
(as the principal judicial organ of the UN), only states may be parties
thereto. An individual may not bring a case before the ICJ. In the ICC,
individuals accused of having committed any of those offenses defined in the
Rome Statute may be charged, prosecuted and tried thereto.

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 14


XXI

What is International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? How is it distinguished


from International Human Rights Law? (5%)

ANSWER:
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of public
international law which governs armed conflicts to the end that the use of
violence is limited and that human suffering is mitigated or reduced by
regulating or limiting the means of military operations and by protecting
persons who do not or no longer participate in the hostilities. (Magallona,
Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 ed., p. 291)

Distinguished from human rights law, IHL applies only in times of


armed conflict, whether national or international; whereas human rights
law applies both in times of war or in times of peace.

IHL permits of no derogation; whereas there are certain human rights


treaties that allow governments to derogate on certain rights in times of
public emergency.

IHL protects civilians and persons who no longer participate in armed


conflict (like prisoners of war and persons hors de combat); whereas human
rights law protects the individual from arbitrary acts of governments at all
times.

Wish you well!

Mock-Bar Exams in Political Law 15

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