Reexamining the Record

CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970

Kristian C. Gustafson

Editors Note: Mr Gustafson CIA agents and officers involved

received the Studies in Intelli in those controversial opera

gence Walter L. Pforzhein?er tions. This study focuses on CIA

Award for this article in 2002. covert action during the six
The prize is given to the graduate weeks following Allendes victory
or undergraduate student who at the pofls in mid-September
submitted the best paper on an 1970. While the activities of the
intelligence-related subject dur CIA may not always be excused,
ing the preceding year they can at least be better

understood.
+ :

While the activities of

the CIA may not always
be excused, they can at
least be better
understood.
From 1970 to 1973, the United Genesis
States government was involved
in overt and covert actions
So sure were senior US officials
against the elected government that Salvador Allende and his
of Chile led by Marxist Salvador coalition would be defeated in the
Allende. Unfolding events dur he
September 1970 election, as
ing these politically tumultuous had been three times previously,
years included the death of Chil that, despite CIA warnings, they
ean Minister of Defense RenØ
Schneider in October 1970. Ulti
mately, Allende was overthrown 1 Executive Branch and Congressional
and replaced by Gen. Augusto reviews of intelligence activities were

Pinochet. The initial history of initiated in the mid-1970s in response

to several revelations, including public
this period, recorded in the 1970s
allegations of CIA wrongdoing in Chile.
and early 1980s, told of a US gov
The probes led to more precise delinea
ernment that abused its power tion of the Agencys powers by President
and betrayed its principles. Pub Ford in Executive Order 11905, which,
lic reaction was universally among other things, banned assassina

negative. This interpretation of tions and increased executive oversight

events has affected the conduct
and perception of American intel
ligence activities ever since.1
A generation has now passed
it is time to reexamine this
of the CIA through creation of the Intel
ligence Oversight Board. Moreover, the
CIA was subjected to an unprecedented
amount of public suspicion and distrust.
Taken together, the investigations
and marked the end of the independence
and relative freedom from scrutiny that

accepted version of events. Congress and the public had previously

allowed the CIA.
Recently, the US government
2 For this
study, these documents were
posted thousands of declassified
accessed at <www.foia.state.gov> be
Kristian C. Gustafson is a
documents to its on-line Chile
tween May and June 2002, using a list
Ph. D. candidate at Cambridge Collection.2 These newly avail all function through all tranches of ma
University, UK, where he is a able resources allow a more terial. Specific UItLs for CIA, State De
Commonwealth/Overseas Trust candidand realisticlook into partment, and NSC documents are

Scholar. the actions and thoughts of the listed in subsequent footnotes.

35
Chile

Colbynoted that
Nixon was furious
about Allendes
were caught off-guard when he game plan
won a plurality. Undeterred by
election]. make the economy scream

the voters preference, President 48 hours plan of action.5

Richard Nixon delivered a clear
and forceful Directive calling for
expanded CIA operations in
Helms, understanding the import
Chile. In the weeks between Soviet Union and the United of the Presidents statements,
Allendes election and his inaugu States that the White House had commented: If I ever carried a
ration planned for 3 November, to deal with the election of a
marshals baton in my knapsack
the CIA actively sought to foment Marxist-oriented government in out of the Oval Office, it was that
a coup in Chile.
Washington was Chile. On 15 September 1970,
day.6 The administration moved
unequivocal about its desire to President Nixon called Kiss
quickly to implement the Presi
keep Allende from power. inger, Director of Central dential Directive. Kissinger was
Intelligence (DCI) Richard to oversee the project, which was
American actions against the Helms, and Attorney General to be called Track II to differen
Allende government occurred in John Mitchell into the Oval tiate it from the ongoing
what Nixons National Security Office toprovide executive guid and related efforts to
diplomatic
ance for US policy toward Chile
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, called thwart communist influence in
the Autumn of Crises.~ The and Allende. William Colby Track I.
Chile, known as

Soviet Unionwas actively threat then Deputy Director, later

ening American national security Director, of the CIAnoted that

When Allendes candidacy was

in several different Nixon was furious and was con

arenas. announced in early 1970, the
Soviet missiles and technicians vinced that an Allende
State Department had developed
had been moved into Egypt. The presidency would assure the a policy to try to dampen Marx
rest of the Middle East was in spread of Cuban President Fidel ist electoral prospects. This
chaosIsraeli attacks against its Castros communist revolution to
approachTrack Iprimarily
Arab Chile and the rest of Latin Amer
neighbors were increasing involved efforts by the US
ica.4 He wanted to prevent
daily, and Syria had attacked its Ambassador and his diplomatic
Aflende from being inaugurated.
supposed ally, Jordan. At the staff to hinder Allende through
The message he delivered at the
beginning of September, a large the manipulation of Chilean con
Soviet flotilla had arrived in meeting reflected his anger. The
gressmen and senators within
hand-written minutes taken by
Cienfuegos, Cuba: There was the framework of the Chilean
DCI Helms are revealing:
suspicion that the Soviets had constitution. At the time, the
designs on this harbor as a new State Department made a con

submarine base in the Western One in 10 chance, perhaps, scious decision to exclude the
but save Chile:
Hemisphere. At a more global CIA from the planning and exe
Worth Spending
level, Washington was struggling cution of the policy, because it
Not concerned risks involved
to maintain momentum in the
No involvement of Embassy
negotiations for the first Strate
$10,000,000 available, more
gic Arms Limitation Treaty. US Congress, Senate, Alleged Assassi
if neceessary nation Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,
full-time jobbest men Interim Report of the Select Committee
It was in this framework of glo we have to Study Government Operations with
bal power plays between the Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th
Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington,
4 William Colby and Peter Forbnth, DC: US Government Printing Office, 20
HenryA. Kissinger, White House Years Honorable Men: Mv Life in the CIA November 1975), p. 227. Henceforward
(Boston. MA: LitUe & Brown, 1979). (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Alleged Plots.
particularly chapters XV and XVI. 1978). p. 303. 6
Alleged Plots, p. 228.

36
 Chile

Disagreements
between the CIA and
the State Department
believed that the CIAs warnings assassination was within the
would be a hallmark of
of impending electoral defeat for guidelines given to him by the
Chiles centrist
parties were American operations President, and I had made that
exaggerated. The CIA, for its in Chile. clear to my fellows. ~0

part, thought that the State

Department did not have a clear ,, With
White
marching orders from the
House, the CIA sent four
understanding of Chilean poli
tics and the nature of the false-flag officers to Chile,
Eastern Bloc threat posed by a starting on 27 September. They
Marxist state in the Americas. project.7 While the removal of were to get in touch with Chil
Such disagreements between the the other government agencies ean military personnel, a task
CIA and the State Department seems extreme, it was viewed as
considered too hot for locally
would be a hallmark of Ameri necessary to the secrecy of the
based CIA personnel.12 With the
can operations in Chile, and operation and was within the assistance of these false-flag
would continue until Allende was Presidents authority with regard officers, the CIA made 21 con
overthrown in 1973. to covert activities.8 The first tacts with officers in both the

Track II situation report, issued military and the Carabineros

As time went on, Track I on 17 September, confirmed that (the Chilean national police) from
the command structure for the 5 to 20 October 1970. When con
expanded to encompass a wide
range of political, diplomatic, Chile project had been estab tacted, Those Chileans who were

lished and that units would inclined to stage a coup were

psychological, and economic poli
cies, as well as covert operations operate under the cover of the given assurances of strong sup
designed to bring about the con deletion] 40 Committee approval port at the highest levels of the
ditions that would encourage of 14 September for political US government Accord
Chileans to stage a coup. The action and the probing for mili ing to available records, the
of Track tary possibilities to thwart wisdom and legality of this
parallel secret approach
II involved more direct efforts to Allende. action, questionable today, was
not disputed at the time.
prompt Chileans to stage an
immediate coup. Both paths The Presidential Directive had
aimed at the same policy objec made it clear that the CIA was to
The Chilean Military
tivethe removal of Allende do what it needed to do to pre
but they differed in their vent an Allende administration.
Finding Chilean officers in favor
approach, means, and timing. The precise parameters of such
On the day following the Oval
of a coup was not an easy task.
action are not yet in the public
The officers of the Chilean armed
Office meeting, William V Broe, domain. Helms later com
chief of the CIAs Western Hemi mented to a Senate committee
sphere Division, circulated the that he did not believe that Alleged Plots, p. 228.
Io

first internal memo related to the 11

Ibid., p. 238.
new Directive. It re-capped the 12
Cable, CIA HQs to Santiago Station,
Presidents orders, indicated that Memorandum for the Record, Genesis As you will be advised. 27 September

the Departments of State and of Project Fubelt, 16 September 1970. 1970. A false-flag officer or false-flag
Defense were to be excluded from
All CIA cables and memoranda used in ger is an officer who operates under a
this study were accessed at forged third-party passport. False-flag
the planning (removing the US
<www. foi a. state.govfvSearchP gers are used to increase the plausible
ambassador to Chile and his
CIA.asp>. Unless otherwise noted, all deniability of an operation, should itbe
defense attachØ from the loop), from the CIA.
documents cited are compromised.
and appointed the CIAs director Colby, p. 303. Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station,
operations, Thomas
of covert Memorandum, Deletion] Situation Highest Levels Here Continue, 7 Octo
Karamessines, to head the Report #1, 17 September 1970. ber 1970.

37
Chile

forces were largely drawn from
the middle class and,
as
were conservative and anti
Allende. Nonetheless,
institution, the military was
strongly constitutionalist, a
stand championed by Gen. RenØ
Schneider Chereau, who had
become the commander-in-chief
of the Chilean Armed Forces in
October 1969.14 Underscoring
the a-political nature of the insti
tution, the Chilean constitution
describes the Army as a non
deliberative body.5 In May
1970, during the election cam
paign, Schneider had told the
newspaper El Mercurio that the
Army would respect the
tional process and make no move
at intervention.6 Although this
Although
Gen. Schneiders
doctrine of non
intervene against the installa
intervention angered
such, tion of an Allende government.
many in the military,
as an that anger did not
necessarily equate to The Ambassadors
action against Perspective
Allende].
The US Ambassador, Edward
Korry, was aware of a long his
tory of mini-plotting in the
Chilean military and did not put
much stock in the chances for
effective action against Allende.
essarily equate to readiness to The outgoing Chilean president,
take action.7 Christian Democrat Eduardo
Frei, had tried the patience of
A sobering consideration was the many conservative army officers,
possibility that a coup attempt and plotting had been rife within
constitu could trigger mass protests, the military during his tenure.9
street violence, or even civil war, Mutinies and small revolts had
given Allendes strong base of become subject of concern,
a

Schneider Doctrine of non support. To thwart such violence made more pressing by the revolt
intervention angered many in the and secure a post-coup govern of the Tacna tank regiment
staunchly conservative military ment, incipient plotters assessed ostensibly over soldiers payin
because of Allendes socialist that the military would need to October 1969. During the Tac
platform, that anger did not nec- act as a whole to
rally behind the nazo rebellion, several generals
new leaders. Potential plotters had fled the country or had been
who were contacted by US opera removed from command after
~
Cable. Santiago Station to CIA HQ. tives reported that their being accused of coup plotting,
Effort to Contact and Influence Chil
commander-in-chief, Gen. among them Gen. Roberto Viaux,
ean Military Figures, 2 October 1970.
Schneider, will only agree to mil the alleged leader, who was
Biographic ,nformation on Schneider
can be found in Grandes Biogruph (as de itary intervention if forced to do forced into retirement.2
la Histona de Chile, Defensor del con
so.8 They concluded, therefore,
stitucionaljsmo de las Fuerzas Arm adas that Schneider had to be con After Allendes election, schem
RenØ Schneider Chereau: 1913-1970, vinced to join the pro- ing continued. A CIA report of
at: chttpi/icarito.tercera.clmiograph interventionist camp soon. If he 26 September 1970 noted that a
ias/1958-1999Thios/schneider.htm>.
Luis
persisted in his constitutionalist number of former Chilean army
Vitale, et. al., Para Recuperar
La Memorta Historica: Fret, Allende stance, he would have to be officers were attempting to infil
YP,nochet removed from his position, in trate leftist groups in the hopes
(Santiago, Chile Ediciones
ChileAmenca-CESOC, 1999), p. 181.
order to allow the military to of conducting terrorist acts that
The Spanish of the constitution reads:
La fuerza
publica es esencialmente
obediente. Ningun cuerpo armado ~
Vitale, p. 187. See also Paul E. Sig 19
Albert L. Michaels, Background to a
puede deliberer. mund, The Overthrow ofAllende and the Coup, paper presented at the State
16 Andrea
Ruiz-Esquide Figueroa, Las Politics of Chile 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh, University of New York, 18-19 October
Fuerzas Arm adas Durante Los Gobier PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977), 1974. (Buffalo, NY: State University of
nos de Edvardo Fret YSalvadorAllende p. 99. New York, 1975) p.9.
(Santiago, Ch,le: Centro de Estudios del 8
Memorandum, Chile Staton to CIA 20
Memorandum, Chile Station to CIA
Desarrollo, 1993~, p. 51 (note 1). HQ, Intelligence,~ 26 September 1970. HQ, Intelligence, 26 September 1970.

38
 Chile

US Amb. Korry
warned. . .
that to
promote a coup . . . was
team and the State
would compel an anti-communist country CIA
to court a failure as
crackdown by Frei and the Army. Department that to promote a

damaging as the Bay of

Others were working in prima coup with the climate and per

rily civilian rightist groups that Pigs. sonnel at hand was to court a

failure as massive and

damaging
had the same aim. The CIA
to American interests as the Bay
observed: President Frei taking
of Pigs? This warning was
no direct part in planning but
ignored in Washington. Korry
close supporters such as Perez
soon was demanding Washing
said to be in his ter of coup speculation, from the
Zujovic] acting ton consultations, noting that all
name.2 plans of many in Washington.
elements in the mission accept
Allendes presidency as
Within weeks of Allendes suc
Was everyone plotting against assured.25
cess polls, Korry sent a
at the
AJlende? Amb. Korry doubted it.
message to the Under Secretary
The Ambassador concurred that of State about coup plotting
Launching Track II
the Chilean military would need within the Chilean Army. He
to act as a whole if
military inter outlined one particular plan
The six weeks between Allendes
vention succeed;
were to unwittingly related by a young
Chilean officer to CIA election and his inaugnration
simultaneously, however, he a co-optee,
doubted that such coordinated and concluded by saying: was not long time to begin
a

with, and, given the need to

action was possible. He reported
ensure secrecy while attempting
less precise but equally
toWashington, a full month to infiltrate operatives and pro
before the beginning of Track H:
lurid information has been
mote a coup, it became incredibly
An
reaching us from many quar
attempt to rob Allende of his short. With almost no contacts at
ters and it usually proves to
triumph by, say, a General Viaux, be nothing more than wish the beginning of the
operation
who has a certain mystique and little knowledge of the key
ful thinking. This report
within the army, would, in all must be considered in the players, the CIA officers in the
likelihood, fail in a post-congres veinn. .1 would pre field considered Operation
same . .

sional decision period and be fer that we ceased to cheek out Fubelt, as Track II was officially
almost impossible post-inaugura all such reports and to be titled, to be a crash
endeavour.26
tion 22
By mentioning a totally surprised by whatever
specific name, Korry was trying might develop in the armed
to exorcise the influence of this forces. In the present circum 21
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
stances it is a waste activity
particular individual, at the cen Ambassador called in Defense AttachØ
for all concerned. Hence Jam and DCOS, 08 October 1970.
instructing CIA station] to 21
Cable, Track 1 Propaganda Place
21
Memorandum, CIA Intelligence Note desist from the normal efforts ments, 10 October 1970. Emphasis in
toFile, 23 September 1970. to learn of possible military original. At the time, Korrys assess
22
Memorandum, Korry to Crimmins, 11 ment was accurate. Even local CIA of
moves.23
August, 1970. State Department cables ficers considered the task of thwarting
accessed at: <http://www.foia.state.gov/ Allende to be a mission impossible. As

SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp> using a Ignorant of the Track II initia one CIA officer later said, the idea of a

list all function for all three tranches tive, Korry warned both the in- military overthrow had not occurred to
ofState Chile Collection. All ca us as a feasible solution. See Seymour
bles/memoranda accessed May/June Hersh, The Price of Power (New York,
2002. Subsequent State Department 23
Memorandum, Ambassador Korry to NY: Summit Books, 1983), p. 277.
documents are marked State in paren Under-Secretary Johnson, 6 October 25
Cable, CIA] Situation Report #1, 17
theses following the citation. 1970. (State) September 1970.

39
 Chile

CIA officers told]

Headquarters that
With the Ambassadors
Gen. Viaux was
influence Santiago station was advised to
sidelined by the Presidential dangerously unstable use whatever channel available
Directive, the CIAs William Broe and likely to lead a to persuade Viaux to hold off his
was now directing the planning premature action that action until a more opportune
against Allende. Pressure for would do. more . .
moment.. .
.
Since a mini-coup
success came from Kissinger and
harm than good. (which is what Viaux is most
the President. With time short,
likely to produce) would be coun
CIA officers in Santiago went
terproductive to our objective
against their better judgment name deleted] has been advised
and opened communications with to do everything possible to pre
retired Gen. Viaux, as well as vent Viaux move, at least for
a
two serving officers, Gen. Camilo the time being..32
Valenzuela, who commanded the may or may not decide to move.30
Santiago Garrison, and Gen. They noted, however, that as a
Vicente Huerta, a senior officer retired officer, no plan by Viaux Frustration Builds
in the Carabinero.27 These lat could succeed without the help of
ter two did not have anything the regular army. The CIA in Chile turned its
close to definite plans and so for attention to Gen. Valenzuela.
the time being were kept on the With the false-flaggers now While his plans were not solid, as
side. established and operating in aserving officer he was at least
Chile, and with the secret assis in a position to command troops
Viaux took the tance of the US defense attachØ, in a coordinated action, and he
spotlight. Though
viewed by many as an unstable the CIA in Santiago set out to was deemed psychologically sta
fool, and though he was no longer determine what real support ble.32 Direct contact was

in the military, a CIA assess

Viaux had within the army The arranged:
ment concluded that he had answer came back within a few
extensive days: COS Chief of Station] 2. CIA agent] will see Genl
support among non-

corns and junior officers.28
Another memorandum pointed
out that since the Chilean mili
tary was byled a man
respected the constitutionality of
the Allende government, the ser
vicemen lacked a serving general
officer to centralize the
and look to Gen. Viaux for
ration.~ As early as 23
September, the CIA was report
ing that Viaux was in touch with
active duty army officers who
met with a false flag officer] who Ca,nilo Valenzuela, if possi
said he had talked with Gen. ble, on date deleted] Oct and
Viaux, and as a consequence is brief him along these lines
who convinced that Viaux has no mili CIA agent] will take oppor
tary support.31 This was tunity to caution Valenzuela
troubling to the CIA
officers, who about precipitate moves by
passed to their Headquarters the Genl Viaux (of which Valen
plotting opinion that Viaux was not only zuela possibly cognizant).
inspi dangerously unstable, but likely
to lead whatever forces he could 3. CIA false-flagger] who
muster into a premature action briefed COS evening date
that would do the anti-Allende del] Oct, promised attempt to
forces more harm then good. contact Valenzuela deleted].

They decided to stop working will ask aforementioned to

with Viaux for the time being: dissuade Viaux, without RPT
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, without promising Viaux
Puro Chile on 5 December, 14 Decem
ber 1970 Cable, Santiago Station to CIA I-1Q,
28 Memorandum for the Record, CIA, 23 There is a possibility that coup 22
Memorandum, Track II, 7 October
September 1970. attempt, 23 September 1970. 1970.
29
Memorandum, Chile Station to CIA ~
Memorandum Intelligence Note to 22
Memorandum, Track II, 5 October
HQ, Intelligence, 26 September 1970. File, Track Ii, 10 October 1970. 1970.

40
 Chile

The United States was

not going to
run a coup
for the Chileans.
USG support for any later Moreover, the United States was
move. (FYI: COS] relieved to not going to run a coup for the
learn CIA asset] not goad. Chileans. On 6 October, Viaux
ing on Viaux, which we] approached the CIA and asked
would view as height of folly). for weapons to start an upris
A bloodbath led by an uncontrol ingbizarrely, he wanted
4.Urge you do not covey lable and mentally tmstable paralyzing gas grenades.~~ The
impression that STA has officer was not the aim of the CIA in Santiago turned down

sure-fire method of halt mission, as the CIA understood the proposal categorically, with

ing, let alone triggering
coup attempts.34
The fourth paragraph of this
message makes a point repeated
often by the CIA agents on the
ground: They were not puppet
masters, capable of fully control
ling the Chilean officers they
contacted. The message had
already been passed that the
United States favored
military
intervention, but the Santiago
CIA operatives did not want to
bear responsibility for unfortu
nate results should a coup be led
by a man such as Viaux:
If Viaux moves on his
and succeeds (which is
tinct possibility) then
the unpleasant prospect that
Viauxs junta will be an auto
it. In short, right-wing the reason given that USG]
a govern
ment was not attractive to the would not provide arms if the
CIA or to the US government, for golpe (coup) were to be made con
it would ultimately be counter tingent on a favorable US]
productive. Associating them reaction. USGI insists that the
decision to move must be a Chil
selves with dictatorial and
eanl decision~ This does not
bloodthirsty regimes would do lit
mean that forceful coup was
a
tle to forward American efforts
entirely out of the minds of the
for increased influence in the
CIA at this point, for there were
region.
routine exhortations on the seri
ousness of USG intent to attempt
The US personnel writing cables deny the] presidency to
at the time did not assume that Allende4 The CIA wanted the
thwarting Allende had to be vio Chileans to do it on their own,
lent. To the modern reader, but found Viauxs plans to be
military intervention implies totally inadequate~
violence. In the case of Chile,
however, what the CIA officers
own
William 1. Robinson, Promoting Pot
were looking for was, in the first
a dis
yarchy: Globalization, US Intervention.
we face instance, not actually a coup.
and Hegemony (Cambridge, UK: Cam
Rather, they sought some type of bridge University Press, 1996~, p. 161.
parliamentary subterfuge, where Also Gabriel Smirnow, The Revolution

cratic, nationalistic military the military would declare a state Disarmed, Chile 1970.1973 (New York,
of emergency and seize power NY: Monthly Review Press, 1979),
govern ment, which may not
p. 1~11.
necessarily be pro- US. temporarily, justifying the disso
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
Accordingly, Viaux should lution of the government in order
It Reported, 13 October 1970.
still be considered only as an to call new elections. Chileans 38
Cable, CIA FIQ to Santiago Station,
opportunity of last resort. - -
called this a whitecoup.~5 The Viaux Recontacted ASAP, 13 October
A Viaux Government, though obstacle to this preferred out 1970.

preferable to Allende, would that Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,

come was army not yet
as
Arms to Start Uprising, 06 October
be a tragedy for Chile and for set to move and that Schneider
1970. While the terms CIA, IJSG,
the free world. A Viaux coup Doctrine still conditions its
and Chilean are all blanked from the
would only produce a inas reflexes.~~ document, a reading of
the 2 full pages
sive bloodbath.35 makes any other insertion inconsistent
and uniikely
Memorandum. Long Range Solu Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, tion, 9 October 1970. Emphasis in orig As Dialogue with Viaux Grows, 13 Oc
7 October 1970. Emphasis in original. inal. tober 1970.

41
Chile

The CIA COS in

Santiago made
Another
dramatically clear the
problem with Viaux was c. Regimental commander
his high profile as an anti-com problems he was facing solution: Station. . .
lacks
munist agitator. Having already in trying to carry out a requisite leverage to pry loose
led one military revolt, he was near-impossible task. most commanders from their
under constant scrutiny by the instinctive obedience to Alto
state security apparatus, which Mando directives.
made clandestine contact by the
Americans dangerous. It 2. What can Viaux accomplish
stations firm opinion that fur massive, as attested by many of under optimum conditions? He
ther contact with name deleted] the men who worked in and can split armed forces fences .
. .

presents great risk poten

too a around the project.~4 The prob itters will watch tide of battle
tial and offers very little in lem was that there was no viable
before engaging themselves on
return. Considering the way the candidate to take the lead. either side. Carnage would be
defense attachØ] -Viaux relation Viaux, clearly, was compulsive considerable and prolonged, i.e.,
ship is unfolding we feel attachØ] and uncontrollable, probably civil war. Under best of circum
contact not worth maintaining even anti-American.45 Valenzu stances, armed forces will break
approach the 24th of ela and Huerta had plans, up and create unpredictable situ
as we no no

October Viaux] will just be too forces assembled, and were per ation.
hot to handle.~2 To make mat haps a bit scared of moving. But
ters worse, the CIA knew that the White House (the highest 5. Above not intended to be
the Chilean Communist Party levels46) was demanding a solu exhaustive enumeration of some
(PCCh) had agents infiltrated tion, a military solution, and all of key factors that
ought to have
close to Viaux and his associ other considerations are second
hearing on your final determina
ates. It would be foolish of ary.~~ Santiago CIA station
The
tion. You have asked us to
Washington to offer Viaux contin sent back what can only be called
provoke chaos in Chile. Thru
ued support if the PCCh would a cynical reply. It is worth quot
Viaux solution we provide you
later be able to disclose Ameri ing at length: with formula for chaos which
can activities.~~ Viaux was a
unlikely to be bloodless. To dis
disaster waiting to happen and 1. Station has arrived at Viaux simulate US involvement will
had to be kept at a distance. solution by process of elimi nation: clearly be impossible. Station
CIA] team, as you know, has
While the CIA wanted to keep given most serious consideration
a. Alto Mando (high com
to all plans suggested by HQs
Viaux at arms-length, the pres mand) solution cannot be
sure on Agency officers in counterparts. We conclude that
achieved.
Santiago to come up with a solu none of them stand even a remote
tion to the Allende problem was b. (Frei Solution] cannot be chance of achieving USC] objec
achieved. tive. Hence, Viaux gamble,
despite high risk factors, may
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, commend itself to you.48
In Fast Moving Situation, 10 October Hersh, p. 286.
1970. Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
In three pages, the CIA COS in
42
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, Fact May Not Be Able, 03 October
It Stations Firm Opinion,lO October 1970. Santiago made dramatically clear
1970. That this communication re Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, the problems he was facing in
ferred to the attachØ can be determined Highest Levels Here Continue, 07 Oc
by comparison of this cable with one cit tober 1970.
ed in the Senate report Alleged Plots. Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, ~
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
Memorandum, Track II, 12 October Instructs You Contact Military, 07 Oc Station has arrived at Viaux Solution,
1970. tober 1970. 10 October 1970.

42
 Chile

trying to carry out near-impos

a the early hours of a coup get a message to Viaux warn

sible task. Constructing a coup attempt, and (b) a method of ing him against precipitate
in country where no one was
a controlling the pro-Allende action. In essence our mes
willing to start the action was mobs which very probably sage was to state: We have
possible, but not if the United would swarm through down reviewed your plans, and
States wanted its involvement to town Santiago in the event of based on your information
remain secret, and certainly not a coup attempt.51 and ours, we come to the con
if it wanted the action to be clusion that your plans for a
bloodless. As far as the Santiago coup at this time cannot suc
The bottom line was that a Viaux
station was concerned, Viaux was ceed. Failing, they may
coup would almost certainly
a no-win on all counts. Some reduce your capabilities for
result in American embarrass
days later, Santiago sent another the future. Preserve your
ment and strengthening of a
message to Langley: Station assets the time will come
Allendes position. Inputs from .
. .

would appreciate firm and realis when you with all your other
both the CIA COS in Santiago
tic guidelines from headquarters friends can do something.
and Amb. Korry made it clear
on what objectives to pursue in You will continue to have our
that Viaux did not have more
further dealings with General support. ~
than one chance in twentyper
Viaux.~~
haps lessto launch a successful
coup. The point had been made, Many commentators have
and the Track II staff, Kissinger pointed out that this message
Reality Sinks In
included, came to the conclusion does not truly turn off the
that . a coup climate does not Viaux plotting Kissinger or, as
Following this cable, CIA Head . .

presently exist. Karamessines] has stated, end Track II plotting

quarters initiated a series of
noted that the highly unpredict entirely. Subsequent messages,
study papers looking more deeply
able Gen. Viaux is the only however, shed some light on this
into the implications of support
individual seemingly ready to controversial issue. One particu
ing Viaux. The conclusions were
not optimisticone paper was attempt a coup and expressed the lar piece of evidence is a
view that his chances of mount memorandum Kissinger wrote to
titled The Coup that Failed: The
Effects on Allende and his Politi ing a successful one were slight. the President on 18 October

cal Posture.Sc Reality was slowly Kissinger] observed that there

-
1970. This lengthy memoran
sinking in at Langley and the presently appeared to be little dum starts by stating: It now
the US can do to influence the appears certain that Allende will
White House:
Chilean situation one way or be electedpresident of Chile in
In summary, there is little
another. Those present con the October 24 congressional run

curred.2 This was acted upon off elections. He will be inaugu

climate in Chile to encourage
the same day, and a directive was rated November 354 It is clear
or sustain a military move
issued to the CIA in Santiago to
at thistime, but Gen. Viaux
cut off plotting with Viaux:
continues to try with his
~ Memorandum of Conversation,
major problems apparently
Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen.
being: (a) a sure way of con it was decided by those
1-Jaig at the White House, 15 October
taining the high command, present that the Agency must 1970.
especially Gen. Schneider in 54 Memorandum for the President,
ChileImmediate Operational Issues,
SI
Memorandum, Situation Report for 18 October, 1970. NSC cable accessed
4
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, Military Move, 13 October 1970. May/June 2002 at: <ht
After Debnefing, 12 October 1970. ~ Memorandum for the Record. Min tp://www.foia.state.gov/SearchCol
5
Memorandum. The Coup That utes of the 40 Committee Meeting, 14 ls/NSC.asp> using a list all function
Failed, 15 October 1970. October 1970, 16 October 1970. (State) for both trariches.

43
Chile

that Kissinger accepted the real which, it assumed, Eduardo

was military have increased in recent
itythat no coup could occur in Frei would win. The kidnapping, days. Gen. Valenzuela, still
timebriefed to him by Amb. the CIA learned, was set for 17 unsure of the necessity for a
Korry and many other individu October between O2O0O7OO.~~ coup, arranged for a meeting
als involved in Chile. The next with Gen. Schneider on the
step, Kissinger stated, was the Coincident with the White evening of 16 October to attempt
formulation of a specific strategy Houses decision to put Viaux to convince the commander-in-
to deal with an Allende govern on hold, a Chilean officer chief of the need for the military
ment. Further statements in approached the United States to intervene in the political pro
the same memo indicate that this requesting funds for a similar cess. The meeting... turned
step should be taken because: kidnap Schneider plan. out to be a] complete fiasco.61
Our capacity to engineer Although it initially seemed pos The following night, Valenzuela,
Allendes overthrow quickly has sible that he was fronting for now finally convinced of the
been demonstrated to be sharply Viaux, the CIA concluded that he necessity of direct action, sent a
limited. ~
Having ordered the was not and decided to provide representative to meet with the
end to US involvement over the the individual with some funds to US defense attachØ in a dark cor

short term with the only individ purchase weapons.56 This was a ner of
Santiago. The contact
ual actively plotting a coup, the last-ditch effort, and the Agency requested three submachine-
executive took the next logical was told by another contact on guns and tear-gas grenades.
step of planning for a coherent the same day that Name Despite puzzlement over the
policy toward an Allende deleted] believes that Viauxs need for these items, CIA Head
government. attempt to kidnap Schneider will quarters authorized Santiago to
not be made and now sees no pos fill the requestthey were deliv
sibility for anything to happen ered at 0200 hours on 22
Best Laid Plans... October. 62
prior 24 October. CIA agent]
. .

reminded Chilean contact] that

While the White House was devel
US stands ready to help with Officers in Washington were not
oping strategy for Chile,
a new
anything plotting elements may fully of the provenance of
aware
Viaux was continuing to solidiFy
need. The contact replied with the Valenzuela plot. CIA Head
his plans. By 14 October, the CIA
an honesty that may have been quarters had several questions:
had learned that the Viaux group
the best summary to date of the
had decided that the best way for
Chilean situation: What we a. What happened between
them to trigger a coup was to kid
need, he said, is not money but morning 17 October and
nap Gen. Schneider and remove a general with b**~s.5B evening 17 October to change
him from Chile.56 This would con
(deleted] from despondency to
vince the Chilean military that The appropriately equipped gen measured optimism?
chaos just around the corner
was
eral was not far away, as it
and, therefore, they should pre turned out. A memorandum of b. Who, exactly, is involved in
vent Allende from taking power.
16 October noted that coup rum
coup attenipt?~
By assuming power themselves to blings within and outside the
quell the chaos, they could open
the wayunder Chilean constitu 6O
Memorandum, Intelligence Note, 16
tional lawfor new elections, ~ Ibid. October 1970. See also Track II, 14
5~ to CIA HQ,
Cable, Santiago Station October 1970.
Summoned Morning, 16 October 1970. 61
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA I{Q.
~ lind. Cable, Santiago Station to CIA IIQ, Meeting Requested, 16 October 1970.
56
Cable, Santago Station to CIA HQ, Meeting Disaster Concerning 6~
Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago, Depend
Viaux Group Will Meet, 14 Oclober Schneider, 16 October 1970. Italics ing How Conversation Goes, 18 October
1970. added. 1970.

44
 Chile

Suddenly, events
deviated from the

As it turned out, the Valenzuela

anticipated script... After the shooting, there was con
Gen. Schneider was fusion among the CIA officers in
plot was almost the same as
Viauxs plan, which had been dis ambushed and shot. Santiago, as well as a degree of
closed to the CIA on 14 October. hope. They were not entirely
Schneider would be kidnapped sure who had launched the
when leaving a stag party the attack, and whether it was a
evening of the 19th. Once kidnapping attempt or an assas
abducted, he would be flown to second attempt on the following sination attempt. They hoped
Argentina. Simultaneously, Frei night also failed, and the CIA that the action was the begin
would resign and leave the coun assured Valenzuela that USG ning of a move against Allende,
try The cabinet would also support for anti-Allende action but there was no evidence that
resign, and a junta led by an continues.67 Valenzuela, for his this was going to occur.69

unnamed general would dissolve part, assured the Americans that

the congress. The CIA learned the Chilean military was still set
No coup immediately followed
that Valenzuela was at pains to to move. While assurances were
the shooting. On the morning of
state to his fellow plotters that being traded, the CIA concluded 24 October, an intelligence sum
the dissolution of the congress that since Valenzuelas group is
mary produced at Langley stated:
would be their only unconstitu apparently having considerable Yesterday Gen. Viaux informed
tional act.6~ Gen. Viaux, difficulty executing even the first some of his followers that a mili
although aware of the Valenzu step of its coup plan, the pros tary coup would be attempted
ela plot, was not involved, it pect for a coup succeeding or during the early hours of
turned out. And Viaux, himself, even occurring before 24 October
24 October . . .
but] there has
may even have been a target for now appears remote.68 There
been thus far no indication that
arrest by the Carabinieros in the would be no kidnapping, no coup. the conspirators intend to push
aftermath of a Valenzuela coup,
on plans to overthrow
with their
sincethey planned to use the kid the government. 70 The cable
Unexpected Turn
napping to justify a move concluded: It was agreed that
against leftist and rightist given the short time span and
But, suddenly, events deviated
extremists.~ the circumstances prevailing in
from the anticipated script: Only
five hours after the machine- Chile, a maximum effort has
The first attempt by the Valenzu
been achieved, and that now only
guns were delivered to the Valen
ela group to kidnap Schneider
Chileans themselves can man
failed because his team became zuela group on 22 October, armed
age a successful coup.
men ambushed Gen. Schneider
nervous due to inexperience.66 A
on his way to work. Drawing his
sidearm, Schneider was shot by In Santiago, a state of emer
63
Cable, CIA HQ Santiago Station,
to the attackers, who part of were gency was imposed after the
Realize this Message. 19 October Viauxs gang. He died on the shooting. Viaux and his gang
1970.
operating table on 25 October. surrendered, fled, or were
64
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, arrested. The military and the
The shooting occurred just 48-
Chronology of Events 18 October, 19
hours before Allende was to be Carabineros were confined to
October 1970. Although listed under
confirmed in a congressional barracks. Valenzuela was
Chronology of Events 12 October, the
date is clearly 18 October both in con vote. appointed Jefe del Plaza for Law
text and when examined with a magni

~ing glass. Cf. Alleged Plots, p. 244.

65 Memorandum,
Special Report, 22 6?
Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station. 69
Memorandum, Special Report, 22
October 1970. Request Contact General Valenzuela, October 1970.
66
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, 22 October 1970. 70 Memorandum, Track II, 24 October

Sent to Visit, 20 October 1970. Alleged Plots, p. 245. 1970.

45
Chile

The CIAs uncertainty

about the killing] can
be ascribed both to
and Order, and one Gen. Prats week before Schneiders death, a

filled the spot of the then still

lack of contact with would think
move one unlikely if
gravely injured Schneider. Gen. Viaux and a the Agency was aware of a spe
Allendes Unidad Popular (the reduction in cific coup attempt. A memo
communist front party) reacted dated 19 October 1970 states:
intelligence-gathering
immediately with public appeals assets. Co-optee] not at all sanguine re

to block any counter-revolution chances perventing (sic) Allende

ary actions, and the resulting from taking office and stressed
tension seemed to favor a coup. fact that abortive coup now could
But the CIA still reported Santi spell end to any chance of suc
ago is quiet.71 cess in future . . .
CIA agent] has
done his work well and there are

Whatever the intended outcome not in the interests of the Ameri no further tasks for the false
from the kidnapping/assassina can government. Could they flaggers at this time he will be
tion, it ultimately increased the have prevented it, and, if so, did instructed depart Santiago del]
desire of the politicians and most they make any efforts to do so? October ~
Moreover, as of 21
of the military to ensure that the October, the COS in Santiago was
constitutional process was fol What the Americans did and did developing post-inauguration
lowed. Aithough Valenzuela was asset-management plans.~~
not know becomes clear in the
in a powerful position and could
message traffic immediately fol
have taken over, the mood had
lowing the murder. A cable of 22 The record shows that the kid
changed so dramatically that he October relates intelligence to napping took the station by
did not make a move. On Satur the effect that Viauxs gang had surprise and that the CIA did
day, 24 October, Allendes election been told that their coup attempt not have absolute knowledge of
as president was duly confirmed
was to be carried out that day, Schneiders attackers. A cable,
by the Chilean congresswith and that it would be initiatedby written on 3 November 1970,
153 votes in favor and only 42
something big that would take discussed a review of the kidnap
votes either against or abstain
place in the early morning hours. ping attempt by the COS in
ing.72 Attempts to prevent The cable continued by speculat Santiago, which stated that a
Allende from taking power had
ing, after the fact, that the particular Chilean contact con
failed. assassination attempt on Gen firmed neither he nor name sec

eralSchneider, Commander-in- del] involved in Schneider assas

Chief of the Army. .
was very
.
sination.76 If the CIA station
Examining the American Role likely the something big which was still discussing who may or

the plotters hoped to use to ini may not have been involved in
Although a ~1successful military
tiate their coup efforts.~~ the attack, and was seeking con
move against Allende had been firmation from its Chilean.
unlikely from the start, the death
The uncertainty of the CIA can contacts, that indicates they did
of Gen. Schneider guaranteed the
be ascribed both to lack of con
collapse of American hopes.
tact with Viaux and a reduction
Clearly Schneiders murder was 7~ Cable,
Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
in intelligence-gathering assets.
Suggested Retired Captain, 19 Octo
The CIA had started to pull out ber 1970.
71
Memorandum, Intelligence Note, 23 its false-flag officers from Chile a 7~
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
October 1970 See also Memorandum, Reflect Realistic Assessment, 21 Octo
Track II, 24 October 1970. ber 1970.
72
Sigmund, p. 123. See also Memoran ~
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, 76
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
dum, Intelligence, Recent Develop Supporters of General Vioux. 22 Octo On 2 Nov COS Reviewed, 3 November
ments in Chile. 2 November 1970. ber 1970. 1970.

46
 Chile

not have firm knowledge to begin sent on 29 October, hints at the that Washington understood that
with. If they planned the
had confusion in Santiago in the his death would benefit Allende

attack, as some accounts main aftermath of the assassination, more than it would his
opposi
tain, would they not have known and the trouble it caused station tion by rallying the army fully
who executed the plan? Another officers in determining what was behind the flag of constitutional
cable discusses their lack of going on. The message says that ism.SO They trusted-Valenzuela
knowledge: marshal law made their work dif to carry out a kidnapping, but not
ficult, but that on 28 October Viaux, and to the last minute
they were able to make first con they attempted to keep Viaux
Station unaware if assassina
tact with name deleted] from moving on his own.81 The
tion was premeditated or
-

deletion] stated that when first CIA and Washington specifically

whether it constituted bun
heard of Schneiders assassina did not want their weapons in
gled abduction attempt...
We know that Gen. Valenzu. tion on radio he was quite upset the hands of the unstable and

elawas involved sec del] we

but has since been informed by dangerous Viaux. Indeed, one
have reason for believing that name deleted] that three message directly discounts
Gen Viaux and machine guns and ammunition Viauxs exhortations that his
numerous
are still in name deleted]s home group did not like killing.82
associates fully clued in, but
that and never given to anybody.
cannot prove or disprove
Also name deleted] still has Did Kissinger actually order an
execution of attempt against
Schneider entrusted to three tear-gas canisters and end to contact with Viaux? The
was

elements linked with Viaux. three masks.78 evidence shows that he ordered
Important factor to bear in Viaux to stand down at least
A CIA review of its own actions,
mind is that Armed Forces, over the short term. Did Kiss
undertaken in 1973, states that
and not retired officers or inger intend Track II to end, as
three submachine-guns were
extreme rightists, set he has testified? Probably, but
Schneider up for execution or provided to three military offic that was at a time when the
ers who planned to use them in
abduction. Before trying to
. .
White House, 40 Committee,
instigating an uprising by the Track II staff, and the CIA
anticipate further course of
Armed Forces. This program was
events station would like to thought that Viaux only was the
conducted at the request of Presi
await events of 23rd Oct available option. Kissinger
dent Nixon with the
which will obviously be ended the Viaux operation while
understanding that it was not to
decisive. ~ urging that pressure be kept on
become known to the State
Allende until such time as new
Department or other members of
Uncertain who had carried out marching orders are given.83
the 40 Committee.~ This is all
the attack, the CIA worried that What Kissinger wanted was
true, but were the weapons given
the weapons it had provided to Viaux stopped for the time being
purposefully to assassinate
without an end to all domestic
Valenzuelas group might have Schneider? The CIA and the
plotting, which might pay off in
been responsible for Schneiders
White House did not want
death. Were the American
Schneider assassinated. Docu
weapons in fact used in the kid ments from early October reveal ~
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
napping attempt that turned into
Review of Significant Developments, 9
murder? The appears to
answer
October 1970.
be no. One CIA cable from Chile, 78
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA UQ. Memorandum, Track II, 19 October

Although Security Still Tight, 29 Octo 1970.

ber 1970. 82
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ,
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, ~
Memorandum, Overview Statements Reports that meeting of Viaux Group,
Headquarters Will Have Noted, 22 Oc on CIA involvement in Chile in 1970, 16 October 1970.
tober 1970, 20 February 1973. 83Alleged Plots, p. 242.

47
 Chile

Kissinger did not want

the
long Essentially, he did
run.
not want to discourage any anti
Allende faction, but sought to
distance Washing-ton from the
most extreme elements.
Perhaps Kissinger need
worried about issues of control.
As the Chilean situation under
to discourageany anti
Allende faction, but
Throughout the crucial weeks in
sought to reduce the
October 1970, information
US connection to the
continued to flow to Broe and
most extreme Karamessines at CIA Head
elements. quarters, and both of these men
testified that they met with
not have Kissinger during this period.
Attesting to connections at the
most senior levels, a cable from

scored, foreign army officers are his office to

Santiago on 18 Octo
not light switches that can sim tance between local officers and ber demands details of coup
ply be turned off The CIA had the plotters, saying that there
plotting because high level
was no one from the station shar
spread the message that it was policy decisions in USG may
interested in a coup against ing in planning of professionally become necessary 88 On
Allende and by now all inter executed military coup, let alone October, a message from CIA
19
..

ested military parties know our to second guess ringleaders. Headquarters informs Santiago
position.8~ Whether the US posi Indeed it was pointedly stated that we] feel we must be pre
tion made a tremendous that the onus for action belonged pared advise higher echelons of
difference is matter of to the Chilean military from that nature of new military leaders
a dispute,
and time forward. On note, the and their programs in event
depends on how one views a wry
the autonomy of the Chilean cable offers the observation that
coup attempted or even suc

officers who, even once American this whole operation was] so ceeds.~ Karemessines stated in
support for a coup apparently unprofessional and insecure that, the same Congressional investi
was toned down, continued to
in the] Chilean setting, it could gation that he had kept the
plot. This was clear from the stand a chance of succeeding. White Rouse abreast of all
moment that the CIA tried to All that was required of the sta developments. His statements
switch tion was to assure the plotters
off
the plotters: Sta appear plausible in light of cur
tion false-flag officer met with that they would not be left high rently available documentation.
Chilean] on del] October and and dry if their coup succeeded.

attempted to dissuade Viaux This we have done.86 J{j~ The bottom line, in my view, is
group from undertaking a coup. inger, nonetheless, was most that Kissinger and the White
The group, however, had met on likely happy to hear that the Rouse were aware of the coup
16 October and decided to oppositions plotting against plotting and were happy to see it
attempt a 21 22 Octo Allende was going ahead, even if go ahead, but at the same time
coup on or

ber. This was not restricted to the reports he heard offered lit had no control over events. In
Viauxs tle chance of light of the CIAs surprise
group; reporting indi success. over

cated that everywhere Coup the death of Gen. Schneider, the

plotting continues to flourish.~~ White House neither planned nor
Many have doubted the subse
desired the assassination. More
quent Hill testimony of Henry
over, US officials may have failed
A cable from Santiago bears out Kissinger and his NSC deputy, to realize the level of complicity
US efforts to increase the dis Gen. Alexander Haig, who said
that they knew nothing of the
plots against Schneider. 87 87
Alleged Plots, pp. 246-249.
Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, ~
Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station,
Agree deleted] Should Cease, 20 Octo Realize this Message, 18 October
ber 1970.
Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, 1970.
~5
Memorandum, Track II. 19 October, Station Making No Attempt, 19 Octo Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station,
1970. ber 1970.
Recognize it Much,19 October, 1970.

48
 Chile

For all of Americas

wealth and power], it
was not able to
between all the various factions covert operations to encourage a

influence men such as

involved inplotting. Ultimately, regime change by indirect means,

it may have been impossible to Frei, Schneider, or which had always been a part of
separate the plotting of one Viaux to march to its Track I, continued for several
group from the next. tune. more years.

When did Track II officially end? Nonetheless, the experience of

There are no memoranda or
1970 carried its own lessons
cables under the title Track II
inauguration, effectively ended about the limits of American
after the inauguration of Allende
when that aim failed eight
on 3 November 1970. The last power. Through its machina
months earliet
mention of Track II in the GINs tions in Chile, Washington
documents is report of the CIAs
a received a strong reminder that
of Track II activity Despite the formal demise of
summary the power of the state operates
Track II, American efforts to
being delivered to the Attorney on a significantly different level
remove Allende continued
General on 2 December 1970.90
throughout his administration. than that of individual actors.
/
An enigmatic cable dated 26 May ai
Karamessines, the CIA officer in Though sincere in their fear of
1971, may hold the key. This one
charge of coordinating anti irreversible Marxist regime in~
line message reads: Project
Allende operations, told the Sen
deleted] termination approved Chile, American leaders stopped
ate Select Committee on
effective 30 June 1971.91 Could short of promoting the use of out-
Intelligence in 1975 that: Track

-
the deleted word be Fubelt? right force at all costs, a caution
II was never really ended. What
Regardless, Track II, which told to do was to con
that sharply limited the exercise
we were
aimed at precipitating a military
tinue our efforts. Stay alert, and of American power. For all of
takeover to prevent Allendes
do what we could to contribute to Americas banks and invest
the eventual achievement and ments, nuclear missiles and
the objectives and purposes of not able
~
Memorandum, Helms to Kissinger, aircraft carriers, it was

of Chile Paper on Track II, 2 Track II.92 In other words,

Delivery to influence men such as Frei,
December 1970.
Schneider, or Viaux to march to
~
Cable, Project Termination Approv
Alleged Plots, p. 248. its tune.
92
al, 26 May 197 1.

49
Cryptologic Museum

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