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Scenario based hazard identification of a gas Station in Arctic Region.

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Scenario based hazard identification of a gas Station in Arctic Region.

by

c Biswas, Rasel (MUN ID. 201085586)

& Sultan, Rasel A. (MUN ID. 201584646 )
B. Sc.(Hons), M. Sc.

A course project report of ENG 9115 submitted to the course instructor

Dr. Faisal Khan & Dr. Ming Yang

Memorial University of Newfoundland

6th December 2015

St. John’s Newfoundland

 Abstract

Working activities will always involve hazard and accidental risk that can cause envir-

onmental damage and also can affect public health and employees corporal integrity.

As many industrial activity, a gas station activity represents a source of hazard due to

the use of dangerous substances and so focusing on Arctic environment the purpose

of this study is to analyze the potential hazards associated in a gasoline filling station

in Arctic environment. Risk associated in filling stations at normal condition is ana-

lyzed initially and furthermore, the possible risk profiles and technical constrains are

discussed in harsh climatic conditions in Arctic environment. Identification of hazard

contributing factors and scenario based illustrations are also discussed in this paper.

ii
Contents

Abstract ii

List of Figures v

1 Introduction 1

2 Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 3

2.1 Vapour release during vessel filling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1.1 Flammable Mixture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1.2 VOCs Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.1.3 Automobiles dispensing spillage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.2 Pipe/vessel leakage effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2.3 Static electric hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.3.1 Energy of electrostatic ignition source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.3.2 Static Electric Hazard Solvents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2.4 Fire and explosion Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3 Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 14

3.1 Engineering challenges in harsh environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3.1.1 Hazard Associated with Metal Tanks in Cold Region . . . . . 15

iii
 3.1.2 Pool fire model for arctic environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.1.3 Lubricant Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3.1.4 Plumbing systems Hazard in cold region . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.1.5 Static electric and auroral activity in arctic region . . . . . . . 20

3.1.6 Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.2 Decline of Human Productivity at Low Temperature . . . . . . . . . 22

4 Results & Discussions 23

4.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

A Appendix 27

A.1 Solved Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

A.2 Solved Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

A.3 Solved Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

A.4 Solved Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

A.5 Bonding and Grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

iv
List of Figures

1.1 Tree-diagram for the possible risk scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2.1 Tank truck unloading into a service station underground storage tank

and practicing “vapor balance” form of emission control.. . . . . . . . 7

3.1 Temperature distribution for pool fire model (1) Fays model (2) Ghaffar

K. model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3.2 Predicted thermal radiations (1) Fays model, (2) Ghaffar K. model at

1 m height . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.3 Bonding and Grounding of Gasoline Tank during Unloading Operation. 21

A.1 Bonding and Grounding of Container. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

v
Chapter 1

Introduction

Working activities will always involve hazard and accidental risks that can cause

environmental damage and also can affect public health and employees corporal in-

tegrity. As any industrial activity, a gas station activity represents a source of hazard,

due to the use and handling of dangerous substances that are subject of regulation

by national legislation, according to the Seveso II Directive.

There are several studies presented in the specialized literature, like the environmental

level of aromatic hydrocarbons in a gasoline service station by gas chromatography

(Periago & Prado, 2005) or the assessment of individual, social, and occupational

risk for gas stations personnel (Santos-Mello & Cavalcante, 2008). Besides the risks

related to the workers security and health, gas station activities also present envir-

onmental risks that can be assessed through qualitative and quantitative analysis.

Taking into account the possible risk scenarios that could take place. In this regard,

designed tree-diagram shown in Figure 1.1. For the identification of potential haz-

ards that causes major accidents specific to the studied objective, a qualitative risk

analysis associated to each scenario has been carried out. Also we sort out some ma-

jor risk associated with gasoline filling station in any place and specifically in Arctic

1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2

Risk Assessment
Startpoint

Knowledge Gathering of
Arctic Environment

Hazard
Identi>ication

Scenarios

Frequency
Risk Modeling Assessment

Overall Risk
Assessment

Uncertainity
Analysis

Figure 1.1: Tree-diagram for the possible risk scenarios

region.
Chapter 2

Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations

Fire, explosion along with liquid spillage has always devastating effect on environ-

mental system. One of the major hazard to create fire and explosion also liquid

spillage is fuel and as we all know gasoline filling stations are fuel storage places

to fill combustible fuels to the automotive. Petroleum VOCs are causes of cancer

and other carcinogenic diseases and workers of gasoline station are always exposed

to VOCs through inhalation process that indicates high risk to them. That is why

Hazardous activity in gas station should be known where hazard identification and

risk assessment is the most effective way to prioritize hazardous activities and meas-

ure its severity level to control it. In normal environment, the potential hazards of

a gasoline filling stations are identified: vapour release during vessel filling, gasoline

discharge from the hole in pipe/vessel, static electricity hazard, fire and explosion

Hazard, tank/pipeline rupture and combustible liquid discharge, and operators fault

and carelessness. First four potential hazards are describing along with solved prob-

lem in the subsequent section.

3
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 4

2.1 Vapour release during vessel filling

Gasolines are flammable and combustible liquids. In gas station, it is common to load

and unload Gasoline. Spillage and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) emission

occurs during loading and unloading gasoline in gas station.

2.1.1 Flammable Mixture

At the gas station, vapour emission control equipment must needed to be installed.

Otherwise, flammable vapours will be released at the time of handling gasoline, trans-

ferred between storage tanks or re-fuelling the car where gasoline is spilt or exposed

to the atmosphere. There may be a chance of flammable atmosphere already exist

at the gasoline storage tank. Continuous removal of gasoline from the tank will be

replaced by air and if the mixture of air and fuel reaches to the ‘flash point’ then

momentarily there will be flame which will propagate to the ultimate explosion. The

following practical problem along with solution indicate a better idea in this regard.

At 77◦ F gasoline has a saturation vapour pressure of 4.6 psia and UFL of gasoline

is 7.6%. From these information, the volume concentration of the gasoline vapour=
4.6
14.7
∗ 100% = 31.3%. Evidently, it lies outside the UFL. Since at the top of the vessel,

concentration of gasoline is too rich to cause a fire. It’s concentration will come below

the UFL value when the gasoline vapour will get diluted with more air. And it may

cause fire and explosion. Thus, in this case, should not vent the gasoline storage tank

in filling station.

2.1.2 VOCs Exposure

Gasoline vapor emissions and motor vehicle exhausts are the main sources of VOCs.

Exposers level of gasoline vapor emissions (gas service stations) were more than the
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 5

motor vehicles exhausts (Lee et al., 2002). At the gas station, VOC generated from

two sources when tank being filled with liquid fuel. They are

i. evaporation of the liquid, and

ii. displacement of the vapour in the vapour space by the liquid filling the tank.

So, the gas station workers and other people who are engaged of it can be exposed

to various hydrocarbon and aromatic vapours via ingestion, inhalation or dermal

absorption; but mostly by inhalation.

The following practical problem helps a better understand of the amount of VOC

emission from a gas station and recoverable gasoline.

Assuming a gasoline tank in a standard automobile contains about 14 gal of gasoline

and can be filled in about 3 min. The molecular weight of gasoline is approximately

94, and its vapour pressure at 77◦ F is 4.6 psi, the T LV for gasoline is 300 ppm.

Thus, the safety factor for this gasoline

325.1
R= = 1.08 > 1
300
(using result from Appendix A.1) indicates the workplace is over exposed. A scavenger

system can remove gasoline vapour ejection from automobile tank during the loading

operation and this can be the possible remedy of the VOC exposure. This ejection

process can be done by an elephant trunk ventilation system which is a part of filter

hose. As a result this reduce risk of air, over exposed threat also monetary gain from

volatile gasoline that being recovered.

Under the same condition, we are calculating how much gasoline is recoverable for

each filling.

We know the ideal gas equation

m PM
= = 7.51 ∗ 10−2 lbm/f t3 .
V RT
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 6

The container size, Vc = 14 gal = 1.87 f t3 . So the total liquid = 1.87 ∗ 7.51 ∗ 10−2 =

0.14 lb/tank. Thus the total gasoline recovered

total liquid 0.14

= = 3.2 ∗ 10−3 cubic f t/tank = 0.024 gal/tank.
liquid gasoline density 0.7 ∗ 62.4

2.1.3 Automobiles dispensing spillage

Gasoline is usually delivered to service stations in tank trucks or smaller account

trucks. Emissions are generated when gasoline vapor in the underground storage

tank are displaced to the atmosphere by the gasoline being loaded into the tank. As

with other loading losses, the quantity of loss in service station tank filling depends

on several variables, including the method and rate of filling, the tank configuration,

and the gasoline temperature, vapor pressure and composition. Loading losses are the

primary source of evaporative emissions from rail tank car, tank truck, and marine

vessel operations. The quantity of evaporative losses from loading operations is,

therefore, a function of the parameters, like physical and chemical characteristics of

the previous cargo, method of unloading the previous cargo, operations to transport

the empty carrier to a loading terminal, method of loading the new cargo, and physical

and chemical characteristics of the new cargo. These emission results are a very

big reason of any hazard in that station due to its flammability and combustibility.

Emissions from underground tank filling operations at service stations can be reduced

by the use of a vapor balance system. This is shown in the Figure 2.1
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 7

Figure 2.1: Tank truck unloading into a service station underground storage tank and

practicing “vapor balance” form of emission control..

2.2 Pipe/vessel leakage effect

At the gas stations, fuel tank are usually bitumen coated single skinned mild steel

tanks. It is placed depend on the safe position while the plumbing costs should be

reduced. The size of the tank can be varies from 27 − 45 m3 . Reinforced concrete pits

are provided adjacent to tanks. In worldwide, there were 480 incidents that related

to tank fire identified since 1950s and every year reported around 15 − 20 (Persson &

Lonnermark, 2004). Most of the incident did not provide detail information regarding

the accident. Since, we can expect many connections like, joints and valves are found

between pipes and tanks. Gasoline discharge from tank and leakage from the adjacent

pipelines of the tank are the main causes of that incident in a sense. Those connections

have to be tight enough to avoid any leakages, but that is not the case all the time.

Corrosion, bumping or even filling erosion in welding joints is problems that brought

up since those tanks and pipelines are made of metals.

Source and release modeling are the important tool to estimate the discharge rate, the

total quantity discharged (or total time of discharge), and the discharge state (that is,

solid, liquid, vapour, or a combination). These scenario are quantitatively estimated

Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 8

by the source model whereas the release scenarios may be any combination of ruptured

pipes or vessels, leaking gaskets, discharges from relief valves, and discharges from

process vents. The following problem helps better understand of the above discussion.

In a refuelling station, gasoline is stored in a tank of 20 f t height and 8 f t diameter.

Suppose the tank is filled 85% of the capacity. Due to the corrosion the tank was

weaken and accidentally a 9 fuel loading truck hit the tank causing one inch puncture

in the tank above 4.5 f t above the ground.

Summarize of the problem results are as follows (see calculation in Appendix A.2)

i. The maximum release rate of gasoline through the whole is 9.1 lbm per second

ii. Total 4694 gallons of gasoline will be released

iii. It will take 53 minutes to empty the whole tank if the emergency response team

do not arrive quickly to repair the hole.

Since gasoline has 0.25 mJ MIE (Minimum Ignition Energy). It is very low compared

to source of ignition. For instance, a static discharge of 22 mJ is initiated by walking

across a rug. In this scenario a small spark can initiate a pool fire eruption.

The energy from pool fires can vary depending on the size of the pool. See calcula-

tion Appendix A.3, in this unwanted scenarion it is clear that not always dangerous

discharge can be eliminated, that time prevention of the possibility of an ignition

may maintain the oxidant levels below the combustible levels. It may be done by

inertting or by maintaining the fuel level below the LFL or above the UFL. Also, by

deflagration venting and explosion suppression are used to mitigate the consequences

of an explosion.
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 9

2.3 Static electric hazard

Static electricity is the electric charge generated when there is friction between two

things made of different materials or substances. It can also be generated by re-

peated contact and separation between unlike materials, like a flat belt on a rotating

pulley. Electric charges can build up on an object or liquid when certain liquids

(e.g., petroleum solvents, fuels) move in contact with other materials. This can occur

when liquids are poured, pumped, filtered, agitated, stirred or flow through pipes.

This buildup of electrical charge is called static electricity. Even when liquids are

transported or handled in non-conductive containers, something rubbing the outside

surface of the container may cause a static charge to build up in the liquid. The

amount of charge that develops depends, in part, on how much liquid is involved and

how fast is it flowing or is being agitated or stirred. In a flammable environment like

gasoline station static electric charge build up easily as almost all the requirements

are present that create this electricity.

Depending on circumstances Static electricity can be a nuisance or a hazard. It can

be a nuisance but a spark that has enough energy to cause a fire or explosion is a

definite hazard. To decide if static electricity is likely to be a hazard we must con-

sider several factors: Can a static electric charge be generated under the operating

conditions; Can the charge accumulate; if it discharges, will it cause a spark; Is there

an ignitable mixture (e.g., solvent vapor or dust in the air) in the area where a static

electricity discharge can occur; Will the discharge generate an incentive spark, i.e., a

spark that has enough energy to ignite the mixture in air? If the answer to the above

five questions is yes where a solvent or fuel is used, then static electricity can be a

fire / explosion hazard. It means that the spark can ignite a vapor/air mixture that

is in its flammable range, the concentration range between the upper and the lower
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 10

flammable limits (see reference’s website).

2.3.1 Energy of electrostatic ignition source

The energy of a spark discharge is a function of the accumulated charge (Q in cou-

lombs) on the object, the capacitance of the object (C in farads) and the potential,
Q
or voltage (V in volts) of the object. They are related as, C = V
. The actual energy

(expressed in joules) associated with the discharge process

Q2
J= (2.1)
2C

The potential hazards of discharge are assessed by comparing the MIE of the fuel

air mixture to the equivalent energy of discharge. The static discharge energy is

a function of the accumulated charge. In an industrial setting, this accumulated

charge is usually the result of either contact or friction charging for flowing solids or

liquids. There are charge accumulation processes: contact and frictional charging,

double-layer charging , induction charging, and charging by transport.

2.3.2 Static Electric Hazard Solvents

Flammable and combustible liquids can present a static electricity hazard depending

on their ability to generate static electricity, how well they conduct electricity (con-

ductivity), and their flash point. Solvents and fuels produced from petroleum (e.g.,

benzene, toluene, mineral spirits, gasoline, jet fuel) can build up a charge when they

are poured or flow through hoses. They tend to hold a charge because they cannot

conduct electricity well enough to discharge when in contact with a conducting ma-

terial, like a metal pipe or container that is grounded. When enough of a charge is

built up, a spark may result. If the vapor concentration of the liquid in air is in the
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 11

“flammable range” and the spark has enough energy, a fire or explosion can result.

According to the NFPA (Code 77), solvents that are soluble in water (or can dissolve

some water themselves) do not build up static electricity. Examples of such liquids

include alcohols and ketones like acetone. However, when liquids are transferred into

non-conductive containers (e.g. plastic, glass), even conductive solvents may build up

a charge because the plastic or glass containers decrease the rate at which the charge

in the solvent dissipates.

The flash point and vapor pressure of the liquid and the temperature are other factors

to consider. The vapor levels will be higher in the air around the container if you are

working outside on a hot summer day than in the winter when the temperature is

below 0C (32F) or colder. At higher elevations in the mountains, the air pressure is

significantly lower and solvents boil at lower temperatures. Under these conditions,

the flash point and the temperature for the optimal vapor/air ratio are lower and

some “combustible” liquids can become “flammable”. A liquid like hexane has a low

flash point and it is flammable when its temperature is in the range −33◦ C to −3◦ C

(−28◦ F to +26◦ F ) at sea level. At normal room temperatures, the vapor/air ratio at

the surface of the solvent will be well above its upper flammability limit and would be

“too rich” to burn. However, at some distance away from the solvent surface, there is

a concentration of hexane vapor in the air that is in the flammable range. A fuel like

kerosene is a combustible liquid with a flash point above 38◦ C(100◦ F ). Under hot

weather conditions or if high flash point liquids are heated to temperatures around

or above their flash points, a flammable vapor/air mixture will form. Generally, the

conditions for igniting a liquid are optimal when the liquid is used at a temperature

that produces a vapor in air concentration (at the surface of the liquid) that is halfway

between the upper and lower flammability limits. Recognizing that these conditions

represent an “optimal” fire hazard, one has to take appropriate precautions.

Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 12

Now, the following problem helps a better understand of the static electric. A gasol-

ine is stored in a tank of 20 f t height and 8 f t diameter. Suppose the tank is filled

100% of the capacity and total quantity of gasoline is 30000 gallon. Accidentally a

fuel loading truck hit the tank causing one inch puncture in the tank above 4.5 f t

above the ground and the maximum release rate of gasoline through the whole is

about 100 gallons per minutes. Streaming current is assumed 1.5 × 10−7 amp, gasol-

ine conductivity is 8.85 × 10−14 mho/cm and dielectric constant is 2.4.

See calculation Appendix A.4, the value is 18.17 mJ > M IE = 0.25 mJ. This in-

dicates the level of viciousness of this hazardous situation. This type of devastating

situation can be prevented by the General Principles in designing a System

1. Reduce the rate of charge generation while handling liquids to prevent the

charges from accumulating to dangerous levels also increase the rate of charge

relaxation.

2. Design the system with low energy discharge to include charge reduction and

to prevent the charges from accumulating to dangerous which is mostly used

when handling powders.

2.4 Fire and explosion Hazard

In gas station, petrol gives off highly flammable vapor even at very low temperatures.

Because of the flammability of petrol vapors, service stations carry a risk of fire or

explosion not common to other types of retail outlets. Ignition of petrol vapors can

happen if vapor comes into contact with a heat source capable of igniting it. An

ignition spark might come from an electrical switch, a cigarette or a static electrical

discharge. Petrol vapor is heavier than air and tends to sink to the lowest possible
Chapter 2. Risks at Gasoline Filling Stations 13

level of its surroundings and may gather in tanks, cavities, drains, pits or other low

points and will travel across the ground due to gravity (down-hill) or may be carried

in the direction of the wind. In order to prevent the risk of ignition, the service

station must be zoned on the basis of the probability of an explosive vapor mixture

forming. Hazardous areas, as found around a service station, are classified into three

categories as illustrated opposite: Zone Classification for Vapours

1. Zone 0, that part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is

continually present or present for long periods.

2. Zone 1, that part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is likely

to occur in normal operation.

3. Zone 2, that part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not

likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will exist for a short period.
Chapter 3

Risk Associated to the GFSs in

Arctic Environment

Risk Associated to the Gasoline Filling Stations in Arctic Environment Temperature

differences in the arctic region is very vast, that occur from place to place and between

summer and winter. This Region means the North Polar Region with predominantly

sea area, has winter time temperature lows in the range of −50◦ C to −65◦ C and

summer temperature can rise to 35◦ C. This harsh climatic change effects the usual

characteristics of fluid, materials, e quipments or units. Hypothermia effects Human

performance in a large extent in cold ambient where wind-chill is also a factor. With

the increment of cold severity problems related to technical and engineering work also

increase. Transportation systems are challenging, material and manpower needed for

operation must be imported great distance at significant cost and the scarcity of pure

drinking water and healthcare make the scenario worse. The risk associated in harsh

environment like arctic is in severe level and it is very important to assess the risk

and to build an action plan based on the magnitude of hazard.

14
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 15

3.1 Engineering challenges in harsh environment

Arctic regions requires some exceptional demands on machines. The effect of ex-

tremely low temperature is one of the major impact on the properties of materials,

that relied upon to protect, lubricate and withstanding working stresses. These im-

pacts can be described by failure of lubricants to perform effectively, resulting in

high wear rates, embrittlement of metals, plastics and construction materials causing

failure, high fuel and energy consumption due to greater rolling resistance and fuel

tank reservoir require additional heating system and stirring due to the increment of

viscosity of oils as the temperature falls, and generation of static electricity which is

a potential threat of causing fire and explosion.

3.1.1 Hazard Associated with Metal Tanks in Cold Region

At low temperature in arctic region, metal alloys change from ductile to brittle over

a relative narrow temperature scale. Catastrophic failures in liquid storage tanks,

pipelines and other structures often occur due to this property of metals. A large

scale fire in an oil tank has occurred in Sweden in 1956, in Nynshamn oil refinery and

the tank ruptured due to severe cold. The tank ruptured due to severe cold. The

oil overflowed the dike and into the refinery area and ignited.“Slop-over” occurred

in the oil by approx. 15 minutes intervals which made the extinguishing efforts very

difficult.

High strength material in low energy mode at ambient temperature can have fracture

throughout the cold regions. Operating stress needs to be below the fracture stress

((σF ) which is determined by the fracture toughness (Kc ). This ensures a safe design

and avoid fracture. From literature fracture failure analysis reveals that the fracture

originated at a flaw of materials like improper welding, welding strike, corrosion or

Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 16

casting defect. Sometimes the flaws are large enough to initiate the crack itself and

reached critical size (acrit ). Thus the fracture toughness comes

√
Kc = αF π acrit (3.1)

Brittle failure of structures (especially gasoline storage tanks) is catastrophic and it

is a serious hazard. American Petroleum Institute standard API 653 (King, 2012)

outlines some guidelines to avoid the scenario. They include: all failures initiated in

the lowest (also the thickest) shell course. riveted tanks constituted the majority of

failures in older and welded tanks, all failure occurred in extreme winter tank age

ranged from new to 44 years old, most of the failures were in the northern tier states

of the Canada and Alaska, and the majority of failure initiated at improper and inad-

equate welded repairs. Brittle failure of structures (especially gasoline storage tanks)

is catastrophic and it is a serious hazard. American Petroleum Institute standard

API 653 (1991) outlines some guidelines to avoid the scenario. They include: the

notch toughness of shell material, it must reflect an appropriate value for the min-

imum temperature that has been experienced at the site the plate thickness, only

plates greater than 12 mm are considered at risk, the presence of defects in the tank

or in the material can trigger the failure, the presence of crack like defects can be the

origin of a crack that will propagate to the other plates, and changing from warm

to cold temperature, heating due to past welding and repairs can result in brittle

failure. Coatings in low temperatures applied to those areas of the tanks subject

to contact with ice are to be durable and resistant to peeling, abrasion or other de-

gradation. American shipping company ABS follows a guideline for vessels operating

in low temperature environments. A vessel designed, equipped, built, surveyed and

crewed in accordance with the requirements of the Guide for Vessels Operating in Low

Temperature Environments will be eligible for the notation CCO+(TEMP). The am-
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 17

bient temperature for which the vessel is designed will be listed in the parentheses

(e.g. (30◦ C)). When cold climate operation is planned ABS follow that guideline

for the safety purpose. Materials for piping, valves and fittings for design service

temperatures lower than 18◦ C are to be selected in accordance with the ABS Rules

for Materials and Welding.

Gasoline tanks are to be provided with heating arrangements if the fuel will cool

below its pour point. Gasoline tanks for residual fuels are to be maintained 10◦ C

(18◦ F ) above the fuels pour point. Tank heating calculations are to be provided to

show sufficient heat transfer capacity for the design service temperature.

3.1.2 Pool fire model for arctic environment

Pool fire is one of the most frequent accidents in gasoline filling stations (GFS). Flame

impingement, blaze and thermal radiation are main hazardous characteristic of pool

fire. Arctic environment is surrounded by heavy ice and the normal characteristic of

pool fire would be different from normal situation. The environmental characteristics

of arctic greatly govern the pool fire model and in this project the pool fire model

developed by Ghaffar (2011) is used.

Burning rate per unit volume at this model,

3 D
m0 = (3.2)
4 L2c a0.5
c

where D is the diameter of the pool, Lc is the plume height and ac is constant.

Thermal radiation model of pool fire is thus

Z Aob →
− →
− →
− −→
00 1 n . dl n .dlr
q = e(di, T ) + rf × e(dir , T ) dA (3.3)
4 0 di3 dir 3
This developed model is capable of identifying the parameters effect of pool fire. In

arctic, snow covered surface and spray ice effects the thermal radiation of pool fire.
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 18

Figure 3.1 shows that temperature is low near the pool surface and it increases with

Figure 3.1: Temperature distribution for pool fire model (1) Fays model (2) Ghaffar

K. model.

height as the release energy rate increases and energy is transferred upward due to the

hot gas movement. It is also notified that after a certain height (= 0.7m) temperature

decrease for energy dissipation. Figure 3.2 shows the relation between radial distance

and thermal radiation. It indicate that with the increase of radial distance released

energy per unit area decreases. The decrease rate decrease with the increase of radial

distance.

3.1.3 Lubricant Temperature

To prevent wear, mating metal parts are separated by a film of lubricant or grease.

Engines or equipment operating in extreme cold weather are subjected to high wear
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 19

Figure 3.2: Predicted thermal radiations (1) Fays model, (2) Ghaffar K. model at 1

m height

and breakage and to prevent from that unwanted situation an constant oil flow is

necessary. Especially the pumps or any other rotating devices or suspension joints

require lubricating. Normal greases solidify at approximately −20◦ C and motor oil

reaches its pour point at near about −32◦ C.

In arctic environment, due to the extreme cold weather, machine operation at temper-

atures below the pour point of oil runs the risk of very high wear due to metal-to-metal

contact. The residual oil film on the metal parts breaks down very soon at the start

up period and lubricant cannot be renewed because the oil pump is unable to draw

in the solidified oil. As a result, engine or rotating devices fail very quickly when

deprived of an abundant lubricant supply.

Using arctic grade lubricant that will not solidify down to −50◦ C could be a solution.

These cold-weather compatible lubricants can greatly reduce the risk which discussed
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 20

above. Furthermore, arctic-grade engine oils with pour points below −59◦ C help to

reduce engine wearing during critical time period after a cold start.

3.1.4 Plumbing systems Hazard in cold region

Components, such as valves, valve control units, manifolds, vents, fittings, and other

piping components exposed to the minimum anticipated temperature should be pro-

tected from ice accumulation or be provided with a means to provide for continued

functionality such as positioning in sheltered locations, installing trace heating or

heated covers. All piping systems throughout the vessel should be designed to min-

imize exposure of crew to low temperature hazards during normal operation and

routine maintenance. If possible, valves and controls should be automated, and pipe

tunnels should be considered if feasible.

The blockage of vent pipes by ice accumulation at the deck or by the freezing of plugs

inside the pipe from the vapors rising from the tank contents or ingress of air into

the tank can result in safety hazards, for example, due to over-pressurization. It is

common to fit, or provide for, heat tracing. If the there is a heated liquid in the

tank being vented, anti-icing equipment may not necessarily be installed provided

supporting calculations are provided.

3.1.5 Static electric and auroral activity in arctic region

In cold regions, static electricity charges build to surprisingly high voltages in very dry

air. Dry air problems are serious in arctic and they become acute where temperature

drops to −35◦ C. Static charges of several thousand volts can build up when a person

walks across a carpeted under this condition. In GFS, charge buildup is always

possible during splash filling. Sparks can be eliminated if it is ensured that all parts
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 21

of the system are connected with a conductor. Bonding and grounding ensures any

charge accumulated in the system is drained off to ground. See discussions of Bonding

and Grounding in Appendix A.5. Another potential threat is the auroral activity

Figure 3.3: Bonding and Grounding of Gasoline Tank during Unloading Operation.

in North Pole where an electromagnetic field creates an alternating flux. The flux

variations in these fields create electricity in any conductor that crosses through them.

The resulting alternating current that is produced is up to 100 amps for a short period

of time at the intense of auroral activity. Grounding also ensures safety from the

auroral flux.

3.1.6 Precautions

Below is shown a problem that may arise in an Arctic region and by finding its reason

precautions can be taken so that hazard reduces in that region.

Assuming, with no wind and spray ice droplets a gasoline reserve tank in arctic has
Chapter 3. Risk Associated to the GFSs in Arctic Environment 22

been ruptured due to the severe cold and static electricity causes a spark that ignite

a pool fire of gasoline with 1.4 meter diameter. In this scenario, if the flame height

is 1 m then the temperature of the pool fire becomes 650◦ K and the approximate

thermal radiation would be 39 KW/m2 by suing the Figure 3.1, 3.2.

3.2 Decline of Human Productivity at Low Tem-

perature

Human can operate their work in a sensitive temperature range. When he pushes to

go out of that range, he is subjected to increasing physiological stress. More energy

is required to keep the body operating and tires more rapidly. Consecutively, body

moves more slowly and again productivity decreases. Heavy clothes and winter gears

also impede motion and require more energy.

Chapter 4

Results & Discussions

4.1 Conclusions

A gas station always faces hazard risk due to many reasons thats why hazard iden-

tification of a gas station is a very important and useful process to reduce risk of

accidents and economical loss in a gas station. As this study has not yet studied that

much, it may add a new step to reduce hazard in a gas station. This paper includes

identification of risks at gasoline station and way to precut the risk specifically in

Arctic environment. Real life scenario with hazards are introduced for all type of

environment surrounded by a gas station. Especially pool fire model in arctic region

is analyzed to know the devastation of any accident that may create pool fire. This

study in overall gives an idea about hazard that may take place in a gas station which

can be used to reduce risk of a gasoline station.

23
Chapter 4. Results & Discussions 24

4.2 Future Work

From Figure 1.1, it is understandable that the frequency assessment and consequence

assessment need to be done for risk assessment (see in Figure 1.1). Where frequency

assessment can be done in future with adequate data by fault tree and event tree

analysis. On the other hand, in this project consequence of some scenario based

hazard identification are discussed. In future consequence analysis can be done for

all cases in both general and harsh environment. So, at a glance, destination of our

future work is to have risk assessment of gas station especially in Arctic region.
Bibliography

Ghaffar, zk. 2011 Fire and Explosion Consequence Modeling in the Arctic Region.

Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada, M.Eng Thesis.

King, T. 2012 An overview of ARINC 653 part 4. Digital Avionics Systems Con-

ference (DASC), IEEE/AIAA 6B11 6B14.

Lee, C. C., Chen, M.R., Shih, T.S., Tsai,P.J., Lai,C.CH & Liou, S.H.

2002 Exposure Assessment on Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) for Tollway

Station Workers via Direct and Indirect Approaches Journal of Occupational health.

44, 294-300.

Ozunu, A.& Anghel, C.I. 2007 Technological Risk Assessment and Environ-

mental Security (Romanian). JAccent Publishing House. Cluj Napoca.

Periago, J.F.& Prado, C. 2005 Evolution of occupational exposure to environ-

mental levels of aromatic hydrocarbons in service stations. Annual Occupational

Hygine. 49(3), 233–40.

Persson, H. & Lonnermark, A. 2004 Tank Fires Review of fire incid-

ents 19512003. SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, SP Report

2004:14.

25
BIBLIOGRAPHY 26

Robu, B. 2005 Impact and Risk Assessment Induced in the Environment by Indus-

trial Activities (Romanian). Ecozone Publishing House, Iasi.

Santos-Mello, R. & Cavalcante, B. 2008 Cytogenetic Studies on Gas Station

Attendants. Mutation Research/Genetic Toxicology. 280(4), 285290.

http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/prevention/flammable static.html
Appendix A

Appendix

A.1 Solved Problem

Consider, vapour concentration (ppm) estimate from a filling operation can be de-

termined
P sat
C(ppm) = (φ rf Vc + KA) ∗ 106 . (A.1)
k Qv P
Assumptions, since the tank area are not given,

φ rf Vc >> KA

For, Filling splash,

φ=1

And no spillage of the gasoline.

Equation A.1 becomes,

P sat 4.6 psi 1
C(ppm) = ∗rf Vc ∗106 . = ∗ min∗1.87 cu. f t/min∗106
k Qv P k 3000 cu. f t/min ∗ 14.7 psi 3
(A.2)

Thus,
65.02
C(ppm) =
k

27
Appendix A. Appendix 28

where the k varies from 0.1 to 0.5 depending on the ventilation conditions. Then,

130.02 ≤ C(ppm) ≤ 650.2.

If we consider average value of k = 0.2, then C(ppm) = 325.1.

A.2 Solved Problem

We know the discharge rate,

s
gc ∗ Pg
Qm = ρ C0 a 2( + g ∗ hL ) (A.3)
ρ
From the given information Area of tank = 50.2, f t2 , Vt = 100.4 f t3 , so L = 17 f t.

Area of lekage, a = 5.45 ∗ 10−3 f t2 , Pg = 2.12 ∗ 103 , lbf /f t2 , C0 = 0.61. Put all of

the parameters value in Equation A.3, get Qm = 9.1 lbm/sec.

Released gasoline amount=V = At ∗ h0L = 27.5 f t3 = 4694 galons.

Release time,
s s
1 At gc ∗ Pg 2 ∗ gc ∗ Pg
t= ( 2∗( + g ∗ hL ) − ) (A.4)
C0 ∗ g A ρ ρ
Put all of the parameters in Equation A.4, then get t = 3184 sec = 53 min.

A.3 Solved Problem

In the case of pool fire, heat release from a tank can be

Q̇ = A ∗ ṁ χ ∆ Hc (A.5)

Given, mass burn rate per area=ṁ = 0.059 kg/m2 s combustion efficiency of gasoline=χ =

0.7, and heat of combustion = ∆ Hc = 43.7 M j/kg for gasoline.

If we consider the pool area is 15 m2 then heat release rate

Q̇ = 15 ∗ 0.059 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 43.7 = 27.07

Appendix A. Appendix 29

A.4 Solved Problem

Max. release rate Qm = 9.35 lbm/sec = 100 galons/min, by using Equation A.3 and

their corresponding all of the information except the tank is 85% full (this problem
π 82 20 f t3 4022 f t3
tank is 100%). The tank will be empty when t = 100 gal/min
= 13.37 f t3 /min
= 300 min =

1800 sec. Charge is a function of time,

r × 0 r × 0
Q(t) = Is × (1 − e− λc ) (A.6)
λc

After putting the value of r = 2.4, 0 = 8.85 × 10−14 mho/cm, λc = 2.4 in Equa-

tion A.6, the calculated result is Q(t) = 3.19 × 10−6 coulombs. At the time of leaking,

total energy is stored at the vessel

Q2
J= (A.7)
2C

Putting the value of assuming spherical vessel capacity C = 4π r 0 r = 2.8 ×

10−10 f arads and Q(t) in Equation A.7, the value is 18.17 mJ > M IE = 0.25 mJ.

A.5 Bonding and Grounding

In gas station transferring a liquid from one metal container to another may result in

static electrical sparks. To prevent the buildup of static electricity and prevent sparks

from causing a fire, it is important to bond metal dispensing and receiving containers

together before pouring. Bonding is done by making an electrical connection from one

metal container to the other. This ensures that there will be no difference in electrical

potential between the two containers and, therefore, no sparks will be formed.

Best way to bond containers is to securely attach a special metal bonding strap or
 Appendix A. Appendix 30

Figure A.1: Bonding and Grounding of Container.

wire to both containers. Some liquid transfer pumps have self-bonding hoses. Bond-

ing can also be done by keeping a solid metal-to-metal contact between the containers

themselves or between a metal container and a conducting nozzle. These latter two

methods are usually not reliable because a good electrical contact is often hard to

make and maintain during the entire transfer.

In the flammable liquid storage and dispensing area, ground dispensing drums. Ground-

ing is done by connecting the container to an already grounded object that will con-

duct electricity. This could be a buried metal plate, a metallic underground gas piping

system, metal water pipes or a grounded, metal building framework. Bonding both

containers and grounding one of them ”drains off” static charges and prevents the

discharge paint, rust or corrosion from points of contact should be done. Specially

designed and approved bonding and grounding wire assemblies are available from

safety equipment retailers.

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