Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No.

204819)
Facts:

The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the legislative’s decision that prior
measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to
the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive
health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for
the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a
population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and
that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

Issue:

Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

Ruling: NO

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
“so as not to cripple or impede legislation.”

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to certain provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
Leonen

Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the
Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first
before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”

Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during
the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right
to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does
not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.

Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin
does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose
or effect
therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

It has a secular legislative purpose;

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.