NAPOCOR V.

Ibrahim
G.R. No. 168732 June 29, 2007

Facts:
Lucman Ibrahim instituted an action against National Power Corporation for recovery of
possession of land and damages, claiming that he and his co-heirs were owners of several
parcels of land consisting of 70,000 sqm., divided into three lots. NAPOCOR allegedly took
possession of the sub-terrain area of those lands and built underground tunnels for
siphoning the water of Lake Lanao. They also claimed that the tunnels endangered the lives
and properties of Marawi City and caused them serious anxiety. NAPOCOR answered that
respondents were never in possession of the sub-terrain portion, had no proof that they
were owners of the property, and that the tunnels were a government project for the
benefit of all. The RTC denied the prayer to dismantle the tunnels but ordered NAPOCOR to
pay rent and damages to respondents. The case was brought to the CA.

Issue:
Whether Ibrahim and co-heirs own the sub-terrain area as well

Held:
Article 437 of the Civil Code states that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of the
surface and everything underneath it. Respondents could have utilized the property by
digging motorized deep wells into them but were prevented from doing so because of the
tunnels. The Court has held in the past that when the government takes property without
expropriation and devotes it to public use, the owner may demand payment of just
compensation if the property cannot be restored to him. The decision is then affirmed.
Tiat King v. Lim
G.R. No. 185407 June 22, 2015

Facts:
Spouses Victoriano and Evelyn Calidguid exectuted an agreement binding themselves to
pay P2,520,000 to Spouses Jaime Lee and Lim Dechu. However, Spouses Calidguid failed to
comply with the terms, leading Spouses Lee to levy a property belonging to the Calidguids.
In the public auction, Jaime was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued to
him. Sio Tiat King, an assignee of the Calidgiuds, redeemed the property before the
expiration of the period of right of redemption. Years after, King filed for the issuance of a
writ of possession, which was granted. Sheriff Cesar Javier served a notice to vacate to the
Calidguids and all others claiming rights under them. The Lims filed a joint affidavit of third
party claim, saying that they were the registered owners of the property, as well as a
motion to quash the writ of possession. They also filed a petition of certiorari saying that
they were ousted from their property without a separate action to resolve the issue of
ownership. The RTC denied the motion to quash, while the CA granted it.

Issue:
Whether the Lims may be evicted from the property because of the writ of possession in
favor of King

Held:
The Lims cannot be evicted from the property because Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of
Court states that the property may be possessed by the last redemptioner unless a third
party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. King acquired his
right over the property from the Calidguids when redemption was made and the Lims’
acquired claim of ownership when it was registered in their names. This means that the
Lims hold the property adversely the Calidguids. The Lims are considered as third party,
and Article 433 of the Civil Code applies to them. It states that actual possession under
claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. King took a procedural shortcut
when he went for a writ of possession instead of a suit to recover possession. The CA’s
decision is then affirmed.
Villasi v. Garcia
G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014

Facts:
Magdalena Villasi engaged the services of Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. to construct a seven-
storeey condominium building in Aurora Boulevard, Cubao. Villasi failed to fully pay the
contract price despite several demands, leading FGCI to initiate a suit for collection of sum
of money. Villasi argued that she delivered the whole amount but FGCI only accomplished
28% of the project. The RTC ruled in favor of FGCI and ordered Villasi to pay damages and
the value of unused materials. The CA ruled that an overpayment was made by Villasi and
directed FGCI to return the excess amount. After filing a motion of execution, the Sheriff
levied on a building in Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. It was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of FGCI, but was registered in the names of Spouses Filomeno and Ermelinda
Garcia. The Garcias filed an affidavit of third party claim to forestall the sale on execution,
reasoning that the City Assessor mistakenly assessed the building in the name of FGCI. The
RTC suspended the sale on execution.

Issue:
Whether the sale on execution may be suspended based on the Garcias’ third-party claim

Held:
Perusal of records shows that the Garcias failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to
the building in question. Aside from claiming that they are the title holders of the land, no
other credible evidence was produced. Meanwhile, Villasi was able to establish the
ownership of FGCI through evidence. The building in question was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI and these constitute credible proof of claim of title over
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation manifests a desire to
obtain title, strengthening one’s claim of acquisition of ownership. The Sheriff may then
proceed with the sale on execution.
Bachrach v. Seifert
G.R. No. L-2659 October 12, 1950

Facts:
Deceased E.M. Bachrach bequeathed all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all his
estate after payment of legacies, bequests, and gifts, to his wife Mary McDonald Bachrach in
his will. He further stated that upon her death, half of his estate would be divided between
his legal heirs, excluding his brothers. His estate received half of the shares of Atok-Big
Wedge Mining Co., Inc. Mary petitioned the lower court to authorize the endorsing and
delivering of the certificate of stock to her, claiming that it was part of the income of the
estate. The legal heirs of E.M. contended that it was part of the capital instead.

Issue:
Whether the shares of stock are part of the income or capital

Held:
There are two rules that govern such. The Massachusetts rule regards stock dividends as
capital because it does not distribute property and only dilutes shares as they existed
before. the Pennsylvania rule declares that earnings of the company, even when turned into
dividends, are still considered income. The latter is more applicable to our statutory laws
because under the Corporation Law, corporations can only declare dividends from the
surplus of their profits. Article 471, 474, and 475 discuss the right of the usufructuary to
fruits of the property in usufruct. The shares of stock then belong to Mary.
Bachrach Motor v. Talisay-Silay
G.R. No. 35223 September 17, 1931

Facts:
A complaint was filed by Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. against Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. for
the delivery of P13, 850. The sugar central should also render an accounting of the amount
it owed Mariano Ledesma and that the sale made by him be declared null and void. The
Philippine National Bank filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive any
amount Mariano Ledesma might be entitled to because that would be civil fruits of the land
mortgaged to said bank by hum for the benefit of the central referred to. Bachrach
answered that its credit against Ledesma was prior and preferential to the bank. The RTC
then held that Bachrach had a preferred right to receive the amount of P11,076.02. PNB
appealed to the decision.

Issue:
Whether the bonus in question is considered civil fruits

Held:
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: the rent of buildings, the
proceeds from leases of lands, and the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other
similar sources of revenue. Since the bonus is clearly not from the first two options, it must
be determined whether it is considered as income. It is to be noted that the bonus has no
immediate relation to the land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the
risk of having subjected one’s land to a lien in favor of the bank. It does not derive from the
value of the mortgaged property but from the total value of the debt. the judgment is then
affirmed.
Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat
G.R. No. L-23352 December 31, 1925

Facts:
Gabriela De Coster executed a general power of attorney to her husband Juan Poizat
allowing him to loan or borrow any amount in cash or fungible conditions he may deem
convenient. Juan then applied and obtained a credit of 10,000 pounds sterling in London.
To secure payment of the loan, he executed a mortgage upon his wife’s real property in
Binondo, Manila. This agreement was with the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company, Ltd. and it had a yearly interest of 9%, the principal of which must be returned
within four years. Juan failed to pay the loan and PSEDC filed an action to foreclose the
mortgage. It was sold to PSEDC for P100,000 though its worth was more than P300,000.
Gabriela objected to the sale, saying that she did not authorize Juan to bind her property ro
secure payment of his personal debts.

Issue:
Whether Gabriela’s property could be made as security for Juan’s loan

Held:
Gabriela did in fact give Juan the power of attorney. If the mortgage was legally executed by
her attorney in fact for her and in her name as her act and deed, it would be legal and
binding upon her property. However, it appears that only Juan was the only party and the
only one who signed the mortgage. There was no indication that his signature would bind
his wife as well, nor any acknowledgment that it was executed on behalf of his wife or in
her name, place, or stead. The mortgage is then declared null and void ab initio as to
Gabriela and her property.
DEPED v. Casibang
G.R. No. 192268 January 27, 2016

Facts:
In 1965, upon request of then Mayor Justo Caronan, Juan Cepeda allowed contruction and
operation of a school on the western portion of his property, now known as Solana North
Central School, operating under DepEd. When Cepeda died, his descedants continued to
tolerate the use and possession of the property. In 2000, respondents entered and occupied
a portion of the property. The school officials demanded them to vacate but they refused
and asserted Cepeda’s ownership of the lot. DepEd then filed a complaint for forcible entry,
which ordered respondents to vacate. They demanded DepEd to pay rent or buy the area
but were refused. They filed an action of recovery of possession against DepEd and were
declared the owners of the land.

Issue:
Whether respondents’ right to recover possession of the property is barred by prescription
or laches

Held:
DepEd did not present a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer of
property. It only presented a deed of sale. Meanwhile, respondents presented many
evidences of their ownership, including OCT, tax declarations, technical description by
DENR Land Management Services, and Certification by the MTC of Solana. These were
sufficient to resolve the issue on who had better right of possession. As registered owners
of the lots in question, respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. Furthermore, it
was merely out of respect and courtesy that Cepeda allowed such school to operate in his
property. Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code emphasize that DepEd must compensate
respondents for staying in their property.