G.R. No.

189476               February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name
cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood
in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held
that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the  civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case,
and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made
parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate
was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote 20 in support of his claim that his change of name was
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be
substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of
entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and
underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the
civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of
a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves

substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe
(Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente
Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that
her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is
Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married"
on "1953 Bulan" are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who
furnished the data in said birth certificate.

The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to
change her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct
her civil status in Victoria’s birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage
to "no marriage."

On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a
question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status
and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together
with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All
other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best
ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status
would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact
that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken . Rule 108, like all
the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules
"shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as
earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court  shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates  two sets of notices to
different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and
the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two
sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5,
also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within
which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that case, Nadina Maravilla
(Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June
Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her
daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he
acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment
of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.

Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the
appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of
the trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.

On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition for
correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not
expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured
the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.  Her interest was affected
1awphi1

by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew
of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast
as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected
by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the
legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.

xxxx

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on
the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho, 27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the
sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates
in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor
children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of
their mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" opposite
the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married.
And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of
marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the
course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from
Maribel to "Marivel."

The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan
who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.

The trial court granted the petition.

On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of the
petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held
that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of
hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the
affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos
were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and
Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for
change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness
stand declaring that she was not married to their father.

What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to
implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a
petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one
who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the
grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009
Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is
NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.

January 17, 2018

G.R. No. 207074

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of rights
and determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's name.

The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who bears it.
Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a product of the
exercise of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.

In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these labels be
registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of one's identity
that pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live Birth  filed with the
civil registrar.

Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as an
exercise of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The
other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to correct the data as
it was recorded in the Civil Registry.

This is a Petition for Review  under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision  of the Court of Appeals
1 2

in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal   from the Regional Trial
3

Court December 7, 2010 Order  granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for
4

Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.

To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan
City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155  for the correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of
5

her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108  of the Rules of Court.
6 7

In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle name,
"Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her
Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded. 
8

As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of
records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate.  9

The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a hearing on
August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela. 10

The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its
behalf.   Trial then ensued.
11

During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's certification,
and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who examined her also
certified that she was female.   On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never undertook any
12

gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any civil or criminal liability,
but to obtain a passport.  13

The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 20 I 0 Order, granted the petition.   It lent credence to the
14

documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and
innocuous."  It concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and
15

applied Rule I 08 of the Rules of Court,   citing Republic v. Cagandahan.   Thus:

16 17

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar
General, NSO through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the Birth
Certificate of the petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy particularly her
first name "MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE'', middle name of petitioner to
be entered as "SORIANO", middle names of petitioner's parents to be properly supplied as "ANGANGAN"
for the mother and "BALINGAO" for the father, as well as date of marriage of petitioner's parents to be
recorded as "MAY 23, 1981 ", after payment of legal fees if there be any.

SO ORDERED. 18

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name.   It argued that Gallo did not comply with
19
the
jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order did
not state her official name, "Michael Gallo."  Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for
20
not
stating the cause of the change of name. 21

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor General's
appeal.  It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were
22

clerical, harmless, and innocuous.  It further clarified that Rule 108 is limited to the implementation of
23

Article 412 of the Civil Code  and that the proceedings which stem from it can "either be summary, if the
24

correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it] affects . . . civil status, citizenship or nationality ...
which are deemed substantial corrections." 25

The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for changing
the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register." 26

Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to wit: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; ( c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 27

The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter, classifies
a change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be corrected
without a judicial order."  It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her parents'
28

middle names, and the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial corrections. 29

As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a
summary proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more rigid
and stringent adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural requirements
under Rule 108.  30

However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo wants
to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo. 31

Citing Republic v. Mercadera,  petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
32

innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108.  Thus,33

the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name.  As "Michael" could not have been the result
34

of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it
contemplates a substantial change.  35

Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule.   It also argues that the
36

use of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103.  37

Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction  as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first name,
38

superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter. 39

To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic,   which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law is to
40

exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 ... and 108 ... of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied." 41

Respondent Gallo, in her Comment,   counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned
42

corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.  In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the
43

applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding
properly satisfied.   Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of
44

non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to
dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court.  45

Petitioner filed its Reply.  The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their
46

respective Memoranda. 47

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the change
sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;

Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and

Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 1âwphi1

This Court finds for the respondent.  Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry.
1âwphi1

In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of error,
petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only raise
questions of law.

Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not include
weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.

In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co. : 48

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been
considered in the lower courts.

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when
the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining
whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the parties raising
the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other words, where there is
no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are
correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each
other, the issue is factual.   (Emphasis supplied)
49

In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining
whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking into
the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.

On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is helpful in
identifying the nature of the determination sought.

Republic Act No. 10172  defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is visible
50

to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

....

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date
of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding,
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:  Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.  51

Likewise, Republic Act No. 9048  states:

52

Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

....

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner.
53

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to
and evaluation of existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever
used.

This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of Appeals,
that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this Court is bound by
the lower courts' findings.

II.A

In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the entry of
Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No. 9048 applies
to all other corrections sought.

Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"  which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there.
54 55

Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage,
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of
natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination
of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of name. 56

As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which
amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or corrections
of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.

Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name.   On the
57

other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil
register may be changed or corrected.  58

Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial
changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by
law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.

This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who
may be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings bind the
whole world. 59

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant
to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding
in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position
in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a
remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives
and is best known." When granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new
"label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or
dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a
record of the change by virtue of a court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by
the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with,
the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication
serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in
the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. However,
"there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already
bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties
with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind."
Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or
disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced ... mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant ... "  (Citations
60

omitted)

Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must file a
petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing
date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 61

After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial
Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civi1 register.62

On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous
mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register.   It also governs the correction of substantial
63

errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule  and those affecting the civil
64

status, citizenship, and nationality of a person.  The proceedings under this rule may either be
65

summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial

errors. 
66

As explained in Republic v. Mercadera: 67

Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even
substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided
the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the
petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which
affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted .... " "Where such a change is ordered,
the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry
in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the
procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution."  (Emphasis in the original)
68

Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.  After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition
69

and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.  70

Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article
412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by
law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for
the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To
assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes
of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical
errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above,  Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of
the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."  (Citations71

omitted)

However, Republic Act No. 9048  amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing
72

clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the
jurisdiction of the civil registrar.  73

In Silverio v. Republic: 74

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .

....

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.  (Citations omitted)
75

In Republic v. Cagandahan:  76

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act
No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.  (Emphasis
77

in the original, citations omitted)

In Republic v. Sali: 78
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has
been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.    (Emphasis
79

supplied, citations omitted)

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or
typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames.  80

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations. 81

Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has
been filed and later denied.

In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172. 82

In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may now
be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes may now
be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or typographical mistake in
the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office
of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. 83

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.-  No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex
of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.   (Emphasis supplied)
84

However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on August 15,
2012-more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13,
2010.  Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
85

II.B

As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature of
the correction sought by Gallo.

Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent contends
that it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical errors.

Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's

Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

A clerical or typographical error pertains to a

[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records[.]  86

However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical or
typographical.  87

Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in
names with the civil register.

In Republic v. Mercadera,   Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from "Marilyn" to
88

"Merlyn."   She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she prayed that the trial
89

court correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she grew up to."  The Office of
90

the Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which must comply with the procedure
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.  However, this Court ruled that Rule 103 did not apply because
91

the petition merely sought to correct a misspelled given name:

In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly
misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that
blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the
same.

The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.  92

Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors that
need not go through the proceedings under Rule 103:

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the same
a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves
the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of
a clerical error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of petitioner's name from
"Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a
summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what
appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the
agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the
name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to 'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion,
because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig).  (Citations omitted)
93

Likewise, in Republic v. Sali,  Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live Birth,
94

alleging that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and her date of
birth as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been using the name
"Lorena" and the birth date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also averred that she had always been
known as "Lorena" in her community. She claimed that the petition was just to correct the error and not
to evade any criminal or civil liability, or to affect any succession of another person. 
95

In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's claim,
alleging that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction of a simple
clerical error. It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the applicant's
names and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing. It also
contended that assuming Rule 108 was the proper remedy, Sali failed to exhaust her remedies when she
did not file an affidavit under Republic Act No. 9048. 96
In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of name,
but a petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had been using
the name "Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to the name she had
been using as her true name. She had no intention of changing her name altogether. Thus, her prayer
for the correction of her misspelled name is not contemplated by Rule 103. 97

In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change sought
by Gallo is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely different
from each other. It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of "Michelle." 98

On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied.  99

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by which
she is commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not filing
the petition to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her name.

Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.  100

Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of her
given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of
these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in
"Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly,
considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does
not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been
known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to
her true given name.

However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.

As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010.   The current law, Republic
101

Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. 102

The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048.  103

To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of
clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial
proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes of first
name or nickname. Thus:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  - No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.  104

Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional Trial
Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the Regional Trial
Court take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali,  105

Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for
correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were
committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the
name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What she
seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to
conform to the name she grew up with.

Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .

....

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has
been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court . . .

....

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the
RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been
administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.  106

Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as
Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May 23,
1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.

Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner. 
107

These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it involves any
change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.

Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding"   fall within the coverage of
108

clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof
that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be made.

Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing a
petition under Rule 108.

However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was a
substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No.
9048.  109

This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan:  110

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.   (Citation omitted)
111

It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as to
biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or clerical
error.  112

However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be considered a
substantive matter.

In Cagandahan,   this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his or
113

her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule
108.  In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in recording
114

but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated by the petitioner.  115

IV

Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding to
the courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048. 116

On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines
because it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues
before this Court.  117

This Court rules in favor of Gallo.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative
processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be
given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust
administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent
condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.  118

However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
court's jurisdiction.  Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno: 
119 120

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of
noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.   (Citation omitted)
121

Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has
jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper
jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 122

In Republic v. Lacap:  123

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.   (Citation omitted)
124
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
cannot be waived.

However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure to
raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an
opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of
laches.125

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: 126

True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the opinion that the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation . . .

....

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction ... In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.   (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
127

Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised only as
an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; ( d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; ( e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo
warranto proceedings . .   (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
128

Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only raised in
this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped
from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the Certificate of Live Birth of
Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected as follows:

1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";

2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";

3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";

4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";

5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and

6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198010               August 12, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,

vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA)1 Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No.
00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of
Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was
born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth 7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her
family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, 8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never
married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. 10 She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the
petition before the RTC.

On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance
and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and
guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the
correction or change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so
that the entries would be:

a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third
party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person,
especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that
respondent has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as
a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16

On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to
implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of
the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. 17 As to whether the
petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering
that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that
their surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino. 18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served
upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the
name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport
and school and professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings
who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The
changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship.
In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in
changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this
country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.

It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that
case is illuminating:

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of
a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long
as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary
proceeding" as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22

In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v.
Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals, 25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was
cured by the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for
correction of entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable
party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was
highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her
children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all
sent to the residence she shared with them.27

In Alba v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting the
petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by
petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of
entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the
notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly
learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied.
Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of
personal service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication.29

In Barco v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries
despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an
indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108
which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition
for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the
provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the
failure to implead indispensable parties.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in
the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction
sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.

We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from
Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v.
Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent
therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name
appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting
the petition for hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an
order of general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and
place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry
"Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his
father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that
the corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The
Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a
petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition
under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and
failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth
certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of
simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The
RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that
any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the
scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial
court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed
a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the
petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation
of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision for failure to comply with the
requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate
was nullified.1âwphi1

In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth
certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to
Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from
"1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion
thereof which directs the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it
was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which
is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.

Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction
of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from
"Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to
different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction
but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where
the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left
out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. 44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would
be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in
Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court  (RTC) Decision  dated May 5, 2009 and Order  dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
1 2 3

16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of
entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002,
at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.  She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
4

entries in the wife portion thereof.  Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well
5

as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.  Respondent
6

also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent.  Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
7

appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L.
Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of
the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED. 9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake. 10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.
11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched in
this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel,
and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED. 12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to
institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE
ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the
entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.  In 15

directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in
effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.  Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is
16

actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of
law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.  Here, the issue raised by petitioner is
18

whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the
promulgation of Republic v. Valencia  in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
19

errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."  An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
20

proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered. 21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register. 22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she
was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that
no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract.
It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that
she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion
of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the
Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document
examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other
evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate
was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards.  The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
23

certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her
petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office  that:
24

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage.  Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and
1âwphi1

that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth
by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197174               September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders  dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of
1

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043.
The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate
of live birth.

The antecedent facts follow:

Petitioner filed a petition  for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
2

named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but
his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his
mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on
his birth certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the
ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial
since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate
child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done
by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found no
proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the
first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2)
whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries;
and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married
on December 23, 1983.

Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the civil
registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,  the case cited by the RTC, we
3

have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be presented during
the trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the
petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be
corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not
married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial
proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing
in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that
petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point.  Indeed, under Section 1  of R.A. No. 9048,
4 5

clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name
can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there
was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Silverio v. Republic,  we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of
6

first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v.
Cagandahan,  we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now
7

be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus
petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.

On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy
and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,  we held that
8

corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings. 9
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. As
mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his
mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained
to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same
petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.

We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail ofthe
administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.  He can also file a new
1âwphi1

petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner
and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature,
however, are now allowed under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided
that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead
as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition
for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida,  we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
11

procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In
Republic v. Uy,  we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
12

the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father
and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner will
have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when
he files the new petition for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The
dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

August 24. 2016

G.R. No. 211724

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN
THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN THE RECORDS OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE), FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 98082, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated
October 6, 2011 and the Order 4 dated November 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43 (RTC) in Spec. Proc. No. 1345 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry in
the Certificate of Live Birth filed by petitioner Felipe C. Almojuela (petitioner).

The Facts

For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the surname "Almojuela." However, when he
requested for a copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he was surprised to
discover that he was registered as "Felipe Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a
Petition for Correction of Entry 5 in his NSO birth certificate before the RTC, 6 docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
1345.7

Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in Pandan, Catanduanes and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), fonner governor of the said province, and
Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred that while his parents did not marry each
other, he has been known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using the said
surname in all of his official and legal documents, including his school records from elementary to
college, certificate of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) membership, government service
records, appointment as Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating in the First Grade Entrance
Examination of the Civil Service Commission, Philippine Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate of
Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes showing that
"Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full name. 8

In an Order9 dated January 10, 2011, the RTC initially dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitioner's recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was improper, as the petition did not involve mere
correction of clerical errors but a matter of filiation which should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule
103 of the same Rules. Moreover, it found that a similar petition docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1229 had
already been ruled upon and dismissed by the court. 10

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the issue of filiation is immaterial since he was
only seeking a correction of entry by including the surname "Almojuela" to "Felipe Condeno," his first
and middle names appearing on his birth certificate with the NSO. He likewise insisted that the name
"Jorge V. Almojuela" was clearly indicated thereon as the name of his father. Finding merit in petitioner's
arguments, the RTC, in an Order 11 dated February 9, 2011, reconsidered its earlier disposition and
allowed petitioner to present his evidence.12

During the proceedings, it was discovered that petitioner's name as registered in the Book of Births in
the custody of the Municipal Civil Registar of Pandan, Catanduanes is "Felipe Condeno" and not "Felipe
C. Almojuela," contrary to petitioner's allegation. 13

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated October 6, 2011, the R TC granted the petition and accordingly, directed the
Municipal Civil Registrar .of Pandan, Catanduanes to cause the correction of entry of the facts of
petitioner's birth by changing his surname from "Condeno" to "Almojuela" and to furnish the Civil
Registrar General with a copy of the corrected birth certificate. 15

In so ruling, the R TC found that the change in petitioner's surname would cause no prejudice to the
Almojuela family nor would they be the object of future mischief. Instead, petitioner has shown that he
was accepted and acknowledged by his half-siblings. Moreover, allowing petitioner to retain the surname
that he has been using for over sixty (60) years, i.e., "Almojuela," would avoid confusion in his personal
undertakings, as well as in the community.16

However, considering that the Book of Births of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pandan, Catanduanes
reflects the name "Felipe Condeno" as petitioner's registered name, the R TC ordered that the same be
first corrected before the correction of entry in the records of the NSO could be had. 17

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), moved for
reconsideration,18 citing lack of jurisdiction due to defective publication and contending that the caption
or title of a petition for change of name should state: (a) the alias or other name of petitioner; (b) the
name he seeks to adopt; and (c) the cause for the change of name, all of which were lacking in the
petition filed before the RTC. 19 In an Order20 dated November 14, 2011, the RTC denied the OSG's
motion and reiterated its stance that based on the allegations thereon, the petition was only for the
correction of entry in the records of the NSO. As petitioner had established compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements therefor, the RTC had thus acquired jurisdiction. 21 Dissatisfied, the OSG
appealed22 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision23 dated February 27, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Decision and
Order, and nullified the RTC's order for the correction of entry in petitioner's birth certificate. 24 It held
that although petitioner correctly invoked Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition, 25 he,
however, failed to strictly comply with the requirements thereunder when he omitted to implead the
Local Civil Registrar and his half-siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for, as
parties.26 Sections 427 and 5 28 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court require that notice be sent to persons
named in the petition, as well as to those not named thereon but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. In petitioner's case, his failure to imp lead and notify the Local Civil
Registrar and his half-siblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. 29

Moreover, the CA also found that the correction of entry sought by petitioner was not merely clerical in
nature, but necessarily involved a determination of his filiation. As petitioner failed to show that his
putative father, Jorge, recognized him as his child through any of the means allowed under Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, 30 petitioner, therefore, cannot use "Almojuela"
as his sumame.31

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter before the Court through the instant petition.1âwphi1

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the correction of
entry on petitioner's birth certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry through an appropriate adversary proceeding. 32 An adversary proceeding is defined as one
"having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it."33

Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court state:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the  persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition,
or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphases supplied)

A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of notices to potential
oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 34 Consequently,
the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as respondents
the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby. 35

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 36 the Court emphasized that in a petition for a substantial correction

or change of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil registrar, as well as
all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby be made
respondents for the reason that they are indispensable parties.37 Thus, the Court nullified the order to
effect the necessary changes for respondent's failure to strictly comply with the foregoing procedure laid
down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Citing Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 38 the Court held therein:

Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All
other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best
ascertained under an adversary system of justice.

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status
would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact
that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all
the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as
earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code. 39 (Emphases, italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in Republic v. Uy,40 the Court nullified the trial court's order to correct respondent's entry for
the latter's failure to implead and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents and
siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections sought. 41

In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to implead both the Local Civil Registrar and
his half-siblings. 42 Although he claims that his half-siblings have acknowledged and accepted him, the
procedural rules nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the interest of fair play and
due process and to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses. 43

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court has allowed the subsequent publication
of a notice of hearing to cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual
or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently
left out,44 these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and controversial alterations
renders the entire proceedings therein null and void. In Republic v. CA, 45 the Court held that the
proceedings of the trial court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to
implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of entry, viz.: >>

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not imp leaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.

xxxx

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party
and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the corrction of entry was concerned,  null and void for lack
of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.46 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Cobnsequently, the petition for correction of entry by petitioner must perforce be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.V. No. 98082 is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 6, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 in Spec. Proc. No. 1345 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth in NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis
5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male
and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as
a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand.
He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in
the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in
a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in
the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the
civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are controlled
by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.  –
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection,
sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the
words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

Respondent. Tinga,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and
ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name
"Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to
"male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered
as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition is very
rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to
the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that
petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants
to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby

ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal

certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR
"GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE." 4

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female
to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section
3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court  a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar. 5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition,
the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of sex or gender is
allowed under Rule 108, 10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements
of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. 11

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila,
to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].

Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall
set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition
is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set
for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four
(4) months after the last publication of the notice.

Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.

Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name
of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.

Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this

rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery
of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead
the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule
108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.18

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery
of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. 20

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the
base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female
gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some
intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex
individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication
in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has
been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’
for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current
state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis

for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the

subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and

categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit
the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent
as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant
of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of
name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate
from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law.
The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based
on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x
x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and
(2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the
guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the
prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court
to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on
its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a
court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the
RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on  Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover,
the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as
required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact." 37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a
Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would
like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her
and Fujiki.46
The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean
that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments.
Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits,  i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The
rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well
as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While
the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has
an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises
the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify"
the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband
or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution
and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of
a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on
the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van
Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country.
If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct
a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of
the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of
the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
"[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions
on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.