DYNAMIC BUILDERS VS PRISBITERO 755 SCRA 90
forum shopping by instituting two suits before the RTC and
DOCTRINE:
For local government infrastructure projects, Regional Trial
Courts may issue provisional injunctive reliefs against
government infrastructure projects only when (1) there are
compelling and substantial constitutional violations; (2) there
clearly exists a right in esse; (3) there is a need to prevent
grave and irreparable injuries; (4) there is a demonstrable
urgency to the issuance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when
there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the
project while the action is pending that far outweighs (a) the
inconvenience or costs to the party to whom the project is
awarded and (b) the public benefits that will result from the
completion of the project. The time periods for the validity of
temporary restraining orders issued by trial courts should be
strictly followed. No preliminary injunction should issue
unless the evidence to support the injunctive relief is clear and
convincing.
FACTS: On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of
Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards,
published an invitation to bid for the construction of a 1, 050
lineal meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality’s
shoreline. It is known as the Construction Shoreline Protection
Project.
On January 17, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee
conducted a pre-bid conference attended by six (6) prospective
contractors including Dynamic Builders. Yhree (3) out of the
seven (7) contractors that had secured bidding documents in
order to bid "submitted letters of withdrawal."6 Thus, only the
remaining four (4) bidders "were considered during the
opening of the bids."7
On April 21, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee issued
Resolution No. 7 affirming the award of contract to HLJ
Construction and Enterprise for the construction of the 1,050-
lineal-meter Construction Shoreline Protection Project
amounting to P31,922,420.37
On September 4, 2006 and pursuant to Article XVII, Section
58 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act, Dynamic Builders
filed the Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
of Bago City, Negros Occidental, assailing Mayor Presbitero's
Decision and Resolution
Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed a dated September 4,
2006 for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner Dynamic Builders submits that Article XVII,
Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 implicitly allowed it to
simultaneously file a Petition for Certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court assailing the protest case on the merits,
and another Petition before this court for injunctive
remedies.32
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has violated the rules on
SC
RULING:Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
"[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of
a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause
of action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits,
whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts."59
This Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public
respondent's Decision and Resolution on the protest — the
same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the
Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner
seeks the same relief through two separate Petitions filed
before separate courts. This violates the rule against forum
shopping.
Private respondent alleges that petitioner did not even notify
the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Negros Occidental, of
its Petition filed before this court.61 The Rules of Court
provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional
Trial Court, the Court of Appeals, and this court in
entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus.62 However, parties must adhere to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy of courts must be respected.
The doctrine with respect to hierarchy of courts was designed
so that this court will have more time to focus on its
constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that
also fall within the lower courts' competence.65 This court
acts on petitions for extraordinary writs under Rule 65 "only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy."66
Consistent with these rules and doctrines, the remedy
contemplated by Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No.
9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional
Trial Court or the proper action filed before this court.
However, direct resort to this court can prosper only when the
requisites for direct invocation of this court's original
jurisdiction are present.
PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA V.
SCHONFELD 516 SCRA (G.R. NO. 166920; FEBRUARY
19, 2007)
Topics: Jurisdiction, venue, forum non conveniens
FACTS: Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident
of New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had been
a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and
water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is
a corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. The president of PPI, Jens
Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was
based in Tokyo, Japan. Henrichsen commuted from Japan to
Manila and vice versa, as well as in other countries where
PCIJ had business.
Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through Henrichsen, as
Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation
Department. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector
manager in the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by
PPI and PCIJ. Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment
to respondent in Canada, requesting him to accept the same
and affix his conformity thereto. Respondent made some
revisions in the letter of employment and signed the contract.
He then sent a copy to Henrichsen.
Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his
position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of
a resident alien. Respondent received a letter from Henrichsen
informing him that his employment had been terminated
effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had
not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the
Philippines. However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by
electronic mail, requested respondent to stay put in his job
after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to
report on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he
had developed.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. The
Labor Arbiter found, among others, that the January 7, 1998
contract of employment between respondent and PCIJ was
controlling; the Philippines was only the "duty station" where
Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions
of Employment. PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite
his having been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had
agreed that any differences regarding employer-employee
relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.
On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the
Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latter’s decision in toto.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with the CA. On the issue of venue, the appellate court
declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of
employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a
case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed,
an agreement that issues between the parties were to be
resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not
exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint
cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction
over respondent’s claim despite the fact that respondent, a
foreign national, was hired abroad by a foreign corporation,
executed his employment contractabroad, and had agreed that
any dispute between them "shall be finally settled by the court
of arbitration in London.
RULING: The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as
held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid
and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a
rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must
be accompanying language clearly and categorically
expressing their purpose and design that actions between them
be litigated only at the place named by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely,"
"exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —,"
"particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal
import were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said that the
court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring
forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.
Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his
Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where the
PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place where the contract
of employment was signed, in London as stated in their
contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent
could have filed his complaint, however, petitioners
themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the
employment contract is indeed merely permissive.
Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of
forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that
respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not
warrant the application of the principle for the following
reasons:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include
forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.34
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly
considered as defense.35
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America
International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,36 this Court held that:
x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the FACTS; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or
is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x
Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this
case.
BIACO VS. COUNTRY SIDE RURAL BANK 515 SCRA
106
FACTS: Biaco vs Countryside Rural Bank Ernesto Biaco is
the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. Ernesto
obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced
by promissory notes. As security for the payment of the said
loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the
bank covering the parcel of land described in Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate
mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When
Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due
date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written
demand . The written demand, however, proved futile
prompting respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure
of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to
the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office. Ernesto
received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to
file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in
default upon motion of the respondent bank. The respondent
bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the
Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the court as
Commissioner.
RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In case of non-
payment within the period, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered
to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of
registered land to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if
there be any should be delivered to the defendants spouses
ERNESTO and MA. THERESA [CHAVES] BIACO. In the
event however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the
mortgage[d] property is not enough to pay the outstanding
obligation, the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of
the judgment as their personal liability. Petitioner sought the
annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending
that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the
judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came
to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of
more than six (6) months after its finality. . She moreover
asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction
because summons were served on her through her husband
without any explanation as to why personal service could not
be made. Petitioner further argues that the deficiency
judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed
void for lack of jurisdiction over her person.
CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions
quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were
not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further
ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot
be considered extrinsic fraud.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud
perpetrated by respondent upon her thereby violating her right
to due process?
HELD: The appellate court acted well in ruling that there was
no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner,
noting that the spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case
and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance
concealed by the husband from the wife cannot be attributed
to respondent bank.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the
basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action
against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action
quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be
granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it
has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of
summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is
limited to the res. Similarly, in this case, while the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a
rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its
jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing
petitioner’s personal liability. In doing so without first having
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did,
the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process,
warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the
case.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. V. SPS. BENEDICTO
& TERESITA YUJUICO G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015
Doctrine: An action to recover the deficiency after
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a
personal action because it does not affect title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein.
FACTS: In 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against
the respondents for the expropriation of 5 parcels of land in
Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondents. 2 of
the parcels of land were mortgaged to the petitioner. In 2000,
the Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the five
parcels of land expropriated for public use. The petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion to, but the RTC denied the motion
for having been "filed out of time." Hence, the petitioner
decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted
on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan.
After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two
lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder. Claiming a
deficiency, the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such
deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint on several grounds. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss, while in CA, it granted the petition, opining
“Thus, a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the
foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action
because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage
contract; it is upon a written contract and upon an obligation
of the mortgage- debtor to pay the deficiency which is created
by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of
deficiency must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.”

Issues: Whether or not the venue for the collection of

deficiency is properly laid.

Held: Yes. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on

whether it is a real or a personal action. According to Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects
title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which
explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as
personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for
the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of
some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property.The venue of a personal action is the place
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the
action is considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions
between real and personal actions, an action to recover the
deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect
title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought the case
in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the
main office of the petitioner was located. We underscore that
in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional,
and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived.