G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,  vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his in the practice of law when he:
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
Management, respondents.
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
petitioner.
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
PARAS, J.: board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
such representative capacity performs any act or acts for
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national
representative capacity, engages in the business of
existence.
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
college degree, and must not have been candidates for v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
any elective position in the immediately preceding
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
proceedings, the management of such actions and
years. (Emphasis supplied)
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly and all action taken for them in matters connected with
provides: the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
work done involves the determination by the trained legal
law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
to an appointive office.
small part of work performed outside of any court and
Black defines "practice of law" as: having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
these transactions may have no direct connection with
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
complex situations. These customary functions of an
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
that these manifold customary functions be performed by
Page 1 of 60 ETHICS0116
 persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the up.
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
question.
3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
(Emphasis ours)
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting on Audit?
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
advocacy, counselling and public service. work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
follows some one or more lines of employment such as
that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which ... ( Emphasis supplied)
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
render any kind of service, which device or service requires
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
23)
(emphasis supplied)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
allowed to make a very brief statement?
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
The Commissioner will please proceed.
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice
professional corporations and the members called
of law for at least ten years".
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make "associates." (Ibid.).
the clarification that this provision on qualifications
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of
are qualified to be considered for appointment as members
court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn.
Audit.
222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to lawyers perform almost every function known in the
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
made available whenever this provision on the would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op.
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar cit.).

Page 2 of 60 ETHICS0116
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client
is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well
as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and
the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public
image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public
mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so?
Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in
most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one
legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless
the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered
the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new
skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the
salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the
nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
Page 3 of 60 ETHICS0116
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major
emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the
use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action
in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration
or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
 clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many
people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private
law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large
enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including
the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how
one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization.
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely
involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes
be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities
available to corporate lawyers to enter the international
law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms.
Because working in a foreign country is perceived by
many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer
in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
Page 4 of 60 ETHICS0116
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known
as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other
— often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends
are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from
industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such
as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-
based models can be used directly by parties and mediators
in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support,
including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special
skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks
of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are
being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in
a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade
as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession.
The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of
the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally
with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
Page 5 of 60 ETHICS0116
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is
to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit
to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security:
Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or
will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On
the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having
hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development,
has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform
law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which
Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts
as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael
Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency
for International Development, during the Session on Law
for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement
drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international business specialist
or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements
contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External
Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which
Page 6 of 60 ETHICS0116
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of
both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence
to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank
v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as
in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest
to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the
case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-
3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it
to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani
Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited
the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from
my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use
of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the
acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action
be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
Page 7 of 60 ETHICS0116
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications
as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown
shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee
by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once,
the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured,
the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of
reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions 
NARVASA, J.,  concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr.
Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to
me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on
Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the
basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first
deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I
was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment,
I am even more convinced that the constitutional
requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years"
has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve
scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to
be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution).
Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards
for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure
that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood,
"practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To
"practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to
exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is
habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be
said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice
his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer
who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Page 8 of 60 ETHICS0116
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs.
Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a particular
activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents involving the
use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
 relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an
activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or
writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful
aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for
at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which
are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or
habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually,
did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if
ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the
practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of
legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or
advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which
do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in
the activeand continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available
to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to
declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position
of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J.,  dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother
Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are
certain points on which I must differ with him while of
course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from
examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the
basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would
still be subject to our review.
Page 9 of 60 ETHICS0116
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved
was the discretion of the appointing authority
to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who
both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind
of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people
may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified
an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission
on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared
ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no
less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what
we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election
but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the
first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent,
I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its
definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous
activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a
lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his
activities involve the application of some law, however
peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster
and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law
even if his main occupation is another business and he
interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the
Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-
A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society,
there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law
or government regulation the businessman must know
about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a
lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern
to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when,
on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a
doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application
of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he
would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law
because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the
practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out
of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law,"
which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to
say that "because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to
consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of
it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally
(even if only remotely) connected with some law,
ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the
lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but
they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution.
It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and
finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions
listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige
as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose
principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be
argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in
Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the
NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together
with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that
his activities in these capacities extended over the
prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is
doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions
worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less
than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to
grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging
in the practice of law as a qualification for public office
would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive
terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that
Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in
the result because there was no error so gross as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2
not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First
is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if
the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr.
Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational
background, experience in international banking and
finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity
and competence are not questioned by the petitioner.
What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement
written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my
constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of
law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say
that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond
rational limits.
Page 10 of 60 ETHICS0116
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he
has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for
COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-
finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm
with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words
shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise;
one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and
attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data
submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that
Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged
one year period after passing the bar examinations when he
worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice
must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he
practice law in the United States while not a member of the
Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department;
Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e.,
Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development
Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989
Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
 d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely
indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough
attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor
the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers
working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice
of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as
an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments
show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law"
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue
ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a
term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every
resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various
times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary
for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay
captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market
vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these
people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the
practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with
having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as
follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court
in connection with litigation but also services rendered
out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill
or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff,
399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill.
462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a
formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as
an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws
and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or
rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition
of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we
Page 11 of 60 ETHICS0116
referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87
N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of
law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him
were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to
how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he
said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked
if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number
of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying
that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the
deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a
practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice
in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he
was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done
about everything that is on the books as far as real estate
is concerned."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-
estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.
2d 773)
x x x           x x x          x x x
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person
designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are
properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is
much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may
be an attorney in facto for another, without being an
attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public
attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The
principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the
court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his
client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client
informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his
secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be
justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently,
 customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of
acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to
exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice
law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523;
Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law
denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated
in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
x x x           x x x          x x x
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the
meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies
customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a
law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
x x x           x x x          x x x
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod
may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such
legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of
practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations
as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of
law, doing business also should be active and continuous.
Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and
casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and
member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President,
Page 12 of 60 ETHICS0116
Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in
prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position
of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments
committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the
nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
A.C. No. 6705             March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,  vs. ATTY. CARLOS B.
SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against
private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of
Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former
President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its
operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat
employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus
Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S.
No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees
alleged that complainant, who took over the management
and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was
assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He
resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing
of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in
relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following
violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal
representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the interest, malice and bad faith. 28
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent
instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed
should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating
Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is
and deciding the case filed by Taggat
bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the
employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that
names of the employees or present them for cross-
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even
examination. 29
harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and
sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15 Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his
appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
from complainant but claims that it
government prosecutor
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of
1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
his consultancy services and not for representation.
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence
Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as
to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee
representation and that rendering consultancy services is
for the months of January and February
not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum,
1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May
states:
1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for
paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking,
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against
and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all
private practice of law while working as government
show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’.
prosecutor.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints
that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of filed by former Taggat employees. 32
the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to
her expectation. 19
prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent
filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and
undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it
Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant
Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January
failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed
1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not
file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating
executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental
Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
reservation. 25
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP
motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned
exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner
complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on Funa"). 38
12 February 1999:
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to
xxx resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he
November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
would do it, Madam Witness?
Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests,
was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating
trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he the prohibition against the private practice of law while
gonna help me. x x x. 26 being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist
three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report
because he was not representing Taggat employees or
reads:
complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing
his official duty as Assistant Provincial Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of
Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of
Page 13 of 60 ETHICS0116
this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S.
No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code"
(see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex
"B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-
Santiago, was being accused as having the "management
and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros.
Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel
of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the
personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat.  Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues,
therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to
the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in
that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein
Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to
"maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v.
Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
he does not represent any client or any interest except
justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer
has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to
matters that he previously handled for that former client. In
this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies,
and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was
for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict.
Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240
not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a
Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it
is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a
former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992
and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were
of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and
management involved are the very personalities he dealt
with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the
corporation and part of its management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or
"consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government
prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of
law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the
legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any
Page 14 of 60 ETHICS0116
activity, in or out of court, which required the application of
law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for
legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava,
105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano
v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain
employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal
complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict
of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest,
and violating the prohibition against the private practice of
law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the
Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the
Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds
respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when
he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or
Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests
does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a
written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private practice of
[his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that
respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various
tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be
asked to use against his former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former
client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The
issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of
wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests, evidence must be presented to prove that
respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous
employment. The only established participation respondent
had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was
the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On
that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that
respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in
resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not
a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing
conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not
guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s
self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy
services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This
argument is without merit because the law does not
distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that
are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
"practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his
legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated
that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s
Page 15 of 60 ETHICS0116
fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to
disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless
the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he
received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as
a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him
with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his
Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the
respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or
disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his
name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following
grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross
violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the
public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in unauthorized private
practice of profession is suspension for six months and one
day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for
respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of
this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record
as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos,
Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of
Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the
permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear
at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney
Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel
for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,  L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled
that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein
qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court
in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the
case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused
presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as
Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section
32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court,
which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims
that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to
appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually
enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed
to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U.
Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961,
the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There
being no reservation by the offended party of the civil
liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The offended party had,
therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in
the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in
the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid
for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San
Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San
Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.
Page 16 of 60 ETHICS0116
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be represented
by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil
action which was impliedly instituted together with the
criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City
Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of
the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of
the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of
the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the
apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is
dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without
merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial
judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider
plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in
his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now
Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no
judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or
of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private
practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney
Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior,
the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the
case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against appellant..
B. M. No. 1036               June 10, 2003
 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,  vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must
possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the
legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice
of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if
he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member
of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However,
the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice
of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for
a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes
in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this
pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,"
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without
the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the
Page 17 of 60 ETHICS0116
charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court
required respondent to comment on the complaint against
him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
"specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date.
He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-
Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent
prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to
respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only
to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges
that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao")
filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate
for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance
on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is "motivated mainly by political
vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before
the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22
May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct
casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC. any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
The Court’s Ruling
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that
However, the records show that respondent appeared as he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in the Philippine Bar.3
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In
right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an
"authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even
also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that person seeking admission had practiced law without a
"Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM- license.5
PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar
May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll
for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
indirect contempt of court.7
All these happened even before respondent took the
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice
and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the
of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
elucidated that: examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
proceedings, the management of such actions and
Roll of Attorneys.9
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for
with the law, incorporation services, assessment and a private client in any court or administrative body since
condemnation services contemplating an appearance respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
stated that he was resigning "effective upon your
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
resignation effective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence
(Italics supplied) x x x
does not support the charge that respondent acted as
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires Sangguniang Bayan.
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent
perform acts which are usually performed by members of
Page 18 of 60 ETHICS0116
to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

Page 19 of 60 ETHICS0116
 A.C. No. 5095             November 28, 2007
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA
C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R.
MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL,
NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G.
IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP, complainants,  vs. ATTY. EDWIN
PASCUA, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3,
1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan
and the other above-named complainants, against Atty.
Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty.
Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering
the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series
of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III,
Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26,
1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries
appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last
entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on
December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have
notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10,
1998.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4,
1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two
documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not
entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his
legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was
attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized
documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service
Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina
M. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They
filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and
Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that Atty.
Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear
case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted
their motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its
Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities
and the basic requirement in the performance of their
duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Page 20 of 60 ETHICS0116
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in
such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging
the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages
of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank
line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V,
Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries
in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject
documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not
recorded in his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional
but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case,
Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter
into his notarial register the documents that he
admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as
a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence
is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last
entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is
Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the
two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December
10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively,
under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining
that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to
the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on
his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member
of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence
of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the
affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible
since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested
witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit
of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when
Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina
Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends
credence to the submission of herein complainants that
Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint
making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and
entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer
coincidence then that both documents are dated
December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from
doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa v.
Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
 As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties for six months, this being his first administrative offense.
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial
public policy and impressed with public interest. commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him
from the practice of law for six months for violating the
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for
Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed
any misconduct in his professional or private capacity.
of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v.
The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries
Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension
public who were found guilty of dishonesty
from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G.
or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent notarized.
lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's
Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document
first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-
without affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing
month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in
the same instrument of which he was one of the
order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation
signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed
of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a
upon him.
notary public.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that
three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
His notarial commission, if still existing, is
warning that another infraction would be dealt with more
ordered REVOKED.
severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the
supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent's SO ORDERED.
first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent
lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being
found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The Court considered the seriousness of the
offense and his previous misconduct for which he was
suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also
be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
recommended that the notarial commission of Atty.
EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that
he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve
to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the
Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of
Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose.4 The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were already dead, this Court held that such
wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed

Page 21 of 60 ETHICS0116
 JBC No. 013               August 22, 2007
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of
the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director
of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI,
Davao City.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on
May 17, 2003.1 Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that
administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge
Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from
the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated
April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain
declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases
Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against
him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed.
No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his
PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy
Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court
Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified
copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.3On
even date, letters4 were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting
for certified true copies of documents relative to the
administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain,
particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing
him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge
Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and
deception he committed before the JBC.5
In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM
furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was
indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for
falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement
vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of
expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183
DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL
DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11
This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime
Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao
City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in
relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code
and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the
NAPOLCOM.
xxxx
Page 22 of 60 ETHICS0116
After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the
above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have
been consummated without respondent’s direct
participation, as it was upon his direction and approval
that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the
falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and
encashment of the check by respondent only shows his
complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes
misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any
standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is
unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to
stress, a public office is a position of trust and public
service demands of every government official or
employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the
highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must
remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure
to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit
admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him
that the government is serious enough to [weed out]
misfits in the government service, and it will not be
irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of
personalities involved. Accordingly, respondent’s
continuance in office becomes untenable.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM,
Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and
benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the
year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.
(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)
By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary7
In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock,
Judge Quitain denied having committed any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his
interview, the members thereof only inquired about the
status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before
the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case
simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he
never received from the Office of the President an official
copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain
within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in
his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public on
November 22, 2001, the administrative case filed against
him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.9
In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004,
respondent explained that during the investigation of his
administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee,
one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from
the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted;
that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable
resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 199311 which was
immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose
the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief"
that he had no more pending administrative case by reason
of his resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative
automatic dismissal" of his administrative case considering complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;
that "the issues raised therein became moot and
2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of
academic"; and that had he known that he would be
the "Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr.
dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for
Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the
the position of a judge since he knew he would never be
subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April 1993;
appointed.
3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively
from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April
liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge
(now a member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted
Quitain were separately published in the Mindanao Daily
a Memorandum12 dated September 3, 2004 to then Chief
Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:
read as follows:
In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly
Mindanao Times:
evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the
records of the subject administrative case against Judge Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal
Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting
Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15
regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for
May 2004, we examined the records of said administrative
understanding to those allegedly behind his ouster from his
case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and
post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the guests in
secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.
yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he
After careful perusal of the documents and records read his prepared statement on his dismissal from
available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime government service.
V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are reasonable
Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned
grounds to hold him administratively liable.
from the Department of Interior and Local Governments in
An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by 1991, a series of administrative charges were hurled against
Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was him by some regional employees.
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M.
"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due
Bustamante of Davao City on 22 November 2001, reveals
process," Quitain said.
that he concealed material facts and even committed
perjury in having answered "yes" to Question No. 24, but He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are
without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.
government service. Question No. 24 and his answer
"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My
thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:
only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me the
24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or chance to clear my name, the only legacy that I can leave to
otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, my children," Quitain said in his statement.
decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or "It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings
any other government office, agency or instrumentality in of the administrative case," he also said.
the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of
an administrative offense or imposed any administrative
Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon
sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is "Yes" to any of
the recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was later
the questions, give particulars.
designated Napolcom acting regional director for Region XI.
But all dismissed (acquitted)
Mindanao Daily Mirror:
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] – August 2, 1995 Quitain vows to clear name
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the
Date of [Dismissal] – July 17, 2000
National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to
As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did clear his name in court from charges of tampering with an
not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the official receipt.
government service. At the time he filled up and submitted
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed
his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he
confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court
had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as
against the group that plotted his ouster from office: He
well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him from
said his only appeal was for Interior and Local Government
the government service. Based on the certified documents
Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to
secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following
answer the charges.
data were gathered:
"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long
1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March
forgiven them," Quitain said.
1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado,
"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge
the only legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.
Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his
Page 23 of 60 ETHICS0116
While the records of the subject administrative case on file
with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt
of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same
does not necessarily mean that he is totally unaware of said
Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted
newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain even aired his appeal
and protest to said Administrative Order.
xxxx
Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied
with the JBC had he known that he was administratively
charged and was consequently dismissed from the service
since he will not be considered. But this may be the reason
why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he
did not declare the administrative case in his Personal Data
Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no
administrative or criminal case that would be filed against
him by reason of his resignation and the assurance made by
the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed,
does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to state that
his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an
automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case filed
against him because when he resigned and relinquished his
position, the issues raised therein became moot and
academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the
formal dismissal of the administrative case because of said
belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself
from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant
and material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member
of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the
NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability
he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to the
automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against
him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case
filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged
administratively could easily escape from administrative
sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the
service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly
believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic
dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could have
done was to personally verify the status thereof. He should
not have relied on the alleged assurance made by the
NAPOLCOM.
On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain
misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that
he had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary.
His prior dismissal from the government service is a blot on
his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even
more because of his concealment of it. Had he not
concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into
consideration when the Council acted on his application. His
act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary,
much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he
was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and
dishonesty.
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant
administrative case against respondent be docketed as an
administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from
the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any
position in the government, including government-owned
Page 24 of 60 ETHICS0116
or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
Respondent was required to Comment.13
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution respondent filed
his Comment14 contending that before he filed his
application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no
knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the
NAPOLCOM service as the case was "secretly heard and
decided." He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral
Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in
Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was
recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor
Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his
appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the
National Police Commission, Region XI;
2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG
Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who
were the same followers involved in the chain of
corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly
pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional
Director;
3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal
integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing
criminal charges against him;
4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial,
he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the
dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused to
do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the DILG
central office in Manila;
5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he
realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated
with his detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence,
upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their
pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in
NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases filed
against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be
dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;
6. From then on he was never formally aware of any
administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he
submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and
Bar Council in support of his application as RTC judge, he
made the following answer in Question No. 23:
23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or
administrative (including disbarment) case or
complaint filed against you pending before any court,
prosecution office, any other office, agency or
instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines?
He could only give a negative answer since there was no
pending administrative case filed against him that he
knows;
7. Had he known that there was an administrative case
filed against him he would have desisted from applying as
a judge and would have given his full attention to the said
 administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing contention that he was denied due process. The documents
embarrassment; and submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that
Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc
8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well
Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993
as the proceedings had thereon and the decision
informing him that an administrative complaint had been
rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have
filed against him and required him to file an answer.19 Then
probably occurred during his "exile period" when he was
on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty.
detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the
Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.20 In administrative
said administrative case are null and void since he was
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an
denied due process.
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one’s
Respondent’s Comment was submitted to the OCA for side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
evaluation, report and recommendation.15 or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005
accorded, there is no denial of due process.21Furthermore,
stating therein that it was adopting its earlier findings
as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain
contained in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004.
ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does
Based on the documents presented, it can not be denied
not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint
that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he
filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from
render said administrative case moot and academic.22 Judge
government service. Considering that Judge Quitain’s
Quitain was removed from office after investigation and
explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of
was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from
his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA
the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion,
credits. Jr.,23 this Court stressed:
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to
recommendation of the OCA. inform the appointing authority and this Court of the
pending criminal charges against him to enable them to
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to
determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the
apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on
position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His
his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as
record did not contain the important information in
may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are
question because he deliberately withheld and thus
qualifications specifically required of appointees to the
effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as his
Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.17
reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was knew would have been taken into account against him if it
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for had been disclosed."
grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by
Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty"
no less than the former President of the Philippines. He
means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness;
insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with
lack of integrity."24
the JBC his verified PDS in support of his application for RTC
Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies
was denied due process. He further argues that since all the dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules,
criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, provides the following sanctions:
1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he
SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a
resigned from office, his administrative case had become
serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
moot and academic.
imposed:
Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit. 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that
any public office, including government-owned or
he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the
that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears
leave credits;
emphasis that in the Mindanao Times dated April 18,
2. Suspension from office without salary and other
1995,18 Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that "I
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due
months; or
process." It also reads: "Quitain, who was one of the guests
3. A fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he
P40,000.00.
read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the
government service." Neither can we give credence to the
Page 25 of 60 ETHICS0116
In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other
Cube,26 we held: privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public
which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is
service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and
into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube
appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of
committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to
the government, including government-owned and/or
be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has
controlled corporations.
tarnished with his falsehood.
This Decision is immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V.
reappointment to any position in the government, including Quitain’s 201 File.
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
SO ORDERED.
forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is
immediately executory.
Adm. Case No. 2984               August 31, 2007
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant, 
integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of
vs.
the Judiciary.27 We have often stressed that the conduct
ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.
required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
RESOLUTION
lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to NACHURA, J.:
let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative
Judiciary. We condemn, and will never countenance any
Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-
the administration of justice, which would violate the norm
one years old and barred from the practice of law for fifteen
of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
years.
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.28lavvphil
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found
follows.
guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal. On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter
administrative offenses:
from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating
that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective 1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, a) part of the sum of ₱27,710.00 entrusted to him for
Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, "the Court payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to
Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle
Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without Verde I; and
prejudice to the decision of the administrative case."29 b) part of another sum of ₱40,000.00 entrusted to him
for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted
the registration of title of Bernardo to another property
by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and
in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985,
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex
the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
P, par. 51, complainant’s affidavit dates October 4,
acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased
1989);
to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par.
retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official
48, id.); and
innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the
rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo’s
dreadful and dangerous implications.30 Indeed, if innocent,
favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
the respondent official merits vindication of his name and
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served
the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in
well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
the amount of ₱50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.1
under the situation.31
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V.
Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of which reads:
QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent,
resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him
meted the penalty of a fine of ₱40,000.00. It appearing that and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.

Page 26 of 60 ETHICS0116
Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately,
Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his
record in the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the
Courts concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be
allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999,
the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the
petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for
review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or
opposition was filed against the petition.2
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of
the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the
Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor
at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicant’s character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character
of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.3
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the
law profession.1avvphi1 Fifteen years had already elapsed
since Mejia’s name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys.
At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and
pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long
repented and he has suffered enough. Through his
reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children
and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a
publication containing his religious and social writings. He
also organized a religious organization and named it "El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and
Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen
years has passed since Mejia was punished with the severe
penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly
take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close
its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years.
While the age of the petitioner and the length of time
during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment
are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no
other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from
this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough.
Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline
Page 27 of 60 ETHICS0116
its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion
when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to
punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6697             July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,  vs. ATTY. LEONARD
S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227             July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC             July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM
THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE
VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY
REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR
ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and
Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The
first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de
Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National
President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board.
The resolution of these cases will determine the national
presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to
make an investigation, report and recommendation on
subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as
follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo
Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on
the following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in
concealing the suspension order rendered against him
by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called
"rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No.
 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was
found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing
Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in
Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged
that the respondent was then forced to resign or
surrender his license to practice law in the said state in
order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent
lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the
country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent
violated the so-called "rotation rule" provided for in
Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent
failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He
surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended
only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be
enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005,
respondent stated that the issues raised in above-
mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were
already extensively discussed and categorically ruled
upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December
2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed
that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed
following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office
of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in
support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005,
complainant maintained that there is substantial
evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness
and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his
disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent
never denied that he used his client's money.
Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present
evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted
the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the
respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted
that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227 A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty.
de Vera's letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath
taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on
the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP
National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President
Page 28 of 60 ETHICS0116
Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated
13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the
IBP Board and the IBP in general.2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-
15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of
Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board
approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this
Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. –
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was
intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the
salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution
approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition
were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court
of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the
afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy
of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty.
de Vera's request for oathtaking as National President, was
filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C.
No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.6
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th
National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where
Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP
Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as
IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP
National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the
removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for
having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP.9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board
held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by
2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of
the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice
President.10 Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of
said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED
as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive
Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the
 Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of scheduled to assume my position as National President of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the
I was denied the very basic rights of due process
decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the
recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative
PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
cases:
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate
of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and 1. The denial of the right to answer the
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A charges formally or in writing. The complaint against
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary me was in writing.
Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and 2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within
pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines; a reasonable period of time after receipt of the
complaint.
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt
the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to
and disrepute;
testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned.
Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that "A My request was denied.
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to 5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on behalf.
similar conduct by others", by making untruthful 6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge.
statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and
Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of judge all at the same time.
Lawyers in Baguio City; 7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even
more evident because when his motion to expel me
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to
was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote),
embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in
Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he
order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the
can vote to support his own complaint and motion to
aforesaid PETITION;
expel me.13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May
Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10th
2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.14 In their Reply, the IBP Board
National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from
explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty.
him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25
de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to
January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION,
protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the
thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP
grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the
National President deliberately prevented him from
following:
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto,
thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the (i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media
IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11 campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to
condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this
withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of
Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G.
compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to
Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a
reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement
Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. (ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned
Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National
Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the President in public or during the Plenary Session at the
Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution 10th National Convention of Lawyers.
Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited'
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice
speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera "fanned
and Judgment Without Formal Investigation."12
the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about
denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board
Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter- of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to
to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose
disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements,
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the
grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of
the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning
names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,

Page 29 of 60 ETHICS0116
 nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga
kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it appear that the IBP
Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing
the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the
Supreme Court.15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation
during the Plenary Session was "the last straw that broke
the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the
interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board
decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with
copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from
various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the
IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice
Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the
EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took
note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought
about by Atty. de Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared
as IBP EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the
election of Atty. Santiago.18 On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during
its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in
the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to
replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a
letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this
Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President Cadiz
also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's
election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as
National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should
his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as
EVP is approved by this Court.21 Also on 28 June 2005, Atty.
de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de
Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or
legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the
IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the
basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds
as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP
was likewise executed without due notice and without the
least compliance with the minimum standards of due
process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly
false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers
at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in
their language and exhortations, not once undermining the
stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors
in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with
the Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary
Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-
elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the
decision to remove him only shows that the right to
Page 30 of 60 ETHICS0116
freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized
by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of
withholding a copy of this Court's Resolution granting the
withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made
no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP,
Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as
it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws
concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the
Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of
two years from July 1 following their election until 30
June of their second year in office and until their
successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his
functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive
Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President
shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion
of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or
disability of both the President and the Executive Vice
President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the
term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other
officers and employees appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure
of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when
both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or
are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election
of an Acting President and that no mention for an election
for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs,
such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly
removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from
Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to
the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII
of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP
Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27
January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement
with the IBP Board's position but because of the various
acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined
to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability
by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech
because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others;
 (iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de
Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due
process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was
duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held
on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor
Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said
meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's
Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself
and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the
required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-
Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP
Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come
from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation
rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-
Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera,
who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP;
and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same
will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or
viable; and, finally, that –
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus,
should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National
President.25
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant
tendered the following issues for the consideration of the
Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S.
DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED
TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE
OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS
ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S.
DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT
NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR
DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE,
DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on
the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will
start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present
administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar
Confidant opined:
Page 31 of 60 ETHICS0116
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or
disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is
grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in
concealing the suspension order rendered against him
by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called
"rotation rule" enunciated in Administrative Matter No.
491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said
issues in an earlier administrative case against the
respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision
dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held
that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him
by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his
California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final
judgment finding him guilty of the administrative
charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are
mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which
are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner
on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and
the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses
that the complainant in the California administrative
case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainant's money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the
investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was
rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to
protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of
the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a
basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same. In this case, the
petitioners have not shown how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to
run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is
disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Parañaque and he was originally a member of the
PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
 membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile
rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph
of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-
Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become
a member of the chapter where his place of residence
or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the
particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his
preference that he will become a member of the
Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains
office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of
more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-
Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is
that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to
which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the
transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National
Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to
Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent
de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that
de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime
between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27
February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers
were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as
mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February
of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27
February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This
makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was
done more than three months ahead of the chapter
elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D.
Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996),
this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the
[Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was
dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly
Page 32 of 60 ETHICS0116
prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting
the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to
only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment
was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued
that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the
same incident. This Court held that while the respondent
is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct,
this does not amount to double jeopardy as both
proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This
Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was
proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the
Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the
Court's plenary authority over membersof the legal
profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears
that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus,
in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William
Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this
Court ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative
cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial
justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for
an act which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B.
Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes
and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-
02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior
judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must
be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled
if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the
same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based
on the ground that the party to be affected, or some
other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same
matter in the former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it
again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over
again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious
trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of
court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes
rights and promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the
issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case.
The complainant's contention that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first
 administrative case was one for disqualification while the
instant administrative complaint is one for suspension
and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is
worthy to note that while the instant administrative
complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or
disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the
disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought
to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP
National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No.
6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election"
and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute
a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case
No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and
the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby
barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to
apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the
merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.29 In the absence of any one of
these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in
his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve
different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case
No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty.
de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present
administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege
to practice law. In the first administrative case,
complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged
violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de
Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same
relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent
Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by
complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally
sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial.
The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties'
rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held
therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from
running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the
present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed
that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise,
we held that the complainants therein were not the proper
parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that
only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file
with the IBP President a written protest against the
Page 33 of 60 ETHICS0116
candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de
Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not
morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-
laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification
proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on
the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer
of the State Bar of California suspending him from the
practice of law for three years. We held in that case that –
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides
that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so
long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under
the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate
from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by
the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise,
every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional
Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to
disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the
IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file
the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against
the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in
the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and
substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is
not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052,
the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty.
de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of
the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State
Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In
The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were
confronted with the question of whether or not a member
of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a
foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the
practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned
as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction
committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the
case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.)
and against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of
Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or
disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he
surrendered his license to practice law before his case could
be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction
does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his
suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension
in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino
lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48,
of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises,
Inc.,32 we explained that "[a] foreign judgment is presumed
to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no
foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by
Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial
evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the
hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must
then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under
Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of
Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so
Page 34 of 60 ETHICS0116
to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension.33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect
the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court and to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.34 The statutory
enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is
not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of
courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of
the court over its officers cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives
a special and technical meaning to the term
"Malpractice."36 That meaning is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession,
not a business.37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates
the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession.38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed
before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm.
Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty.
de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized
by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority
by the son to control the case because the latter was then
studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds
in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in
settlement of the case which he then deposited to his
personal account;39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for three years;40 and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which
resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do
not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the
latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use
the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did
not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that
the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and
attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal
use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation
in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited
said amount in his personal account and not in a separate
trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for
personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his
client's funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –
The relation between attorney and client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good
faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of
the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the
protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every
lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he
shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Even more specific is the
Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for
his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be commingled
with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of
Page 35 of 60 ETHICS0116
professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them
are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred
or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
(Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that
he used his client's money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission
constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of
rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly
authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for
the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had
restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the
filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar
of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we
cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that
indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds
of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged,
it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the
hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that
he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility
of the document containing this statement, he is now
estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was
not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by
Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of
the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his
client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of the
character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was
perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to
his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is
clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own
account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical
behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the
noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence.48 Respondent
violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution.49 Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty.
should not be decreed. de Vera as IBP Governor
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP
Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law Board is vested with the power to remove any of its
for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-
account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Laws, which states:
Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52 Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of
IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each
Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any
for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of
of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
by them for their clients without the latter's permission.
resolution of the Majority of the remaining members,
In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended
may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval
respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of
of the Supreme Court.
the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount
received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be
amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the removed for cause, including three consecutive absences
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate. from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by
resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the
members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his
Supreme Court.
suspension or disbarment
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of
whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by
membership from the Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and
majority vote, elect a successor from among the
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP
members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor
Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was
is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired
made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National
portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a
resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein. Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP
Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of
two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board,
transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his
subject to the approval of this Court.
disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds.
three months immediately preceding any chapter election. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due
process recognized by the Honorable Court even in
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his
administrative cases" like the right to answer formally or in
membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical
writing and within reasonable time, the right to present
conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue
witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de
that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein
Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine
case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP
the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera)
chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the
and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which
next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National
made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time.
Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit
inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However,
nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National
when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as
President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera
accomplishing such goal.
asked for another round of voting so he could vote to
Bar Matter No. 1227 Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15- support his own motion.
SC
The IBP Board counters that since its members were
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter present during the plenary session, and personally
No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed: witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary.
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave
Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was
abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor
enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and
and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
answer all the charges imputed against him. They
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with
emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the
administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and
13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was
valid cause.
part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of
to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his
the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume
case.
the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
Page 36 of 60 ETHICS0116
We are in agreement with the IBP Board. the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of
voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on
due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 55 It cannot For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP
be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's expulsion (including Atty.
the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
required to remove any member of the board of governors
for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be
members of the board. removed for cause, including three consecutive absences
from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully
resolution adopted by two-thirds of
invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
side.56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term
"due process of law" as used in the Constitution has no Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP
fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the
the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of remaining members. The phrase "remaining members"
justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of refers to the members exclusive of the complainant
more than one general statement."57 The phrase is so member and the respondent member. The reason therefore
elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on is that such members are interested parties and are thus
circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially.
necessities of the situation.59 This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera
should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical
the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the
with "judicial process" for a trial in court is not always
seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while
essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of
two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote
right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
requirement for expulsion.
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The
due process clause guarantees no particular form of The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for
procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in just and valid cause
certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what
a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law.
constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has
The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a
not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it
fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had
without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it
before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is
is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect
available trial and tribunal before which all objections and
itself from an intractable member whose removal was
defenses to the making of such determination may be
caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due
raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due
to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board
process requires. What is required for "hearing" may differ
considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the
as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.60
IBP in general.
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in
due process.61 Nor is an actual hearing always
disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case
Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove
where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose
or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of
shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an
Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that
IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the
the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not
Supreme Court – all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in
recognized by the IBP Board.
the IBP National Convention in question.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its
complaint against him and that he was present when the
public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that
matter was taken up. From the transcript of the
Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not
stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein
capricious or arbitrary.
Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera
was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees
accusations made by Atty. Rivera. of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life
of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that
are said to disagree before they agree.
Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also
voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting its governing body for then there would be the impression
but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors,
Page 37 of 60 ETHICS0116
does not and cannot speak for its members in an
authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the
IBP's prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with
the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must
thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to
free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a
mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have
been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not
efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a
contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the
dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can
speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the
majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the
board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in
removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during the
10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role
of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the
IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive
unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the
Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the
standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness
and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who
insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due
discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the
board as a governing body will be negated if its
pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept
the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so
that he could criticize in public the majority
opinion/decision to his heart's content; otherwise, he
subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of
Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of
Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well.
Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a
member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal
from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him
from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be
contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP
Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered
without grave abuse of discretion
Page 38 of 60 ETHICS0116
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an
extensive power of supervision over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic
that such power should be exercised prudently. The power
of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion
especially in the administration of its internal affairs
governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws
were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the
powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its
organizational structure, and govern relations and
transactions among its officers and members. With these
By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that
the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs,
without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and
activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.65 The Board acts as a collegiate
body and decides in accordance with the will of the
majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility
of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or
malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and
resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the
disputable presumption66 of validity, which shall continue,
until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and
actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the
absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP
Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with
grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to
overturn and set aside the Board's action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to
remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section
4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the
IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to
remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and
EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with
due process and the IBP Board acted well within the
authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There
being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP
Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's
resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in
replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance
with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-
Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action
taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a
special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is
a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules
and By-Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue
of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also
removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants
to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising,
in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
the Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
44 (Removal of members),70 Section 47 (National regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the
officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72and Section 49 rotation shall begin anew.
(Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has
xxxx
specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on
how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de (Emphasis Supplied)"
Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual,
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP
emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining
which is actually rotated among the nine Regional
members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the
Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is
situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in
new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic
2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation
granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP
automatically become President for the next succeeding By-Laws.
term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term"
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with
necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty.
since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of
Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e.,
the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the
2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-
supervening event of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP
SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from
Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume
assuming the position of Acting President because we have
the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the
yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty.
rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a
2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25
license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the
Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP
Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters
and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come without having to expend valuable time for the usual
from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time
rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws. that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on
matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the
indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It
EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among
should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar
among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who
Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
are serving in a national capacity, and not from the
"ORDER members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one
who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have
xxxx
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of
3. The former system of having the IBP President and national leadership.
Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP
of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
assume the post of IBP President. By electing the
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The
replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-
right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case,
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
Governor Salazar – who would have served in a national
resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287)
capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
should be as it is hereby restored.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the
automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005
Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to
will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
the office of president. The incoming board of governors
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President
a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement
who has served as president may not run for election as
Page 39 of 60 ETHICS0116
Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as
much as practicable" to clearly indicate that the rotation
rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by
Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be
assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against
the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be
bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that
only one who is honed in service while serving in a national
post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in
accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as
IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the
IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would
have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the
IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from
the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the
finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera
and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera,
dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for
the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered
without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty.
Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the
term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in
accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately
take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007
in accordance with the automatic succession rule in
Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of
this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Page 40 of 60 ETHICS0116
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,  vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,  vs. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,  vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of
unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent
Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be
allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar
and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for
mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the
several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly
abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of
the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170
SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-
taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed
separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of
10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution
of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready
reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No.
616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution
allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that
respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded
them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is
without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June
1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite
lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that
Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and
Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed
away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in
allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29
December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting
with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the
community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was
signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter;
 and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as
well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR
Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24
February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that
"the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as
President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the
good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr.
Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the
former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated
29 December 1986, and that he himself had not
submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-
1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to
require the present Board of Officers of the IBP,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or
not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to
respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to
take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a
COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days
from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R.
Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August
1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally
with the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed
by him as would disqualify him from admission to the
Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there
is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus
Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte),
Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in
this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have
secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a
parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be
a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural
Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed
and the land sold at public auction and respondent has
not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis
Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a
Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary
Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to
wit:
Page 41 of 60 ETHICS0116
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by
the Office of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in
the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City
Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been
convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending
derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above
findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by
the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the
Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid
IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio
Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting
vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and
Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge
Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case
before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court
resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking
of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to
inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled
Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his
"Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received
another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant
Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-
taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations
in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August
1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court
that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been
restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been
done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her
case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she
sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as
he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which
she believes make him morally fit to become a member of
the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter
stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the
legal profession and request this Honorable Court to
schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This
letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which
also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants
Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in
their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a
private personal disposition which raises the question
whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to
exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we
believe and maintain the importance and finality of the
Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and
discretion of any party to change or amend said final
resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions,
these cases therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject and subservient
 to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties,
devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's
scheming change in tactics and strategy could not
improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November
1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge
Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8,
Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio
Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on
30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December
1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990,
in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered
closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated
24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal
parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by
the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original
Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name
and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank
of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation;
reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by
the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership
over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the
loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its
cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned
Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January
1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia
and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20
December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles
of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal
has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause
to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our
Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the
aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants
with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to
comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said
Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August
1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is
"proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance
with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated,"
and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission
to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24
September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal
reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
Page 42 of 60 ETHICS0116
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was
allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from
the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations,
after careful consideration of his show of contrition and
willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the
several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received
the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking
the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case
against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the
Government in 1985 and was brought about because of
respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent
over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its
use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At
that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of
Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it
default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The
controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise
with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title
to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy
peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred
by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The
Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to
the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed
that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the
amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the
defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in
1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's
petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied
on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this
Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral
character without, however, mentioning the pendency of
that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances
attending its termination, the Court now entertains second
thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member
of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land
Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over
property which he could not but have known was public
land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak
well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross
dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be
erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic
against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been
compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a
confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have
known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took
advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as
collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did
not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed
against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad
reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure
to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for
Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us
also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral
character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him
and were obviously made without awareness of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the
Government against him. Those testimonials can not,
therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and
lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC
606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any
opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment.
They have already expressed their objections in their earlier
comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her
objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance
in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of
another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is
not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always
tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training as well as
in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this
high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end
is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest and to
possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil.
230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399
[1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for
bar membership is more important than truthfulness or
candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A.
2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to
become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution,
dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO
PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Page 43 of 60 ETHICS0116
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo —
for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang —
for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
— for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-
evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968
and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35%
and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the
Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was
raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I,
rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law
Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by
Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated
"that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in
other examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to
the release of the results. Note that this was without any
formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the
bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is
no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be
contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that
some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'?
Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient
reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and
found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and
Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal
Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the
respective examiner concerned. Further check of the
records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No.
954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the
1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination
Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and
the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn
statements on the matter, with which request they
complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back
to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked
the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has
the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering
that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971
bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5,
1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five
examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo,
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-
41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March
19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent
Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the
Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was
not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or
re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in
Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was
asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.).
Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for
it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation
and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject
of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from
4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is
owned by another successful candidate by the name
Page 44 of 60 ETHICS0116
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the
latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed
that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a
student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon
University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this information at
the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember
having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar
examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July
17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit
their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14,
1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took
up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed
to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to
testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits
and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they
offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C.
Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year,
while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low
one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year,
he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
 reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back
to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation
of the answers were based on the same standard used in
the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to
10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8
with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated
his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following
additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were
not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of
examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity
of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had developed to the point that with
respect to the correction of the examination booklets
of bar candidates I have always followed him and
considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to
the same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I
was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme
Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received
by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who
Page 45 of 60 ETHICS0116
made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo
Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International
Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my
residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least
two companions. The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and,
after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained
a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant,
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant
told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified
or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar
Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he
had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed
the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets,
my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated
as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted
and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his
earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in
political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not
know him personally, and that I have never met him even
up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as
the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or
his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was
apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular
course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was
my official liaison with the Chairman,  as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal
contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It
did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was
riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that
he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in
the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered
661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that
the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the
position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade
obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered
661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It
had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know
Page 46 of 60 ETHICS0116
the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed
in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver
and collect examination books to my residence at 951
Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would
be raised a few points to 75%then he would make the
general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,
that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz
stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in
good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the
identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains
a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his
affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part
of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review
the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given
him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if
the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the
fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I
had previously given and submitted was entirely within
my discretion.
 3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to except Mercantile Law;
me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-
would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this
evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I
particular Bar candidate;.
recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in other That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
items, and maintained the same grades in other items. candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating
the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the
the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the
increase his final grade to 71%;
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
That consequently, I amended my report and duly
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.;
initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No.
emphasis supplied).
1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo
Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement,
restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17,
adding the following:
1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I
in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned
hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
could be faulted for not having verified from the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such
re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned,
omission, that —
which I did.
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I
time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the
No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have
suggest that the grade of a particular examination
never met up to this time this particular bar examinee
notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature
of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant
was legitimate. Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-
view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to
that particular subject that the said examine failed, the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
herein respondent became convinced that the said
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
should then be given to clarify of language and soundness
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
of reasoning' (par. 4),
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
reappraising the answers, herein respondent examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately
the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164,
after the release of the results of the examinations, we
pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972: copy their answers and have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of them would file motions
xxx xxx xxx
or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Page 47 of 60 ETHICS0116
 Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just
the same they have to be denied because the result of
the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such
instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo
avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the
examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or
not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought
to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a
matter concerning another examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade below 50% in
Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that
his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved
failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the
matter being that the notebooks in question were
submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and
marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion
marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter
of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry
into the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the
early part of February, 1972, on my way back to the
office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that
the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my
Page 48 of 60 ETHICS0116
sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the
fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed
and a portion of the post to which it is attached is
identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954".
This number became doubly impressive to me because
the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or
connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either
started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked
as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh.
6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the
list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as
Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the
list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out
of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November
27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be
recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From
then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from
the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after
buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time
was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office
code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into
the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity
of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all
good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
 Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-
a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them
aside and later on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could
have reference to either of the two cases which I brought
to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing
the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of
4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh.
10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook
was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International
Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which
the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so,
notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee
that there was very little time left and that the increase in
grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial,
may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to
accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth.
In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to
scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a
Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
Page 49 of 60 ETHICS0116
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code
number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme
Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing"
case, especially in a situation where the respondent and
the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire
situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this
Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had
no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never
knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent
utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in
his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination
papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then it must have been
done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase
the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched.
Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations
of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf?
To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that
would be presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for
the bar themselves and the result of their work that year,
as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said narration of facts an
unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
 actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties
and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I Law, the general average of said examinee was short of
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how
respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated
and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or
recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by
deceiving separately and individually the respondents-
examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the
respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian
thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle
part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if
he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he
will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for
re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular
notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine
will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian
took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and
in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an
examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office
Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the
said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V,
pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee
Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After
such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission
to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early
part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's
Page 50 of 60 ETHICS0116
notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook
and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook
and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial
passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark
and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent
Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent
Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in
the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent
Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely
within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had
the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate
the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo,
resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the
changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading
sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit,
and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75;
Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee
Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing
marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new
batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public
International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's
Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have
passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook
would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible —
the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the
practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the
request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the
said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated
the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the
corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and
accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing grade,
because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal
Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then
helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and
Public International Law, as he had already finished
correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned
subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns
that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by
only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal
Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the
words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification
and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the
grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list
and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner
Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66
and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown
any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had
failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in
the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise
Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his
failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile
Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last
phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on
February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Page 51 of 60 ETHICS0116
Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p.
16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made
during the meeting within hearing of the order members,
who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the
particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed
to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.
Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and
after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the
final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or
decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given
the information that the particular examinee failed only in
his subject and passed all the others, he would not have
consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to
change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp.
34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo
riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code
No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according
to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that
particular notebook obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After
clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the
answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase
of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622
as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto
Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63;
Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo,
respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF
EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN
ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested
on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-
evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or
less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the
passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond
dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the
Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners
concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the
authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII,
p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good
faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..."
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the
initial correction of the examination papers and never as a
basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol.
VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo,
Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on
the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions
committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent
as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the
respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified
by extensive cross-examination conducted during the
investigation and hearing of the cases show how
respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the
1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the
records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and
the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as
well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and
characterized his relationship with the five members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
Page 52 of 60 ETHICS0116
and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in
the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him
to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-
calculated moves in successively representing separately to
each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the
examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in
the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% — which under
no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed
that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of
Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-
evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was
in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects
under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original
average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase
of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice
of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But
only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for
Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has
absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only
function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee
in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general
average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative
data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the
Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74
or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions
of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot
presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for
re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the
same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can
validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing
justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for
re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety
(90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70%
to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47,
101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as
borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the
papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of
66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to
do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo,
grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the
1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety
candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the
Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the
said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the
same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political
Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the
notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give
his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who
were far better situated than Galang would not give him
away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg
and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of
the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office
code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the
first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47.
rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why
he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
Page 53 of 60 ETHICS0116
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that
it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ
NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF
47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL
LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law
and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg
were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during
its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter
decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for
re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol.
VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in
a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first
meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.).
Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the
Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28,
rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the
Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in
the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the
release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It
appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials
of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31,
rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law,
maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile
Law which was officially brought to him and this is
substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-
35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code
number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that
the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz
was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present
when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number
951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but
Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that
he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the
Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects
except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to
the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in
which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He
cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared
that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on
the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in
one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with
Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which
was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed
to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following
the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed
him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs
to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose
problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the
Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to
the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that
there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the
answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting
on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all
the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee
failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner
Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3)
subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the
re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
Page 54 of 60 ETHICS0116
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile
Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the
disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2)
other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying
grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law
and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated
the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in
February, 1971, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly
be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said
referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of
his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing
grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade
of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the
integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public
faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz
should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-
evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil
Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial
Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting
candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules
and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar
Examination Committee, composed of a member of the
Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the
Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with
one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison
officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one
hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the
other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee
in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be
in accordance with the established rules of the Court and
must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.
With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his
functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the
examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court,
a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the
Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to
determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's
appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is
immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or
incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar
were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964,
in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a member
of the Bar must be ... of good moral 
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to
1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127).
Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay
Page 55 of 60 ETHICS0116
before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to
fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is
for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity
of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending —
becomes more compelling. The forms for application to
take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of
criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending
against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took
the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require
the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But
as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory
evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation
to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal
case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character.
And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before
it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the
applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that
an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether
pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's
acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or
fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third
time, respectively, the application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has not been accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the
application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of
that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare
that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or
conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical
injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding
from the Court his pending criminal case for physical
injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971;
and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury
when he declared under oath that he had no pending
criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court
that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent
Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to
take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to
take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground
for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled
(see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that
the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he
applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud
upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law
examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have
been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v.
Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled,
and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the
license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the
roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred
in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully
and frankly of matters tending to show the character of
the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from
which he comes. The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having been
apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances
of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in
that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and
his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his
name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate
his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the
formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised
of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal
case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he
passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order
the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
Page 56 of 60 ETHICS0116
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in
Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to
be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to
the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar
(citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any
precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions
in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds,
among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from
the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re:
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the
Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and
People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were
convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having
made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers
in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith;
and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the
notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee
who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same
without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and
WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and
without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the
matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and should
have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request
of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have
asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee,
who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court.
At least the respondents-examiners should have required 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the and 72, rec.).
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
Pamatian —
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in
their respective and particular subject and/or was on the 3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year,
borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
could have easily done and the stain on the Bar owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
examinations could have been avoided. reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited
do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee
33-34, rec.).
had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he Manalo —
would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164,
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he
the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein
evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark
respondent became convinced that the said examinee
to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him,
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?'
but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.;
I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with
emphasis supplied).
me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and
what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient Pardo —
as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the
because I corrected that particular notebook on
answers was correct although it was not complete I raise
December 31,1971, considering especially the
the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall 
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain
make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own
impartial or free from any improper influence, their
words:
conceded integrity, honesty and competence
Montecillo — notwithstanding.
Q And by reason of that information you made the re- Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he
evaluation of the paper? deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
A Yeas, your Honor. evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own Case No. 1163).
accord in the absence of such information?
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were
that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5)
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
Page 57 of 60 ETHICS0116
subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the
admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the
greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of
their duties relative thereto.
V 1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum
filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-
examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal
to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend
— a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records
will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's
memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against
the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian,
who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore
cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation
which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case
on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into
re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in
their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of
the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in
that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned
in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-
evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said
bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the
official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous
act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly
act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme
Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence  that the
illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang
Page 58 of 60 ETHICS0116
to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for
valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent
Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971
Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court.
acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972
but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same
date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and
lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of
a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48;
Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and  P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under
Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore
that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was
used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable
listed under Assets in his 1971 statement  was not realized
because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-
48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is
extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of
$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement
of Assets and Liabilities  filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received
from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider
it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed
upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator
 the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a
lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore,
that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an
ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the
foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and
lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities  is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while
in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car  worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the
said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent
Galang's examination papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the
Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on
the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13,
1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His
resignation before he was required to show cause on March
Page 59 of 60 ETHICS0116
5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities,
is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release
of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof
in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp.
40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent
Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the
dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined
that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep.
Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were
not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they
were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible
contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his
father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter
become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I
Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans
Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his
pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now
MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the
Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental
agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including
the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held
the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in
1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having
Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol.
retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which VII, p.51, rec.).
is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
father who all the time attended to the availment of the Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia
said educational benefits and even when he was already in and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital
Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation,
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a
he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator
member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as
Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however,
the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as
that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent
into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US
Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational
Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and
Institution effective the first semester of the school
with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo,
May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22,
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has
up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not
submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant,
even know the location of the said office. He does not also
the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever
know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol.
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No.
V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had
1164 as above delineated.
gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he
insists that he never bothered to take a look at the WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162,
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED
imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
building and is obliquely across the City Court building. ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG,
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the
IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits
and disability benefits; that he does not remember,
however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know
the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE,
belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and
then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol.
VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement
in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion
especially while working with the Philippine Veterans
Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to
which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only
and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
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