PEOPLE vs.
CONDE time to conduct surveillance of the appellants
FACTS:
The RTC ruled that Conde, Atis and Perez, Jr.
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Oscar Conde claims that he was
illegally arrested by the authorities. He adds
that the Indian Embassy was pressuring the
police to solve the murder. He also wants the
Court to disregard as evidence the stolen items
and weapons illegally seized by the police.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellants were illegally
arrested.
2. Whether or not the items seized were
admissible as evidence.
RULING:
1. YES
The arrests of the appellants came after the
lapse of 5 days from the time they were seen
committing the crime. At the time they were
arrested, the police were not armed with any
warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule
113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerates the instances when an
arrest can be made without warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in
this case. Appellants were merely walking
along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not
committing any crime. Neither can it be said
that the crime had just been committed. It
cannot also be said that the arresting officers
had probable cause based on personal
knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they
learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero
and certain unnamed informants. The third
circumstance is patently not present. The lapse
of five days gave the police more than enough
and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly,
appellants rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their
constitutional rights prior to their arraignment.
An accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the
quashing of the Information against him before
his arraignment. When the appellants entered
their pleas on arraignment without invoking
their rights to question any irregularity, which
might have accompanied their arrests, they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial
process. It is much too late for appellants to
raise the question of their warrantless arrests.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after trial free from error. The warrantless
arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all
other proceedings including those leading to
the conviction of the appellants and his co-
accused, nor can the state be deprived of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts on
record point to their culpability.
2. NO
The warrantless search in the house of a
certain Jimmy, based on the confession of
accused Perez, Jr., is definitely questionable.
PO3 Sevillano categorically stated that they
were able to recover the stolen items, i.e., the
beach towel and the umbrella, because of the
confession of Perez, Jr. who was not assisted
by counsel when he confessed and eventually
led the police to the whereabouts of the said
items. The use of evidence against the accused
obtained by virtue of his testimony or
admission without the assistance of counsel
while under custodial investigation is
proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article
III of the Constitution.
Moreover, the Court find in order the search of
the bag of Felicidad Macabare, at the time she
was visiting her husband who was a detainee.
PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of
police standard operating procedure and is
recognized as part of precautionary measures
by the police to safeguard the safety of the
detainees as well as the over-all security of the
j a i l p r e m i s e s . H o w e v e r, t h e w e a p o n s
confiscated from Felicidad Macabare, were not
formally offered as evidence by the
prosecution, hence probatively valueless.
With regards to the crime committed,
appellants are guilty of two counts of homicide
and not robbery with homicide because only
the facts and causes of deaths were
established with moral certainty.
VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA (1989)
FACTS:
On January 20, 1987, the National
Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated with the mission of conducting
s e c u r i t y o p e ra t i o n s w i t h i n i t s a r e a o f
responsibility and peripheral areas for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of
the NCR. As part of its duty to maintain peace
and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela and Metro Manila.
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots
to destabilize the government, in the interest
of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a
wa r ra n t l e s s s e a r c h w h i c h i s , h o w e ve r,
reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by
the military is susceptible of abuse by the
military in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable
limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
Hence, the petition is dismissed.

Petitioners aver that because of the

institution of said checkpoints, the Velanzuela VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA (1990)
residents are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the Facts:
military manning the checkpoints considering
In the Court’s decision dated 29
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
September 1989, petitioners’ petition for
to regular searches and check-ups especially at
prohibition seeking the declaration of the
night or at dawn without a search warrant or a
checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
increased when Benjamin Parpon was gunned
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and
down allegedly in cold blood by members of
supplemental motion for reconsideration of
the NCRDC for ignoring and/or continuing to
said decision. Before submission of the incident
speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the
for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the
air.
respondents, filed his comment, to which
ISSUE: petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are
nonetheless attacked by the movants as a
Whether or not the installations of the warrantless search and seizure and, therefore,
checkpoints violated their constitutional right violative of the Constitution.
against illegal search and seizures.
Issue:
HELD:
Whether installment and operation of
No. The constitutional right against checkpoints is unconstitutional and constitutes
unreasonable searches and seizures is a warrantless search.
personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed or threatened to be Held:
infringed. Not all searches and seizures are
No, it is the basic right of the State to
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
defend itself from its enemies and, while in
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned
power, to pursue its program of government
checkpoints may be considered as a security
intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
of those objectives, the government has the
mission of establishing effective territorial
equal right, under its police power, to select
defense and maintaining peace and order for
the reasonable means and methods for best
the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not
achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently
one of such means it has selected. it the basic
right to defend itself from its enemies and,
while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in
the pursuit of those objectives, the
government has the equal right, under its
police power, to select the reasonable means
and methods for best achieving them. The
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it
has selected.
Routine checkpoint stops do not
intrude similarly on the motoring public. First,
the potential interference with legitimate traffic
is minimal. Motorists using these highways are
not taken by surprise as they know, or may
obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere.
Second, checkpoint operations both appear to
and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner
in which established checkpoints are operated
is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding
motorists, that the stops are duly authorized
and believed to serve the public interest. The
location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by
officers in the field, but by officials responsible
for making overall decisions as to the most
effective allocation of limited enforcement
resources. We may assume that such officials
will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it
bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists
as a class, and since field officers may stop
only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is
less room for abusive or harassing stops of
individuals than there was in the case of
roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a
particular exercise of discretion in locating or
operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is
subject to post-stop judicial review.
A C C O R D I N G LY, t h e M o t i o n a n d
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
DENIED.
PEOPLE vs. EXALA
Facts:
On November 02, 1982, a private jeep
driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was
stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City
for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his
co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang,
a member of the inspection team, went near
the jeep and asked the occupants if there were
firearms inside. They answered in the negative.
Pfc. Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by
beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a
black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide
and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When he
asked what it contained, there was deadening
silence from the 3 accused. Nobody answered.
Instead, they suddenly became fidgety.
Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag
opened, which was found out to contain
marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter
prosecuted and convicted of illegal
transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan
appealed and questioned the legality of the
admission of the marijuana as evidence against
him since it was seized without a valid search
warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct
in his contention that the evidence is
inadmissible since it was obtained through a
warrantless arrest.
Held:
The Court held that Bocalan is deemed
to have waived his objection to the admission
of the seized marijuana because he neither
raised this issue before the trial court nor
objected to the admissibility of the marijuana
when it was offered in evidence.
And even assuming that there was no
such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalan’s
contention deserves scant consideration
because there are instances where search and
seizure can be made without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be
the “stop-and-search” without a warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been
upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa].
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through
these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If
vehicles are stopped and extensively searched
it is because of some probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief of those manning
the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are
or have been instruments in the commission of
an offense.
According to the Court, lest it be
misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not
intended to do away with the general rule
that no person shall be subjected to search of
his person, personal effects and belongings, or
his residence except of virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or
an offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-search” at a
military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was
established in line with “Operational Bakal,” the
main object of which was to search for
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items
in the possession of unauthorized persons
passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it
was flagged down and the occupants were
asked routine questions. In the course thereof,
Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the
sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused
answered. At that moment, the demeanor of
the accused changed; they became
suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were
concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The
accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of
being discovered. Such peculiar
apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of
the accused, which did not appear normal,
provided the probable cause justifying a more
extensive search that led to the opening of the
bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
Hence, accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
GUAZON V. DE VILLA
Facts:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the
“saturation drive” or “aerial target zoning” that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila)
were unconstitutional. They alleged that there
is no specific target house to be search and
that there is no search warrant or warrant of
arrest served. Most of the policemen are in
their civilian clothes and without nameplates or
identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls
and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and
herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip
down to their briefs for the police to examine
their tattoo marks. The residents complained
that they’re homes were ransacked, tossing
their belongings and destroying their valuables.
Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents
also reported incidents of maulings, spot-
beatings and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical
torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations.
The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies. Respondents
contends that the Constitution grants to
government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of
peace in the state. The aerial target zoning was
intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements coddled by the communities were the
said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead for the actual operation and that
local and foreign media joined the operation to
witness and record such event.
Issue:
Whether or Not the saturation drive
committed consisted of violation of human
rights.
Held:
It is not the police action per se which
should be prohibited rather it is the procedure
used or the methods which “offend even
hardened sensibilities.” Based on the facts
stated by the parties, it appears to have been
no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested.
There is no showing that the objectives
sought to be attained by the “aerial zoning”
could not be achieved even as the rights of the
squatters and low-income families are fully
protected. However, the remedy should not be
brought by a taxpayer suit where not one
victim complaints and not one violator is
properly charged.
Under the circumstances of this
taxpayers’ suit, there is no erring soldier or
policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts, no
permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime, where there is
showing that some abuses were committed,
the court temporary restraint the alleged
violations which are shocking to the senses.
Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
ABENES Vs. CA
Facts:
 Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman,
was charged with illegal possession of high-
powered firearm and its ammunitions during
the election period. Two informations were filed
for (1) illegal possession of firearms and its
ammunitions; (2) violation of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The firearm was confiscated from
Abenes at a checkpoint wherein his vehicle was
stopped, and he was asked to alight the same
for routine inspection. The policeman saw the
firearm tucked in his waist and asked him to
produce a license for it. When Abenes could
not produce one, the policeman confiscated the
firearm. It was found that Abenes was not a
registered nor a licensed firearm holder.
The trial court then convicted Abenes
on both charges. Abenes appealed to the CA
alleging that the checkpoint was not shown to
have been legally set up, and that his
constitutional right against unlawful search and
seizure was violated. The CA affirmed the trial
court.
Issues:
Whether or not the checkpoint was
legally set up.
Whether or not Abenes’ constitutional
right against unlawful search and seizure had
been violated.
Held:
Yes. This Court has ruled that not all
checkpoints are illegal. The checkpoint herein
conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The production of a
mission order is not necessary in view of the
fact that the checkpoint was established 3 days
before the May 11, 1998 elections; and the
circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a
warrant.
No. In the instant case, the firearm
was seized from the petitioner when in plain
view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist
uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are
present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial
intrusion because of the enforcement of the
Gun Ban and were properly in a position from
which they particularly viewed the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the petitioner where they saw the
gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in plain
view and discovered inadvertently when the
petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
However, there is insufficient evidence
that the firearm Abenes carried had no license.
Thus, failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Abenes was
carrying a firearm without prior authority,
license or permit, the latter must be
exculpated from criminal liability under the
illegal possession of firearms law.
Nevertheless, Abenes is still convicted for
violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
GANAAN vs IAC
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his
client Manuel Montebon were in the living room
of complainant’s residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed with the Office of
the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a
telephone call to Laconico. That same morning,
Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer,
to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because
his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went
on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty
minutes later, complainant called again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money.
Complainant called again and
instructed Laconico to give the money to his
wife at the office of the then Department of
Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received
the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following
day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to
the complainant for robbery/extortion which he
filed against complainant. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged
appellant and Laconico with violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan
and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted
petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with
modification hence the present petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone
is covered by the term “device or
arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200
Held:
No. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200
provides that “It shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.”
It shall also be unlawful for any person,
be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record,
or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, That the
use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this
prohibition. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC)
The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or
cable or the use of a “device or arrangement”
for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation
of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be
placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.
The petition is granted, and the
petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation
of Republic Act No. 4200.
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were
issued at different dates against petitioners
and the corporations of which they were
officers. Peace officers were directed to search
the persons of the petitioners and/or their
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences. Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets, and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins were to be seized.
 Petitioner contends that the issued
search warrants were null and void as having
contravened the Constitution and the Rules of
Court for, among others, it did not describe the
documents, books and things to be seized
PARTICULARLY.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has
been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may
be admitted in court.
Held:
No. The authority of the warrants in
question may be split in two major groups: (a)
those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations; and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of the petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action
against the contested warrants on the first
major group. This is because corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of their officers,
directors and stockholders. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired, the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure purely being
personal cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two
important questions need be settled: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and
the searches and seizures made under
authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if
the answer is no, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of
the people from unreasonable searches and
seizure. Two points must be stressed in
connection to this constitutional mandate: (1)
no warrant shall be issued except if based upon
probable cause determined personally by the
judge by the manner set in the provision; and
(2) the warrant shall describe the things to be
seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense
has been alleged in the warrant’s application.
The averments of the offenses committed were
abstract and therefore, would make it
impossible for judges to determine the
existence of probable cause. Such impossibility
of such determination naturally hinders the
issuance of a valid search warrant.
The Constitution also requires the
things to be seized described with particularity.
This is to eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants
issued for the search of three residences of
petitioners are null and void.
PASTRANO VS. CA
FACTS:
On February 13, 1989, a group of
students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza,
then intelligence operations officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, at Oroquieta City.
They reported having seen Clyde Pastrano
beaten up by his father, petitioner Pedrito
Pastrano. The students were willing to testify
but expressed fear of the petitioner who,
according to them, had firearms. Clyde
Pastrano had died and it was suspected he had
been the victim of foul play.
On February 20, 1989, two sons of
Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife —
James Clement G. Pastrano and Clinton Steve
G. Pastrano — also saw Capt. Mañoza, seeking
his assistance in connection with the death of
their brother Clyde. The brothers reported that
their father and his common-law wife were
keeping unlicensed firearms in their house.
They executed a joint affidavit on February 20,
1989 in which they stated that they had
personal knowledge of the fact that their father
Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3)
firearms of different calibers in the bedroom of
his house. On the basis of the affidavit of the
Pastrano brothers, Capt. Mañoza applied for a
search warrant on the same day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant
issued is valid.
HELD:
YES. Trial court actually examined the
two brothers, James Clement G. Pastrano and
Clinton G. Steve Pastrano. These two were the
ones who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza.
They gave information of the illegal possession
of firearms by their father, petitioner herein, on
the basis of personal knowledge. Their
testimonies, not that of Capt. Maoza, formed
the basis of the trial courts finding of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
ABERCA VS. VER
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal
searches and seizures and other violations of
the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver “to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that
complying with said order, elements of the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures
and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions
and in order to punish them; that all violations
of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
e x t ra c t i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i n c r i m i n a t o r y
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize,
harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by
defendants.
A motion to dismiss was filed by
defendants, through their counsel, then
Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging
among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause
a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming
that the courts can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability
for acts done in the performance of their
official duties.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action
for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?
2. If such action for damages may be
maintained, may a superior officer under the
notion of respondeat superior be answerable
for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been
violated?
HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual
to seek release from detention through the writ
of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any
public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein. The doctrine of
respondeat superior has been generally limited
in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military
and their subordinates. Be that as it may,
however, the decisive factor in this case, in our
view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person
‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
 By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior
official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty
to supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for
the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors
that propelled people power in February 1986
was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not
actually responsible for, the rampant violations
of human rights. While it would certainly be so
naive to expect that violators of human rights
would easily be deterred by the prospect of
facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no one’s terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
the transgression joint tortfeasors.
FORBES VS CHUOCO TIACO
FACTS:
April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco
Tiaco filed a suit in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila against the plaintiffs
alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909,
under the orders of the said W. Cameron
Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent
to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E. Harding
and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated,
of the police and of the secret service,
respectively, of the city of Manila, and that
having been able to return to these Islands he
feared, as it was threatened, that he should be
again deported by the said defendants,
concluding with a petition that a preliminary
injunction should be issued against the
plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from
deporting the defendant, Chuoco, and that
they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an
indemnity.
Respondent argued that It is true that
the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11
others or his nationality, expelled from these
Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs
J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, under the
orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, but
the said expulsion was carried out in the public
interest of the Government and at the request
of the proper representative of the Chinese
Government in these Islands.
The said complaint having been filed
with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he,
granting the petition, issued against the
plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting
them from deporting the defendant Chuoco
Tiaco.
The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against
the same and presented a motion asking that
the injunction be dissolved, the grounds of the
demurrer being that the facts set out in the
complaint did not constitute a motive of action,
and that the latter was one in which the court
lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction
against the plaintiffs for the reasons set out in
the complaint; notwithstanding which, the
defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the
demurrer and disallowed the motion, leaving
the complaint and the injunction standing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can take
jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise
of this inherent power in the deportation of
aliens, for the purpose of controlling this power
vested in the political department of the
government.
HELD:
NO. Under the system of government
established in the Philippine Islands the
Governor-General is "the chief executive
authority," one of the coordinate branches of
the Government, each of which, within the
sphere of its governmental powers, is
independent of the others. Within these limits
the legislative branch cannot control the
judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch,
nor either the executive department. In the
exercise of his political duties the Governor-
General is, by the laws in force in the Philippine
Islands, invested with certain important
governmental and political powers and duties
belonging to the executive branch of the
Government, the due performance of which is
entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and
discretion. So far as these governmental or
political or discretionary powers and duties
which adhere and belong to the Chief
Executive, as such, are concerned, it is
universally agreed that the courts possess no
power to supervise or control him in the
manner or mode of their discharge or exercise.
LUMANOG V. PEOPLE and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we
have ruled that whatever flaw that may have
FACTS: initially attended the out-of-court identification
of the accused, the same was cured when all
These cases were consolidated. The
the accused-appellants were positively
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
identified by the prosecution eyewitness during
Court of Appeals convicting Lumanog, Santos,
the trial.
Fortuna and De Jesus of the crime of murder
for the death of Col. Rolando Abadilla.
Lumanog and Santos separately filed their
motions for reconsideration seeking the
reversal of their conviction. They assailed the
weight and credence accorded to the
identification of the accused by the lone
eyewitness presented by the prosecution,
security guard Freddie Alejo.

Fortuna submitted an Affidavit

executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who
claimed to be one of the police officers initially
assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna
contended that said belated statement would
certainly cast doubt on the procedures
undertaken by the police authorities in the
apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not introduction of

additional evidence after the trial is valid to
justify new trial

HELD:

No. Introduction of additional evidence

after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.

E v i d e n t l y, F o r t u n a s e e k s t h e
introduction of additional evidence to support
the defense argument that there was no
positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To
justify a new trial or setting aside of the
judgment of conviction on the basis of such
evidence, it must be shown that the evidence
was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be
considered newly discovered, must be one that
could not, by the exercise of due diligence,
have been discovered before the trial in the
court below.

Movant failed to show that the defense

exerted efforts during the trial to secure
testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or
other persons involved in the investigation,
who questioned or objected to the
apprehension of the accused in this case.
Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of
Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered
evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial