CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II b.) Yes.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
PROFESSOR: Atty. Thomas Kristino B. Caharian
DIGESTS COMPILATION BY 1-WIGMORE
I. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATION
ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
G.R. No. 122156 (February 3, 1997)
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding
shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at
P41.58/share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share.
Pending the declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to
accept. The petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is
part of the national patrimony, petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON self-executing provision
b.) Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON
Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony.
c.) Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony, WON selling mere 51% shares and
not the land itself can be considered part of national
patrimony.
d.) WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
a.) Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987
Constitution is self-executing which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The
Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
c.) Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land
on which the hotel edifice stands.
d.) Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid
price tendered by the foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares of
MH accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner after the latter has matched the
bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the
matching bid of petitioner and execute the necessary
clearances for the purchase of the subject 51% MHC
shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Pamatong vs. Comelec
(G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004)
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35)
others nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks to reverse the
resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of
his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access
to opportunities for public office" grants a constitutional
right to run for or hold public office
RULING:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. Also, the "equal access"
provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution. The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to
opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance
Candidates" and outlined instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course
to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, the equal access clause is not
violated.
Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of
candidates especially in the case of candidates for
national positions because the election process becomes
a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would
have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates,
Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These
would entail additional costs to the government xxx[I]t
serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to
continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough
to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim.
It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.
Yrasuegui vs. PAL
(G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)
FACTS:
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by
PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and
considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,"
his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal
under the Labor Code.
b.) WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on
the bona fide occupational disqualification defense.
c.) WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection
clause guaranty
RULING:
a.) Yes. It would fall under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to
no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment
he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed
by the weight standards.
b.) Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs
may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion,
or national origin. However, if the employer can show that
sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job, the qualification is then considered
valid and referred to as bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ).
Applying the “Meiorin Test” in determining whether an
employment policy is justified, the following must concur:
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard
for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of
the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment
of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in
order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most
important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety
of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an
emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of
the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open
emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in
cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand
grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
c.) No. In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant
to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Private
actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.
DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
People vs. Siton
FACTS:
In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police
officer, lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance
conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and
prostitutes proliferate in the place where the respondents
(among other women) were wandering and in the wee
hours of night and soliciting male customer. Hence,
respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano
were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal. In turn, the respondents filed separate
Motions to Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON the definition of the crime of vagrancy under
Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague.
b.) WON Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection
clause under the Constitution because it discriminates
against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
RULING:
a.) No. The trial court in its assailed ruling relied on the
underlying principles in Papachristou vs. City of
Jacksonville case: First, that the assailed ordinance fails
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by a statute and;
Second, it encourages or promotes opportunities for the
application of discriminatory law enforcement. However,
the aforementioned principles do not apply in the case at
bar since: The first principle finds no application here
because under our legal system, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith and; Second,
the fear exhibited by the respondents, that unfettered
discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an
arrest or search, is assuaged by the constitutional
requirement of probable cause, which is one less than
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.
The requirement of probable cause provides an
acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may
otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of
persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). Furthermore,
it may be note worthy that the Jacksonville ordinance was
declared unconstitutional for provisions that are not found
in the questioned Vagrancy law in the case at bar. The
power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding
penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as
an aspect of police power. The legislature however, must
inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it
intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is
his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known
as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.”
b.) No. Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection
clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and
the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause
alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be
considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order
crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves,
at a certain place and time which orderly society finds
unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the
safety and well-being of members of the community.
DLSU vs. CA
FACTS:
The private respondents were involved in mauling
incidents that were a result of a fraternity war. On May 3,
1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were
meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,
pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
ISSUE/S:
WON private respondents accorded due process of law?
RULING:
1. Yes. Private respondents were accorded due process
of law.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students
found violating school discipline, "[t]here are minimum
standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are: that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.
In the case at bar, the Private respondents were duly
informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they,
in fact, submitted their respective answers.
They were also informed of the evidence presented
against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the
right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did.
Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of
evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering
its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can
be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation
of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.
Surigao Electric vs. ERC
FACTS:
On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order,
mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from
its power supplier should be deducted from the
computation of the power cost upon ascertaining that the
Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) of SURNECO
resulted to an over-recovery amounting to
PhP18,188,794.
ISSUE:
WON SURNECO was deprived of the opportunity to be
heard in ordering it to refund alleged over-recoveries
arrived at by the ERC.
RULING:
NO. In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries
based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA
mechanism remains a purely cost-recovery mechanism
and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its authority to
regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric
cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply
performed its mandate to protect the public interest
imbued in those rates.
It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police
power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility
such as SURNECO.— The regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
exercise thereof. When private property is used for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it
ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the
property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation.
We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was
denied due process when the ERC issued its questioned
Orders. Administrative due process simply requires an
opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It
means being given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing
is not even essential. It is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their
respective positions and to present evidence in support
thereof.
Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the
electric cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions
to substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were
duly informed of the need for other required supporting
documents and were allowed to submit them accordingly.
In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC
conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives’
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss
preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for
inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition, after the
issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives
were allowed to file their respective motions for
reconsideration. It cannot claimed, therefore, that
SURNECO was denied due process.
Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An
Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007.
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON petitioners possess locus standi
b.) WON there is an actual case or controversy
c.) WON RA9372 Regulates speech so as to permit a
facial analysis of its validity
RULING:
a.) YES. It must be noted that in constitutional limitations,
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi. For a concerned party to be
allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show
that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners in this case have not presented any personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them
faces any charge under RA 9372. Petitioner-
organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being
suspected "communist fronts" by the government,
especially the military; whereas individual petitioners
invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
While jurisprudence holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner
has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury, this does not apply in cases involving
the constitutionality of penal legislation.
b.) NO. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or
controversy By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates
only when there is an actual case or controversy.
Herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected
conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable
threat has been established, much less a real and existing
one.
c.) NO. The rule established in our jurisdiction is; only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no
case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.
VAGUENESS VS. OVERBREADTH:
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes
that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits
and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.
FACIAL CHALLENGE VS. AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE:
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier
cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may
be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable
under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the
law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by the free speech clause. The
argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to
penalize is conduct, not speech.
Hence petitions are dismissed.
DUE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed
into law the Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
Petitioners herein are operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila which are directly affected by the said
ordinance.
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
and void since it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON the petitioners’ has legal standing
b.) WON the petitioners have the requisite standing to
plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection
rights.
c.) WON the ordinance is unconstitutional
RULING:
a.) Yes. Petitioners in this case are owners of
establishments offering "wash-up" rates and their
business is being unlawfully interfered with by the
Ordinance. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party
to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and
harm from the law or action challenged to support party's
participation in the case.
b.) Yes. The requirement of standing is a core component
of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct
and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause
for a petitioner's standing. Nonetheless, the general rules
on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing
and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine
are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right
of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant
must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or
her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to
the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.
“Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They
rely on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a
relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the
rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into
play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies
when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners claim that
the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right
to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth. It is thus recognized that the petitioners have
a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to
patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time
frame.
c.) Yes. The said ordinance is unconstitutional.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. For an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a
room more than twice a day.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is
one of due process. The due process guaranty has
traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property However, if due process were confined solely to
its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation
of arbitrary government action, provided the proper
formalities are followed. Substantive due process then
completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on
substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, to wit;
First, the rational basis examination - laws or ordinances
are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest.
Second, the intermediate review - governmental interest
is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.
Third, applying strict scrutiny- the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest.
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only into private rights.
restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to
act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of Based on the foregoing facts, Ordinance No. 7774 is
the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the
petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of
Office of the Solicitor vs. City of Manila
availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
FACTS:

Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations
of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn
in Metro Manila. The shopping malls operated or leased
of political consequence. Still, the Bill of Rights does not
out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of
shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
motor vehicles, they collect parking fees from the persons
fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively
making use of their parking facilities, regardless of
exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
whether said persons are mall patrons or not.
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the
degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.

In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. Whether
or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual
behavior among willing married or consenting single
adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed
as well. We cannot discount other legitimate activities
which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are
very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room
out for more than twice a day. E.g. Entire families are
known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst
the power is momentarily out in their homes.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash
rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights
and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint
investigation on which the following purpose is included:
(1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of
shopping malls of charging parking fees. The Committees
found that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls
is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor
[sic] illegal.
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information
enjoining respondent SM Prime and similar
establishments from collecting parking fees, and to
impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under
Presidential Decree No. 1096.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compelling the respondent to provide
parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons
or the public in general, free of charge constitutes an
unlawful taking of property without just Compensation?
RULING:
YES. The Court finds that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees from the public
for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would
be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power
to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not
include the power to confiscate. Police power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to
confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting
the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of
the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount
to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is
not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the
latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion
into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they
being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from
profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the
required parking facilities.
BSP MB VS. Antonio Valenzuela
G.R. No. 184778 (October 2, 2009)
FACTS:
In September of 2007 the Supervision and Examination
Department (SED) of BSP conducted examinations of the
books of the following banks: Rural Bank of Parañaque,
Inc. (RBPI), Rural Bank of San Jose (Batangas), Inc.,
Rural Bank of Carmen (Cebu), Inc., Pilipino Rural Bank,
Inc., Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, Inc., Rural Bank
of Calatagan (Batangas), Inc. (now Dynamic Rural Bank),
Rural Bank of Darbci, Inc., Rural Bank of Kananga
(Leyte), Inc. (now First Interstate Rural Bank), Rural Bank
de Bisayas Minglanilla (now Bank of East Asia), and San
Pablo City Development Bank, Inc.
After the examinations, exit conferences were held with
the officers or representatives of the banks wherein the
SED examiners provided them with copies of Lists of
Findings/Exceptions containing the deficiencies
discovered during the examinations. The banks were then
required to comment and to undertake the remedial
measures stated in the list within 30 days. The banks
requested for extension to comply with the remedial
measures and noted that none of them had received the
Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit
findings.
The respondent banks then filed before the RTC an action
to nullify the ROE and issuance of restraining order
contending that their right to due process was violated
because they were not furnished with ROEs. They further
contend that the sanction of closure that the MB might
impose upon the receipt of ROE will result in irreparable
damage to them as well as to the public.
ISSUE: W/N due process has been violated by SED due
to its failure to send copies of the ROEs to the respondent
banks.
RULING:
No, The respondent banks have failed to show that they
are entitled to copies of the ROEs. They can point to no
provision of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP
that shows that the BSP is required to give them copies
of the ROEs. The respondent banks cannot claim a
violation of their right to due process if they are not
provided with copies of the ROEs. The same ROEs are
based on the lists of findings/exceptions containing the
deficiencies found by the SED examiners when they
examined the books of the respondent banks. As found
by the RTC, these lists of findings/exceptions were
furnished to the officers or representatives of the
respondent banks, and the respondent banks were
required to comment and to undertake remedial
measures stated in said lists. Despite these instructions,
respondent banks failed to comply with the SED’s
directive.
Respondent banks are already aware of what is required
of them by the BSP, and cannot claim violation of their
right to due process simply because they are not
furnished with copies of the ROEs.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been
justified as a measure for the protection of the public
interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP
when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate
and determined efforts are taken by the government
against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in
the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the
prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention
the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed CA Decision is REVERSED
 ROXAS & CO vs DAMBA-NFSW
FACTS:
Petitioner voluntarily offered to sell its Hacienda Palico to
DAR pursuant to CARL. Subsequently, it withdraw its
offer believing said hacienda was already converted as
non-agricultural land, not covered by CARL, under
PP1520 declaring the municipalities of Maragondon and
ternate in Cavite province and the municipality of
Nasugbu as a TOURIST ZONE and for OTHER
PURPOSE.
There were proceeding in the DAR to acquire these
properties covered by CARL, which was contested by the
Roxas & Co claiming that they were not notified of the
proceedings before the DAR, Roxas & Co were arguing
that they were not afforded due process.Petitioners
allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of
the acquisition proceedings themselves.
ISSUE:
WON due process was violated.
RULING:
YES. The procedure in the sending of these notices is
important to comply with the requisites of due process
especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical
entity.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference,
and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the
States police power and the power of eminent domain. To
the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution.But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of
the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
The Bill of Rights provides that [n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. The CARL was not intended to take away property
without due process of law. The exercise of the power of
eminent domain requires that due process be observed in
the taking of private property.
DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN
SOLGEN VS AYALA
FACTS:
The respondents, Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la
maintain and operate shopping malls while SM Prime
constructs and leases building structures.
The shopping malls that respondents operate have
parking facilities in which they collect parking fees from
the persons making use of their facilities.
In May 2000, a joint investigation conducted by the
Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on
Justice and Human Rights issued Senate Committee
Report No. 225 in which they find that the collection of
parking fees by herein respondents are contrary to the
National Building Code. The Code merely requires malls
to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it is
free or not.
On 4 October 2000, the OSG, herein petitioner, filed a
petition to the RTC of Makati praying that the practice of
respondents in charging parking fees is violative of the
National Building Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. Upon appeal,
CA denied the petition and likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of OSG is a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
RULING:
No. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of
the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount
to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is
not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the
latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion
into the property rights of respondents. Not only are they
being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from
its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for
the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection
by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the
mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building
Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property
without payment of just compensation.
ORTEGA VS CITY OF CEBU
FACTS:
The spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel
of land. On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cebu City enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving
authority to the City Mayor to expropriate 1⁄2 portion of
such land, and appropriating for that purpose the amount
of P3,284,400.00. The amount will be charged against
Account No. 8- 93-310, Continuing Appropriation,
Account No. 101-8918-334.
Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint
for Eminent Domain before the RTC against the Spouses
Ortega. RTC then declared that [Cebu City] "has the
lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case,
for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon
payment of just compensation."
Based on the recommendation of the appointed
Commissioners, RTC issued another order, ordering
Cebu City to pay the spouses the sum of P31,416,000.00
as just compensation for the expropriated land.
RTC’s decision became final and executory after Cebu
City failed to perfect an appeal on time. RTC then issued
another order stating that Ordinance No. 1519
appropriating the sum of P3,284,400.00 for payment of
the subject lot is chargeable to Account No. 101-8918-334
and is now subject for execution or garnishment for it is
no longer exempted from execution.
Cebu City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution,
Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case,
contending that the price set by the RTC as just
compensation to be paid to the Spouses is way beyond
the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized
housing program. The motion was denied by the RTC.
Cebu City’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.
By virtue of the said order, a Notice of Garnishment was
served to Philippine Postal Bank.
Cebu City then filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve,
Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that
the account mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not an
existing bank account and the garnishment of Cebu City’s
bank account with Philippine Postal Bank is illegal,
because government funds and properties may not be
seized under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgement, on obvious reason of public policy. RTC
denied the said motion and likewise denied its Motion for
Reconsideration.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s
Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgement and to be allowed
to withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
a.) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment
and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation
Proceedings.
b.) Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine
Postal Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its
Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to
garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered
by City Ordinance No. 1519.
RULING:
a.) No. Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on
Expropriation speaks of 2 stages:
a. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
b. Determination by the court of the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken.
An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage
of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the
second stage—the determination of just compensation,
and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts
an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the
petitioner to condemn the respondents’ properties.
Because an order of expropriation merely determines the
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on
the payment of just compensation. After all, there would
be no point in determining just compensation if, in the first
place, the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the property was
not first clearly established.
Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by
the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a
prior order of expropriation. As applied to the case at bar,
Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the
judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed
to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation
proceedings.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of
just compensation is a judicial prerogative. In Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, we declared:
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power
Corporation v. dela Cruz and Forfom Development
Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we
emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the
ascertainment of just compensation as aided by the
appointed commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative, the appointment of commissioners to
ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be
taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own
estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid reasons;
that is, where the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners
is a substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all.”
b.) No. The proper remedy of [the Spouses Ortega] is to
file a mandamus case against Cebu City in order to
compel its Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an
appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of the
Spouses Ortega’s claim.
It is a settled rule that government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious
consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law.
EUSEBIO VS LUIS
FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land
which was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980
and was used as a municipal road.
On February 1, 1983, the Sanggunian of Pasig City
passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to
respondents for said parcel of land. However, the
Appraisal Committee assessed the value of the land only
at P150/sqm. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents
requested the Appraisal Commiitte to consider
P2,000/sqm as the value of their land.
Respondent’s counsel sent a letter to Mayor Eusebio,
demanding the amount of P5,000.00/sqm as just
compensation for respondents property. In his reply,
Mayor Eusebio said that the City of Pasig cannot pay
them more than the amount set by the Appraisal
Committee.
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents’ filed a complaint
before the RTC praying that the property be returned to
them with payment of reasonable rental for 16 years of
use, or in the event said property can no longer be
returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just
compensation.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Upon appeal, CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not property taken without the benefit of
expropriation proceeding required by law in the taking of
private property for public use can be regained.
RULING:
Citing the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Court of
Appeals, the Court emphasized that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use
without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.
The Court went on to remind government agencies not to
exercise the power of eminent domain with wanton
disregard for property rights as Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.
In Forform Development Corporation vs Philippine
National Railways, the court declared that recovery of
possession of the property by the landowner can no
longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more
importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation. It is settled that non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lot. Herein
respondents also failed to question the taking of their
property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early
1990s).
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just
compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the
Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation
proceedings instituted to determine just compensation,
the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with
the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment
of not more than three competent and disinterested
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property. The Court
reiterated its ruling in National Power Corporation v. Dela
Cruz that trial with the aid of commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all. It was also
emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just
compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the
trial courts own estimation of the propertys value only if
the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded
a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation
should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property
at the time of taking that is controlling.
In this case, the trial court should have fixed just
compensation for the property at its value as of the time
of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record showing
the value of the property at that time. The trial court,
therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the
subject land on the price paid for properties in the same
location, taken by the city government only sometime in
the year 1994.
City of Iloilo vs. Contreras and Javellana
(G.R. No. 168967)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against
private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana and Southern
Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee which
sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in
Javellana’s name to be used as a school site for Lapaz
High School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property
was declared for tax purposes to have a value of P60.00
per square meter, or a total value of P43,560.00.
Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of
his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter.
Petitioner was able to take physical possession of the
properties sometime in the middle of 1985. Private
respondent thus demanded his just compensation as well
as interest. Private respondent alleged that since he had
not been compensated for the Subject Property,
petitioner’s possession was illegal, and he was entitled to
recovery of possession of his lots. Private respondent
could only demand for the payment of just compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be based on the
fair market value of a property at the time of the filing of
complaint.
RULING:
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Just compensation is to be determined “as of
the date of filing of the complaint”. The reckoning date
should be in 2004 because of the clear injustice to the
private respondent who all these years has been deprived
of the beneficial use of his properties. City of Iloilo is held
liable for damages for taking private respondent’s
property without payment of just compensation.
RP vs. MANGOTARA
FACTS:
Dona Demetria owns two parcels of land and has titles to
prove ownership. 83 years later authenticity of said
ownership was still in doubt and the government filed a
case of expropriation against occupants of the land (not
really the owners, just renters). The occupants questioned
the expropriation case contending that expropriation
cases can only be filed against owners, not mere
occupants, of the land. The government also filed a case
of Reversion against Dona Demetria’s heirs contending
two parcels of land were fraudulently acquired. The
owners of the land questioned the case for Reversion
contending that, since they filed a case for Reconstitution
of Titles in 1914 and they still have said titles at present,
the government has no right to the land.
ISSUE/S:
a.) WON owners of parcels of land are indispensable
parties to an expropriation proceeding?
b.) WON the government erred in filing both a case for
expropriation and a case for Reversion against the
occupants and the owners of the land?
c.) WON, in filing the case for Reversion, the government
is barred by res judicata and prescription?
RULING:
a.) No. The defendants in an expropriation case are not
limited to the owners of the property condemned. They
include all other persons, owning, occupying or claiming
to own the property. When property is taken by eminent
domain, the owner is not an indispensable party to the
proceeding.
b.) No. The Republic is not engaging in contradictions
when it instituted both expropriation/reversion
proceedings for the same parcels of land. Rule 67,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows filing of
expropriation even when “the title to any property sought
to be condemned appears to be the Republic, although
occupied by private individuals.”
c.) Elementary is the rule that prescription does not run
against the State. The indefeasibility of a Title over land
previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired,
if the purpose of such investigation is to determine w/n
fraud had been committed in securing such title in order
that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by
the government.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-52245)
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position
of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Constitution which
provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or
municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to
be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired.” He
likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously
against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds,
therefore, class legislation.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being
contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.
RULING:
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to
rational classification based on reasonable and real
differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years
of age have been classified differently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory
retirement while the latter are not.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be
to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribed is a classification which
is arbitrary and unreasonable. There is reason to
disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run
for office because there is the “need for new blood to
assume relevance”. When an official has retired he has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 is valid.
Quinto vs. COMELEC
(G. R. No. 189698)
FACTS:
R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are not
deemed resigned upon filing of their certificate of
candidacy, however, appointive officials are considered
deemed resigned upon filing of the COC’s.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 is violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING:
Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned upon filing of CoCs, but not considering resigned
all other civil servants, specifically elective ones, the law
duly discriminates against the first class (appointive
officials). Applying the four requisites of valid
classification, the Court finds that treatment of persons
holding appointive officers as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the purposes of law
(Requisite No. 2). There is no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of law.
2010 Decision Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are
elected by his constituents, if they are deemed resigned,
the constituents will be affected. On the other hand, in the
case of appointive officials, they do not have ordinary
succession, thus, there will be vacancy during
resignation.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to
the sovereign will.
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC
GR No. 190582
FACTS:
Ang LADLAD is an organization who identifies
themselves as LGBT that applied for registration with the
COMELEC as party-list but the application was
denied/dismissed the petition (1) on moral grounds, (2)
nuisance. The COMELEC also cited verses/provisions
from the Bible and the Qur’an, that they advocate sexual
immorality among other things. It would expose our youth
to an environment that does not conform to the teachings
of our faith.
Ang LADLAD is questioning that the basis of the
COMELEC to discredit, deny or dismiss the petition was
baseless. And also there was a violation of equal
protection according to LADLAD. One of the rulings of the
COMELEC here was that the LGBT sector is not
enumerated in the constitution and RA 7941 nor is it
related to any of the sectors enumerated in that law.
The Court said that the ruling of the COMELEC was
wrong because the listing under that law is not exclusive.
Meaning if in analogous circumstances they may fall
under that listing as enumerated and explicitly ruled in
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC. The enumeration of
the marginalized sectors is not exclusive.
The Court said that the invocation of the Bible and Qur’an
contravenes Article 3 Section 5 of the constitution on
neutrality. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. Meaning all government issuances must be
neutral. There must be a secular purpose of the religious
purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not denying the application of Ang Ladlad is
violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING:
Yes. COMELEC made an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC, the
majority of Filipinos considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable. Such reason is sufficient to
disqualify the petitioner. Homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of equal protection clause.
Moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy the
rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
LGBT has the same interest in participating in the party-
list system. Laws of general application should apply with
equal force to LGBTs.
BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC.
vs E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC.
G.R. No. 131481 (March 16 , 2011)
FACTS:
Several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares)
which from part of a larger expanse with an area of 372
hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas,
Cavite was originally owned by Manila Golf and Country
Club, he property was acquired by the [herein respondent
EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the
same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's
Life Homes".
In 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite,
acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264,
otherwise known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted
Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as
Ordinance No. 1, entitled "An Ordinance Providing
Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for
Violation Thereof." In May, 1972 E.M. Ramos and Sons,
Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development
its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential
subdivision, ataching to the application detailed
development plans and development proposals from
Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel
Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of
Dasmarinas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal
Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity),
approving [EMRASON's] application. Subsequently,
[EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to
proceed with property development.
On June15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or
CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land
classification, acquisition and distribution. Secretary
Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of
notices of acquisition to EMARSON.EMRASON] filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB),Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate
petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices.
Legal Division of DAR rendered a decision declaring as
null and void all the notices of acquisitions. At this
juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject
property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, on appeal, the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs The Court of
Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because -the
latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial
to the interest of the original parties, nor will such
intervention change the factual legal complexion of the
case." The Court of Appeals further observed that the
subject property has never been devoted to any
agricultural activity. thus, CA granted the petition.
ISSUE: W/n the subject property could be placed under
the CARP.
RULING:
No, Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24
particularly defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit:
SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners
with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not
be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
CARP:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification
of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the
specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific
limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to
or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for
agriculture regardless of the agricultural products
raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down
the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP
to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."
The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt
from the CARP, the subject property should have already
been reclassified as residential prior to said date.
Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and
buildings according to districts or zones. It is
comprehensive where it is governed by a single plan for
the entire municipality and prevails throughout the
municipality in accordance with that plan. It is partial or
limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the
municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts
and building regulations are forms of partial or limited
zoning or use regulation that are antecedents of modern
comprehensive zoning, (pp. 11-12.)
The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of
comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental
regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to
districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize
classification of uses within districts as well as
classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is
impossible to deal specifically with each of the
innumerable uses made of land and buildings.
Accordingly, (zoning has been defined as the confining of
certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities,
areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that zoning
is the regulation by districts of building development and
uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only
capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and
artificial meaning in accordance therewith. (Zoning is the
separation of the municipality into districts and the
regulation of buildings and structures within the districts
so created, in accordance with their construction, and
nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts
delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the
general welfare.) Numerous other definitions of zoning
more or less in accordance with these have been given in
the cases, (pp. 27-28.)
The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases
is the reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v.
Court of Appeals, the Court had the occasion to define
and distinguish reclassification from conversion as
follows:
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a
piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved
by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification,
on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the
land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure
for land use conversion, x x x. (Italics supplied.)
Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-
agricultural lands to agricultural use.
Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that
the authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily
resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality.
Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its
approval on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning
and reclassifying of the subject property for residential
use. It need not comply with any of the requirements or
conditions which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon.
DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not
reviewed and approved by the NPC, in violation of the line
in Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, stating
that "[c]ities and municipalities may, however, consult the
National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning." Consideration must be given,
however, to the use of the word "may" in the said
sentence. Where the provision reads "may," this word
shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary. It is an
auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission
and possibility. The use of the word "may" in a statute
denotes that it is directory in nature and generally
permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis
in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. Since
consultation with the NPC was merely discretionary, then
there were only two mandatory requirements for a valid
zoning or subdivision ordinance or regulation under
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely,
that (1) the ordinance or regulation be adopted by the city
or municipal board or council; and (2) it be approved by
the city or municipal mayor, both of which were complied
with byl Resolution No. 29-A.
 Trillanes vs. Pimentel
(G.R. No. 179817)
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’état in relation
to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won
a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that
he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of
Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas
that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. He
asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Petitioner also illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with
crimes involving moral turpitude, whereas he is indicted
for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to attend the
Senate sessions.
RULING:
No. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental
in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. The Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat
cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range
of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to
the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission
(G.R. No. 192935)
FACTS:
EO No. 1 was issued by President Aquino to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption of previous
administration. The petitioners assail EO No. 1 is violative
of the constitutional safeguard because it does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the
intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its
sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility." To be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually
all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Truth Commission is violative of the
equal protection clause.
RULING:
YES. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. For a
classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality,
it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration” only. The previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and
intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was
underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of
a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from
arbitrary classification.
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS LIMITATION ON
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS
IN RE MORALES
FACTS:
OCA received two unsigned and undated letters from
anonymous who claim alleging Atty. Morales, was
consuming his working hours filing and attending to
personal cases, such as administrative cases against
employees in his old sala, using office supplies,
equipment and utilities. Because of the said letter, DCA
Dela Cruz together with four NBI agents conducted a spot
investigation. The team was able to access the personal
computer of Atty. Morales and printed two documents
stored in its hard drive, and thereby seized and took
Morales's computer to the custody of the OCA
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's
personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him?
RULING:
No. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of
the people to be secure in their persons and properties
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is
provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained
in violation of such right. The fact that the present case is
administrative in nature does not render the above
principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of
Appeals, any violation of the aforestated constitutional
right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were
able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of
Atty. Morales. The Court finds however that such
allegation on his part, even with a similar allegation from
one of his staff, is not sufficient to make the present case
fall under the category of a valid warrantless search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search;
that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LOSS OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IS NOT TO BE PRESUMED AND COURTS
INDULGE EVERY REASONABLE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST WAIVER OF FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. To constitute a valid
consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty.
Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right.
While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal
computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the
presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI
agents during the March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is
also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an
administrative case against said persons questioning the
validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting
standards required of every court employee,
unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained
from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right.
PEOPLE V. NUNEZ
FACTS:
With a summon, Brgy. Captain and Tanod of Brgy. San
Antonio assisted Laguna Police Detectives in
coordination with the Los Banos Police Station and IID
Mobile Force in a search operation in the house of Raul
R. Nuez based on reports of drug possession. Upon
arriving at appellants house, Mundin called on appellant
to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer
Pagkalinawan showed Nuez the warrant. Several shabu
paraphernalia were found. Following the search, SPO1
Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a
Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed.
RTC convicted appellant for a violation of R.A. 6425 as
amended which was affirmed by the CA. Appellant assails
the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his
exact address but only the barangay and street of his
residence. He maintains that none of the occupants
witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living
room. Finally, appellant questions why the prosecution did
not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light
on the details of the search.
ISSUE:
W/N there was an irregularity in the search conducted.
RULING:
YES. Turning to the objects which may be confiscated
during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court is pertinent: SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.
A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property: (a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or (c) Used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense. As a rule, only the
personal properties described in the search warrant may
be seized by the authorities.[23] In the case at bar, Search
Warrant No. 42[24] specifically authorized the taking of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem
generis, where a statute describes things of a particular
class or kind accompanied by words of a generic
character, the generic word will usually be limited to things
of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated,
unless there be something in the context of the statement
which would repel such inference. Thus, we are here
constrained to point out an irregularity in the search
conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet, cash, grinder,
camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw,
electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not
encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no
relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the
said items then, the police officers exercised their own
discretion and determined for themselves which items in
appellants residence they believed were proceeds of the
crime or means of committing the offense. This is, in our
view, absolutely impermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the
articles to be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only
those particularly described in the search warrant -- to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in
the search warrant should be restored to appellant.
DEL ROSARIO V. DONATO
FACTS:
Del Rosarios alleged that NBI agents entered by force in
their premises to search for fake Marlboro Cigarettes
pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained by RTC
of Angeles. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro
cigarettes. Subsequently, petitioner initiated a 50 million
suit for damages. As the case was elevated before CA, it
held that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC failed
to state a cause of action against NBI. Del Rosarios allege
is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully
obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the
fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get
such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro
cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosarios premises.
ISSUE:
W/N CA correctly rule that the complaint of the Del
Rosarios did not state a cause of action against NBI
agents.
RULING:
YES. A JUDICIALLY ORDERED SEARCH THAT FAILS
TO YIELD THE DESCRIBED ILLICIT ARTICLE DOES
NOT OF ITSELF RENDER THE COURTS ORDER
UNLAWFUL. The Del Rosarios did not allege that
respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating
testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue
the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents
used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere
conclusion of law. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and
other related words without ultimate facts to support the
same are mere conclusions of law. As such, it exposes
the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure
to state a cause of action.
 PEOPLE V. TUAN
FACTS:
Two separate Information were filed before the RTC
against accused- appellant for illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. Accused-
appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her
house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search
Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to
comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements.
She alleged that the following defects which made said
Search Warrant void: (1) the informants made
misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search
Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) MTCC Judge failed to
consider the informants admission that they themselves
were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed
to particularly describe the place to be searched because
the house was a two-storey building composed of several
rooms.
ISSUE:
W/N the search warrant is valid?
RULING:
Yes. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests
upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.
In this case, (2) and (3) for a validly issued search warrant
were complied with, i.e., personal determination of
probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under
oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two
informants by Judge Cortes.
and (4) i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
description of the place to be searched and things to be
seized is to be determined. A MAGISTRATE’S
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT MUST HAVE
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR THAT DETERMINATION.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. Substantial basis exists in this case. Judge
Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the
Search Warrant for accused-appellants residence after
said judges personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez,
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
DEFINITENESS.A description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In
the case at bar, the address and description of the place
to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
enough. There was only one house located at the stated
address, which was accused-appellants residence,
consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of
several rooms.
PEOPLE V. MAMARIL
FACTS:
OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL was convicted due to
possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11,
Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
Accused-appellant alleged that the issued search warrant
was not based on probable cause. It relied heavily on its
argument that SPO4 Gotidoc, as the applicant of the
search warrant, did not testify on facts personally known
to him but simply relied on stories that the accused-
appellant was peddling illegal drugs. W/N there is a
probable cause in issuing the search warrant? Yes.
PROBABLE CAUSE means such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the
questioned search warrant was based on a probable
cause. A portion of the direct testimony of SPO4 Gotidoc
where he said that there were many persons who were
going to her place and they’ve been hearing news that
she is selling prohibited drugs and some of them were
even identified. Furthermore, the authorities already
conducted surveillance prior to the application for search
warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid issuance of a search
warrant.
YES. Section 6, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that:
If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based or that there is probable
cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
THERE IS NO GENERAL FORMULA OR FIXED RULE
FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
since the same must be decided in light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to
a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination.
JUDICIAL FUNCTION’S PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY It is presumed that a judicial function has
been regularly performed, absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrates determination of a probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.
The defenses reliance of the quoted testimony of the
police officer alone, without any other evidence to show
that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is
insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court. The
accused-appellant, having failed to present substantial
rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity
of duty of the issuing judge, will not be sustained by this
Court.
SY TAN vs SY TIONG GUE
FACTS:
Romer Sy Tan (PETITIONER) filed a criminal case of
robbery against respondents Tiong Gue, et al. The
Respondents moved for the withdrawal of the information
which was subsequently granted by the RTC on the
ground that the essential elements of robbery i.e.,
unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and
intimidation, were absent as decided upon by the Court of
Appeals on an prior complaint. Thus, there was lack of
probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the
Information.
Hence the case was dismissed. Now the petitioner, before
Supreme Court contended that he filed information for
qualified theft based on the same subject matter of the
dismissed robbery and would like to use the item seized
in the previously conducted search for the new
information of qualified theft.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the items seized in the previously
conducted search warrant issued by the court for robbery
be included and used for the filing of for an information for
qualified theft.
RULING:
NO. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the
items seized as evidence in any other offense except in
that in which the subject search warrants were issued.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicants personal knowledge and his or her witnesses.
Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by
virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the
case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft,
even if both cases emanated from the same incident.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the
Information was based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause
to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the
essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an
essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all
offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of
Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper.
 TY v DE JEMIL NO. The ownership of the seized branded LPG cylinders,
allegedly owned by Omni customers as petitioners
adamantly profess, is of no consequence.
FACTS:

Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation

("Omni"). (JGAC Law Offices sent a letter to the NBI The law does not require that the property to be seized
requesting, on behalf of their clients Shellane Dealers should be owned by the person against whom the search
Association, Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers Association, Inc., warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no
and Totalgaz Dealers Association, Inc., for the consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
surveillance, investigation, and apprehension of persons whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
or establishments in Pasig City that are engaged in the property sought to be seized.
alleged illegal trading of petroleum products and
underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33, as amended by Presidential
Petitioners cannot deny that the seized LPG cylinders
Decree No. (PD) 1865.
were in the possession of Omni, found as they were inside
the Omni compound.
VALID INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
NBI Agents Marvin De Jemil and Edgardo Kawada
SEIZURES
conducted surveillance operations on Omni. On 15 April
2004, the NBI Agents carried out a test-buy. Using eight A. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES
branded LPG cylinders from Shell, Petron and Total, they
went to Omni for refilling. Omni refilled the cylinders. The
NBI agents paid more than P1500. Inspector Noel Navio ANIAG v. COMELEC
found that the LPG cylinders were without LPG valve
seals and one of the cylinders was actually underfilled.
FACTS: In preparation for the synchronized national and
local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11
Agent De Jemil obtained a search warrant from Pasig
December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred
RTC branch 167. The NBI seized several items from
to as the "Gun Ban,".
Omni's premises. Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed his
Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ. Assistant City
Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause for violation of
BP 33. This was later approved by Chief State Prosecutor On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr.
Jovencito Zuno. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the
return of the two (2) firearms issued to him by the House
The CA found strong probable violation of refilling of
of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on
another companys or firms cylinders without such
13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately
companys or firms written authorization under Sec. 3 (c)
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the
of BP 33, as amended. The CA relied on the affidavits of
firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return
Agents De Jemil and Kawada, the certifications from
them to Congress.
various LPG producers that Omni is not authorized to refill
their branded LPG cylinders.

Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the

same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed
Petitioners contend that they were not the owners of the
by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
seized LPG cylinders
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty
(20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes
later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down
ISSUE: the car driven by Arellano as it approached the
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms
Whether or not the issue on ownership of confiscated are
neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in
material to the determination of probable cause and to the
the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and
validity of the search warrant?
detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner
to get the firearms from the house and return them to
Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of
RULING: Representatives.

The police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for inquest. The City Prosecutor ordered the
release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn
explanation meritorious.
Upon the invitation of the City Prosecutor, the petitioner
to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only
appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm
Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor
urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning the
firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver,
not a security officer nor a bodyguard.
City Prosecutor issued a resolution ordering the dismissal
of the case against Arellano. However, upon
recommendation of the Law Department, COMELEC
issued resolution directing the filing of the information
against the petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec.
261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
7166;7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not
be disqualified from running for an elective position,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to
Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of
B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
However, this was denied by the COMELEC. Hence, this
petition,
ISSUE: W/N he can be validly prosecuted for instructing
his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless
search of his car.
RULING: No. The warrantless search conducted by the
Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared
illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless
search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding
against petitioner.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which
the PNP conducted the search. According to him, without
a warrant and without informing the driver of his
fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The
firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the
immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in
their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of
the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the
evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs.
2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. Petitioner
further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party
respondent in the preliminary investigation before the
Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge
sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the
criminal information would violate his constitutional right
to due process.
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation
of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg.
881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and
accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall
be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that
it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought
the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence,
submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as
he was invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the
circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the
firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation
about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that
violation of the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the
intention of the offender is immaterial.
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However,
this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in
plain view,17 as well as the search conducted at police or
military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per
se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited
to a visual search.
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in
Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they
were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag
at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not
rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner
by which the package was bundled led the PNP to
suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention
either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or
unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was
stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and
relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not
thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package
without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be
resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the
warrantless search is determined by the facts of each
case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless
search in situations where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or
where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee.
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set
up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan
Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327. There was no
evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do
so because of a confidential report leading them to
reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were engaged in
gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that
could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing
to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search
could not be valid. The action then of the policemen
unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the
security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of
the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search
cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of
Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of
petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the
search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms. The
facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five
o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search
was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was
not shown that news of impending checkpoints without
necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the
same have been announced in the media to forewarn the
citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon
carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its
operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not
have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the
instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and
search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any
choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any
attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion
and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the
motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his
vehicle. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation,29 driver Arellano being alone
and a mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshalled the strength and the courage to protest
against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In
such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was
any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity
on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
EPIE v. ULAT-MARREDO
FACTS: Accused Ulat was charged with violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705; that without
any authority of law or without any license or permit
granted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, he
possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber
having a total market value of ₱24,360.00 belonging to
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage
and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum
aforesaid.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around
2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station
received an information from a confidential agent that a
jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet
was loaded with Benguet pine lumber. SPO2 Ngina
immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao
Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly
established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet. At
around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives
spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They
flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the
vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then
loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some
pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his companions
admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The
police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners,
Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos.
Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68
of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners,
through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of
the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet
pine lumber were illegally seized.
This was denied by the RTC. CA affirmed the decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N police officers have a probable cause to
believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal
cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched
without a warrant.
RULING: Yes.
In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land
recognizes and protects the right of a person to privacy
against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the
State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence
obtained in violation of the above provision shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be
carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such
search and seizure constitutes derogation of a
constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In
People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search
and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view;
(5) search when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence
of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place to be
searched.8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in
warrantless searches, probable cause must only be
based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in
determining probable cause for its determination varies
according to the facts of each case.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance
where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should
determine is whether there was probable cause to justify
such warrantless search and seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998,
a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a
passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with
Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The
lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP
roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to
intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same
day, the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down
but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it
reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle
disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber.
Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit
to cut and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle
sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, in an
apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding
with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify
a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law
or that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies
to the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not
err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless search is
valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence
against petitioners.
 PEOPLE v. TUASON his address and the name of his employer. After two days,
he was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the
owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the
FACTS: Accused Tuazon not being lawfully authorized to
gun recovered from said vehicle. He learned later on that
possess any regulated drug have in his possession,
he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425
custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent
for illegal possession of shabu and Presidential Decree
plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams, 95.46 grams,
No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter case
40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and
was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct
3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white
examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have
crystalline substance, which after the corresponding
been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu,
laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to
but Reyes who was driving the Gemini car.
the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride also known
as "shabu" a regulated drug, in violation of the Section 16,
Article III, R.A. 6425.
RTC found the accused guilty and imposed upon
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P500,000. Upon appeal, contends that at the time
The prosecution's version of the case relied heavily on the
of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within
testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who
Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not
testified that in the morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo
committing, and was not about to commit any crime which
City Police Station received through telephone, a
could have justified his apprehension. He goes on to
confidential information that a Gemini car bearing plate
argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the
number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount
validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the matter before
of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on
entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the
said tip, Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene
unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the
Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to
police. Appellant claims that as the confidential informant
conduct a surveillance. When the team arrived in Marville
had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior
Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and
to his arrest, the authorities were already informed of his
immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled
identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have
to a stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the
conducted a prior surveillance and then sought a search
policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as
warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu
members of the Antipolo City Police Station. It was then
seized from him should be excluded from evidence. CA
that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked
affirmed RTC’s decision. In sustaining the trial court, the
on appellant's waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about the gun
Court of Appeals found PO3 Bueno's testimony to be
and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor
"clear and unequivocal"14 and should therefore prevail
could he produce any pertinent document relating to said
over appellant's defense of denial.15 The Court of
firearm. This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to
Appeals likewise brushed aside appellant's contention
get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped
that he was a victim of frame-up as this defense has been
down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic
viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of
sachets on the driver's seat, the contents of which
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was
Dangerous Drugs Act.16 It also took note of appellant's
thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
failure to give any credible reason why the police singled
him out considering that they were strangers to one
another prior to the date of the incident.17
Appellant’s account of events: On 6 March 1999, he
reported for work at six o'clock in the evening. Later that
night, unidentified men walked up to him. One of these
Hence, this petition.
men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked
outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men
outside so he could confirm the identity of the owner of
the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search is valid.
men pointed to him a green colored Isuzu Gemini car
which according to him was driven by his employer,
Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified RULING: Yes.
men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and
ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men
allegedly asked him regarding the whereabouts of Reyes No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the
and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
was in. A few hours passed and he was then brought to effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
the police headquarters where he was asked regarding
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called
exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same
article '
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional
provisions against warrantless searches and seizures
admit of certain exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk;
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.31
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,32 this Court had the
occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption
of searches of moving vehicles from the requirement of
search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use
of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from
one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought."
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search
warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give
the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would
render the aforementioned constitutional stipulations
inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police
distrust which could amount to outright harassment.
Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of
search of moving vehicles does not encompass such
arbitrariness on the part of the police authorities. In
recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates
that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in
order to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.33
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe
prior to the search that they would find the instrumentality
or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.35
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause
to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven
by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that
said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police
sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said
vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned
out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted
in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When
they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in appellant's
waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his
possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the police's suspicion. After he was told to
step out of the car, they found on the driver's seat plastic
sachets containing white powdery substance. These
circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish
probable cause for the warrantless search of the Gemini
car and the eventual admission into evidence of the
plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the
admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground
that the same was obtained through a warrantless search.
His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial court
to admit said evidence.36
Appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
 PEOPLE v. MARIACOS
FACTS: Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged
in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165; that he
transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana
fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from
the proper government agency or office.
San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the
poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of
marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La
Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of
PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of
Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not
yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police
instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang,
PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag.
Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
"O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said
jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with
an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2
Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top
of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc
alighted together with the other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried
away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women
and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that
they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later
identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos,
and the bags to the police station. The bags were opened
and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper,
two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were
recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and
forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime
laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive
for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Accused’s account of events: While the jeepney was still
at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-
ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a
few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney.
At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was
persuaded later when she was told that she would only be
carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-
ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away.
A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them,
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to
the police station. When they were at the police station,
Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police
station that accused-appellant discovered the true
contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She
maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and
that she did not know what were contained in the bags.
RTC found the accused Mariacos guilty as charged and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued
that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the
prosecution despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that
her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly
violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search
warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that
PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to
verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he
had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant
contended that there was no probable cause for her
arrest.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless
arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of
marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had
committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based
on reliable information from their agent, which was
confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the
distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that
appellant was now estopped from questioning the
illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea
of "not guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the
trial and presented her evidence.
CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. The CA ruled that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag
that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that
appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate
court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier
ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard
the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the
jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was
already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for
himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw
accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was
within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant.
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time,
when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the
suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked
the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew
who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of
the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the
situation. The local police has been trying to intercept the
transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no
avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2
Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly
as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving
vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be
expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the
contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the
moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have
been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left
the locality.13
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search is valid.
RULING: Yes.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances
when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of
which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective
decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a
moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched
to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
The essential requisite of probable cause must be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be
lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the
articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the
person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers
to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the
place to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.20
It is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid.
The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited
drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a
quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to
require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the
essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to
obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior
valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary
for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the
exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if
the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search.25
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based
on that search is also valid.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she
was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who
had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention,
however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof
is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute
a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are
not exempting circumstances where the crime charged is
malum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere possession
and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal
authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are
regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs
of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
behavior directed not against particular individuals, but
against public order.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the
drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by
counsel, and that no representative from the media and
the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not
fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or
make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items.37
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s
arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station
where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the
Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal
drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the
police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to
appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes
the chain of custody from the time of appellant’s arrest
until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime
laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state
explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with
Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that
appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are
inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown
because appellant did not question the custody and
disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.38
Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by
Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before
the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of
the information at the first instance. But she did not.
Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on
the matter.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against
petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the
procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to
be performing their duties regularly, absent any
convincing proof to the contrary.39
In sum, the prosecution successfully established
appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.
According to the petitioner, the small structure, 20 meters
away from his house where they found the confiscated
items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a
storage place by his father.
RTC found him guilty of violating Section 16, Article III,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto and the appeal is
DISMISSED.

B. SEARCH INCIDENT TO A VALID ARREST

Hence, this petition.

DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE

ISSUE: W/N accused herein is guilty of the crime

FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that charged.
petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting
surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of RULING: No.
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and
served the search warrant to petitioner. Upon arrival,
somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to
As to the validity of the search warrant - Petitioner insists
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and
that there was no probable cause to issue the search
went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the
structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-storey
police officer who applied for it, had no personal
house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of
informed her that they will implement the search warrant.
the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains
But before they can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon
that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small
motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section
structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were
did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show
not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his
assertion or representation.

They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and

closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover.
As to the admissibility of the four (4) packs of shabu
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson
seized inside the shop of petitioner - Petitioner asserts
Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly
that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his
del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the
house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may
nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His
be searched by the police officers due to the distance and
men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to
as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four
other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
(4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable
Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were
only against government authorities and not to private
sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the
contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic
folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa
packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the
hut.
result of which proved positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
As to CA’s decision in finding petitioner guilty of the
charge - petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to
be in possession of the same just because they were
found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG
dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that,
when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house
or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular
person, the presumption arises that such person is in
possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact
of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of
petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge;
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she
may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable
cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula,15
and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree
upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to
disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the
issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must
be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement
of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search Warrant
No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes
the residence of the petitioner as the place to be
searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a
barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the
search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized
were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as
evidence because the one who discovered them was a
barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizure being applicable only against government
authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who
effected the search warrant that they asked the
assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been
established that the assistance of the barangay tanods
was sought by the police authorities who effected the
searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore
acted as agents of persons in authority. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items
are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the
confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus,
making the same items admissible in evidence,
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to
establish constructive possession of the regulated drugs
seized, would still be meritorious.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is
about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the
following essential elements must be established:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated
drug;
(b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly
constituted authorities; and
(c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched
or seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient
showing that the property is under appellant’s control or
possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. Constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found.30 The records are void
of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut
in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely
presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being
an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in
the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and
dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law's own starting perspective on the status of the
accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.
LUZ v. PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then
assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that
he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from
his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which
turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself and raised the
defense of planting of evidence and extortion. RTC
convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person
of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The
RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to
be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. RODEL LUZ
y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims
that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket
or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been
lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus: The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time
when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there
is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to
flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was
actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the
accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or
arrested by the apprehending officers.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid arrest that may allow the
public officer to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.
RULING: No.
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for
the particular reasons alleged.
First - There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver
for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt
prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period
not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date
of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a
ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The
mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a
Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the
phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop
mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. Second,
circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are
not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. The usual traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions
that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the
purposes of Miranda.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-
012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear
a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by
a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for
a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance
of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were
not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested,
it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement they might make could
be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this
case, these constitutional requirements were complied
with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Second - There being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this
case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although
alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container
inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown
by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given
and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not
suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the
RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the
contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or
passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this
case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless
search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk"
rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop
and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.20
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales
for the "search incident to arrest" exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and
(2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x
x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the
search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer
safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is
a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-
235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop,
on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is
more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a
formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296
(1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence").
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest. The subject items seized during the
illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26
Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause
or ground.
AMBRE v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Ambre, Castro and Mendoza were
charged with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia and
illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu. Both Castro and Mendoza
pleaded guilty to both charges. Ambre, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the
merits ensued.
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the
Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special
Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant
to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdulah
Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp (Aderp) were
engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential
compound in Caloocan City; that the buy-bust operation
resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar
Tagoranao (Tagoranao); that Sultan ran away from the
scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2
Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of
the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house;
that inside the house, the police operatives found Ambre,
Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in
particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be
shabu in a rolled up aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran
ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested
Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu. The
items confiscated from the three were marked and,
thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination, which
later on turned out to be positive for the presence of
shabu.
However, Ambre vehemently denied the charges against
her. Through the testimonies of Ambre, Mendoza and Lily
Rosete (Rosete), Ambre was inside the residential
compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that when they
failed to buy malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the
residential compound to look for other vendors; that ten
minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound
and arrested her.
RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution
was able to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre for
illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The
RTC, however, acquitted her of the crime of violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the
prosecution to prove with particularity the drug
paraphernalia found in her possession.
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the
search of her person was valid; and
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in
evidence.
Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and
search made against her were illegal because no offense
was being committed at the time and the police operatives
were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the
dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged "hot
pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house,
where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found
having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. In
this regard, Ambre cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of
the Prosecutor's Office of Caloocan City dismissing the
case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of
evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust operation
was highly suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the
items allegedly seized from her were inadmissible in
evidence being fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that
the omission of the apprehending team to observe the
procedure outlined in R.A. No. 9165 for the seizure of
evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the
prosecution s case. Lastly, Ambre maintains that she was
not subjected to a confirmatory test and, hence, the
imposition of the penalty of six months rehabilitation was
not justified.
RULING: Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid, hence,
the items seized were admissible. mbre stands.
The conviction of A
One of the recognized exception established by
jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In
this exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. As a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. (Emphasis supplied)
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre
was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu
and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1
Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected
shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17
Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no
prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The
argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior
lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante
delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the
apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in
the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the
arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro
and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers.
Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only
authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre
together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section
15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Moreover, the Court holds
that Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to
her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was
valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her
person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate
warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre,
together with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using
shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found
positive for the presence of shabu
C. WHEN THINGS SEIZED ARE WITH PLAIN VIEW OF A
SEARCHING PARTY
ABENES v. CA
FACTS: Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of Pagadian City, through its Company Commander Major
Pedronisto Quano, created a team composed of seven
policemen with a directive to establish and man a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the
purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being
implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3 Cipriano Q.
Pascua was the designated team leader. Vehicles
passing through the road block were required by the team
to stop and their occupants were then politely requested
to alight in order to allow routine inspection and checking
of their vehicles. Motorists who refused the request were
not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red
Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point was
stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of
the road. As the occupants within the vehicle could not be
seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo,
a member of the team, knocked on the vehicle’s window
and requested the occupants to step down for a routine
inspection. The eight occupants, which included the
accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay
Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del
Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture, SPO1
Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered
firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The
firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not
covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then
asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and
authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession
was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the
COMELEC. Accused answered in the affirmative. The
policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to
be shown to support Abenes’ claim. He could not show
any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm,
which was later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol
bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine
containing seven live ammunitions.
Upon the indorsement of Abenes to a certain SPO2
Benvienido Albon for further investigation, it was found
out Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm
holder, through the certification issued by Firearms and
Explosives License Processing Section of the PNP.
In his defense, accused-appellant tried to establish that
the firearm did not belong to and was not recovered from
him; that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from
the floor of the vehicle inside a clutch bag which was
allegedly left by an unidentified person who hitched a ride
somewhere along the national highway of Tawagan Norte
Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay
Bazaar in Pagadian City.
RTC convicted petitioner on the following charges:
1. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED
FIREARM & ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294)
2. Election Offense in violation of Sec. 261 (9)3 , BP 881
(OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis-à-vis COMELEC
RESOLUTION # 1958 (GUN BAN)
In addition thereto, herein accused is disqualified to hold
any public office and deprived [of] the right of suffrage
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the
checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set up,
and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered
to alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with his companions
in the vehicle, violated his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
with modification as to the penalty. The CA found that with
respect to the admissibility of the firearm as evidence, the
prosecution witnesses convincingly established that the
.45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the
petitioner when he alighted from the vehicle, was readily
visible, and, therefore, could be seized without a search
warrant under the "plain view" doctrine.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search is valid by virtue of
the plain view doctrine.
RULING: Yes.
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court reverses the
CA’s finding of his conviction in Criminal Case No. 4559-
98 (illegal possession of firearms).
As to the validity of checkpoint, petitioner insists that the
prosecution should have produced the mission order
constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v.
Comelec,15 where the Court purportedly held that
firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are
inadmissible because there was no indication that would
trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other
circumstance showing probable cause. In the present
case, the production of the mission order is not necessary
in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established
three days before the May 11, 1998 elections; and, the
circumstances under which the policemen found the gun
warranted its seizure without a warrant.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’
right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot
be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the
gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC
would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It
would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against
illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they
were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such
as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if
the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they
would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
petitioner’s reliance on Aniag is misplaced.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the
petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked
into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain
view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.18 The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.19
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant
case. The law enforcement officers lawfully made an
initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun
Ban and were properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they
saw the gun tucked into his [right] waist. The gun was in
plain view and discovered inadvertently when the
petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
However, the Court must underscore that the prosecution
failed to satisfactorily prove the negative allegation in the
Information that the petitioner possessed no license or
permit to bear the subject firearm.
It is a well-entrenched rule "that in crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the
subject firearm, and the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same."
Witness for the prosecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados
admitted that his records were outdated, i.e., that his
Master List of holders of firearms only covered licenses
up to 1994; that it was possible for the petitioner to acquire
a license after 1994; and that he issued the Certification,
dated May 18, 1998, stating that the petitioner carried no
license or permit to possess the guns because he was
ordered to do so by his superiors. There is no evidence
that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime
was allegedly committed, no license was issued to
petitioner. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a
firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter
must be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No.
1866, as amended.
With respect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of
B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm
the conviction of the petitioner, since the prosecution
successfully discharged its burden of proof.
Petitioner Rodolfo Abenes Y Gacutan is ACQUITTED
from the charge of illegal possession of firearm under P.D.
No. 1866, as amended, for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond unreasonable doubt. With respect
to Criminal Case No. 4563-98 (Violation of the provisions
of Gun Ban), the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
penalties.
ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Esquillo was charged with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) –
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
when she has found to be in possession, custody and
control 0.1224 gram of shabu.
On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin, together
with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan
St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the
area known only as "Ryan." As PO1 Cruzin alighted from
the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who
was standing three meters away and seen placing inside
a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic
sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner
started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He
then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner
and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing
inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was
timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her
to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case. After apprising petitioner of her
constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet7 on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the
seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a
Pasay City Police Station.
However, petitioner has her own account of events stating
that at around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question,
while she was sick and resting at home, several
policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists
barged in and asked her whether she knew one named
"Ryan" who they claimed was a notorious snatcher
operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative.
The police officers then forced her to go with them to the
Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was
detained. While she was under detention, the police
officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
contained shabu and recovered from her. In fine,
petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was
"planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by
the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
RTC found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Susan
Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of
R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On appeal, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest
without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on
the occasion thereof inadmissible. CA, affirming RTC’s
decision, citing People v. Chua, held that the police
officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the
"stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception to the
general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.
In her present petition to the SC, petitioner assails the
appellate court’s application of the "stop-and-frisk"
principle in light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to justify his
suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having
merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette
case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if
there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that
would arouse the suspicion.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search, and subsequent
arrest, are valid.
RULING: Yes.
Appellant’s conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest
– before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to
quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised
the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion
thereof– for the first time only on appeal before the
appellate court.18 By such omissions, she is deemed to
have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.
PLAIN VIEW
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which
petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a
search on her was warranted. Recall that the police
officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their
law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view.
Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was
instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to
approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired
about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more
pricked his curiosity.
STOP-AND-FRISK
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation
and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v.
Chua22 RULING:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a
"stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.23
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned
act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-
frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected
shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later
voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed
inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced
himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior
and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had
identified himself.
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that petitioner
seeks exculpation by adopting two completely
inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one
hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon
her person and personal effects was unjustified as it
constituted a warrantless search in violation of the
Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies
culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at
home resting on the date in question and had been
forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives
and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason
than to try and extort money from her.
 PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Accused were found to be sniffing and
possessing dangerous drugs (shabu residues) contained
in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during
a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the
proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].
According to the prosecution, that on September 2, 2006,
at around 12:45 o’clock in the afternoon, a concerned
citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot
session was going on in the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales (Gonzales). Upon receipt of the report, PO1
Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and
members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon
inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales
was located. As the police officers entered the gate of the
house, they saw accused Orlando Doria (Doria) coming
out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside
the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez
(A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez
(R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the
presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic
sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The
accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct.
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez,
Dizon, and R. Martinez, claimed that in the morning of
September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano
Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with
a certain Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R.
Martinez and who was to give the materials for the
painting of said jeep. As they were going around the
subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front
of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass
by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that
five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them.
They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in
Perez, Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and
charged with sniffing shabu.
RTC found the petitioners guilty f the crime of Possession
of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings defined and penalized under Section 13 in
relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165.
Case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to
evidence. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless search.
RULING: No.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records,
the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are
1] that the evidence against the accused are inadmissible;
and
2] that granting the same to be admissible, the chain of
custody has not been duly established.
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before
arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of
an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search,
both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be
considered valid exceptions to the constitutional
guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a
warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused
was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an
incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1
Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz,
they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned
citizen that a pot session was going on in said house.
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs
cases16 that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search,17 such rulings
cannot be applied in the case at bench because said
cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in
transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of
an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug
cases involve police officers entering a house without
warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an
informer’s tip.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the
police that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited
drugs at a certain house. The police immediately
proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked
towards the house accompanied by their informer. When
they reached the house, they peeped inside through a
small window and saw a man and woman repacking
marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced
themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug
paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court
ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were
apprehended does not fall under any of the above-
enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal.
First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a
crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have
any reasonable ground to believe that accused-
appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were
not prisoners who have escaped from a penal
establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain
view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already
discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested.
Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to
contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The
police officers intentionally peeped first through the
window before they saw and ascertained the activities of
accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs
search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under
exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence
at hand is bereft of any such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers
should have conducted first a surveillance considering
that the identities and address of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have
secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest
and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot
be used against accused-appellants; hence, their
acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the
fundamental law.19
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in
arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is
based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 20
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of the
arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or
were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable
cause to enter the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in
order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that the
accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in
the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a
concerned citizen who himself had no personal
knowledge of the information that was reported to the
police.
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized
in plain view. The elements of plainview are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and,
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.22

The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the
police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior
surveillance or investigation before they discovered the
accused with the subject items.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identity and address of
one of the accused were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, then a search warrant
should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a
result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is
deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree and should be excluded.23 The subject
items seized during the illegal arrest are thus
inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its
inadmissibility thus precludes conviction, and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.
D. STOP AND FRISK
POSADAS v. CA
FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in
the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar,
both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of
the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence
Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner (minor) carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves
as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver
with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas)
grenade,3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for
further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in
his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken
to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy
the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty
and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on
October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless search and
arrest.
RULING: Yes.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen
approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has
been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as
follows:
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is
not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure
conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that,
indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only
after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the
purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile
and much too late.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
(People vs. CFI of Rizal)
The United States Supreme Court held that "a police
officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behaviour even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply
to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop
a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more
information. (Terry v. Ohio)
PEOPLE v. MENGOTE
FACTS: Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was
convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength
mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the
moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and was
therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government
disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received
in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was
incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if
admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8,
1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance
team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. There they saw two men "looking from side to side,"
one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached
these persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to
escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a
.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets
in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote
and Morellos were then turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented
by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who
identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen
from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on
June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the
robbers. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove
that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to
possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been
"Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver
should not have been admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident
of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant.
The defense also contends that the testimony regarding
the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant
and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
Solicitor General maintains that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were
lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest and
seizure.
RULING: No.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and
cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote
was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining
the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par.
(b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he
has committed or while he is actually committing or is at
least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence
of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the
case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side"
and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed
or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of
an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-
appellant had committed it." The question is, What
offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
On the other hand, there could have been a number of
reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting
from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they
excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as
the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been
shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the
policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched
to that place only because of the telephone call from the
informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in
that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North
Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought
the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
impending crime.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent
requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's
arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about
a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at
all, had been committed and neither were they aware of
the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was
only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his
house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8
As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on
Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation
conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor
was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no
knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that
he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
MANALILI v. CA
FACTS: At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11,
1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front
of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The surveillance was
being made because of information that drug addicts were
roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
They then chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person
was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in
a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid
the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced
themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked
the male person what he was holding in his hands. The
male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the
male person if he could see what said male person had in
his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat.
Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed
marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents. The male person was then brought to
the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo
Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned
over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its
suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be
the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
However, according to the defense, at about 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN
MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near
the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding
house. Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle
to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger
were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen
brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford
Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen
then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver.
At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he
was being searched and the policemen replied that he
(accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was
found on the persons of the accused and the driver. Upon
arrival at the police station, the accused was asked to
remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and
another companion. However, nothing was found, except
for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of
the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to
release the accused. That the accused was told by the
policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case
and that the accused was brought in the office of an
inquest fiscal and there he was told that no marijuana was
found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to
say anything.
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting
officers' testimony. This was affirmed by the CA. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless search.
RULING: Yes.
First ISSUE: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During
a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves
found in his possession, contending that they were
products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his
Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as
memorandum for respondent, counters that the
inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived
because petitioner never raised this issue in the
proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility
in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that
there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was
incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was
valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk
along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to
police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were
"high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in
petitioner's possession
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's
contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he
failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial.
A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires
the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the
right to be waived existed;
(2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and
(3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards
and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to
exercise this elementary right. In the present case,
however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right
for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court.
Second ISSUE: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers'
testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained" contradictions which did not support
petitioner's conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in
this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it
had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and
deportment as they testified before it. Moreover,
assuming that there were inconsistencies in the
prosecution’s testimonies, we do not find them substantial
enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by
tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas'
contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by
the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both arresting policemen.
The question of whether the marijuana was found inside
petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial,
considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said
substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did
not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner's
possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor
and does not destroy Espiritu's credibility.
ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Accused Esquillo was charged with violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) –
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
when she has found to be in possession, custody and
control 0.1224 gram of shabu.
On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin, together
with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan
St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the
activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the
area known only as "Ryan." As PO1 Cruzin alighted from
the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the
target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who
was standing three meters away and seen placing inside
a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic
sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner
started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He
then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner
and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing
inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was
timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her
to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case. After apprising petitioner of her
constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet7 on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the
seized item, petitioner was brought for investigation to a
Pasay City Police Station.
However, petitioner has her own account of events stating
that at around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question,
while she was sick and resting at home, several
policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists
barged in and asked her whether she knew one named
"Ryan" who they claimed was a notorious snatcher
operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative.
The police officers then forced her to go with them to the
Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was
detained. While she was under detention, the police
officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
contained shabu and recovered from her. In fine,
petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was
"planted," stemming from an all too obvious attempt by
the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
RTC found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Susan
Esquillo y Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of
R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On appeal, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest
without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on
the occasion thereof inadmissible. CA, affirming RTC’s
decision, citing People v. Chua, held that the police
officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the
"stop-and-frisk" concept, a recognized exception to the
general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.
In her present petition to the SC, petitioner assails the
appellate court’s application of the "stop-and-frisk"
principle in light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to justify his
suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having
merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette
case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if
there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that
would arouse the suspicion.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search, and subsequent
arrest, are valid.
RULING: Yes.
Appellant’s conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest
– before her arraignment. Neither did she take steps to
quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised
the issue of warrantless arrest – as well as the
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion
thereof– for the first time only on appeal before the
appellate court.18 By such omissions, she is deemed to
have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.
person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a
"stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.23

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned

PLAIN VIEW
act of the police officers constituted a valid "stop-and-
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected
petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later
search on her was warranted. Recall that the police voluntarily exhibited24 to the police operative - was
officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed
law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior
Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had
instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to identified himself.
approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired
about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more It has not escaped the Court’s attention that petitioner
pricked his curiosity. seeks exculpation by adopting two completely
inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one
hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon
STOP-AND-FRISK her person and personal effects was unjustified as it
constituted a warrantless search in violation of the
Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies
and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at
RULING: home resting on the date in question and had been
forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives
and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, than to try and extort money from her.
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and
make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must

exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
 E. EXPRESS WAIVER
VEROY v. LAYAGUE
FACTS: Petitioners who were presently residing in
Quezon City, were the owners of the house in Catalunan
Grande, the upkeep of which was left to two (2)
houseboys. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior
of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon
to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since
1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys
to the children's rooms were retained by herein
Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the
caretakers could enter the house.
On April 12, 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo
Patrol Station, PC/INP, acting upon a directive issued by
Metrodiscom Commander Col. Franco Calida, raided the
house of herein petitioners in Davao City on information
that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of
rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the
help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since
the owner was not present and they did not have a search
warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone
in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask
permission to search the house in Davao City as it was
reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center
of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded
that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but
relented if the search would not be conducted in the
presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the
PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the
Veroys. The authority given by Ma. Luisa Veroy was
relayed by Capt. Obrero to Major Macasaet who
answered that Ma. Luisa Veroy has called him twice by
telephone on the matter and that the permission was
given on the condition that the search be conducted in his
presence.
Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the
children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero
recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing
seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an
unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing
printed materials of RAM-SFP (samples of which were
attached as Annexes "H" and "H-1" of the petition) (Rollo,
pp. 49-55) were also found in the children's room. A
search of the children's recreation and study area
revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo
shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short
sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's
socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black
bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic
Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the
Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted
medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the
master's bedroom.
Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an
information against herein petitioners for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion)
Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the
articles seized in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure
ISSUE: W/N the seized firearms considered as
admissible evidence.
RULING: No.
Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero
had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the
door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel"
soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house.
The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal
search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they
are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an
arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure
of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No.
88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The
reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that
it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment
center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to
enter the compound, he did not enter the house because
he did not have a search warrant and the owners were
not present. This shows that he himself recognized the
need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in
entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to
seek permission to enter the same. Permission was
indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but
only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had
ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms
is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial
in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense
may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the
rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally
and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners
in the criminal action against them for illegal possession
of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690
[1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a
search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no
need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the
same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness
there is no crime.
Criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession
of firearms is DISMISSED
PEOPLE v. NUEVAS
FACTS: PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the
morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B.
Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and
monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter
Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had
received information that a certain male person, more or
less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark
on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried
leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later
identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor
vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that
they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he
was going. Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards,
calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray
dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff
in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and
two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male
persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing
more or less five (5) kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded
to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which
according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions,
Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw
and approached two (2) persons along the National
Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din
was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din
disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then
took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."8
After confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling brought
Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III
for proper documentation.
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of
Nuevas was the result of a tip from Fami’s informant,
conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not
included in the list of persons under surveillance. Fami
then relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated that
Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was
holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the
violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his
willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts.14
When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified
location of Nuevas’s cohorts, they chanced upon Din and
Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while
Inocencio was looking into its contents.15 Cabling
averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was
holding to the police officers.
Nuevas, Din, and Inocencio provided different testimonies
as to their whereabouts. All three were found guilty as
charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to
the Court for automatic review.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The
appellate court stated that the search in the instant case
is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as
appellants themselves waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the
appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din
voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never
presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant
case, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the acts of the accused constitute an
express waiver.
RULING: Nuevas – Yes; Din and Inocencio - No
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be
carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any
evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional
proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of
exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec.
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect
a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured.37
The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on the
ground that the searches and seizure conducted in the
instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under
one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all
allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags
containing marijuana to the police officers.38
We differ.
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures
conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the
Rules of Court.39 Recent jurisprudence holds that the
arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed as in this case where the search preceded the
arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if
the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search. 40
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The
searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be
said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable
information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."41
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under
the plain view doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such
that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.42

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside
the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and
were not readily apparent or transparent to the police
officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves
found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue
cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon
inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the
items were in plain view which could have justified mere
seizure of the articles without further search.45
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search
conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his consent.
In Din’s case, there was none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the
search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether
a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the
police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State
which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.46
In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed
voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police
officers.
It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate
himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with
the police, gave them the plastic bag and even revealed
his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an informant. His
actuations were consistent with the lamentable human
inclination to find excuses, blame others and save oneself
even at the cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would
have affirmed Nuevas’s conviction had he not withdrawn
his appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the
case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had
actually been given.
Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld
the validity of consented search, the police authorities
expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of
the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In
People v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon
any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law.55
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s
conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness
of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution.1awphi1.net56 As such, Din deserves an
acquittal.
Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves
cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants,
Din more specifically, as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that
he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.
Inocencio’s supposed possession of the dried marijuana
leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking
into the plastic bag that Din was carrying.58 Taking a look
at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while
held by another, is not the same as taking possession
thereof.
Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando
Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE v. DEQUINA
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. That they sell, or offer for sale, deliver or
transport marijuana dried flowering tops with total weight
of thirty two thousand nine hundred ninety five (32,995)
grams which is a prohibited drug.
Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at
about 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1
Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief
Inspector Romulo Sapitula to proceed at the corner of
Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where,
according to the report given by the informant, three
persons – a male and two female[s] would be coming from
Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana. At
around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from
Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of the pier. At a
certain point along Raxabago Street, about a hundred
meters away from the position of their patrol car the taxi
stopped. From it emerged three passengers – a man and
two women – each one of them carrying a black travelling
bag. As the trio fitted the descriptions given to them by
Inspector Sapitula, they intently watched and monitored
their movements. About one or two minutes later, as the
trio started walking towards the western portion of
Raxabago St., they drove and trailed them. As the patrol
car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its
presence. She started walking in a more hurried pace
("parang walkathon") as if she wanted to run away
("parang patakbo"). SPO1 Blanco alighted from the car
and chased [Dequina] while PO3 Masanggue, who was
behind the wheels also alighted and restrained [Jundoc]
and [Jingabo]. While thus trying to get away, [Dequina]
dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the
zipper of the bag gave way. Bundles of dried leaves
wrapped in transparent plastic bags case into view.
Suspecting the stuffs to be marijuana, they further
inspected the other two bags in the possession of
[Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found out that they had the
same contents. They boarded the three accused, along
with their bags in their patrol car. During the investigation,
it was discovered that each of the three black travelling
bags confiscated from the three accused contained
eleven bricks of marijuana.
RTC found the accused-appellants guilty as charged. The
MFR was also denied. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the accused-appellants actuations constitute
of waiver (and thus resulted to a valid warrantless search
and arrest).
RULING: Yes.
Accused-appellants assail their conviction, asserting that
their arrests were illegal.1âwphi1 They were not doing
anything illegal that would have justified their warrantless
arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons
and belongings. A search made without a warrant cannot
be justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself
was lawful. Accused-appellants insist that the description
of the persons who were transporting marijuana relayed
by the Chief of Police to the apprehending officers, PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco, was so general that it
could not be sufficient ground for the apprehension of
accused-appellants.
The People counters that accused-appellants’ arrests
were lawful as they were then actually committing a crime.
Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the
resulting warrantless search of their persons and
belongings was also valid. In addition, accused-
appellants did not refute that they were indeed
transporting prohibited drugs when they were arrested
and, instead, alleged as defenses that Dequina acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and
Jingabo were merely accommodating a trusted childhood
friend.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the
judgment of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
was supported by the evidence on record. The People
was able to discharge the burden of proving the accused-
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no question that the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of the
marijuana were valid and legal.
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.13 It further decrees that any evidence obtained
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.14
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal
and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless
search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.15
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is
defined to mean "to carry or convey from one place to
another."16 The evidence in this case shows that at the
time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in
their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco
need not even open Dequina’s traveling bag to determine
its content because when the latter noticed the police
officers’ presence, she walked briskly away and in her
hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the
zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks
therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed
by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was
legally justified, and the following warrantless search of
their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their
lawful arrest.
Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest
when they, together with their bags containing marijuana,
were brought to the police station for investigation and
subsequent prosecution. In People v. Fernandez,17 we
ruled that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right,
be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly
or impliedly.18
In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability,
Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana
under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and
Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to
accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.
We are unconvinced.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, like one who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt
from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An
act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will
but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat
of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.19
Here, Dequina’s version of events that culminated with
her and Jundoc and Jingabo’s arrests on September 29,
1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and
Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total
ignorance of the transportation of marijuana.
Accused-appellants guilty of the crime of illegal transport
of marijuana
F. SEARCH OF WAREHOUSE IN VIOLATION OF CUSTOMS
AND TARIFF CODE OR TO ENFORCE CUSTOMS LAWS
 BOC v. OGARIO
FACTS: On December 9, 1998, Felipe A. Bartolome,
District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant
of Seizure and Detention1 of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing
the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on
board the M/V "Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6
in Cebu City. The warrant was issued on the basis of the
report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice had been illegally
imported. The report stated that the rice was landed in
Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks
marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan." It was then
shipped to Cebu City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto."
On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark Montelibano,
the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his buyer,
respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction
in the RTC alleging that the defendants rushed to the port
with long arms commanding the plaintiffs laborer[s] to
stopped [sic] the unloading of the same from the vessel
named M/V Alberto alleging that the said rice was
smuggled without even proof that the same were [sic]
purchased from a particular country; that by the mere
suspicion of the defendants that the goods were
smuggled from abroad, they immediately put on hold the
release of the goods from the ship and at the same time
they jointly barred unloading and loading activities of the
plaintiffs laborers of the herein-mentioned rice. The
plaintiffs then presented all the pertinent and necessary
documents to all of the defendants but the latter refused
to believe that the same is from Palawan because their
minds are closed due to some reason or another [while]
the plaintiffs believed that the same is merely an act of
harassment. That the acts of the defendants in stopping
the loading and unloading activities of the plaintiffs
laborers [have] no basis in law and in fact; thus, unlawful
and illegal. A mere suspicion which is not coupled with
any proof or evidence to that effect is [a] matter which the
law prohibits. That a Warrant of Seizure and detention
issued by the Collector of Custom[s] dated December 9,
1998 be quashed because the defendants act of seizing
and detaining the herein-mentioned sacks of rice are
illegal. The continuing act of detaining the herein-
mentioned sacks of rice will lead to the deterioration of the
same. That no public auction sale of the same should be
conducted by the Bureau of Custom[s] or any government
agenc[y].
Petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu3 and
the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard,
sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction, but their motions were
denied.
RTC held that the Warrant of Seizure and Detention
issued by the Bureau of Customs cannot divest this court
of jurisdiction since its issuance is without legal basis as
it was anchored merely on suspicion that the items in
question were imported or smuggled. It is very clear that
the defendants are bereft of any evidence to prove that
the goods were indeed imported or smuggled, which is
why the plaintiffs have very vigorously protested against
the seizure of cargoes by the defendants. In fact, as
revealed by defendants counsel, the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention was issued merely to shift the burden of
proof to the shippers or owners of the goods to prove that
the bags of rice were not imported or smuggled. However,
the court feels this is unfair because the settled rule is that
he who alleges must prove the same. Besides, at this time
when our economy is not good, it would be a [dis]service
to the nation to use the strong arm of the law to make
things hard or difficult for the businessmen. The 25,000
bags of rice were ordered returned to respondents upon
the posting by them of an P8,000,000.00 bond.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of
Customs of Cebu, it was decreed that the 25,000 sacks
of rice be released to the owners. Since this decision
involves the release of some of the articles subject matter
of herein case which is considered adverse to the
government, the same is hereby elevated to the
Commissioner of Customs for automatic review pursuant
to Republic Act 7651. The District Collector of Customs
found "strong reliable, and convincing evidence" that the
25,000 bags of rice were smuggled. Said evidence
consisted of certifications by the Philippine Coast Guard,
the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Arrastre
Stevedoring Office in Palawan that M/V "Alberto" had
never docked in Palawan since November, 1998; a
certification by Officer-in-Charge Elenita Ganelo of the
National Food Authority (NFA) Palawan that her signature
in NFA Grains Permit Control No. 00986, attesting that the
25,000 bags of rice originated from Palawan, was forged;
and the result of the laboratory analysis of a sample of the
subject rice by the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI) stating that the sample "does not compare with any
of our IRRI released varieties."
Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the
proceedings before the District Collector of Customs
despite due notice sent to his counsel because he refused
to recognize the validity of the forfeiture proceedings.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N RTC is vested with jurisdiction over seizure
ad forfeiture of dutiable goods (in this case are sacks of
rice).
RULING: No.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court, reiterating its
ruling in a long line of cases, said:
jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings."11
They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the
question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure
of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial
Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on
board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended
to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power
to effect customs searches, seizures, or arrests provided
by law and continue with the administrative hearings.12
As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v.
Vinuya:13cräläwvirtualibräry

There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid

of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of
of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
Customs, is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be
Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere
assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive
with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting
competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed,
in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
the most that can be said is that under certain
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred
on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming
that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with
cognizance over such matters even through petitions of
competence when clearly in the light of the above
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The
proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final.
An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and
It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach
and Customs Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The
amended, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Court proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is thus
of Tax Appeals," specify the proper fora and procedure for indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein
the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner
of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the
Court categorically declared inn v. Natividad (213 SCRA
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y express provision of law, amply
Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of
Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught."
over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of
placing no unnecessary hindrance on the governments
drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds
The decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of
upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective
Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in
and efficient the collection of import and export duties due
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is
the State, which enables the government to carry out the
DISMISSED.
functions it has been instituted to perform.

SO ORDERED.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were
illegal, which has yet to be proven, we have said that such
act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction
thereon.

Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals

that regular courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this
case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious doubt as
to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs
 RIETA v. PEOPLE Hall. He learned that Boy will haul household appliances
from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven by Boy and
they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. While they were
FACTS: The accused fraudulently import or bring into the
along Roxas Boulevard near the Daily Express Building,
Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three
two (2) vehicles intercepted them and ordered them to
hundred five (305) cases of assorted brands of blue seal
pull-over. The passengers of the said vehicles introduced
cigarettes which are foreign articles valued at
themselves as Metrocom soldiers, and ordered them to
P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell,
alight and to raise their hands while poking guns at them.
transport or assist and facilitate the buying, selling and
They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their belly on the
transporting of the above-named foreign articles after
pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The
importation knowing the same to have been imported
Metrocom soldiers did not find anything from their bodies.
contrary to law which was found in the possession of said
Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were
accused and under their control which articles said
ordered by the Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep.
accused fully well knew have not been properly declared
While they were aboard the jeep, he overheard from the
and that the duties and specific taxes thereon have not
Metrocom soldiers that their driver was able to escape.
been paid to the proper authorities in violation of said Sec.
Likewise, they were also informed by the Metrocom
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
soldiers that the cargo truck was loaded with blue seal
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to
cigarettes. The cargo truck was not opened in their
Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the National
presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to them
Internal Revenue Code."7
upon their apprehension.

Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence

RTC found the petitioner guilty. This was affirmed by the
Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group
CA. Hence, this petition.
(MISG for brevity), received information that certain
syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling activities
somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed
that the activities [were being] done at nighttime and the ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless search.
smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery truck
[were] being escorted by some police and military
personnel. At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that RULING: Yes.
morning, a green cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167
came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and
escorted closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest
Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that time, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid,
Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever as the law upon which it was predicated -- General Order
about the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to No. 60, issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos --
intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo truck was was subsequently declared by the Court, in Tañada v.
intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car Tuvera,33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts,
following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in
towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going evidence.
south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a
U-turn and gave chase to the speeding Toyota car. The
chase lasted for less than 5 minutes until said car made a
stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. We do not agree. In Tañada, the Court addressed the
Col. Lacson and his men searched the car and they found possible effects of its declaration of the invalidity of
several firearms, particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how
one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. When the cargo truck with such a declaration might affect acts done on a
Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal presumption of their validity, the Court said:
or untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo truck
driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the
other passengers or riders of said truck were "x x x. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the

According to the petitioner, in the early morning of Act of Congress, having been found to be
October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the Kawit Town unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects –with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the
attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.'
xxxx xx xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/enforcement
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is 'an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x
x that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.'"34
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior
to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative
necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an
operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while
the legislative or the executive act was in operation should
be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all
respects.35 The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under
General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision in
Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact
that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected
to have been introduced into the country in violation of
customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted
exceptions36 to the constitutional provision. Such
provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge who
has personally determined the existence of probable
cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure
and arrest may be made even without a warrant for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the
Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass
through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store
or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on
board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law.38
SALVADOR v. PEOPLE
FACTS: On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio
Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador,
then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air
Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport,
of
were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine
Air Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets
containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries
valued at more than half a million pesos. They were
charged before the RTC with violation of Section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code.
198 pieces of means watches…………… ₱187,110.00
76 pieces of men’s diving watches……… 8,640.00
32 pieces of ladies watches……………… 11,600.00
1600 grams of assorted jewelry…………. 322,000.00
with a total market value of ₱537,500.00
Prosecution FACTS: Special Mission Group from the PAF
Special Operations Squadron conducted routine
surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to
check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. Major
Pagcaliuangan then ordered Sgts. Teves and Ople to
keep close watch on the second airplane parked inside
the Domestic Airport terminal. This aircraft is an Airbus
300 with tail number RPC-3001. At 12:15 a.m. the
following day (June 4), Sgt. Teves reported that the three
(3) persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had
disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging. They
then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off. The
PAF surveillance team promptly boarded their vehicles
and followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima Gate of the
Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow
truck. Sgt. Teves then got off, identified himself and asked
the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later
identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin,
Danilo Santos and Napoleon Clamor, the driver of the tow
truck. Sgt. Teves approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed
that Mandin’s uniform was partly open, showing a girdle.
While Sgt. Teves was reaching for the girdle, a package
wrapped in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the
package contained smuggled items, Sgt. Teves yelled to
his teammates, "Positive!" Thereupon, the rest of the
team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who
surrendered without a fight. The team searched their
bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles
beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while
petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team
confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the
PAFSECOM Office.
At around 8:00 o’clock the following morning, Emilen
Balatbat, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived
at the PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets
and on seeing that it contained dutiable goods, she
proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from
the accused. She then prepared an inventory of the items
seized and listed the weight of the packets.4 Thereafter,
she brought the seized packets to the In-Board Section,
Bureau of Customs, Airport Office where their contents
were identified and appraised. The Bureau of Customs
found 248 pieces of assorted watches and fourteen karat
(14K) gold jewelries.
All these allegations were denied by the accused stating
that they were being framed up by the military.
RTC found the accused guilty of the charge. CA affirmed
the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid warrantless search.
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and
seizure conducted by the PAF operatives is illegal. Citing
People v. Burgos,9 he maintains that at the time he and
his co-accused were stopped by the PAF law enforces,
they were unaware that a crime was being committed.
Accordingly, the law enforcers were actually engaged in
a fishing expedition in violation of his Constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure. Thus, the seized
items should not have been admitted in evidence against
him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
under the factual circumstances of the case at bar, there
was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance
team to stop and search petitioner and his companions.
They boarded the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the
time when there were no other PAL personnel working
therein. They stayed inside the plane for some time and
surprisingly, came out with bulging waists. They then
stopped and looked around and made apparent signals.
All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable
suspicion that petitioner and his colleagues were up to
something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was
conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs
law when the petitioner and his co-accused were riding a
motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at
the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport
which, like every gate in the airport perimeter, has a
checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions
agreed to the search after one of them was caught with a
suspicious-looking packet. Under these circumstances,
the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are
admissible in evidence.
We agree with the OSG.
As a rule, the Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law
enforcers to a person’s body, personal effects or
residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a
search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1)
search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5)
stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.10
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in
question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was
to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of
drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel
in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search
made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused
was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team
properly effected the search and seizure without a search
warrant since it exercised police authority under the
customs law.11
In Papa vs. Mago12 involving a customs search, we held
that law enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized
to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article,
cargo or other movable property when there is reasonable
cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced
into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs
law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of
any vehicle or person suspected of holding or conveying
the said articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State
to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers
who evade payment of customs duties. The
Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of
smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on
the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not
been paid are entitled to the same Constitutional
protection as an individual’s private papers and effects.
Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy
which we have continued to affirm.
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search,
petitioner and his co-accused were on board a moving
PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the requirement for a search warrant. Such
exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may
readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle
since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.14 Verily,
we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in holding that the articles involved in the instant
controversy were validly seized by the authorities even
without a search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence
against petitioner and his co-accused.
G. EXIGENCY
PEOPLE v. DE GRACIA
FACTS: The incidents involved in this case took place at
the height of the coup d' etat staged in December, 1989
by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the
Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People
(RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various
government establishments and military camps in Metro
Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with
their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November
30, 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine
Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout
Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine
Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the
Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied
the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro
Manila. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was
charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance
of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. In Criminal Case
No. Q-90-11755, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson and
several John Does whose true names and identities have
not as yet been ascertained, were charged with the crime
of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, penalized under Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia,
Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several
John Does were charged with attempted homicide
allegedly committed on December 1, 1989 in Quezon City
upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and hit
on the right thigh.
Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms
in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.
The records show that in the early morning of December
1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on
board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office. The surveillance, which actually
started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around
10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report received by the division that said establishment
was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post. Sagario was tasked to
park the car arounf 10-15 meters away from the building.
A group of five men disengaged themselves from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance
team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated
in front, saw the approaching group and immediately
ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area.
As they passed by the group, then only six meters away,
the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance
team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or
bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a
consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989,
a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the
rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. As a result of
the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso
Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the
Eurocar building. No search warrant was secured by the
raiding team because, according to them, at that time
there was so much disorder considering that the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity
of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed.
Accused De Gracia denied all the allegations against him
implying that his arrest was maliciously made due to the
prior conflict between Col. Matillano and the prosecution
witness, and the fact that he is working for Matillano.
RTC found De Gracia not guilty of attempted homicide but
guilty of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us
in this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid search and seizure.
RULING: Yes.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search
warrant at that time. 15 The raid was actually precipitated
by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily
and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms
and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably
explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking
into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court
was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.
In addition, we find the principle enunciated in Umil, et al.,
vs. Ramos,
et al., 21 applicable, by analogy, to the present case:
Absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder
acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies
of the situation that involves the very survival of society
and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which
(are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection,
most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their
persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
RTC decision hereby affirmed.
 H. SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY PRIVATE PERSONS
PEOPLE v. MARTI
FACTS: Appellant Marti and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders". Anita Reyes (the proprietress
and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes
then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect
the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of
appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles,
he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the
opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one
of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter
reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper. Job Reyes brought out the box
in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the
presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane
wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves
were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books
was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana
leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried
marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the
cigars.
An Information was filed against appellant for violation of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence subject
of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art.
III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art.
III).
ISSUE: W/N the contention of the appellant is tenable.
RULING: No.
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted
to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by
the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers
or other authorized government agencies.
In the case at bar, it assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that
his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an
act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
In the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The
Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was
made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which
appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a
travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. The
search was made on the motel owner's own initiative.
Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local
police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not
require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search
by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only
proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that
NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which
resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to
be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the
part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts.
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box
containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the
rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody
thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made
no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary
to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights
answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against
the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual
and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech
of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers,
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly
declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence
was procured by police authorities or private individuals
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the
constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does
not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it
must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in
the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the
issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest
vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988];
Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12
[June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in
no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone
else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable
search and seizure may only be invoked against the State
by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of
a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should
also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation
of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally
applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-
governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to
privacy and communication.
The judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby
AFFIRMED.
WATEROUS DRUG CORP v. NLRC
FACTS: WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez
informed WATEROUS Vice President-General Co that he
noticed an irregularity involving Catolico (pharmacist of
WATEROUS) and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(hereafter YSP). Previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc.
showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No.
19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per
bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated
December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc.
to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed
that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of
ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as
per their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the
undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through
China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the
check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation
with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms.
Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the
envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered
her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount
in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours,
her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for
additional time to give her explanation,12 and she was
granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990.
However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be
placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests
of the company.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested
access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her
to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter
she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when
Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a
letter15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through
her counsel, explained that the check she received from
YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice."
She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-
motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between
her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990,
WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memorandum16 notifying Catolico of her termination.
Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and
illegal suspension. Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez
found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because
petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as
complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any
investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was
without just cause and due process. He thus declared the
dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed
reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the
parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to
Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year
of service; back wages for one year; and the additional
sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30
days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of
Catolico as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
—————
TOTAL AWARD P35,401.86
—————
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and
urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter
erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and
that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause
for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that
petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of
P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her
co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope.
But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article
III of the Constitution.20
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause
for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that
petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of
P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her
co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope.
But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in
evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article
III of the Constitution.20 It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as
it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal
basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but
modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision
by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same
was already included in the computation of the aggregate
of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Hence, this petition.
(1st and 2nd grounds) Petitioners insist that Catolico had
been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or probably from
other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9
November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also
maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position
and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by
her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted
breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of
NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain
her side of the controversy. Petitioners submit that, in light
of the decision in the People v. Marti,21 the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
refers to the immunity of one's person from interference
by government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the private
respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill
of Rights
RULING:
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other
conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the
instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process.
Procedural due process requires that an employee be
apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time
to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so
desires.23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee
to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense,
including legal representation.24
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an
opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from
the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued
by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her
counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues
were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's
memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS]
possession," which were not, however, submitted. What
the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the
check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the
burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause
for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge
that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.25 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the
task.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that
Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their
evidence does not establish that there was an
overcharge.
Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have
discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in
his affidavit:
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the
discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was
indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP
Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there
was really an overprice and she said that the difference
was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552
which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia
Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was
based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never
testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case;
thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by
Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.27
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on
mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment;31 and even the dismissal of an employee
for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims,
caprices, or suspicion.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which
the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to
revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti34
that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities.
The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2
December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No.
005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for
upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the
evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of her constitutional
rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set
aside.
People vs. Mendoza
301 SCRA 66
FACTS:
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife
Cecilia and their 10-year old daughter Charmaine went to
the birthday party of a relative of Octavio in Mcdo,
Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without
telling his wife and kid, and went to KFC.
Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldn’t find him in the
party, they went home in Las Pinas. They arrived home at
7 pm and left again to go to Cecilia’s parents in Bacoor to
bring perfume. Octavio still was not home.
They got home around 9pm and saw Octavio’s car parked
in the garage of their neighbor. All the lights were opened
but the front door was locked. After a while, Octavio
opened the back door and let them in. He was drunk and
told Charmaine to get cold water and douse him. She
followed and was instructed to go to her room. She went
and got ready for bed. She heard her parents arguing
about them leaving the party without Octavio. Afterwards,
she heard three gunshots, ran to their room and saw her
mom on the floor bleeding. She also saw her dad hide a
gun under the bed.
Octavio then called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac.
When Gabac arrived, they all brought him to Perpetual
Help Hospital where Cecilia was declared dead on arrival.
The policemen investigated Gabac and found a .38
caliber revolver in his waist. Gabac told them that Octavio
handed it over to him as soon as he arrived at the crime
scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio learned of his
daughter’s death and that valuables were being taken
away from her house. He and his sons decided to go there
and decided to remove, together with his sons, the
remaining pieces of property therein, including accused-
appellant's personal effects such as memorandum receipt
and mission order authorizing Mendoza to carry weapon.
At court, Charmaine testified that she saw her father hide
the gun under the bed. In her second testimony, she said
she saw no such act. Octavio also denied that he killed
his wife and that he owned that gun. He said that the
memorandum receipt and mission order were illegally
procured by Eusebio in violation of his right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUE: RULING: Yes

WON Octavio’s constitutional right against unreasonable The contention of the accused appellant that the suitcase
search and seizure violated when Eusebio took the was opened and searched without his consent hence, a
memorandum receipt and mission order and brought it to violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
court. search and seizure is devoid of merit.

RULING In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-

appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel.
NO. The Court held that Eusebio did not violate Octavio’s It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that
constitutional right against unreasonable search and they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
seizure. The constitutional protection against search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity items was therefore carried out without government
of one’s person from interference from THE intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection
GOVERNMENT and it cannot be extended to acts against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the case at bar,
the articles were discovered by Cecilia’s father, Alipio
Eusebio, a private individual. Besides, other evidence
proved his guilt. Test showed nitrate in his hands and the The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private
testimony of his daughter was accorded great weight. He employee and does not discharge any governmental
was charged of the crime parricide with the special function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the
firearm. law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other
agents of the state that the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
People vs Bongcarawan
G.R. No. 143944. (July 11, 2002)
things in possession of a person are presumed by law to
be owned by him.[31 To overcome this presumption, it is
FACTS: necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain
Alican Alex Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was presented no evidence to support his claim.
charged for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by RA 7659 for the possession, custody and WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
control eight (8) packs of shabu. affirmed. penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11,
1999 an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5,
sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on
March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port
of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy
about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her
co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. After the
body search, The security requested to open the
samsonite suitcase thus revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. The
security then reported the suspected drugs.

ISSUE:

W/n the the search and seizure was valid and therefore
admissible as evidence?
 I. JAIL SAFETY
PEOPLE VS CONDE
FACTS:
The witness to the robbery was only the one who saw the
victim got stabbed. The victim was an alien (Indian).
There were 2 aliens. The witness was able to identify the
accused.
These accused after they were identified, and eventually
apprehended by the policemen and they were jailed.
There was no evidence that the officers saw the stabbing
of these victims. However, when the wife of one of the
accused visited the police station, she brought a knife in
her bag. When she passed through the inspection in the
jail, the knife was seen she may not pass through the
checkpoint for it may be used to kill or injure someone.
That piece of evidence was used as evidence against the
accused.
The weapon used and the identity of the assailant was the
link to the stabbing. It was argued by the accused that this
knife could not be admitted as an evidence because it was
procured by the policeman without any warrant, pursuant
to illegal search.
ISSUE:
W/N jail searches are reasonable forms of searches.
RULING: Yes. The Court said that the knife is admissible
as evidence even if there was no warrant when the search
was done. The Court said it was valid when the knife was
found inside the bag of the wife when she was visiting her
husband who is a detainee. The police officer testified that
the search that was done to her is part of the Police
Standard Operating Procedure and recognized as part of
the precautionary measures by the police to safeguard
the safety of the detainees as well as the overall security
of the jail premises.
It’s a reasonable form of search. What is protected under
Article III Section 2, are unreasonable searches. Even if
there was no search warrant, it is reasonable and
therefore the item was admissible.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHECKPOINTS AND “AREA TARGET
ZONINGS”
VALMONTE vs.DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988 (September 29, 1989)
FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated for the purpose of
establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive
to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners
aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for
their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,
Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold
blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on
several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints
where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
ISSUE Whether or not checkpoint is unconstitutional.
RULING No.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at
being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as
per se illegal. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that
he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without
more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's
right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes
a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
VALMONTE vs.DE VILLA
G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
FACTS
In the Court's decision dated 29 September 1989,
petitioners' petition for prohibition seeking the declaration
of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners
have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration of said decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not checkpoint is unconstitutional.
RULING
NO. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit
of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security.
In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of
the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness
and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported to media.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
PEOPLE VS. EXALA
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS
On November 2, 1982, a private jeepney driven by the
accused - appellant, Restituto Bocalan,was stopped at a
police checkpoint for routing inspection regarding
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. Along with
Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime Fernandez and
Rodelio Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a member of the
inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the
occupants if there were firearms inside, and in which the
occupants answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then
noticed a black bag inside the jeepney, as he became
suspicious, he asked the occupants of what the bag
contained, but nobody answered. Pfc. Galang then
opened the bag and found a number of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused were brought to the police station
for further investigation. The accused were all charged for
violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended.
Bocalan now assails his conviction. He contends that the
trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against
him since it was obtained through a warrantless search.
ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless search was valid and
legal, thus proper in using the marijuana as evidence for
convicting the accused (Bocalan) of the crime charged
against him.
HELD
Yes. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest,
Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest.
This issue was never raised in the proceedings. Bocalan
never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the
ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless
search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility
of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of
such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. But
even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still
appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest. The instant case is an incident to or an offshoot of
a lawful "stop-and- search" at a military or police
checkpoint. The checkpoint in the instant case was
established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main
object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and
other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized
persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged
down and the occupants were asked routine questions. In
the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather
bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered.
At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed;
they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they
were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The
accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being
discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear
normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more
extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and
the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there
was no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The
accused remained silent even after their arrest. Their
submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of
marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their
part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their
professed innocence but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was
waiver of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Guanzon vs De villa
G.R. No. 80508 (January 30, 1990)
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit the military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal Target
Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or
saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the
military and police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during
the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay
City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these
drives, it is alleged that the following were committed.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal
age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers
and leaders in their respective communities De Villa et al.
allege that the accusations about the deliberate disregard
of human rights are total lies. They cite Art VII, sec 17 and
18174 as legal bases for the drives. Petitioners seek to
prohibit the respondents from further conducting these
drives.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed
consisted of violation of human rights.
RULING:
No, The areal target zonings in this petition were intended
to flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly
because of the blatant assassinations of public officers
and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by
the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and
respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or
criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d'
etats. There appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep
were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning"
could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and
low income families are fully protected.
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess
the truth. Everything before us consists of allegations.
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons
were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig;
and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport
area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in
the illegal and inhuman manner described by the
petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a
trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in
courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of
thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced
in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested.
None of those arrested has apparently been charged and
none of those affected has apparently complained.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing
that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the
kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to
assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the
violation of residences even if these are humble shanties
of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are
shocking to the conscience. WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts.
 Abenes VS CA
G.R. No. 156320 (February 14, 2007)
FACTS:
RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN was accused of the
offense of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED
FIREARM & ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294), committed as
follows:
That on May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the
Election period which is from January 11, 1998 to June
30, 1998, in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the
purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being
implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3 Cipriano Q.
Pascua was the designated team leader. SPO1 Requejo
and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was
tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was
readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the
shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3
Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry
the firearm, and whether his possession was exempted
from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC.
Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then
demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to
support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence,
SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm.
ISSUE:
1. W/n the petitioner’s constitutional right against unlawful
search and seizure violated, Given the circumstances,
and the evidence adduced.
2. W/n the checkpoint was legally set up?
RULING:
1. No, In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the
petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it tucked
into his waist uncovered by his shirt. It must be
emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm
[on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after he alighted
from the vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3
Pascua’s testimony[,] corroborated by that of SPO1
Requejo[,] convincingly established that the holstered .45
caliber pistol tucked at the right waist of the [petitioner]
was readily visible to the policemen (TSN, August 24,
1998, pp. 18, 37). While the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by
the police from the possession of the petitioner, without
the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof
that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm.
In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution
from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to
carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a
certification from the government agency concerned. 24
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a firearm
without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must
be exculpated from criminal liability under P.D. No. 1866,
as amended.
With respect to the charge of violating Section 261(q)
of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm
the conviction of the petitioner, since the prosecution
successfully discharged its burden of proof.
2. Yes, This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are
illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’
right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot
be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention
of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are
required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the
gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC
would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It
would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car to be able to
easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against
illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they
were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such
as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if
the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they
would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting
its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands.17 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The
Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Rodolfo Abenes Y Gacutan is ACQUITTED from the
charge of illegal possession of firearm
device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone
unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the
user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an
alien?

WIRE TAPPING
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
GAANAN vs.IAC communication. There must be either a physical
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation
of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept,
FACTS or record the spoken words.

Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to

withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty.
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan
to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
listened to the telephone conversation without
construction that in order to determine the true intent of
complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
(RA 4200).
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

ISSUE

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use
to overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line.
RULING
NO. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The
petitioner was acquitted of the crime of violation of Rep.
Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping
Act.
Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA
4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone
is not among such devices or arrangements.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive

nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry in certain
areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizen who happens to pick
up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime
might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that
he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his
own telephone to secretly overhear the private
communications of the would be crime.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however,

revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other
REMEDIES IN CASES OF VIOLATION
A. EXLUSIONARY RULE
STONEHILL vs DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search
warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace
officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search
for personal properties “books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the
offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised
Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents,
papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were
subjected to deportation proceedings and were
constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962
with respect to some documents and papers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.
RULING:
NO. The constitution protects the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none
of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere
allegation that Stonehill et al committed a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be
a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of
a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications
— without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure
of records pertaining to all business transactions of
Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure
of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described —
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is
likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against
a defective search warrant is emphasized.
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to
the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge
to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
 Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as penalized
under P.D. No. 1866, §1.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of
those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, ISSUE:
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, Whether or not the Search Warrant issued by Judge
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, Teodorico Durias is invalid for failure to comply with the
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse basic requirements of the Constitution.
a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably
— finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
RULING:
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, NO. The Court held that petitioner waived any objection
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for based on the illegality of the search.
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

Petitioner assails the absence of a written deposition

PASTRANO vs. CA showing that the judge had examined the complainant
G.R. No. 104504 October 31, 1997
and his witnesses by means of searching questions in
writing and under oath as required by Rule 126, §4 of the
FACTS: Rules on Criminal Procedure.

A group of students went to see Capt. Rodolfo Mañoza,

then intelligence operations officer of the Philippine
Rule 126, §4 indeed requires the examination of the
Constabulary, at Camp Naranjo, at Oroquieta City. They
complainant and his witnesses to be put in writing and
reported having seen Clyde Pastrano beaten up by his
under oath. But although this is a ground for quashing a
father, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano. The students were
search warrant in this case, petitioner did nothing to this
willing to testify but expressed fear of the petitioner who,
end. He did not move to quash the information before the
according to them, had firearms. Clyde Pastrano had died
trial court. Nor did he object to the presentation of the
and it was suspected he had been the victim of foul play.
evidence obtained as being the product of an illegal
Two sons of Pedrito Pastrano by his estranged wife also
search.
saw Capt. Mañoza, seeking his assistance in connection
with the death of their brother Clyde. The brothers
reported that their father and his common-law wife were
keeping unlicensed firearms in their house. They Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the
executed a joint affidavit which they stated that they had illegality of the search. As held in People v. Omaweng, the
personal knowledge of the fact that their father Pedrito right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of different seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the
calibers in the bedroom of his house. waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, The Court find that the prosecution clearly established the
Capt. Mañoza applied for a search warrant on the same elements of the crime charged and that the Court of
day. Appeals and the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge
Teodorico M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of
Oroquieta City (Branch I) issued a search warrant which
Capt. Mañoza and his men later served at the residence
of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City.
Seized from petitioner's dwelling was a sack containing
the following:XXX

On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner

Pedrito Pastrano y Capapas and his common-law wife,
Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were charged with Illegal
 B. CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES
ABERCA vs. VER
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver
had ordered the Task Force Makabansa of the AFP to
conduct "preemptive strikes against known communist
terrorists'' underground houses" in Metro Manila. The
TFM raided some places using defective warrants; they
seized personal belongings of petitioners; they had been
interrogated in violation of their right to silence and to
counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated.
Petitioners asked for payment of damages for violations
of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal
arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining
his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and
cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
PD 1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following text: However, when the action (for
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public
officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising
from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial
of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for
injuries suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to
remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
The question became moot and academic since the
suspension of the PWHC had been lifted with the
issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation
No. 2 on March 25, 1986.
Forbes vs Chuoco Tiaco
G.R. No. L-6157 (July 30, 1910)
FACTS:
On the 1st of April, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco
(alias Choa Tea) filed a suit in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila against the plaintiffs in which
substantially the following allegations and petition were
made, alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under
the orders of the said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, he was deported
therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E.
Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of
the police and of the secret service, respectively, of the
city of Manila, and that having been able to return to these
Islands he feared, as it was threatened, that he should be
again deported by the said defendants, concluding with a
petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued
against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from
deporting the defendant, Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea),
and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an
indemnity.
The plaintiff countered a demurrer against the same and
presented a motion asking that the injunction be
dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that the
facts set out in the complaint did not constitute a motive
of action, and that the latter was one in which the court
lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction against the
plaintiffs for the reasons set out in the complaint;
notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield
overruled the demurrer and disallowed the motion,
leaving the complaint and the injunction standing.
The purpose of the first suits, was to make the Governor-
General personally liable for the damages of his acts
which was done in the exercise of his duties, as well as to
prevent him from exercising the same power in the future.
This sufficiently appears by the declarations, which
suggest and do not exclude official action, and is alleged
in the complaints for prohibition. On April 19, 1910, the
Philippine legislature then passed an act which grants the
governor- general the authority to deport."in the exercise
of authority vested in him by law," enacted that his action
was "approved and ratified and confirmed by the
subsequent law.
ISSUE: WON the Governor General, as Chief Executive,
can be sued in a civil action.
RULING: No, That the Government of the United States
in the Philippine Islands is a government possessed with
"all the military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to
govern the Philippine Islands" and as such has the power
and duty, through its political department, to deport aliens
whose presence in the territory is found to be injurious to
the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
That the Governor-General, acting in his political and
executive capacity, is invested with plenary power to
deport obnoxious aliens, whose continued presence in
the territory is found by him to be injurious presence to the
public interest, and in the method of deporting or expelling
them, he may use such method as his official judgment
and good conscience may dictate.
That this power to deport or expel obnoxious aliens being
invested in the political department of the Government,
the judicial department will not, in the absence of express
legislative authority, intervene for the purpose of
controlling such power, nor the purpose of inquiring
whether or not he is liable in damages for the exercise
thereof.
Therefore the lower court was without jurisdiction to
consider the particular questions presented in the cause,
and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the writ of
prohibition shall be issued, directed to the defendant, the
Hon. A. S. Crossfield, perpetually prohibiting him from
proceeding in the cause in which Chuoco Tiaco
(alias Choa Tea) is plaintiff and W. Cameron Forbes,
Charles R. Trowbridge, and J.E. Harding are defendants,
and to dismiss said action, as well as to enter an order
dissolving the injunction granted by him in said cause
against the said defendants.
WHEN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT
A. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RULE
LUMANOG V. PEOPLE
630 SCRA 42 SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
FACTS: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the
ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the
Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National
Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
Joel, who was believed to be the murderer, was
arrested six (6) days after the murder on June 19, 1996.
The murder was committed on June 13, 1996. He was
arrested without warrant.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest without warrant is valid
RULING: No, the arrest without warrant six days after the
commission of the crime is not valid. The period of time
when the appellant was arrested is no longer the purview
of hot arrest pursuit which is one of the instances of valid
warrantless arrest.
PEOPLE V. ARANETA
634 SCRA 475 OCTOBER 20, 2010
FACTS: A confidential information arrived at the drug
enforcement unit of Pasig Police Station about the alleged
peddling of illegal drugs of the live-in couple Botong and
Malou. The team arrived at the target place at 4:10 in the
morning.
Upon arrival, PO2 Damasco and the informant went near
the appellants who were standing just outside their house.
The informant and appellants exchanged greetings and
the parties exchanged conversations. The latter then
immediately gave her the marked P100 bill. Malou
called Botong and when the latter came out, Malou
handed to him the marked money. Botong then gave
Malou a plastic sachet which she handed to PO2
Damasco.
After examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Damasco
immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to the other
members of the team who thereafter rushed to the scene.
PO2 Damasco arrested Malou while SPO2 Zigapan
arrested Botong. SPO2 Zigapan recovered from Botong
the marked P100 bill and after frisking him, the police
officer found in Botong’s pocket one plastic sachet of what
looked like marijuana and eight plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest without warrant is valid
RULING: Yes, the arrest is valid even without warrant.
A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed
because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused
were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and
selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was
definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search,
them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a
justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-
bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and
means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and
has been proven to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
PEOPLE V. UYBOCO
640 SCRA 146 JANUARY 19, 2011
FACTS: Nimfa and her wards (Jeson Kevin and Jeson
Kirby) were kidnapped by appellants and were brought to
a house in Paranaque. While still in garage of the house,
Nimfa was able to sneak out of the car and place a call to
the secretary of her employer to inform the latter that they
were in Merville Subdivision. She came back to the car
undetected and after a while, she and her wards were
asked to alight from the car and they were locked inside
the comfort room.
Through further negotiations, the parties agreed
to a ransom of P1.5 Million Pesos and the said ransom
was then brought by Jepson and taken by the kidnappers
in their agreed location.
P/Insp. Escandor together with two other police
officers brought a camera to cover the supposed pay-off.
He took a total of 24 shots.20 He identified Macias
together with appellant in Magallanes Commercial Center
and the latter as the one who took the ransom.
P/Supt. Chan was one of the team leaders dispatched to
take a video coverage on the supposed pay-off. He
witnessed the pay-off and identified appellant as the one
who took the bag containing the ransom money from the
car trunk of Jepson.
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned with the primary task of
apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves’ children and
helper. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that
the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in
their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car
and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati.
They continuously followed the car inside the village.
When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle. They introduced
themselves as police officers and accosted the suspect,
who turned out to be appellant.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest is valid
RULING: Yes, the warrantless arrest of the appellant is
valid.
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is
a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest
covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be
effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2)
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the
instant case. The police officers present in Magallanes
Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off
which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping.
They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk
of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant
was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes.
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough
for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who
was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
 B. EXCEPTION TO STRICT ENFORCEMENT: ILLEGAL
POSSESSIONS OF GUNS OR DRUGS
PEOPLE V. PENAFLORIDA
551 SCRA 111 (APRIL 10, 2008)
FACTS: SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente)
narrated that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle
of marijuana was being transported by appellant to
Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. A team was then organized.
The team boarded the police mobile car and
proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-
huyon.5 They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle.
The police officers flagged appellant down and found
marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
together with other grocery items. The amount
of P1550.00 was also found in appellant's possession.
The police officers confiscated these items and took
photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the
headquarters where he was booked.
In assailing his conviction, appellant appellant resorts to
a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack
of a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest without warrant was valid
RULING: Yes, the arrest without warrant was valid.
The OSG correctly justifies the failure to apply for
an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the
essence in appellant's apprehension, noting in the same
breath that there is no law requiring investigation and
surveillance upon receipt of tips from assets before
conducting police operations.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that
appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon.
Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as
appellant was already in transit and already committing a
crime. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and
carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating
that a crime was then already being committed. Under the
circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe
that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the
warrantless arrest is justified.
PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO
628 SCRA 328 AUGUST 16, 2010
FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted. The police
officers waited until appellant arrived at around 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon. Upon appellant’s arrival, the
confidential informant introduced PO1 Manaol to him as
an interested buyer of shabu. PO1 Manaol handed the
two marked One Hundred Peso bills to appellant, who, in
turn, handed one (1) plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance to him. The transaction having been
consummated, PO1 Manaol executed their pre-arranged
signal and scratched his head. When the other members
of the team saw PO1 Manaol execute the pre-arranged
signal, they immediately proceeded to their location and
arrested appellant.
PO1 Manaol recovered the suspected shabu subject of
the sale from appellant and placed his initials JAM
thereon. PO1 Bagay was also able to retrieve the buy-
bust money from appellant’s right hand. A follow-up frisk
on appellant resulted in the confiscation of two other
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance suspected
to be shabu, from the right hand pocket of his shorts.
Immediately after retrieving the evidence, PO1 Bagay
marked the confiscated sachets with his initials KJB.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant was illegally arrested
RULING: No, the appellant was not illegally arrested.
On the legality of the warrantless arrest, We
reiterate that appellant was arrested during an
entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an
entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be
secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless
arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
xxx
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with
due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-
bust operation, such as the one involving appellant,
deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless
arrest and warrantless search and seizure conducted on
the person of appellant were allowed under the
circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful arrest,
needed no warrant to sustain its validity.Thus, there is no
doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during the
legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were
properly admitted in evidence against him.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-
serving and uncorroborated, and must fail in light of
straightforward and positive testimony of poseur-buyer
identifying him as the seller of shabu. The twin defenses
of denial and frame-up hold little weight vis-à-vis the
strong evidence gathered by the prosecution in proving
his complicity to the offenses.
C. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OG ILLEGAL ARREST
PEOPLE V. BIYOC
532 SCRA 611 DECEMBER 7, 2007
FACTS: Herein appellant was charged with qualified rape
of AAA. After the incident, CCC thus immediately
confronted AAA who did confirm that appellant had
inserted his penis inside her vagina that afternoon, and
that appellant had been doing the same act to her since
she was nine years old. Incensed, CCC accompanied
AAA the following day, December 6, 2000, to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
to report the incident.
From the DSWD, AAA and her mother, accompanied by
a social worker, proceeded to the police station of San
Mateo, Rizal where they lodged a complaint against
appellant. At the police station, AAA and CCC were
interviewed by PO1 Florescita S. Javier.
PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter
proceeded to the family home, and on their way, they met
appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him of his rights,
arrested him, and brought him to the police station. AAA's
and CCC's statements were thereupon taken.
Appellant claims that his arrest was illegal
because a "warrantless arrest was effected even before
the statement of the private complainant was taken.
ISSUE: W/N the objection of appellant was valid
RULING: In the present case, appellant failed to question
the illegality of his arrest before entering his plea, hence,
he is deemed to have waived the same.
Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be
made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise,
they are considered waived.
We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped
from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move
for the quashing of the information against him before his
arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court as what was done by the appellants in the instant
case. Not only did they enter their pleas during
arraignment, but they also actively participated during the
trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their
arrest.
VALDEZ V. PEOPLE
538 SCRA 611 NOVEMBER 23, 2007
FACTS: Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m.
of 17 March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol
along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito
Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño
when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a
mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who
appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the latter
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put
him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house
of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where
he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to
open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair
of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane.
It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station
for further investigation.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest effected against the
appellant by the barangay tanods was unlawful
RULING: Evidence shows that the arrest of appellant was
unlawful. However, at the outset, we observe that
nowhere in the records can we find any objection by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation
in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
 PEOPLE V. SANTOS
555 SCRA 578 JUNE 26, 2008
FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted. Upon
reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the
informant alighted from their vehicle, while the rest of the
team were left inside. The informant then pointed to two
persons standing along the target area, one of whom was
Monching Labo, later identified as appellant Ramon Catoc
y Picayo. After approaching, the informant introduced
PO3 Luna as a shabu customer to one of the persons,
later identified as appellant Jerry Santos y Macol.
Appellant Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth
of shabu he was buying and asked for the money. PO3
Luna gave appellant Santos the buy-bust money
consisting of a pre-marked P100.00 bill. Appellant Santos
handed this money to appellant Catoc, who took out from
his pocket a sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
a white crystalline substance, which he handed back to
appellant Santos. When appellant Santos gave the plastic
sachet to PO3 Luna, the latter nabbed the former and
introduced himself as a policeman. At that point, the other
members of the team arrived and likewise held and
arrested appellant Catoc.
After their arraignment, the accused objected to the
alleged irregularity of their arrest.
ISSUE: W/N the appellants did a timely objection to the
alleged irregularity of their arrest
RULING: The claim of appellants that their warrantless
arrests were illegal also lacks merit. The Court notes that
nowhere in the records did we find any objection by
appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their
arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the
illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. It is
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless
arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused
arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a
judgment of conviction rendered against him.
Nevertheless, our ruling in People v. Cabugatan provides
that: The rule is settled that an arrest made after an
entrapment does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is
considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule
113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, which states:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
As we have already declared the legality of the buy-bust
operation that was conducted by the police, it follows that
the subsequent warrantless arrests were likewise legally
effected. Furthermore, any search resulting from the
lawful warrantless arrests was also valid, because the
appellants committed a crime in flagrante delicto; that is,
the persons arrested committed a crime in the presence
of the arresting officers.
Ople v Torres
293 SCRA 141 (1998)
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that this Court invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a
National Computerized Indentification Reference System”
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone
of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates the constitutional right
to privacy.
Ruling:
Yes. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code provides that “every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbours and other persons” and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and
prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letter and
other private communications. The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws
like the Anti- Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The
Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we rescind from the premise that
the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution; hence, it is the burden of government to
show that AO No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide
our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transaction and misrepresentations by person seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of AO No.
308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of AO No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear
and present danger.
AO No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will
only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
That lack of proper safeguards in this regard od AO No.
308 may interfere with individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement;
it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing
expeditions” by government authorities and evade the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider
that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the
date encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill
of Rights seeks to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of
man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources – governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes
from the executive branch of government which by issuing
AO No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record -keeping power of the computer, only the
indifferent fail to perceive the danger that AO No. 308
gives the government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take
not of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., “the
disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened
by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In
a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the
society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.”
Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we shout
not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for
flattery.
PRIVACY
IN RE: CAMILO SABIO
504 SCRA 704 OCTOBER 17, 2006
FACTS: Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former
President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task
of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the
deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.2 Section 4
(b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio,
under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein
petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons
in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. On
May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Moreover, even with further notices, Sabio still did not
comply.
Moreover, n G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers
alleged, among others, that the subpoenae violated
petitioners' rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of their right to privacy
RULING: No, their right to privacy has not been violated
by the Senate Committees.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance
with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the
Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's
"right to be let alone" or the "right to determine what, how
much, to whom and when information about himself shall
be disclosed." Section 2 guarantees "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders
inviolable the "privacy of communication and
correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.50 Applying this determination to
these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?;
and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited
in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the
operations by their respective board of directors."
Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners' acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving
their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and
over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line with Whalen v.
Roe,employed the rational basis relationship test when it
held that there was no infringement of the individual's right
to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is
for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of
honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court
remarked that as public figures, the Members of the
former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their
actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people
to access information on matters of public concern
prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies
in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions
of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG
and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to
exact vital information from the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in
crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption
and formulate remedial measures and policy
determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those
directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate
Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not
been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
SJS V. DDB
570 SCRA 410 NOVEMBER 3, 2008
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo
a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. -
Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall
be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of
the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims
that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship,
(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess
any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass
a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for
a third, a person’s constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g)
of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE: W/N paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36,
RA 9165 violate the right to privacy
RULING: The Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements. A random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of
public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly
for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under
Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner
Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while
there has been general agreement as to the basic
function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
“translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable
broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public
and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA
9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned
shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be
noted the very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to
safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the
deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional
by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification
for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case
of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and
one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and
“suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III
of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
Zulueta v CA
253 SCRA 699 (1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks,
diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in
a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence
RULING:
YES. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy
of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in
any proceeding.”
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouse by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent if the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the
other.
In Re Alejano
468 SCRA 188 (2005)
FACTS:
This case results from the Oakwood incident in July 2003.
No. The opening and reading of the detainees’ letters in
the present case did not violate the detainees’ right to
privacy of communication. The letters were not in sealed
envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received
the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo
was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and
not as their counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not
confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers,
the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is
available only to the public at large but not to persons who
are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.

One of the petitioners’ argument is that the officials of the

ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees’ right to
privacy when ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one
of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the
letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded
because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention
Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits
the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny
that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officials of ISAFP Detention Center

violated detainees’ right to privacy of communication.

RULING:
 III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
PRIOR RESTRAINTS/SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
Chavez v. Gonzales
FACTS: As a consequence of the public release of copies
of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-
President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could
be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the
National Bureau of Investigation to go after media
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release
all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that
the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to
them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall
not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting
of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC
stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello
Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a
continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate
of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be
a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the
said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP)
which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement
which stated, among others, that the supposed
wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and
handled responsibly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there’s a purported violation of law such
as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
RULING:
No. Anti-wiretapping law does not endanger the national
security of the State. We rule that not every violation of a
law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds
and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct
which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a
persons private comfort but does not endanger national
security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation, by itself and without more, cannot support
suppression of free speech and free press. In fine,
violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which
should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the
injurious effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international
covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press.
In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the
Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations
of law. By all means, violations of law should be
vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their
own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent
their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free
speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold
the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
 Newsounds v. Dy
FACTS:
Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations
in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years
undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002,
respondents in their official capacities impeded the ability
of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all.
These actions have ranged from withholding permits to
operate to the physical closure of those stations.
Petitioner were required to submit requirements for the
reclassification of the land wherein the said stations are
operating. Such requirements then as required were
never listed in the list of requirements in the
renewal/application of any permit issued by Cauayan City.
And notably, petitioners had never been required to
submit such papers before.
ISSUE: W/N the right of petitioner’s freedom of
expression was violated by the respondents by the
closure of the station.
RULING:
YES. The circumstances of this case dictate that
respondents’ closure of petitioners’ radio stations is
clearly tainted with ill motives. It must be pointed out that
in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela
that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other
members of the Dy political dynasty. Bombo Radyo is a
rival station of DWDY who is also owned by the family DY.
Also, in an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer
dated February 2004, respondent Dy was quoted as
saying that he will "disenfranchise the radio station." Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondents’
denial of petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground
that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and
that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from
Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a
blatant violation of the petitioners constitutional right to
press freedom.
The requirements required of petitioners are frankly
beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local
governments throughout the Philippines. Prior to 2002,
petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various
local government requirements for the operation of their
stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the
election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan,
that the local government started to impose these new
requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs
property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during
the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela
that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other
members of the Dy political dynasty. Respondents efforts
to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified
immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a
former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca,
was mounting a credible and ultimately successful
challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who
happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also
bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners
by the Cauayan City government are frankly beyond the
pale and not conventionally adopted by local
governments throughout the Philippines.
Soriano v. Laguardia
FACTS:
Petitioner Eliseo S. Soriano, the former Ang Dating Daan
host, uttered the following statements in his TV program
against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristo’s minister and
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo! Sinungaling ! Gago ka
talaga, Michael! Masahol ka pa sa
Espinosa, Forto, Gascon, Ibrahim, Sidaya, Valdevieso,
Villamor, Zapanta
putang babae, o di ba? ‘Yung putang babae, ang
gumagana lang doon, ‘yung ibaba, dito kay Michael, ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang
babae ‘yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang
Dating Daan, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a
preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him
liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month
suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan.
Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.
ISSUE:
W/N the 20-day preventive suspension order of MTRCB
was an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of
speech and expression and an impermissible prior
restraint.
RULING:
NO. It has been established in this jurisdiction that
unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to
libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e.,
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated
as obscene, at least with respect to the average child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. Where a
language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioners
utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it
may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Soliven Vs Makasiar; Beltran vs Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585 (November 14, 1988)
FACTS: Soliven broadcasted the statement that
President Cory hid under the bed during a coup d’etat.
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,
together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corazon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-
affidavit against him and others. Beltran questioned the
issuance of the warrant. He said the judge did not
“personally examine” the witnesses, which is
unconstitutional. In an arrest warrant, the judge may rely
on the evidences. He need not call the witnesses.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners here can be sued for libel.
RULING: No. Libel is an actual and malicious imputation
of a prime vice or defect against any person (RPC). Even
dead persons are subject to libel. The SC held to look at
the context of his statement. He was referring to her
official functions, hence it is protected by freedom of
speech. If you’re a public official, people are allowed to
comment on your official functions. What is not covered
by freedom of speech are comments on private matters.
Borjal v CA, Wenceslao
301 SCRA 1 (1999)
FACTS:
Francisco Wenceslao was one of the heroes of EDSA,
and the chairman and director of the First National
Conference on Land Transportation. Apparently this
conference attracted media mileage and drew public
attention.
Sometime in 1989, a series of articles written by petitioner
Borjal was published on different dates in his column
Jaywalker. The article dealt with anomalous activities
such as solicitations and unauthorized use of names of
Pres. Cory Aquino of an “organizer of a conference”
without naming or identifying Wenceslao. Neither did it
refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned.
Wenceslao filed a case for libel against petitioner Borjal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Borjal is protected by freedom of
expression
RULING:
Yes. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt
with matters of public interest.
The court held that Wenceslao is deemed a public figure.
A public figure is a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings,
his affairs and his character, has become a "public
personage."
The FNCLT was air undertaking infused with public
interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the
government and the private sector, and organized by top
government officials and prominent businessmen. For
this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public
attention not only to the conference itself but to the
personalities behind as well. As its Executive Director and
spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed
the status of a public figure.
 Vasquez v. CA
314 SCRA 460 (2000)
FACTS:
Rodolfo Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families
from the area went to see then National Housing Authority
General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint
against Brgy. chairman Jaime Olmedo about his alleged
engagement in land grabbing. After their meeting with
Atienza and other NHA Officials, petitioner and his
companions were met and interviewed by a newspaper
reporters at the NHA compound concerning their
complaint. The next day the news articles were published
in the paper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the article, published
the complaint of Vasquez against Brgy. Chairman
Olmedo about the said land grabbing.
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint
for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s
statements cast aspersion on him and damaged his
reputation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for libel
RULING:
No. The standard actual malice in New York Times vs
Sullivan is to be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
If the defamatory statements is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties
and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he
does not prove that the imputation was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false,
no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless
the public official concerned proves that the statements
was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
Tulfo v. People
565 SCRA 283 (2008)
FACTS:
Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and
charged petitioner Erwin Tulfo, as author or writer of the
daily tabloid Remate, with the crime libel. That private
respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler and having his wealth illegally.
Tulfo had no reliable source.
RTC found petitioners guilty if the crime of libel. CA
affirmed the judgement of the trial court. Hence, Tulfo
appealed and raised that the said article is qualified
privilege communication and is written without malice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the article is defamatory and
petitioner is liable for libel
RULING:
Yes. The Court has long respected the freedom of the
press, and upheld the same when it came to
commentaries made on public figures and matters of
public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the
press was given greater weight over the rights of
individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such
freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of
this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible
exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free
license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the
rights of others.
The exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent
with good faith and reasonable care. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken,
as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
 B. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT OF RULING:
PRIVACY
YES. The production and filming by petitioners of the
projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does
AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
FACTS:

The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates

to the non- bloody change of government that took place
Petitioner Ayer Productions is a movie production
at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and
company which 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for
the train of events which led up to that denouement.
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
release, the histolic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at
concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international
EDSA. Petitioners discussed this Project with a local
interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
movie producer who suggested that they consult with the
in the history of this countryand as such, must be
appropriate government agencies and also with General
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as
FVR and Senator Enrile, who had played major roles in
an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
the events proposed to be filmed. The proposed motion
coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater,
picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed
as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
by the MTRCB as well as the other government agencies
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and
consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his
certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce
approval of the intended film production. In a letter,
Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story
petitioner informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his
about the projected motion picture enclosing a synopsis
immediate family, what we have here is not a film
of it. On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile
biography, more or less fictionalized, of private
replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the
respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is
use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to
any cinema or television production, film or other medium
refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
for advertising or commercial exploitation" and further
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing,
government in February 1986.
distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no
reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual)
should not be made to [him] or any member of his family,
much less to any matter purely personal to them. It A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting
name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
projected motion picture. become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a
celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are
those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
Enrile filed a Complaint with application for TRO and Wilt
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
of Pretion with the RTC seeking to enjoin petitioners from
entertainment.
producing the movie alleging that without private
respondent's consent and over his objection, producing
the movie constitutes an obvious violation of his right of
privacy which was granted. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because,
inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in
February 1986. Because his participation therein was
ISSUE:
major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
W/N granting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction against revolution that fails to make reference to the role played
the petitioners is a restraint on their right of the free by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The
expression? right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower
than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has
not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship.
he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful
political campaign during which his participation in the
EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in
the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the Philippines.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant
case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in
terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture
must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or
reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of
private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There
must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the
unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of
intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed
motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of
essentially private concern." To the extent that "The Four
Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation
of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those
events which are directly and reasonably related to the
public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into
private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as
unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be
carried out even without a license from private
respondent.
PHIL. JOURNAL V. THEONEN
FACTS:
For almost a century, this Court has sought that elusive
equilibrium between the law on defamation on one hand,
and the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech
and press on the other. This case revisits that search.
Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently
residing in this country with his Filipina wife and their
children. He filed a civil case for damages against
peittioners after having been identified in a brief news item
w/ a headline Swiss Shoots Neighbors Pets. He claims
that the report was false and defamatory, and that the
petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth
of the same prior to publication.
The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to
cover news events in the CID, acquired a copy of a letter
from a trusted source in the CIDs Intelligence Division.
They claimed to have reasonable grounds to believe in
the truth and veracity of the information derived (from
their) sources which served as the basis for the article.
ISSUE:
W/N constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of
speech and the press against liability for damages extend
to Phil. Journal in this case?
RULING:
NO. The freedom of speech and of the press is not
absolute. Enshrined in Section 4, Article of the Bill of
Rights of the 1987 Constitution, it states, No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
But not all speech is protected. The right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the
- lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and - the
insulting or fighting words – - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or - tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.
It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.
Libel is not protected speech. Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter
written by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged
communication, it lost its character as such when the
matter was published in the newspaper and circulated
among the general population. A written letter containing
libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it
is published and circulated in public, which was what the
petitioners did in this case.
 C. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE MATTER-MACASAET FREEDOM of the press and
OF JUSTICE (CONTEMPT OF COURT) judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at
kalayaang panghukuman)

IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST FACTS:

MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE
HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
FACTS:
Respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002
issue of the Inquirer that he suggested that the Court must
take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and
reports that the Court would vote in favor of or against the
validity of the Plunder Law to protect the credibility of the
Court. He explained therein:
The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in
the Business Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the
Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is
the publisher. The articles, containing statements and
innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the
Supreme Court involving J. Consuelo Ynares- Santiago,
came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent can invoke the defense of

In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of
the Honorable Members who were being unfairly dragged
and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side
of the issue, was being viciously attacked. To remain
silent at this time when the Honorable Court was under
siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to
influence the court in their decision would and could lend
credence to these reports coming from anonymous
sources.
freedom of speech.
RULING:
No. The Court have no problems with legitimate criticisms
pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or
even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They
should even be constructive and should pave the way for
a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.

RULING: Whether or not the repot made by respondent

is a protected speec.
No. Freedom of speech includes the right to know and
discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does not
cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts
integrity and authority, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not
absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the
requirements of equally important public interests, such
as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent
Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has
crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks
which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press
freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance
of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the
integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the
doctrine of judicial independence.

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed

against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather,
it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the
dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech,
for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein.

Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to

rule in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or
risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot
be construed as falling within the ambit of constitutionally-
protected speech.
 D. SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION
Texas v. Johnson
419 US 109 (1986)
FACTS:
During the 1984 Republican National Convention,
respondent Johnson participated in a political
demonstration to protest against Reagan Administration
and some Dallas-based corporations. During the
demonstration Johnson burned an American flag outside
of the convention center in Dallas, Texas. He was
arrested and charged with violating a Texas statute that
prevented the desecration of a venerated object, including
the American flag, if such action were likely to incite anger
in others. A Texas court tried and convicted Johnson. He
appealed, arguing that his actions were "symbolic
speech" protected by the First Amendment.
ISSUE: Whether or not flag burning constitutes "symbolic
speech" protected by the First Amendment
RULING:
Yes. The SC said that it respects freedom of expression,
freedom to burn the flag, and then you can because it is
part of our democracy.
Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag
constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke
the First Amendment. The State conceded that the
conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of
a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National
Convention; the expressive, overtly political nature of the
conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly
apparent.
E. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Dela Cruz v. CA
305 SCRA 303 (1999)
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various
schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually
dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in
connection with the administrative complaints filed before
its office by their respective principals for participating in
a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-
to-work order by DECS constituting grave misconduct.,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law,
Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of
Presidential Decree 807.
The petitioners averred that they were denied of their right
to freedom to assembly and that they were dismissed
illegally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their
right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid
RULING:
No. The SC said that the court denies the claim that the
teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.
But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990
mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights
within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by
staging the mass protests on regular school days,
abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even
after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers
availed of their free time — recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances
and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even
the Supreme Court — could have held them liable for their
participation in the mass actions.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
A. REGULATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN/ELECTION
ACTIVITY
ABS-CBN v Comelec
323 SCRA 811 (2000)
FACTS:
In this case the comelec issued a resolution approving the
issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit surveys. The electoral body believed that
such project might conflict with the official Comelec count,
as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that
it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to
undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed
the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls
were actually conducted and reported by media without
any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave
abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in conducting
exit polls during the elections
RULING:
Yes. The petition was granted and the TRO issued by the
Court was declared null and void.
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly
untenable.
First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will
as much as possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or group
polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace
or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists
merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the
limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not
at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of the
latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative
of the other.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose.
The valuable information and ideas that could be derived
from them, based on the voters' answer to the survey
questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored.
Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers,
social scientists and the electorate in general would be
deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of
election-day and other factors on voters' choices
SWS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571 (May 5, 2001)
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the prohibition of COMELEC on the
publication of election surveys 7 days prior to an election
under the Fair Election Act as unconstitutional. SC
agreed, ruling that the prohibition was invalid because (1)
it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it had a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted could have been achieved by means other
than the suppression of freedom of expression.
Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin the
COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of the Fair Election
Act in the 2001 elections, which provides: Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published 15
days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published 7 days before an
election.
Restriction on publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint. Publication of survey results in prior
elections does not cause confusion among voters. There
is no evidence that election surveys cause an immediate
and inevitable danger to the voting process. There was no
reason for voters to be denied access to the results of
election surveys which are relatively objective.
ISSUE: W/N Sec. 5.4 of the Fair Election Act is
constitutional (NO, it is unconstitutional)
RULING:
Petition for prohibition GRANTED. Sec. 5.4 of R.A. No.
9006 declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Since the prohibition lays down a prior restraint on
freedom of speech, expression, and the press and
considering the preferred status of said constitutional
rights, there is a presumption of invalidity due to the
nature of the prohibition. The government has the burden
of justifying the restraint. Applicability of Art. IX-C, Sec. 4
The provision on the COMELEC’s supervisory power to
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the
operation of media of communication, and the
corresponding presumption of validity attached to the
exercise of such power, does not apply. It is limited to
ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges
for the use of such media facilities for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates.
Test to determine validity As held in United States v.
O’Brien, government regulation is justified (1) if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; (2) if it
furthers a substantial governmental interest; (3) if the
interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and
(4) if the incidental restriction is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Conclusion The SC held that the prohibition was invalid
because (1) it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it had a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted could have been achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
B. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
BAYAN vs ERMITA
488 SCRA 226 (2006)
FACTS:
Petitioners come in three groups. Bayan, et al, Jess del
Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et
al.
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España
Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and
going towards Mendiola. Police blocked them and
prevented them from proceeding further. They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three
other rallyists were arrested.
In the case of Bayan et al they are citizens and taxpayers
of the Philippines and they allege that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of
them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a),
and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated
Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy
and the CPR policy recently announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place
of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of
the government. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test.
ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No.
880 violated their rights as organizations and individuals
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
RULING:
B.P. No. 880 requires a permit for all who would publicly
assemble in the nation’s streets and parks.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the
very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which
all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government
for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to
organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to
law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of
Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article
XIII.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A
fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause"
does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are
the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and
benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground
of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has
no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down
as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify
abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned
as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as
to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid
because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear
and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a
deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific
freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after
that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance
with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of
the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be
deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind
shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only
requirement will be written notices to the police and the
mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly
activities.
C. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
GSIS vs KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA
G.R. No. 170132 (December 6, 2006)
FACTS:
There was a 4 day rally in front of GSIS, attended byGSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein
respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS
rank-and-file employees.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the
GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to show
cause why they should not be charged administratively
for their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMG
sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground,
among others, that the subject employees resumed
work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-
work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration
was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on
October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against
some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that
inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from
forming, joining or assisting employees’ organization,
petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges
against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and
demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive
effect of such mass action.
ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS
employees were valid
RULING:
NO. The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for
the first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization to complement the provision according
workers the right to engage in “peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law.”.
It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions
of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held, citing
MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of
government employees to organize is limited to the
formation of unions or associations, without including
the right to strike. Specifically, the right of civil servants
to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-
Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free
expression and of assembly, there are standards for
allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the
purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security.
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself
qualifies its exercise with the provision “in accordance
with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state
may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny
certain sectors such right. Public employees going on
disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted
mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG
members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out
and waged or participated in a mass protest or
demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS
main office building. In whatever name respondent
desires to call the four-day mass action in October
2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring
employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities
during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach
to attain whatever it was they were specifically after.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General
Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility,
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS
Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline
GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner
Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative
charges against the absenting participants of the
October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a
duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless
of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed
the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as
legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.
GSIS vs VILLAVIZA
G. R. No. 190291 (July 27, 2010)
FACTS:
Garcia, as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against
respondents and eventually found them guilty for
Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and meting out the
penalty of one (1) year suspension plus penalties. The
charges contained that respondent, wearing red shirt
together with some employees, marched to or
appeared simultaneously at or just outside the
office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for
penalized employees, the latter having surreptitiously
entered the GSIS premises. On appeal, CSC found
that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU
office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing
do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action
proscribed above. CSC added that their actuations can
be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason
to deviate therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unruly mass gathering
of twenty employees during office hours, inside office
premises to protest falls within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly. NO.
RULING:
Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights
of those in the government service, the concerted
activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending
a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with
them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some
even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are
acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose
of realizing their demands of force concession.
Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of
government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in
the government service of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. Government workers, whatever
their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they
believe to be a violation of their rights and interests.
Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining
the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom
can be reasonably regulated only but can never be
taken away. Respondents freedom of speech and of
expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No.
021316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity
or mass action has only tempered or regulated these
rights. Measured against that definition, respondents
actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted
activity or mass action.
D. MOVIE CENSORSHIP
GONZALES vs. KALAW KATIGBAK
137 SCRA 647
FACTS:
Gonzalez is the President of the Malaya Films, a movie
production. Maria Kalaw Katigbak is the Chairman and
Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada is the Vice-Chairman of the
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. In a
resolution of a sub-committee of the Board of 23 October
1984, a permit to exhibit the film "Kapit sa Patalim" under
the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes
and deletions enumerated was granted. The film in issue
was given an adult classification to serve as a warning to
theater operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit
are not fit for the young. A good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked,
or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by Gonzales, in behalf of
Malaya Films, stating that the classification of the film "For
Adults Only" was without basis. For petitioners, such
classification "is without legal and factual basis and is
exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression.
The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including
those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are
essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole,
there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification." The
Board further resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board
to withhold the issuance of the permit to exhibit until these
deficiencies are supplied." Gonzales, et. al. filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television have the power to classify the movie “Kapit
sa Patalim” under the classification “For AdultsOnly” and
impose conditions to edit the material to allow it a
“General patronage” rating.
RULING:
(1) Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse. The "importance of motion pictures as an organ
of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform." There is no
clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and
what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were
sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free
expression.
(2) Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all
there is to free speech or free press. To avoid an
unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of the
Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to
safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what
motion pictures are for general patronage and what may
require either parental guidance or be limited to adults
only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of
expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The
power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed,
rather the presumption is against its validity.
(3) The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present danger
of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a
right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but
also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared
may be traced to the expression complained of. The
causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such
danger be only probable.
(4) The law, however, frowns on obscenity. All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implici t in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance.
(5) This being a certiorari petition, the question before
the Court is whether or not there was a grav e abuse
of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion
by respondent Board is evident in the light of the
difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before
Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only,"
without any deletion or cut. Moreov er its perception
of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was
an abuse of discretion.
(7) All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to
be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to
motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that
where television is concerned, a less liberal approach
calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers
of the programs therein shown.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA
259 SCRA 529
FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo". The program presents and propagates
petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR
tapes of its TV program to be aired. The Board
classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing
on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law." It appealed to the Office of the
President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive
Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for
Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the
respondent Board. According to the letter the episode
in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and expression and no indication that the
episode poses any clear and present danger.
Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that
the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to
submit the VTR tapes of itsTV program and in x-
rating them. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia
ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible
and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is
found in the bible. The board contended that it
outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled
in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the "ang Iglesia Ni Cristo" program is
not constitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression.
RULING:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied
with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it
fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship
will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-
called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions .
RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise
of religion. “attack” is different from “offend” any race
or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with
the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. Under our constitutional
scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at
war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom
of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear
and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the
time, place or manner of speech.
E. RADIO BROADCAST
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Jose P. Dans, Jr.
G.R. No. L-59329. July 19, 1985
FACTS:
A petition was filed to reopen The radio station DYRE.
DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of national
security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite
people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE petitioners contends
that they were denied due process. There was no hearing
to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore,
the closure of the radio station violates freedom of
speech and expression. Before the court could even
promulgate a decision, petitioner through its president,
Mr. Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The
rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Mr.
Pastrana, who is no longer interested in pursuing the said
case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, the
Court still finds that there is a need to pass a resolution
for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative
tribunals in matters as this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the
freedom of speech and expression clause.
RULING:
Yes. The closure of the petitioner’s radio station on
grounds of national security without elaboration of the
grounds and without hearing deserves to be condemned
in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process
was not observed. If there is an idea which should be
impressed in the minds of those who wield power it is that
power must be used in a reasonable manner.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in
metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular
transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines
beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
shelter inevitably enjoy high priorities.
All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled
to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger
rule—that words are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent. The clear and present
danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic
and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums.
F. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations
G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008
FACTS:
DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of approximately
USD 329.5M (or P16 Billion).
The NBN Project was initially approved as a Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
The NBN Project became the subject of investigation of
several senate committees. NEDA Chair Romulo Neri
was summoned to appear and testify. He disclosed that
then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve after being informed of the bribe
attempt. For his refusal to answer, the Senate cited Neri
in contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not executive privilege violates Art. III, Sec. 7
of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
No, invoking executive privilege does not violate Art. III,
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The Court stated that
“there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality
of such information is a recognized principle in other
democratic states. The right to information is not an
absolute right. Restrictions to such right include: (1)
matters of national security, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information. Matters of national security
include state secrets with regard to military and diplomatic
matters, as well as information on inter-governmental
exchanges prior to the finality of treaties and executive
agreements. For these state secrets to be protected, it
must be examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection.
In the case at bar, it was considered privilege because it
was within the scope of presidential communication and
correspondence. So, the Court allowed such non-
appearance for it was based on the principle of separation
of powers.
Center for People Empowerment in Governance vs.
Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 189546. September 21, 2010
FACTS:
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People
Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a
nongovernment organization, wrote respondent
COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board
of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC
CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and
congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs,
and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs
called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source
code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist for the reasons: 1)
that it had not yet received the baseline source code of
the provider, Smartmatic, since payment to it had been
withheld as a result of a pending suit; 2) its customization
of the baseline source code was targeted for completion
in November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369,
the customized source code still had to be reviewed by
“an established international certification entity,” which
review was expected to be completed by the end of
February 2010; and 4) only then would the AES be made
available for review under a controlled environment.
Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009
CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus, seeking
to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source
codes available to CenPEG and other interested parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
should disclose the source code for the Automated
Election System (AES) technologies it used in the 2010
national and local elections
RULING:
YES. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is
clear in that “once an AES technology is selected for
implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct
their own review thereof.” The COMELEC has offered no
reason not to comply with this requirement of the law.
Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code
was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked for
it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, “under a controlled
environment.” The elections had passed and that reason
is already stale.
 G. ACADEMIC FREEDOM

De La Salle University, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola G.R. No. 127980. December 19, 2007
School of Theology
G. R. No. L-40779. November 28, 1975
FACTS:
FACTS:

Members of the Tau Gamma Phi were expelled by the De

la Salle University and the College of Saint Benilde Joint
Epicharis T. Garcia studied M.A. Theology because she
Disciplinary Board because of their involvement in an
wants to become a priest. She was a lay woman, she
offensive action, causing injuries to petitioner James Yap
enrolled in the first semester of M.A. Theology. Her
and three other members of the Domino Lux Fraternity.
enrollment was denied. Fr. Lambino, the head of the
When they tried to enroll, they were barred to enroll. They
School of Loyola said “you are very smart, you are very
went to Court to ask for the TRO. The Court granted the
brilliant, but we cannot allow you to enroll in M.A.
TRO directing De la Salle University to accept the
Theology because M.A. Theology is a prerequisite for the
students as enrollees. Undaunted, De la Salle University
seminary, and later on for priesthood.” She went to Court.
and College of Saint Benilde denied their enrollment
She filed a mandamus case to compel the Ateneo School
claiming Academic Freedom
of Theology to accept her enrollment because she wanted
to become a priest.

ISSUE:
ISSUE:

Whether or not De la Salle University can validly deny the

enrollment of private respondents considering their right
Whether or not petitioner can compel the Faculty
of education and the University’s right to Academic
Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology
Freedom.
to let her continue studying therein.

RULING:
RULING:

YES. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution

NO. The internal conditions for academic freedom in a
guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic
university are that the academic staff should have de facto
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the
control of the following functions: (i) the admission and
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among
overriding public interest calls for some restraint.
the different categories of expenditure. It would be a poor
According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely
encompasses the independence of an academic
on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2)
acquire for their academic members control of these four
what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who
functions, for in one constitution or another most of these
may be admitted to study.
functions are laid on the shoulders of the lay governing
body. Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education
Act of 1982 that students have a right “to freely choose
SC held that part of academic freedom is barring the
their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
enrollment of this student. The College of Theology had
continue their course therein up to graduation,”77 such
all the right to bar the enrollment of this student.
right is subject to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well
exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free
choice of students for admission to its school.
 IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts
in Iligan City (Re: Office Hours)
A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC. December 14, 2005
FACTS:
In their Letter to Executive Judge Salazar, RTC Iligan
City, several Muslim employees requested that they be
allowed to enjoy the following privileges: (1) to hold office
hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or
coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; (2) to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every
Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar
year. The Muslim employees invoked P.D. No. 291 as
amended by P.D. No. 322, which was issued to reinforce
national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making
them part of our national holidays.
Section 3 of the same law, as amended, provides that
during the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all
Muslim employees in the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall
observe office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without
lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no
diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the
employeewho is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of
this provision. It also provides that "regulations for the
implementation of this section shall be issued together
with the implementing directives on Muslim holidays.”
Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
promulgated Resolution No. 811277 stating that during
“Ramadan," the fasting month of the Muslims, the Civil
Service official time of 8:00 to 12:00 and1:00 to 5:00 is
hereby modified to 7:30 AM to 3:30 P.M. without noon
break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as
undertime. The resolution also declared that during Friday
Muslims are excused from work from 10o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon. In another
resolution, CSC clarified that the term "Friday “in the
above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the
month of Ramadan but refers to "all Fridays of the
calendar year."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Muslim employees be granted of their two
requests above mentioned.
RULING:
No. Only the first request, which is to hold office hours
from 7:30am to 3:30pm without lunch break or coffee
breaks during the month of Ramadan, can be granted and
not the second one. Said requests are grounded on
Section 5, Article 3 of the Constitution, particularly the free
exercise clause to one's religion. The court said that this
clause is of two-fold, freedom to believe which is absolute
and freedom to act on one's beliefs as subject to
regulation since it involves matters affecting public
welfare. The Court recognizes that the observance of
Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to
the Islamic faith. However, only the first request finds
support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by
P.D. No. 322, there is no basis for the second request. In
fact, allowing the second request would mean diminution
of 12 hours from the prescribed government working
hours.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the
Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious
denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the
public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not
exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable
requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
TARUC VS. DELA CRUZ
FACTS :
The petitioners were members of PIC in Surigao while the
respondents de la Cruz and Florano were the bishop and
parish priest. Petitioner, Taruc, tried to organize a mass
to be celebrated by Fr. Ambong during the fiesta of
Socorro. When Taruc informed the Bishop of his plan, the
Bishop was against it for the reason that Fr. Ambong was
not a member of the clergy of Surigao. Bishop de la Cruz
declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the
PIC because the priest still celebrated the mass.
Subsequently, Fr. Ambong filed a case before the court
for him to be reinstated.
ISSUE : Whether or not the court has jurisdiction
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the court has no
jurisdiction. The Church and the State are to be separate
and distinct from each other. The expulsion or
excommunication of members of religious institutions is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials.
 ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter in the RTC. She
lives with a man who is not her husband (Quilapio) and
they have a son. Her husband died before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still married to another.
According to complainant (Estrada), Escritor should not
be allowed to be employed in the judiciary for it will appear
as if the court allows such act.
Escritor claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion (Jehovah’s Witness). They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’
under the approval of their congregation which is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can use compelling state
interest to determine that Escritor’s conduct is immoral
and therefore must be administratively charged?
RULING: Supreme Court held that no, because it was
found out that it was part of their religious practice.
Freedom of religion was preferred over by the court than
gross immorality.
A. TAX EXEMPTION
BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD
FACTS:
The Church owns a parcel of land in Ilocos del Norte. On
the south side was the church yard, the convent and a
vegetable garden. On the center was the church. And on
the north side was an old cemetery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the whole lot is exempted from
tax?
RULING: The Supreme Court that it is exempted from tax.
Section 344 (c) of the Administrative Code provides the
exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the
tax refers to the home of the priest who presides over the
church and who has to take care of himself in order to
discharge his duties. It not only includes the land actually
occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground
destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man.
TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
FACTS:
These are motions seeking reconsideration for dismissing
the petitions filed in the cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) contends that by
removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
the press. It is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation
of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not sales tax on bible sales is violative of
religious and press freedom?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held no. The VAT is not a license tax
and not included in religious exercises. It is not a tax on
the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional
right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange
of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services
and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes.
To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the
exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to
violate its freedom under the Constitution.
B. PUBLIC AID TO RELIGION
AGLIPAY VS RUIZ
FACTS:
Mons. Gregorio Aglipay seeks the issuance from the court
of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional
provision stating that no public funds shall be
appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system
of religion, etc.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the non-
establishment clause?
RULING: Supreme Court held no. The issuance of the
postage stamps by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular
church or religious denomination. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. From the letter of the Director of Posts, the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this
country."
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. FLAG SALUTE
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUP’T OF SCHOOLS
FACTS:
The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by R.A. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they
taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are"acts of worship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to
anyone or anything except God". They think that
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades
the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution
protects.
ISSUE: Whether or not the students be dismissed for
refusing to take part, on account of their religious beliefs,
in the flag ceremony?
RULING: Supreme Court held no. A similar exemption
may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard
to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for
their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate
in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt
such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention
during the flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave
and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.”
B. FREEDOM TO PROPAGATE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-
profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its
Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said
City. The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation
with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.
American Bible Society has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialect City Treasurer of Manila informed
American Bible Society that it was violating several
Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit
and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure
the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q
1945-2Q 1953.
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible
Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees
under protest.
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and
3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the
City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since
1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales
tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its
bibles
ISSUE:
Whether or not American Bible Society liable to
pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of bibles
RULING:
NO. While it is true the price asked for the
religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean
that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation
of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons,
the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
which requires the payment of license fee for conducting
the business of general merchandise, cannot be applied
to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
 The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent." (Tañada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th
ed., p. 297).
CENTENO V. VILLALON
FACTS:
Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers
of a civic organization known as the Samahang
Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for
the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco,
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.
It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a
permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
As a consequence, an information was filed
against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio
Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before
the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2,
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed
a motion to quash the information2 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming
that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such
as the construction of a chapel. This was denied by the
trial court, and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes”
should be construed in the broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.
RULING:
NO. The acts of the petitioners cannot be
punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
In the provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein
given which include the words “charitable” and “religious”
make use of the disjunctive “or.” In its elementary sense,
“or” as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating
an alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When “or” is
used, the various members of the enumeration are to be
taken separately.
Accordingly, “charitable” and “religious,” which
are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive
“or” should be given different, distinct, and disparate
meanings. There is no compelling consideration why the
same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made
applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1564.
C. EXEMPTION FROM UNION SHOP
VICTORIANO V. ELIZALDE
FACTS:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop
agreement with the Company that membership in the
Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all its permanent employees.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits
the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in
1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the
Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the
service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the
Union as a member.
The management of the Company in turn notified
Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for
injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the
Union from dismissing Appellee. In its answer, the Union
invoked the “union security clause” of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had
no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No.
875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional
for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.
RULING:
NO. RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from
the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any
labor organization. What the exception provides,
therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot
be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when
said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union.
It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit
the members of said religious sects from affiliating with
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and
the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union,
they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them
from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,
does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.”
V. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to
possible threats & following supervening events. Marcos
filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order
the respondents to issue them their travel documents and
prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his
return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
President that the decision was made in the interest of
national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives
them of their right to life, liberty, property without due
process and equal protection of the laws. They also said
that it deprives them of their right to travel which according
to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be
impaired by a court order.
ISSUE:
WON there is violation of the Marcoses right to
abode and right to travel?
RULING:
NO. It must be emphasized that the individual
right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote.
The right to return to one’s country is not among
the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution]. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
i.e.,against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof [Art. 12 (4)].
The issue before the Court is novel and without
precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence. Consequently, resolution by the Court of
the well- debated issue of whether or not there can be
limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.
SILVERIO VS. CA
FACTS:
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years
after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the
passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone
abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment
and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court,
on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department
of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to
deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country.
This order was based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding
that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985,
“the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has
never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this
Court” (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1)
on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous,
claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be
held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the
Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the “interest of national security, public safety
or public health.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation to Right To
Travel Restricted By Conditions Of Bail
RULING:
NO. The condition imposed upon an accused on
bail to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
of his right to travel.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the
basis of “national security, public safety, or public health”
and “as may be provided by law,” a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas,
Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was
a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party
(See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
COJUANGCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to due
process, a speedy trial, and a speedy determination of his
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies. Further, he prays for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) from
further enforcing and/or implementing its order dated
February 20, 1995 which bans petitioner from leaving the
country except upon prior approval by said court.
Criminal Case No. 22018 is an offshoot of a
complaint filed on January 12, 1990, by the Office of the
Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), docketed as I.S. No. 74,
against the former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) and the former members of the PCA
Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended.
In said complaint, the respondents were charged
“for having conspired and confederated together and
taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship with the former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
without authority granted a donation in the amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using
PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino
people and to the Republic of the Philippines.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation to the Right to
travel.
RULING:
YES. Prescinding from our initial declaration that
the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner by
respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary
that there be strong and compelling reasons to justify the
continued restriction on petitioner’s right to travel abroad.
Admittedly, all of petitioner’s previous requests to
travel abroad has been granted and that, as confirmed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has
always returned to the Philippines and complied with the
restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further
denying petitioner’s right to travel abroad, with attendant
restrictions, appears less than clear.
 The risk of flight is further diminished in view of
petitioner’s recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he
has now more justification to travel so as to oversee the
entire operations of that company. In this regard, it has to
be conceded that his assumption of such vital post has
come at a time when the current economic crisis has
adversely affected the international operations of many
companies, including San Miguel. The need to travel
abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate
and implement the necessary corporate strategies and
decisions, could not be forestalled. These considerations
affecting the petitioner’s duties to a publicly held
company, militate against imposing further restrictions on
petitioner’s right to travel abroad.
YAP JR. V. CA
358 SCRA 564 (2001)
FACTS:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of
abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two (2)
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. Petitioner was convicted of
estafa by the RTC of Pasig City for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5.5 million. Petitioner filed a
notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional
liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court.
The Solicitor General commented on the motion and
opined that the petitioner may be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P5.5 million and be required to secure a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case
he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant. Petitioner contended in his
reply that the proposed bail was violative of his right
against excessive bail and prays that bail be reduced.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is excessive bail.
Whether or not the conditions imposed in the bail bond
impair petitioner’s liberty of abode and travel.
RULING:
Yes. There is excessive bail. The Court finds the setting
of amount to P5.5 million as unreasonable, excessive,
and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to
bail and believes the amount of P200,000 is more
reasonable.
Pertaining to standards for fixing bail, bail is not intended
as a punishment nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgement of the appellate
court. Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. The Court will not hesitate
to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts
should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail,
effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum
or exacting unreasonable conditions. The amount should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfil this purpose.
No. The conditions imposed were not violative of
petitioner’s rights. Petitioner was found to have left the
country several times while the case was pending, the
Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport
and the issuance of a hold departure order against him. It
was also shown that petitioner used different names in his
business transactions and had several abodes in different
parts of the country. Under the circumstances of this case,
we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in
the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold departure order
and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts.
MIRASOL V. DPWH
490 SCRA 318 (2006)
FACTS:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, asserting
that Department of Public Works and Highways’ (DPWH)
Department Order No. 74, No. 215, and the Revised
Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) violate Republic Act No.
2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access Highway Act.
Petitioners also seek to declare Department Order No.
123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1)
unconstitutional. Petitioner states that the petition is in
order to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South
Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. Furthermore,
Department Order No. 123 was issued which allowed
motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities only (toll ways).
Trial Court issued decision dismissing petition but
declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations
contravene RA 2000.
Whether or not AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the RTC’s ruling is based on a
wrong premise.
DO 74 and DO 215 are void. The RTC assumed that the
DPWH derived its authority from its predecessor, the
Department of Public Works and Communications, under
Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to
consider the evolution of the Department of Public Works
and Communications.
Under EO 125 and EO 125-A, which further reorganized
the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all
laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is
clearly with the DOTC. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void
as the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities but rather it is the
DOTC which is authorized.
Yes. DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to
promulgate it. Petitioners argue that AO 1 violates their
right to travel.
The Court finds that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable
restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary
measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These
rules were designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be
used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height.
None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary
and capricious. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’
right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles,
tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as
the mode of traveling along limited access highways.
The petition is partly granted. DO No. 74, 215, and 123
and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board is declared
void. However, Administrative Order No. 1 of the
Department of Public Works and Communications is
declared valid.
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES vs.
MACARINE
677 SCRA 1 (2012)
FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the
present administrative case against Judge Ignacio B.
Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No.
49-2003. The Circular required that all foreign travels of
judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of
days, must be with prior permission from the Court. A
travel authority must be secured from the OCA. Judges
must submit requirements that should be submitted to and
received by the OCA at least two weeks before the
intended time of travel. No action shall be taken on
requests for travel authority with incomplete
requirements. Judges and personnel who shall leave the
country without travel authority issued by [the OCA] shall
be subject to disciplinary action.
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court
Administrator, requesting for authority to travel to
Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10
- 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday.
Respondent however did not submit the corresponding
requirements and so his request remained enacted upon
but the respondent still proceeded with his travel abroad
without the required travel authority from the OCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OCA Circular violated the
liberty of abode and travel by the defendant.
RULING:
No. The OCA circular was not violative of the
respondent’s constitutional rights to travel.
While it is true that the right to travel is guaranteed by
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not
absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that
such restriction is in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as may be provided by law. This,
however, should by no means be construed as limiting the
Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over
lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict
but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be
complied by judges and court personnel, before they can
go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or
prohibit a person from doing something; to “regulate” is to
govern or direct according to rule.
For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed
by the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 49- 2003.
Punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Failure to file an application for leave and a report on his
caseload prior to his travel abroad, the Court held Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine admonished, with warning against
repetition of similar violation.
VI. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION
MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA
384 U.S. 436 (1996)
FACTS:
On March 13, 1963, the police arrested the indigent
Mexican Ernesto Miranda based on circumstantial
evidence which links him to a kidnapping and rape of an
eighteen-year old woman. The police took him into a
special interrogation room for two (2) hours where they
were cut him off from the outside world. The defendant
was not given a full and effective warning of his rights at
the outset of the interrogation process. At no time was
Miranda been told his right to counsel, was not advised of
his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his
statements during the interrogation would be used against
him. The questioning secured a signed confession that
was admitted to trial. His court-appointed lawyer objected
the presentation of the confession as it was not obtained
voluntarily and should therefore be excluded but such was
overruled and defendant was sentenced to 20-30 years of
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement obtained from the defendant
who was subjected to custodial police interrogation is
admissible against him in a criminal trial.
Whether or not the procedures which assure that
individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not be compelled to
incriminate himself are necessary.
RULING:
No. The U.S Supreme Court held that the prosecution
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination, and that the defendant not only understood
his constitutional rights, but voluntarily waived them.
Yes. The procedures which assure that individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment
necessary. The U.S Court held that there can be no doubt
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of
criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons
in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed
in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. Furthermore, the Court held that without
proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would otherwise do so freely.
Therefore, the defendant must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
 HO WAI PANG V. PEOPLE
659 SCRA 624 (October 19, 2011)
FACTS:
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 P.M, Flight No.
068 of the United Arab Emirates Airlines from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).
Among the passengers were thirteen (13) Hongkong
nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the
arrival area, Sonny Wong presented a Baggage
Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco
(Cinco), which examined the baggage of each of the
thirteen (13) passengers. From the first traveling bag, she
saw few personal belongings such as used clothing,
shoes and chocolate boxes. The following bags also
contained chocolate boxes of the same size as those in
the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four (4)
of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead
of chocolates, what she saw inside was white crystalline
substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco
immediately called her superiors which advised her to call
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. All in
all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the bags of
the six accused.
The thirteen (13) tourists were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. Out
of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of
R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-
accused. Petitioner claimed that when they confessed,
they were not assisted by counsel, not informed of rights
to remain silent and competent counsel of his choice.
Therefore, they contend that it was a violation of their right
because they were already in custodial investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
excluding evidence taken during the custodial
investigation.
RULING: No. Petition is denied and the assailed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to
all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional
right under Section 12 [31] of Article III of the Constitution,
we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said
constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only
confessions and admissions of the accused as against
himself. Thus, the Court held that The infractions of the
so-called “Miranda rights” render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation; The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any
confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any
extrajudicial confession extracted from him as evidence
of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from
petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in
evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of
the petitioner and his co-accused, the trial court based its
Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the
Court held in People v. Buluran, any allegation of violation
of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission
or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction.
Petitioner’s conviction in the present case was on the
strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis
of any confession or admission.
Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed
before Jan. 17, 1973.
LUZ v. PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then
assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers
to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that
he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from
his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which
turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself and raised the
defense of planting of evidence and extortion. RTC
convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person
of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The
RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to
be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. RODEL LUZ
y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims
that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket
or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been
lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus: The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time
when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there
is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to
flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was
actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the
accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or
arrested by the apprehending officers.
ISSUE: W/N there was a valid arrest that may allow the
public officer to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.
RULING: No.
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for
the particular reasons alleged.
First - There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver
for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt
prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period
not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date
of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a
ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The
mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a
Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the
phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop
mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. Second,
circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are
not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. The usual traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions
that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the
purposes of Miranda.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-
012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear
a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by
a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for
a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance
of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were
not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested,
it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement they might make could
be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this
case, these constitutional requirements were complied
with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Second - There being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this
case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although
alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container
inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown
by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given
and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not
suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the
RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the
contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or
passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this
case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by
several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless
search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk"
rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop
and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.20
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales
for the "search incident to arrest" exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and
(2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x
x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the
search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer
safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is
a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves
"danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure
which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-
235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop,
on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is
more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a
formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296
(1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence").
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest. The subject items seized during the
illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26
Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause
or ground.
 TEST OF VALIDITY OF WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
PEOPLE VS. RIBADAJO
142 SCRA 637 (1986)
FACTS:
There were originally six accused which were all
members of the Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang, however
one of them died during the pendency of the case. On
November 18,1971, at about 7:55 P.M, the evidence on
record shows that the prisoners from Brigade C,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, succeeded in opening the door of their
dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked
the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then
getting their food rations from the delivery truck wherein
the victim was among them. A prisoner (Catamura) was
stabbed simultaneously which resulted to his death. In an
investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of
the New Bilibid Prisons, all the accused executed
statements admitting their participation in the slaying of
Bernardo Cutamora. Their motive was to avenge the
throwing of human waste on them.
Appellants claim that they have not been informed of their
right to silence and counsel during custodial investigation.
They withdrew their pleas of guilty, and repudiated their
confessions, claiming that they had signed the same
under duress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as
evidence, and in giving weight to the supposed
extrajudicial confession of the accused which is violative
of the Miranda Right.
RULING:
No. The trial court did not err in admitting as evidence, the
confession of the accused. Also, claim of respondent is
bereft of merit.
Under the 1935 Constitution, one cannot invoke the rights
under custodial investigation. Appellant made the
confession on November 18, 1971. As to the appellants’
claim that they have not been informed of their right to
silence and to counsel during custodial investigation,
suffice it to state that the proscription against the
admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused
during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of
procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. No law gives
the accused the right to be informed before the enactment
of the 1973 Constitution, even if presented after January
17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty relative to
confessions obtained during custodial investigation does
not have any retroactive effect.
All confessions, whether or not executed before the 1973
Constitution took effect are subject thereto and must
comply therewith.
JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 79543 (October 16, 1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a police investigator of the Western Police
District in Metro Manila. Together with his co-accused, he
was being charged of being a mastermind of the armed
hijacking of a postal delivery van. This happened in
Bulacan, wherein the said accused, two of whom were
armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by
means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop the Postal
Delivery Truck while it was travelling along the said
municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob
and carry away with them the following:(1) Postal Delivery
Truck, (2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and
Vouchers (3) Social Security System Pension Checks and
Vouchers (4) Treasury Warrants, and (5) Several Mail
Matters from abroad.
The Sandiganbayan found them GUILTY as co-principals
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e),
in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. On appeal to the SC, the
petitioners claim that the rights of an accused under
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which
includes the right against an uncounseled waiver of the
right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even
though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 --
long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. This is
because it is favorable to him as an accused pursuant to
Art. 22 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution shall be given retroactive effect and
petitioner’s extrajudicial confession be held as
inadmissible evidence.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect
for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
sustained.
While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual
criminal," what is being construed here is a constitutional
provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which
is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a
declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and
privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect
against violations by the government, or by individuals or
groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the
individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.
Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are
those imposing punishment for an offense committed
against the state which the executive of the state has the
power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime
or offense against its law.
NOT APPLICABLE TO RES GESTAE
STATEMENTS/SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUANITO BALOLOY
G.R. NO. 140740 (April 12, 2002)
FACTS:
At Barangay Inagasan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on
the evening of August 3 1996, the body of 11 years old
Genelyn Camacho was found at the waterfalls at the said
barangay. Autopsy report found the Genelyn was raped
before she was drowned. The one who caused its
discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself,
who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was
catching frogs in the nearby creek. While in the wake of
Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the barangay captain that
he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping and
throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody of
authorities, he was asked incriminating questions by
Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that Juanito
was not yet in custodial investigation.
Based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled
with circumstantial evidence, the trail court violated
Section 12 (1) of Article III of the barangay captain Ceniza
and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to
inform him of his Constitutional rights before they took it
upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory
information. It is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are
not police investigators, for as public officials it was
incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of
the Constitution. While these rights may be waiver
executed in the presence of counsel. He concludes that
his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juanito’s extrajudicial confession
before the barangay captain was admissible.
RULING:
Yes, as to his confession with the barangay captain
Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional provision
on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions
made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before
he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. In the instant case, Juanito voluntarily
narrated to Ceniza that he rapes Genelyn and thereafter
threw her body into the ravine. This narration was
spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an
ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or
place under custody for investigation in connection with
the commission of the offense. Moreover, Juanito did not
offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the
party of Ceniza, which could have compelled her testify
falsely against him.
BENJAMIN JESALVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 187725 (January 19, 2011)
FACTS:
On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon, filed a criminal complaint for Frustrated Murder
against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on September
15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner
with the crime of Murder. After conducting a hearing on
the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992,
granted him bail. On January 11, 1993, the MTC
recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and
then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon. Thus, petitioner
was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information
dated January 26, 1993.
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria
Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that petitioner was
courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they
should just remain as friends because she was already
married, and that she loved her handsome husband.
Petitioner denied that he killed Leticia. He testified that he
did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had many
reasons why he should not kill her.
RTC ruled against petitioner. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Petitioner avers that the statements he made at the police
station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he
was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that
there was no waiver of his right to remain silent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC as well as the CA erred
in ruling that the statement made by petitioner were
admissible
RULING:
The assailed statements herein were spontaneously
made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through
questioning. It was established that petitioner, together
with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the
police station and voluntarily made the statement that
Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of
September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not,
therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure
for custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant
case.
NOT APPLICABLE TO STATEMENTS GIVEN
ADMNISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE TING LAN UY
G.R. NO. 157399 (November 17, 2005)
FACTS:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) intended for the purchase of
US Dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), respondent along with Ernesto Gamus, Jaime
Ochoa and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Malversation
through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined
and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC")
became embroiled in a controversy involving the
disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds which
were originally on deposit with the Philippine National
Bank, NPC Branch ("PNB") but were subsequently used
to purchase two (2) managers’/cashier’s checks in order
to comply with its loan obligations to the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB").
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the
funds covered by the two PNB Manager’s checks by
falsifying a commercial document called an "Application
for Cashier’s Check" (ACC) by inserting an account
number (A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after
the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch.
In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no
evidence that he committed any of the acts alleged in the
information, particularly the intercalation on the ACC; that
he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he
received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with
any of his co-accused. He claims that his conviction was
based on the alleged sworn statement and the transcript
of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with
appellant by the NPC personnel and the report of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
ISSUE: Whether or not his sworn statement is
incompetent evidence and is in violation of Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
IN
RULING:
The fact that an NBI investigation was being
contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn
statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard
is protection from coercion. The interview where the
sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC
personnel for the NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding
separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry
and should not be confused or lumped together with the
latter.
Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation
Report and the transcript of stenographic notes are
hearsay for having been made extra-judicially. The
record, however, shows that the prosecution presented
the team leader of the NBI investigators who conducted
the investigation, although his testimony was dispensed
with as the parties stipulated on the existence and due
execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without
admitting the truth of its contents. If at all, the admission
of the report’s existence is an acknowledgment that it is
neither spurious nor counterfeit.
ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 159734 (November 29, 2006)
FACTS:
Rosario Astudillo and Filipina Orellana were hired by
Western Marketing Corporation (Western), as
salespersons, while Roberto Benitez and Flormarie Robel
were hired as floor manager and service-in-
charge/cashier-reliever, respectively. In the course of
preparing the monthly sales report of the branch, the
Branch Accountant noticed discrepancies in the monthly
sales report. The case of the missing invoices and the
shortage of cash sales collection were then reported to
Western‘s branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily).
Petitioners were found guilty of qualified theft by the RTC
for feloniously taking, stealing and carrying away two (2)
booklets of Sales Invoices Nos. from128351 to 128400 of
the said corporation and thereafter use the said invoices
in the preparation of fictitious sales and withdrawals of
merchandise from Western Marketing Corp.
ISSUE: Whether or not extra-judicial admissions taken
before an employer in the course of an administrative
inquiry are admissible in a criminal case.
RULING:
Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-
custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the
suspect. He must be warned prior to any questioning that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution
formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file any
objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions.
At any rate, the Court answers the issue in the affirmative.
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation; that is his privilege. But if
he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation
against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements,
whether at the administrative investigation, or at a
subsequent criminal action brought against him, because
he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his “Miranda rights” which, to repeat, are
relevant in custodial investigations. The Court of Appeals
did not thus err in pronouncing that Astudillo and Orellana
were not under custodial investigation to call for the
presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their
written incriminatory statements are admissible in
evidence.
CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INVESTIGATIONS – POLICE LINEUPS
ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 102786 (August 14, 1998)
FACTS: An electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to
inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the
Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation
(CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, discovered that the said electric
meters were missing. He reported the loss to the
MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. They
suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have
damaged the electric meters while tampering with them
and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have
removed the electric meters. They expressed suspicion
that MERALCO personnel were involved.
Patrolman Enopia, who was assigned to the case,
proceeded to the scene of the crime and inquired from
people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters
being taken down from the post near the gate of
CAPASSCO. According to one of those he asked, on April
11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck,
with the number 522 painted on its side, removed the
electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked
MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom
turned out to be petitioner de la Torre.
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD
headquarters for investigation. They were included in a
line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner
de la Torre as the leader of the group which took down
the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises.
Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of his
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4,
1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers
of MERALCO service truck number 522 were presented
in a police line-up. He further invokes the exclusionary
rule in par. 3 of the same 12 that "any confession or
admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s Constitutional rights
were violated during the police line-up.
RULING: NO. A police line-up is not considered part of
any custodial inquest because it is conducted before that
stage is reached.
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with
the other crewmembers of MERALCO truck number 522,
was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from
which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader of the
group which had removed the electric meters from the
CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation
did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put
to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses
of the complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner's allegations that his rights as a suspect in a
custodial interrogation were violated.
PEOPLE V PAVILLARE
G.R. No. 129970 April 5, 2000
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged and convicted
of kidnapping one Sukhjinder Singh at the corner of Scout
Reyes and Roces Avenue, this City, and thereafter
brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston
street, this City, for the purpose of extorting ransom
money in the amount of P20,000.00 Philippine currency,
thereby detaining and depriving him of his liberty for more
than three hours, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both
pleaded "not guilty"
The trial court rendered judgment finding Eduardo
Pavillare guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
committed the crime of kidnapping for the purpose of
ransom.
The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt.While under police custody
the appellant was required to stand in a police line-up
where he was supposedly identified by the private
complainant as one of his abductors. He claims that he
was identified by the private complainant as one of his
abductors because the Indians needed a "scapegoat" for
the other four cases of kidnapping of Indian nationals then
pending. The appellant argues that the private
complainant could not identify his captors by himself
which is shown by the inconsistencies in his testimony
and by the improper suggestion made by the investigating
police officer pointing to the accused-appellant as one of
the malefactors.
The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the
affirmance in toto of the appealed decision. The appellee
contends that in court the private complainant
unhesitatingly and consistently identified the accused-
appellant Pavillare as one of the kidnappers. Throughout
his narration of the incident in court the complainant
referred to Pavillare as one of the kidnappers because he
was the one who made the phone call and the one who
received the ransom money. The complainant's failure to
state an accurate description of the kidnappers in his
sworn statement does not belie his identification of
Pavillare in court as it is the general rule that affidavits are
often inaccurate and incomplete. The argument of the
accused-appellant that his identification in the police line-
up was made with improper motive either from the other
Indian nationals who were at the police station or from
SPO1 Frias is without evidentiary basis.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the rights under the
Miranda Doctrine?
RULING:
Section 12 (1), Art. III of the Constitution states that “Any
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.”
Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted
without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible
in evidence.
The prohibition however, does not extend to a person in
a police line-up because that stage of an investigation is
not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has been
repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences Accused-appellant contends that the evidence against
when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
a suspect in the commission of the crime under doubt.
investigation and the police officers begin to ask
questions on the suspect’s participation therein and which
tend to elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation ISSUE: WON the constitutional rights of Casimiro was
wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has violated?
been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the
right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It
RULING: Accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is acquitted
has also been held that an uncounseled identification at
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of an
in-court identification. The identification made by the
private complainant in the police line-up pointing to
Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves
although the accused-appellant was not assisted by was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and
counsel. signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as
“suspect/owner.” In effect, accused-appellant admitted
that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an
TEST OF VALIDITY OF WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS offense under the law. Having been made without the
assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that
marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in
evidence.
PEOPLE V CASIMIRO
R. No. 146277 June 20, 2002

The warning was incomplete. It did not include a

FACTS: On the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or
deliver to
SPO2 Dorotheo Supa of the 14th Regional Field Office,
Narcotics Unit, posing as buyer, about nine hundred fifty
(950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.
statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford
counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was
perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he
understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate
in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. We
cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer,
accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely.
What is more, the police investigators did not pause long
enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he
was willing to answer their questions even without the
assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right
to remain silent at all.

Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard

After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him
operating procedure for a buy-bust operation. The
to the 14th Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2
government’s drive against illegal drugs deserves
Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay wrote their initials on the
everybody’s support. But it is precisely when the
brick of marijuana before giving it to the evidence
government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be
custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and
most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice
arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory
Brandeis warned long ago, "the greatest dangers to
examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also
liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
prepared a "receipt of property seized.
well meaning but without understanding." Our desire to
stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense
of constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot
Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
assistance of counsel.

The trial court rendered a decision finding accused-

appellant guilty of the crime charged.
 PEOPLE V SAYABOC
G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004
FACTS: That on or about December 2, 1994, in the
Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines Benjamin Sayaboc was accused of killing
certain Joseph Galam y Antonio. At their arraignment
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.
On 8 March 1995, the caretaker and the waitress
identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot
Joseph Galam to death. Sayaboc was taken to the
Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya to take his statement but before taking the
statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his
constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he
wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since
Sayaboc could not name one, the police officers brought
Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred
with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc
say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which
Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However,
Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever
Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort
room.11 That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial
confession12 in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to
killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje
for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was
also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal
Melvin Tiongson.
ISSUE: WON Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession was
admissible?
RULING: Apart from the absence of an express waiver of
his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right
to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. In People v. Jara,26 the Court explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all
extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police
investigators either automatically type it together with the
curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious,
fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an
impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free,
and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle."27 It should allow the suspect to consider the
effects and consequences of any waiver he might make
of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like
Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV,
was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been
under the control of the police officers for two days
previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his
constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are
unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty.
Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show
through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution
witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained
silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are
presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this
presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to
show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding
an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the
extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The
rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the
person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the
confession may appear to have been given voluntarily
since the confessant did not file charges against his
alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to
properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible.
The right to be informed requires “the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.” It should allow the suspect to consider the
effects and consequences of any waiver he might make
of these rights.
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial
investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely
gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired.
Wherefore the court held that Sayaboc should only be
guilty of homicide.
PEOPLE V BAGNATE
G.R. Nos. 133685-86 May 20, 2004
FACTS: There were two criminal charges for Bagnate.
First for killing Auria Broña by attacking and hacking with
a bolo inflicting upon her mortal wounds which caused her
death and the other by unlawfully and feloniously having
a sexual intercourse with Rosalie Rayal, against her will,
whom the accused attacked and hacked afterwards
inflicting upon her mortal wounds on the different parts of
her body, which caused her death.
On arraignment bagnate pleaded not guilty to both
charges against him.
Appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base
requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and
subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of
the confession as well as the authenticity of the signatures
of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the
extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the
crimes were committed by him.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before
the trial court and assailed its admissibility alleging that it
was executed in violation of his constitutional rights,
particularly his right to a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully
apprised of the consequences of his confession.
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession was
admissible?
RULING: Yes, the extrajudicial confession of the accused
was admissible.
To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession
must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with
the assistance of an independent and competent counsel,
and a person under custodial investigation must be
continuously assisted by counsel from the very start
thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the
voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the
assistance given must be independent and competent,
that is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused. The rule is premised on the presumption
that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
running through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. It is not
intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to
protect the accused from being coerced to admit any that
is untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate
him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false. The counsel, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in
evidence is confession given by an accused without
having been informed of his right to remain silent, or,
without having been given competent and independent
counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford
the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or
the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the
presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced,
threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means
that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the
Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an
accused of the possible penalty for the crime he
committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the
counsel is incompetent or not independent just because
he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable
penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After
all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the
resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission
of a crime. To be considered competent and independent
for the purpose of assisting an accused during a custodial
investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be: “. . . .
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be
giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of
the individual’s constitutional rights. In People v. Basay
(219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed that an
accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent
and to counsel contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.”
A. GALIT RULE
PEOPLE V GALIT
G.R No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil
the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail.
He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no
evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul
him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted
on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession
must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat
him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner
could not take any more. His body could no longer endure
the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to
suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: WON the confession was valid?
RULING: No.The confession is not valid.
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means—by telephone if possible—or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
B. NEW RULE ON WAIVER
SANTOS V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 71523-25 December 8, 2000
FACTS: Finding accused Alfredo Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy
Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y
Estrella and Rolando Santos y Ramirez alias Mickey
Mouse, guilty as co-principals in the three (3) separate
complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Documents. Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and
Desiderio appear to have been detained at the NBI as of
February 16, 1982 by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order, although all of them were later bonded and
released on different dates, except Santos who has
remained in custody up to the present.
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo,
Desiderio, Estacio, Valentino and Santos, assisted by
their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his
stay at the NBI for about two months, his wife and children
would visit him every week and he could talk to them
freely.24 He was transferred to Muntinlupa and detained
at the Death Row for two years. On March 22, 1982,
Agent Ranin took his second statement that was a
continuation of his first statement. He was unable to read
his supplementary statement because of fear of Agent
Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed that the
statements he made before the NBI were not true and that
he only signed those documents because he was afraid
of Agent Ranin.
Petitioners assert that there was no proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes charged
principally because the extrajudicial confessions of
petitioner Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible in
evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said
confessions were executed;
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confessions cannot be
used as evidence
RULING: Relevant to petitioners’ contention on the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner
Estacio and Valentino is Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution providing for the rights of an accused during
custodial investigation. It reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence."
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel."
A comparison of these provisions would readily show that
the 1973 Constitution does not specify the right against
uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found
in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. However, the latter constitutional provision
cannot be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior
to its date of effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
this Court held that:
“x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution
requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to
counsel during custodial investigation must be made with
the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively
or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made
prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly,
waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the
1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have
been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive
ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this
Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the
guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that
‘(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.’
Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in
these cases as the extrajudicial confessions in question
here, were taken on February 13, February 17 and March
22, 1982, long before the date of promulgation of the
Morales Decision on April 26, 1983. Prior to this date, the
guidelines requiring that waiver of the right to counsel by
an accused can be properly made only with the presence
and assistance of counsel, had yet to be formulated and
pronounced by this Court.
People vs. Mendoza
G.R. No. 143702, September 13, 2001
FACTS: On July 7, 1994, at around 1:30 a.m., the victim
Hernandez Abatay and his companion Jose Neri
Tajanlangit were at the corner of Quezon and Ledesma
Streets in Iloilo City waiting for a jeepney to take them
home. They had just come from work at a supermarket.
Tajanlangit left Abatay to urinate nearby. He was about
15 feet away from Abatay when he saw accused-
appellant Zaldy Mendoza and a companion approach
Abatay. The two men robbed Abatay. Accused-
appellant’s companion held Abatay’s hands behind his
back while accused-appellant took Abatay’s wrist watch
and money. Accused-appellant then stabbed Abatay in
the abdomen. Abatay ran away but accused-appellant
pursued him. PO3 Tan then took accused-appellant to the
St. Paul’s
Hospital where Abatay was confined. In the presence of
Tan and some nurses and the attending physician in the
emergency room, Abatay pointed to accused-appellant as
one of those who had held him up and then stabbed him.
At that time, Abatay was in good condition and even
spoke with Tan. Tan then placed accused-appellant under
arrest
and took him to the police station for investigation.
Accused-appellant allegedly pointed to Marco Aguirre as
his companion when they held up Abatay. Accused was
convicted, and upon appeal, one of his arguments is that
the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St.
Paul’s Hospital that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed
Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-
appellant) was in custody.
ISSUE: W/N the confession made by the accused is
admissible as evidence.
RULING: Accused-appellant argues that the confession
he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Paul’s Hospital that
he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible
in evidence because it was given without the assistance
of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under
Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution,
because it was given under custodial investigation and
was made without the assistance of counsel. However,
the defense failed to object to its presentation during the
trial with the result that the defense is deemed to have
waived objection to its admissibility. No error was,
therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence
of the confession
 THE BURDEN OF PROVING VOLUNTARINESS OF WAIVERS IS
ON THE PROSECUTION
People vs. Bacor
G.R. No. 122895, April 30, 1999
FACTS: On March 17, 1991, at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, more or less, in barangay Señor, municipality of
Sinacaban, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforementioned accused with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously
attack, assault and shoot one DIONISIO ALBORES with
the use of a shotgun while the latter was inside his
dwelling, unaware, unarmed and defenseless, thereby
inflicting multiple gun shot wounds on different vital parts
of his body causing his [instantaneous] death. On June 6,
1991, appellant approached Jesus Bernido, Chief of the
Intelligence Section of the Sinacaban Police Station and
told the latter that he was the one responsible for the
killing of Dionisio Albores . In view thereof, Bernido asked
appellant what prompted him to surrender and appellant
told him that it was due to his
guilty conscience. Consequently, Bernido, accompanied
by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, Chief Investigator of the
Sinacaban Police Station, and two (2) other police escorts
brought appellant to the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in
Oroquieta City.
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1991, accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense demurred to the
evidence on the ground that accused’s extrajudicial
confession which is the only piece of evidence connecting
him to the commission of the murder, is inadmissible for
any purpose.
ISSUE: W/N the confession made by the accused is
admissible as evidence.
RULING: Accused-appellant claims that he gave the
confession without being warned of his constitutional
rights. This is not true. The record shows that he was
advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent,
not only once but thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam
Anggot of Public Attorney’s Office (PAO); second, by
SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took
accused-appellant’s confession; and lastly, by the branch
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City,
Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom accused-
appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each
time, he was asked whether he was willing to give a
statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary
to accusedappellant’s
contention, there is no need for a separate and express
written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-
appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the
authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he
was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily
executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the
presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after
having been informed of his constitutional rights,
accused-appellant effectively waived his right to remain
silent.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
People vs. Andan
G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997
FACTS: That on or about the 19th day of February 1994,
in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd design,
by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and
without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic)
the identity of the victim, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said
Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said
victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds which directly caused her death. The
police were able to identify the accused, and was brought
into their custody. In the presence of the mayor, the
police, representatives of the media and appellant’s own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed
how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness
from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying
he did it because of ill-feelings against them.
However, upon appeal, accused-appellant assailed the
admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor
and the news reporters because they were made during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: W/N the confession made by the accused is
admissible as evidence.
RULING: Plainly, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to
remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this
provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado
character of custodial interrogation or investigation also
obscures a later judicial determination of what really
transpired.
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are
accorded to “[a]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense.” An investigation begins when
it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with
an alleged offense. As intended by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, this covers “investigation
conducted by police authorities which will include
investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC
and the NBI and such other police agencies in our
government.”
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer
engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even
before the police found him at his parents’ house. This is
clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the
police chief investigator of the crime.
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999
FACTS: That on or about February 17, 1989, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, ARNOLD
PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then an Emergency
Laborer assigned as bag opener at the printed matters
section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking
advantage of his official position by having access to the
mail matters in conspiracy with accused RONNIE S.
ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals,
did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and
without the consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and
carry away from the Central Post Office of Makati one bag
containing assorted mail
matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the
aggregate amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the
amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the different addressee or the
government in the aforesaid mentioned amount.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in
the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative
and Investigative Staff and the people transacting
business with the NBI at that time. According to Director
Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to
identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated
from them.
ISSUE: W/N the letters signed by the accused during
custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
is admissible as evidence
RULING: To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in
Beltran is different from the use of petitioner’s signature in
this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the
specimen handwriting matched the handwriting in the
document alleged to have been falsified and thereby
show that the accused was the author of the crime
(falsification) while in this case the purpose for securing
the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely
to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from
him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and
petitioner’s signatures on the envelope, when coupled
with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the
envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him
and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of
petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of
admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused
under circumstances contemplated in Art. III, §§12(1) and
17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, petitioner and his co-accused signed following
their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial
investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the
rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice and if the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
 People vs. Janson
G.R. No. 125938, April 4, 2003
FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at
about 10:00 o’clock in the evening at Barangay Mateo,
Municipality of
Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-
named accused JOEL JANSON, RICKY PINANTAO alias
OGCO in company with alias ABDUL, alias PUTO, JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE, constituting a band and armed
with long and short firearms,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
and carry away, at gun point, cash money in
the amount of P1,400.00, three (3) pieces of wrist
watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken
and if converted into cash it
amounted to P1,845.00 or a total amount of Three
Thousand Two Hundred Fourty Five Pesos (P3,245.00),
Philippine Currency,
owned by Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA; and on the
same occasion, the above-named accused, with the use
of force, violence and intimidation and armed with
firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take turns in having carnal knowledge with one
MARITESS ALCANTARA, a girl about 13
years old, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO
ALCANTARA, against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of the aforesaid persons in the
aforesaid amount.
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared
that he was assisted by a lawyer when he was
investigated and made to sign a sworn statement before
the police on June 26, 1986. But he denied the accusation
against him and claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel during the custodial investigation. He claimed
that he did not know how to read or write, and that he was
made to execute a sworn statement before a certain
policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did
Atty. Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination,
he said that he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.
ISSUE: W/N the sworn statement is admissible as
evidence.
RULING: Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of
appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence.
The manner by which it was obtained violated accused’s
constitutional right to counsel. It is well-settled that the
Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or
admission and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy
the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing. The purpose of providing counsel to a
person under custodial investigation is to curb the
uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion
no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit
something false. What is sought to be avoided is the evil
of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission
of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute
and thereafter convict him. These constitutional
guarantees have been made available to protect him from
the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical,
atmosphere of such investigation.
VII. RIGHT TO BAIL
WHEN RIGHT MAY BE INVOKED
People vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007
FACTS: On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing
with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations
against the former President and the other respondents
therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of
plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant
of arrest for [Jinggoy] and his co-accused. On its basis,
[Jinggoy] and his co-accused were placed in custody of
the law.
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a “Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion” alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing
that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and
not in a “series or combination of overt or criminal acts”
as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right. [He] prayed that he be excluded from
the Amended Information …. In the alternative, [he] also
prayed that he be allowed to post bail.
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately
adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari
before this Court claiming that the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his right to post bail pending the resolution of the
Plunder case.
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the
Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail10
against which the prosecution filed its comment and
opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed
by the submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution11 of March 6, 2003,
respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted
the omnibus application for bail for ₱500,000.00.
Petitioner assailed the decision, hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N bail should be granted.
RULING: Even if the capital offense charged is bailable
owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right
to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of
escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the
assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago,
Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan,
seem to be a flight risk.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is
predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the
evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine
whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted.
Needless to stress, a grant of bail
does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft
Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence
after full trial on
the merits. As jurisprudence teaches: x x x Such
appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and
should not prevent the trial judge from making a final
assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is
not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person
granted bail is convicted in due course.
VALERIO VS CA
G.R. No. 164311-12 / 2007-10-10
FACTS: On march 18, 2000 at around 12:30 a.m Jun
Valerio, chief OF the Office OF the government corporate
counsel was shot and killed in front of his house at No. 82
Mapang-akit ST. Diliman Quezon City. An information for
murder was filled against Antonio E. Cabador, Martin M.
Jimenez, Samuel C. Baran and Geronimo S. Quinta, Who
shot the victim with an unlisenced .38 Caliber armscor
revolver, hitting him on different parts inflicting fatal
wounds that cause the immediate death.While
information of parricide was filed against the victim’s wife,
Milagroso F. Valerio who allegedly ordered them to shoot
Atty Jun Valerio for a consideration, promise or reward
and was also found to have relationship with Antonio
Cabador. Milagro Valerio filed and application for bail
claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not
strong. Which the RTC granted but denied the motion to
convert Samuel as stats witness. On March 5, 2002
Milagros posted bail bond furnished by Central Security
and Insurance Company, and was ordered release.
Meanwhile, Antonio Caborador was arrested. In his
Sworn statement he stated that it was Milagroso who
planned the murder and pleaded guilty to charge of
murder. Petitioners contended that Milagros is not entitled
to bail as the evidence of guilt against her is strong. Then
bank on the testimony OF Modesto Cabador, victim’s
cousin that he heard Milagros impatiently Ask Antonio
about Their plot to kill Jun Valerio. Petitioners also assert
that Antonio’s plea of guilty to the charge of conspiring
with Milagros in the murder of Jun Valerio indicated strong
evidence of guilt against Milagros. Herein petitioners,
Laarni N. Valerio, sister of the victim and the People of the
Philippines, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
ascribing grave abuse of description but Appellate court
found no abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milagros is entitled for bail
considering she was pointed Antonio Cabador as the
mastermind of the incident.
RULING: No Milagros is Not entitled to bail. Bail is not a
matter of right in cases where person is charged with
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
Perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, “No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the crimimal action”. In this
case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring Face that
the killer himself had confesses to the crime and has
implicated that Milagros as the mastermind. When Taken
in conjuction with the Other evidence on Record, these
facts show very strongly that Milagros may have
participated as principal by inducement in the murder of
Jun Valerio. It was this a grave Errol or a grave abide of
discretion Committee by the trial court to grant her
application for bail. The Appellate court clearly Committee
a reversible Errol affirming the trial court’s decision
granting bail to Milagros Valerio. WHEREFORE, the
instant consolidated petitions or GRANTED. The
assaulted Decisions dated April 28, 2004 and resolution
dated July 1, 2004 of the court of appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 71900 and 72132, affirming the subject resolution
dated February 26, 2002 and orders of the Regional trial
court of Quezon City,Branch 81, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
00-93291 and Q-00-93292, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
81 is directed to CANCEL the bail posted by accused
Milagros E. Valerio and to order her Immediate arrest and
Detention.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R NO. 179817/ 2008-06-27
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded resignation of the President and key official
dubbed as the “Oakwood Incident”. Later that day,
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring stats of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces so suppression
the rebellion. After series of negotiations, military soldiers
surrendered that evening. In the after math petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his
comrades, with coup d’etat before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. Close to foul years later, petitioner,
who has remained in detention won a seat in the senate
with Six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,2007.
Before the comencement of his term petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City l, Branch 148 an “Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Request” The Trial Court denial the
request in the Omnibus Motion.Hence the present petition
for certiorari to Set aside orders of the trial court and for
prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: whether or not Trillanes’ election as a senator
provides legal justification to allow him the application of
Bail.
RULING: Petition is bereft of merit The Court of Appeals
exercised its discretion in denying petitioners application
for bail pending Appeal. He was considered a high Risk
for flight by not attending several hearings before the
RTC. Also He did not inform his transferred of residence
hence bail is not allowed. xxx Alowing accused-Appellant
to attend congressional sessions and Committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week Will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special
Class, it also would be a mockery of the purpose of the
correction system.xxx WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED SO ORDERED.
QUI VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO 196161/ 2012-09-26
FACTS: On December 1999, Quezon City, Philippines.
Petitioner feloniously committed acts of cruelty, and Child
abuse upon Christian John Ignacio, 8 years old. Thus
petitioner Cyril Calpito Qui was charged with two (2)
counts of violation of RA 7610 of Special Protection of
Children Agiants Child Abuse, Exploitaion and
Discrimination Act before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 94 Quezon City. And on June 18, 2010 petitioner
was convicted as charged and sentenced to two equal
periods of imprisonment. On July 2010 petitioner filed
before the Appellate court an Urgent Petition/ Application
for Bail which the OSG urged to deny on the ground of
petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is a
flight risk, as she failed to attend several hearings before
the RTC resulting the issuance of three (3) warrants for
her arrest. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
application for bail, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail
pending trial
RULING: Petition is Bereft of Merit. The CA properly
exercised its discretion in denying petitioner’s application
for bail pending trial on the ground that she is a flight risk,
a bail-negating Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114. The CA’s
determination is not without factual mooring. The
undisputed fact that petitioner did not attend hearing
before the RTC is undeniable indicative of petitioner’s
propensity to trifle with court processes and shoulder
weight heavily against grant of bail pending trial.
Moreover, petitioners penchant to disobey court
processes is also deduced from the fact that she lied in
order to justify her Non-appearance on March 8, 2010
hearing before the RTC. Said her father was hospitalized
and died days later when in fact her father died a year
ago. And her transfer of residence without informing her
bondsman and the trial court can be viewed inclination to
evade court appearance. Also her argument that she has
the Constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of
guilt against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after
one is convicted by trial court, the presumption of
innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, End
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
 WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT, WHEN IT IS A MATTER
OF DISCRETION
GACAL VS JUDGE INFANTE
A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1845/ 2011-10-05
FACTS: Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private Prosecutor for
murder arising from the kiling of Felomino O. Occasion,
charges Judge Jaime I. Infante, presiding Judge of
Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Criminal case was raffled
for arraignment and trial, with gross ignorance of the law,
gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for the latter’s
failure to Set a hearing before granting bail to the accused
and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail.
Judge infante would excuse himself from blame and
responsibility by insisting that the hearing was no ko her
necessary considering that the accused had not filed a
petition for bail; in that much as no application for bail had
been filed my the accused, his taon orders of April 23,
2003 where not orders granting an application for bail, but
were instead his approval of the bail bond posted;and that
Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion and Other motions and
written submission lacked the requisites written
conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them null
and void.
ISSUE: whether or not grant of bail by the respondent
Judge is valid.
RULING: The court rules in the negative. In the light of
the foregoing facts, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct
a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was
inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and
the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement.
He well knew that the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial
discretion. And that the discretion lay not in the
determination whether or not a hearing shoulder be held,
but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
Prosecutor’s evidence of guilt against the accused. His
fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the
absence of petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the
requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whom and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
A. BAIL IN MILITARY COURTS
COMENDADOR VS DE VILLA
G.R. NO. 93177/ 1991-08-02
FACTS: Private respondent in this case is involve in a
consolidated case of officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for alleged failed
participation in the failed coup d’etat on December 1-9,
1989. Charges against them include Mutiny, conduct of
unbecomming an officer and a gentlemen, and various
crimes in relation to murder. In the pre trial investigation
(PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the
petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavit of their
witnesses. All were move to delay and the petitioners
contended that there was no pre-trial investigation done.
Jacinto Ligot applied for bail but was denied by GCM no.
14. The RTC granted him provisional Liberty but He was
not released immediately, then RTC ruled that the right to
bail covers military men facing court-martial proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the AFP personnel are entitled to
bail?
RULING: No Supreme held that the right to bail invoked
by the petitioner has traditionally not been recognized and
is not available in the military, as an exception to the
General rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
ASWAT VS GALIDO
G.R. NO. 88555/ 1991-11-12
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B.
Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) respectively holding the ranks
Private First Class and Corporation. Both assigned to the
SOLCOM . Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier
General Galido’s rest house while Nebres was assigned
as personal driver of Brigadier General Galido’s wife. On
december 1988 both was involved in a Shooting incident
at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted to the
death of Nebres. Thereafter, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered to Baguio City police authorities and was
briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until He was
transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on December
1988. On April 20 1989 He was charged before a
SOLCOM General Court Martial with violaytion of Article
94 of the Articles of War, the specification being homicide.
Petitioner filed an instant petition contending that He is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuing
to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not peritioner is entitled to right to bail.
RULING: No petitioner is not entitled to bail The
justification for this exception was well explained by the
Solicitor General as follows: ‘The unique structure of the
military shoulder be enough reason to exempt military
men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that
mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of the
democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are pair out of the
revenues collected from the people. All Other insurgent
elements carry out their activities outside of and against
the existing political system’. xxx xxx xxx The argument
that denial from the military of the right to bail would
violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This
guarantee requires equal treatment only to persona or
things similarly situated and does not apply where the
subject of the treatment is substantially different from
others. They cannot say that they have been
discriminated because they are not allowed the same
right that is extended to civilians. ACCORDINGLY, the
Court revolves to DISMISS the petition for lack of Merit.
SO ORDERED.
STANDARDS FOR FIXING BAIL
VILLASENOR VS ABANO
(G.R. No. L-23599) 1967
FACTS: Reynaldo Villasenor was charge with the murder
of Boac police sergeant Alfonso Madla. He was admitted
a P60K bail which was later on reduced to P40k.
Petitioner posted a property bond, was set at provisional
liberty. However the court further required that the
persons who can only post the property bond should be
residents of Marinduque actually staying therein which
must be in the possession and ownership of the said
resident for 5 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bond requirement is
excessive?
RULING: NO. It does not transgress the excessive bail
prohibition. The respondent Judge reasons out that it has
been his experience that “it is hard to send notices to
people outside the province.” The posture taken by
respondent judge does not offend the good sense of
justice. Bail is given to secure appearance of the accused.
If bondsmen reside in faraway places, even if within
Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There
is insufficiency of the mails as an effective means of
communication. And then, there is the problem of
complying with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial.
If notice to sureties is not served, no trial can be had.
DE LA CAMARA VS ENAGE
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
FACTS: Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal
Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on
November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of
fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur,
on August 21, 1968. Then on January 14, 1969, came an
application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court,
premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to
link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order
granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that
there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove
that petitioner would flee even if he had the
opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the
excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder
and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated
murder. Then came the allegation that on August 12,
1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos,
upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is
excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either
in cash or property, would be reasonable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bail was excessive
RULING: Yes. Before conviction, every person is bailable
except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence
of guilt is strong. It is not beyond the realm of probability,
however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make
himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case.
A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would
be thwarted. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it
should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the
right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be
clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of
August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder,
there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for
the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there
being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional
provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not
possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for
murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case
that the Department of Justice did recommend the total
sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. There is an
attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what,
on its face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged
reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano.9 The guidelines in the
fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of
Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to
give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the
offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused
appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether
the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did
ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of
the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court
called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress,
however, that where conditions imposed upon a
defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof
and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will
not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide
the required remedy. In the same breath that he was told
he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required
could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond
his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were
informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of.
YAP JR. VS CA
(G.R No. 141529, June 6, 2001)
FACTS: Francisco yap was convicted of estafa for
misappropriating money in the amount of P5.5 million.
Then after, he filed for bail and was granted fixing the
same in the amount similar to that of his civil liability which
is P5.5 miliion. He also contested the condition imposed
by the court that he secure a certification/guaranty to
travel abroad, violates his right to travel.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the proposed bail of P5.5
Million was violative of petitioner’s right against excessive
bail? (2) Whether or not the condition imposed by the
court is violative of his liberty of abode and right to travel?
RULING: (1) Yes. The court find the amount of P5.5
million to be unreasonable, excessive and constitutes an
effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose of
the bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused in
the trial. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose. To fix
bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability is to permit
the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction
of the civil liability that accuse is charged of; this we
cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgement of the appellate
court.
(2) No. The right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines, being invoked by petitioner are not absolute
rights. The court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is s
necessary consequence of the nature and function of bail
bond. If accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
RIGHT TO BAIL AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD
MANOTOC JR. VS COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-62100, May 30 1986)
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with estafa. Then he
posted bail. Petitioner wanted to go abroad, so he filed a
motion before the trial court stating as ground therefor his
desire to go to the United States relative to his business
transactions and opportunities. The prosecution opposed
the said motion and after due hearing, the same was
denied. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to
bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted
him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right
to travel.
ISSUE: Whether or not there petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel has been violated?
RULING: No. A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending trial,
and at the same time, to put the accused as much under
the power of the court as if he were in custody of the
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him.
Manotoc failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate
court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as
well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel.
 SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ
(G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993)
FACTS: An information was filed against petitioner
Santiago for the violation of Anti-Graft and corrupt
practices act. Petitioner posted bail but later on asked for
the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan
deffered it. The latter issued a hold departure order
against Santiago by reason of the announcement she
made that she would be leaving for the U.S to accept a
fellowship in Harvard. Hence, a motion was submitted
before the Supreme Court she argues that her right to
travel is impaired.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of Petitioner’s
right to travel?
RULING: No. The hold departure order is but an exercise
of the court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain
the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused. Under the obligations assumed by
the petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable
at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she
may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during
the pendency of the case.
SILVERIO VS COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 94284, APRIL 8, 1991)
FACTS: Ricardo Silverio was charged with violation of
section 20 (4) of the revised Securities Act. He then
posted bail for his provisional liberty. After more than two
years after the filing of the information, respondent people
of the Philippines filed a motion to cancel the passport of
and to issue a hold departure order against accused on
the ground that he had gone abroad several times without
the necessary court approval resulting in postponement
of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Thereafter, RTC issued an order directing the Department
of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to
deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent petitioner from leaving the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an impairment of
petitioner’s right to travel?
RULING: No. Bail is the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any
court when so required by the Court or the Rules. The
foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to
travel.
Holding an accused in criminal case within the reach of
the courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on
his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their
best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with
an accused holding himself amenable at all times to court
orders and processes.
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL
PEOPLE VS DONATO
(G.R No. 79269, June 5, 1991)
FACTS: Private respondent Rodolfo Salas and his co-
accused were charged of rebellion. The former filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed because respondent
is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending
Art. 135 of the RPC. However the PD’s were repealed and
thus restoring Art. 135 of the RPC. Judge Donato now
granted the bail which was fixed at P30K but was
increased to P50K and imposed a condition that he shall
report to court once every two months within the first ten
days of every period. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail
considering the inevitable probability that the accused will
not comply with the condition.
A petition for habeas corpus for private respondent and
his co-accused was filed but was dismissed on the basis
of the agreement of the parties under which herein private
respondent Salas “will remain in legal custody and will
face trial before the court having custody over his person”
and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are
deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released
but shall submit themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person.
Issues: (1) Whether or not private respondent has the
right to bail? (2) Whether or not Accused validly waived
such right?
RULING: (1) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Bail is a
matter of right in this case since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefor prosecution has no right to present
evidence. It is only when capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for Judge
Donato to change the amount of bail from 30K TO 50K
without hearing the prosecution.
(2) Yes. In this case, accused validly waived his right to
bail. The agreement that herein private respondent will
remain in actual physical custody of the court as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-
accused, who were to be released in view of the recall of
the warrants of arrest against them. The stipulation that
only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Conception shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that herein
private respondent shall remain in custody of the law or
detention or confinement. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of law. Hence, there was a
waiver of his right. Right to bail is one of the constitutional
rights that can be waived. It is a right which is personal to
the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
LARDIZABAL v. REYES
FACTS:
On October 25, 1993, a minor named Cynthia L.
Lardizabal, through Atty Luis L. Lardizabal filed a
complaint with ignorance of the law resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice against Judge Oscar A. Reyes.
The complaint alleges that on September 1, 1993 that
complainant filed a criminal complaint for rape.
Respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of
the accused, but at the same time, motu proprio, fixed the
bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without
any application on the part of the accused to be admitted
to bail and without conducting any hearing thereon. The
accused then filed a motion to reduce bail from
P80,000.00 to P20,000.00, respondent judge, again,
without prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to
P40,000.00
ISSUE: W/N Judge Reyes’ fixing and granting bail motu
proprio proper
RULING:
The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with
a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua, bail
may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has
been filed and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to
determine whether the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is
strong.—The Court does not accept as satisfactory
respondent’s explanation that good faith urged him to fix
and grant bail motu proprio for the provisional release of
the accused charged with rape. By so doing, he acted
irregularly, thereby depriving the prosecution of an
opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. The
rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a
serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua, such
as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing
thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not
the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is strong. Respondent
could not have arrived at a fair conclusion that the
evidence was not strong enough to deny bail to the
accused when the prosecution had not been heard on the
matter. Respondent’s unjustified haste in granting bail
and thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both
instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution,
speaks poorly of his competence in applying the law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
PEOPLE v. PANES
FACTS:
The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another to better realize their
purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver
respectively, with treachery and/or evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
assault, attack, stab and shut Nicanor Tamorite with the
knife and .38 caliber revolver with which they were then
provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab
wounds and gun \shot wounds on the different parts of his
body which caused his death immediately thereafter.
The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional
liberty of the accused. The trial court issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused. the accused filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed by the prosecution.
The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail.
Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any
stage of the trial and the trial court rendered judgment and
convicted both the accuse guilty of the crime.
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure
(a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of
relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that
Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful
aggression.The appeal has no merit. The trial court did
not err in finding appellants guilty of murder.
ISSUE: W/N both the accused should be granted the right
to bail?
RULING:
Under the law, in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no
right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court
must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny
bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail
and have the court hear his application summarily and
promptly, such right may be waived expressly or
impliedly.
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case
without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial
court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in
the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to
bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest
opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived
their right to bail.
What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by
the conviction of the accused. When an accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and
evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is
neither a matter of right nor of discretion. Thus, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
VIII. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
SCOPE
In Re: Sabio
FACTS:
Years back, Pres. Cor. Aquino issued a EO no. 1 creating
the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). It is entrusted to them to recover the ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.
As provided by Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1: "No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.
Senator Santiago introduced a resolution “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and Philcomsat
Holdings due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors”.
With this, the PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio was invited
by the Senate to be one of its resource persons.
However, Chairman Sabio declined, invoking Section 4
(b) of EO No. 1. Another notice was sent to Sabio
requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject
matter but the same did not comply. Sabio again sent a
letter reiterating his position.
Hence, this prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order
requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners Abcede,
Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should
not be cited in contempt of the Senate.
ISSUE: The merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before
respondent Senate Committees is justified
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants
the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House
of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.
Furthermore, the respondents have not violated any civil
right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to
privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth,
the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into
justiciable controversies. One important limitation on the
Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." This is just another way of saying that the
power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed
by the Constitution on government action."
As to Right to incrimination;
It must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by
the said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation only when the incriminating question is being
asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the
nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them."
That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no
ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their
power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power
is abused, such issue may be presented before the
courts. At this juncture, what is important is that
respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to
guide them when the right against self-incrimination is
invoked.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them
in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent
legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every
citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity
of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully
with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation.
 SJS vs DDB
FACTS:
Three consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality
of Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses.
The mandatory drug testing imposes an additional
qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided
by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution
authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g)
are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal
protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or
employee deemed undesirable. The constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers
maintains that said provision should be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for
being contrary to the due process and equal
protection guarantees.
ISSUE: Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution
RULING:
YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates
for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify
these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,
or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by
the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with
like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and,
if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution
add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in
the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
 IN WHAT PROCEEDINGS AVAILABLE
Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners
FACTS:
An administrative case was filed against Pascual Jr.
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton.
It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case7 for alleged immorality, counsel for
complainants announced that he would present as his first
witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the
respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself.
The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but
scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in
the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority.
Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court
ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against
the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further
proceeding with such an administrative case and to await
the judicial disposition of the matter.
With this, a decision was rendered by the lower court
finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act
and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself."
ISSUE: Whether a medical practitioner charged with
malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against
himself.
RULING:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the
license to practice medicine while administrative in
character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An
unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the
license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to
right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused
while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to
remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when
called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is
that the right against self incrimination, along with the
other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that
while a crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive
to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality.
Galman vs Pamaran
FACTS:
Years back Sen. Aquino was killed inside the premises of
the Manila International Airport (now NAIA).
With this, to investigate the death of the Senator and his
suspected gunman, PD 1886 was promulgated creating
an ad hoc Fact Finding Board or the Agrava Board.
Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and
produced evidence before the Board were the private
respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General
Prospero Olivas,Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas
Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio,
Sgt.Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
These Private respondents were charged as accessories
for killing the said senator and gunman (GALMAN).
During their court trial, the prosecution offered in evidence
their individuals testimonies before the Agrava Court.
In return, the private respondents, in a Motion to Exclude
Evidence, objected to the admission of said exhibits
contending that its admission will be in derogation of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative
of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies made by the
private respondent before the Board is immune from
prosecution by the virtue of their right against self-
incrimination that is granted by PD 1886.
RULING:
No. PD1886 merely grants immunity from use of any
statement that was given before the board, but not from
prosecution. Merely testifying and producing evidence do
not render the witness immune from prosecution
notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against
him of such statement and nothing more.
 In Re Sabio

“USE IMMUNITY” VS. “TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY”

FACTS:
A. USE AND FRUIT IMMUNITY

Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon Galman vs Pamaran

requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on FACTS:
Government Corporations and Public
Years back Sen. Aquino was killed inside the premises of
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
the Manila International Airport (now NAIA).

With this, to investigate the death of the Senator and his

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b)
of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall
be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits
power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding.
suspected gunman, PD 1886 was promulgated creating
an ad hoc Fact Finding Board or the Agrava Board.
Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and
produced evidence before the Board were the private
respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General
Prospero Olivas,Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas
Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio,
Sgt.Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
These Private respondents were charged as accessories
for killing the said senator and gunman (GALMAN).
During their court trial, the prosecution offered in evidence
their individuals testimonies before the Agrava Court.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 In return, the private respondents, in a Motion to Exclude
Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Evidence, objected to the admission of said exhibits
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any contending that its admission will be in derogation of their
of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative
conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886.
means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative functions are
also available to the committees. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies made by the
private respondent before the Board is immune from
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has
prosecution by the virtue of their right against self-
gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
incrimination that is granted by PD 1886.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section
4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from RULING:
the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’
No. PD1886 merely grants immunity from use of any
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything
statement that was given before the board, but not from
that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
prosecution. Merely testifying and producing evidence do
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
not render the witness immune from prosecution
extends “to government agencies created by Congress
notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-
and officers whose positions are within the power of
incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against
Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to
him of such statement and nothing more.
this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is

not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution
or its basic principles.
 IX. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed.

Dimarucot vs People
FACTS:
Petitioner is the accused in a criminal case for Frustrated
Murder in the Regional TrialCourt of Malolos, Bulacan.
Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner
thru his counsel de parte requested and was granted
additional period of twenty (20) days within which to fileaid
brief. This was followed by three (3) successive motions
for extension which were all granted by the Court of
Appeals.
The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for the
accused-appellant failed to file his appellants brief within
the reglementary period which expired.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, his counsel
admitting that he was at fault in failing the appellants brief
due to personal problems emanating from his counsel’s
wife recent surgical operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention is valid
RULING:
No. It is not valid.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was
served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his
appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file
appellant's brief. The purpose of such a notice is to give
an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any,
why the appeal should not be dismissed because of such
failure, in order that the appellate court may determine
whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.
Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and
negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal
problems and emotional depression. The negligence and
mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. There are
exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law, or when the application of the general rule results
in the outright deprivation of one's property or liberty
through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no
reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule.
The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and
ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of
excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more
vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel
with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner
continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal
and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of
moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the
rules for reason of petitioner's age and medical condition.
Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also
from their clients

As stated in Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to

prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the
appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by
this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a
counsel de oficio.

It is clear under the foregoing provision that a criminal

case may be dismissed by the CA motu proprio and with
notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief
within the prescribed time. The phrase "with notice to the
appellant" means that a notice must first be furnished the
 Angeles vs Sempio-diy
FACTS:
Judge Sempio-Dy is the judge in criminal cases file by
Judge Angeles.
Complainant Judge Angeles filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment and dismissal from judiciary
service against respondent Judge Sempio Diy which
stemmed from consolidated criminal case that filed.
Judge Angeles further alleges that she was the private
complainant in the above-mentioned cases which by
order of respondent judge were submitted for decision
and set for promulgation. However, said rendering of
decision and promulgation of judgment incur delay after a
lapse of 90 days and six (6) months, respectively, from
the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was
promulgated.
In return, Respondent judge belies to the accusations
hurled at her by complainant. The former counters that
she decided subject cases in due time and within the
extended period granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Judge Dy be punished for the delay
RULING:
No. Upon investigation, OCA found that Judge Sempio
Diy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in
rendering the Joint Decision in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-
61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably-filed
requests for extension of time. The requests were all
granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008
Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of
ninety (90) days from September 18, 2008. The OCA,
however, opined that respondent should be
administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the
resolution of accused Carino’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Sempio Diy claims that the delay in
submitting accused’s motion for reconsideration was due
to inadvertence and without bad faith on her part. She
explains that she opted to wait for the defence to file its
reply to the prosecution’s comment on the motion for
reconsideration because the offense of which accused
was convicted was serious and his liberty was at stake.
She adds that the death threats she and the members of
her judicial staff received from May to July 2009, caused
them disorientation and contributed further to the delay in
the resolution of the subject motion.
A judge ought to know the cases submitted to her for
decision or resolution and is expected to keep her own
record of cases so that she may act on them promptly. It
is incumbent upon her to devise an efficient recording and
filing system in her court so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition.
Proper and efficient court management is as much her
responsibility. She is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of her official functions.
The Court reminds the respondent of her duty to closely
supervise and monitor the monthly docket inventories to
forestall future occurrences of this nature. The petition
was admonished.
Raymundo vs Andoy
FACTS:
The complainant, Cirila Raymundo, sometime in 2000,
filed six counts of violation of BP Blg 22 against
Hermelinda Chang before the MTC of Cainta, Rizal to the
respondent judge presided over the court.
In time, after the trial ended the complainant filed with the
MTC an urgent ex parte motion to render decision. And
almost two years again, on March 12, 2008, the
complainant filed another ex parte motion to render
decision. The respondent judge did not act on these
motions on the reason of the heavy case on the part of
the Judge.
In the findings of the OCA: The OCA explained that while
the Court is not unaware of the heavy caseload of judges,
nothing in the records shows that the respondent judge
asked for an extension of time to decide the subject
criminal cases. In addition, the respondent judge failed to
consider that the subject cases required a quicker
resolution as they were covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of
the charges against him
RULING:
Yes. As the Court discussed, it was clear that the
respondent judge failed to observe the mandated period
of time to decide cases under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Following Section 17 of this Rule, he should
have rendered a decision within 30 days from the
termination of trial on August 4, 2004. Even assuming that
the subsequent resettings of the cases for trial were valid,
he should have rendered a decision within 30 days from
October 12, 2005, or the date the cases were finally
considered submitted for decision. His failure to meet this
deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into
account and had disregarded the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed
before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within
90 days from the time the case is submitted for decision.
Failure to comply with the mandated period constitutes a
serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
a speedy disposition of their cases a lapse that
undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As correctly pointed out by the OCA, while the
respondent judge attributed his failure to render a
decision to the heavy caseload in his sala, he did not ask
for an extension of time to decide the cases. This failure
to decide within the required period, given that he could
have asked for an extension, is inexcusable; it constitutes
neglect of duty as well as gross inefficiency that
collectively warrant administrative sanction.
X. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE
WHAT ACTS CANNOT BE CRIMINALIZED
A. DEBTS AND CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 (1986)
FACTS:
The subject petitions arose from cases involving
prosecution of offenses under BP 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law. The defendants in these cases moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed
the case.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and
issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue of insufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment."
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any
person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of 90 days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge"
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover
the check upon its presentment.
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22,
the most serious is the alleged conflict between the
statute and the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute
runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which
states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax."
ISSUE: Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt?
RULING: No.
The Court held that BP 22 does not conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature
that as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. Organic
provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were
intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for
liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition
was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex
delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein
do not arise from any contract entered into between the
parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong
he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to
fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal
proceedings as punishments for crime
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation.
PEOPLE vs. NITAFAN 202 SCRA 726 (1992)
FACTS:
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before
respondent court with violation of B.P. 22 in an
Information alleging that he made or draw and issued to
Fatima Cortez Sasaki a Philippine Trust Company Check
dated February 9, 1985 in the amount of P143,000 well-
knowing that at that time, he did not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank. The check was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Fatima
Cortez Sasaki the amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
Private respondent moved to quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a
felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check
he issued was a memorandum check which was in the
nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of a worthless memorandum
check is punishable?
RULING: Yes
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check,
with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written
across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer
engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without
any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check
is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although
may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect
as an ordinary check, and if passed to a third person, will
be valid in his hands like any other check.
From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum
check, which is in the form of an ordinary check, is still
drawn on a bank and should therefore be distinguished
from a promissory note, which is but a mere promise to
pay. In the business community, a promissory note,
certainly, has less impact and persuadability than a check
A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit
of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but merely provides
that "any person who makes or draws and issues any
check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bankwhich
check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by
imprisonment. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally
accepted by the bank. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as
an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.
Thus, a memorandum check is still covered under BP 22
and can still be prosecuted for violation of the bouncing
checks law.
VERGARA vs. GEDORIO 402 SCRA 520 (2003)
FACTS:
Petitioners are tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property
in Paranaque City. In 2001, they were arrested by
authority of a warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion
filed by Eleuteria P. Bolaño, as Special Administratrix of
the estate of late Anselma P. Allers, praying that
petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not
complying with probate court's order directing them to pay
their monthly rentals to respondent Bolaño
Pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Anselma P. Allers, respondent Bolaño included the said
property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of
the estate. The probate court ordered that Taripe’s
lessees and listed in the
Inventory to pay their respective monthly rental regularly
starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears if
any, to the duly appointed Special Administratrix Mrs.
Eleuteria P. Bolaño.
Some of the petitioners, together with the other tenants of
the property, informed the probate court that they are
"freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a quandary
as to whom to pay the rentals.

Bolaño then filed a motion to cite Vergara, et. al. in
contempt. The probate court found Vergara, et. al. guilty
of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of
P30,000 each and to undergo imprisonment until they
comply with the probate court's order for them to pay
rentals. Vergara et. al. wrote the probate court to withdraw
the “indirect contempt” and stated that their failure to
attend the hearing was due to financial constraints, most
of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum
wages, and repeated that the reason why they are
freezing the monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as
to whom to remit it.
ISSUE: Whether imprisonment due to non-payment of
rentals, made in contravention of the trial court’s order, is
within the purview of the right against imprisonment from
debt?
RULING: No.
Imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for
civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means
fail, but the court's power to order the contemnor's
detension continues so long as the contumacy persists.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person
shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of
a contract, express or implied.
In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of
the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate
court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners
did not comply with the order for the principal reason that
they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to
pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe
who had originally leased the subject property to them.
Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the
constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
B. ACTS WHICH WHEN DONE WERE INNOCENT
(EX POST FACTO LAWS)
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI 35 SCRA 429 (1970)
FACTS:
A petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc. claiming to be duly recognized as an existing
non-stock and non-profit corporation. It also prayed for the
determination of the validity of Section 8 of R.A. 6132
which prohibits any candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention to allow himself to be
represented as being a candidate of any political party or
any other organization or organized group of whatever
nature.
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc avers that it has printed materials
designed to propagate its ideology and program of
government and that it intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention
who will propagate the same ideology.
According to the group, RA 6132 violates due process,
right of association, and freedom of expression. It also
claims that the act is in the nature of an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: WON the challenged provision constitutes an ex
post facto law?
RULING: No. An ex post facto law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of
ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only
to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any
provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof,
the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision
thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval.
On the contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall
be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August
24, 1970.
Side ISSUE: Sec. 8 of R.A. 6132 not violative of due
process, right of association and freedom of expression.
R.A. 6132 is designed to prevent the clear and present
danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the
prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
SALVADOR vs. MAPA 539 SCRA 37 (2007)
FACTS:
Fidel Ramos issued A.O. 13 which created the Ad Hoc
Fact Finding committee on behest loans. A loan
transaction between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA),
now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) were referred
to the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding-Committee for
investigation as being a behest loan. Subsequently,
Memorandum Order No. 61 was issued to define criteria
in determining behest loans.
A behest loan is under-collateralized, the borrower
corporation is undercapitalized, direct or indirect
endorsement by high government officials like presence
of marginal notes, use of corporate layering, extraordinary
speed in which the loan release was made, stockholders,
officers or agents of the borrower corporation are
identified as cronies, among others.
After examination of the loan transactions, the Committee
determined that it is a behest loan because the
stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of
then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-
collateralized; and that the PEMI was undercapitalized at
the time the loan was granted.
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding
Committee, and representing the PCGG,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A.3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr. et al.
After considering the Committee's allegation, the
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint complaint holding
that the offenses charged had already prescribed and that
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 are ex post facto laws. According to it, the said orders
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for
ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a person for an act
done prior to their issuance and which was innocent when
done.
ISSUE: WON AO 13 is an ex post facto law?
RULING: No. An ex post facto law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
Orders issued are not ex post facto laws (only for penal
laws). The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post
facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal
laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders
clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition.
Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and
provides for its composition and functions. It does not
mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of
reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal
laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto
laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to
rule that the subject administrative and memorandum
orders are ex post facto.
Side ISSUE: The offense charged under R.A. 3019 has
not prescribed. Since the prescriptive period commenced
to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and
since discovery could not have been made earlier than
October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was
created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the
respondents had not yet prescribed when the complaint
was filed on October 4, 1996.
PEOPLE vs. CASTA 565 SCRA 341 (2008)
FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC
with the crime of murder by inflicting upon Danilo Camba
the injuries using a knife which caused the latter’s
instantaneous death. The appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charge upon arraignment. However, at the police
station, the appellant confessed to the killing of Danilo
after being informed of his constitutional rights and in the
presence of counsel.
The RTC convicted the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
The Information indicates that the crime was committed
on August 20, 1989 which was before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 amending
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code on murder, raising
the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death. Prior to its
amendment the penalty for the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death.
In light of the greater penalty that attaches under the
amendment, the previous penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death will have to be imposed in
order not to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed will be based on RA
7659
RULING: The punishment for his acts must be based on
the law applicable during the time he killed the victim in
1993. He cannot be prosecuted for the new law under
1998 because it provides greater penalty.
Under Section 22 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no
ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. An
ex post facto law, among others, is one that changes the
penalty and inflicts a greater punishment than what the
law annexed to the crime when committed - the situation
that would obtain if the amendment under RA 7659 would
be applied.
Considering that the appellant has in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender with no
aggravating circumstance to offset it, he was sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as maximum.
 NASI-VILLAR vs. PEOPLE 571 SCRA 202 (2008)
FACTS:
This case originated from an Information for Illegal
Recruitment as defined under Sections 6 and 7 of R.A.
8042 filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Davao del Sur on 5 October 1998 for acts committed by
petitioner and one Dolores Placa in January 1993. The
aforenamed accused recruited Nila Panilag for
employment abroad and demanded and received the
amount of P6,500 as placement fee, the said accused
being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to engage
in the recruitment of workers abroad.
The RTC hereby finds accused Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment and
based on the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as
amended, said accused is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 YEARS as minimum
to 5 YEARS as maximum. The CA declared that petitioner
should be charged under Art. 13(b) of Labor Code and not
under R.A. 8042 since said law was approved on 7 June
1995 and took effect on 15 July 1995.
Petitioner alleged that CA erred in failing to consider that
R.A. 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the
decision of RTC constitutes a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law.
Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in January 1993
when the crime was allegedly committed, petitioner
argues that law cannot be used as the basis of filing a
criminal action for illegal recruitment. What was applicable
in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in relation
to Art. 39, the violation of the Code is penalized with
imprisonment of not less than 4 years nor more than 8
years or a fine of not less than P20,000 and not more than
P100,000 or both. On the other hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A.
No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day but not
more than 12 years and a fine not less than P200,000 nor
more than P500,000. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment
provided in the Labor Code was increased by R.A. 8042.
Petitioner concludes that the charge and conviction of an
offense carrying a penalty higher than that provided by the
law at the time of its commission constitutes a violation of
the prohibition against ex post facto law and the
retroactive application of R.A. 8042.
ISSUE: WON RA 8042 is an ex post facto law?
RULING: No.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under
the law in force at the time of its commission. Thus, she
was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under R.A. 8042.
There is neither violation of the prohibition against ex post
facto law nor a retroactive application of R.A. 8042, as
alleged by petitioner. An ex post facto law is one which,
among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed or changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed. Penal laws and laws which,
while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions
defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be
given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable
to the accused.
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code and gave a new definition of the crime of illegal
recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is
no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the
penalties provided therein, would take effect retroactively.
A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it
operates prospectively since its strictures would cover
only offenses committed after and not before its
enactment.
(BILL OF ATTAINDER)
PEOPLE vs. FERRER 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano
Co on the alleged that he became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow
the Government of the Philippines by means of force,
violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means
for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training
school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military
arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. Co
moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five
others with subversion on the alleged that the above-
named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
organized, joined and/or remained as officers and/or
ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a
subversive organization. Tayag moved to quash,
impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that
(1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the title; and (4)
it denies him equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
RULING: Yes.
Article III, Section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of
a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making.
In this case, the Anti-Subversion Act Was condemned as
a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the
Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing
menace to the freedom and security of the country; its
existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the
security of the Philippines.' However, the Court held that
the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The "Communist Party of the Philippines" is
used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act
applies not only to Communist Party of the Philippines but
also to "any other organization having the same purpose
and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but
on conduct.
REPUBLIC vs. RMDC 426 SCRA 517 (2004)
FACTS:
Petitioners, after having been granted permission to
prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-
Bato in Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble
deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in
Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range. They applied with the Bureau of Mines,
now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of
the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.
The Mines and Geosciences Bureau granted a license to
exploit marble deposits. Subsequently, Maceda through
Proclamation No. 84, unilaterally cancelled such license
because it violated Section 69 of PD 463. The latter
reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation
No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be
served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded
by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land
as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park. The RTC held
that said proclamation was an ex post facto law as it
automatically cancelled the license without trial.
ISSUE: WON the Constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto law applies to Proclamation No. 84?
RULING:
The Court did not sustain the argument that Proclamation
No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a "legislative act which
inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Neither is the
cancellation of the license a punishment within the
purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of
attainder. There is no merit in the argument that the
proclamation is an ex post facto law. There are six
recognized instances when a law is considered as such:
1) it criminalizes and punishes an action that was
done before the passing of the law and that was innocent
when it was done;
2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it
was when it was committed;
3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is
greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed;
4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes
conviction upon a less or different testimony than that
required by law at the time of commission of offense;
5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a
deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that
was considered lawful when it was done; and
6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he or she become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or
the proclamation of an amnesty.
Proclamation No. 84 does not fall under any of the
enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto
law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its
scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84,
which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-
na-Bato national park by cancelling respondents' license,
is not penal in nature.
WHAT PUNISHMENTS CANNOT BE IMPOSED
A. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
SARMIENTO vs. TUICO 162 SCRA 676 (1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the
services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig
ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly
carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises. As a
result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on May 26, 1986,
claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor
practice. The conciliatory conference failed to settle the
dispute.
Noting that the impending strike would prejudice the
national interest as well as the welfare of some 350
workers and their families, the Ministry of Labor and
Employment issued an order certifying the labor dispute
to the NLRC and it enjoined the management from lacking
out its employees and the union from declaring a strike or
similar concerted
action. The MOLE issued a return-to-work order and that
the union and the striking workers should return to work
immediately to resume operations. Meantime, the
defendants were charged with staging an illegal strike,
barricading the gates of the ATC plant and preventing the
workers through intimidation, harassment and force from
reporting for work.
ISSUE: WON a return-to-work order may be validly
issued by the National Labor Relations Commission
pending determination of the legality of the strike?
RULING: Yes.
The return-to-work order is issued pending the
determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is
not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike
is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for
the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while
the determination is being made.
While one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect
the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the
employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more
important reason is to prevent impairment of national
interest in case the operations of the company are
disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as
directed. In the instant case, stoppage of work in the firm
will be hurtful not only to both the employer and the
employees but also to the national economy because of
the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our
dollar reserves.
It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work
order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty;
and while as a right it may be waived, it must be
discharged as a duty even against the worker's will.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option
or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return
to his job together with his co-workers so the operations
of the company can be resumed and it can continue
serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the
real reason such return can be compelled.
The Court held that the return-to-work order should
benefit only those workers who complied and must be
entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed.
Conversely, those workers who refused to obey said
order and instead waged the restrained strike are not
entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement
to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to
return thereto as ordered.
 B. EXCESSIVE FINE
PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ 92 PHIL 906 (1953)
FACTS:
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than
the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after
trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to
imprisonment for 5 years, and to pay a fine of P5000 plus
costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale
and retail business for 5 years.
In this appeal he argues that the trial judge erred: (a) in
not holding that the charge was fabricated;
(b) in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate
to the offense and therefore unconstitutional and (c) in not
invalidating Republic Act No. 509 in so far as it prescribed
excessive penalties.
509) The evidence shows that in the morning of
October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the
defendant's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased
from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty
centavos. As the purchase had been made for Ruperto
Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz
the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in
this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No.
331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509 fixed 20
centavos as the maximum price for that kind of
commodity.
ISSUE: WON the penalty was excessive?
RULING: No.
The Constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration
or amount. To justify a court's declaration of conflict with
the Constitution, the prison term must be so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the
moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and
proper under the circumstances.
Two theories:
1. Prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to
the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of
the statute
2. Authorities are not lacking to the effect that the
fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's
power and authority
Referring to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 509,
under the first theory the section would violate the
Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all
circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of
proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed. If it is not,
the imposition by the judge of a stiff penalty - but within
the limits of the section - will not be deemed
unconstitutional. The second theory would contrast the
penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the
particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity
results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the
statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme
or oppressive.
The Court held that the penalty was not excessive
because milk, as a precious commodity, should be
protected. Taking into consideration the duration of the
offense, the Court held that he may even have profited
more. Hence, the penalty is not excessive because it was
not disproportionate to the offense committed.
PEOPLE vs. DACUYCUY 173 SCRA 901 (1989)
FACTS:
Private respondents Celestino Matondo, Segundino
Caval and Cirilo Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged before the municipal court for violation of
RA 4670. At the arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Thereafter, they orally moved to quash the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense; but it was
denied.
So they filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial
order and alleged that Section 32 of RA 4670 is
unconstitutional for: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of
the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court.
ISSUE: WON the indefinite penalty of imprisonment
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment?
RULING: No.
It is contended that RA 4670 is unconstitutional on the
ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of
imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate
of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and
should be rejected.
A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is
a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community.
However, the absence of designated limits in the court's
discretion to fix length of imprisonment constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such
that the duration thereof may range from one minute to
the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to
this case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers. On the foregoing considerations, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be
declared unconstitutional.
AGBANLOG vs. PEOPLE 220 SCRA 530 (1993)
FACTS:
Feliciano Agbanlog was the Officer-In-Charge of the
Office of Municipal Treasurer of Aglipay, Quirino for the
period from March 24, 1986 to May 31, 1986. When
audited by COA Auditing Examiner of the Provincial
Auditor's Office of Cobarroguis, Quirino, on August 4,
1986 for the aforesaid period of his incumbency as Acting
Municipal Treasurer, Feliciano Agbanlog was found short
in his cash and accounts in the sum of P21,940.70
A written demand to explain the shortage and to pay the
amount thereof was neither answered nor acted upon by
the said accountable officer. Consequently, a Report was
made by Examining Auditors manifesting their findings
and recommending the institution of administrative and/or
criminal charges against Acting Municipal Treasurer
Feliciano Agbanlog. At the outset, the Auditors found the
accused Agbanlog short in the amount of P32,950.34
Upon the finding that P11,009.64 of this amount was
chargeable to the account of former Municipal Treasurer,
the said amount of P11,009.64 was deducted from the
accountability of Feliciano Agbanlog.
As regards the disbursement voucher billed as a cash
advance for various expenses in the amount of
P12,504.49, this voucher was disallowed by the auditors
because there was no appropriation for this
disbursement. It is indicated in the voucher that the giving
out of this money was in the nature of a cash advance.
The purpose for which the cash advance was given out
was, however, not clearly indicated.
Petitioner admits the shortage of the accountable funds
charged by the prosecution but claims that the
prosecution failed to show that the shortage accrued
during his short stint as acting treasurer. The Court found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Malversation
of Public Funds and sentencing him to suffer "the
indeterminate penalty of, from 11 years and 1 day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum to 16 years, 5 months and 11
days of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
Petitioner questions as oppressive and unconstitutional
the penalty imposed on him.
ISSUE: WON the penalty was excessive?
RULING: No.
Petitioner argues that considering the value of the peso in
1932 when the Revised Penal Code was enacted and the
value of the peso today, the penalty for malversation of
P21,000 should only be an imprisonment of one or two
years.
Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more
severe the penalty for malversing P21,000, the remedy
cannot come from this Court but from Congress. The
Court can intervene and strike down a penalty as cruel,
degrading or inhuman only when it has become so
flagrantly oppressive and so wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral senses.
Considering that malversation of public funds by a public
officer is a betrayal of the public trust, We are not
prepared to say that the penalty imposed on petitioner is
so disproportionate to the crime committed as to shock
the moral sense.
C. CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS
PEOPLE vs. ECHEGARAY
267 SCRA 682 (1997)
FACTS:
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and
convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed in April,
1994, during which time RA 7659, commonly known as
the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-
appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Law as being severe and excessive,
cruel and unusual in violation of the constitution. He
invokes the ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US
Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is
cruel and degrading. He also argues that death is an
excessive and cruel punishment for a crime of rape
because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the
ruling in Coker vs. Georgia which said that while rape
deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the
taking of human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim.
Death penalty should only be imposed where the crime
was murder.
ISSUE: Is DeathPenalty is cruel and unusual
punishment?
RULING: No.
The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the
US case of Kemmler, it was held that punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It
implies there something inhuman, barbarous, something
more than the extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it
involves public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient,
but must be disproportionate to the crime committed.
Excessiveness is measured by
7) seriousness of the crime, 2) policy of the
legislative,
(c) perversity of the accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death
penalty itself, but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed by
the jury. It was nullified because the discretion in which
the statute vested in trial judges and sentencing juries
was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines,
or standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held
that this case has no bearing on Philippine experience
and culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the
biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of
the death penalty in the context of our legal history and
cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed
in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects, and because they have so
caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would
pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous
crimes – crimes punished with death are those that are
grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent
viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are
repugnant and outrageous to common standards of
norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society. They also include crimes which are
despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is
treated as an animal or dehumanized.
PEOPLE vs. TONGKO
290 SCRA 595 (1998)
Accused Roberto Tongko was found guilty of estafa under
Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. He was
sentenced to suffer 27 years of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify Carmelita V. Santos by way of actual damages
in the sum of P100,000.
Accordingly, the accused opened savings and current
accounts with Amanah Bank. In the morning of August 20,
1993, Marites Bo-ot brought the accused to the office of
Carmelita V. Santos to borrow money. The accused
asked for P50,000 to be paid not later than December
1993 and assured Santos that his receivable would come
in by November 1993. He persuaded Santos to give the
loan by issuing 5 checks, each in the sum of P10,000,
postdated December 20, 1993 and by signing a
promissory note.
The promissory note was co-signed by Bo-ot. In the
afternoon of the same date, the accused returned to
Santos and borrowed an additional P50,000. Again, he
issued five (5) checks, each worth P10,000 postdated
December 20, 1993. He also signed a promissory note
together with Bo-ot. On September 14, 1993, Amanah
Bank closed accused's current account for lack of funds.
On October 1993, accused himself requested for the
closing of his savings account.
Estafa has the following elements: (1) postdating or
issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued;
510) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and
511) damage to the payee thereof.
Accused contends that the penalty of twenty seven (27)
years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh and out of
proportion to the crime he committed. He submits that his
sentence violates section 19(1) Article
3. of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
ISSUE: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
RULING: No.
In People v. de la Cruz, the Court held that the prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount. In People v.
Estoista, the Court further held that it takes more than
merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "Wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."
The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe
penalties for violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will show that
the severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of
swindling by issuance of bouncing checks.
ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY
297 SCRA 754 (1998)
FACTS:
The Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition
upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He
assailed the constitutionality of RA 7659 (the death
penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for
the crime of rape.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the
mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution
to lethal injection, and passed RA.
8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL
INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7659.
Echegaray filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by
lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. 8177 and its
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void
for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary,
unreasonable and a violation of due process,
(c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise
by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and
(f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by
the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
The Office of Solicitor General stated that (1) this Court
has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. 8177, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply than electrocution
or the gas chamber; (3) the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A.8177
properly delegated legislative power to respondent
Director.
ISSUE: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
RULING: No.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on
a hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution room. A
trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the
inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline
solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of
drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The deadly
concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal
dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing
barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium bromide, a
drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium
chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first
two drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the
patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in
heart bypass surgery.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per
se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the
oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court
held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture
or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton
pain" in case of possible complications in the intravenous
injection, considering that respondent Director is an
untrained in administering the lethal injection. Such
supposition is highly unsubstantiated. Any infliction of
pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out
the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment.
LIM vs. PEOPLE
390 SCRA 194 (2002)
FACTS:
Spouses Lim issued to Wilson Cham two postdated
checks in the amount of P365,750 and P429,000. The first
check was dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against insufficient funds while the other check was
not presented for payment upon request of Spouses Lim
who promised to replace the dishonored check. When
they reneged on their promise to cover the amount of the
first check, Cham filed a complaint affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging
them with the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 818. A
warrant of arrest was subsequently issued.
Spouses Lim filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash
Information and Warrant of Arrest” which was denied by
the trial court. Their motion for bail was also denied. They
filed a petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion, arguing that P.D. 818 violated the
constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
They contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject
check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion
perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty is too
severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed
and infringes on the express mandate of Article III,
Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction
of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. They argue
that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for
estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d), RPC, it did
not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new
penalties.

ISSUE: WON said punishment is cruel and inhuman?
RULING: No.
P.D. 818, a decree increasing the penalty for estafa by
means of bouncing checks, is constitutional. The increase
in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was
motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate
the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s
commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a
necessary precaution to deter people from issuing
bouncing checks. The fact that PD No. 818 did not
increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties
only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the
proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of
bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary
purpose for which said law was decreed, the court
concluded that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of
Article III of the Constitution.
D. INDEFINITE IMPRISONMENT
PEOPLE vs. DACUYCUY 173 SCRA 901 (1989)
FACTS:
Private respondents Celestino Matondo, Segundino
Caval and Cirilo Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged before the municipal court for violation of
RA 4670. At the arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Thereafter, they orally moved to quash the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense; but it was
denied.
So they filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial
order and alleged that Section 32 of RA 4670 is
unconstitutional for: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and
may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of
the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court.
ISSUE: WON the indefinite penalty of imprisonment
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment?
RULING: No.
It is contended that RA 4670 is unconstitutional on the
ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of
imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate
of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and
should be rejected.
A punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is
a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community.
However, the absence of designated limits in the court's
discretion to fix length of imprisonment constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such
that the duration thereof may range from one minute to
the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to
this case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers. On the foregoing considerations, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be
declared unconstitutional.
Recall the facts. Section 32 of RA 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such
that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the lifespan f the
accused. It cannot be allowed.
It vests in the courts a power and duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied in this case,
does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well
as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time,
the presumption of constitutionality has to yield. By virtue
of separability clause in Section 34 of RA 4670, the
penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 should be
declared unconstitutional.
THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. TWO SITUATIONS COMTEPLATED
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
148 SCRA 292 (1987)
FACTS:
On February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light
System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city
judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
Storage owned and operated by the private respondent
Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric
wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed,
without the necessary authority from the city government,
and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building owned by the private respondent. These electric
devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the
petitioner designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the electric
meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant.
On November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an
information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A
violation of this ordinance was, under its terms,
punishable by a fine "ranging from P5 to P50 or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or
both, at the discretion of the court."
14 days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II
another information against Manuel Opulencia for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. That without
knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light
System, accused feloniously take, steal and appropriate
electric current valued of P41,062.
Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia
filed a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of offense charged in second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON there was double jeopardy?
RULING: No.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction
for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first
information filed before the City Court of Batangas City
was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation
of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only
two elements are needed to constitute an offense under
this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an
installation; and
(2) no authority therefor had been obtained from the
Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System.
The offense under the City Ordinance is the installing of
electric wiring and devices without authority from the
proper officials of the city government. To constitute an
offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to
establish any mens rea or intent to appropriate and steal
on the part of offender. In contrast, the offense of theft
under Article 308 of RPC has quite different essential
elements. The petitioner alleged that theft of electricity
can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized
installations of any kind.
The petitioner concludes that the unauthorized installation
punished by the ordinance of Batangas City is not the
same as theft of electricity under RPC; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above arguments are correct. This is clear both from
express terms of constitutional provision involved - which
reads as follows: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act."
Our Bill of Rights deals with 2 kinds of double jeopardy.
The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III,
ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." The second sentence
of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act."
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that
he is charged with different offenses, or the offense
charged in one case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second
sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of
an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the
two charges are based on one and the same act
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy
has attached under one of the information charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the
same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975.
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia
installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the
necessary permit or authorization from the municipal
authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very
purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This corrupt
intent was thus present from the very moment that such
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow
of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In
other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral
with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and
devices.
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary
that an accused should be shielded against being
prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single
act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use
to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many
offenses as can be justified by said act or omission by
simply adding or subtracting essential elements. It
remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas
City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas
City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had
already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the
accused of that offense.
PEOPLE vs. CITY OF COURT
154 SCRA 195 (1987)
FACTS:
Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan was accused
of violating Section 7 of RA 3060 (An Act Creating the
Board of Censors for Motion Pictures) in relation to Article
201 (Immoral doctrines , obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows) of the RPC. On April 07,
1972, two information were filed against the accused. The
first one, filed for violation of RA 3060, alleged that the
accused, without having previously submitted to the
Board of censors for Motion Pictures for preview and
examination, exhibited a motion film in a public place.
The second one, filed for violation of Article 201, alleged
that the accused exhibited motion pictures “depicting and
showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons
with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various
lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and
equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place
open to public view, to wit: at Rm 309, DeLeon Bldg, Raon
St. corner Rizal Avenue.”
Accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in the
criminal case for ground of double jeopardy as the case
pending against him for violation of RA 3060, allegedly
contains the same allegations in the criminal case.
Respondent City Court (City Court of Manila, Branch 6)
dismissed the criminal case on the basis that the
allegations in the two information are identical and the
plea entered in one case by the accused herein can be
reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in
the other case.Petitioner contends that the accused could
not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal,
dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings in
another case for the same offense.
ISSUE: WON there was double jeopardy?
RULING: No.
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double
jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a
frustration thereof. All these requisites are absent.
The 2 informations with which the accused was charged,
do not make out only one offense, contrary to private
respondent's allegations. The offense defined in section 7
of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion
pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the
offense defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral
motion pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each
other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved would show
that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from
each other. It is evident that the elements of the two (2)
offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense
defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any
motion picture which has not been previously passed by
the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion
picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not
been previously approved by the Board, its public
showing constitutes a criminal offense. On the other hand,
the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code is the public showing of indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
The crime punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a malum
prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved
because it is presumed, while the offense punished in
Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se,
in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient.
Considering these differences in elements and nature,
there is no Identity of the offenses here involved for which
legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other.
Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same
evidence required to prove the other. The defense of
double jeopardy cannot prosper.
B. RULES OF COURT PROVISIONS
MELO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with frustrated
homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin
Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
However, Obillo died and so an amended information was
filed charging the accused with consummated homicide.
The accused filed a motion to quash the amended
information alleging double jeopardy but it was denied by
the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further
entertaining the amended information.
ISSUE: WON there is double jeopardy?
RULING: No.
Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides:
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
may dismiss the original complaint or information and
order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial."
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss
the first information and order the filing of a new one for
reason that the proper offense was not charged in the
former and the latter did not place the accused in a
second jeopardy for the same or identical offense.
The rule of "double jeopardy" meant that when a person
is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical offense.
There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so-
called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague
and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a
clearer and more accurate form.

Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses
not only when the second offense is exactly the same as
the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information. In this connection,
an offense may be said to necessarily include another
when some of the essential ingredients of the former as
alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-
versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included
in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute
a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116,
sec. 5.)
In other words, one who has been charged with an
offense cannot be again charged with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater
than the former.
This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there
is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. In this case, there was
no double jeopardy because the death was a supervening
event.
PEOPLE vs. CITY OF COURT
121 SCRA 637 (1983)
FACTS:
This case involves the dismissing of information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against private
respondent, Francisco Gapay y Mallares, on the ground
of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the private
respondent having been previously tried and convicted of
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the
resulting death of the victim would place the accused in
double jeopardy.
ISSUE: WON a person who has been prosecuted for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for
homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party
dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered?
RULING:
In Melo vs. People, this Court held that "where after the
first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts existing at a time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
second offense."
However, the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs.
People does not apply in the case at bar in view of this
Court's ruling in People vs. Buan, that Article 365 of the
Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not
the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once
prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused
cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence
although for a different resulting injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17,
1971. The following day, October 18, an information for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was
filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the
same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged
with an offense cannot be charge again with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater
than the former. However, as held in the case of Melo vs.
People, supra, the rule of identity does not apply when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to
be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
"Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not
put him twice in jeopardy." Stated differently where after
the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the facts existing at the
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the
day the information was filed, and the accused was
arraigned two (2) days after, or on October 20, 1972.
When the information for homicide thru reckless
imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24, 1972, the
accused-private respondent was already in jeopardy.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court
is affirmed.
 PEOPLE vs. YORAC
FACTS:
Rodrigo Yorac was prosecuted for frustrated murder
arising allegedly from having assaulted with a piece of
wood the offended party (Lam Hock), for which he had
been previously tried and sentenced for slight physical
injuries, his plea being one of guilt. He started serving his
sentence forthwith. The later information for frustrated
murder was based on a second medical certificate after
the lapse of one week from the former previously given by
the same physician who, apparently, was much more
thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did
suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained.
A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the ground
that, having been previously convicted of slight physical
injuries and having already served the penalty imposed
on him for the very same offense, the prosecution for
frustrated murder arising out of the same act committed
against the same offended party, the crime of slight
physical injuries necessarily being included in that of
frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy
if indicted for new offense.
ISSUE: WON the defendant, who had already been
convicted of slight physical injuries and had served
sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated
murder for the same act committed against the same
person?
RULING: No. There was double jeopardy. A defendant in
a criminal case should therefore be adjudged either guilty
or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter
case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. If
the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a
fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have
existed when the first examination was made on
December 10, 1956. There is no new or supervening fact
that could be said to have developed or arisen since the
filing of original action. The wound causing the delay in
healing was already in existence at the time of the first
examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination then made. No supervening fact
had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in
Melo vs. People, for which reason we are constrained to
apply the general rule of double jeopardy.
IVLER vs. MODESTO – SAN PEDRO
635 SCRA 191 (2010)
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, Jason Ivler
was charged before the MeTC, with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by Evangeline L. Ponce and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
On 7 September 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence. However, it was
denied.
Ivler submits that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. He argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. He
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the homicide and damage to property.
ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?
RULING: Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless
Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365
is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365. These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its
Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty. The two charges against
Ivler, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of RPC, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code) that “reckless imprudence” is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines
a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent.
Article 365 of RPC fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death,
according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crime.
YSIDORO vs. LEONARDO–DECASTRO
665 SCRA 89 (2012)
FACTS:
Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for failure to give to Nierna S.
Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer
(MSWDO) of Leyte without legal basis her RATA for the
months of August, September, October, November and
December, all in the year 2001 amounting to P22,125 and
her Productivity Pay in the year 2000 amounting to
P2000. Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the
information and for judicial determination of probable
cause but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for
ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019, which states that “Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as
a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office.”
ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?
RULING: No.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double
jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials,
thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would
be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further
prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is
likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the
criminal defendant’s culpability.
However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be
properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition, predicated on two
(2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of
acquittal rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the
court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of
due process.
There was no double jeopardy because it was two
different offenses.
 BAUTISTA vs. CUNETA-PANGILINAN
684SCRA521 (2012)
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against against Pete G.
Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista
and Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by
publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon
Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera. It says
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON! Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba
singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead.
Magsalita ka, Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo. Dios
mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly
biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan
but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good
reviews we’ve done on her.
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit alleged that
Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-
accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged
libelous articles which were published therein, and subject
of the two informations.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April
25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to Evidence was
tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can
no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place
them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that
respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not
have prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect,
assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In
other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in
the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was
not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show
special and important reasons to justify their invocation of
the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. She avers that the acquittal of petitioners does not
preclude their further prosecution if the judgment
acquitting them is void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she
points out that contrary to petitioners’ contention, the
principle of double jeopardy does not attach in cases
where the court's judgment acquitting the accused or
dismissing the case is void.
ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?
RULING: No.
There is no liberl because Sharon was not actually named
in the article. It was in fact a blind item.
Under Section 23,29 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on
Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution terminates
the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial
court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by
the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused
files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and
the same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his
defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by
the accused without prior leave of court and the same is
denied, he waives his right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the
accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by
the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the
trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not
sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence,
the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case
which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be
appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.
Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in
view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for
certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by
respondent in her personal capacity. Although the
conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and
set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence
would violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right
against double jeopardy. Had it not been for this
procedural defect, the Court could have seriously
considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in
seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore,
be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not
only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the
private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing
done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is
acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with
no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision
of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his
right against double jeopardy.
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A. FUNCTIONS OF THE WRIT
VILLACENCIO v. LUKBAN
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of
Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to
Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the
prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an
haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were
confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year
before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats
bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption
that they were being transported to another police station
while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that
the women being sent to work for him were actually
prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file
charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao.
They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued
against the respondents to compel them to bring back the
170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their
will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were
deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly
assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no
law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170
prostitutes.
ISSUE:
W/N Habeas Corpus that the prostitutes filed will prosper.
RULING:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and
that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily
responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for
his failure to comply with the order of the court.
IN RE GONZALES
FACTS:
In line with their participation in the “Oakwood Mutiny” that
led to Pres.Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be under a
"state of rebellion” and General Order No. 4 directing the
AFP and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures,
giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and
quell the "rebellion.", petitioners were taken into custody
by their Service Commander. Gonzales and Mesa were
not charged before a court martial with violation of the
Articles of War. They were, however, among the soldiers
charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, with the crime of Coup D’ etat as
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code.
They were consequently detained in Fort Bonifacio under
the custody of the Philippine Marines. A petition for bail
was filed by the accused soldiers which the RTC
subsequently granted. Despite of the order and the
service thereof, petitioner was not released. As a
response, the People of the Philippines moved for partial
reconsideration of the order granting bail. With the denial
of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed
with the Court of Appeals on 4 February 2005 a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Moreover,
since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a
Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner Pulido
on their behalf. In response, Respondents prayed that the
Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two
grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and
Mesa is justified because of the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July2004 of
the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the
7th Division of the Court of Appeals and (2) petitioner is
guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in
the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated
to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7th
Division. Thus, we have this case.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for habeas corpus was proper despite of
the pending special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals 7th Division.
RULING:
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the
application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes
moot and academic. With the release of both Mesa and
Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed,
been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions where
no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule
that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the
issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to
be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical value. This Court
will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for.
VELUZ v. VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Eufemia E. Rodriguez, a 94-year old widow, allegedly
suffering from a poor state of mental health and
deteriorating cognitive abilities, was living with petitioner,
Edgardo Veluz, her nephew, since 2000.
On January 11, 2005, respondents, legally adopted
children of Eufemia, took their mother from Veluz’ house.
Veluz made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia
but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were
restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. However, CA
ruled that Veluz failed (1) to present any convincing proof
that respondents were unlawfully restraining their mother
of her liberty, and (2) to establish his legal right to the
custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian.
Hence, this case was filed. Petitioner claimed that, in
determining if a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a
court should limit itself to determining whether or not a
person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no
need to consider legal custody or custodial rights.
ISSUE:
W/N the issue on legal custody is insignificant for a
petition for habeas corpus.
RULING:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person
is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s
liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person
from someone entitled to such custody.
In deciding a petition for habeas corpus, a court must first
inquire into whether a person is being restrained of his
liberty. Where such restraint exists, only then will inquiry
into the cause of detention shall proceed. Only if the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful will the
writ be granted. Indeed, while habeas corpus is a writ of
right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.
Herein, there is no proof that Eufemia is being detained
and restrained of her liberty by respondents. On the
contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children,
are taking care of her.
FLETCHER v. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU
FACTS:
Petitioner Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from
prison in this petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17
years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos
to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years,
three months and 12 days, including his good conduct
allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.
ISSUE:
W/N petition for habeas corpus is granted
RULING:
We note the issuance of a warrant for petitioners arrest
on March 8, 1996, the date he was first set for arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 94-6988. Pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ cannot be issued
and petitioner cannot be discharged since he has been
charged with another criminal offense. His continued
detention is without doubt warranted under the
circumstances.
Petitioner asserts that his sentence in Criminal Case No.
95-995 was commuted by then President Ramos.
However, he presented no proof of such commutation.
Other than indorsements by the Chief Justice, Public
Attorney’s Office and Undersecretary of the Department
of Justice, no document purporting to be the commutation
of his sentence by then President Ramos was attached in
his petition and in his subsequent missives to this Court.
His barren claim of commutation therefore deserves scant
consideration, lest we be accused of usurping the
Presidents sole prerogative to commute petitioner’s
sentence in Criminal Case No. 95-995.
Ampatuan v. Macaraig
(G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010)
FACTS: A press briefing was then conducted where it
was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the
killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United
Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged
murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law
Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1
Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters
Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.
Petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, continues
that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1
Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent
Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito
Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V.
Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of
PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show
cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty
of PO1 Ampatuan.
Respondents assert that PO1 Ampatuan is under
restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative
case for grave misconduct, claiming that habeas corpus
will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody.
They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par.
4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the
PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of administrative case for grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not PO1 Ampatuan should be
released and a writ of habeas corpus is proper.
RULING: No, PO1 Ampatuan should not be released and
a writ of habeas corpus should not be given due course.
In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing
administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. A petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows
that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty
unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known
as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act
of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also
known as the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that
members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for
his continued detention. This Court has held that a
restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of
liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the
remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for.
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is
the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is
within such administrative process.
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A
POST CONVICTION REMEDY
Lamen v. Director
(G.R. No. 117078 February 22, 1995)
FACTS: The petitioners filed the instant petition to secure
the release of Willy Bagawe y Pagalla, who was earlier
convicted of the violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, for selling and delivering marijuana
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The prohibited drugs
involved consist of three matchboxes containing
marijuana flowering tops with a total weight of 3.5 grams,
one matchbox with a marijuana cigarette butt, and one
brown paper bag containing 10 grams of marijuana
flowering tops.
Willy Bagawe y Pagalla is presently serving his sentence
in the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila.
He has been under incarceration since his arrest on 14
April 1987.
The petitioners contend that since the gross quantity of
the marijuana involved in this case is only 13.6 grams,
then in the light of People vs. Simon, the maximum term
imposed on Bagawe should be reduced to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional;
and since he has already served more than six years, he
should be released from imprisonment.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees
with the petitioners that Simon should apply but disagrees
with their computation of the maximum penalty. It
recommends that, following the penalties imposed by us
in Simon and in People vs. Saycon,7 the proper penalty
should be six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, without
fine.
ISSUE: Whether or not Willy Bagawe y Pagalla may use
the Writ of Habeas Corpus as a post-conviction remedy.
RULING: Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code operates
to benefit Willy Bagawe since R.A. No. 7659, is favorable
to him and since he is not a habitual criminal.
Following Simon, the penalty which could have been
imposed on Willy Bagawe under R.A. No. 6425, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7659, would have been prision
correccional and, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he would have been sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as maximum.
Since the decision in G.R. Nos. 88515-16 had long
become final and Willy Bagawe is in fact serving his
sentence, we cannot alter or modify the penalty therein
imposed. Nevertheless, the writ of habeas corpus comes
to his rescue since he has undergone imprisonment for a
period more than the maximum imprisonment which could
have been properly imposed on him taking into account
the favorable statute, R.A. No. 7659. In the 1932 case of
Directo vs. Director of Prisons,8 we ruled:
In view of the foregoing considerations
we are of the opinion and hold: (1) that
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
which makes penal provisions retroactive
so far as they favor the accused,
provided he is not a habitual criminal,
does not authorize a court whose
sentence has become final and
executory to make a substantial
amendment, and any amendment made
in such sentence, though it be to give
effect to a penal provision favorable to
the accused, would be null and void for
lack of jurisdiction; and (2) that the only
means of giving retroactive effect to a
penal provision favorable to the accused
when the trial judge has lost jurisdiction
over the case, is the writ of habeas
corpus.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
GRANTED and WILLY BAGAWE y PAGALLA, accused-
appellant in G.R. Nos. 88515-16, is hereby ordered
RELEASED from detention, unless for any other lawful
cause his further confinement is warranted.
SO ORDERED.
C. SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE
Lansang v. Garcia
(G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971)
FACTS: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9
p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding
a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades
were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where
said candidates and other persons were. As a
consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many
more injured, including practically all of the
aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained
extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have
been fatal had it not been for the timely medical
assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the
Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No.
889 which is a declaration of a state of lawlessness. The
said proclamation suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, for persons presently detained, as well
as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by the
petitioners for having been arrested without a warrant and
then detained upon the authority of the proclamation. The
petition also seeks to assail the validity of the
proclamation
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
constitutional
RULING: Yes, it is constitutional. The petition assailing its
validity is denied.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the
privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent
danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension. The President declared in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions
are present.
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence attests
abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines.
The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the
second condition essential to the validity of the
suspension of the privilege — namely, that the
suspension be required by public safety.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution,
three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call
out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called
out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved
inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)
other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the
President has acted arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No.
889, as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.
The court has satisfied itself that there was a massive
systematic Communist oriented movement to overthrow
the government through the use of force, thus it has
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS
A. FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Martinez v. People
(G.R. No. 132852 May 31, 2000)
FACTS: Petitioner was accused of homicide in a criminal
case. During the hearing, petitioner represented by Atty.
Chavez of PAO objected to petitioner’s motion to be
allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike
the entire testimony of the first witness for the
prosecution. On July 1994 the trial court issued an order
overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court
denied the motion for reconsideration. This prompted
petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it issued the assailed orders.
On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto
supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by
two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to
petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege. The
CA denied the motion and directed petitioner to remit
docketing fees in the amount of P420.00 within 5 days
from notice. The petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to litigate
as a pauper but the same was denied. Petitioner then filed
a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated
through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees
required of his client "under protest" and that the money
remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G.
Chavez himself. The transmittal of the amount was
evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the
Motion to Litigate as Pauper.
In the assailed Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition,
citing petitioner’s failure to pay the required docket fee.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance
with the docket fee requirements as alleged in his
Manifestation, but the CA in the assailed resolution
denied this latest motion on the ground that the amount
remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of P150.00
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to
appeal as a pauper litigant.
RULING: Yes, the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to appeal as a
pauper litigant.
The Bill of Rights decrees that “Free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty”
A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has
complied with all the evidentiary requirements for
prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He
has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and
his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more
than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property,
a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00. He has
also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L.
Ongtico and Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City,
who generally attested to the same allegations contained
in petitioner's own affidavit. Based on this evidence, the
Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an
indigent.
The Court ordered the CA to allow petitioner to litigate as
pauper and to return to him the amount of P420.00
representing the docket fees he paid.
B. PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
(WRIT OF AMPARO)
Tapuz v. Del Rosario
(G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008)
FACTS: The private respondents filed with the MCTC a
complaint for forcible entry and damages with the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against petitioners. The private respondents alleged in
their complaint that they are the registered owners of the
disputed land and they were the disputed land’s prior
possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos
carrying firearms and together with unidentified persons
numbering 120 – entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondent’s permission
and against the objections of the private respondents
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.
In their answer, the petitioners denied the allegations of
the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are
the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2)
on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders;
and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked for the
dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim
for damages.
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners
filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition
contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the
writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may be granted the
remedy of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo
RULING: We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance
of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the
writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.
The Writ of Amparo
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as
a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is
a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process
dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ
of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified
or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the
right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has
not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to
secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the
course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind
in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is
not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners’ Association
G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008
FACTS: The petitioners sought for the issuance of a Writ
Amporo claiming that they were deprived of their life and
liberty to shelter as result of various activities of the
respondents; and that, as illegal settlers in a certain parcel
of land situates in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, their
dwelling/houses is about to be demolished.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of amparo can be issued.
RULING: The threatened demolition of a dwelling by
virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case
was affirmed with finality by this Court is not included
among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-
quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ
of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling,
assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no
legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
FACTS: Raymund and Renalo Manalo were suspected
sympathizers of the NPA and therefore was abducted by
armed men belonging to the CAFGU and forced
disappearance. They were tortured and could have been
subjected to more if they were not able to escape.
Subsequently, the filed a Petition for petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other rights. The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo then took effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have the right to
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo even if their enforced
disappearance had already passed as the have escaped
from captivity.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a
continuing violation of the Manalo’s right to security. The
Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. Understandably, since their
escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of their
abduction, detention, torture, and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of
amparo.”
 Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
FACTS: Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes was among
those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007 for the crime of rebellion. This was
then dismissed by the RTC for the lack of probable cause.
The petitioner invokes the Writ of Amparo which is
anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues
that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has
no legal basis since the criminal case against him has
already been dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction on the petitioner’s
right to travel was unlawful.
RULING: The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as
a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which
there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
So vs. Tacla
G.R. No. 190473, October 19,2010
FACTS: David So filed a petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter who was
accused of qualified theft in the criminal case pending
before Judge Tacla. He alleged that his daughter was
under a life-threatening situation while confined in a
government hospital to ascertain the actual psychological
state of the latter. During pendency of the case, Tacla
dismissed the criminal case for qualified theft against
Maria.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus and
amparo should be dismissed for having been rendered
moot and academic.
RULING: The petition for habeas corpus and amparo has
to be dismissed for being moot and academic anent the
dismissal in the qualified theft case. Also, the most basic
criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some
legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Absent unlawful restraint and threat or violation of life,
liberty or security, the petitions could still have not
prospered.
Manila Electric vs. Lim
G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010
FACTS: Rosario Lim, a administrative clerk at
MERALCO, was the subject of an anonymous letter
denouncing her, which was posted and spread in their
office. Shed then reported to the local police but was
directed to transfer to another branch in light of these
accusations. She asked for the deferment of the transfer
however no response was received. Hence, she filed a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against
the petitioners MERALCO alleging that the failure and
refusal to provide her with details and information about
the report concerning her security and safety amounted
to a violation of her to privacy in life, liberty and security,
correctible by habeas data. She requested for full
disclosure of report.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas data can be
issued in favor of Lim.
RULING: The court ruled no. The case of the petitioner
Lim does not fall within the proving of a writ of habeas
data – that a writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information
regarding the person...” against abuse in this age of
information technology. There is no showing from the
facts that MERALCO committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis
the right to life, liberty and security.
(WRIT OF HABEAS DATA)
Gamboa vs. Chan
G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012
FACTS: Gamboa, a Mayor in Ilocos Norte, alleged that
after a series of surveillance operations conducted by the
PNP-Ilocos Norte against her, she was said to be
maintaining a private army group from a confidential
report and that through Thru local TV news and print
media, her name has been tagged as one of those
politicians alleged to be maintaining the said group.
Gamboa then questioned such inclusion stating that such
is a form of harassment a violation of her right to privacy
towards these confidential reports by filing a writ of
habeas data requiring the government to release these
reports to ascertain.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas data is the
proper remedy.
RULING: The court ruled that the remedy of writ of
habeas data is not proper in this case. The writ of habeas
data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. In this case, the petition was not
granted because such information holds legitimate public
interest in dismantling these private armies. PNP released
information to the Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is
an inherent and crucial component of intelligence
gathering and investigation. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
allegation as to what particular acts or omission of
respondents violated or threatened petitioner’s right to
life, liberty and security. The CA also correctly held that
petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his
right to life, liberty and security were violated, or how his
right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did
not specify the particular documents to be secured, their
location or what particular government office had custody
thereof, and who has possession or control of the same.
The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the
evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing of a petition
for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data,
not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as
they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced.

With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA
Saez v. Arroyo
did not commit a reversible error in declaring that no
(G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012)
substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a
FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the second look on the evidence on record and finds no
Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs
amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary prayed for.
protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents.5 In the petition, he expressed his fear of
being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be
placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise
prayed for the military to cease from further conducting
surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his
name to be excluded from the order of battle and other
government records connecting him to the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP).

The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what

actually transpired and to determine specific acts which
threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting
April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being
followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan
Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity
of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner
was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him
of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan,
Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still
involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA
justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home
to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in
the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio
who was always at the pier.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may be granted the

remedy of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo

RULING: The court denied the petition.

A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA

correctly found that the petition was bereft of any