G.R. No.
127240             March 27, 2000 failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old
boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he
has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his
own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at
the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner,
after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the
provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on
Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that
the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization
by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether
the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he
remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is
rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the
major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted
as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present
any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2)
failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3)
in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation
and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention
of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN
Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong
Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As
petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed
income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net
income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and
Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then
again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner
failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed
a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by
petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance
with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living
together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in
1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include
said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already
noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong
Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application
under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated
in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates
against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow
those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward
and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect
his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that
he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7
 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his
petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition.
As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public,
as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice
their objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision,
the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity,
thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four
children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's
8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting
by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and
irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore
disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income.
His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income
tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It
must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is
an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide
for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public
charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his
wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly
pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and
allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT
CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE
BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE
MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and,
on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having
been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court
which provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That
is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for
the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not
covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does
not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object
against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No.
031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually
filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can
be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN
Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case
number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents
presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN
Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him
and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such,
they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to
make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not
err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this
case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of
petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of
his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such
requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to
check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information
regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant
for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
ONG CHIA vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALSFACTS:Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. He has
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own
business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the
age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. During
the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses
to corroborate his testimony. ISSUE:Whether or not the rule on evidence is applicable
in naturalization proceedings.RULING:The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed
to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that: These rules shall not
apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described
in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final
and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined
from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner
to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision,
petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct,
For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as
complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the
trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso
Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the
Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila
Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-
1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to
this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request
for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject
annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr.
Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes,
At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case
pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit,
and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound
by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of
securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only
because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of
the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court
was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of
the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding
section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible
entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is
if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his
integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may
be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
of fidelity that each owes to the other.
CECILIA ZULUETA vs COURT OF APPEALS AND ALFREDO MARTIN
FACTS:On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:Whether the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
RULING:The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
__________________
G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in
order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death
of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal
knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,
seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of
their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were
talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang,
left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her
husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in
the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her
clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the
house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the
house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the
house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked
appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring
to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw
appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang
and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing
a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the
house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This
time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her
that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it.
She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her
where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband
then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of
Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights
in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door
to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked
Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door
was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark,
she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the
naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her
husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and
saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her
stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel,
Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman
was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab
wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals
beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt
splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police
Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away
from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the
gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was
approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned
on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest
respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and
five (5) incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of
her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was
complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30,
1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant
lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending
physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions
or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that
the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and
some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on
her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A
person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s
lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can
assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed,
efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving
sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen,
blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and
fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that
there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected
from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples
to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests
in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based
on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between
the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would
allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the
case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since
it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and
his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn
Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent
quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen
of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with
collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at
12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming
down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8)
The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a
rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines
protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her
stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10)
Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive
with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of
the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was
detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and
17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling
which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him
are unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application
of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence
at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably
link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially
in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within
a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere
five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens
his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a
quo committed reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that
he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
"something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to
preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of
being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value"
may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the
trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in
order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion
that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test
of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt
as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that
she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and
proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before
the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to
rape her after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident
or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body
was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to
Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was,
"If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements
were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the
instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted
Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful
deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby
causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant
had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved
by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the
woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate
a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the
female genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for
conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may
be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender
age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years
older than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived
in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the
separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred
(100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the
third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over
the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3)
Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred
by the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to
P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of
prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of
the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias
"Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. JOEL YATAR alias “KAWIT”, GR No. 150224, 2004-05-19
Facts:
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide
Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She
called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that...
day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if
Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was
cold and rigid.
She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylyns's death... appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself.
Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten
meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the
Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He's... running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel
exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer
Abagan recaptured him.[12] He was charged with Rape... with Homicide. When he
was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."... appellant was
convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide... and was accordingly, sentenced to
Death.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and
17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him
are unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application
of an ex-post facto law.
Ruling:
Appellant's contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of... weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.[13] Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent... reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not
the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and
unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment,
conduct and attitude.[14] Absent... any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judge's assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court's highest respect.[15] Where... there is nothing to show that the
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.[16]
The weight of the prosecution's evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt... that the accused committed the crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and
five (5) incised, were found on the victim's abdomen and back, causing a portion of
her small intestines to spill out of her body.[18] Rigor mortis of the... vicitm's body was
complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.[19] In other... words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30,
1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant
lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending
physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions
or hematoma were noted on the victim,[20] Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the... vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated
that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through
sexual intercourse with the victim.[21] In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the... prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested
by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant's assault on her virtue.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant's gene type.
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical... twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source... of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared
with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether... the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.[30] Based
on Dr. de Ungria's testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile
of... appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,[33] it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would... allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques.
DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.[34] Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and... utilizing STR analysis, and which was
appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant's semen found in the victim's
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated... circumstantial evidence as being sufficient
to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is
sufficient circumstantial... evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.[37] The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of...
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing,
paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling
which was conducted in open court... in the presence of counsel.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a... question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant's twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence
at Isabel Dawang's house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably
link him to the... incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case
where the two places are located in the same barangay.[40] He lives within a one
hundred (100) meter... radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
Appellant's assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
"something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value."[41] This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied
by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally...
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value
of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in
order to sustain a... conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.[42] This requires that... the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion
that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.[43] In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus... far, we rule that the present case passes the
test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt
as to the identity of the culprit.
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that
she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.[45] She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel's... house
and proceeding to the back of the same house.[46] She also testified that a few days
before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar
attempted to rape her after she came from the school."[47]
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five
days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother's house
on June 25, 1998.[48] In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family.
Thus, appellant's motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the
instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after... the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
G.R. No. 155208             March 27, 2007
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA,
CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the
Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as
Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by
Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of
Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to
enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not
secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena
cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by
herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over
the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son
Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against
Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in
her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new
title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed
for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with
leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died
intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena
as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her
counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral
damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale
dated October 14, 1969 (Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu
thereof to issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner
of one-fourth (¼) portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-
indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of
one-fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-
fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-
00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of
Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼ Pro-
indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena Lazalita
Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing
thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the
same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of
₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages, ₱10,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages, ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and ₱3,000.00 by way of
litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its
Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.14
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
August 22, 2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided
the instant case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and
Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the
evidence on record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers
errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a
petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it
was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private
respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October
14, 1969 is simulated because Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her
property but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral. Petitioner
asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding
that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated
December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long
been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner
the right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14,
1969, the Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977
and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.18 Petitioner argues that if
the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the
petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her
death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never
uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine
held time and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial
document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its
pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust
relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of a
contract are clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner
failed to show that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving
at their assailed judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to
prove that the contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely
simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela created
a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound
at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively
simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is
the intention of the parties.20 Such intention is determined from the express terms of
their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and
gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight
of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they
are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for
being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error
in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available
to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not
have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that
the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he
must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the defendant.28 Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of
their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of
simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present
case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for
taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972
to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was
only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not,
in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.32 Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to present
even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the
disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in
the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only to
the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains
a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was
built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent
until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in
executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true intentions
through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of
which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she
is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete
step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten
years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioner’s favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in
dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside
in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership and possession are two
entirely different legal concepts.35 Just as possession is not a definite proof of
ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph
of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the
present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual
possession or occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of
sale in her favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
FACTS
Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the
night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still
being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having
known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the
hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told him
that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed
the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon
succumbed to death.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed

the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative
value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private ISSUE
respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations
contained in the said affidavit. Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res
gestae?
However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains
that private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela
and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of
contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its RULING
simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving their
allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale
stands. Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res
gestae, the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and death and right after the incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or
Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to part of the res gestae.
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, may be admitted when the following requisites concur:
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents
is DISMISSED.
(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death;
No costs.
(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of
SO ORDERED. an impending death;

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and

G.R. No. 173476 (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is a victim.
February 22, 2012
All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying
Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he
was conscious of his impending death. Bolanon died in the emergency room a few
minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after the incident.
Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in
evidence when the following requisites concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That
when he gave the identity of the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, and had no time to contrive his identification. His utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res
gestae for having borne the requisites of the both principles.
G.R. No. 173476               February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets
the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is
admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal
stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision
promulgated on November 24, 2005.1
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the
credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed
near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his
assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle
Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that
it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of
Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13
years, who was in the complex at the time.2
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period,
despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23,
2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing
blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around
Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal
area which caused Bolanon’s death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto
Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought
Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and
even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing,
victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness
Mendoza on how Salafranca had effected his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the
victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,"
Salafranca did not give Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted
inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that
he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in
Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been hiding,
there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence, especially
because he was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby
found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code with the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery (248
par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance
attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of
Correction, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00
representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying
declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and
Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that
Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not
overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
indicative of his guilt.10
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño
were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique and
unequalled position of observing their deportment during testimony, and of assessing
their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a
substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and conclusions
reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment
and conclusions,11 considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither
substitute its assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive
showing that the RTC misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant
evidentiary matters that would alter the result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show
a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no
position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were
entitled to great weight and respect.13
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by
Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to
such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill
motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the
truth.14
Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had
"encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow
using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one
encircling the blow towards below the left nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection
of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be attendant in
the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CA’s concurrence because
Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by
Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and
included an aggressive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured the
success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon.
According to the Revised Penal Code,16 treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of
statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident.
The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca? causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after
his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had
A Yes, Sir. been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as
both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
Q How long have you known him? the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.18
A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him? character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur,
namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
A Yes, Sir. circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
Q Will you look around and point him to us? homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he
will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.17
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of
Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño
had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed
him, and the latter had told Estaño that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the
time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing,
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement
to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of
his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a
stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few
minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There
is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death
can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur,
to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then
on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act."22 In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.24 The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death
indemnity of ₱50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled
by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when
death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral
damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate damages.26
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which
were different from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss
of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly
assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the
victim.28 Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were
not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set
an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status quo ante.
Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as moral
damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award
despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and
emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on human nature and
experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victim’s family.1âwphi1 It is inherently human to suffer
sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or
brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support,
but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to
them.30
The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition
of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated by
receipts, temperate damages of at least ₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it would
certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them compensation by
way of actual damages.31
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be
awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."33 Conformably with such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the
heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery. It
was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as
such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v.
Catubig:34
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches
the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of
the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense
by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to
be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed
reasonable and proper,35 because we think that a lesser amount could not result in
genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the
amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128538       February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
            SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent
DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from
State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The
loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on
the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January
12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent
LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves
jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
            SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to
SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
            SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
            In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner
contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action
was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
            The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-
court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the
following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
            1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and
the     defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits
and   that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued
in      this present action;
            2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant
SCC    Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account
of    even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
            3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC
Chemical             Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta
and Pablito           Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for
the amount of             P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
            The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
            SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of
either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC
or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial
court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
            On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
            1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.
            2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as
required                      by law.
            3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.
RULING:
            1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
            Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
            SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay       excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his   personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except   as otherwise provided in these rules.
           
            Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is to
be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity
to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness
are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner
was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's
witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No
error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's
finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's
witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
            2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the
question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission.
Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof.
            3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as
there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the
contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No
reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner
liable on its obligation
G.R. No. 128538       February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No.
45742 entitled "State Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC
Chemical Corporation." The questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case NO.
84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment
House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum
reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay
plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated
February 27, 1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is
as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its
chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito)
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in
the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus
penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-
payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan,
Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on
the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand
letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was
made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that
the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and
of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in
an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following
stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the
defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits
and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be
sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC
Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of
account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and
Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for
the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.2
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants
were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness
was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either
party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its
counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to
have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness
presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness
was not established and there was no showing that he had personal knowledge of the
transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of
the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed
out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed
from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of
error:
I
 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND
OVERCAME IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that
private respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant
evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of
attorney's fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence
through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and
whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not
demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule
130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of SIHI did not
profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by
SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section
2,5 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and
authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence.
Petitioner likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary
evidence presented by SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such
was in violation of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It
was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to consider the same.
Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents
presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided
for in Section 3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.
Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on
scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled
hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by
SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an
error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony
pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a
rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule
does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then
the same is admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a
litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.10 However,
the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-
examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was
thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that
petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now
too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that
the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of
his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of
the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial
sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having
been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause.
Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory
note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning
their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to
establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or
proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible
error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for
having sustained the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio
Communications of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where
we held that when attorney's fees are awarded, the reason for the award of attorney's
fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision. Petitioner submits that since the
trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of attorney's
fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule,
hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would
bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise
stated, given the failure by the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award
of attorney's fees, the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the
records shows that the trial court failed to explain the award of attorney's fees. We
hold that the same should thereby be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated

November 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees to private respondent SIHI is
hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.