CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE DIGEST

Submitted to:
Prosecutor Victoria C. Garcia
By:
L-1800532
Erin Galvez
1-N
TITLE VIII (8)
People v. Dalag
GR 129895
FACTS:
On August 15, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Armando C. Dalag, a member of the
Philippine National Police, killed his wife Leah Nolido Dalag by inflicting serious
multiple injuries upon her; particularly head traumas and cerebral traumas that
caused Leah’s death.

Armando would constantly beat-up his wife whenever they would quarrel. It led to
a point wherein the father of Leah, intervened and demanded Armando to stop
beating his daughter. Instead of heading to the father’s requests, Armando took
out his gun and aimed it at Marcos, his father-in-law.

On the evening of August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking hard liquor, while his
wife Leah was in the yard. Leah asked Armando to stop drinking. A few minutes
later, their three children heard something being banged on the wall. Alarmed, they
rushed to the scene where they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah until she
fell on the ground. Despite Leah already being on the ground, Armando did not stop
and continued beating her up, and punching her. The children pleaded for their
father to stop; instead of doing so, he told them not to interfere and even
threatened to beat them up as well. Armando grabbed Leah’s hair and banged her
forehead directly against the wall. In the process, Armando stepped on a nail. Leah
got up to get some medicine to treat her husband’s wound from the neighbor.
Armando ran after Leah, brought her back to their home and resumed with the
beating.

Princess Joy, one of their children noticed that their mother was lying on the ground
unconscious. She tried pouring water on the face of her mother but Leah did not
move. Armando tried to revive Leah but still no response. They brought her inside
the house. The following day, August 16, 1996, Leah still remained unconscious;
she was then brought to the hospital, and a few days later, she died because of the
injuries she sustained.

Armando was charged with Parricide

Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 42, found Armando guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide and sentenced him to the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. The Trial Court appreciated the mitigating circumstances of :
1. Voluntary surrender
2. One analogous to passion and obfuscation.

Armando appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in its decision

HELD:
NO.
The crime of Parricide as defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements:
1. a person is killed;
2. the deceased is killed by the accused; and
3. the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.

The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In
the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the
prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.
The testimony of Dr. Canto as to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by
Leah not only confirms the testimonies of the children but likewise exposes as
utterly preposterous the appellants claim that she suffered from a bad fall. Notably,
Dr. Cantos findings were corroborated by the findings of Dr. Cruel, who conducted
the post-mortem examination on Leah’s corpse. As the trial court aptly observed:
The denials of the accused that he authored the injuries sustained by his wife and
his claim that she was injured because she hit her head on two big stones when she
accidentally fell, appear illogical and a poor concoction of facts, so hard to believe
in the light of undisputed findings and conclusions by medical experts declaring
otherwise, and the recollection of facts by the eye-witnesses

The application of the mitigating circumstance of Voluntary Surrender was also

proper since Armando surrender to SPO3 Herman S. Garcia.

However, the trial court erred in applying in favor of the appellant the mitigating
circumstance of Passion or obfuscation. The trial court declared that the appellant
was agitated and angered when Leah failed to return immediately from Tia Felis
house where she was supposed to get medicine for his wounded foot. The attitude
of Leah was, as found by the trial court, obviously unjust and improper to a husband
who was suffering and bleeding.

Decision of the Supreme Court: Affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
but with modification. Appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide as provided for in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The lower penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed upon him in compliance with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
 People v. Rebucan
GR 182551
FACTS:
On November 6, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, accused-
appellant Rosendo Rebucan with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there feloniously
attack, assault, and wound Felipe Lagera, 65 years old and Ranil Tagpis, 1 year old
with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which resulted to Hypovolemic shock,
massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds that led to the death of Felipe
Lagera and Ranil Tagpis.

A case was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of
Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13 charging him of two separate counts of Murder. During
this arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
commenced.

During the Trial, the prosecution presented witnesses that would attest that the
accused indeed committed the crime that he was charged with. Carmela Tagpis
testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She identified the accused-
appellant as the Bata Endong (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and
brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was hit on the
face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the
accused- appellant, the former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the
direction of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela said that
she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that
Felipe also owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was
attacked. She was then inside the house with Felipe and her two younger brothers,
Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about four meters away when the hacking
incident occurred indoors. On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time
of the incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the house and she was
situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was also there near the bench
and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the accused-
appellant came inside the house in a sudden manner, Carmela answered in the
affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe when the accused-
appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or altercation occurred between
Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran
outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the back of the house.
On the other hand, the defense presented their witnesses to account for the
accused-appellant’s whereabouts during the time of the incident. Raymond Rance
testified that his mother’s name is Marites Rance. The accused- appellant is not his
biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated
that on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house. Felipe
placed himself on top of Raymond’s mother, who was lying down. Raymond and
his younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their mother and they were
awakened. His mother kept pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in
driving him out. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and the accused were already
living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left their house
after they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latter’s
mother. Raymond testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was
supportive of his family. He also stated that the accused-appellant seldom drank
liquor and even if he did get drunk, he did not cause any trouble.
Renerio Arminal who was the Barangay Chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara,
Leyte testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to
him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he (the accused- appellant)
fought with Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human rights action officer,
Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused- appellant
to the police station. Afterwards, the police officers came to his place and he
accompanied them to the house of Felipe.
Rosendo Rebucan was charged with the crime of Double Murder
The Regional Trial Court of Cariga, Leyte Branch 13 found Rebucan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder and to suffer the maximum
penalty of Death and to pay civil indeminities for the respective families. The RTC
also took into consideration the presence of the aggravating circumstances of:
a) evident premeditation;
b) treachery(alevosia);
c) dwelling;
d) intoxication
e) abuse of superior strength; and
f) minority.
Although there is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it cannot
offset the aggravating circumstances present in the said case.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals for automatic review since the
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death. Both
parties submitted their appeal briefs.
The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the RTC. Accused-appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Murder for the deaths of
Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua for each count of murder he has committed as the evidence of
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex crime of double
murder.
Also, the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. With respect to the ensuant mitigating
circumstances, CA credited the circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the
accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate
vindication of a grave offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil,
the appellate court also ruled that the same was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal has merit

HELD:
NO. The appeal lacks merit.
According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant
circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within
the provisions of Article 246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is a
deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and
unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for
what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-
appellant carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we
reiterate the established doctrine articulated in People v. De Guzman that in the
resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court.
Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of
Carmela, but some portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary
evidence admitted by the trial court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch
of the human anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit B for the
prosecution, stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds that were found
on his right arm, at his nose maxillary area and on his left arm. On the other hand,
the accused-appellant testified that he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the
three of which landed on the left side of the victim’s abdomen, the right side of his
neck and on his upper left arm. When confronted on the said apparently conflicting
statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any explanation.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals by finding Accused-
appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
TWO (2) SEPARATE COUNTS OF MURDER and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in both the
murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence of the lone
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly established in both
instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that the
proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for
each of the two counts of murder.
 PEOPLE v. LAGMAN
GR 197807
FACTS:
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m., Donna Maniego was in front of her
banana cue store on Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside
her mother, Violeta Sicor, inside the sidecar of a motorcycle. Without warning, the
accused approached her and punched her face several times. The accused turned
on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small
knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay for help.
Upon finding that the barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check
on her common-law spouse, Jondel Santiago, at the house of Santiago’s mother.
On her way there, she saw the accused stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance
of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between where Maniego was punched
and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters. Maniego then saw the
accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna
Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat
Andres Bonifacio Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital,
she saw the accused, who was being treated after an angry crowd mauled her.
Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting the accused that it was the
latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago. After receiving the information from
Maniego, the accused was arrested and brought to police headquarters. On cross-
examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for almost ten
years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused got angry
with her when she eloped with Santiago.
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his motorcycle
on his way home. While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets,
it was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken place. He headed towards
an area where a crowd was causing a commotion. He then saw a woman who
looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was bloodied. He handcuffed
the injured woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone. At the
time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the womans waist. He confiscated the
item and brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Hospital. He identified the woman as the accused.
At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing
was found on her body when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by
PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in the area where it was
found. She added that she had an argument only with Maniego, not with Sicor or
Santiago.

Two criminal informations charging the accused Cecila Lagman were filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 in Manila. She was charged with Murder and
Frustrated Murder.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of Murder for the death of Jondel
Santiago and is sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua and Less Serious Physical
Injuries for the she wounds inflicted on Donna Maniego.
The RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by Sicor was not on a vital part
of the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after receiving medical
treatment.
The accused-appellant filed an Appeal before the Court of Appeals stating that the
trial court erred for not considering the inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony of prosecution witness Maniego. She also averred that the same witness'
credibility was improperly appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was
different from the one who rendered the decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The appellate court
ruled that the totality of the prosecution’s evidence showed that accused-
appellants guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It added that accused-
appellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
falsely testify against her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not elements of Less Serious Physical injuries were duly established

HELD:
NO, elements of less serious physical injuries were NOT established. The RTC
properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated murder as it was not
shown that there was intent to kill. While the RTC correctly ruled that the accused-
appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder, the records do not support a conviction
for less serious physical injuries.
Art. 265 of the RPC provides, Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries
not described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the offended party
for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same
period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor. Nothing in the records, however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated
 for labor for ten (10) days or more or that she required medical attention for the same
period.
The wound on Sicor’s buttocks was immediately treated and it was proven that the
wound caused was not a mortal wound. Sicor testified that she was unable to work
for 2 days due to the injury that she sustained. Therefore, an element provided for
in Art. 265 of the RPC is missing; namely, the offended party shall be incapacitated
to work for ten days or more. The prosecution was, unable to establish that the
injury sustained by Sicor falls under less serious physical injuries absent the
requirement that her injury required medical attention for 10 days or incapacitated
her for the same period.
The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries.
Under par. 1, Art. 266 of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto
menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance
during the same period.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA with modifications. The elements
of murder are duly established hence the accused is convicted with Murder and
Slight Physical Injuries.
 PEOPLE v. MACASPAC
GR. NO 197807
FACTS:
At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Rodrigo Macaspac was having drinks
with Ricardo Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan on
Pangako Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City In the course of their drinking, an
argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that,
Macaspac uttered to the group: “Hintayin nyo ako d’yan, wawalisin ko kayo, “and
then left. After around three minutes, Macaspac returned wielding a knife. He
confronted and taunted Jubulan, saying, “Ano?”. Jebulan simply replied, “Tama
na”. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right area of
his chest and ran away. The others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. He was
rushed to the hospital but was rushed dead on arrival.

Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffed
for the possession of the knife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he
seized control of the knife. However, he later on claimed that Jebulan had been
stabbed by accident when he fell on the knife. He denied being the person with
whom Jebulan had the argument, which he insisted had been between Barcomo
and one Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his efforts
angered Jebulan, who draw out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately
evaded the stab thrust of Jebulan, whom he struck with a wooden chair to defend
himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing his chest.

An information was filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City,
charging Rodrigo Macaspac of Murder for killing Robert Jebulan.
The case was archived for more than 15 years because Macaspac had gone into
hiding and remained at large until his arrest on July 28, 2004. Upon his arraignment
on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to the foregoing information.

The Regional Trial Court of Branch 129, Caloocan City found Macaspac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced him to an imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua and to the heirs of the victim, Robert Jebulan P50,000 as moral
damages.

The accused filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court but modified the
imposition of Civil Liability. Aside from the moral damages awarded by the Trial
Court in the amount of P50,000, he is futher ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
of Robert Jebulan civil liability, exemplary damages, and temperate damages.

The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court. Macaspac is arguing that the CA
erred in affirming the decision of the RTC since the prosecution was not able to fully
establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Macaspac’s conviction for murder on
the ground that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for murder beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No. Although the Court sees no misreading by the RTC and the CA of the credibility
of the witnesses and the evidence of the parties. On the contrary, the CA correctly
observed that inconsistencies had rendered Macaspac’s testimony doubtful as to
shatter his credibility. The Court cannot uphold the CA’s conclusion on the
attendance of treachery.
Alas, Macaspac did not discharge his burden. It is noteworthy that the CA rejected
his claim of self-defense by highlighting the fact that Jebulan had not engaged in
any unlawful aggression against him. Instead, the CA observed that Jebulan was
already running away from the scene when Macaspac stabbed him.

According to the facts, he did not mount the attack with surprise because the
heated argument between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back
“to sweep them” had sufficiently forewarned the latter of the impending lethal
assault.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be
appreciated, namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the
execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. Treachery, whenever alleged in the
information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and
 raises it to the category of murder.
The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and, the lapse of a sufficient
length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.

The first and second requisites were established. But it is the essence of this
circumstance that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. By quickly returning to the group with
a knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to
carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the
resolve to commit a crime. As such, the third requisite was absent.

Without the prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either

treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the
killing of Jebulan.
The Supreme Court ruled that the accused-appellant Rodrigo Macaspac was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight years of Prison Mayor as minimum, to 14 years,
eight months and one day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
 WACOY & QUIBAC v. PEOPLE
GR Nos. 213792 & 213886
FACTS:
According to prosecution witness Benito, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, he
was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a
commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all
about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in
that position, he saw the accused Guillermo Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after
which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so.
As Aro stood up, James Quibac, also an accused, punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.
Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a
perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet,
that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled
with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest
during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation. Due to financial
constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and
eventually, died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause
of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and
generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his
remains revealed that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary
to blunt traumatic injuries."

An information was filed charging Wacoy and Quibac for the crime of Homicide
under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before the Regional Trial Court of
Benguet, Branch 10.

Trial commenced. In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied
the charge against them. They averred that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk
and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table,
causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified
him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not
for Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell
to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the
waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist
fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home.
The Regional Trial Court found herein accused Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under
Article 251 of the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and indemnified them to pay civi liabilities, as well as moral,
and temperate damages.
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly
establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the
medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained
from the mauling directly contributed to his death. In this relation, it opined that
"[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the extent
and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led
to his death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime
of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide.

Wacoy and Quibac filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of
HOMICIDE under Article 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
Contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be
convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were
only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no
tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the
crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro
was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. The CA
denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration; hence, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
HELD:
YES. The Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac's
conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will
be explained hereunder.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows:
1. (a) that there be several persons;
2. (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally;
3. (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused
and tumultuous manner;
4. (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray;
5. (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
6. (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.
Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The elements of Homicide are the following:
1. (a) a person was killed;
2. (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
3. (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and
4. (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or
by that of Parricide or Infanticide.

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in
the course of which Aro died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that
there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.
Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the
latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. Therefore,
the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the
proximate cause of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally
liable therefor, specifically for the crime of Homicide.
The Supreme Court denied the petition of Wacoy and Quibac. The decision of the
Court of Appeals are Affirmed with Modification. Accordingly, petitioners
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code.
 PEOPLE v. ABARCA
GR No. 74433
FACTS:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit
relationship apparently began while the accused, Francisco Abarca was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations while his wife was left behind in their
residence in Tacloban, Leyte. Accused went to the bus station to go to Eastern
Samar to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip in the
morning. He went back to the station in the afternoon but the bus had engine
trouble and could not leave. The accused then proceeded to the residence of his
father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at around 6:00 PM.
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. revolver. The accused who was then
peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
The accused went to look for a firearm. He went to the house of a PC soldier, Talbo,
and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house. He was not able
to find his wife and Koh there. Accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit. Arnold and Lina were hospitalized and operated on.

An information was filed before the Office of the City Fiscal of Tacloban charging
Francisco Abarca with the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder.
The case was heard in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palo, Leyte.
The RTC rendered its judgment sometime in 1986 finding the accused, Francisco
Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Complex crime of Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant
to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to death, and to
was ordered to pay indemnities to the heirs of the victim Khingsley Koh.

In 1987, the Philippines had a new Constitution, wherein the new Constitution
abolished the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment.
Hence, the RTC rendered the appealed judgment, wherein the dispositive portion
stated that It appears from the evidence that the deceased Koh and defendant's
wife had illicit relationship and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused is deserving of
executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical
reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
The case was elevated to the higher court for automatic review since the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death. The accused-
appellant appeals that the Court erred in convicting him for the crime charged
instead of entering a judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court erred in convicting him for the crime charged instead
of entering a judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
YES, the court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged. There is
no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this
case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements:
(1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-
appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim
and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be
the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised
Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . .
. immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247 does not define an offense; it
merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an
exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent.
The accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide,
parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is intended more for the protection of the accused than
a punishment.
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not
being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or
other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this
case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical
injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado.
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple.
Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of
his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony.
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not
committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting
death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold
the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the
Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered
warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") “Those not concerned, get out”, that is
not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him
liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious
physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose
upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods)
in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro)
The decision of the Appellate Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is
sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period
within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these
penalties.
 PEOPLE v. ENTRAMPAS
GR No. 212161
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas (Entrampas) and BBB were common-law
spouses. They co-habited for eight years, from 1995 to 2003. AAA, BBB’s daughter
from previous relationship, lived with them. She viewed Entrampas as her adoptive
father.
Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 pm., in a rural sitio of Barangay Bawod,
San Isidro, Leyte. AAA arrived from school to cook for her family. She was
interrupted by Entrampas and was asked to go to the room upstairs. The 11-year
old girl obeyed. Once in the room, Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the floor.
She was warned by the accused-appellant that if she shouted, he would kill her.
She was also warned that if she told her mother about what he was about to do,
he would kill them. Entrampas took off the child’s panty, undressed himself, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain as he penetrated her. Her vagina
bled. She cried and pleaded him to stop. As he consummated the act, she noticed
a knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful. After satisfying
himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her and her mother if she
informed anyone about the incident.
The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. Entrampas told AAA to
lie down, penetrated her vagina, and then left her. Over the following months,
Entrampas repeatedly raped AAA, who out of fear, and remained silent.
In July 2003 BBB observed some changes in her daughter’s body, AAA's breasts had
swollen, she had lost her appetite, and she was always sleeping. AAA’s belly had
become noticeably bigger. She was brought to the dispensary where her urine test
was submitted for analysis. AAA's pregnancy test yielded positive. Fearing for her
life, AAA refused to reveal the identity of the father of her child. Neighbors
suspected that Entrampas got her pregnant. BBB asked Entrampas, who,according
to BBB, admitted that he was the father of AAA's child.
Entrampas and BBB went to BBB’s brother, CCC, on September 2003, to confess the
crime he had committed against AAA. Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful and told
CCC to kill him for avenge AAA. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police.
On November 3, 2003, AAA gave birth to a baby boy at the North Western Leyte
District Hospital of Calubian, Leyte.
Two separate Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Calubian,
Leyte, Branch 11 charging the accused with two (2) counts of qualified rape under
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of
1997).

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of Statutory Rape as charged in the Informations and as defined and
penalized in Article 299-A of the Revised Penal Code, and in accordance with
Criminal Case No. CN-04-457, this Court is left with no alternative but to impose
upon the accused, Juanito Entrampas, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law and was also ordered to pay
indemnities.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. It held that
the inconsistencies alleged by Entrampas did not "touch upon the commission of
the crime nor affect [the minor victim]'s credibility. The CA also modified the ruling
of the RTC by increasing the indemnities that should be paid by the accused to the
victim.
Entrapas filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA for resolution whether or not he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in its decision of finding the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape.

HELD:
No, the decision of the Appellate Court and the RTC is correct. the accused-
appellant Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable Doubt of two (2) statutory rape.
On the two (2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently
communicated how the accused-appellant threatened and forced her into having
sexual congress with him. Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to
immediately report the incident to the authorities or her mother do not undermine
her credibility. The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual
molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated. A minor cannot be
expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have a
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain
immediately that she had been sexually assaulted.
Forced and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim’s perception and
judgement when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated by close
kin, such as the common-law spouse of the child’s mother, actual force or
intimidation need not be employed. While accused-appellant was not a biological
father of AAA. She considered him as a father since she was a child. Moral influence
or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It enhanced the fear that cowed
the victim into silence. Accused-appellant’s physical superiority and moral
influence depleted AAA’s resolved to stand up against her foster father. The threats
to her and her mother’s life, as well as the knife within accused-appellant’s reach,
further prevented her for from resisting her assailant. As accused-appellant
sexually assaulted AAA, she cried and pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or
to tenaciously repel the accused-appellant does not mean that she voluntarily
submitted to his dastardly act.

Accused-appellant’s act amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge

under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-A.
Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is Committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a). Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b). When the offended party is deprived of a reason otherwise unconscious;
c). By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d). When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be presented.
Acussed-appellant also committed the crime with the aggravating/qualifiying
circumstance that he was the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother. Under Article
266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-B. Penalties. –Rape
under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall punisher by Reclusion
Perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1). When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a guardian or
the common –law spouse of the parent of the victim.

The Supreme Court affirms both the decision of the trial court and appellate court
that accused-appellant Juanito Entrapas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
doubt of the crime of statutory rape as charged in the informations and as defined
and penalized in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. With
Modifications with regard to the indemnities.
 PEOPLE v. JESSIE GABRIEL
GR 213390
FACTS:
"AAA" at the time material to this case is a 17-year old first-year nursing student at
the Colegio de Dagupan and temporarily resides at the boarding house of appellant
in Dagupan City. 6:00 p.m. of February 17, 2010, “AAA”, with her cousin and co-
boarder "BBB," was inside their room at the second floor of the said boarding house
when appellant, Jessie Gabriel suddenly entered their room and accused them of
having stolen items of merchandise from his store located near the said boarding
house. "AAA" and "BBB" vehemently denied this accusation, but appellant did not
believe them. Instead, appellant directed them to see him in his room at the first
floor of the boarding house to talk about the matter. When "AAA" went inside
appellant's room, the latter
renewed his insistence that "AAA" own up to having stolen the merchandise in
question, otherwise he would bring her to the Police Station and have a theft case
against her blottered. He then told her to sit on his lap and began caressing her
back. "AAA" demanded that he stop what he was doing because she did not like it,
but he paid no heed to her demand. When "AAA" stood up to leave, appellant
pulled her back, compelled her to sit on his lap anew, and then proceeded to
unhook her bra. Accused-appellant then forced himself to “AAA” and proceeded to
have carnal knowledge upon her. Despite AAA’s constant plea for accused-
appellant to stop, he did not and proceeded to force himself upon her. He only
stopped when his child knocked on the door and called for him. When he heard his
child's knocking, he released "AAA" from his clutches, told her to get dressed and
leave the room.
"AAA" then went to the bathroom to wash and then returned to her room at the
second floor where she continued to cry. "BBB" asked her why she was crying but
she could not tell her of her forcible violation. Later that evening, "AAA's" aunt,
"CCC," and her husband "DDD," together with "BBB's" mother "EEE" (who was
earlier texted by "BBB" to come to the boarding house) arrived.
They confronted accused-appellant about his accusation that "AAA" and "BBB" had
stolen certain items from his store. It was then that "AAA" told "CCC" and "DDD"
that she had been raped by appellant.

An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch
43 charging Jessie Gabriel of Rape Contrary to Article 266-A par. 1-a, in relation to
the 2nd par. of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused Jessie Gabriel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A
(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti
Rape Law of 1997 and is hereby imposed with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

The instant rape case is one of multifarious cases where there are no dentified
witnesses, and where the evidence effectively boils down to the complainant's
word against the accused's. However, a pronouncement of guilt arising from the
sole testimony of the victim is not unheard of, so long as her testimony meets the
test of credibility. This is especially true in the crime of rape the evidentiary
character of which demands so much on the part of the victim — it entails her to
submit to an examination of her private parts, and to subject the sordid details of
her story to a public trial and against a given presumption of the accused's
innocence. To establish the crime of Rape under the article cited above, two
elements must be shown to exist. And these are; 'that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the offended party; and that the coitus was done through the use of
force or intimidation.' AAA cried profusely while recounting her awful experience
at the hands of her abuser. As has been repeatedly held, 'no young girl would
concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape, undergo medical examination,
then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive
was other than a fervent desire to seek justice.' AAA had revealed the incident to
her relatives. If it is not rape, what is it? Accused's attempt to characterize the
testimony of 'AAA' as incredible lacks merit. Accused['s] defense of denial must
crumble in light of AAA's positive and specific testimony. It is an established
jurisprudential rule that denial, like alibi, being negative self-serving defense,
cannot prevail over the affirmative allegations of the victim and her categorical and
positive identification of the accused as her assailant. 'Denial must be proved by
the accused with clear and convincing evidence otherwise they cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.'

Accused filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court erred
in finding him guilty of the crime of Rape.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of AAA is sufficient to establish the crime of Rape.
HELD:
Yes, the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy,
it is usually the victim alone who can testify on the forced sexual intercourse.
The testimony of AAA is simple, candid, straightforward, and consistent on material
points, detailing the act of rape against her by appellant. It is corroborated by the
physical evidence of fresh hymenal lacerations. The medico-legal report revealed
that AAA's perihymenal areal and fossa navicularis had erythema and her hymen
had multiple fresh lacerations at 3, 6, 9 & 12 o'clock positions. In short, the medical
examination showed evidence of sexual abuse.
It is highly improbable that a young, decent woman taking up nursing would
concoct a rape story against a man who is accusing her of a petty crime which she
denies. A woman who claims rape exposes herself to the spectacle of a public trial
where she would recount the sordid details of her ordeal. Thus, it has been
repeatedly ruled that no young and decent woman in her right mind
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by her desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against
her. Even assuming that AAA did not tenaciously resist the sexual assault[,] that
does not negate rape. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the
light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. It is settled that not all victims react the same way. Some victims may cry
out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may
appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may
be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not an
element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her
power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force
or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point. In this case, what is important is that AAA did not consent to the intercourse.
She cried as appellant ravished her and told her uncle about the rape at the first
opportunity.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court affirmed the ruling of both the
Appellate Court and Trial Court in finding Jessie Gabriel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay other indemnities.
 PEOPLE v. GUTIEREZ
GR 208007
FACTS:
The prosecution stated that AAA is 10 years old. She testified that on November
29, 2005, when she was on her way home from school to have lunch, she met the
accused Rodrigo Gutierez at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her
down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He pulled down
his pants and then inserted his penis into her vagina. According to AAA, Rodrigo
stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid
came out. He then gave her P5.00.
AAA went back to school her adviser, asked her where she came from because she
was tardy. Upon insistent questioning, AAA admitted that she came from "Uncle
Rod.” AAA was brought to the comfort room where her teacher inspected her
panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA's
private organ was swelling and her underwear was also wet. She was brought to
Baguio General Hospital where her underwear was again inspected. On the way to
the hospital, her teacher passed by the barangay hall and the police station to
report the incident.
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing
to her about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten
P10.00 or P5.00 pesos. Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical certificate issued
by the examining physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma that
could have been caused by sexual abuse additionally, there are some hematoma in
AAA's legs. The defense stated that Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at
12 noon on November 29, 2005 and claimed he was already at work at 1:30 p.m.
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived
together as common- law spouses. He also admitted that a similar complaint was
led against him by AAA's mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled
the case at the barangay level.
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59
against the accused-appellant charging him of statutory rape as punished by Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59 found Rodrigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Rodrigo filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA's testimony
was not enough to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is the required
quantum of evidence needed to convict him. He argued that she did not cry for
help when her family's house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable
doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape punishable under Art. 266-A
of the RPC

HELD:
YES, Gutierez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape. Statutory rape is
committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat
or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or
whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that
the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are
not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not
and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's
consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from
evil.
In this case, the defenses did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the
time of incident. Birth Certificate was also presented before the trial court. AAA
was also able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done
to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her
testimony deserves full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that
a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. And
this was supported by the testimonies of her teachers and medical certificate
presented.
The defense that AAA did not cry for help is immaterial since the law presumes that
such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her
own.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of both the Appellate Court and Trial Court.
finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is
ordered to pay AAA the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision until its full satisfaction.
 PEOPLE v. CRISOSTOMO
GR 196435
FACTS:
"AAA" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was playing with her
playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which was just below
their house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a
vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their house and where accused
was employed. While "AAA" was at the house of accused, she claimed that her
genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused.
"AAA" testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who
also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her,
inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6)
year old girl.
Three separate Informations, appellant was charged with rape committed as
follows: Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault), Criminal Case No. 99-
16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault), and Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape).
“BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughter's birth certificate.
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" identified his
Medico-Legal Report and testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree
burns in the perianal region. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that there was a loss
of virginity on the part of the victim.
"CCC" (aunt of "AAA") testified that she assisted the mother of "AAA" in bringing
the victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a
doctor also examined "AAA" and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of
rape. "CCC" testified that they then proceeded to the Women's Desk to file the
instant complaint against the accused.
Accused denied the allegation of rape against him and presented his brother-in-
law, Rogelio Oletin, who testified that he was tending the store located at the house
of accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 a.m. and slept
until 5:00 p.m.of the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of
accused as the latter worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the
vulcanizing shop owned by the victim's father.
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAA's" body, the
defense presented a supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan.
According to Mary, she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates
together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit" (son of accused) were burning worms near a
santol tree in their neighborhood. This Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw which
inadvertently burned the anal portion of "AAA's" body. Mary's exact words were to
the effect that "napatakan ang puwit ni "AAA".

Three separate Informations were filed In the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 73 charging the accused-appellant with with rape committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT), Criminal Case No. 99-
16236 (RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT), and Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (STATUTORY
RAPE).

The Regional Trial Court of ntipolo City, Branch 73 found appellant GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND ONE
COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE. (Article 266-A Par. 1 and Art. 267-B, Par. 7 in relation
to R.A. No. 7610).
(Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In particular, appellant insisted that
the trial court erred in finding "AAA's" testimony credible considering that she was
unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in burning her private
parts. Appellant argued that "AAA" never showed signs of shock, distress, or
anxiety despite her alleged traumatic experience. Appellant also alleged that
"CCC's" testimony should be disregarded as she was not even present when the
rape incidents happened. He opined that "CCC" influenced her niece, "AAA," to file
the suit against him which bespoke of ill- motive on her part.)

Accused-Appellant filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification as regards to the penalties imposed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court and Appellate Court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of rape
by sexual intercourse

HELD:
NO, When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is
"termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.
What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have
a will of her own on account of her tender years." In this case, the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on
April 8, 1999, appellant took off her clothes and made her lie down. Appellant also
removed his clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," inserted his penis into her
vagina, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. At the time of the rape,
"AAA" was only six years of age. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on
April 4, 1993. "AAA’s" testimony was corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Reyes who
found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Moreover, uncertainty is inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an
instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of rape
by sexual assault. " The inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony do not impair
her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not
alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. Additionally, "AAA's" reaction
does not prove the innocence of appellant. Appellant's alibi and denial are weak
defenses especially when weighed against "AAA's" positive identification of him as
the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its commission. In fact,
he admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA". As
appellant already admitted, his house is near the house of "AAA" hence there was
no physical impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for
two counts of rape by sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit
cigarette stick into "AAA’s" genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd
degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAA’s" anal orifice
causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court. finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral damages in Criminal Case
No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is increased to ₱75,000.00 and the award of
exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236
(rape by sexual assault) is increased to ₱30,000.00 for each count. In addition,
interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date
of finality of judgment until fully paid.
 PEOPLE v. JASTIVA
GR 199268
FACTS:
On August 3, 2004, then 67-year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn
("kamalig") in a farmland located at [Sitio XXX], Zamboanga del Norte, when her
husband BBB left her alone. BBB spent that night in their permanent residence at
[Sitio WWW] because their daughter has no companion.
At about 11:00 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later
identified as accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva covered her mouth, threatened her
with a knife and told her not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with
her. AAA grabbed accused-appellant’s hand and felt the blade of the knife he held.
Thereafter, accused-appellant removed AAA’s underwear. However, he cannot
proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yet erected, accused-
appellant therefore toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Accused-appellant
then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue. The latter evaded her
assaulter’s sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded
the same through her teeth. Once done, accused-appellant held his penis and
inserted it to AAA’s vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and before AAA could
stand up, accused-appellant tapped AAA’s shoulder and said "Salamat" (Thank
you).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter
passed through AAA, it was then that the AAA clearly recognized, through the
illumination of the moon, that it was their neighbor accused-appellant who abused
her. Engulfed with fear, AAA immediately closed the door because she thought that
accused-appellant might go back and kill her. AAA later learned that accused-
appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen to enter the small barn. AAA
was no longer able to sleep after the incident.
At about 5:00 in the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her
neighbor Corazon Mokot and her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her
that they will bring the matter to the attention of the authorities. On August 5,
2004, they [AAA and BBB] went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay [YYY] to report
the incident. Barangay Kagawad Celedonio Paul Payla, Jr., the officer-on-duty wrote
a barangay blotter about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically
examined by Dr. Domiciano Talaboc, the Municipal Health Officer of the
Municipality of [ZZZ]. They filed a complaint for rape with the help of the police.
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9
charging Aurelio Jastiva of rape penalized under Article 266-A in relation to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused Jastiva guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to serve the
determinate penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Being a detention prisoner, Aurelio Jastiva is entitled to the full benefit of his
preventive detention.
The accused filed a case before the Court of Appeals questioning his conviction on
the following grounds : following: (i) the RTC "gravely erred by giving weight to the
testimony of [AAA] that she recognized the accused-appellant when he went out
of the house of [AAA];" and
(ii) the RTC "gravely erred in convicting [the] accused-appellant despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."

the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC
albeit with a slight modification, i.e., that appellant Jastiva be furtherrequired to
pay interest on all damages awarded to AAA.

(1) YES, AAA positively identified Jastiva.

True, the place where the incident happened was dark, which prevented AAA from
recognizing accused-appellant as the author of her honor’s ravishment. But it was
not only through the window when AAA saw accused-appellant but also when he
passed through her upon going out the door of the small barn. This put AAA in a
position to clearly see accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant next asserts that the case of People v. Castro is on all fours with
the instant case. He claims that if indeed AAA saw him as [her] attacker, she should
have mentioned distinguishing features or physical appearance on his body to
recognize him.
We do not agree.
In Castro, therein accused-appellant Castro was practically a stranger to private
complainant Edith, thus the need for the latter to mention distinguishing features
in the face or physical appearance of the former to show that she indeed
recognized him as the person who raped her.
Unlike in this case, AAA testified that she knows accused-appellant very well, they
being neighbors. In fact, she is a friend of accused-appellant’s wife as sometimes,
the latter would sleep with her at night. Accused-appellant even admitted that she
knows AAA and that the latter could not have mistaken her for someone else. Thus,
AAA does not need to mention any distinguishing features of accused-appellant.
(2)YES, force and intimidation was exerted upon AAA.
Accused-appellant next posits that AAA’s testimony below failed to show any force
or intimidation exerted upon her. Accused-appellant stated that what further
erodes the credibility of AAA is her testimony that accused-appellant appeared to
have indulged in "sexual foreplay" first, i.e.[,] he sucked AAA’s vagina and then
went up to kiss her, which does not happen in rape cases. Usually, according to
accused-appellant, a rapist is pressed with (sic) time so as not to be caught in
flagrante delicto; thus, a rapist would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse
with his victim being in consonance with reason and common experience.
We still disagree.
For one, the "sexual foreplay" referred to by accused-appellant was not improbable
considering that as testified to by AAA, accused-appellant was not yet erected (sic)
at that time. For another, there is a sufficient reason to believe why accused-
appellant did this because he may have been aware that BBB, AAA’s husband, was
not around on that night. Certainly and more likely, accused-appellant would not
have acted upon his lewd design had he known that BBB was there in the small
barn with AAA. In addition to this was accused-appellant’s testimony that aside
from the fact that he knows AAA very much, he also knows that sometimes AAA’s
family would stay in their small barn in Barangay XXX and sometimes in their
permanent residence in Barangay ZZZ.
ISSUES:
1. Is AAA’s testimony credible?
2. Is force and intimidation exerted upon AAA?
3. Did AAA positively identify Jastiva?
HELD:
1. YES, AAA’s testimony is credible.
Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility
of witnesses are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such
conclusiveness derives from the trial court’s having the first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor and manner of the victim when he/she testified at the trial.
It is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an
accusation of rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more
difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care and caution;
and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the
crime of rape was committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the
testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may
issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s testimony. This is because no decent and
sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public
contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
2. YES, force and intimidation was exerted upon AAA.
In this case, appellant Jastiva insistently makes an issue out of AAA’s failure to shout
for help or struggle against him, which for him does nothing but erode her
credibility. This Court, however, does not agree. It does not follow that because
AAA failed to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could
not have been raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term,
depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on their
relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal
safety.
Record disclose that in this case, AAA was already 67 years of age when she was
raped in the dark by appellant Jastiva who was armed with a knife. Justifiably, a
woman of such advanced age could only recoil in fear and succumb into
submission. In any case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it would not
be reasonable to impose upon AAA any standard form of reaction. Time and again,
this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation
involving a startling occurrence.
More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a
woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Some may offer strong
resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all, just
like what happened in this case. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the
rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution
is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with
the victim – which it did in the case at bar.
3. Yes, AAA positively identified Jastiva
Appellant Jastiva’s assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside
the "kamalig" where the crime took place, utterly diminished AAA’s ability to
identify him or anyone for that matter, is downright specious. AAA never claimed
to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig." What AAA testified to was the fact
that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the open door of the
"kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. As explained by the
RTC –
In not a few cases, though, the High Court held that an accused need not always be
identified under a perfect or near perfect visibility. This was demonstrated in
People v. Villaruel with the Supreme Court saying that –
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may,
in proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility
of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.
The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even
more to the point, thus:
[I]f identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason
that one could identify persons by moonlight.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of both the Trial and Appellate Court.
Appellant Aurelio Jastiva is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE v. AAA v. CA et.al
GR 183652
FACTS:
Private respondents, Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola, together with Christian
John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and
Joseph Villame,were charged for allegedly raping AAA, a 16 year old minor by
getting AAA drunk. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty of the offense
charged.
The prosecution alleged that after AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony, she attended a graduation party dinner with her friends. AAA, together
with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of Gemeno. After
eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson's Palace. They soon had a drinking session.
At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. Soon
after, she consumed more or less five glasses of Emperador Brandy. She felt dizzy
so she laid her head down on Oporto's lap. Oporto then started kissing her head
and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop,
and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that
time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They
helped her stand up and make her drink. She leaned on Oporto's lap again, then
she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle
to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she
drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep. The next thing she knew, Roda
and Batoctoy were carrying her and then she was asleep again. When she regained
consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. During
one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her
on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying.
She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and
Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point,
AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She
cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last
time, she fell unconscious. When she woke up, she was all alone. When AAA
reached their house she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting
her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination where a hymenal
laceration and presence of sperm was found. The accused denied that they raped
AAA alleging that the sexual intercourse was consensual.
The Regional Trial Court of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21 found the
private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape. It, however,
acquitted DelaCruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The private respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate
court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court's ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents.
The prosecution was not able to prove the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and appreciated the defense that AAA has given consent to the sexual act reasoning
that she did not even shout or call for help during such act. There was presence of
old hymenal laceration meaning she has already engaged in sexual relations with
another man before the incident. The reaction of her mother in slapping her was
more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had
premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are Guilty of Rape

HELD:
Yes. Under Art. 266-A, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her
to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having
sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or
unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. Moreover, AAA
positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried
to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. Also,
the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on
AAA's part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had
sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she
was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid
and intelligent consent to the sexual act. The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the
defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a
thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed
witness. In this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to
have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a
woman against her consent.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence
presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. Due
process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside.
The appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal.
The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help,
and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter
that the sexual acts were indeed consensual. But the CA seemed to forget that AAA
was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. The elements of rape under Art.
266-A are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act
was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.
Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she
could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter
was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents
ravished her.
In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself,
sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has
been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can
usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s
testimony itself.
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The appropriate
penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or morepersons is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of
an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon them, 84 for each count. With regard to Oporto,
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next
lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within
the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal)
and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. With that, the Court shall
impose the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed. However, Oporto shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344, which
extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty- one (21) years, so
long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, and provides for the
confinement of convicted children.
The Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a
complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or
informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not
heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail
of this defense simply because they did not Ile a motion to quash questioning the
validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have
waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts
imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of
perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak
of. There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they "took turns
in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004. Further,
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA
was indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused
themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her
legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had
sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged
in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial,
the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and
impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four
(4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the
commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held
liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself
testiIed that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA's mouth, the Court cannot
convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor because the same was not
included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a
case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
 PEOPLE v. LAOAG
GR 178321
FACTS:
AAA testified that she and her friend were walking on their way to apply. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly
brought them to a grassy area. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head
with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit
AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face.
While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging
pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top
of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA,
appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA
regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she
reached her uncle’s farm at day break. When she saw him, she waved at him for
help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Cano then brought her to hospital. She later
learned that Jennifer had died. Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges
against him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the
time the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver
and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o’clock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had
reported him to the police after he went wild that same night and struck with a
lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was
already incarcerated, he learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.
Appellant Laog was charged with murder and rape in the Regional Trial Court of,
Malolos Bulacan, Branch 11.
The RTC found Laoag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art.266-A par.
(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the private complainant. The RTC also
found Laoag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua
The CA affirmed with modification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of rape and murder

HELD:
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape
is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape,
the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.
Thus, we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element
for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible.
In People v. Larranaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime,
as follows, a discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where
the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex
crimes under the Revised Penal Code are robbery with homicide, robbery with
rape, kidnapping with serious physical injuries, kidnapping with murder or
homicide, and rape with homicide.
In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the
component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision:
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or
is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases
at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically
alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in connection with
her detention and was killed subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof.
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x x
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty
for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the
occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of
AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape
with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed
Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run
away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA,
the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant
purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s body, so
that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought
that the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as
with Jennifer. But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide
were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is
someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from
our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of
homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or
on the occasion of robbery.
The crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by
reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances
treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation alleged in the
information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would not
qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with
homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head
with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the
manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first
hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable
before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally
used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his
unarmed victim.
As aptly observed by the appellate court has long been established that an attack
made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself
or repel the aggression, taking advantage ofsuperior strength does not mean that
the victim was completely defenseless.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength
over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the
employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, accused-
appellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and
weapon gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellant’s sudden attack
caught the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.
The Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal for Lack of Merit. The CA Decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.
 PEOPLE v. VILLAFLORES
GR 184926
FACTS:
The accused in this case is Edmundo Villaflores who was also known as “Batman”
in their neighborhood and was known to be a drug-addict. The victim is a four-year
and 8 months old girl named Marita. On July 2, 1999, Marita was last seen by her
mother Julia to be playing at the rear of their residence, when her mother noticed
that she was missing, she called her husband who rushed home to find their
daughter. On the next day, after the mother consulted a manghuhula out of
desperation, they found Marita’s lifeless body covered with blue and yellow sack
five houses away from their home. The result of the postmortem examination
showed that the child was raped and the cause of death is asphyxia by
strangulation.
Upon police investigation, two (2) witnesses who were Aldrin Bautista and Jovy
Solidum pointed Villaflores as the culprit. Both witnesses narrated that at about
10:00AM on July 2, 1999, they saw Villaflores leading Maria by the hand. At noon,
the three (accused, Alvin and jovy) used shabu for a while, but the witnesses did
not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house, Jovie presumed that Batman is
hiding the child at the back of his house. It was about 3:00PM when he heard cries
of a child. At about 7:00PM both witnesses saw Batman carrying a yellow sack
which appears heavy, the same sack that he saw when they are still inside the
house of Batman.
The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of July
2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sacks under their house and then went
closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack, when she confronted his
husband who was on drugs, Villaflores said it was nothing.
Testifying in his behalf, denied the charge of raping and killing the child saying he
did not see the child at any time on July 2, 1999. At around 10:00 o’ clock in the
morning of July 2, 1999, he was at the market place at Phase 10 to get some
plywood for his Aunt Maring. His Aunt called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed
there for about 5 hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon.

Accused was charged with Rape with Homicide through circumstantial evidence.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Villaflores of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, holding that
the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that his guilt was shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Can the accused be convicted of a composite crime of rape with homicide through
circumstantial evidence?

HELD:
YES. In order to convict Villaflores for the composite crime of rape with homicide,
the State must thus prove the concurrence of the following facts, namely:
1. That Villaflores had carnal knowledge of Marita;
2. That he consummated the carnal knowledge without the consent of
Marita;and
3. That he killed Marita by reason of the rape.
Under the RPC as amended, rape is always committed when the accused has carnal
knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime is commonly called
statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed incapable of giving consent
to the carnal knowledge. Marita’s Certificate of Live Birth disclosed that she was
born on October 29, 1994, indicating her age to be only four years and eight months
at the time of the commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal
knowledge of herby Villaflores would constitute statutory rape.
The crime becomes a composite crime of rape with homicide when it was made on
the occasion of the rape, which refers to a killing that occurs immediately before
or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape,
for as long as the killing is lined to rape. Although the best evidence to prove rape
is the testimony of the victim herself, the rule held that the Rules of Court allows
circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the
identity of the culprit when the rape victim is herself killed; provided however, that
such circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction.
The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals finding and
pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with homicide,
subject to MODIFICATION.
 PEOPLE v. JOSE BRONIOLA
GR. 211027
FACTS:
On February 28, 2000, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag (Abag), was
on his way home bringing some "Taiwan" fish to sell when he met the appellant at
a shortcut road passable only to people and animals. He noticed that appellant Jose
Broniola had scratches on his face and his hand was holding a lagaraw (bolo) with
blood on it. Appellant asked for the price of the fish but he did not buy and just left.
From what he had observed, appellant was restless and uneasy.
Meanwhile, AAA’s father, BBB, reported to the barangay authorities that his
daughter was missing. In the morning of February 29, 2000, he, together with Abag
and two barangay officials, began to search for AAA. They found her already dead,
lying on a grassy area near a farm hut. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds, blood
oozed from her mouth, her one hand and one finger were cut off. He knows
appellant because they are neighbors. Their families had a rift because appellant’s
father was killed by his son- in-law, Lito Miguel.
Dr. Sofronio T. Edu, Jr., Municipal Health Officer or Arakan, conducted a post-
mortem examination of the cadaver of AAA. According to Dr. Edu, the probable
cause of death was loss of blood due to the hack wounds. He also opined that the
genital injury could have been caused by a penetrating penis or any blunt object.

Jose Broniola, accused-appellant was charged with the complex crime of Rape with
Homicide.

The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused-appellant finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide.
The trial court found the testimony of Abag to be straightforward, categorical and
convincing, which established that appellant went to Sitio Kabanatian where Abag
met him coming from the shortcut road in the afternoon of February 28, 2000
carrying a blood-stained lagaraw. Said court gave no credence to appellant's
defense of denial and alibi as it failed to show the impossibility of his presence at
the scene of the crime and to rebut the prosecution's circumstantial evidence
proving that he committed the rape and killing of AAA.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court but modified the
penalty to be imposed. the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is imposed without
the possibility of parole.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide

HELD:
YES, the accused is guilty of rape with homicide.
Appellant was charged and convicted of rape with homicide. The felony of rape
with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law
treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single
criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1)
the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman
was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on
occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the
appellant killed a woman.
In this case, nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA. Appellant
however may still be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses.
Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution
may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC and CA found the following circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution as sufficient for the conviction of appellant: First, witness Abag met
the appellant on a shortcut road near the place where AAA’s dead body was found,
at about the same time (5:30 p.m.) AAA went missing as she failed to return home
that day; Second, appellant had scratches on his face and he was holding a lagaraw
a type of bolo used in the rural areas, which was stained with blood, and he was
restless and uneasy; Third, in the morning of the following day, AAA’s lifeless body
was found with several hack wounds inflicted on her face, neck and extremities,
one hand and one finger were totally severed; Forth. The post-mortem
examination conducted by Dr. Edu confirmed that AAA died from loss of blood due
to multiple hack wounds, her underwear was blood-stained, she had hymenal
lacerations and a whitish discharge was found in her vagina; Fifth, appellant had
the motive to commit the crime against AAA considering that it was BBB’s son-in-
law, Lito Miguel, who killed appellant’s father; and Sixth, appellant was evasive
when being questioned on his knowledge of the identity of his father’s killer and
the latter’s relationship to the family of AAA, and the amicable settlement executed
by his mother in behalf of appellant’s family.
We concur with the CA and RTC.
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, we are
satisfied that the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken
chain leading to the one fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant was the
perpetrator of the crime.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary
damages are increased to ₱100,000 each and that temperate damages of ₱25,000
is awarded to the heirs of AAA.
 PEOPLE V. SUANSING
GR 189822
FACTS:
“AAA” used to live in Tangub City with her grandparents but was later transferred
to the residence of “EEE” who raised her as her own daughter.
Sometime before April 8, 2001, "GGG" requested "FFF" to get from appellant Jojie
Suansing’s boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. "FFF" together with
her brother and "AAA" went to the boarding house of appellant. After giving the
requested items, appellant ordered "FFF" and her brother to leave "AAA" behind.
"FFF" brought the items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was still with
appellant, requested "FFF" to return to appellant’s boarding house to fetch "AAA."
Upon arriving at the boarding house, "FFF" noticed that the door was closed. She
called out to "AAA" to go home to avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA" opened the
door and came out fixing her short pants. "FFF" then asked "AAA" if anything
happened. "AAA" replied that after "FFF" and her brother left the boarding house,
appellant pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and panty, told her to lie
down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent.
"AAA" requested "FFF" not to tell anyone that she was raped by appellant. "EEE"
learned about the rape and confronted "AAA." "EEE" then reported the incident to
police authorities. The genital examination of "AAA" on August 6, 2001 revealed
old hymenal lacerations. Her psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was
suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child.
In his testimony, appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that he used to live
with "AAA" and her relatives and was considered a member of their family. He
treated "AAA” as his niece and he knew about her mental retardation. He belied
the statement of "FFF" that "AAA" was fixing her short pants when she came out of
his room. Appellant claimed that the relatives of "AAA" filed the instant case
against him because his sister, "GGG", no longer gives them financial support.

Jojie Suansing was charged with the crime of Rape

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape. the RTC also ruled that since "AAA's" mental
retardation was not specifically alleged in the Amended Information, it cannot be
considered as a qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the
death penalty. The RTC stated that the "mental disability" of "AAA" at the time of
the rape relates to a broad description of several mental ailments and that the
Amended Information failed to specify what constitutes "mental disability."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Simple Rape

HELD:
NO. The accused-appellant is guilty of qualified rape.
Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition
of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial
assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with
one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent
to the carnal act already constitutes rape without requiring proof that the accused
used force and intimidation in committing the act." Only the facts of sexual
congress between the accused and the victim and the latter’s mental retardation
need to be proved.

In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond

reasonable doubt the sexual congress between appellant and "AAA" and the
latter’s mental retardation. "AAA" positively identified appellant as her rapist. The
Court is not persuaded by appellant’s denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive identification by "AAA" of him as the perpetrator of the
crime.

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the rape
qualifies and makes it punishable by death. He also admitted that "AAA" was known
to be mentally retarded in However, such knowledge by the rapist should be
alleged in the Information. Clearly, appellant’s knowledge of the mental disability
of "AAA" at the time of the commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged
in the Amended Information. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the
mental retardation of "AAA." Appellant testified that he knew "AAA" and that he
even used to reside with her and her relatives. He also admitted that “AAA” was
known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of "AAA" was
easily noticeable to the RTC from the answers she gave to the questions
propounded to her in the course of her testimony. We also stress that from the
filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not assail "AAA’s" mental disability
and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellant’s
knowledge of "AAA’s" mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime
qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified
rape.

The Supreme Court ruled that RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death
penalty. In lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance
with Section 2 of RA 9346. In addition, as provided under Section 3 thereof,
appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be ₱75,000.00 if the rape is perpetrated with any
of the attending qualifying aggravating circumstances that require the imposition
of the death penalty. Moral damages must also be awarded in rape cases without
need of proof other than the fact of rape since it is assumed that the victim suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award. Exemplary damages are likewise
called for, by way of public example and to protect the young from sexual abuse.
Appellant Jojie Suansing is hereby found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. The amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded to "AAA" are increased to ₱75,000.00 each. Appellant Jojie
Suansing is also ordered to pay "AAA" exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00.
 PEOPLE v. CATAYTAY
GR 196315
FACTS:
On September 7, 2003, BBB, the mother of AAA was told that there is a problem
and was brought to the barangay. She saw AAA and Leornardo Cataytay at the
outpost. AAA told her that she was raped by Cataytay. During the interviews made
by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused- appellant,
which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. Cataytay answered the
knock and Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house.
AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. The report stated
that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified
AAA's birth certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the
time of the incident. When AAA appeared a witness for the prosecution they stated
that it was apparent that she was mentally retardate. AAA, testified that she was
raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her
protestations and she was given money by Cataytay. For the defense, Cataytay
testified he was in his house on that day and he then went out and proceeded to a
videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his house, where he stayed for less
than 5 minutes when barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested him stating
that he is a suspect in the rape of AAA. He denied the accusations against him. He
estimated that the house of BBB was more or less 50 meters away from his house,
and that it would take more or less a one minute walk from the videoke bar to the
house of AAA. Moreover, he admitted that by merely looking at AAA, he could tell
that she has a mental disability. Accused-appellant's brother, Jose, testified that
Cataytay was inside their house feeding his daughter. At around 7:00 p.m., he told
Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was around 30 meters away from
their house where he stayed for 5 to 10 minutes, then went back to their house
and watched television. Accused- appellant was arrested that night within the
vicinity of their house by the barangay tanods. He estimated that AAA's house is 20
to 30 meters away from the videoke bar, and that it would take less than five
minutes to reach the house of AAA from the videoke bar. Moreover, Alicia, shated
that she heard AAA shouting that she was raped. She asked AAA who raped her.
AAA replied "Pilay," referring to their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay. Alicia saw
Jun Pilay run from AAA's house towards a dark area.

Leonardo Cataytay, accused was charged of the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code
The Regional Trial Court found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of rape against one [AAA] defined and penalized under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10 of
the same Code. As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y
SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from
TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua.

Cataytay filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals claiming that the testimony
concerning the details of the commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay
and therefore has no probative value and that since AAA is a mental retardate she
can be easily influenced.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the accused-appellant and affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Modifying the penalty to simply reclusion perpetua and reduced
exemplary damages to Php 30,000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cataytay is guilty of Rape

HELD:
YES. AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics
of the assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated
the same when she was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the
incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to
prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar
,immaturity are generally badges of truth.

Under Art. 266-A rape is committed b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious and d) when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above
be present among others.
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the
mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed
to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the “mental age of the victim
whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen
(19) years old
x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child.”

The Supreme Court found the Accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged

in the Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special
qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been
imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals
correctly modified the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be
applied.
As regards accused-appellant’s civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the
amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision by granting the additional
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and reducing the award of exemplary
damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People v. Lumaho, where the
penalty for the crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because of
Republic Act No. 9346, we increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be
imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, we impose 6% interest per
annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.
 PEOPLE v. NERIO, JR.
GR 200940
FACTS:
Martin Nerio, Jr. was accused of raping AAA, a 13-year old and mentally retarded.
AAA went missing one day during school hours. Her mother Kathlene, who works
at the canteen of the same school, notice that AAA was missing during school hours
but did not worry until after school hours when AAA is still nowhere to be found.
She tried to look for her but to no avail. AAA’s father, Rick, was told that AAA was
seen boarding a minibus with a group of people who just had picnic at the beach.
They were able to locate the owner the minibus bound to Matanao, Davao Del Sur.
Arthur Lucero, the charterer of the minibus, help them locate the house of the
Nerios. Upon arrival, the mother of the accused, Violeta, opened the door. She told
them that AAA was sleeping upstairs but immediately corrected herself that AAA
was sleeping in the ground floor. Nonetheless, Kathlene who started to proceed
upstairs continued and in a one room, saw her daughter scantily clad sleeping
beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on his shoulder. AAA was
examined by Dr. Arthur Natividad and a laceration in her genital area was found. A
psychological assessment report was also submitted to show AAA’s mental
retardation
Violeta stated that AAA boarded their minibus and would not leave. She also said
that she slept with Nerio and AAA at the ground floor and between them. On the
other hand, Nerio stated that they knew all along that AAA is a special child and
that he slept downstairs while AAA, along with her mother and sisters, slept
upstairs.

Martin Nerio, Jr was charged with the crime of Rape.

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt and is hereby meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is ordered to pay
civil indemnity and moral damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of Rape
2. Can there be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rap
where the victim is mentally retarded and was not present in court during
the trial
HELD:
1. YES. It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardant is
rape as she is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious. The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass
those who are suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation. Carnal
knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but with the mental age of
a child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape because a
mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent consent to such act. The
essence of the offense is whether the alleged victim has the ability to render an
intelligent consent, and therefore, could not have been deprived of the required
reason at the time of the sexual congress. Contrary to the assertion of the defense,
the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child.
Evidence of mental retardation:
1. Nerio’s admission;
2. Dr. Natividad’s observation that AAA acted like a child during physical
examination;
3. The Psychological Assessment Report; and
4. Lower court’s observation that while in court AAA would bury her head in
Kathlene’s lap and make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds.
2. YES.It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential. However,
when the victim is a small child or, as in this case, someone who acts like one, and
thus cannot effectively testify as to the details of the offense, and there are no
other eyewitnesses, resort to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. It is not
a weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. Here, AAA was not presented
to testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge the functions of
a credible witness.
Circumstances relied upon by court:
1. Positive identification of Nerio seen alone in bed with AAA naked;
2. Incosisteny of testimonies of Nerio and his mother;
3. Dr. Natividad’s finding of fresh hymenal laceration which could not have been
inflicted more than 3 days; and
4. Non-showing that AAA met with another man during the 3-day period.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Trial Court that the accused-
appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. As regards to the
imposition of damages, the SC modified it by adding an exemplary damage of 30k
to deter others from committing bestial acts specially against mentally challenged
persons.
 PEOPLE v. OBOGNE
GR 199740
FACTS:
The information reads as follows: On or about July 29, 2002, in the afternoon, in
barangay Ogbong, Viga, Catanduanes, Philippines, accused Jerry Obogne, by means
of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of “AAA”, a 12–year old mentally retarded person. When
arraigned,appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
“AAA” recalled that while she was playing, Obogne saw her and asked her to go
with him because he would give her a sugar cane. Then he brought “AAA” to his
house and while inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her
vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane. Then he brought “AAA”
to his house and while inside, he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis
into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he
gave it to her and then she
went home.

Accused Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of Rape

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Simple Rape committed against "AAA"and, hereby, sentences him to
suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify "AAA".
The trial court did not consider AAA’s mental retardation as a qualifying
circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information that Obogne knew of
AAA’s mental disability.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and modified the award of damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court and Appellate Court err in not considering mental
retardation as a qualifying circumstance

HELD:
NO. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of
simple rape and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 266–B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability could not be considered as a
qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant
knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As held
in People v. Limio:
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call
for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental
disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.

For the Anti–Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266–B of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of ‘(10) when
the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.’ Said
knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance,
which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction
of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266– B (10), RPC, could not be sustained,
although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
The mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically
merit the imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266–B (10) of the Revised
Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional
disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the
qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. As such
this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by
the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x
But in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in the information that the
appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate
proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266–B (10), RPC, could not be properly
applied.
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article
266– A of the Revised Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Appellate and Trial Court finding
appellant Jerry
 Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE v. JOSON
GR 206393
FACTS:
Michael Joson y Rogando the biological brother and thus a relative within the
second degree of consanguinity of AAA a minor fourteen (14) years of age had
carnal knowledge of said AAA, against her will and consent. Upon arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution stated the testimony of the victim wherein it was stated that AAA
lives with Joson and his common-law partner. AAA testified while appellant's wife
was away she was awakened by Joson undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but
appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and
mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain
in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At
about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for
what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. On the same day, AAA told
Joson’s wife the rape incident and she reported the incident while being
accompanied by her father. The prosecution also presented a provisional medico-
legal report on the examination conducted on AAA which essentially states that
there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination. They also
submitted AAA’s birth certificate prove that she was still a minor at the time the
rape was committed on 14 May 2009. Joson admitted that AAA is his sister but he
claimed that he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back
to his house in Dasmariñ as on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the
accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict
with his sister. Appellant also denied writing the apology letter and presented his
specimen handwriting in court.

Michael Joson, accused was charged with violation of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
indemnify to the victim by way of moral damages (Php50,000), civil indemnity ex-
delicto (Php50,000) and exemplary damages (Php25,000).
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA and considered the letter as
admission against appellant’s interest.
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the
elements of rape under Article 266-A. Appellant argues:
(1) that AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with the use of
any weapon nor did appellant say anything to threaten or intimidate her;
(2) that the Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those
close kin who has moral ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for
force and intimidation; and
(3) that that there was no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his
alleged sexual advances.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the appellate court. In a Resolution dated
19 June 2013, the Court ordered the elevation of the records and directed the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs should they so desire. However,
appellant and the Office of the Solicitor-General both manifested that they were
adopting their respective appeal briefs previously filed with the Court of Appeals.
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape
as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements
of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she
was threatened by appellant with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor
did appellant say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to moral
ascendancy, appellant contends that the Court in a recent case did not consider a
brother as one of those close kin who has moral ascendancy over a victim that
would substitute for force and intimidation. Appellant further points out that there
was no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellate court erred in finding the appellant guilty of Rape

HELD:
NO. AAA’s testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article
266-A of the RPC. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA
positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering
in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant
employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we
quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is
required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The
parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating
the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force
which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if
employed against a person of tender age.
Under Article 266-A of the RPC, the prosecution must prove that:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented.
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force
sufficient to consummate the rape. At the time of the incident, AAA was only 14
y/o. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the
accused-appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant
in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force
or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the
desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside
the point.
We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant’s insistence that the absence of
any resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress
was without her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the
sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need
not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the
victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear. After all, resistance is not
an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA’s claim that the
accused-appellant consummated his bestial act.
Anent appellant’s argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her
sister, the victim, that could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in
People v. Villaruel, as cited by the Court of Appeals, has rejected such proposition.
“The accused-appellant was her older brother who had definitely moral
ascendancy over her. xxx More importantly, the moral ascendancy and influence
the accused-appellant has over the complainant sufficiently substitute for the force
and intimidation required in rape.”
We likewise agree that appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding appellant
Michael Joson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded
is increased to P100,000.00; moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary
damages to P100,000.00. SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE v. CANDELLADA
GR 189293
FACTS:
AAA was the second of three daughters of Candellada and his deceased first wife.
AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latter’s second wife, while AAA’s two
sisters lived with Candellada’s mother. While they were still living in Davao,
Candellada impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant,
accused-appellant brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant and
AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.
Candellada approached Gemina, who he came to know during a previous visit to
Lanao del Norte in 1993. Candellada asked permission if he could stay at Gemina’s
old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina
immediately noticed that AAA was pregnant. She also commented that AAA was so
young she could already be accused-appellant’s daughter, but accused-appellant
only laughed. Gemina and her husband allowed accused-appellant and AAA to stay
at their old house on the condition that accused-appellant would pay for the
electricity.
While they were staying at Gemina’s old house, accused-appellant had intercourse
with AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on
May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004;
November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004
On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA.
AAA refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit
her head with a piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious.
Candellada for his defense states that he and AAA had misunderstandings because
he would admonish AAA for roaming around late in the evening. In 2004, AAA got
pregnant and had to stop her studies. Accused-appellant did not inquire from AAA’s
sisters, friends, classmates, or teachers who impregnated AAA. Accused-appellant,
upon the insistence of his second wife, brought AAA to Lanao del Norte to conceal
AAA’s pregnancy. Accused-appellant and AAA stayed at Gemina’s old house while
in Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant denied introducing AAA to Gemina as his
wife. He introduced AAA to Gemina as his daughter and said that AAA was
impregnated by a classmate. By accused-appellant’s account, AAA gave birth on
October 10, 2004 but the baby died. Accused-appellant and AAA were planning to
go back to Davao in January 2005 after accused-appellant had saved enough money
from making charcoal and cutting grass.
Accused-appellant was charged eight counts of consummated rape, and one count
of Attempted Rape.
The Regional Trial Court acquitted Candellada for the crime of attempted rape since
the prosecution was not able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, In Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-
2005, 163-07-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005, pursuant to
Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, in relation with Republic Act No.
7[6]10, otherwise known as Anti-Child Abuse Law, =nding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged and committed against his minor
daughter, [AAA], and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in
each of the 8 counts thereof;
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the sentence
and award for damages. After taking into account the qualified aggravating
circumstancesof minority of the victim and her relationship with accused-appellant
Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente Candellada) is directed and ordered to serve the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the eligibility for parole for each rape
committed under Criminal Cases Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-
200[5],162-07-2005, 163-07-200[5], 164-0[7]-200[5], 165-07-2005, and 166-07-
2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the decision of the Trial Court

HELD:
YES. There is no merit in the petition. Qualified rape is defined and punished under
the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. –Rape is committed–
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
2. b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
3. c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
4. d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the
ordinary elements of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and
without consent; and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the
additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of
the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim.
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by
accused- appellant during the pre-trial conference. The existence of the first three
elements was established by AAA’s testimony.
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that AAA’s testimony deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases,
primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The
settled rule is that the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in
rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times, even
finality. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position
to decide the question of credibility.
Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. No such facts or
circumstances exist in the present case.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or
made threats to AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in
rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common- law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence or intimidation.

The Supreme affirmed the decision of the Appellate and Trial Court with
modification that the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA shall be
increased to ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages awarded shall be
subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid. No costs
 PEOPLE v. CIAL
GR 191362
FACTS:
"AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB"
cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as "Onot"). Appellant and
"BBB" have two (2) children.
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the
bedroom inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAA’s" shorts and
panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and
inserted his penis into the little girl’s vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not
try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust,
appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to
anyone. At that time, "AAA’s" maternal grandmother was in the house but was
unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But
"AAA’s" mother did not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her
maternal uncle’s house. There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her
mother’s siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by appellant’s wrong doing.
But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when appellant
fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the house of
her aunt. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District Hospital
in Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial.
Dr. Imperial issued a Medico-Legal Report which essentially states that:
1. She was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area,
with normal external genitalia;
2. The hymen has an old laceration on the 12o’clock and 5o’clock positions, introitus
admits one examining finger with ease; and
3. Spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of spermatozoa.
On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for
Women at Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still
continued to reside therein at the time of her testimony.

As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA"

as his own daughter. He also claimed that "AAA’s" aunt fabricated the charge
because appellant called her a thief.
appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a 13-year old minor “AAA”.
The charges allege that commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying
circumstances of minority, the victim being less than 18 years old, and relationship,
the accused being the common-law husband of complainant’s mother.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of qualified
rape. Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the death
penalty, the trial court instead sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified sentence and
award of damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial and Appellate Court correctly appreciated the Qualifying
Circumstances in the crime of Rape

HELD:
NO. Both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule
otherwise.
Upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never
presented or offered during the trial of the case. Up until the prosecution rested its
case, nobody was presented to testify on "AAA’s" Certificate of Live Birth. Records
show that the prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses.
Dr. Imperial never testified on "AAA’s" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified
on the witness stand that she does not know her age clearly, the prosecution failed
to prove the minority of "AAA".
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship.
The prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish "AAA’s" relationship with the
appellant. Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law
husband of "AAA’s" mother, "AAA’" referred to appellant as her step-father.
Given that Marciano and AAA's mother were not legally married, the qualifying
circumstance that the accused is the common-law husband of the victim's mother
may be properly appreciated.
The terms "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal
connotations. For appellant to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally
married to "AAA's" mother.
Qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the
crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly tailed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant
should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is
reclusion perpetua.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals. From Qualified
rape to Rape. The accused-appellant is found guilty of rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnities imposed by the
court.
 PEOPLE v. LUCENA
GR 190632
FACTS:
Manolito Lucena ,appellant, a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, took advantage of his
position to have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of
age, against her will and consent. Upon arraignment, the appellant, pleaded not
guilty. The prosecution alleged that, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was
then 17 years old, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the
streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, when two barangay tanods, one of whom
is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested for
violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA's companions,
however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. AAA was then
ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. AAA was brought within the
vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay Hall. After a while, the appellant told the other
tanod that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house. However, instead
of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge.
While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she
resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight
from the tricycle. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and
positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and
commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the
gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina despite the
latter's plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short
while, or after about five minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into
AAA's vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted
again his penis into AAA's vagina. The appellant stopped ordered AAA to dress up.
The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone
about what happened between them. The following day, AAA filed a complaint
against the appellant. AAA was also examined by Dr. Tan where it was found that
she had hymenal lacerations and that there are evidence of blunt force.
The defense alleged that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall.
Then he received a call from his companion, a barangay tanod. He cannot recall any
unusual incident that transpired on that day. He also admitted the he knew AAA as
the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied that he knew her
personally. Among the things that he denied are a) raping AAA; b) that he was one
of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance
of their barangay; and c) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the
barangay hall.

Accused Manalito Lucena is charged with three counts of Rape

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266-a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B of the
RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape and to pay civil indemnities.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the Trial Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Appellate court err in affirming the conviction of the three
counts of rape considering that the reis only an intervening period of five minutes
between each penetration.

HELD:
NO, the CA did not err in doing.
It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis
into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after
satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would
again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault
upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several
criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.

In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time,
he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood
up and commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and,
for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued
making pumping motions.
From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one
count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no
indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful
desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This
Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act
of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.

The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron
Case.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages (the Court consider the use of
gun in awarding exemplary damages).
 PEOPLE v. TIONLOC
GR 212193
FACTS:
It is alleged that Juan Richard Tionloc, appellant, committed sexual abuse upon AAA
by making her drink liquor which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of
unconsciousness and brought her to a room and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will. Upon arraignment, Tionloc pleaded "not guilty."
Another Elvis Meneses was involved in the commission of the crime but could not
be prosecuted due to his minority. The prosecution stated at around 9:30 p.m. of
September 29, 2008, she was drinking with Tionloc and Meneses in the house of
Tionloc. Soonafter, she felt dizzy and took a nap. She was roused from her sleep by
Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina. She feared
that the knife lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted.
Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering,
appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she
did not reply appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she
tried to reposition her body. AAA immediately returned to the house she shared
with her live-in partner. The following day, AAA reported the incident to the police.
She also underwent a medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations
in her hymen.
The defense alleged that Juan Tionloc was having a drinking session with his cousin,
Gerry Tionloc. When Meneses and AAA arrived and joined them. Meneses and AAA
went inside his bedroom and continued drinking while he went out of the house to
buy food. When he returned and entered his bedroom, he saw Meneses and AAA
having sex. Meneses then came out of the bedroom followed by AAA who was
holding a bottle of rugby.

Three counts of rape were filed against Richard Tionloc

The Regional Trial Court clarified that appellant is charged with rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC based on the allegations in
the Information and not with rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of the same
provision of law, as the designation in the Information suggests. The RTC stressed
that this is consistent with the legal precept that it is the allegations or recital in the
Information that determine the nature of the crime committed.

Thus, the RTC ruled that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape punishable under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It
held that the prosecution successfully established the crime through the testimony
of "AAA," which was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding Tionloc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

HELD:
Yes, The trial court gravely erred in finding Tionloc guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape
The prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by
presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266- A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is
a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was
accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation.
In the present case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old
man who had sexual intercourse with AAA, a 24 year old woman. However, there
was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during
his sexual congress with AAA. Moreover there is no showing that Tionloc or
Meneses forced, threatened or intimidated her. There was no evidence that the
knife was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her. Moreover,
Meneses was already gone when Tionloc asked AAA for a sexual favor. The source
of the feigned force, threat or intimidation was no longer present when appellant
casually asked AAA if they can do it. AAA did not respond either in the affirmative
or in the negative. Therefore, appellant never employed the slightest force, threat
or intimidation against AAA; She never gave the slightest hint of rejection when
appellant asked her to have sex with him; and, appellant did not act with force since
he readily desisted when AAA felt the slightest pain and tried to move during their
sexual congress.
It would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman who, after
giving him the impression through her unexplainable silence of her consent and
allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and
charged him with rape. Additionally, their age gap negates force, threat or
intimidation; he was only 14 while AAA was already 24. Lastly, the fact that AAA
was tipsy cannot be held against the appellant. There is authority to the effect that
"where consent is induced by the administration of drugs or liquor, which incites
her passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the accused is not guilty of
rape." Therefore, Tionloc is not guilty of rape.

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and acquitted Tionloc
due to insufficiency of evidence.
It has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles
appellant to an acquittal.
 PEOPLE v. JUMAWAN
GR 187495
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan, and his wife, KKK, were married have lived
together since then and raised their four children. On February 19, 1999, KKK
executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband raped her. He pleaded
not guilty. The prosecution alleged that in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. His
abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. On the day of the
incident, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not
lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior made her angry. KKK insisted to stay on the cot and
explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took
her pillow and transferred to the bed. The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK
and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers
on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she
was not feeling well. The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and
when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so
forcefully they tore on the sides. The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,
stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him
away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying
out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest. The accused-appellant's
aggression recurred the following night. The accused-appellant denied raping his
wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. He also alleged that KKK was having
extramarital affairs and money squandering.
Two informations for Rape Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997. were filed against the accused Edgar Jumawan.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused Edgar Jumawan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the Trial Court.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimonies of KKK,
MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements
of rape under R.A. No. 8353; that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a medical
certificate is not necessary to prove rape; that Edgar’s argument that “he and KKK
are spouses with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, thus, to
prove rape, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the
alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises” deserves no merit;
that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and
convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have
sexual intercourse with the accused; that the fact that KKK and Edgar are spouses
only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right
mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true; that the
delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when
the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical
injuries told her about it; and that Edgar's alibi must be dismissed for lack of
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence
in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering
that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or
five hours away.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband can be held liable for committing rape upon his lawful
wife.

HELD:
YES, a husband may be liable for marital rape. In rape cases, the conviction of the
accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Here, KKK and her testimony
were both credible and spontaneous.
In the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the
absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress. Under the law, consent is
absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation,
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable
of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.
Here, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of
which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the
pertinent testimony of KKK.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with Edgar to their conjugal bedroom on October
16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. Edgar was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for
her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act of
KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place.
The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally
required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent
was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when
it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case,
that point is when Edgar tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended
to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim
the burden to prove resistance much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof. Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be
irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is
necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and
hapless victim to bow into submission. At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible
and intelligible resistance for Edgar to recognize that she seriously did not assent
to a sexual congress.
Moreover, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the
victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical
certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details
do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -
sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.
Edgar’s assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they
did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who
can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Hence, the
probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's
narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the
rape incidents.
In this case, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that
Edgar, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced
carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK, on the nights of October 16 ad 17, 1998.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because
they failed to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK
belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting
sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife
to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that
she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. told her
about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
against Edgar.
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No.
8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it
was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor
Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common
factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more
cumbersome in marital rape cases.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the trial and appellate courts were able to prove
the accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Marital
Rape.
 PEOPLE v. AMARELA &RACHO
GR 225642-43
FACTS:
AAA was watching a beauty contest with her aunt at a basketball court where a
make-shift stage was put up. She went to the comfort room beside the building of
the Maligatong Cooperative near the basketball court. However, she was not able
to reach the comfort room because Amarela was already waiting for her along the
way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked
and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of
the day care center, punched her in the abdomen and had carnal knowledge of her.
When she called for help, three persons came and brought her to a hut. However,
they also had bad intentions with her. Luckily, she managed to escape. She went to
the house of Dumandan who brought her to the Racho residence because
Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Neneng Racho asked her son
(Racho) to bring her to her aunt's house instead. While on the way, AAA stated that
Racho had carnal knowledge of her when she was brought to a shanty against her
will and boxed her lower abdomen. Amarela denied raping AAA. Also, Racho
confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but denied raping her stating
that he could not have raped AAA due to his long scar on his left arm.

Two informations were filed against Juvy D. Amarela And Junard G. Racho for the
crime of Rape.
The two cases were jointly tried by the Regional Trial Court.
The Regional Trial Court found b Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho
(Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) different charges of rape and
imposed upon them the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged against
them

HELD:
No, the accused – appellants are not guilty of rape.
After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony,
reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the
truth due to the following reasons, (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her
a davit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court
(2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark
and she only saw him for the first time;
(3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage
against her will; and
(4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive
of any signs of forced entry. What needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in
a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral
certainty that the accused is guilty.
The court is constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence
of lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case.
Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the
prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court reversed both the rulings of the trial and appellate court on
the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crimes charged against them. Hence, accused-appellants are
acquitted.
 RICALDE v. PEOPLE
GR 211002
FACTS:
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s
Bel- Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative
and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.
After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was
late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach
and something inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When
Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what
happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted
Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked him to leave. XXX’s
mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to
report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station. The police referred them to the
municipal health center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX
and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also "NEGATIVE for
[s]permatozoa."
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the
Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.
Ricalde denied the accusations. He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town
fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX’s mother is the cousin of his cousin
Arlan Ricalde. He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house. On
January 30, 2002, XXX’s mother picked him up to sleep at their house. He slept at
10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor. He denied the
alleged rape through sexual assault.

Ricalde is charged with Rape by Sexual Assault

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but with modification as to
the award of damages.
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have
applied the "variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa, and the court would have
found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code. The petition then enumerated circumstances showing
possible homosexual affections between petitioner and XXX. These include the fact
that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXX’s penis.
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX
mistook as penetration. XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as
a male organ trying to enter his [anus]." Assuming these acts took place, these
would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Richard Ricalde, the accused’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape through sexual assault

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction with modification on the
penalty imposed.
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or
object rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." The gravamen of rape
through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal
orifice."
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not
conclusive effect." No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower
courts’ findings.
First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony
fails to convince.
In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies
of child victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity." XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against
petitioner.
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are
minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse."
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into
his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal
orifice. This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief that
"[a]lthough it is true that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out
the possibility of rape in cases where the victim remained physically intact at the
time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing that in the instant
case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellant’s penis fully
penetrated his anus."
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was
inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through
sexual assault was committed.
The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of
an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony
of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human
nature.
Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People
v. Sumingwa.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with
qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the accused’s] penis
into [the victim’s] vagina."
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was
proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus." The slightest
penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the
crime of rape.
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation
can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to
the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of
penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant
only insofar as these define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does
not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape
is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of
the penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to the victim’s dignity is
incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative
psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-
destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal
difficulties. Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just
because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes
are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished
was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a
message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than
another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts.
Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person’s will and body. In terms of
penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness
than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was
not raised in this case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in
favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty
for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim. (Citations
omitted)
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was
established by his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. His age
of 10 years old was alleged in the Information. The higher penalty under Republic
Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law
(Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide
greater protection for children.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused with modification as to
the penalty imposed by the lower court tot the penalty under Article III, Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610.
 PEOPLE v. DULAY
GR 193854
FACTS:
AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister introduced
accused Dina Dulay to AAA as someone who is nice. Dulay thereafter convinced
AAA to accompany her at a wake at San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to
the said wake, they went to a casino to look for Dulay’s boyfriend, but since he was
not there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. Dulay’s boyfriend was also not there.
They thus went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish
when they saw Dulay’s boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA, Dulay and the latter's boyfriend
proceeded to a “Kubuhan” located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. There,
Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed"
was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dulay and heard "Speed" tell Dulay
to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands
to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dulay’s help when she saw the latter
peeping into the room while she was being raped, but to no avail. After the rape,
"Speed" and Dulay told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they
would get back at her.
AAA told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother about it.
AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter,
the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station.
Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a
social worker of the DSWD, Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical
examination on AAA which yielded a Medico-Legal Report stating that there was
no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot exclude sexual
abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion
pertains to the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found multiple
abrasions on the back portion of the body of AAA.
In her defense, Dulay maintained that she met AAA when the latter was introduced
to her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag.
The cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the
morning of the alleged incident, Dulay averred that she was at La Huerta, at the
Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for
about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of Dulay’s cousin in
Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons.
She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his two (2)
companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it
was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response
of AAA, Dulay left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.

Dina Dulay, accused was charged with the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1
(a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610
The Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua under Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code and to award damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as
to damages
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dulay is liable as co-principal for the rape of AAA.

HELD:
NO. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the
acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of
rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have
offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up
being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the
crime of rape.

However, while Dulay was found not to have committed the crime of rape as a
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a)
of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, which provides that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include,
but are not limited to, the following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
 4. Threatening o rusing violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution.
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. The accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. The act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
1. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written
or oral advertisements or other similar means;
3. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a
prostitute;
4. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute;
or
5. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child
with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. The child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In
other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant
facilitated or induced child prostitution. Undoubtedly, the same falls under Section
5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a procurer of a child and inducing the
latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that the character of the crime is
not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.

The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the Lower courts modifying the
conviction stating that the appellant is NOT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610,
amended, for which she is sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum and is also ordered to award damages.
 BONGALON v. PEOPLE
GR169533
FACTS:
The prosecution claimed that Jayson and, his brother, Roldan joined the procession
and when they passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary
Ann Rose, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner
confronted the brothers and called them names like "strangers" and "animals";
that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on
the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged their
father, Rolando, to a fight; that Jayson was brought to the police and the hospital
where the doctors attested that there were contusions.
The petitioner denied it and explained that he only talked with the brothers after
his minor daughters had told him about the formers’ throwing stones at them and
about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He also insisted that he only told Rolando
to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. Mary Ann Rose testified that her
father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson. She also denied throwing
stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy."

Accused George Bongolan is charged with the crime of Child Abuse under Section
10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The Regional Trial Court found and declared the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to
undergo imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the
penalty to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term. Also to award damages.

ISSUES
1. Was the petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 10(a) of RA No. 7610?
2.If not, what crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

HELD:
1. NO. Although the court affirmed the factual findings that the petitioner
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, the
acts did not constitute child abuse. The records did not establish beyond
 reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to
debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that
he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had
just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential
in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every
doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused.
2. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of
medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries with
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation because the petitioner lost
his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will
power.

The Supreme Court set aside the ruling of the lower courts and entered a new
judgment:
(a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised
Penal Code;
(b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and
(c) ordering him to pay Jayson dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, plus the costs of suit.
 JABALDE v. PEOPLE
GR 195224
FACTS:
AAA testified that he was 11 years old at the time of the incident; that on May 29,
2009, at around eleven o'clock in the morning, he and his two brothers: BBB, 9
years old, and CCC, 8 years old, were flying paper planes from the third floor of
their house when the planes landed in front of the house of Perlin, the daughter of
petitioner. Perlin uttered "putang ina" directed at CCC.

The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of their house. Private
complainants got three ketchup sachets from their refrigerator and threw these at
her. However, Perlin went inside their house so it was petitioner who was twice hit
instead by the sachets. Petitioner exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala
kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito,
pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko."

When DDD confronted petitioner, the latter uttered "nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka.
" Petitioner then went inside her house, came out with a bolo, and threatened DDD,
"walang demanda demanda sa akin, basta bumaba kayo dito lahat, papatayin ko
kayong lahat. Tatagain ko kayo, papatayin ko kayo." The incident left private
complainants terrified. They only went downstairs when they had a companion;
and they no longer played as they usually did. BBB and CCC corroborated AAA's
testimony that they threw ketchup sachets at Perlin because she uttered bad words
against CCC.

Virginia Jabalde, the accused in the said case was charged for violation of Section
10 (a), Article VI, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, Discrimination Act."

The Regional Trial Court found Jabalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610. Appreciating in her favor the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, and applying the provisions of
the indeterminate sentence law, [ Jabalde is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the accused’s
sentence to to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in appreciating
the acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A.
No. 7610.

HELD:
Yes, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private
complainants DOES NOT constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of
R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner had NO INTENTION to debase the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child. It was rather an act carelessly done out of anger. The
circumstances surrounding the incident proved that petitioner's act of uttering
invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the heat of anger.
Also, the utterances against private complainants were made because there was
provocation from the latter. AAA, BBB, and CCC were throwing ketchup sachets at
petitioner's daughter Perlin.

Well settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Nevertheless,
here, one of the exceptions exists – that the judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts. To finally resolve the factual dispute, the Court deems it proper to tackle
the factual question presented.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 requires an intent to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth of a child victim.
Verily, Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law,
highlights that in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement is
defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something;
degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or
quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation or character.
When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused
shall be convicted of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier
penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries or other light threats under the
RPC.
The subsequent profanities and alleged hacking gestures were NOT directed
against private complainants. It must be emphasized that the alleged hacking
gestures and the expression "putang ina mo" were not specifically directed to the
children; rather, these were made against DDD, their mother.
Notably, DDD filed a separate criminal complaint for grave threats against
petitioner because petitioner brandished a bolo against her. The present case is
only concerned with the acts committed by petitioner against private
complainants; and not those committed against DDD which purportedly
constituted grave threats. Further, DDD conceded that the profanity hurled by
petitioner was directed at her. The expression "putang ina mo" is a common
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive
that punctuates one’s expression of profanity.
Thus, it cannot be held with moral certainty that the purported hacking gestures
and profanities subsequently hurled by petitioner were intended for private
complainants.

However, the accused did commit the crime of other light threats.
Nevertheless, though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth of private complainants, petitioner still uttered
insults and invectives at them. Petitioner merely intended that private
complainants stop their rude behavior. Thus, petitioner committed the crime of
Other Light Threats under Article 285(2) of the RPC.
In grave threats, the wrong threatened to be committed amounts to a crime which
may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong
threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition.
In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there
is no condition.
Here, the threat made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private
complainants was expressed in the heat of anger. Petitioner was merely trying to
make private complainants stop throwing ketchup sachets at her. However, instead
of doing so, private complainants still continued to throw ketchup sachets against
petitioner, which infuriated the latter causing her to utter invectives against private
complainants.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article
285, par. 2 (other light threats) since: (1) threat does not amount to a crime, and
(2) the prosecution did not establish that petitioner persisted in the idea involved
in her threat.
Assuming arguendo that private complainants were also affected and distressed by
the threat made by petitioner against DDD in brandishing a bolo, such act is still
within the ambit of Other Light Threats under Article 285 (1).

The Supreme Court set aside the ruling of the lower courts and entered a new
judgment finding petitioner Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 2,
Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor.
 ROSALDES v. PEOPLE
GR 173988
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven-year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil
at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo,
was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his
teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa.
Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.
When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to
Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and
pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried.
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break,
Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother
and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain,
Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the
Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador.
They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station.

Felina Rosaldes, the accused in this instant case is charged with child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an
indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

The trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court with the modification
that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum
of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum.
The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan,
a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the
left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and
as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but
instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy
up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."

The petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase,
demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of
discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the
development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine
of in loco parentis.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting the petitioner by holding that the
acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under the Revised Penal Code?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting the petitioner by holding that
petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated
when the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly
recited in the information?
HELD:
1. NO. Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael
Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary,
violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining
him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the
Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by
a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael
Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the
time the boy had sustained his injuries.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may
consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael
Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the
floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused- appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part,
the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been
aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan
as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was
neither her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo
revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s
cruelty. The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another child named Dariel
Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity
for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.
2. NO. The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against
the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court
should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the
information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior
to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the
ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form,
or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the
challenge.
On civil liability: We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid
omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under
the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they
thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they
betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and
the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties
will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice
to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court
mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the lower courts that the accused-
appellant did indeed commit the crime of Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610. With Modifications (a) the petitioner shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor , as themaximum; and the accused is ordered to award
damages.
 QUIMVEL v. PEOPLE
GR. 214497
FACTS:
AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the
children of XXX and YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY
was a Barangay Tanod who derived income from selling vegetables. AAA and her
siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY in Palapas, Ligao City.
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to
buy kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived
bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay
with them as she and her siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them.
AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when she
felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting
his right hand inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private
part. She removed his hand.
Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in
his house. Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he
left, YYY and his children went back to sleep.
On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was
lying down with her children, she asked them what they were doing while she was
away. BBB told her that Quimvel touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what
Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid down beside her and touched
her vagina.
Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and
thereafter to the police station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought
AAA to a doctor for medical examination.
As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He maintained
that he brought the ducks of AAA' s grandmother to the river at 7 o'clock in the
morning, fetched it and brought it back at AAA's grandmother's place at 4 o'clock
in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he rested. He said that he never went
to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted and accused him of touching
AAA, he was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he was still
detained at the Barangay Hall. He was then brought to the police station for
interrogation. Eventually, he was allowed to go home. He did not return to the
house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any untoward incidents.
Eduardo Quimvel, the accused in the instant case is charged with the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610
and thereby sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period as minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and nineteen (19) days of
reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court with modification of
awarding damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court as the prosecution failed to prove Quimvel’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Whether the accused may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under
Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

HELD:
1. No, the CA did not commit an error when it upheld the decision of the RTC. The
trial court held that the prosecution duly established petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt through AAA's straightforward testimony. The trial court
observed that when AAA testified, she was able to steadily recount Quimvel's
immodest acts.
Let us not forget the circumstances of this case, not only was the offense
committed against a child under twelve (12) years of age, it was committed when
the victim was unconscious, fast asleep in the dead of the night. AAA, then a minor
of seven (7) years, was awoken by the weight of petitioner's leg on top of her and
of his hand sliding inside her undergarment. His hand proceeded to caress her
womanhood, which harrowing experience of a traumatic torment only came to a
halt when she managed to prevent his hand from further touching her private
parts.
As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls
or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The law does not
require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy
is sufficient. The petitioner's proposition — that there is not even an iota of proof
of force or intimidation as AAA was asleep when the offense was committed and,
hence, he cannot
be prosecuted under RA 7610 — is bereft of merit. When the victim of the crime is
a
child under twelve (12) years old, mere moral ascendancy will suffice.

2. Yes. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of
lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected
to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of RA 7610, the accused
performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are
committed on a child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to
"other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of lasciviousness committed on the child
are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the child is either
exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." (emphasis
supplied)
Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b)
of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of
sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610
occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim
only once, even without a prior sexual affront.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction made by the lower courts that
Eduardo/Edward Quimvel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness.
 TORRES v. PEOPLE
GR 206627
FACTS:
On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol
waiting for the conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres
who had just arrived from fishing. CCC's wife, who was also with them at the
barangay hall, persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation proceedings to answer
for his liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multi-cab. In the middle
of the brewing argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's
multi-cab and accused him of stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in
the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop.
However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to accuse Torres of damaging
his uncle's multi-cab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped AAA on the
neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down
from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They
engaged in a fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando
Miano. Torres hit AAA with a wet t-shirt three (3) times. Based on the physical
examination conducted by Dr. Vicente Manalo, Jr., AAA sustain a contusion.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following version
of the incident: Torres testified that he had just arrived tired from fishing when CCC
badgered him to answer for the damage he had allegedly caused to CCC's multi-
cab. AAA abruptly interrupted the heated discussion between the two men.
Angered by what AAA had done, Torres told AAA to stop making unfounded
accusations or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres' bluff, which
further provoked Torres. Torres attempted to hit AAA but was thwarted by the
timely intervention of CCC, who suddenly attacked. Torres claimed that CCC filed
this case to preempt him from filing a complaint for physical injuries against CCC.
He also claimed that he tried to settle the matter with CCC and CCC's wife.
However, the parties failed to reach an agreement due to the unreasonable
demands of the spouses.

Van Clifford Torres, the accused, is charged with other acts of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The Regional Trial Court found Van Clifford Torres the accused ,guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Section 10, paragraph A of
Republic Act No. 7610 and applying in his favor the beneficial provisions of The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby imposed the indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of six (6) years, the maximum period of prision correccional as
minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.
Torres filed an Appeal before the Court of Appeals arguing that the prosecution
failed to establish all the elements of Child Abuse and that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court with modification
that the accused-appellant is sentenced to five (5) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a
judgment premised on a misapprehension of facts; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial
court neither disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that
would substantially alter the case. The presence or absence of one person during
the incident is not substantial enough to overturn the finding that petitioner
whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt. Assuming, without admitting, that
petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be considered as child
abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. Petitioner maintains that he
whipped AAA merely to discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying
the situation." He also maintains that his act was justified because AAA harassed
and vexed him. Thus, petitioner claims that there could not have been any intent
to abuse on his part. Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not
affect the latter's physical growth or development and mental capacity. He argues
that he could not be convicted of child abuse without proof that the victim's
development had been prejudiced.

He begs the indulgence of this Court and claims that his conviction would only
serve as a "precedent to all children to act recklessly, errantly and disobediently"
and would then create a society ruled by juvenile delinquency and errant behavior.
If at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted of slight physical injuries
under the Revised Penal Code for the contusion sustained by AAA. Respondent
maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse. Respondent argues
that the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child
for it to constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Respondent, citing Sanchez
v. People, argues that Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and punishes
four distinct acts. We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is
not child abuse but merely slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.
The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled
to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary purpose of which has been
defined in Araneta v. People thus:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a

national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members
of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of
the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the lower courts that accused-
appellant Van Clifford Torres is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
 DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM
GR 193707
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro, Petitioner, and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
respondent, are married in Holland and are blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo van Wilsem. Their marriage ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by a
competent court in Holland when their son was only 18 months old. Soon after, the
petitioner and their son went back to the Philippines. According to Del Socorro,
respondent promised to provide monthly support for their son. However, none was
delivered since their arrival in the Philippines. Respondent then went to the
Philippines and remarried. Petitioner sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, the respondent refused to receive the letter. Del Socorro
the filed a complaint-affidavit against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of RA 9262 for the respondent’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner. Respondent submitted a counter- affidavit. The provincial
prosecutor filed an information for the alleged crime which stated that the
respondent deprived his son of financial support resulting in economic abuse to the
victim. Respondent led a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. The RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute and offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
Subsequently, the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
petition. Petitioner alleged that the respondent is liable under Article 195 of the
Family Code which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Respondent however, contended that there is no clear and sufficient basis that she
and her son are entitled to financial support.

Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem the respondent in this case is charged with
Violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of RA 9262 Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the criminal case against respondent on the
ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent.
The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier
in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling
that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound
by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused
herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating respondent's

obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family Code, thus,
failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor's nationality."
The motion for Reconsideration was dismissed for lack of Merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign national be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child

HELD:

Yes. Van Wilsem, being a foreign national, can be held criminally liable under ra
9262 for refusing to provide monthly support for his minor child.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
necessary that the legal obligation to support exists. In the case at bar, the Del
Socorro cannot rely on Article 195 of the Civil Code in demanding support from the
respondent who is a foreign citizen because of Article 15 of the Civil Code which
stresses the principle of nationality. The obligation to give support to a child is a
matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, the court agrees with RTC-Cebu that Van Wilsem is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
However, this does not mean that Van Wilsem is not obliged to support De
Socorro’s son. It is the responsibility of the respondent to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. The respondent’s failure to prove the national law of
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern;
whereas if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, Philippine
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our domestic law. Since the
law of Netherlands regarding the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith. Also, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued.
Moreover, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall
not be applied. Applying such, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce
a parent's obligation to support his child nor penalize the non- compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto. However, the respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, respondent may be made liable under
Section 5 (e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to
petitioner's son. Section 5 of such law states that the crime of violence against women
and their children is committed though (2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman
or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support or (i) Causing mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,..., and denial of financial
support of minor children.
Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, Territoriality
Principle in criminal law, should be applied. The alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City.
Moreover, courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5 (e)
(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Therefore, Van Wilsem can be held criminally liable under RA
9262.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court, and
granted the Petition.
 DINAMLING v. PEOPLE
GR 199522
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session and went to
the boarding house of AAA. At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were in
an ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common children. Dinamling
and his friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed.
Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA. His reason for the eviction was that she
was allegedly using the place as a “whore house” wherein she “brought (her)
partners.” She then went to the house of BBB and requested the latter to fetch her
children. When BBB and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already
had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by
the friends back to AAA.
In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and
AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went
to the police, she was merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked
over. Dinamling was, at that time, a policeman himself.
Six days later, another incident occurred. AAA was at the house of CCC when
Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she
came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. AAA left
for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her
until she fell to the ground.
AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning.
She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately
brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and
had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited
her but showed no remorse over his acts.

Two criminal information were filed against the accused, Ricky Dinamling or
violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
1st criminal information - "xxx by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting
of several bad and insulting utterances directed against the victim and a feeding
bottle being thrown against the latter in anger."
2nd criminal information - "xxx by boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the
back and removing her pant and panty"
**with both the offenses being attended by the special qualifying aggravating
circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time. For the prosecution, AAA,
her mother DDD and Dr. Diaz testified. For the accused, only petitioner testified for
and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he was on
duty at the town's police station at the time that the offenses were committed.
The Regional Trial Court found Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both
charges against him.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dinamling is guilty of violation of RA 9262

HELD:
Yes, On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the
victim AAA's evidence. The testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two
Informations filed against petitioner.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the
elements of the crime are derived as follows:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate
or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.
The elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as
the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year ongoing relationship with
petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children.
AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse.
In the evening of the incident, she and her children were actually evicted by
Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and
the children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a “whore-house” and
alleged that AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further
humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her clothes. This forced AAA to hastily leave
even without her children.
Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and left the baby behind. AAA
had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby.
According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as
similar incidents had happened previously.
As for the second case, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to
the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the
offender, the prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or
emotional anguish through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling
actions. All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public,
highlighting the public ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her
mental and emotional pain.
The testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of
the act, as long as it is credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because
evidence is weighed and not counted. It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes
some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women
and children.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental
or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony
of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied
with in the case at bar.
In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight relative to the
affirmative testimony of the offended party. The only exception to this rule is
where there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused
has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies. In the case at
bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward,
unequivocal and positive declarations of Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such
testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to whether the mauling of
AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.
The Court disagrees.The fact of AAA's physical injuries from the mauling, including
her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged.
Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him.
Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of
such physical injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal.
Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an element of the crime that petitioner
was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. In
fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical
violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of
the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262.
The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the
accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which
case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical
violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether
or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological
violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being.
In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and
stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical
violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and
proven that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or
emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the
physical violence done on her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she
experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts. The victim's resulting
actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have
led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the
information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for
conviction. It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does
not establish any of the crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not
allege the same. However, from the fact of miscarriage one may logically derive the
fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating circumstance for the crime and
which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's
unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in
the course of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered
an “incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling.” The fact of AAA's pregnancy
has been established and it may be taken account of and considered as a
circumstance that aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the Trial and Appellate courts in
convicting Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged
against him.
 PEOPLE v. BAYABOS
GR 171222
FACTS:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory
“Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from May 2 to June 1, 2001.
Balidoy died on May 3, 2001. The NBI probed the death of Balidoy and
subsequently, the Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable
cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Alvarez, Montez,
Reyes and Simpas (Alvarez, et al.) A criminal case was then filed with the RTC-
Zambales. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable cause to charge the
respondent-school authorities (Bayabos, et al.) as accomplices to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law.
Meanwhile, the RTC-Zambales dismissed the Information against the principals,
Alvarez, et al. that led to the filing of a Motion to Quash by the respondents
Bayabos, et al. arguing that:
The case against the principals had already been dismissed with finality by
the RTC; no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the
execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be
dismissed; and
Failure to include in the Information---
(a) All the essential elements of the offense;
(b) No allegation that the purported act had been made a prerequisite for
admission to the PMMA, especially considering that Balidoy had already been
accepted in the academy;
(c) No averment that the PMMA was a fraternity, sorority or an organization;
(d) Absence of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the “physical,
mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to
determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members”; and
(e) No allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that
they had permitted the activity.

On the other hand, the Special Prosecutor opposed the Motion insisting that:
(a) The Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the
presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing; and
 (b) There was nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first
before a case could be filed against the accomplices.
The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was silent on the other issues
raised in the Motion to Quash.
Six days before the respondents were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the
Information against them on the basis of:
(a) The fact that the charge against the principal accused Alvarez, et al. was dismissed
with finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those charged as accomplices,
whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of the former;
(b) That the Information charged no offense, and that the allegations therein were mere
conclusions of law; and
(c) There was no averment that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental
and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance
the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members" of the AFP
and PNP.

It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical
determination that the PMMA was considered an "organization" within the
meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, a petition was filed before the
Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
A criminal case was filed against Alvarez et. al before the Regional Trial Court of
Zambales charging them of violating Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the Information against the
principal accused, Alvarez, et al. Bayabos, et al. led a Motion to Quash the
Information arguing that the Information did not contain all the essential elements
of the offense. Moreover, there was no allegation that the purported act had been
made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, considering that the victim had
already been accepted in the academy. They also stated that there was no
averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an
organization. Furthermore, they emphasized that there was no allegation that they
were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they had permitted the
activity. Lastly, they argued that the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom
they could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the
case against them must be dismissed. The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion
of Bayabos, et al. insisting that the Information alleged the material facts that
would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime of
accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring
that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be led against the
accomplices. However it was silent on the issue of whether the Information
contained an allegation that the supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for
admission to the PMMA, and whether the academy was considered an
"organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law. Days before the
arraignment,
Sandiganbayan issued the assailed quashing the Information and dismissing the
criminal case against them. Stating that the fact that the charge against the
principal accused Alvarez, et al. was dismissed with finality carried with it the
indictment against those charged as accomplices. It stressed that before there can
be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation. In this case, as
there were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else
with whom they could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. It
also stressed that there was no averment that the alleged hazing was not part of
the "physical, mental and psychological testing and training procedure and
practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness
of prospective regular members" of the AFP and the PNP The accused Velasco
surrendered and then led his own Motion to Quash. However, the Sandiganbayan
issued another Resolution dismissing the case against him. The Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, led with this Court Petitions assailing
SB Resolution I and II.

ISSUES:
1. Will the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused?
2. Does the Information filed against respondents contained all the material
averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the
Anti-Hazing Law?

HELD:
1. Yes, It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is
not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals;
the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter's acquittal,
especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. The
corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory
 are distinct from each other. Accordingly, so long as the commission of the
crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to
determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that the
alleged principal.

In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that:
1. Hazing occurred as established by the elements:
a. A person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation
or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and
b. These acts were employed as a pre-requisite for the person’s
admission or entry into an organization.
2. The accused are school authorities or faculty members; and
3. They consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite
actual knowledge thereof.
In addition, the Court rejects the contention of respondents that PMMA should not
be considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term
organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities,
citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a government-
owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the
term organization within the meaning of the law.

2. NO. The Court finds – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash
must be granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts
constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Information, the indictment merely states, “psychological pain and physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim”. There is no allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to
aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the
criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the
crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term — in this case, hazing — is
insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of As can be gleaned from
the the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
The Special Prosecutor's belated argument in his Petition before the Court that the
successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a
prerequisite for continued admission to the academy does not cure this defect in
the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it
presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Sandiganbayan.

TITLE IX (9)
PEOPLE v. CHAN
GR 226836
FACTS:
According to the version of the prosecution, the victim left Ernesto's house; that
Ernesto followed the victim only until the latter was nearing the house of Helen
Pamo; that the victim was about 10-20 meters ahead of Ernesto; that when the
victim reached Melrose's house, Ernesto saw appellants come out of the yard; that
upon seeing appellants, Ernesto hid; that Ernesto saw appellants hit the victim with
bamboo sticks on the neck and kept hitting him even after he became unconscious
and fell to the ground face down; that appellants went inside the yard; that they
came back carrying a sack; that the appellants placed the victim, who was then
unconscious, inside the sack and carried him inside their yard; that Ernesto did not
see what happened thereafter.
The defense, on the other hand, offered the testimony of appellant Bong and his
sister who testified that around 9:00 p.m. of September 27, 2004, she was inside
their house when the victim and Tito wanted to buy liquor; that she told the victim
that she had no more stock of wine; that, contrary to the claim of the prosecution,
there was no heated argument; that she left them and returned inside their house
to take care of her husband who was sick at that time; and that on the said night,
her brother and her father were at the auditorium of Barangay Tawin-tawin, which
is a kilometer away from their house, to watch over their sacks of palay.
An information was filed against Bong and Elmo Chan charging them with
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the RPC and sentencing them o each
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua or twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years with the accessory penalties provided for by law and
to award damages.
The RTC gave no credence to the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial
considering the positive testimony of Ernesto, who had no ill motive to testify
falsely against the appellants.
Appellants appealed the case to the CA putting in issue the credibility of Ernesto.
They contended that Ernesto's testimony that he was driving his jeepney in the
morning of September 28, 2004 to earn money contradicted with the testimony of
Rachelle that Ernesto was with them in the morning of September 28, 2004 looking
for the victim. They further argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual
confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention are present in this case.

HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are
present in this case.
Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention are, as follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping
or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are in􏰅icted
on the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, female or public officer."

All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are
present in this case. First, appellants are both private individuals. Second, the fact
that they kidnapped the victim was clearly established by the testimony of the
prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto. Third, appellants' act of kidnapping was illegal.
Lastly, the victim has been detained for more than three days. In fact, until now,
the victim has not returned, nor his body been found.
Appellants, however, insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established
as the prosecution allegedly failed to establish actual confinement, detention, or
restraint of the victim.
Actual confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element
of the crime of kidnapping. Thus, in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution
must show "actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such
deprivation was the intention of the malefactor.
In this case, Ernesto testified that he saw appellants: (1) hit the victim on the neck
and other body parts using bamboo sticks causing the victim to fall down on the
ground unconscious; (2) retrieve a sack from their yard; (3) place the victim inside
the sack; and (4) carry him to their yard. Clearly, the acts of appellants of hitting
the victim until he was unconscious, of putting him inside the sack, and of carrying
him to their yard showed their intention to immobilize the victim and deprive him
of his liberty. Thus, contrary to the claim of appellants, the element of restraint was
clearly established. As aptly pointed out by the CA, "[a]ctual restraint of the victim
was evident from the moment appellants clubbed the victim on the neck and other
parts of his body and thereafter placed him inside a sack. Not only was [the victim's]
freedom of movement restricted, he was immobilized because the blows rendered
him unconscious. Putting him inside the sack completely rendered the victim
powerless to resist."

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the lower courts finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, is affirmed
with modifications that the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages.
 PEOPLE v. DAMAYO
GR 232361
FACTS:
On August 7, 2008, at 12:00 noon, Jerome Rosario, then eleven (11) years old, was
outside his school at Sucat Elementary School, Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa City when
Damayo, known to him as Kuya Frank, approached and told him that he was there
to fetch him as they were going somewhere. Since Jerome was familiar with
Damayo, he went with him and both boarded a jeep bound for Pasay. Upon arriving
at Pasay, they boarded a bus. Jerome did not know where they were going.
Worried that Jerome had not returned from school, his parents Edna Rosario and
Jerry Rosario started to look for Jerome. When they chanced upon Daryll, a
classmate of Jerome, and asked him on his whereabouts, Daryll informed them that
an unknown man had taken Jerome during dismissal time. Edna and Jerry then
reported the incident to the barangay, where it was blottered.
The next day, August 8, 2008, Edna received a call on her daughter's cellphone from
a person who introduced himself as Jerome's classmate. The man, whom Edna
recognized to be Damayo, stated that Jerome was with him and will be let go,
provided that he will be given P150,000.00 and Edna will be unaccompanied when
they meet. He directed her to meet him at a terminal in Dau, Pampanga.
The following day, August 9, 2008, Edna and Jerry went to the Muntinlupa City
Police Station to report the matter. An operation was planned to retrieve Jerome,
where it was agreed that upon meeting Damayo at the designated meet-up point,
Edna would touch Damayo's arm, signaling to the police his identity.
At 2:00 P.M. of the same date, Edna, Jerry, and the police officers, namely, Senior
Police Officer 4 (SPO4) Elias Nero, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Rudolph Delmendo, PO3
Roberto Lanting and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Julkabra Sulaiman, proceeded to the Dau
terminal in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Upon seeing Damayo, Edna touched his arm
which prompted the police to arrest him. After handcuffing him, informing him of
his arrest and reading him his constitutional rights, the police asked Damayo where
Jerome was being kept. Damayo told them that Jerome was at his house at No. 301
Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga. They proceeded to the area and were able
to safely recover Jerome.

Damayo is charged with Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court finds accused Francisco Damayo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under the first (the
private complainant is a minor) and second (for the purpose of extorting ransom)
paragraphs of Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence which established that on
August 7, 2006, Damayo took Jerome Rosario y Sampaga (Jerome), who was then
eleven years of age, from his school and brought the latter to his house in
Pampanga where he deprived the said victim of his personal liberty for three (3)
days and that Damayo demanded ransom of P150,000.00 from Edna, Jerome's
mother, for the release of her son from captivity. According to the RTC, Jerome
convincingly testified on the events that transpired during the kidnapping incident
from August 7 to 9, 2006 and positively identified Damayo as his abductor. The RTC
rejected the defense of denial interposed by Damayo because it was not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Trial court with modifications
with regard to the award of damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the conviction of the Trial Court.

HELD:
YES, The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been
sufficiently proven in the case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private
individual, and that he took Jerome from his school at Sucat Elementary School,
Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon, brought said
victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him
there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the police officers on August
9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain Jerome is
undeniable.
Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was
locked up, he was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the
place where Damayo brought him as the latter remained outside and kept watch
of him. This only goes to show that Jerome was constantly guarded by Damayo
during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be underscored that leaving a child in
a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to
roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty
inasmuch as under this situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and
control of the abductor. Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located
somewhere in Pampanga, a place which is totally unfamiliar to him and very far
from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, would constitute denial of the said
victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of locomotion inside the house of
Damayo, he did not have the freedom to leave the same at will or escape therefrom
because he did not know where to go and could not possibly go back home to his
mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome was merely waiting and
hoping that he would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him. Verily,
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended
to deprive Jerome of his liberty, and his parents, with the custody of their minor
son.
Jerome's testimony prevails over the statement he gave in the affidavit which he
previously executed. It is settled that whenever there is inconsistency between the
affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in
court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.

The Supreme Court affirmed both the rulings of the lower court Accused-appellant
Francisco Damayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua without eligibility for parole.
 PEOPLE v. MAMANTAK
GR 174659
FACTS:
Teresa with her two-year old son Christopher and her sister Zenaida went to a
McDonalds outlet in Binondo. Teresa and Christopher took their seats while
Zenaida went to the counter to order their food. Christopher followed Zenaida to
the counter and after a few moments, he disappeared. Teresa and her sister
searched the whole premises, to no avail. They later reported him missing to the
police. The next day, Teresa sought help from media outlets, but still they received
no word about Christopher.
After a few months, Teresa received a call from a woman claiming to have
Christopher and asking for P30,000 in exchange for the boy. She instructed Teresa
to get a photo of her son from a restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo. When
Teresa went there, someone gave her a photo of Christopher. She then contacted
the woman and she was instructed to go to Lanao Del Norte and bring the money
with her.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). PO3 Juliet Palafox was assigned to act as her niece. Upon arriving in
Mindanao, they proceeded to Titang’s Carinderia where the caller said she would
meet them. While waiting, they were approached by two Muslim women who
asked who they were waiting for. These two women were later identified as
Mamantak and her sister Taurak. Teresa said they were waiting for a certain Rocma
Bato, the name given by the caller. Taurak then informed her that she had
Christopher and asked them to come with her to a nearby ice plant to fetch him,
but they refused. Taurak left to get Christopher while Mamantak stayed at the
Carinderia to watch over Teresa and PO3 Parafox. When Taurak returned with
Christopher, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child could no longer
recognize or understand her because he could only speak in the Muslim dialect and
when asked for his name, gave a muslim name with Taurak as surname. When
Mamantak asked for the ransom money, Teresa told them it was with her niece,
PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and Palafox boarded a jeepney where she
handed the money to Mamantak. PO3 Palafox then gave the pre-agreed signal and
the PAOCTF team arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Taurak found Christopher wandering aimlessly while she was peddling wares in
Divisoria. She took the boy and waited for someone to come for him but no one
did. The next day, she took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was
there. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him. When no one
was looking for him after a few months, she brought the boy to Lanao del Norte.
She claimed that the meeting at the carinderia was merely by chance and she did
not know Teresa prior to the meeting. Mamantak corroborated her sister’s
testimony.

Likad and Raga Sarapida Mamantak, accused, is charged with Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention for Ransom

The Regional Trial Court found both Likad and Ragad guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and
both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with
modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom

HELD:
YES. If the victim is a minor or when the purpose is for extorting, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death,
even if neither of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267
are present.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the deprivation of liberty and the intent
of the accused to deprive the victim of the same. It does not mean mere physical
restraint but includes one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties. In this case,
Christopher was recovered only after 16 months. During the entire time, he was
kept away from his mother and deprived of the opportunity to return to his family.
He had no choice but to go with strangers. Taurak unlawfully kept the child under
her control and custody, while Mamantak’s actions (staying at carinderia and
acceptance of ransom) showed without a doubt that she was aiding her sister.
Taurak’s defense is too incredible. She never brought Christopher to the barangay
or DSWD. That she was at the carinderia at the same time Teresa was there
unworthy of belief.
The CA considered the demand of P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance for the
imposition of the death penalty. The RTC, on the other hand, found the amount to
measly as compared to what was actually spent for the care of Christopher while
he was away. It treated the amount as reimbursement of expenses. We agree with
the CA. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a capture person to release him from captivity. The amount and
purpose for the ransom is immaterial.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the CA with modification of the
penalty to reclusion perpetua due to the suspension of the death penalty.
 PEOPLE v. MUIT, et.al
GR 181043
FACTS:
On 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at
the latters house Pancho, Sr., Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a
gray Mitsubishi car. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a
safehouse for their visitor. Ferraer was hesitant at first as he thought it was risky
for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they are not
killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money
they will get would be shared equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would
guard their victim. Later, Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and alias Puri, came.
They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to
Ferraer for safekeeping a package that contained guns.
Romeo would be the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman
of the victim. On November 25, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and
asked Ferraer if he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the
affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told him to wait for the groups return. However, the group
returned without the intended victim because the latter did not show up at the
construction site.
On 2 December, the group received a call from Romeo informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon, Manuel,
Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the construction site. Pancho, Jr. was on board the
Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around 2:00pm, Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove
a blue Pajero carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project
site. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from the Pajero and, along
with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand
Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss.
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the
Pajero. Seraspe was surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together
suddenly lay prostrate on the ground. Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man
standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men surrounded the Pajero.
Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men, Muit, poked
a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground. The
assailants dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order
Seraspe to give them the keys to the Pajero. When the victim was already on board
the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them say, Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay.
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road
gate. Two more persons who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.
At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission
(Supt. Mission) received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a
kidnapping was ongoing and the kidnappers on board a Pajero were heading
towards Lipa City. Supt. Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the
Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the meantime, two teams were
organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade.
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was
spotted. When policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle.
While two policemen approached the Pajero, the driver and front passenger
opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At this point, all the
policemen present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four
minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger
who managed to escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the
escapees who turned out to be Muit, the driver of the Pajero.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio
Ong, Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy; Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty.
Mallare, the lawyer who assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing
their respective sworn statements as witnesses. Their accounts were corroborated
by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial confessions of
Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare.
Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4
December 1997, in which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second
statement was dated 7 December 1997 in which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon
De Jesus and witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his brother,
Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the defense presented
appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997
he was working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. He denied any
participation in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged
against him.
Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of the
shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his
uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of
the crime.

Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.), Rolando
Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo Eddie Hermano
alias Bobby Reyes alias Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were
charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping in two
separate informations.
Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo, Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial.
However, Ferraer was discharged RTC and was utilized as a state witness.

The Regional Trial Court found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. It found the prosecutions
witnesses more credible than appellants, whose self-serving statements were
obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal liability. The RTC did not
give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial confessions were
procured through torture as these were belied by the testimony of Atty. Mallare
and appellants medical certificates which were issued during their incarceration
and after the execution of their statements. And the RTC noted that even without
appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still sufficient evidence on record
to hold them guilty.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused are correctly convicted
2. Was there conspiracy

HELD:
1. Yes, The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention are
the following:
(a) the accused is a private individual;
(b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
 (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in
Article 267 is present.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.
The totality of the prosecutions evidence in this case established the commission
of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended,
defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.[25] The crime was
committed in this case when the victims Pajero was forcibly taken away from him
contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by
the direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the
group approached and convinced him to let them use his house to keep the victim
they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime in Ferraers house and waited for
the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the construction
site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them
that the victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry
out their plan. At the construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit
and the other members of the group pointed their guns at the victim and his
companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys
to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle with Muit
driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and
the kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission
testified that the kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot
out in which the victim was among the casualties. Muit was one of the two persons
who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the police. Pancho, Jr.
returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their
meeting place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the
group engaged the police in a shoot out and most of them were killed, and that
Muit was arrested by the police.
2. Yes, Conspiracy is present. Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did
not participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held
liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a
crime.Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act
 of one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation in the commission of
the crime is immaterial.
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence.
The group thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently
waited for the day when the victim would be at the construction site. Then on 2
December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so they proceeded to the
construction site and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed
different roles to consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his
other companions played in the actual abduction were described earlier. As for
Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho, Jr.
served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the groups informant.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with the modifications
that be increased to P75,000.00 and the moral damages to P500,000.00, and that
appellants shall also pay the heirs of Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of
P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping. Costs against
appellants.
 PEOPLE v. DIONALDO
GR 207949
FACTS:
Roderick Navarro dropped his brother Edwin off at the Health is Wealth Gym in Caloocan
City. Thirty minutes thereafter, Roderick received a text message from another brother
that Edwin was kidnapped by three men, later identified as accused Armando Dionaldo,
Renato Dionaldo, and Mariano Gariguez, Jr. These three forcibly dragged Edwin, who was
bloodied, down the stairway of the gym, to a dark green Toyota car (UKF 194).
Around 10 a.m., Roderick received a call from the Edwin’s kidnappers who threatened to
kill him if the matter was reported to the police. The next day, Roderick received another
call from the kidnappers, demanding the amount of P15 million as ransom money, but
was adjusted to P110,000 after negotiations, since Roderick only had P50,000 with him
that time. Roderick was instructed to bring the money to Batangas, and wait for the next
call.
At 7:30 p.m. that same day, Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom
money when the kidnappers called, instructing him to open all the windows of his car,
and to turn on his hazard lights when he reaches the destination. Another call was
thereafter received by Roderick, directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to
C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village, and was told to park beside the Libingan ng
mga Bayani. Several hours later, an Orange Mitsubishi car (DEH 498) pulled up in front of
Roderick’s vehicle where four men alighted. One of the men took a mobile phone and
uttered the word “alat,” and thereafter the four men returned to their car and drove
away.
During the course of the investigation by a team organized by the Camp Crame Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) over Edwin’s case, Rodolfo Larido, who is an
employee of the Health is Wealth Gym, confessed that he was part of the plan to kidnap
Edwin as the tipper of Mariano, Renato, Armando, and a Virgilio Varona on the condition
that he will be given a share in the ransom money. By Rodolfo giving the whereabouts of
his cohorts, the police were able to arrest the accused on June 12, 2003.
The following day, the PACER team found Edwin’s dead body at Sitio Pugpugan, Laurel,
Batangas, as identified by Roderick. A Certificate of Death established the fact of Edwin’s
death during the trial.

Except for Rodolfo, the accused individually claimed that on said date and time, they were
in their respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then
subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained.
Rodolfo averred that as he was walking on his way home, he noticed a van following him.
Four men then alighted from the van and took him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually
tortured him. He also claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession,
purporting, too, that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist
him, the latter failed to do so.

Armando Dionaldo, Renato Dionaldo, Mariano Gariguez, and Rodolfo Larido were
charged with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Regional Trial Court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.
In addition to the RTC Ruling, CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were
never supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was
afforded competent and independent counsel in its execution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged

HELD:
YES, they are guilty of the said crime BUT subject to modification.
Although the Supreme Court did not disturb the factual findings of the RTC as to the
testimonies, and as to the attendance of conspiracy, the Court MODIFIED the ruling of the
RTC and CA, from the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to a SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIME of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE, in view of Edwin’s
death, which was specifically charged in the Information, and was clearly established
during the trial of the case.

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code by RA 7659, Article 267 now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In the previous case of People v Mercado, the Court introduced (through the cited case
of People v Ramos) in our criminal statutes the concept of “special complex crime” of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing
was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267,
as amended by RA No. 7659.
The modification of the crime committed could have imposed the maximum penalty of
death, but due to the imposition of RA 9346 which suspended death penalty, the RTC and
CA’s ruling which imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua is correct. Accused- appellants
are not eligible for parole.
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower courts with modification that all
accused-appellants are equally GUILTY of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE.
 MADSALI, et. al v. PEOPLE
GR 179570
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt
Inon Dama were fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub, Bataraza,
Palawan.Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a badong(bolo).
They tried to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the hair of AAA and told her,
Sara, you go with me. If you will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon Dama came to AAA's
rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she was able to shield herself with a plastic
container. AAA was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then drew his gun,
which was tucked in his waist, pointed it at Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will
shoot you. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon
Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA
to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her
back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There, AAA
was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA,
she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if she would submit to
his desire, her life would be spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her private parts and
inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and
she noticed blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused three times on the
ground, where she was made to lie down on a bed of leaves. During the entire time that
AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the
forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day and brought AAA to
the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard
AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape.
AAA’s mother attempted to rescue AAA, but Egap refused and threatened to kill AAA if
the mother reported the same to the authorities. Nine days after the abduction, upon
instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The
marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents.
After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's
wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained,
AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was
held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt
to escape. During her detention, Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to
roam within the vicinity of the house but she was usually accompanied by Egap's wife
who served as her guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons. She got
pregnant after some time.
Eventually, BBB and Inon Dama went to Puerto Princesa City to report AAA's abduction
to the proper authorities. The acccused was then arrested by the police. Sajiron and
Maron was charged with the crime of abduction with rape. In another information, Egap
and Sajiron was charged with the crime of serious illegal detention.
The RTC found Sajiron and Maron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
abduction with rape. Egap and Sajiron were also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of serious illegal detention. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Sajiron argued, however, that he and AAA were engaged for three years prior to their
elopement. During the period of their engagement, Sajiron lived with AAA in her mother's
house. AAA married Sajiron voluntarily and out of her own free will. The sexual
intercourse between AAA and Sajiron was consensual. The defense further claimed that
AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry
(dower) in the amount of P10,000.00 to AAA's parents. Sajiron asserted that he did not
pay the dowry because he had already rendered services to AAA's family for about three
years prior to his marriage with AAA.
Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) and Maron Lajim (Maron) were charged with the crime of
abduction with rape, while Egap Madsali (Egap) and Sajiron Lajim (Sajiron) were charged
with the crime of serious illegal detention.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision wherein the he accused Sajiron Lajim and
Maron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or forty
(years) and accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court but modified the amount to
be paid by the accused-appellants as award for damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sajiron is guilty of Rape
2. Whether or not Sajiron and Maron are guilty of Rape with Abduction
3. Whether or not Egap and Sajiron are guilty of Serious Illegal Detention

HELD:
1. Yes. The testimony of AAA is clear, categorical, and consistent sufficient to establish
the crime of rape with abduction. the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost always
the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the
sole basis for the accused's conviction. AAA positively identified Sajiron and Maron as her
abductors and narrated how she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest.
The following defenses also are without merit:
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility
of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered
doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. CCC’s testimony (AAA’s
father) also cannot be given weight as to prove that the marriage is valid, as AAA testified
that she had never seen her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned
them.
The assertion of the accused that the reason why a criminal case was filed against him
was his failure to pay the P10,000.00 dowry is too lame to be accepted as true. No young
Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she has been raped unless that is the truth.
either is the Court convinced of the sweetheart theory, the defense of the accused, by
alleging that AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to their elopement and
marriage. If there were indeed romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the
latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to cover up for the man she
supposedly loved. On the contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation, right after she was rescued by the authorities.
Moreover, the sweetheart theory proffered by the accused is effectively an consequently
places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence
The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present
any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that, indeed, he
and the victim were sweethearts. In the case at bar, Sajiron was unable to present any
evidence to prove their relationship. Clearly, the “sweetheart theory” is a self-serving
defense and mere fabrication of the accused to exculpate himself and his cohorts from
the charges filed against them. It bears stressing that during her testimony before the trial
court, AAA vehemently denied that she and Sajiron were sweethearts and firmly declared
that the latter never lived in their house.

2. No.Article342 of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements of the crime of forcible
abduction, thus:
(a) that the person abducted is a woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation;
(b) that the abduction is against her will; and (c) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
In this case, the crime charged, although denominated as “rape with forcible abduction”,
did not make out the elements for the same since the taking, as alleged, was not with
lewd designs. The only act that was alleged to have been attended with lewd design was
the act of Rape. Upon futher persual of the allegations in the information, it appears that
the crime charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and rape, defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the information does not specifically allege the term kidnap or detain, the
information specifically used the terms take and carry away. To Kidnap is to carry away
by unlawful force or fraud or to seize and detain for the purpose of so carrying away.
Whereas, to take is to get into one's hand or into one's possession, power, or control by
force or stratagem. Thus, the word take, plus the accompanying phrase carry away, as
alleged in the information, was sufficient to inform the accused that they were charged
with unlawfully taking and detaining AAA.

Further, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conlusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects
of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the
information. Simply put, the crime charged is determined by the information's accusatory
portion and not by its denomination.

The accusatory portion of the information alleges that AAA was taken and carried away
by Sajiron and Maron against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the occasion
thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat, violence and intimidation -- had carnal
knowledge of AAA.

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the RPC are:
(1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present:
(a)the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer .

In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private individuals, forcibly took and
dragged AAA, a minor, to the forest and held her captive against her will. The crime of
serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it
is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation. In the present case, although AAA was not actually
confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty,
because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus, making it very
easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.
The crime of rape was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Sajiron
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force and intimidation.
For fear of losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to Sajiron's beastly and lustful
assault.
Clearly, conspiracy between Sajiron and Maron attended the commission of forcible
abduction and the subsequent rape of AAA. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.Once established, all
the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
participation of each of them, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one is the
act of all. In the case at bar, it was proven that Sajiron and Maron cooperated to prevent
AAA from resisting her abduction by tying her hands behind her back and putting a piece
of cloth in her mouth. Maron watched and stood guard to make sure that no one would
interrupt or prevent the bestial act perpetrated by his son against AAA. Maron did not
endeavor to prevent his son from raping AAA thrice. The next morning, Sajiron and Maron
brought AAA to the house of Egap to detain her there.

Thus, Sajiron and Maron are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape.

3.Yes. All the elements of the crime of serious illegal detention are present in the instant
case: AAA, a female and a minor, testified that on July 2, 1994, after she was raped in the
forest, she was brought to and detained at the house of Egap and forced to cohabit with
Sajiron. From the very start of her detention on July 2, 1994, Egap directed Sajiron to
guard her, and shoot her if she attempted to escape.

AAA was also guarded by Egap's wife. Even the two sons of Egap, upon the latter's
instruction, constantly guarded and threatened her to keep her from leaving. In fine, the
accused had successfully instilled fear in AAA's mind that escaping would cause her not
only her own life, but also the lives of her loved ones.

To give a color of legitimacy to AAA's detention, Sajiron married AAA. However, the
marriage between her and Sajiron is considered irregular under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083). Art. 15 (b) of said the law provides that no
marriage contract shall be perfected unless the essential requisite of mutual consent of
the parties be freely given. And under Art. 32 of the same law, if the consent of either
party is vitiated by violence, intimidation, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the
marriage is considered irregular (fasid) from the time of its celebration.

AAA did not give her consent to the wedding. The marriage was solemnized only upon
the instruction of Egap. She was also forced to sign the marriage contract without the
presence of her parents or any of her relatives. She did not want to marry Sajiron because
she did not love him. The Imam who solemnized their marriage did not even ask for the
consent of the parties. He was merely compelled to solemnize the marriage because he
was afraid of Egap, and the latter threatened him. Clearly, the marriage ceremony was a
farce, and was only orchestrated by the accused in an attempt to exculpate themselves
from criminal responsibility.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with Modifications as to the crime
committed – special complex crime of KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
WITH RAPE as to Sajiron and Maron Lajim, and another special complex crime of
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION as to Sajiron Lajim.
 PEOPLE v. MIRANDILLA
GR 186417
FACTS:
It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi City. At the
plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB.

AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making her way
back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her shoulders, with
a knifes point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the man’s name at the police
station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. He told her not to move or ask for
help. Another man joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at her back, one
of whom had a gun. They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the
deafening music faded into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields,
they reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon
passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with Mirandilla who
after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the
darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de Legazpi in Rawis.

Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete house. At
gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants. When she defied him, he slapped her and
hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching
her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them inside. The pain weakened her. He
forcibly pulled her pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.
Sayang ka, she heard him whisper at her, as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.

When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried for help,
shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he
ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his penis inside her
mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the
roads side, Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth,
punched her arm, thigh, and lap, and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
gone. Then she felt Mirandillas penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned
Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away they reached a nipa hut and AAA was
thrown inside. Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at
her point blank, grabbed her shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into
her vagina.

The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she
suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime, moved her back and
forth from one place to another on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to
Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type house and was raped repeatedly on
the grassy field right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they caged her in a small
house in the middle of a rice field. She was allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell. Seeing that
Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed outside and ran,
crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding behind
a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed out of peoples sight for two nights.
Finally, she found a road and followed its path, leading her to the house of Evelyn
Guevarra who brought her to the police station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul
smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her
food. When the police presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized
the mans face she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr. Sarah
Vasquez, Legazpi Citys Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor discovered
hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative of sexual intercourse.
Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had contracted gonorrhoea.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into each
other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached him. They had
a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until Mirandilla left his wife
and daughter there for good.
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting her, and,
after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became lovers. Mirandilla was
then 33 years old.
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends houses and in cheap
motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mothers house in Kilikao, they
met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of the parks comfort room,
near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served as the CRs guard. They decided to
elope and live as a couple. They found an abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of
Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza who owned the house, rented it to them for
P1,500.00. They lived there from 28 October until 11 December 2000. From 12 December
2000 until 11 January 2001, Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellanas house, at
the resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.

Mirandilla and AAAs nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only during AAAs
menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December 2000. In late December,
however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA
soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating stomach pain. AAA had abortion an inference
he drew upon seeing the cover of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled
for days until she left him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days.

Six informations were filed against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the accused charging him of Six
informations were filed against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the accused charging him of with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, four counts of rape, and one count of
rape through sexual assault.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with rape, four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruing of the trial court with regard to the accused’s
conviction. However, it modified its ruling wherein they found him guilty of the SPECIAL
COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH RAPE (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled),
four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mirrandilla Jr. is guilty of kidnapping with Rape

HELD:
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of her; (2) through
force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his
penis into her mouth; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that: Art. 266-A. Rape, When
and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. Xxx

Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659,
states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v.
Larraaga, this arise where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses.

However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should not
have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible
abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only
necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and
separate count of rape.
It having been established that Mirandillas act was kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several
times. We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape, warranting the penalty of
death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of death is hereby reduced to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals but modified since he
separate informations of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in
view of the above discussion.
Title X (10)
PEOPLE v. DILLATAN, SR.
GR 212191
FACTS:
Private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob),were
owners of a market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora, Isabela. Around
6 o'clock in the evening of February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their
son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded home by riding together on their
motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta sat at the middle, while Henry sat behind
her. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when
they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein Richard Dillatan, Sr.
(Dillatan) and Donato Garcia(Garcia), accused-appellants, near a motorcycle. When
they passed, accused-appellants rode the motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-
appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced
them to stop and immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while
Dillatan grabbed her belt bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter,
Dillatan uttered,"barilin mo na."

Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of Violeta. The bullet went
through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest causing the latter to fall
down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off
the motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his
right knee. Accused-appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several
people then came to the aid of the private complainants and brought them to the
hospital where Homer later expired by reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and
Henry were treated for their wounds. Accused-appellants were apprehended by
police authorities later at night where they were subsequently identified by Violeta
at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and shot them.

Garcia claimed that on February 7, 2010, he was at a tricycle terminal in Aurora,

Isabela where he worked as a dispatcher until 7 o'clock in the evening. His
allegation was corroborated by the testimony of another tricycle driver who
claimed to have seen him during the night in question. On the part of Dillatan, he
testified that he was in his bakery in Quezon, Isabela until 7 o'clock in the evening
of February 7, 2010. His testimony was corroborated by his own witness.
An criminal complaint was filed against Richard Dillatan, Sr. and Donato Garcia
charging them for the crime of robbery with homicide.

The Regional Trial Court RTC rendered its decision finding accused- appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, thus, imposing upon
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC held that: all the elements of the crime of robbery are present in the
instant case; robbery was the main purpose of accused- appellants; the killing of
Homer and the infliction of injuries upon Violeta and Henry are only committed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery; hence, these crimes are merged into a
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as defined and penalized under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The RTC further held that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that the accused-appellants are the
perpetrators of the crime when they were positively identified by Violeta.

The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused
2. Whether or not accused-appellants acted in conspiracy with one another

HELD:
1. YES. It must be stressed that Henry and Violeta were seated together atop their
motorcycle when Dillatan grabbed her bag and Garcia fired at them. In fact,
Violeta was embracing her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them. Both
accused-appellants, at that time, were both less than a meter away from the
victims. Hence, despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and
Violeta could not have mistaken the identity of accused- appellants as the
persons responsible for the attack.
Moreover, Violeta's testimony disproves the poor illumination claim of
accused-appellants when she testified that "it was still bright" at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is settled that when the conditions of visibility are
favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification of accused-appellants as
the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the crime should be accepted.
 Add the fact that Violeta and Henry had an unhindered view of the faces of
accused-appellants during the whole time that the crime was being committed.
Thus, accused-appellants' attack on the positive identification by Violeta and
Henry must, therefore, fail.
2. Yes. In the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of the accused-
appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime point to no
other conclusion than they have acted in conspiracy with each other.
In the present case where, aside from the killing of Homer, the Spouses Acob, on
the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the severity,
the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the
Spouses Acob are subsumed under the generic term "homicide" and, thus, become
part and parcel of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Nonetheless, it is also settled that in robbery with homicide, the victims who
sustained injuries, but were not killed, shall also be indemnified. Hence, the nature
and severity of the injuries sustained by these victims must still be determined for
the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages.
In the instant case, while it was alleged in the Information that Henry, who was
shot on his right knee, and Violeta, who's left hand was hit by the same bullet that
killed Homer, could have died from their injuries were it not for the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to them, the prosecution failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove such allegation. Thus, their injuries are not considered fatal and,
as such, the Spouses Acob are each entitled only to be indemnified amounts which
are equivalent to those awarded in an attempted stage.
Also, this Court has held in the controlling case of People v. Jugueta that in special
complex crimes like robbery with homicide where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages
are now uniformly pegged at P75,000.00. The award of temperate damages is also
increased to P50,000.00.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of the lower courts.
 PEOPLE v. BALUTE
GR 212932
FACTS:
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois
(SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and
daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle
was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons,
later on identified as Arnel Balute and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly
appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1
Manaois and saying "putang ina, ilabas mo!" Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1
Manaois's mobile phone, a Nokia 3210, from the latter's chest pocket and shot him
at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and
alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to
the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite
undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.

Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against him. He maintained,
inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol
(Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder from 8:00 o'clock in the morning
until 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and did not notice any untoward incident that
day as he was busy working the entire time. Nicol corroborated Balute's story, and
imputed liability on Blaster and a certain Intoy.

An information was filed against Arnel Balute, the accused charging him of Robbery
with Homicide.

The Regional Trial Court found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, in lieu of death penalty.
he RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the
elements of Robbery with Homicide, as it proved that Balute poked his gun at SPO1
Manaois's side, took his mobile phone, and shot him, resulting in the latter's death.
In this relation, the RTC gave credence to Cristita and Blesilda's positive identication
of Balute as the assailant, as compared to the latter's mere denial and alibi.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Balute’s conviction with modification that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution
failed to allege the same in the Information.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.

HELD:
YES. The CA correctly upheld Balute's conviction for Robbery with Homicide.
The Court exhaustively explained that "[a] special complex crime of robbery with
homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the]
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery."
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if,
for instance, it was committed:
(a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit;
(b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses
in the commission of the crime.

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC's finding that the prosecution
was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the
latter's mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite
surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda's
positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as opposed
to the latter's denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and
the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that "alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted
by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter."This is
especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim such as Cristita
and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois, respectively since
"[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the
conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other
than the true culprits."

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the
accused-appellant Arnel Balutey Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.
 PEOPLE v. OROSCO
GR 173479
FACTS:
Albert M. Arca (Arca)testified that on May 16, 2006, about two o'clock in the
afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis,
Legazpi City. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between
Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given
insufficient changeand insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap
opened the door, the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru
its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck
of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her
back restraining her hands. He recognized the man who was holding the hands of
Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who covered her
mouth as thin, with less hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the
center of her chest. When they released her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant
then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious icon or "santo" at the
altar infront of the store's window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap
fled together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near
the bloodied victim but also left and went home afraid because he was seen by one
of the lookouts.
Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on
arrival. Later, at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District
office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown
to him, Arca positively identified Abner Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting
beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued against
appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter
Doe remained at large.
For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he
was at his house in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was
washing clothes. He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past
3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While he admitted that
he was a resident of Purok 4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house
at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any motive for Arca to
testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting
for work after May 16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at
the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for his sick child.
Charlie Orosco, along with Abner Astor, “John Doe” and “Peter Doe” were charged
with Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. John Doe was the man who stabbed Yap. Abner Astor was one of the
two men sitting beside the store as lookouts.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment convicting the accused Charlie
Orosco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals upheld his conviction as it found no compelling reason to

deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.

On appeal to SC, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that
the trial court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of
Arca who could not point to him during the trial, and that even granting that
criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not
the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was not
him who stabbed Yap

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the trial and appellate courts err in giving credit to the
uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during
the trial?
2. Whether or not the crime of robbery only may be imputed against appellant
Charlie Orosco and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering
the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.

HELD:
1. No. It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the
testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to
convict an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are
reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate. In this case, both the trial and appellate courts
found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing notwithstanding
 that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he initially
desisted from physically pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap's hands
from behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by
appellant's cohort (John Doe).
2. Yes. The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animolucrandi;
and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its
generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason
or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to
prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses
to the commission of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede
the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused. The appellant played a crucial role in the killing of
the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands
while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim
without any means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in
the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant is equally liable
for the killing of Yap.
In the case of People vs. Baron, the Supreme Court held that when a homicide takes
place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall
be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor
to prevent the killing.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court stating that
he trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death
and P75,000.00 as moral damages, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. The
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 proper due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength, though these were not alleged in the information. While an aggravating
circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit established at trial)
cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature
entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code because the requirement of specificity in the information affected only the
criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability. The aforesaid sums shall earn
the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.
 PEOPLE v. CABBAB
GR 173479
FACTS:
That father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie
Quindasan, Felipe Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, attended a "fiesta"
celebration, but it was already over when they got there. On their way home, they
were met by accused-appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who invited them to
play "pepito," a local version of the game of "russian poker." Winner Agbulos won
the game. On their way home, Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan picking-up guava fruits from a tree, saw Cabbab, Calpito and a
companion running up a hill. He heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie
Quindasan, who were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. Belmes
dove into a canal to save himself, he ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad,
who were walking behind the group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos
and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed by Cabbab and Calpito. They proceeded to
the crime scene where they saw the dead body of Winner Agbulos together with
Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for as dead. The three sought help from the
police authorities and returned to the scene of the crime where they found Eddie
Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan Cabbab, Jr. and
Calpito who ambushed them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00, of
Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game.

Eddie Quindasan was brought to the Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following
day. The version of the defense is as follows: Cabbab claimed that he went to Palao,
Baddek, Bangued, Abra to visit his friends Romeo, Demetrio and Restituto, all
surnamed Borreta. He stayed there almost the entire day and left only at around
5:00 p.m. He arrived home in Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra at around 5:30 p.m. He
declared that his co-accused Calpito was not with him that day. He likewise averred
that he did not know prosecution witnesses PO William Belmes and Vidal Agbulos
nor did he know of any motive for them to testify against him.Calpito denied having
committed the crimes charged. He testified that at around 8:30 a.m. of April 22,
1988, he went fishing at Kimmalasag, San Isidro, Abra until 4:00 a.m. of the
following day.

Juan Cabbab, Jr. was charged along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, with
the crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery committed with
treachery, evident premeditation, with intent to kill and intent to gain.
The Regional Trial Court finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder with robbery or better put, robbery with
double homicide and attempted murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Art. 294 of the same Code or robbery with double
homicide defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Same
Code with aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating
circumstances and sentences him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
of the killing of Winner Agbulos and for robbing the said victim after killing him and
for the killing of Eddie Quindasan.
The court likewise finds the accused Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the attempted murder defined and penalized in Art. 48 in relation to Art.
6 of the Revised Penal Code. These offenses attended by the aggravating
circumstance of uninhabited place with no mitigating circumstances and sentence
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
maximum.
While accused Segundino Calpito is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision and found appellant guilty
of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposed upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed appellant's conviction, as
well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted murder.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Cabbab and Calpito are guilty of Robbery with Homicide
2. Whether or not they are guilty of the separate crime of attempted murder

HELD:
1. YES. For the crime of Robbery with Homicide to arise, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (b) the property taken belongs to another;
(c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and
(d) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would
supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim
of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of
his winnings, appellant shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie
Quindasan. The two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted
homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the
robbery, as in this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, which
is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the
number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.

2. NO. The two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate crime of
attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide
or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in
this case, is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special
complex crime that remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number
of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. For reasons herein stated, appellant is ACQUITTED of the separate crime
of attempted murder against the person of PO William Belmes.
 PEOPLE v. SUYU
GR 198020
FACTS:
At around 7:15 in the evening on January 13, 1996, Clarissa, a college student from
St. Paul University, was with her boyfriend William. They were eating inside a
pickup truck parked near the DepEd and COA in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. A tricycle
passed by on its way to the COA building, then subsequently Clarissa saw the
shadows of persons nearing the truck. Clarissa told his boyfriend to leave, while
William opened the window to check if anybody was around. Suddenly, Macarubbo
appeared in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them, and declared a holdup. Willy
also appeared and lifted the lock on the driver’s side where William was seated,
and entered the pick-up. Clarissa told William to give everything in their possession
so that they would not be harmed. Willy took William’s wallet with P150 in cash.
Cainglettook Clarissa’s jewelry (gold earrings and gold ring worth P2,500.00 and
cash amounting to P10.00. Willy clubbed William then dragged him out of the truck.
William escaped the vicinity and went to the police station to report the incident.
Willy opened the lock on Clarissa’s side, then he and Macarubbo dragged her.
Macarubbo and Willy held her by the arms, while Cainglet poked a fan knife at her.
She was then brought to a house near a muddy place, where Rodolfo, Willy’s half-
brother, met the party. Rodolfo then said to Clarissa, “You stay there because I will
be the first one.”Rodolfo then started embracing and kissing Clarissa and fondling
her breast. Rodolfo removed his pants. As Rodolfo was embracing her, Clarissa felt
a knife, pliers, and flashlight on Rodolfo’s back. She took the knife, then struggled
with Rodolfo until she kicked his groin. Rodolfo loosened his grip on her, then she
was able to run. However, she stumbled, and Rodolfo was able to grab her hair.
She pleaded for help, but the other perpetrators did nothing.
Rodolfo passed Clarissa to Cainglet. She pleaded for mercy and subsequently asked
for the knife to commit suicide instead. Cainglet kissed her until she bit his tongue,
causing it to bleed down her shirt. The three companions came back and warned
Cainglet that police were coming. Clarissa was unable to shout for help because
one of the perpetrators thrust a knife against her. She was forced to lie on her back
as Cainglet punched her at the thighs. Cainglet pinned her on the ground, then
Rodolfo removed her pants and underwear, as well as spread her legs apart.
Rodolfo went on top of her. He tried to insert his penis, but Clarissa kicked her.
Rodolfo pushed his tongue inside her mouth but Clarissa bit it. He then inserted
two of his fingers inside her vagina, then commented to Cainglet that she was still
a virgin. With the aid of his fingers, he successfully inserted his penis into his vagina.
Rodolfo told Cainglet that the latter was next. Cainglet went on top of her, then
Rodolfo held her. Clarissa kicked Cainglet. He continued to move on top of her.
Cainglet was able to insert half an inch of his penis into her vagina. Willy and
Macarrubo served as lookouts. They warned Rodolfo and Caingletthat the police
were coming.
She was allowed by the culprits to leave after promising to not report them to the
authorities. She fled to a house where an old man and his children attended to her.
The police then brought her to the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital. The nurses
however, merely examined her bruises. Upon arrival at the police station, she told
the authorities that there was merely an attempt to rape her.
On January 17, 1996, Clarissa underwent a physical and gynecological examination
at the CVRH. The examining physician, Dr. Elsie A. Pintucan, found hematoma and
contusions, sustained five days before.On January 19, 1996, Clarissa signed and
filed a criminal complaint for robbery and rape against Rodolfo, Suyu, Cainglet and
Macarubbo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tuguegarao City.
Rodolfo’s defense was an alibi. He declared that on that night he was in their house
at Alimannao, Tuguegarao City taking care of his 3 children. He also added that on
January 16, 1996, he was shot by an unknown assailant on the left thigh while
gathering cogon. He was then arrested in the hospital where he was treated and
subjected to a police line-up.
Cainglet declared that he was a security guard on duty in Corinthian Gardens,
Quezon City during the night of the incident. He claimed that he went to
Tuguegarao only on January 21, 1996. The next day, he claimed that he was
arrested by 12 men, and his personal properties worth P10,000 were taken by
them. He also alleged that the policemen tried to torture him to secure a confession
from him. He was brought before Rodolfo, who said that he did not know him.
Clarissa then pointed at him as the perpetrator in a line up.
Macarubbo denied knowing any of the co-accused. He said that he went to San
Pablo, Isabela, from Tuguegaraoin January 12, 1996 to visit his aunt. On January 17,
he went to a drinking spree where one of the drunk guests shot at his leg. He was
brought to the hospital where he was subsequently arrested by police.
Willy admitted that Rodolfo was his half-brother. However, he was at Dodan,
Peñablanca, Cagayan, at the time of the rape. He gathered firewood during the day
then returned home at 6pm. He had dinner at 8pm then had a beer with a friend.
He went to bed at 9 pm. He also alleged that he only Clarissa at the police station
for the first time when she asked for him.
An Information was filed Charging appellants with Robbery with Rape

The Regional Trial Court found accused-appellants Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with rape. The RTC gave credence and probative weight to Clarissa's
testimony and rejected the defenses of denial and alibi of the accused. Defense’
testimonies were full of inconsistencies and were not in accord with human
experience. The four accused conspired in the robbery with rape.

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED, but modified the penalty of Rommel Macarubbo
to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 15 years
of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape

HELD:
NO, the CA did not err in convicting the accused of robbery with rape.
After going over the voluminous records, We find no error in the aforesaid
observations of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. Courts generally view the
defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an
accused can concoct them to suit his defense. Again, these weak defenses cannot
stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.
Clarissa, in this case, as aforesaid, passed the test of credibility in her account of
her ordeal; positively identified her assailants; and had no ill-motive to falsely
implicate them to the commission of a crime, other than her desire to seek justice
for a wrong. Where an alleged rape victim says she was sexually abused, she says
almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been inflicted on her person,
provided her testimony meets the test of credibility.
Conspiracy to commit the crime was also correctly appreciated by the trial court.
Indeed, “at the time of the commission of the crime, accused acted in concert, each
doing his part to fulfill their common design to rob the victim and although only
two of them, through force and intimidation, raped Clarissa, the failure of
Macarubbo and Willy Suyu to prevent its commission although they were capable
would make their act to be the act of all.” We have previously ruled that once
conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime
of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by any of
them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the other from committing rape.
The conviction thus of appellants for robbery with rape defined and penalized
under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is correct. The law
provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. –
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur:
1. the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
2. the property taken belongs to another;
3. the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
4. the robbery is accompanied by rape.

The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the
felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be
contemporaneous with the commission of the robbery. We note that aside from
raping the victim, appellant Rodolfo Suyu inserted his finger in her sexual organ.
Appellant Suyu, thus, committed sexual assault as defined and penalized in Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353. Also, aside from Rodolfo Suyu,
Cainglet raped the victim. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible
felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of
robbery with rape.

The Supreme Court upheld the Decision of the Court of Appeals but with
modification that all the appellants are also ordered to, jointly and severally, pay
Clarissa Angeles P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the rape by Rodolfo Suyu; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the rape by Francis Cainglet; and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the sexual assault by Rodolfo Suyu. No costs.
 PEOPLE v. BARRA
GR 198020
FACTS:
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for a long time. He stated that
he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m.
in the light of a bright moon, he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which
was lit
with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money.
De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the
money was not in his possession, appellant shot him. He went home and reported
the
incident the following morning.
Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the victim’s
house to collect his daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the victim’s
house. He inquired from appellant if the victim was around. Appellant responded
that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his house
that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the
victim died.
Asor then proceeded to report the incident.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges against him. Appellant claimed that he
was in Batangas City, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was
arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and charged with the crime of “robbery
with murder.” Appellant’s brother, Benjamin, tried to corroborate his testimony.

An information was filed charging the accused for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding the accused, Joseph Barra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined
and penalized under Article 291(1) of the Revised Penal Code,and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Since this
fact was not duly established, accused-appellant should be held liable only for the
crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article
297 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides –
“When by reason of or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is
committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve
a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code .”
The appellant is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he
commenced the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The claim of the defense that accused-appellant should be convicted only of the
crime of homicide is bereft of merit. The killing of the victim herein was by reason
of or on the occasion of robbery.
The attendant circumstances clearly show accused-appellant’s intent to rob the
victim. That motive was manifested by accused-appellant’s overt act of poking a
gun at the victim’s forehead demanding money from the latter. When the victim
refused accede to the demand, accused-appellant shot the former. The killing was
an offshoot of accused-appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was
bent on resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victim’s failure to
give his money, the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the appellant is guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision.
In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites to be proven by the
prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed
In this case, appellant’s intent was to extort money from the victim. By reason of
the victim's refusal to give up his personal property — his money — to appellant,
the victim was shot in the head, causing his death. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the element of taking was not complete.
Elements to be convicted under Art. 297 (as discussed in People v. Macabales)
1. there is attempted or frustrated robbery;
2. a homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the
victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown
to have been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Appellant can
only be found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable under
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
appellant's crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals with modification
that that the amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to P30,000.00 and
all monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 AMPARO v. PEOPLE
GR 204990
FACTS:
On April 26, 2007, Raymond Gaa Ignacio was riding a jeepney going to Lawton when
2 men boarded the jeepney along T. Mapua Street. One of them sat beside him,
pointed a knife at him and declared a hold up. He was ordered to take his necklace
off and hand over his mobile phone.
Later on, Ignacio heard a gunshot wherein it rattled the robbers and drop their
knives on the jeepney bench. A police officer arrived and ordered the robbers to
alight from the jeepney. Four (4) men, later identified as Ahmed Alcubar, Roberto
Guarino, Juanito Salmeo and Ramon Amparo, were handcuffed and taken to the
police station.
Alcubar was the one who poked the knife and Guarino was the one who announced
the hold-up as identified by Ignacio. The latter also identified Salmeo and Amparo
as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. However, he stated that he
does not know what the 2 men were doing at the time of the incident but he
testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police
fired a warning shot.
SPO3 Renato Perez testified that on the day of the incident, he was about to report
for work when he noticed a commotion inside a passenger jeepney. He saw Alcubar
embracing Ignacio while pointing a stainless one-foot long double bladed fan knife
at him. He fired a warning shot then later arrested Alcubar. Perez also ordered the
other 3 men to alight from the jeepney. Upon frisking them, he recovered a
balisong from Guarino, an improvised kitchen knife from Salmeo and a fan knife
from Amparo.
He testified that on April 26, 2007, he was in Carriedo, Quiapo, Manila, working as
a parking attendant when a person he did not know arrived and arrested him. He
was then brought to Philippine National Police Anti-Carnapping Unit where he saw
Ignacio for the first time.

An Information was filed against Ahmed Alcubar (Alcubar), Roberto Guarino

(Guarino), Juanito Salmeo, and Ramon Amparo y Ibañez (Amparo) for robbery.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery in band defined and punished under
Art. 294 in relation to Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code without any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attendant to its commission granting the accused the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, all the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

CA noted that Amparo had abandoned his earlier defense of alibi and was arguing
that there was no evidence that he actively participated in the commission of the
robbery. It was found, however, he was caught red-handed with a weapon during
robbery, which was sufficient to establish that he had a common unlawful purpose
with the rest of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court and CA erred in finding that petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with a band.

HELD:
No. the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
was guilty of robbery in band.
Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to
another by use of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5) in relation
to Article 295, and Article 29648 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is
committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All
members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band,
unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of
the crime.
Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public
highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or
brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it
can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose
of committing the crime.
In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was guilty of robbery in band.
Ignacio was also able to testify that he saw both Salmeo and petitioner place their
knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired a warning shot. SPO3 Perez
corroborated this, and testified that there were eight (8) other passengers in the
jeepney, who pointed out all four (4) of the accused. After making the arrests, the
four (4) accused were frisked, and a fan knife was recovered from petitioner.
Petitioner initially offered a defense of alibi before the trial court. He abandoned
this defense on appeal after the trial court concluded that petitioner's alibi was not
enough to overcome Ignacio's positive identification. He then argued before the
Court of Appeals that while Ignacio might have seen him at the scene of the crime,
there was no evidence of petitioner's exact involvement. His changing defenses,
however, only show the weakness of his arguments. Nevertheless, a conviction
stands not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence. As discussed, the evidence of the prosecution was strong enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CA while modifying the penalty to be
imposed. He is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum to nine (9) years and four (4) months of
prision mayor medium as maximum.
 FRANSDILLA v. PEOPLE
GR 197562
FACTS:
On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private
complainants' residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon City,
private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in front of their
gate. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their
purpose, as there were four (4) of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia
Yreverre, n Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese
Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person whom she wanted to talk
to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine that she was from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension that Lalaine offered
herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house. When they were
already having a conversation, Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone,
which the latter acceded to and handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed
that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said that the person
she was calling did not know how to use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on
dialing the telephone.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the
cigarette, the four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly
came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still dialing
the telephone. When Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was
calling, she asked Lalaine if she could use the comfort room, which the latter again
permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the telephone, got her bag and went to the
comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs as
she said she was having a menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention
was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at
Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal
was poking a gun at Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other
men proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other
companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and cousin inside the
bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled
Lalaine's hair and dragged her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The
gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted
upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his companions
to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried
the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs, they
threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine
opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her.
Accused Cacal then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her
towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the
room. Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused
Cuanang came and tied her arms at her back. While she was being tied, appellant
Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was also at the time that accused Cacal
and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the jewelries and things they
saw.
When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle
downstairs, she saw Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their
guns around their waists. Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on
board two (2) cars that were waiting for them just outside the house, and one of
which, a black Colt Mirage, was driven by accused Manuel Silao, together with
appellant Edgardo Silao who was seated at the front passenger seat.
At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and
untied her. Lalaine then called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia
reported the incident to the police authorities. Not too long thereafter, the police
investigated the incident.

An Information was filed against Fransdilla and her co-accused charging them with
the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house (Art 299) by armed persons
and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Art 294).

The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision finding Aurora Fransidilla the
accused-appellant and her co-accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and in the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The CA observed that the clear and categorical testimony of Lalaine positively
showed that Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design with the other
accused to commit the robbery, stressing that "it is a common design which is the
essence of conspiracy, though the conspirators may act separately and on different
manner but always leading to the same unlawful result."

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt
2. Whether or not Fransdilla committed the complex crime of robbery in an
inhabited house by armed men under Article 299 and robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons under Article 294

HELD:
1. YES. the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the
State competently and credibly established her active participation in the execution
of the robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific acts.
Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense, despite her being directly
incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for her specific overt acts
of complicity in the robbery and thus rendered the incriminating evidence
unrefuted.
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an
accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the
crime, her overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of the crime
agreed to be committed. The overt acts of each of the conspirators must tend to
execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held
to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is
the mastermind.
Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive
coconspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by
representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not always
required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the
agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful
scheme or objective would be carried out. Conspiracy can also be deduced from
the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from
the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is established, the
act of each conspirator is the act of all.
In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial
evidence. Lalaine's testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence.
Lalaine's direct testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the execution
of the robbery, while the following circumstances indicated the unity of action and
common purpose or design to commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-
accused

2. YES. In Napolis v. Court of Appeals , the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted
in United States v. De los Santos 19 that when the felonies of robbery in an
inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with
violence against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code are committed, the violence against or intimidation of a person was the
"controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by
violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary
robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation
against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society
and the security of the individual."
To start with, the information fully alleged the complex crime of robbery in an
inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with
intimidation or violence under Article 294 , Revised Penal Code by averring that
"the above-named accused conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the
residence . . . ." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the
commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused,
after entering the residential house of the complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St.,
Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the vault containing
Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence
against and intimidation of persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening
Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of the household inside
the bodega of the house.
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or
public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by
reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and
if:
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed,
by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if —
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed
furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the
robbery.
Relevant are paragraph (a) 4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA)
and paragraph (b) 2 (because the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's
upstairs bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the robbery was
committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the
more serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four
months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, must be
corrected to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.

The Supreme Court affirms in all respects the conviction of accused Aurora Engson
Fransdilla for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against and
intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS that she shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum;
 ABLAZA v. PEOPLE
GR 217722
FACTS:
Rosario S. Snyder (Snyder). Snyder narrated that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 29,
2010, she was using her cellphone while walking along Jolo Street, Barangay
Barreto, Olongapo City when a motorcycle with two male persons on board
stopped beside her. The backrider then suddenly grabbed her three necklaces:one
big necklace worth P43,800.00 and two other necklaces each with pendants worth
P13,500.00 and P12,800.00, respectively,the prices of which were evidenced by the
receipts issued by Eleanor Pawnshop and Jewelry Store where she bought
them.Snyder further recounted that after grabbing her necklaces, the two male
persons moved a short distance and then looked back at her to check if all her
necklaces were taken. Recovering from shock, Snyder managed to shout and ask
for help. A tricycle passed by and so the male persons on board the motorcycle
immediately sped away.Snyder asked the tricycle driver to run after the snatchers
but he unfortunately missed them. Thus, Snyder went to the Police Station to
report the incident.
While at the police station, Snyder was shown some pictures from which she
identified petitioner as the driver of the motorcycle. Snyder was certain about the
identity of petitioner since she had a good look at the robbers' faces when they
looked back at her before speeding away and also because petitioner was not
wearing any helmet at that time.
On the same day, a policeman accompanied Snyder to the house of petitioner who,
when asked, denied any involvement in the snatching incident and claimed that he
was asleep at that time. After a while, Snyder and the policeman discovered that
Lauzon, whom Snyder earlier learned to be the backrider, was also in petitioner's
house hiding under the kitchen sink. Unfortunately, Snyder was not able to recover
her necklaces.
Petitioner claimed that on the date and time of the incident, he and Lauzon were
asleep in his house in Purok 6, Lower Kalaklan in front of Ocean View since they had
a drinking spree the night before. Petitioner only woke up when a policeman
arrived asking him if he was Jomar Ablaza. Upon confirming that he was Jomar
Ablaza, the policeman told him that a woman wanted to see him. However, upon
seeing petitioner, the woman told the policeman that he was not the one since the
person she was looking for was "tisoy" with tattoo. Upon hearing this, the
policeman reminded the woman that petitioner already had a record with the
police. The policeman and the woman then simply left. After two months, however,
petitioner was arrested in connection with this case.

An Information was filed charging Jomar Ablaza and Jay Lauzon with the crime of
Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons under paragraph 5,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding Jay Lauzon and Jomar Ablaza
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery defined and penalized under Article
294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences them to each suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum to
eight (8) years and twenty (20) days as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court modifying the penalty
and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellants since their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The Court finds that petitioner should be held liable only for theft.
The findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique
opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand.
Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial
court in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
affect the result of the case. Said rule finds an ever more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA, as in the case at hand.
Indeed, the case of People v. Concepcion is on all fours with the present case, viz.:

x x x Article 293 or the [Revised Penal Code (RPC)] defines robbery as a crime committed
by 'any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal properly belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.' x x x
Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter's consent. x x x
By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in three ways, by using:
(a) violence against any person;
(b) intimidation of any person; and/or
(c) force upon anything. Robbery by use of force upon things is provided under Articles
299 to 305 of the RPC.

The main issue is whether the snatching of the shoulder bag in this case is robbery
or theft. Did Concepcion employ violence or intimidation upon persons, or force
upon things, when he snatched Acampado's shoulder bag?
In People v. Dela Cruz, this Court found the accused guilty of theft for snatching a
basket containing jewelry, money and clothing, and taking off with it, while the
owners had their backs turned.
In People v. Tapang, this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for frustrated
theft because he stole a white gold ring with diamond stones from the victim's
pocket, which ring was immediately or subsequently recovered from the accused
at or about the same time it was stolen.
The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or
force in snatching Acampado's shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified
that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder.
Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in
snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion's snatching of Acampado's
shoulder bag constitute the crime of theft, not robbery.

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for Review on Certiorari of the
accused-appellants. The Court still affirmed the conviction by the Appellate Court
but Modified its Decision finding petitioner Jomar Ablaza y Caparas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons
under paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is MODIFIED in that he is
instead found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor
as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum.
 MEDINA v. PEOPLE
GR 182648
FACTS:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the
registered owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was
involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002,
he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop
in Buenavista, Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina's
shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the under chassis
was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts
were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the
morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim's sister, instructed Danilo
Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from Medina's shop on the agreement that
he would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was
not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims
worth P5,000.00, P5,000.00, P2,500.00, and P10,000.00, respectively, could not be
found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him.that he took and installed them on Lim's
another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop.
Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep,
but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair
shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the
jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft was filed by Purita,
representing her brother.

An Information was filed charging Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple
theft, defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Regional Trial Court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and
considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The CA agreed that Medina
admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the pick-up; that unlike the pick-up,
the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove
that the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in good running
condition; and that he failed to prove that the pick-up is owned by Lim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Medina is liable for simple theft.

HELD:
Yes. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent. As defined and
penalized, the elements of the crime are:
1. there was taking of personal property;
2. the property belongs to another;
3. the taking was done with intent to gain;
4. the taking was without the consent of the owner; and
5. the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of
persons or force, upon things.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Although proof
as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive
taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As to the concept of "taking"
— The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of
"asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away.
As to the concept of "taking" —The only requirement for a personal property to be
the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It
need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." To
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away. To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The
word "take"' in RPC includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x
may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any
mechanical device.
IN THIS CASE, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep's
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the
defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. With such admission,
the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were
indeed lawfully taken. The Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the
burden. He failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the
owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items
that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the
transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts
from, the jeep and their placement to the pick-up.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT: Medina identified purported acknowledgment
receipt. According to Medina, Mendoza came to his place and the auto parts while
being transferred from jeep to the pick-up and that Medina even called Brgy
officials and let them sign a document to bear witness on the matter. The
Acknowledgment receipt was not recognized by Trial Court because it was not
formally offered in evidence.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA in toto.

 PEOPLE v. NIELLES
GR 200308
FACTS:
Petitioner Juanita Flores is engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase
orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and disposing, selling or
transferring them for consideration.
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles initially worked as house helper of Petitioner
Flores but was eventually hired to work at the latter’s office performing clerical jobs
like sorting invoices. Thereafter, appellant was assigned to bill and collect from sub-
guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks.
While Petitioner Flores was in Hong Kong, Nielles, enjoying the trust and confidence
reposed upon her by the said complainant, allegedly collected P640,353.86 from
sub guarantors which Nielles did not remit to Flores nor deposited in the latter’s
account. She instead issued 15 personal check totaling P640.353.86 and deposited
them to Flores’ account. All checks issued were dishonored upon presentment due
to “account closed”. Nielles absconded.

An Information was filed charging Mera “Joy” Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles
Delos Reyes with the crime of Qualified Theft

The taking was done with intent to gain because when the accused’s checks
bounced, she failed to remit or return the amount. The accused’s act was
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, but rather by the use of abuse of confidence reposed [by] private
complainant [upon] her. Thus, the elements of theft, as well as the circumstances
that made the same as qualified theft, are present in the instant case.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding the accused Mera “Joy”
Eleuterio Nielles a.k.a. Mera Nielles Delos Reyes, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In her Brief, appellant asserted that since private complainant Flores was abroad
on July 15, 2004, she could not have personally known whether appellant indeed
collected amounts from the sub-guarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the
15 checks is not proof that she received/collected payments from the sub-
guarantors or that she failed to remit the monies belonging to Flores. She insisted
that the prosecution failed to establish that she indeed collected monies from the
sub- guarantors amounting to P640,353.86. Appellant also theorized that she might
have issued the checks in favor of the sub-guarantors for whatever transactions
they have between them; and that thereafter, when she went to these sub-
guarantors to collect their dues for private complainant, these sub-guarantors used
the same checks she previously issued as their payment for private complainant.
For that reason her personal checks were deposited in private complainant’s
account.
The CA held that the fact that Flores was out of the country during the commission
of the offense is irrelevant since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that
upon her arrival in the Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and
talked to the sub-guarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed appellant issued 15
personal checks in lieu of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores’
account but were all dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted
that aside from her bare denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support
her claim that she did not steal the amount of P640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the
CA found all the elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court,
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nielles is guilty for qualified theft

HELD:
Yes. The prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft
which are:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking was done with intent to gain;
4. That it was done without the owner's consent;
5. That it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
or of force upon things; and
6. That it was done with grave abuse of confidence.

Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of

P640,353.86 from her without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she
collected from the former's sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks
and deposited the same to Private Complainant's account which however, all
bounced for the reason "account closed". The taking of the amount collected by
Accused-appellant was obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the
same to Private Complainant. Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful
taking. Further, the unlawful act was accomplished by Accused-appellant without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, [or] of force upon things as the
payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily handed to her by the sub-
guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection of payments.
Grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified theft was also proven
as it is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into possession of
the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her employer, as
in the instant case.
The element of taking of personal property was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. During her cross-examination, Flores testified that upon having been
apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an investigation and
inquired from her sub- guarantors who admitted making payments to appellant.
She also testified during cross-examination that when appellant arrived from Hong
Kong, the latter went to Flores' office and admitted to having converted the
collections to her personal use. Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify,
appellant did not rebut Flores' testimony.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

 ZAPANTA v. PEOPLE
GR 170863
FACTS:
A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the
fabrication and erection of the building's structural and steel framing to Anmar,
owned by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from
Linton Commercial in Pasig City and hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction
materials to the project site. Anmar likewise assigned Engr. Anthony Zapanta as
project manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody,
and checking of all building construction materials. On two occasions, Zapanta
instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking's truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, to
unload wide flange steel beams at Anmar's alleged new contract project along
Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Upon being informed that several wide flange steel
beams had been returned to Anmar's warehouse, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS'
project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon of the said return. Engr. Marigondon
contacted Zapanta to explain, but the latter simply denied that the reported return
took place. Engr. Marigondon later found out through his warehouseman that
several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway but the
same were never recovered, resulting in loss amounting to P2,269,731.69.

An Information was filed charging the petitioner, together with Concordia O. Loyao,
Jr., with the crime of qualified theft.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It gave
credence to the prosecution witnesses' straightforward and consistent testimonies
and rejected the petitioner's bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as
maximum.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision convicting the petitioner of
qualified theft.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Zapanta committed qualified theft
HELD:
YES, the Petitioner is guilty of Qualified Theft.
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles
308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are:
(a) The taking of personal property;
(b) The said property belongs to another;
(c) The said taking be done with intent to gain;
(d) It be done without the owner's consent;
(e) It be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
(f) It be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC,
i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, t
upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide steel beams had been
delivered, twice, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the
petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project
manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the
authority and consent of the owner of the materials.
Also, Zapanta’s argument that the failure to present the alleged stolen beams in
court was fatal to the prosecution's cause is without merit. Corpus delicti refers to
the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was
lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. The positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, stating that the petitioner directed them
to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext
of a new Anmar project, and the security logbook entry, delivery receipts and
photographs, proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a
different location other than the project site and are sufficient to support
conviction.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modification. Petitioner
Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE v. CAHILIG
GR 199208
FACTS:
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was
tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the
WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals
from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit.
Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI
president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI's
bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal
was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to another
was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually
transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that
a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip
to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases
of qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI'S funds a
total of P6,268,300.00. All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon
agreement of the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru trial for purposes of
efficient and speedy administration of these cases, the actual trial and presentation
of evidence will only be done on the first three counts of the cases. Thereafter, the
parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining 27 counts considering that
all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus
operandi used in committing the crime charged,and involving the same accused
and the same offended party.

Thirty (30) Informations were filed against the accused-appellant Trinidad Cahilig,
all charging him of the crime of Qualified Theft.
The Regional Trial Court finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for every crime he is charged with.
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence
by the key officers of the association. The RTC noted that Cahilig “enjoyed access
to the funds and financial records of the association, a circumstance that
understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted to her
personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the
trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision

HELD:
No. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence,
are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these cases. Cahilig
took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position.
Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed
scheme to commit the theft. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified
Theft, "must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship,
or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high
degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused." Cahilig's position
was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling,
managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI's depositors and other
funds of the association. Cahilig's responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required
prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care. However, instead
of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal
account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision made by the Appellate Court in finding
that the accused-appellant is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Qualified Theft; however, the Supreme Court noted that the CA erred in the
penalty imposed in 6 of the charges filed against the accused-appellant. In lieu
ofthe penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191,
03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified
theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the
corresponding charges stands.
 PEOPLE v. DONIO
GR 212815
FACTS:
On November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police Station, Tarlac
City, headed by SPO4 Taberdo, conducted a checkpoint along the junction of
MacArthur Highway in relation to the campaign of the PNP against hijacking,
carnapping, and kidnapping, hailing cargo trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards
to southbound vehicles. At 2:30AM of the same day, a speeding tricycle abruptly
stopped a few meters from the checkpoint and caught the attention of the police
officers. SPO4 Taberdo and two others approached the vehicle. The driver, later
identified as Donio, was noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking the starter of
the tricycle. When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul Layug and
then handed to SPO4 Taberdo a temporary license bearing the said name. The
police officers asked the driver and his companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan,
to bring the vehicle, a Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint
when they failed to produce its certificate of registration and the official receipt.
Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained mini jungle bolo
inside. They seized the tricycle and the bolo, and then brought the three to the
police station. At 9AM, Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the
registration papers. The officers allowed him, however, he did not return.
Meanwhile, around 6:30AM of the same date, Rodrigo was searching for his
brother Raul, the victim, who has not returned home since last night. Raul was the
driver of Rodrigo's tricycle. Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin from
Mawaque to ask him if he saw his brother. His cousin accompanied him to Barangay
Madapdap where they found the remains of Raul. Words spread about his death.
Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed them that he saw a vehicle similar to
Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police Station. Rodolfo, Raul and Rodrigo's other
brother, went to the station where he learned that Paulino and Ryan were released.
Sometime in December 2003, the brothers returned to the station upon learning
that Donio was apprehended. On December 7, 2003, the Chief of Police summoned
SPO4 Taberdo to identify the driver who asked permission to retrieve the
registration papers but did not return at the Concepcion Police Station. Upon
seeing Donio, the disgruntled SPO4 Taberdo asked him, "Why did you do that?" He
was referring to the incident when Donio did not return. It was also that same day
that he learned Donio's real identity.
A post-mortem examination was conducted on Raul’s body by Dr. Dizon, he
determined that Raul sustained stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument.
Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old grass cutter and a resident of
Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, denied the accusations. As a sugarcane
plantation worker, he has a long palang for harvesting and cutting. It was not similar
to the sharp and pointed mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in plantation worker, he does
not leave the workplace for six months. His wife visits him instead.
On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas, Tarlac. However,
from the evening of November 25, 2003 until the next day, he was at home after
his wife fetched him to tend to their sick child. He first learned of the carnapping
charge when the police officers came to his house looking for a certain Val Paulino.
He was taken to the municipal hall where he was investigated and detained for five
days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him for three hours forcing him to admit
the crime.

An Information was filed charging Enrile Donio with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6539, otherwise known as Anti- Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by R.A.
No. 7659.
The prosecution established all the elements of the crime. Donio failed to
substantiate his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense or the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. Under the Rules, SPO4 Taberdo's
action as police officer enjoys the presumption of regularity. In the absence of
evidence showing that he was motivated by bad faith or ill-will to testify against
Donio, SPO4 Taberdo's categorical identification of the accused stands.

The Regional Trial Court Convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Carnapping as defined in Section
2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with credit of his preventive imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The CA found his averment that he was taken from his house, tortured and made
to sign a blank sheet of paper as highly implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete
with details which were unlikely the product of creative imagination of the police.
There was no proof that the police singled him out or was impelled by an evil or
ulterior motive. The said affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed with the
assistance of counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable
doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

HELD:
Yes. After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the parties, this
Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Donio's conviction.
At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution should have filed an Information
for the special complex crime of qualified carnapping in aggravated form. While it
is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake
in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is
not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged
in the information which determines the real nature of the crime. The recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information determines the
character of the crime and not the caption or preamble of the information or the
specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated. In the case
at bar, the acts alleged to have been committed by Donio are averred in the
Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized under Sections
2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A. No. 6539, as
amended are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Records show that
all the elements of carnapping in the instant case are present and proven during
the trial. The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as evidenced
by a Deed of Conditional Sale in his favor. Donio was found driving the vehicle in
the early morning of November 26, 2003, the same day Rodrigo was looking for his
missing brother Raul. Also, SPO4 Taberdo positively identified Donio as the driver
he flagged down at the checkpoint in his testimony.
"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act.
The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects
belonging to the person robbed and killed is considered the author of the
aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has been
invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the
proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence
inconsistent thereto. The said principle may be applied in this case as the concept
of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. Here, Donio
failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the
victim before the police officers when his identity was asked, and left under the
guise of getting the said documents. It was also established that he and the others
were strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with the
circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the presumption that he was
one of the perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's
death.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. Donio's intent
to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were
using it as means of transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion
police officers.
He alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be predicated on a series
of circumstantial evidence, the same must be convincing, plausible and credible.
Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence does not
necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no longer be proved by any other
evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can
replace direct evidence as provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
which, to warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more than
one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven; and (c) the combination of all these circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who committed
the crime. Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
After a careful perusal of records, Donio’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
established. First, Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were
accosted during a checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur Highway by
elements of the Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30 in the morning on
November 26, 2003;
Second, his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he failed to produce
its registration papers;
Third, he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even presented it
and introduced himself as Raul to the police;
Fourth, a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;
Fifth, Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and that he was
looking for him on the same day that Donio and the others were flagged down;
Sixth, Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November
25, 2003 when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal at the corner of MacArthur
Highway and Mawaque Road.
Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's body at around
6:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003 at a vacant lot towards the road to Sta.
Lucia Resettlement corner Barangay Dapdap.
Eighth, Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp instrument as
depicted in the post-mortem examination sketch by Dr. Dizon and reflected in the
Certificate of Death.
Ninth, Donio was subsequently apprehended and SPO4 Taberdo positively
identified him as the driver they flagged down at the checkpoint.
Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from
the officers to get the registration papers but never returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's
flight is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position
to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. The factual findings of the appellate
court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally
devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness. Records are bereft
of evidence which showed ill-will or malicious intent on the part of SPO4 Taberdo.
In absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court finds that the RTC and the CA did
not err in the findings of facts and the credibility of the witnesses.
No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason, it
is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the
following: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed;
and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission. It must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.
Donio failed to present convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for him to
be at the scene at the time of carnapping. Similarly, this Court is unconvinced of his
insistence that he was tortured in view of lack of any evidence to validate the same.
Thus, the uncorroborated alibi and denial of Donio must be brushed aside in light
of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained his
identity.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Court finding accused-
appellant Enrile Donio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclucion perpetua with
all the accessory penalties, is hereby affirmed with modifications.
 ONG v. PEOPLE
GR 190475
FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires,
described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of
P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires. Private
complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires
specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires
using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St.,
corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned
by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was
in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995,
thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that
all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which
was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported
the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous
business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24,
1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in
Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if
appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which
the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from
his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private
complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was
again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and
reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police
District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six
(6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel
Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-
buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with
the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The
team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza
proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the
street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck
tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which
Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires
were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found
that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial
numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust
team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from
the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team
went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the
barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening
when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for
investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza.
The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been
engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and
denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong
Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go)
offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan,
Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he
was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold
Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in
his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back
to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store,
confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires.

An Information was filed charging Jaime Ong of the crime of violation of

Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution had sufficiently established
that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie
evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials,
he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the
minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correcional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating P.D. 1612

HELD:
No. First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar),
whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse
where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had
been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the
tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565dated 10 November 1994 and an Inventory List.
Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay taken at the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio. The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong
Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the
robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in
his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing
tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen
tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession. Ong likewise admitted that
he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of 245,500 where
he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.hanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong,
who was in the
business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he
did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from
the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His
experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and
the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the
streets.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy
bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong
Marketing.
Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that
defense is disputable. In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was
disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were
fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and
to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima
facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

 PEOPLE v. DIMAT
GR 181184
FACTS:
Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez
and Ruben Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000, Delgado’s wife,
Sonia, bought from accused Mel Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number
WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine number as
TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a
suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered
that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles.
They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had
been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. The latter confirmed that
it was his car stolen from Robinsons Galleria’s parking area.
First, the engine and chassis number are different as evidence by the deed of sale
evidencing the transactions and; second, he has no criminal intent.

An Information was filed charging Mel Dimat, the accused in the said case for
Violating the Anti-Fencing Law
The Regional Trial Court found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and
sentenced him to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision
mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified t he penalty
to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, as maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia
Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
HELD:
YES. The elements of fencing are
1) a robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article
or object taken during that robbery or theft;
3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing was derived from that crime;
and
4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Here someone carnapped the car of Mantequilla and was later on sold by Dimat to
Delgado. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the
latter gave the car to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him
the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in
his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Based on this, Dimat knew that
the car he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not
be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents
to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the car came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Delgado.
As to the defenses raised: First, the engine and chassis number are the same when
inspected by the police. Second, the Anti-Fencing Law is malum prohibitum
requiring no proof of criminal intent.

The Supreme Court affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the CA.
 CARGANILLO v. PEOPLE
GR 182424
FACTS:
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija, gave
petitioner, Nenita Carganillo, P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay. The
petitioner, who was alleged to be an “ahente” or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay,
agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before
November 28, 1998. According to the “Kasunduan” signed by the petitioner, the
parties agreed that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall earn a
commission of P0.20 centavos. But if no palay is purchased and delivered on
November 28, the petitioner must return the P132,000.00 to Teresita within 1 week
after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and 1 week
thereafter, Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for the return
of the amount but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an affidavit-
complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal’s Office.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and denied that she entered into a
“principal-agent” agreement with, and received the P132,000.00 from, Teresita.
She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and
rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and that, in November
1996, she was made to sign a blank “Kasunduan” that reflected no written date and
amount. She likewise denied personally receiving any written demand letter from
Teresita.

An Information charging Nenita Carganillo, the accused, for the crime of Estafa
The Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner of the crime of estafaand
sentenced her to suffer, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imprisonment
ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Estafe
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the following
elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
All the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the petitioner received in
trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and
misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to Teresita upon
demand.

The Supreme Court affirmed the correctness of the penalty imposed by the CA, as
it is fully in accordance with the law. The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article
315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00,
isprisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum. The minimum term is
taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prisión correccional
minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
 CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
GR 180016
FACTS:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged
in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the
former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2,
1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned
over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an
Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa. The prosecution, to
prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy.

The defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia,
who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For
every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having
transacted any business with private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining
a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank
receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of
jewelry, which he did not even see.

An Information was filed charging Lito Corpuz, the petitioner, for committing the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court finds the accused Lito Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of estafa under article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph
(b) of the RPC; there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable; accordingly, the accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional in its medium period as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as
maximum.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC with modification on the imposable prison
term.

Petitioner, in his defense, argued against the admissibility of a mere photocopy of

the receipt; that the information was defective for it does not contain the period
when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant;
Petitioner that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the Petitioner

HELD:
No. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the
crime. It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Petitioner argues that the last element was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he looked for petitioner for a week
after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner twice about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The CA observed that the law is
silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus: When
the law does not qualify, We should not qualify.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) is
with modification that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 3 years, 2 months and 11 days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 BELEN REAL v. PEOPLE
GR 152065
FACTS:
Petitioner Belen Real was an agent of private complainant Benjamin Uy in his
jewelry business. On several occasions, Uy entrusted to petitioner pieces of jewelry
with the obligation on the part of the latter to remit the proceeds of the sale or to
return the pieces of jewelry if unsold within a specific period of time.
On January 10, 1989, around 8:30 a.m., petitioner arrived at Uy’s house at Nueva
Villa Subdivision, Barangay Alangilan, Batangas City and requested Uy to lend her
some pieces of jewelry as she had a buyer at that time. Because petitioner is his
kumadre, since Uy was one of the sponsors in the wedding of petitioners daughter,
and because petitioner was his agent for quite a time, Uy agreed. He showed
petitioner some pieces of jewelry and allowed the latter to select from them.
Petitioner selected seven (7) pieces of jewelry. Uy prepared a receipt for the items
selected by petitioner and handed the same to the latter. After checking the
receipt, petitioner wrote the name Benjamin Uy at the upper portion thereof and
affixed her signature at the lower portion including her address.
Ten days thereafter, Uy went to petitioner’s house at Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas and
asked about their transaction. Petitioner informed Uy that the pieces of jewelry
were already sold but the payment was in the form of check. Petitioner showed Uy
five (5) pieces of checks all dated January 31, 1989 and requested the latter to
collect on said date. Uy acceded, but when he returned on January 31, 1989,
petitioner again requested him to return the following day as she had not encashed
the checks yet. Uy again agreed but when he demanded the payment the following
day, petitioner called him makulit and could not sleep for that matter. Petitioner
further remarked that the more she would not pay Uy.
Constrained, Uy brought the matter to his lawyer, Atty. Dimayacyac, who
thereafter sent a demand letter to petitioner. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner
failed to make good her obligation. Consequently, Uy lodged a criminal complaint
against petitioner before the City Prosecutor of Batangas.

An Information was filed charging Belen Real, petitioner with the crime Estafa
under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court promulgated its decision finding petitioner guilty of
swindling (estafa) under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) sentencing the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Trial Court.

HELD:
No. The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC as follows:
1.that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same;
2. that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and
3. that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.

Although the trial court only mentioned in passing that damage was caused to
private complainant Uy, it cannot be denied that there exists a factual basis for
holding that petitioners refusal to account for or return the pieces of jewelry had
prejudiced the rights and interests of Uy. Certainly, disturbance of property rights
is equivalent to damage and is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. In this case, Uy, who is a businessman,
not only failed to recover his investment but also lost the opportunity to realize
profits therefrom. Anxiety also set in as he ran the risk of being sued by the person
who likewise entrusted him the same pieces of jewelry. To assert his legal recourse,
Uy further incurred expenses in hiring a lawyer and in litigating the case.
HOWEVER, that the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals was improper.
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Art. 315 is composed of two periods; hence, to get the
maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of years
included in the two periods should be divided into three. Article 65 of the RPC
requires the division of the time included in the prescribed penalty into three equal
periods of time included in the penalty imposed, forming one period for each of
the three portions.
Thus, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed for
estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are:
Minimum 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days Medium 5 years,
5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days Maximum 6 years, 8 months,
and 21 days to 8 years
In the present case, as the amount involved isP371,500, which obviously exceeds
P22,000, the penalty imposable should be the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 further states
that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000
defrauded in excess of P22,000 but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years. The amount swindled from Uy exceeds the amount
ofP22,000 which, when translated to the additional penalty of one year for every
P10,000 defrauded, goes beyond 20 years (close to additional 35 years to be exact).
Hence, under the law, the maximum penalty to be imposed to petitioner should be
20 years of reclusion temporal.
On the other hand, the minimum period of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Art. 315, par. 1(b)
of the RPC. In this case, the penalty next lower to prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (6 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months) to prision correccional medium (2 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). Therefore, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA in finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, however, modified the penalty to
imposed. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 SULIMAN v. PEOPLE
GR 190970
FACTS:
In six (6) Informations, all dated June 6, 2003, Vilma Suliman and Luz Garcia (at-
large) were charged before the RTC of Manila with 2 counts of illegal recruitment
under Sec. 6, par. (a), (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995), as well as 4 counts of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the
RPC. The 6 cases were consolidated and the accused was brought to trial.
In separate cases, Suliman and Garcia were charged for estafa involving private
complainants Anthony Mancera, Perlita Prudencio and Jimmy Tumabcao.
Complainants alleged that Suliman is the owner and general manager of Suliman
International (recruitment company). Allegedly, Suliman and Garcia separately
charged the complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and
₱21,400.00 as placement fees for their deployment either in South Korea, Saudi
Arabia and Canada. However, promised employment abroad never materialized
and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered. Hence, they
filed their respective complaints.

The petitioner was charged with 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment under Sec. 6, par.
(a), (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995); and 4 counts of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of
estafa. Suliman was acquitted of one charge of estafa for failure of the prosecution
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of trial court, and modified the penalty to
be imposed on the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting Suliman of
1. 2 counts of illegal recruitment; and
2. 3 counts of estafa

HELD:
1. No. Sec. 6 of RA 8042 provides that illegal recruitment is committed x x x
 a.To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance; x x x
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department
of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving
economic sabotage. x x x
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has
established that Suliman and Garcia committed the acts enumerated under the
provisions of Section 6 (a), (l) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged
the private complainants the amounts of ₱132,460.00, ₱120,000.00 and
₱21,400.00 as placement fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private
complainants without valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said
complainants after such failure to deploy.

2.No. Under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, estafa is committed by any person who
shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious
name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. Suliman and Gaarcia
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the
private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and
Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants' payment
of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by
Suliman and Garcia that induced the private complainants to part with their money.
As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private
complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Suliman argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor was
she aware of the recruitment activities done by Garcia. Suliman avers that when
Garcia received several amounts of money from the private complainants, she
acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and
consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager,
Suliman was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman International.
Undoubtedly, she has control, management or direction of the business of the said
company. In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of
the private complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner
was the one who offered the private complainants an alleged alternative
employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not materialize.

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals finding Suliman
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of Illegal Recruitment and 3 counts of
Estafa.
 PEOPLE v. TIBAYAN
GR 209655
FACTS:
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment
company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
September 21, 2001. Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on
TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling
securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of “The
Securities Regulation Code,” and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s
Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICI’s
corporate registration for being fraudulently procured.
Private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, Milagros Alvarez, Clarita P. Gacayan, Irma
T. Ador, Emelyn Gomez, Yolanda Zimmer, Nonito Garlan, Judy C. Rillon, Leonida D.
Jarina, Reynaldo A. Dacon, Cristina Dela Peña, and Rodney E. Villareal were enticed
to invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance
that they will recover their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks, representing
the amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings,
respectively. Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, as the account was
already closed, prompting private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the
TGICI office to demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said
checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that
their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office
closed down without private complainants having been paid and, thus, they were
constrained to file criminal complaints against the incorporators and directors of
TGICI.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto claimed that his
signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was forged and that since January
2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI. For her part, Tibayan also claimed that
her signature in the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was
neither an incorporator nor a director of TGICI.
An Information was filed against Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto, the accused-
appellants charging them with multiple criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa (case
did not specify the number of cases charged) against the incorporators and
directors of TGICI).
The Regional Trial Court issued six (6) separate decisions convicting Tibayan of 13
counts and Puerto of 11 counts of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315
of the RPC in relation to PD 1689.
RTC convicted the accused of simple estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege
in the informations that the accused and other directors/incorporators formed a
syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public.

The Court of Appeals modified accused-appellants’ conviction to that of

Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly increased their respective penalties to life
imprisonment for each count.
TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme which relied on
subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors- and is what D 1689 precisely aims
to punish. Since the TGICI director/incorporators comprised more than 5 persons,
accused criminal liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants guilty of Syndicated Estafa

HELD:
Yes. The Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellants.
The elements of estafa by deceit are the following:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In relation thereto, Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as follows:

Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of swindling
as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is
committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the
intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise
or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
“samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are:
(a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is
committed;
(b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations,
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of
inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would
be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from 3%-5.5%. Under
such lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start that TGICI is
operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay
the assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply with their guarantee and
had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. Thus, the CA correctly held that
accused- appellants, along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI
to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed through
a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case, considering that:
(a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellants,, made false pretenses and
representations to the investing public – in this case,the private
complainants – regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with
TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of
fraud;
(c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and
(d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the
private complainants’ investments, obviously to the latter’s prejudice.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals accordingly,
accused-appellants Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of 13 and 11 counts, respectively, of Syndicated Estafa and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for each count.
 HAO v. PEOPLE
GR183345
FACTS:
Manuel Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch
where Ngo was the manager. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took
Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an investment house that will give a higher
rate of return. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao (Gracia) who presented
herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State
Resources Development Corporation (State Resources), the recommended
company that can give Dy his higher investment return.
Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00). This initial investment
earned the promised interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to increase his
investment to almost One Hundred Million Pesos (₱100,000,000.00). Dy increased
his investments through several checks he issued in the name of State Resources.
In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his
investment. Gracia issued checks in the total amount of One Hundred Fourteen
Million, Two Hundred Eighty Six Thousand, Eighty Six Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(₱114,286,086.14). All these checkswere subsequently dishonored when Dy
deposited them.
Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored
checks. Ngo promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy found out that Ngo
already resigned from Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located. Hence, he
confronted Gracia regarding the dishonored checks. He eventually learned that
Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Gracia’s
husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the petitioners never
returned Dy’s money.
A supplemental brief was filed to include Chester De Joya, Allan Roxas, Samantha
Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators and/or directors of
State Resources.

An Information charging Manuel Dy and other six co-accused charging them for
syndicated estafa.

The Judge of the Regional Trial Court issued warrants of arrest against the 6.
Petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of probable
cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

The Court of Appeals stated that the evidence and affidavits only indicated the
crime of simple estafa since there was no evidence that State Resources was
formed to defraud the public in general or that it was used to solicit money from
other persons aside from Dy, then the offense charged should only be for simple
estafa. Nevertheless there was still probably cause to issue the warrants of arrest
for simple estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge erred in issuing a warrant of Arrest

HELD:
Yes, the warrant of arrest may issue because syndicated estafa is necessarily
included in estafa by means of deceit and there is probable cause to convict
petitioner of the latter.

As To Estafa By Means Of Deceit

As Dy alleged in his complaint-affidavit, Ngo and Gracia induced him to invest with
State Resources and promised him a higher rate of return. Because of his good
business relationship with Ngo and relying on Gracia’s attractive financial
representations, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of ₱10,000,000.00.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest more
so that he eventually advanced almost ₱100,000,000.00 with State Resources.
Gracia’s succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments, however,
were all dishonored upon deposit. He subsequently learned that the petitioners
used his money for Danny’s construction and realty business. Despite repeated
demands and the petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they never returned Dy’s
invested money and its supposed earnings.
These cited factual circumstances show the elements of estafa by means of deceit.
The petitioners induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher returns.
But unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a ruse to secure his money to be
used in Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became
more blatant when they admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995,
State Resources had already been dissolved. This admission strengthens the
conclusion that the petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and
State Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with
an inexistent corporation.

As To Syndicated Estafa
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons
3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers associations or
of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second
elements of syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of
Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental
complaint- affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was
committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but also by the other officers and
directors of State Resources. The number of the accused who allegedly participated
in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the requirement for the existence
of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case,
no evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through
State Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-
complainants alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State
Resources. The general public element was not complied with. Thus, no syndicated
estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of deceit.
Moreover, we note that simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely
different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa.
An offense is necessarily included in another offense when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny Hao
be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.
 PEOPLE v. WAGAS
GR 157943
FACTS:
On April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone;
that he and his wife would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order
by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint
them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business
and money in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the
goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of
Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice and at the same
time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for
₱200,000.00 payable to cash and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited
the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds; that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told
him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated
demands, Wagas did not pay him.
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No.
0011003 to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any
telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check
was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy,
but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July
3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he
admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received. There he promised
acknowledged his failure to make good of his obligation on or before June 15, 1997
and reasoned that he sold his real property located in Manila whose buyer likewise
failed to pay. As a resolution, Wagas promised to source funds from the same
property as collateral and funds from which shall be released within 30 days from
such writing.
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with
Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband
(Cañada) had begged him to assume the responsibility. Wagas declared that
Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed the letter only to
accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing
Cañada’s application for overseas employment.
An Information was against Gilbert Wagas, the accused-appellant charging him of
the crime of Estafa.
The Regional Trial Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua
as maximum.

Wagas filed a Motion for New Trial and or a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had transacted with
Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed
that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their
alleged telephone conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that
Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of the
case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada
who could not testify during the trial because he was then out of the country, and
(b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in another criminal case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. RTC deinied. Prior to the elevation of the records to the
Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted
the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had
defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with
whom he was transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to
Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type
of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas
had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-
in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did
not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and
expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was
Cañada.
The accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order
to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the
mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa
simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt
must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and
who delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any
showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual
and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This
lack of factual and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being
Cañada’s brother-in- law.
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over
the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that
the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom
he had not yet met or known before then.
A telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of
rice to be first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others,
the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first
satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the
authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone
conversation with him would be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based
on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable
peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed. The identity of the caller could also
be established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence,
like the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the statement
challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, and disclosure
of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller. Verily, it is only fair that the
caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence.
According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant
to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of
evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the party against whom the
conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not
necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the
person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification
is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of
the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself
sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of corroborating circumstances so
as to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or
following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The
completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than
its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court
to determine within its sound discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has
been met.
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to
definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on
the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to
how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought
to elicit from him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas.
Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice
because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the
certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s
familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s
answers that Wagas was not even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the
transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas had
no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as
decisive as the identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was
admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the
denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it
could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of
evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is
offered, not for any other purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such
exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had
signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to
do so could not be taken for granted.
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable
where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the
admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray,
a holder in due course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to
pay the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the conviction of the trial court and
acquitted Gilbert R. Wagas on the grounds that guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
not established.
 PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA
GR 163662
FACTS:
Madarang was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth ₱1,010, 000. 00.
Villanueva made out nine checks drawn against PNB, eight of which were
postdated. Villanueva signed the receipt stating the sets of jewelry received with
the corresponding amount and the checks issued. Madarang received the checks
because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored upon
presentment. However, the drawee bank paid only two (2) PNB checks, the
remaining seven checks being dishonored either by reason of Account Closed or
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her
residence to inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by
security guards from reaching Villanueva. Madarang resorted to sending demand
letters, but her effort to contact Villanueva proved futile.
Villanueva claimed that Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry on
credit, and even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was
dissatisfied with her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces
of jewelry, for which she issued six checks as payment, five of which were
postdated. On August 16, 1994, Villanueva sought to have the jewelry replaced.
Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously issued and replaced them with
another set of postdated checks that were the subject of the criminal case against
her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks were issued as guarantee
under the agreement that they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised
Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she
did not receive any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks.

An Information was filed charging Julie Villanueva of the crime of Estafa.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as
charged of the crime of estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818. The accused shall suffer the
penalty of punishment for a period of Fourteen Years Eight Months and One Day
to Twenty Years which is within the range of Reclusion Temporal in its medium and
maximum periods.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the trial court but modified the
penalty of punishment to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to 30
years of Reclusion Perpetua as maximum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Estafa

HELD:
YES. The elements of estafa were present.
There is estafa when:
1.the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time of the postdating or issuance;
2.at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and
3.the payee has been defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of the
defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.

The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued
the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased.
The second element was likewise established because the checks were dishonored
upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the account was already
closed.
The third element was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered
prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance.
Villanueva’s defense that there was an agreement with Madarang whereby the
latter would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the
sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account was not proved. Her defense was
anchored on the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable
character of the check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For
instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the
issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present
the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the
element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are not
covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.
The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated
checks by listing the items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If
the parties really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of
the sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in
the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another
document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision promulgated by the CA, but modified the
awards for damages.
 DE CASTRO v. PEOPLE
GR 211917
FACTS:
Amparo Matuguina (Amparo) and Milagrosa Cornejo (Milagrosa) are bank
depositors of BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay
City. Amparo and Milagrosa left their savings account passbooks with the accused
within the space of a week in October-November 1993 when they went to the bank
to transact on their accounts. On October 29, Amparo withdrew the sum of P500
and left her passbook with Marieta De Castro (Marieta) upon the latter’s
instruction. She had to return two more times before the branch manager Cynthia
Zialcita (Cynthia) sensed that something wrong was going on. Cynthia then
reviewed Amparo’s account and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19, 29
and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen
signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that
Marieta had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her
initials were affixed thereto. Upon Cynthia’s instruction, assistant manager
Benjamin Misa (Misa) went to Amparo and it was confirmed that it was not Amparo
who affixed the signatures in the withdrawal slips. On the same day, Misa visited
another depositor, Milagrosa, whom they feared was also victimized by the
accused. Their worst expectations were confirmed. Cynthia then reported her
findings to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims against her but
when she was asked to write her statement down, she confessed her guilt.
The employment of Marieta was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Amparo
P65,000 while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused in the amount of
P2000.

Four Informations were filed charging Marieta de Castro, the accused for the crime
of Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment, finding the petitioner guilty as
charged.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the the
provision of the dispositive portion requiring accused to pay BPI Family P2000. This
must be deleted because the accused had already paid the amount to the
depositor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marieta de Castro is guilty of the crimes charged against her.

HELD:
YES. The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller,
she took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted her enough to leave
their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however,
she filled out withdrawal slips that she signed and misrepresented to her fellow
bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her
misrepresentation to her co- employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated
in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by
defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from
the bank accouts of Amparo and Milagrosa; and falsification of a commercial
document, by forging the signatures of Amparo and Milagrosa in the withdrawal
slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the respective slips
in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex
crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the
falsification of the withdrawal slips.
Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime is
that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and will not
attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial
documents is punished with prision correcional in its medium and maximum
periods (i.e two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of P5000.
In contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of the defraudation, as
follows: with the penalty of prision correcional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight
years) if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000, and
if such amount exceed P22,000 the penalty is imposed in the maximum period,
adding one year for each additional P10,000, but the total shall not exceed 20 years,
in which case the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be, in connection with the accessory penalties that may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the
penalty of prision correcional in its minimum and medium periods if the amount of
the fraud is over P6,000 but does not exceed P12,000; with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum to prision correcional in its minimum period if the amount
of the fraud is over P200 but does not exceed P6000; and with the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods if the amount of the fraud does
not exceed P200.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CA with modifications as to the
penalty imposed.
 OSORIO v. PEOPLE
GR 207711
FACTS:
Sometime during the period comprised from November 19, 2001 to January 11,
2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, prior to and even
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that her money, if
invested with Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20% interest per annum, and
by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said
JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give and deliver, as in fact, she gave and delivered to the
said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00, on the strength of the
manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the said
manifestation and representation were false and fraudulent and were made solely
for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount of
Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in the aforesaid amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.

An Information was filed charging Maria Osorio, the accused of the crime of estafa,
punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Maria C. Osorio's (Osorio) conviction for the crime
of estafa.

ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
....
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.

In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:

(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article
315(2)(a). The false pretense or fraudulent representation referred to under the
first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary
transactions, or when the accused commits other similar deceits.
There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when
she obtained private complainant's money.
Petitioner argues that she did not use a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself
as an agent of Philam Life. During her first meeting with private complainant,
petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as proof of her identity and
employment.Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance
Department, even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life
agent as of December 2000.
In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or
pretended to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or
business in soliciting private complainant's money, petitioner should nevertheless
be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter's
money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds
may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums.
Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner
due to the promise that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company
with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her funds because
of the representation that her investment's earnings would be conveniently
channeled to the payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of petitioner's
representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the
succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance
of Philam Life receipts led private complainant to believe that her money was
already as good as invested in the company.

Petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code.
For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following elements must exist:
(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in
[Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as
a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. (Citation omitted)

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code is necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted
of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction rendered by the Trial and Appellate
Court but modified the crime that she committed. Petitioner Maria C. Osorio is
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of other deceits under Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and (1) day to four
(4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period.
 CAMPOS v. PEOPLE & FWCC
GR 187401
FACTS:
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from
respondent First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
She issued several postdated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed
installment payments. Fourteen of these checks drawn against her Current Account
No. 6005-05449-92 with BPI Family Bank-Head Office, however, were dishonored
when presented for payment the checks were declared by the drawee bank to be
drawn against a "closed account.” After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding
obligation with FWCC despite demand.
She was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City, with 14
counts of violation of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as she failed to attend
court proceedings after being arraigned.
The MeTC rendered its decision with dispositive portion that reads: WHEREFORE,
all the foregoing considered, the accused is hereby CONVICTED of fourteen (14)
counts of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. She is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months imprisonment for each violation and to
indemnify the complainant the sum of ₱46,666.62 representing the total value of
the checks, plus legal interest from date of default until full payment.
The Regional Trial Court upheld the conviction of the MeTC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a demand letter which was sent through registered mail
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of BP. 22 as to knowledge of the fact
of the dishonor of the subject checks
2. Whether or not Campos’ want of Information of the fact of the cheque’s
dishonor and her subsequent arrangements for their payment tantamount
to good faith.

HELD:
1.NO. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements
must be present:
1.the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
 2.the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and
3. the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
creditor dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced
by Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a
written demand letter from FWCC. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an
element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was
aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored
it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2 of BP 22.
Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds. In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding
that the required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos,
nonetheless, still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not
sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of the letter and the
registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court
has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts
that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by
affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be
regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the
existence of the second element of the offense.
2.NO. In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however,
considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable
settlement
with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee
bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition that, "[she]
has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made
arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor
of the checks."
Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required
notice of dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have entered into the alleged
arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor,and
had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor
of her checks. Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due
on the checks or making arrangements for payment in full within 5 days after
receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant
case. She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with
FWCC, and to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to
completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover,
documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during
the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to
present evidence. Given the circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to
reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of Campos.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

 GRIFFITH v. CA
379 SCRA 94
FACTS:
In 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as
president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued two Far East Bank and Trust Co. checks in
the amount of P100,000.00 and P115,442.65. The voucher for these checks
contained the following instruction: “These checks are not to be presented without
prior approval from this Corporation to be given not later than May 30, 1986.” Also
written on the face of the voucher was the following note: “However, if written
approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps Dodge,
Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable.”
On May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for
payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week
labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business operations of Lincoln Gerard.
On June 2, 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln
Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were
dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Three
days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, apprising Griffith
of the dishonor of the checks and asking him to fund them within the time
prescribed by law. Lincoln Gerard still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a
letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln’s inability to fund said checks due to the
strike. Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that
its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure
and auction sale on June 20, 1986, despite Lincoln Gerard’s protest.

Two Informations were filed against Geoffrey Griffith charging for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law).

The case was remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in view of Republic
Act No. 7691 that expanded the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
The MeTC finds the accused GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, GUILTY OF VIOLATION of
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law
on two counts

The RTC affirmed the ruling of MeTC.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the petitioner of violation of BP 22

HELD:
Yes. The Court noted that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against
petitioner, the checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly
failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee. The Court also
stressed that by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale, Phelps
Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totaling P215,442.65.
In fact, it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the
debt or the checks. This was the situation when, almost two years after the auction
sale, petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time,
the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer
subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals called the payment thereof as
involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was
already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents
of the two criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure
and sale, Phelps Dodge was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln
Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became
final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. Holding the debtor's president to
answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, was no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations, the creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks
for payment of rentals, via auction sale.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account user." It was not designed to
favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. Noteworthy, in Administrative Circular
No. 12- 2000, this Court has expressed a policy preference for fine as penalty in
cases of B.P. 22 violations rather than imprisonment to "best serve the ends of
criminal justice." Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system
leans toward the classical school that imposes penalties for retribution, such
retribution should be aimed at "actual and potential wrongdoers."
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower and appellate
courts. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of
B.P. 22.
 LIM v. PEOPLE
GR 190834
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim issued two checks in the amount of P100,000 each. He gave the
checks to Mr. Willie Castor as his donation to the latter’s candidacy during the 1998
elections. Castor ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner’s
check to pay for the same. Because the delivery was not made on time and was no
longer used for the campaign, Castor told petitioner to issue a Stop Payment Order
for the checks. Petitioner complied and the checks were dishonored by the bank.
Private complainant Magna Badiee (from whom Castor ordered the printing
materials) sent two demand letters to petitioner and subsequently filed a
complaint with the Prosecutor. After receiving a subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, petitoiner immediately issued a replacement check in the amount of
P200,000 which complainant was able to encash. However, six months after
making payment, two informations were charged against petitioner for violation of
BP 22.

Two Informations were filed charging Ariel Lim for violation of BP 22

The Metropolitan Trial Court promulgated its Decision finding petitioner guilty of
two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The Regional Trial Court modified the ruling of the MeTC because the lower court
of Manila has no jurisdiction to try and decide cases where the essential ingredients
of the crime charged happened in Quezon City. The decision of the lower court with
is ordered vacated and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of BP 22.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the Trial Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused violate BP 22

HELD:
No. The CA took it against petitioner that he paid the amount of the checks only
after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, which supposedly
shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not because he wanted to settle his
obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution. This reasoning is tenuous,
because we need not differentiate as to whether payment was made before or
after the complaint had been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor. What matters
is that the amount stated in the dishonored check had actually been paid before
the Information against the accused was filed in court.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P.
22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment
for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the
application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. The
elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
(1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value;
(2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.”
Although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day
period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability,
the Court cited the cases of Griffith vs. CA and Tan vs. PCIB. In both cases, the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements
of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused would prove to
be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, petitioner
should not be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are
proven to be present. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection
of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by
penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made
restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In
effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already
attained the purpose of the law and extinguishes one’s criminal liability.
The court further clarified that its ruling in this case should be differentiated from
cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of
the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In
such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused
from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not
the criminal liability.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of both appellate and trial
court.
 BUEBOS & BUEBOS v. PEOPLE
GR 1633938
FACTS:
On January 1, 1994, around 3:00 A.M., Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at
Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child when she heard
some noise around the house. She got up and looked through the window, where
Adelina saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and
Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw
the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help, but the dour accused
fled instead of helping her.
Olipiano Berjuela, who was then drinking with Pepito Borbe in celebration of New
Year’s Eve, heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano immediately ran to the place
and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight
on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr., while Olipiano saw Rolando Buela running away.
As a result, Adelina filed a complaint against the four accused, including petitioners
Dante and Sarmelito Buebos.

As a defense, the petitioners and their co-accused raised denial and alibi as line of
defense, contending that they were at different places at the time of the incident.
1. Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay
as there was a novena prayer at his parents’ house on occasion of the death
anniversary of his late grandfather;
2. Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Callejas having gone there in
the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o clock noontime of
January 1, 1994;
3. Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay,
Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that he
never left his house;
4. AntonioCornel,Jr.likewise claimed to be at his residence at Agas after having
visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after
the incident happened when he visited his parents at Malictay;

An Information was filed charging petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos,

together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., for committing the crime of
Arson.
The Regional Trial Court finds accused Rolando Buela, Dante Buebos, Sarmelito
Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the RTC and modified the penalty
imposed. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in modifying the penalty to that of simple arson and
not for burning or an inhabited house.

HELD:
NO, it did not err in so doing.
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3,
paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613. The elements of this form of arson are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the
information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited
house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Under Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the information or
complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute and
specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the
accused will not be convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not
properly alleged in the information.
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally
burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information
merely recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the
latter’s damage and prejudice. Such rules of criminal procedure are given
retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,
paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.

The Supreme Court affirmed in toto the ruling of the CA.

 PEOPLE v. MACABANDO
GR 188708
FACTS:
The appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that
he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn
his own house.
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that
there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke
coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents
into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that
of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When
Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag
and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire
would be killed. Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted
a spot investigation of the incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire
started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional. Barangay
Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay,
and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department
personnel in assessing the damage.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-storey house
in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima
Edemal. He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001
because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. The appellant claimed
that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire
had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house,
and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by
his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use
during the New Year celebration. His cousin attested that appellant did not carry a
revolver or shot one on the day of the incident. His brother-in-law attested that
appellant was asleep at the ground floor on the time the fire broke out.

An Information was filed charging Alamada Macabando, the accused-appellant of

the crime of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of Revised Penal Code.

The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Destructive Arson, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of Destructive Arson

HELD:
No. The appellant is guilty of Simple Arson, not Destructive Arson. Article 320.
Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to,
official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade,
workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as
but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or
terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in
said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the
building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation
or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which
are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or
defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public
and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree
of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art.
320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand,
acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In
other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The Information
alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to
other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been
intentional. Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and
Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used
as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the
crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous
or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to
those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration
spread to the neighboring houses.

The Supreme Court affirms the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant is
indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt, however, the SC also modified that the
crime committed by Macabando is Simple Arson, not destructive arson.
corresponding penalty to be imposed.
 INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES vda. DE
CARUNGCONG v. PEOPLE
GR181409
FACTS:
William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and Wendy.
Zenaida died ahead of her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law. In 1992,
William made Manolita sign special powers of attorney appointing Wendy, then
only 20 years old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-fact to sell and dispose four valuable
pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita (who was already completely
blind) that the documents she was signing was merely for paying taxes. Believing
William's misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The parcels of land
were sold and William misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting to
P22,034,000.

After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed a
petition for the settlement of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC praying
the she be appointed administratrix thereof.

An Information was filed against William Sato charging him of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, par. 3 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
William moved to quash the Information claiming that under Article 332 (1) of the
RPC, his relationship to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts him from criminal
liability. The RTC sustained William’s motion and dismissed the information. The
court said that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
of her husband William and her mother Manolita.

The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to quash filed by Sato, dismissing the
case. The RTC stated the following conclusion; “A judicious and thorough
examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of
Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it
does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are
still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-
law even beyond the death of Zenaida.”

The Court of Appeals affirms the ruling of the RTC.

Nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of
petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity
between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective
mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and
that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be
the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is
indicated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of Zenaida dissolve the relationship by affinity of
her surviving spouse William and her mother Manolita?
2. Whether or not William should be exempted from criminal liability for
reason of his relationship to Manolita

HELD:
1. There are two views on the subject:

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which
gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the
relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that
produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity
endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where
statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of
affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded
as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that
intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory
cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the
degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the
same line is couched in general language. It made no distinction between the
spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child.

Third, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.
That relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the
marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to

resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for
the accused.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created
the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense
of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones
relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

2. No. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
 mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.
The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not
by the designation of the offense. What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being
charged in the Information.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. He resorted to falsification of public
documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as
a necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which respondent
was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, he cannot avail himself of the absolutory
cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.
Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private
relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very
serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to
an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a
means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from
the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower courts. The case
is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
TITLE XI (ELEVEN)
PEOPLE v. AMARO
GR 199100
FACTS:
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her way home
from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she
later identified in court as Rosendo Amaro, the appellant, who asked her to buy
cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the latter gave
her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and
passed out. AAA was brought to the house of appellant. When she regained
consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then undressed her, kissed her
on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain.
AAA cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for
six (6) days and was raped five (5) times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellant's
penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with
appellant because the latter promised to bring her home.
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their
way to San Jose, a certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked
her up and brought her to the police station. Appellant noticed AAA being taken
away but he did nothing.
Accused denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter
to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him
to take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon
reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magay's sister.
Appellant then went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only
decided to go back home when he heard his name on the radio in connection with
the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in Barangay Tagburos and
brought her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her house.

An information was filed charging Rosendo Amaro, the accused-appellant, charging

him of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, as defined and penalized under
Article 342 and Article266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 in
relation to Article 48 thereof.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding the accused Rosendo Amaro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, as
defined and penalized under Article 342 and Article266-B of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by RA 8353 in relation to Article 48 thereof. The accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD:
YES. The prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are:
(1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation;
(2) that she is taken against her will; and
(3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman by:
(1) force or intimidation, or
(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or
(3) when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA
was a seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told
her that he knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age,
AAA could have easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception
suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an
unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes
them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible
abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the
victim suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the
complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the participants are
witnesses to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility.
Significantly, findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal
 since conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the
sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Moreover, AAA testified in a straightforward
manner.
On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi. It is jurisprudential
that denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere denial, without any strong evidence
to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the
identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. Alibi is
evidence negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment rendered by the CA and modified the amount
of damages.
 PEOPLE v. CAYANAN
GR 200080
FACTS:
On February 1, 2001 Marvin Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA while the victim
was alone inside her house in Bulacan. Cayanan is the victim's brother-in- law, being
married to her older sister, and the couple lived in a nearby house. AAA was asleep when
she felt someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her
and told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and
after the latter took off his own undergarment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia.
Cayanan, who had a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed
anybody of the incident.
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Armina
Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas.
Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he covered her
mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop in
(...) Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of clothes as she was in her
school uniform and later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his sister's house in
(...) where he raped her inside a bedroom. Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie
talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where she was asked to
execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter's
mother and sister-in-law who brought her home later that evening. She told her mother
and brother of the incidents only after her classmate Adriano informed her family of what
happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA testified that she did not immediately
tell her family because she was still in a state of shock.

Marvin Cayanan, the accused, was charged with two crimes, Qualified Rape and Forcible
Abduction with Qualified Rape.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Cayanan of the crimes of Qualified Rape and Forcible
Abduction with Qualified Rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each crime without eligibility for parole.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC and modified by increasing the award
of damages.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the RTC err in charging the accused with Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape
2. Whether or not the CA err in increasing the award of damages?

HELD:
1. Yes, Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in Forcible abduction is
absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In
this case, circumstances show that the victim's abduction was with the purpose of raping
her. Thus, after Cayanan dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until
they reached his sister's house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
2. No, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in
awarding additional P75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as these are in accord with
prevailing jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court found Marvin Cayanan, the accused guilty of Qualified Rape. In all
other aspects,the CA decision is affirmed in toto.
TITLE XII (TWELVE)
CAPILI v. PEOPLE
GR 183805
FACTS:
James Capili was lawfully wedded to Karla Medina-Capili. The marriage was celebrated on
September 3, 1999. Three months later, on December 8, 1999, he married Shirley Tismo-
Capili. It was SHIRLEY who filed this case against James. James was charged with Bigamy
before the RTC of Pasig.
In response, James filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:
(1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage to Shirley
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by the first wife, Karla.
(2) in the event that the marriage between him and Karla is declared null and void, it
would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and
(3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
THE RTC of Pasig reset the arraignment and pre-trial of the bigamy case.

During the interim, the RTC of Antipolo were the rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and SHIRLEY
on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime
of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
James then filed a Motion to Dismiss the bigamy case before the Pasig RTC. The Pasig RTC
granted James’ Motion.
Shirley appealed the Pasig RTC’s Decision before the CA. This time, the CA ruled in favor
of Shirley. It remanded the case back to the Pasig RTC for trial. Hence this Petition on
Certiorari filed by James.

An Information was filed charging James Capili of the crime of Bigamy.

The RTC of Antipolo rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is
void from the beginning.
The petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the
RTC.
The RTC granted the manifestation and motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals remanded the bigamy case back to the RTC of Pasig for Trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground
for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy

HELD:

NO. Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
The crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void. It is a settled rule
that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.

The Supreme Court reversed affirmed the ruling of the CA.

 PEOPLE v. ODTUHAN
GR 191566
FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, Edgardo Odtuhan, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).
On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).
Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon
died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned
of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information for Bigamy.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the
facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished.
RTC denied respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the
information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and
without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can
the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished,
because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information
despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio
prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
CA granted the petition and ordered the RTC to give due course to and receive evidence
on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, and held that
there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the
evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential
element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. The appellate court further held that
respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.
Hence this petition, contesting, among others, that the subsequent court judgment
declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondent’s
criminal liability which already attached prior to said judgment.

An information is filed charging respondent with Bigamy.

The Regional Trial Court that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime
of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the
ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of
the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
The RTC convicted the respondent wit the crime charged.

The Court of Appeals reversed RTC Ruling. No Bigamy because the subsequent court
judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio extinguished respondent’s
criminal liability.
Petitioner contested that subsequent court judgment declaring respondent’s first
marriage void ab initio did not extinguish respondent’s criminal liability which already
attached prior to said judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision

HELD:
Yes, the CA erred in its judgment.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by the Supreme Court in
Montañez v. Cipriano, Teves v. People, and Antone v. Beronilla. (Discussion can be found
in the full text) The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual
antecedents as in the above cases.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration,
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
If the SC will allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information
against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing
of the complaint for bigamy against him—
SC cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule
that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that
the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription. Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to
the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters
of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
 SANTOS v. SANTOS
GR 187061
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008. In his
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and
Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had
gotten married on June 18, 1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were
engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.
As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong
Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February
1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo further
alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao,
Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court
petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away. Celerina claimed that
she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no
longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.

Ricardo Santos filed for a declaration absence or presumptive death before the Regional
Trial Court.
The Regional Trial Court declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively
dead.
Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her
day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented
to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a
wrong mode of remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent marriage contracted after the court issues a declaration
of presumptive death is bigamous

HELD:
It depends. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage
may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status
of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest
who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second
marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present
1.The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2.The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3.There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and
4.There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that
the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted
in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The
prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for determination of the
existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the
merits of the petition.
 SANTIAGO v. PEOPLE
GR 200233
FACTS:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded “not guilty,”
while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang
since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43- year-old
widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother- in-law and
parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
“without responsibility.”
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused
in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his
second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she
argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos.
Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and
September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

An Information was filed against Leonila Santiago and Nicanor Santos charging them with
the crime of Bigamy

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding the accused Leonila G. Santiago
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Bigamy

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, Santiago should be a co-accused in the instant case

HELD:
Yes, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s marriage
to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by
the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting
petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and
(3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner
on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that
she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to
prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla holds that the second
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to
Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person,
whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.”
Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage
license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under
the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal
case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without
a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages, petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family
Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to
use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on
the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case,
the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on
18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the
marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order
to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a
Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for
seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this
Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” It must be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping therefore
with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CA with modification that petitioner is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum to four
years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
 LASANAN v. PEOPLE
GR 159031
FACTS:
Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the
marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage
license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo
Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or
affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto
because of irreconcilable differences.
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo
City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. The
accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro in the
RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and
fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish,
sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.

An Information was filed charging Noel Lansanas, the accused with bigamy.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding Noel Lansanas, the accused, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

The Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the RTC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the decision of the RTC

HELD:
Yes. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
1.That the offender has been legally married;
 2.That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3.That he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4.That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent
marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires
is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply
evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was
filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been instituted,
such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying
his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be
allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability
of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually
file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its
simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his
marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by
a court of competent jurisdiction.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially
because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage
with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he
had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would
abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of
marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus
confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s
subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of
lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however,
because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals, the Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences
is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory,and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA and orders the petitioner to pay the
costs of the suit.
 RONULO v. PEOPLE
GR 182438
FACTS:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's
officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.
With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an
Aglipayan Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony
on the same day where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the
guests. This was despite Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

An Information was field against Rene Ronulo, petitioner, charging him for violating
Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

The Municipal Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613.
in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner
violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613
or the Marriage Law.

The Regional Trial Court affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably
show that a marriage ceremony had transpired.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner violate Art. 352 of the RPC and commit an illegal marriage
ceremony.

HELD:
Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer; and
2. His performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage.
The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article
6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:
1. For the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and
2. Declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other
as husband and wife.
The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement
is likewise present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.
The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the
Marriage Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.
In the present case, Fr. Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. Article 6
of the Family Code provides that "no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a
marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer;
and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, Fr. Ronulo admitted that the parties appeared before him and
this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the prosecution has
proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared
that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne,
and even Fr. Ronulo's admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support
Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they
take each other as husband and wife. The solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, Fr. Ronulo admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship. Undoubtedly, Fr.Ronulo conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking.

The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

TITLE XIII (THIRTEEN)
SORIANO v. PEOPLE
GR 225010
FACTS:
On July 31, 1998 at Iriga City, Philippines, Eliseo Soriano, the accused being then the
anchorman of a religious radio program "Ang Dating Daan" of DZAL with intent to cause
and expose to public ridicule, dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the persons
comprising the Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry (J[MC]IM), a religious group,
publicly air in his said radio program his prepared taped broadcast containing false,
injurious, and defamatory statements with no good intention or justifiable motive in the
guise of preaching the gospel of the Lord by branding its leader as "BULAANG PROFETA,
TARANTADO AND GAGO"; its pastors as PASTOR NG DEMONYO, MGA PASTOR NA
IMPAKTO and GAGO and its members as "ISANG DAKOT NA GAGO and SIRA ULO" which
in words are quoted hereunder respectively intended for group's leader, pastors and
members.

Two separate Informations were filed charging Eliseo Soriano, accused, for the crime of
Libel

The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Both cases
of libel and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,000.00) for each case pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 relating to the
emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in
libel cases under the circumstances therein specified, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Libel

HELD:
Libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code is defined "as a public and malicious imputation
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.""[F]or an imputation to be libelous, the
following requisites must be present:
 (a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable."
In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas v. Victor A. Domingo and
the People of the Philippines,16 this Court explained the rule in the determination of
defamatory imputation, viz:

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the

possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, a charge is sufficient
if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or
persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to
impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

From the abovementioned tests, petitioner's words stated during the mnng of his
program are clearly defamatory. The words "GAGO", "TARANTADONG PASTOR", "PASTOR
NG DEMONYO IYAN", "BULAANG PROPETA" disparage private complainant Wilde Almeda
(Almeda). As in Buatis, Jr. v. People,evidence aliunde is unnecessary to establish that
these words are without malice. Moreover, examination of the statements put forth in
the Information does not reveal any good intention on the part of petitioner or any
justifiable motive as to negate the presumption of malice.

Petitioner's claim that his motive was harken to other religious leaders and pastors and
members of any religious congregation not to use the institution of religion in a manner
that would subject not only the pastors and ministers of any religious congregation but
also the religion itself to public distrust and disdain, does not make his statements
justified. His purported motive is simply not reflected in his malicious statement and
insulting labels to the pastors of Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry (JMCIM).

There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory
matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has
been written. Libel is published not only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is
made known or brought to the attention or notice of another person other than its author
and the offended party. In this case, there is no doubt that the video footage of petitioner
was published as it was broadcasted through petitioner's radio program.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by
the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class
allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with
the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.

The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the lower courts, finding the accused-appellant,
Eliseo Soriano, guilty of one count of Libel, acquitting him for the second information
charged against him since the prosecution was not able to provide evidence that he spoke
defamatory statements against the aggrieved party.
 BUATIS v. PEOPLE
GR 142509
FACTS:
Atty. Pieraz's wife retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The
letter was open, as it was not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on
her husband’s desk. It reads:
"Atty. Pieraz: This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August
18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English. May we remind you that any
attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No.
1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his
regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment
against you. You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of
the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same
is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other
than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons
behind these nefarious activities. Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned
to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove "who is who" once and
for all. Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name; JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR."
Atty. Pieraz responded and sent mail to Buatis, Jr. Buatis then dispatched a second letter.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, particularly: "Satan, Senile, Stupid, English
Carabao.” The subject letter and its content came to the knowledge not only of his wife
but of his children as well and they chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Buatis testified that he could not recall whether he had signed letter-comment or if it was
even addressed to Atty. Pieraz.
Buatis as well asserted the ruling of People vs Velasco that if the act charged as libelous
is ONLY an INCIDENT IN an act which has another objective, the crime is not libel. In this
case, he claims that his reply was meant to inform Atty. Pieraz that Ms. Quingco is
recognized tenant, and that the communication in whatever language of lawyer under
obligation to defend client’s cause is BUT a privileged communication.
Calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not
only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous
letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of
respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer; the letter is libelous per se since a
defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message sought to
be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory
imputation contained in the letter.
There was PUBLICATION since letter was made known or brought to the attention and
notice of other persons other than the offended party.
The element of IDENTITY was established since the letter was intended to Atty. Pieraz.
A complaint for Libel was filed by Atty. Pieraz against Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr.,

The Regional Trial Court rendered its judgment finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis,
Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum.

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED lower court decision. The words used are uncalled for
and defamatory in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as
lawyer and that is malicious.
It rejected Buatis' claim that it is privileged communication since he failed to come up
with valid explanation why he resorted to name calling and downgrading of lawyer to the
extent of ridiculing him.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Libel
2. Whether or not defamatory imputation is present in the instant case

HELD:
1.Yes, Buatis is guilty of the crime of LIBEL.
Libel (Article 353) is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, requisites must concur: (DIMP)
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) the victim must be identifiable;
(c) it must be malicious; and
(d) it must be given publicity.
In the present case, PUBLICATION has been established. PUBLICATION means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written. Petitioner’s letter-reply itself states that the same was copy
furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is
enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person.
Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an
envelope thus, open to public.
IDENTIFIABLE: the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
2. YES, the imputation was defamatory and malicious.
"In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction
are conspicuously applicable:
(1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural
and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what
was uttered.
(2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."
In this case, the words used is defamatory--"lousy", "inutile", "carabao English",
"stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character,
integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.
GENERAL RULE under Article 354 is that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice
on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner’s
imputation is malicious (malice in law). There was nothing in the said letter which showed
petitioner’s good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to
overcome the legal inference of malice.
Such letter is not private communication made in the performance of moral and social
duty as attorney-in-fact as claimed by the petitioner. Article 354 provides two exceptions
to the general rule that every defamatory imputation is malicious, when:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
In order for it to be qualified privileged communication, following requisites must concur:
1. The person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication;
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
3. The statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
Although Petitioner made the letter out of his social duty BUT he failed to show any
explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises
as against the claim of respondent's client. The letter merely contained insulting words
which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs Quingco's right over the premises. More
so, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he
dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of
the computer. And that the reply-letter was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of
selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication.

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Court with the modifications that,
in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of
Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
award of compensatory damages is Deleted.
 TULFO v. PEOPLE
GR 1611032
FACTS:
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate
informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with RTC Pasay City. These were assigned
to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao,
as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the
Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in
connection with the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of
May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.

In his (Erwin Tulfo) series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of
Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for
personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to
his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He
accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And
when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty.
So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose
ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with
malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles.
He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed
against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South
Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people's
names to advance their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither
discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of
Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research
on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his
source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South
Harbor.

The Regional Trial Court finds the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn
Barlizo and Philip Pichay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime
of Libel, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial Court

ISSUE:
1. Whether or the case of Borjal v. CA was applied in this case
2. Whether or not the assailed articles are considered privileged communications
3. Whether or not the assailed articles are fair commentaries

HELD:
1.No, the case of Borjal was not applied to this case because:
a. Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal
case.
b. The ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant.
c. The subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a
public official.
d. It was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were “fair commentaries on
matters of public interest.”
2. NO. The columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official.
a. Even with the knowledge that he might be in error, even knowing of the possibility that
someone else may have used Atty. So’s name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to
verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person
he was accusing.
b. Although falsity of the articles does not prove malice, the existence of press freedom
must be done “consistent with good faith and reasonable care.” This was clearly
abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or
honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public.
c. Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of whether the
same were false or not. The test laid down is the “reckless disregard” test, and Tulfo failed
to meet that test.
d. Evidence of malice: The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting Atty. So
after the commencement of an action. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider
his actions, but went on to continue defaming Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his
intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice.
3.NO. Good faith is lacking ,as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his
story before publication.
a. They provided no details of the acts committed by the subject. They are plain and
simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source.
b. Not “fair” or “true” because “fair” is defined as “having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty.” “True” is defined as “comfortable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine;
honest.” Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before
making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The
articles are not “fair and true reports,” but merely wild accusations.
Elements of fair commentary (to be considered privileged):
1. That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a pulic officer in the exercise of his
functions;
2. That it is made in good faith;
3. That it is without any comments or remarks.
Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession,
but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they
may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility. The mere fact that the subject of an article is a public
figure or a matter of public interest does not mean it is a fair commentary within the
scope of qualified privileged communication, which would automatically exclude the
author from liability. The confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists are
accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists making no efforts to
verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw
wild accusations and besmirch the name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists have
a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least investigate their stories
before publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof. Journalists are not
storytellers or novelists who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them
off as reality. There must be some foundation to their reports; these reports must be
warranted by facts. Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press may not be
unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with the modifications that in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of six thousand
pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, while the award of actual damages and exemplary damages is deleted.
 BELEN v. PEOPLE
GR 211120
FACTS:
On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was assigned to then Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the
submission of the parties and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was
submitted for resolution. In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his
cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the request,
Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved
by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration
& Disqualify), the contents of which later became the subject of this libel case.

Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the
Secretary of Justice, Manila. The copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed
envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City was
received by its Receiving Section on August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions
filed with the said office are first received and recorded at the receiving section, then
forwarded to the records section before referral to the City Prosecutor for assignment to
the handling Investigating Prosecutor.

ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael
Belen, the son of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also
informed about the motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City.
She then asked the receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and requested a
photocopy of it for her own reference.

On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint
for libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration &
Disqualify). The complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before the OCP of San Pablo
City. Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City
voluntarily inhibited itself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel
complaint and forwarded all its records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.
On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order designating State
Prosecutor II Jorge D. Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation
of the libel complaint.

On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable

cause to file a libel case against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an Information
charging petitioner with the crime of libel.

Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court entered a plea
of "NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses, namely: (1) complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and
representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores and
Gayne Garno Enseo, who are part of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City.
For its part, the defense presented the accused petitioner as its sole witness.

The Regional Trial Court ound petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of
₱3,000.00, with no pronouncement as to damages on account of ACP Suñega-Lagman's
reservation to file an independent civil action against him.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be
found is guilty of libel.

HELD:
No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication
of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation
though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he
has of himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory
letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient
publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by
person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous communication knows or
has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the person
defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel, however, should not
be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is parted with unless it
appears that there is reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen
by third persons.

In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but
only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done,
petitioner conceded that the defamatory statements in it were made known to someone
other than the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was
contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than
the one defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely
because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the
respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in Manila.
Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere private
communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the government office.
Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence
of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and service of
his Omnibus Motion.

It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory

matters is not satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed
person. In this case, however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the
Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of
respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed
person, ACP Suñega-Lagman. Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to
Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had read the contents of the
Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a public officer,
in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or
to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of
the communication, such communication does not amount to publication."15 Petitioner's
argument is untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the
subject matter of his motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa
complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the
case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions
filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
TITLE XIV (FOURTEEN)
IVLER v. HON MODESTO
GR 172716
FACTS
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses:
(1) Criminal Case No. 82366 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Criminal Case No. 82367 - Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 (RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES) and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366 (RI – Homicide – DP), including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking the
petition for review as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the
MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of petition for certioriari for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.

Jason Ivler was charged with two separate offenses namely : Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce and Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle.
The Metropolitan Trial Court petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Physical Injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure
meanwhile petitioner filed for a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy for the second
information filed against him.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain the action arising from the MeTC’s order to
arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment. Thus, without reaching the
merits of the petition for certiorari, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in the petition for
certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment.
2. Whether or not double jeopardy applies in the instant case.

HELD:
1. No. The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence.
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP) as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
2. Yes. The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 (RI-Homicide-DP).
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing
crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence only by dint of lingering
doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses,
barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from
the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

(B) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution

for the Same Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,
decided in 1954. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Supreme Court REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler pending with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
 MARIANO v. PEOPLE
GR 178145
FACTS:
At around 6:30 p.m., Ferdinand De Leon was driving his owner-type jeep in Angat,
Bulacan. He was with his wife and two-year old son. They came from a baptismal party.
Accused Reynaldo Mariano was driving his Red Toyota pick-up with his wife and helper
as passengers. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party
and was driving his owner type jeep.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano
stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However,
Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand
hurled invectives at him. Luis De Leon intervened and the parties went their separate
ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his
mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front
of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a
moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness.

The jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother
about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up
as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made
a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted
from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo
did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders
might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to their house,
Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and
report the incident.

An Information was filed charging Reynaldo Mariano, the accused with the crime of
Frustrated Homicide

The Regional Trial Court finds the accused Reynaldo Mariano GUILTY for the lesser
offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Article 50 thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

The Court of Appeals modified the ruling of the trial court accused-appellant Reynaldo
Mariano is found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Serious
Physical Injuries
2. Whether or not the CA erred in the imposition of penalty

HELD:
1. YES, the Petitioner is guilty.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the
direct causal
connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s
observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order
to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit
Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
2. YES, the CA erred in the imposition of penalty.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of
the resulting injuries had his act been intentional.
Rules Article 365:
a. Had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender
shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period;
b. If it would have constituted aless grave felony,arresto mayor in its physical
injuries: minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and
c. If it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum period
shall be imposed.
The RPC classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity of the
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured
person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power
to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the
use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was
therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost
any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated
for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than
ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the
injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in
Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248,
the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision
number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period; the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries
did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered
the petitioner's act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have
imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its medium period. Instead, the petitioner's act that caused the serious physical
injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand's physical injuries were those under Article
263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which
he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months.
As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not
applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of
imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law
inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor
was the correct penalty for the petitioner.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications that the penalty
to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight penalty of two months of arresto
mayor and award for damages.
 GONZAGA v. PEOPLE
GR 195671
FACTS:
At around 6am on June 25,1997 Dionesio Inguito Sr., with his children, were on their
motorcycle on the way to school. While they were ascending the curving road going
to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser
driven by Petitioner was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction.
Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr.
tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same
direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle resulting in a collision in which
Dionesio Sr. (he died) was pinned under the Land Cruiser while the 2 children were
thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser causing injuries to their legs.
Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road
aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together on the
rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land
Cruiser.
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane
along the descending curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon,
when, from a distance of about 70 meters away, he saw the motorcycles driven by
Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from the opposite direction.Dionesio,
Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf
was on his proper lane. Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision,
Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless,
bumped into it. As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over
the roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road,
while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned beneath the land Cruiser. With
the use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and
Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr.
and the motorcycle from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims
on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe hospital, but the vehicle
turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another
vehicle instead.

An information was filed charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to

Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
The Regional Trial Court found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC
and sentencing him to to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two
(2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum.

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the ruling of the RTC

HELD:
YES. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it
must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence
and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless
driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which
injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily,
it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences
of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence
and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the
private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving
very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision,
resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and
Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards
towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under
such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was
bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the
vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is
elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it
may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite
direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances
such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes
negligence.

The Supreme Court inds that Rogelio Acted Recklessly and Imprudently in driving at a
fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly
accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the
collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the
presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the
RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who "fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give.”
 DR. CRUZ v. DR. AGAS
GR 204095
FACTS:
In his Complaint-Affidavit for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence
and Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that
sometime in May 2003, he engaged the services of St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC)
for a medical check-up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003,he
underwent stool, urine, blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the employees
and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was sent to the Gastro-
Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because
the specialist assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave
the colonoscopy results to the attending female anesthesiologist for the information
and consideration of the assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he was sedated and the
endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt
that something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold
clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or
sit upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen; that when
he was about to urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the
specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that
his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical condition and
immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected that he had
hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical
operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the
ICU on May 30, 2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy
because of the internal bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the
left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches because it had a partial tear of the colonic
wall which caused the internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was under
tremendous pain in the incision area during his recovery period in the ICU and had
fever; and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery on
the left part of his chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the
colonoscopy procedure but the latter insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7,
2003, he was discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard
time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two hours because he easily
got full; that he had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel; that he had
lost his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was
in good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.

Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements
of reckless imprudence or negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear
that he did not know that he would perform the procedure. He explained that before
the start of the colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review
his medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal physician. He
claimed that the gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were
completely successful considering that the latter did not manifest any significant
adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that his vital signs were
normal throughout the procedure.
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the
Assistant Medical Director for Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of
Digestive Diseases, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse attesting to the fact
that the intraperitonial bleeding which developed after the colonoscopy procedure,
was immediately recognized, evaluated, carefully managed, and corrected; that he
provided an adequate and reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz; that the
endoscopist followed all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy procedure
was done properly; that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the
colonoscopy procedure; that he did not deviate from any standard medical norm,
practice or procedure; and that he exercised competence and diligence in rendering
medical services to Dr. Cruz.

A Complaint was filed by petitioner Dr. Jaime T. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) for Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against respondent,
Dr. Felicisimo V. Agas, Jr. (Dr. Agas).

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for
Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
The Department of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

The Court of Appeals endered a decision affirming the said DOJ resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Agas committed medical Negligence
HELD:
No. In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its
discretion in finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the
complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence
and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the
doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
doctor would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor
would not have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care
provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr.
Agas. Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to
a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr.
Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words,
Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission
committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was
"inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

 SENIT v. PEOPLE
GR 192914
FACTS:
Private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their
three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He
turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus
driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia,
suddenly overtook a big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident
by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and applying the brakes, but
he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus
crashed
into the right side of private complainant's pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist
Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities,
they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor's Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon.
Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the right arm and
displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity
which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a result of the accident
and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and
P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of
the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular'bone of
his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a
wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by
the pick-up reached P106,155.00.

An Information was filed charging the petitioner, Napoleon Senit with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he
resigned from his employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly
became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new counsel.
The Regional Trial Court finds the accused Napoleon Senit guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an
indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum
as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision Correc[c]ional medium
as maximum.
The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC WITH MODIFICATION as to
the penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the accused

HELD:
No. Art. 365 Imprudence and Negligence- Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary,
but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present
case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that
their testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he
turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting
to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and
testimonies presented in the instant case.
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the
Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly
from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he
applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner
recklessly drove on the right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound
ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to another
vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the
ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed
down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan
public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the
pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then
chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering the
intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the
necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things,
the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

 SEVILLA v. PEOPLE
GR 194390
FACTS:
on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla
made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). That in answer to the question
of whether there is a pending criminal case against him, Sevilla marked the box
corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against him
for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Malabon City, Branch 55.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to
the "no" answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case.
However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was
Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed
in his house. At around two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza
that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of
the City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza
to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel
office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that
he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he
failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal
case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto Torres (Torres), a former
City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the
Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the members of Sevilla’s staff would then
need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office.
Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter
having used the typewriter in his office.

An Information was filed charging Venancio Sevilla, the accused with the felony of
falsification of public document, penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC.

The Sandigangbayan finds the accused guilty of Falsification of Public Documents

Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which
is a public document, and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position
since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City
Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to
prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out
that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there
was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public
documents. Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted
of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC since he did not act
with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. However,
considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in
the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the Felony of Falsification of Public
Document through Reckless Imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against
him in the information is different of which he is convicted of.

HELD:
YES, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony
supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of
reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the
falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony
committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are
distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere
quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like;
when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or
‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing
the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to
precedent. Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents
through reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the
Court now weighs the merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly
on the variance between the offense charged in the Information that was filed against
him and that proved by the prosecution.
In case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted
of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved. There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense
alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution – the Information charged
him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4)
of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved
then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is
necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification of public document under
Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals, has answered the foregoing question in the
affirmative. Thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi-offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense,
upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the
Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is
untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of
public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted
of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding
that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.