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Juncker's EU Army: Towards A European Security and Defence Union

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 TALLINN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND SOCIETY

JUNCKER’S EU ARMY
MILITARISATION OF THE EU: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND
SECURITY UNION

PREPARED BY:
ISLAM MUHAMMAD

TALLINN, ESTONIA
MAY 2017
 JUNCKER’S EU ARMY
ISLAM MUHAMMAD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 3

NOT A NEW IDEA: HISTOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 3

THE REVIVAL OF THE IDEA: JUNCKER’S PLAN ...................................................... 5

A NEW BALANCE OF POWER....................................................................................... 5

IT IS REALISM AND POWER POLITICS ...................................................................... 6

THE ROAD MAP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON ARMY ......................................... 7

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 8

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... i
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of the 27th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Jean-Claude Juncker
– President of the European Commission - delivered a speech in Berlin at the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation premises presenting his long-term plan to establish a European Common Army (ECA).
This occasion was not the first-time Juncker expressed this idea. In the previous year and on several
occasions Juncker said that Europe although indeed owes an enormous debt of thanks to the U.S.,
they will not safeguard the European Union’s (EU) security forever (Juncker, 2016). He further
stressed that Europe should carry this task for itself. Juncker concluded that this is why Europe
needs, now more than ever, to take a new approach to the European Security and Defence Union,
including the long-term plan to establish a European Common Army.

The viability of Juncker’s proposal comes as concerns grow over the security situation in
the member states of the European Union. The threats that originate from the rising aggression
from the Russian regime along the eastern borders of the EU, as well as the future of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). A future that could be at stake due to the current political
turbulence in the U.S. with Donald Trump coming into power and him questioning the U.S.
commitment to NATO and the worrying signs he will pivot towards Russia (MacAskill, 2017).

The United Kingdom has been for so long opposing any initiative promoting a European
Defence and Security Union. Now, with its impending exit from the EU, the remaining 27 EU
member states are looking towards developing a stronger common security and defence policy
(Brady, 2016).

In this article, I will look through a structural realist lens on Juncker’s plan to create the
European Common Army, by shedding light on the histography and causality of the European
Defence Cooperation. The article will move forward to reflect on how the establishment of the
European Common Army (ECA) would affect the existing of the NATO and the current world
balance of military power.

NOT A NEW IDEA: HISTOGRAPHY

Juncker’s plan to create a European Common Army is not a brand-new idea. It is as old as
the proposal of the European Unity that surfaced after the end of World War II. The French Prime
Minister, René Pleven, in 1950 proposed an idea for a common army for Western Europe to oppose
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the Soviet power. Branded as the Pleven Plan, it called for a joint European army, under the control
of institutions similar to those of the ECSC, in which all countries, except Western Germany,
would contribute their national forces (Glencross, 2014, p. 43). The U.S. immediately rejected the
plan outright, labelling it as a diversionary tactic that would never raise the number of German
troops necessary for defending Western Europe. France then presented a modified plan, drafted by
Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of European Integrity, which allowed for the creation of
entire West German divisions, with the multinational army coming under supranational control
and be funded by a common budget. The then new proposal was labelled as the European Defence
Community (EDC) and was formalised as a treaty in May 1952. The Treaty, however, received a
devastating blow in August 1954 when the French National Assembly rejected it, refusing even to
discuss the matter (European Defence Agency, 2016).

Over the following decades, European cooperation in defence has taken place primarily in
the framework of NATO. Until the ratification of the Treating of the European Union, known as
the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced Article 42.7 which introduced the Mutual Defence Claus
that allows for a joint European military action in times of distress. The clause states that if a
member of the European Union is under armed attack on its territory, other member states of the
EU have an obligation of assistance and aid by all the means in their power (Treaty of Lisbon,
2009).

Article 42.7 was included in the Lisbon Treaty on the request of Greece, which demanded
to have some collective defence protection outside of the realm of NATO since Turkey, its biggest
adversary, is also covered by NATO but is not an EU member (POLITICO, 2015).

The Lisbon Treaty also established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that lies under the umbrella of the CFSP. The
CSDP, although it does not mean the full integration of EU military powers, it aims at providing
the EU with an operational and functional capacity based on civilian and military assets. The EU
may use them on missions outside Europe for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening
international security by the principles of the United Nations Charter (Glencross, 2014, p. 188).

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THE REVIVAL OF THE IDEA: JUNCKER’S PLAN

Juncker’s proposal revives the old idea of creating a European Common Army. It comes
amid rising fears over the security of Europe both on internal and external levels. The plan aims at
consolidating peace in Europe, reacting to security threats both within the continent and in its
neighbourhood, defending European values vis-à-vis aggressive powers, notably Russia, and
creating economies of scale by consolidating demand for military machinery (Frontini, 2015).

To conclude, Juncker’s argument on the important of having an ECA is based on three

pillars:

a) Common Threat: the Russian aggression on the eastern EU borders, migrant crisis,
and the change in the world balance of power.
b) Common Army: reacting more credibly to any threat to peace in a member state or
a neighbouring country. The ECA would be complementary to NATO. More
defence in Europe doesn’t necessarily mean less transatlantic solidarity. The
reduction of the U.S. security footprint in Europe and Europeans’ dramatic loss of
army capability since the 1990s have resulted in a security vacuum in Europe.
c) Common Budge: facing the challenges created by shrinking national defence
budgets and the unnecessary duplication of organisations, capabilities, and
expenditures. A European Defence Fund would allow military research and
development.

Juncker refutes the claims that having an ECA means a step towards the establishment of
the United States of Europe (Juncker, 2016). Keohane scrutinised Juncker’s claim and plan by
stating that a European army cannot exist without a supranational European state. And since a
federal superstate is not in the cards, those who propose a European army may think that they are
advancing their federalist fantasies, but it is not a credible solution to today’s EU security
challenges (Keohane, 2016).

A NEW BALANCE OF POWER

The establishment of the European Common Army would present a new form of the
world’s order. Combining the various military capabilities of the EU member states together under
one EU authority would alleviate EU’s role in world politics. With the growing uncertainty of the

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U.S. commitment to Europe security and NATO, Europe finds itself forced to fill in the power
vacuum that could occur if the new U.S. President Trump decides to withdraw from the Alliance
(Rettman, 2016).

Trump on various occasions expressed his willingness to work with Russia and shift the
U.S. policy towards embracing it as an alley. At the beginning of his presidency, he declared
NATO as obsolete. Later, he reversed his position by saying that NATO is no longer obsolete due
to its importance to fight terrorism (Liptak & Merica, 2017). For Trump, the importance of NATO
is only to fight Islamic terrorism and not the Russian aggression. The instability and uncertainty
of the position of the U.S. foreign policy don't present a solid prove of U.S. continuous support to
NATO.

Trump would aim to undermine NATO. He recently proposed, during his first visit to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the U.S. President, a new regional security architecture labelled as
Arab NATO, to push back against the threats coming from Iran and guide the fight against
terrorism (Rogin, 2017).

With Trump’s efforts to undermine the role of NATO, and with the UK’s decision to leave
the EU, Brussels believes it is in the best interest of Europe to have a European Security and
Defence Union and eventually an ECA taking care of its security and defence matters.

IT IS REALISM AND POWER POLITICS

Mearsheimer in his explanation of Structural Realism states that in Realism, sovereign
states are the key players in the international system, whereas individuals, international
institutions, non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, other sub-state or trans-
state actors are depicted as having little to zero influence (Mearsheimer, 2013). Mearsheimer
further explains that in realism, states are inherently aggressive (labelled as offensive realism) or
obsessed with security (labelled as defensive realism). In structural realism, a security dilemma is
created whereby the increase of one's security may bring along greater instability as an opposing
power builds up its arms in response, resulting in arms race. Mearsheimer concludes by saying
that security becomes a zero-sum game in that environment where only relative gains can be
obtained.

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Contrary to liberal accounts of the EU, Rosato challenges these conventional explanations,
arguing that the European Community (EC) came into existence as a consequence of balance of
power concerns (Rosato, 2011). Rosato claims that the Federal Republic of Germany and France,
the two key founding members, established the European Community at the peak of the Cold War
as a means to balance against the Soviet Union and one another.

That same argument is also valid to apply to the establishment of the European Common
Army. Rosato’s core argument is that the balance of power determines whether and how states
cooperate with each other. States decide to come together aiming at balancing against a common
adversary. They choose among different arrangements based on an evaluation of their power
position relative to that common adversary and their coalition partners (Rosato, 2013). Thus,
Rosato concludes, the occurrence and form of international cooperation is best understood as a
reflection of the distribution of power.

Moravcsik refuted Rosato’s argument about the establishment of the European

Community, and the claim that European Integration was a result of power politics (Moravcsik,
2013). Moravcsik argues that Rosato’s claim is based on monocausal interpretation based on anti-
Soviet and Franco-German balancing. He further explains that European integration is based on
economic interdependence mainly, and geopolitics comes second.

THE ROAD MAP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON ARMY

The possibility of a common defence policy is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty's Article 42
which stipulates that 'the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive
framing of a common Union defence policy.

Following the announcement of Juncker’s plan, Federica Mogherini 1, the High

Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the road map to
the establishment of the European Common Army labelled ‘A New Level of Ambition’
(Mogherini, 2016). The proposed new ‘Level of Ambition implementation plan aims to develop a
stronger Union in defence and security, which is capable of tackling today’s challenges and threats

1
Federica Mogherini also holds the role of Vice-President of the European Commission, and Head of the
European Defence Agency

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more effectively, with the right tools, capabilities and structures to deliver greater safety for EU
citizens. The key areas of the plan are:

a) to increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP

b) to enhance the development of EU Member State capabilities
c) to strengthen the European defence industry

CONCLUSION
Juncker’s plan to establish the European Defence Union (EDU) is becoming a reality,
backed by the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.

The establishment of the European Defence Union and consequently the European
Common Army is indeed bringing a new power dynamics in world politics. The question still
arises of whether this will mean the end of NATO as we know it nowadays or present a new way
to define the relationship between the EU and NATO, where EDU works within the realm on
NATO, complementing it.

The ECA intends to show that EU has advanced and strong joint military power that can
deter any offence and help protect international security and stability.

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REFERENCES
Brady, K. (2016). UK ′will oppose any idea of EU army′ despite impending Brexit. Retrieved May
17, 2017, from http://www.dw.com/en/uk-will-oppose-any-idea-of-eu-army-despite-
impending-brexit/a-35898499

European Defence Agency. (2016). The European Defence Community failure. Retrieved May 17,
2017, from https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/our-history/inception

Frontini, A. (2015). Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why
of Juncker’s call for a common European army. EPC Commentary, 12 March 2015. Retrieved
from http://aei.pitt.edu/62542/

Glencross, A. (2014). The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided?

Juncker, J.-C. (2016). The “Europe Speech” given by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-3654_en.htm

Keohane, D. (2016). Samuel Beckett’s European Army. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/66456

Liptak, K., & Merica, D. (2017). Trump reverses position, says NATO is “no longer obsolete.”
Retrieved May 18, 2017, from http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/donald-trump-jens-
stoltenberg-nato/

MacAskill, E. (2017). Pence’s speech on Nato leaves European leaders troubled over alliance’s
future. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/18/trump-pence-eu-nato-munich-conference-
germany-britain

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2013). International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. In T. Dunne,

M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity
(Third Edition, pp. 77–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mogherini, F. (2016). Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. Brussels. Retrieved from
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf

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Moravcsik, A. (2013). Did Power Politics Cause European Integration? Realist Theory Meets
Qualitative Methods. http://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844511

POLITICO. (2015). What is article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty? Retrieved May 17, 2017, from
http://www.politico.eu/article/what-is-article-42-7-of-the-lisbon-french-government-
terrorist-attacks-paris-treaty/

Rettman, A. (2016). Germany: Trump victory to spur EU military union. Retrieved May 18, 2017,
from https://euobserver.com/foreign/135877

Rogin, J. (2017). Trump to unveil plans for an “Arab NATO” in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 18,
2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/05/17/trump-to-
unveil-plans-for-an-arab-nato-in-saudi-arabia/?utm_term=.7a3360caf83f

Rosato, S. (2011). Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community.
Cornell University Press.

Rosato, S. (2013). Theory and Evidence in Europe United: A Response to My Critics. Security
Studies, 22(4), 802–820. http://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.844513

Treaty of Lisbon. (2009). Mutual Defence Clause. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/mutual_defence.html

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