Truth-testing

Five dictionaries1 define negate as to deny the truth of and affirm 2 means to state
something as true Thus Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves or
denies the truth of the resolution:
outweighs on Constitutivism--
Prefer Additionally
1)Resolvability -
2) Jurisdiction
3)Performativity:
4)Functional Limits
5) Agonism:

1
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate,
http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate

2
Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that
it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true
 A priori
Affirm on face:
1. States is defined as “express something definitely or clearly in speech or
writing.” OUGHT TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARSENALS
 Affirm
I assert that everything is true because of trivialism:
1. The Liar’s paradox proves every statement is both true and false.
Kabay [Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, ) "A
Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-
access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017 // WWBW]
(1) L is true (2) It is not the case that L is true (3) Therefore, trivialism is true. Here L is simply the self-referential liar
sentence: ‘L is false’. Note that one could substitute for L any so called dialetheia (i.e. sentence that is both true and false).
The most obvious alternative is the Russell paradox generated by the naïve conception of set (i.e. the set of all sets that fail to have
self-membership). One then could have as premise (1), ‘R is a member of itself’, and for (2), ‘It is not the case that R is a member of
itself’. I will not examine R as an alternative to L, as much of what I have to say about the latter applies to the former. The inference
from (1) and (2) to (3) is traditionally known as ex contradictione quodlibet, and it takes the general form of p, ¬p├ q. More recently
it has come to be referred to as explosion.74 Note that the argument can be modified to prove the truth of any arbitrary
proposition, p. If sound, this argument would provide independent evidence for every belief held by the trivialist. Is this argument
sound? Well there are reasons to think that the premises are true and that inference is valid. Let’s begin with the truth of the
premises. The liar sentence in some form or another has been known for some time. It was supposedly discovered or first uttered by
the Megaric philosopher Eubilides. Normally taken as a paradox that requires solution, it has more recently been argued that it is an
instance of a dialetheia i.e. a true contradiction.75 The argument for thinking that L is both true and false goes as follows. Either
L
is true or L is false (by the Law of Excluded Middle or LEM). If it is true, then what it says is the case and it
says that it is false, so it is false. If it is false, then this is what it says it is, so it is true. Either
way it is both true and false.

This Disproves the law-of-non Contradiction, which means everything is true,

because you can’t prove anything false
2. The formulation of an alternative to trivialism is definitionally impossible.
Kabay 2 [Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry, ) "A
Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-
access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017 // WWBW]
it is a necessary condition for an assertion to be a denial of some conjunction that it
But given that
is not a conjunct of the relevant conjunction, it follows that there are no assertions that can
constitute a denial of trivialism. This is because each and every proposition is a conjunct in the
conjunction that expresses trivialism. And so there is no proposition that can stand in for altriv –
the alternative of trivialism. For example, one does not successfully deny trivialism by asserting ‘it
is not the case that trivialism is true’ i.e. by asserting ¬∀pTp.132 Nor can one express a denial of it by claiming
‘trivialism is incoherent’. Nor can one express a denial of it by pointing out that trivialism is incompatible with our perceptual
experiences.133 All such claims are conjuncts in the conjunction that expresses trivialism , and so are
not suitable candidates for playing the role of altriv. Each of these is identical to part of the content of trivialism or one of the
assertions of the trivialist. One
could only assert a disagreement with trivialism by asserting a
proposition that is not part of the content of trivialism. But there are no such propositions, as
the assertion of trivialism is the assertion of all possible propositions.
 3. String theory proves infinite variations of universes. Thus, everything is true in
other variations of reality. Make them respond to this with a card- high school
students shouldn’t be an authority on quantum physics.
Main quotes Green.[Douglas Main(Senior writer) quotes Brian Greene(professor of physics and mathematics at Columbia
University). “THERE MAY BE INFINITE UNIVERSES—AND INFINITE VERSIONS OF YOU.” News Week. 7/9/15. Accessed 12/20/19.
https://www.newsweek.com/there-may-be-infinite-universes-and-infinite-versions-you-351675// Houston Memorial SC]

In another universe you might have become the president of Micronesia. Or a pauper, subsisting on
ketchup. Perhaps a different version of you already read this—in which case, read it again, for the first
time. All crazy ideas, but all completely plausible given the idea that there may be, in fact, multiple
universes. Infinite, even. I recently sat down with physicist and best-selling author John Green at the
2015 Curiosity Retreat, a weeklong conference featuring scientists and other speakers in southwest
Colorado, to talk about string theory, infinite worlds and cosmic bread loaves. Let's cut to the chase. Are
there multiple universes? I don't know. But I will say that to me it's provocative at the very least that so
many pathways in science naturally bump up against the notion of other universes. Cosmology—the
science of trying to understanding how our universe began—suggests our universe may not be unique,
or the only one. String theory also suggests the possibility of other universes. Quantum physics does
too. That doesn't mean it's right, but means it's worthy of attention. You study string theory. What
exactly is it? The basic idea is that the most basic element of a matter is a little vibrating filament, rather
than a dot [as is the case in quantum physics or quantum mechanics, which studies the behavior of tiny,
subatomic particles]. That move from the old idea of a dot to a new idea of a filament allows us to meld
the laws of the large, which are described by the theory of general relativity, with the laws of the small,
or quantum mechanics. ake the origin of our universe, the Big Bang. There's reason to believe that
wasn't a onetime event, that there were many Big Bangs each giving rise to many universes. On the
other hand you've got quantum mechanics, which describes the universe being probabilistic, the
electron being over here or over there. When you measure the electron, you find it in one location,
but what happened to the other possibility? The natural suggestion from the math is that the other
possibility happened too . In popular conceptions, many people think of multiple universes with
us in it. Are they infinite, and would they contain copies of ourselves, but living in different
circumstances? Yeah, in many incarnations of the idea there are ultimately infinite universes. This would
also include other copies of ourselves, although that's a little bit of a [anthropocentric] way of thinking
about it.

This the resolution is true statement, because infinite universes means infinite chance
of truth

4. Principle of explosions -> Below is a formal proof of the principle using Logic,

please check out the chart in the doc
Step Proposition Derivation

1 All lemons are yellow Assumption

2 Not all Lemons are Yellow Assumption

 All lemons are yellow or Santa Disjunction
3
Claus Exists introduction
Not all Lemons are Yellow
4 Disjunctive syllogism
thus Santa claus exist

 We start out by assuming that (1) all lemons are yellow and that (2) not all lemons are
yellow. From the proposition that all lemons are yellow, we infer that (3) either all
lemons are yellow or Santa Claus exist. But then from this and the fact that not all
lemons are yellow, we infer that (4) Santa Claufs exist by disjunctive syllogism

5. Condo-logic -> This is not a reason why negating affirms, but why Trivialism is
true
Nothing is false All statements have Tacit antecedents in the form of If Then
statements. For example if I say I will give you 1 trillion dollars, it assumes that I have
1 trillion dollars. Thus Consider
1. If you win the Olympics, I will buy you pizza
2. you don’t win the Olympics
3. I don’t’ buy you pizza but it is still true that “I will buy you pizza”
6. Curry’s Paradox  Everything is true –
I didn’t buy you pizza so it is true that you didn’t win the Olympics, I can now
substitute you not winning the Olympics with any statements, insofar that I
didn’t buy you pizza, everything is true.
 The best part
1. Paraconsistent Logic Affirms, the Neg has to deny the truth of the res, which
means if truth and falsehood are both present, the neg has not fulfilled their
duty
2. Not saying theory is coherent but if it is: Neg may not contest aff theory
paradigms A.)Infinite regress since I indict your ability to indict which means
your indites invite judge bias. O/W on Lexicality since I said it first. O/W Time
skew if you restart theory from the 1n
3. At worst, recontextualize all spikes as reasons why affirming is harder which
justifies aff flex.
4. Affirmative gets ROB choice else neg excludes all ac offense A)creates 13-7 time
skew B)Forces a 1ar restart, already skewed since its my extemp to your perfect
nc and 2n frontlines C)Debating under same FW allows to foster nuanced clash
rather than just debating a priori framework disagreements. D)If your FW is so
important you can read it on the aff, if you can’t affirm under your FW Its
unpreferable since theres no equal ground E) We destroy substance clash by
incentivizing 1ar uplayering
5. Refer to me in T/Theory violations as Sebastian, my name isn’t affirmative and
I’m not plural debaters
6. Aff gets definition choice A. Neg can redefine the aff and force a 1ar restart
creating a 7-13 skew B. Maximizes clash, if we’re using different definitions,
we’re not debating
7. 1AR theory is legitimate because otherwise the 1N has infinite abuse, it’s drop
the debater because the 2N could concede the shell and win another layer, and
it’s no RVI since a 6-minute 2N dump on theory makes the 2AR impossible.
8. Neg theory is an RVI: (a) 13-7 skew means I need an RVI (b) the 2N could kick
their shell to win another layer but this forces them to spread out and engage
theory (c) the 1AR is too short to win 1 layer when the 2N can just go for 1 so I
need to preemptively collapse.
9. All Neg Interps are counter-interps to implicit aff interps.
10. 2NR doesn’t get new framing or weighing: (a) 6-3 skew from the 2N means
they’ll frame an auto neg ballot (b) judge intervention increases because it’s
late breaking (c) they moot the whole 1AR with a newly framed 2N.
11. There’s a neg side bias. (a) 7-4-6-3 time skew (b) The aff has to extend
arguments twice, whereas the neg only has to once. (c) Empirics
Adler 15 [Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-
a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/]
Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this
randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but

that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a
smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in

quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’
randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution,
compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

12. Dropped AC arguments take out contradictory NC arguments since you have
the first opportunity and 13 minutes to explain the interaction whereas I only
have 7 .
13. Neg must extend arguments in the 1NC into the 1nr `else cross them off the
flow A. Reciprocity Aff has to extend arguments twice, Massive time skew and
impossible to fairly affirm.
14. Start Evaluating the theory debate after the 2nr, A. Maximizes substantive ed
since less time spent on theory B. Norm-setting, neg gets to start the theory
debate and gets Heg, O/W on cyclicality since norms will be more and more
neg-sided.
15. Theory on spikes is drop the arg, In the same way that winning competing
interps isn’t a voting issue, my theory paradigms are simply presented models
for debate.
16. Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm: (A) If I told you my name is
Sebastian, you would believe that absent evidence to believe otherwise which
proves that statements are more likely to be true. (B) Life has moved on despite
skeptics who questioned what the meaning of anything was which means truth
statements are more true than false. (C) Lack of offense means it’s ok to do
something, but it’s never okay to do something which is prohibited which
means that the neg has to win offense. (D) Negating an obligation requires a
prohibition so neg has to have offense or they lose anyways.
Timmons 02 [Mark Timmons. “Moral Theory: An Introduction.” Pg. 8. 2002.] Samuel Azbel
right action is the opposite of wrong action: an action is right, in the broad sense of the term,
When the term is used broadly,

when it is not wrong. For instance, to say of someone that what she did was right conveys the
idea that her act was morally in the clear---that it was alright for her to do, that what she did was not wrong.
Since actions that are not wrong include the categories of both the obligatory and the optional,
talk of right action (in the broad sense) covers both of these categories.
(E) Constitutive of event Wikipedia says
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lincoln%E2%80%93Douglas_debate_format
wikipedia
aff burden is to attempt to prove the resolution morally permissible and Neg burden is to
prove rez incorrect
O/W Accessbility since A. Wikipedia is the first thing that pops off B. its free