1

The Security Dilemma Revisited: A Paradigm for international security in the 21 st

century?

By Christoph Bluth

The concept of the ‘security dilemma’ is a classic term in realist international relations

theory coined by John Herz to explain the behaviour of states in an anarchic self-help

international system and has since become a standard term in any discourse on

international security. 1 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler in their book have engaged in a

major effort to redefine the concept and adapt it to the concerns of global security in the

21st century.2 Herz’s original concept was based on the notion that states in an anarchic

system had to take measures to protect themselves from the threat posed by other states,

which would lead them in acquiring military capabilities that would in turn be considered

to be threatening by other states. Even peace-minded states would therefore become

entrapped in a vicious cycle of competition for power which could lead to arms race and

eventually war. The new definition by Booth and Wheeler defines the strategic dilemma

as a two-level strategic predicament. The first level is that states have to come to an

interpretation of the intentions, motivations and capabilities of a potential adversary in

‘the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty’. The second level is that once the

problem of interpretation has been settled, the most appropriate response has to be

determined.

There are two immediate observations about the definitional framework of this study.

First of all, Booth and Wheeler criticize the way the term ‘dilemma’ is used in the

discourse relating to the traditional understanding of the security dilemma, but this

criticism is groundless. They describe a dilemma as ‘a situation that requires one to

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choose between two equally balanced alternatives”. Expressed less technically, a dilemma

is a particularly vexing predicament. ‘3 The more technical of these definitions is not

generally relevant to international security, the second is devoid of meaning. But the

common usage of the term dilemma (‘double proposition’) is a problem where two

solutions are available, neither of which is practically acceptable. Contrary to Booth and

Wheeler, this latter definition of the term fits perfectly with Herz’s explanation of the

security dilemma, in which two options (not to build up military capabilities in response

to an external threat) and the opposite (to build up such capabilities) both result in

undesirable consequences. The other point about this new definition of the security

dilemma is that it seems to be completely trivial. In essence all it says is that states need

to assess the threats to their security accurately, and then take the most appropriate

measures to deal with them. By contrast, Herz’s definition was a powerful paradigm

about the sources of insecurity in an anarchic international system.

For Booth and Wheeler, a critical element of their approach is the complex interaction

between psychological and material factors, and that at the root of the security dilemma is

what they call the unresolvable uncertainty. They focus on misperception and mistrust as

a fundamental source on insecurity. In this context Herz’s security dilemma is redefined

by Booth and Wheeler as the security paradox.4

However, they contend that a vicious cycle of mistrust is not inevitable, but can be turned

in a virtuous circle of co-operation. An important factor is the attitudes of the actors

involved, and here Booth and Wheeler introduce the concept of security dilemma

sensibility. This denotes the intention and capacity of an actor to appreciate the possibility
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of complex motives for military intentions by another, and especially understand the role

of fear and how it may be exacerbated by the actor’s own actions.5

It seems surprising that one would want to base a paradigmatic analysis of contemporary

international security on the concept of the security dilemma, if we are interested in

assessing the risks of armed conflict between states and the factors that either give rise to

them or prevent them. This is because armed conflict between states has become quite

rare. Not only has the armed confrontation between Great Powers ended with the Cold

War, but in most parts of the globe countries no longer fear attacks by other states. There

is practically no potential for inter-state armed conflict in the Western hemisphere.6 West

and Central European states have no plausible enemies, Russia does not have to fear a

military attack from anyone, China is predicating its international reputation on the

‘peaceful rise of China’, South East Asian states are not intending to invade each other,

Australia and New Zealand do not fear military attack, and interstate conflict in Africa is

also practically non-existent. The risk of armed conflict between states remains confined

to South Asia (the arc from Afghanistan to India), the Korean peninsula and certain parts

of the Middle East. The authors claim that ‘by the first decade of the twenty-first century,

radical steps in disarmament have slipped lower on the international agenda than at any

time since the Second World War’.7 But this is due to the fact that military

establishments throughout the world have been emasculated. The Soviet army collapsed

as a result of the CFE Treaty, the withdrawal from Central Europe and the dissolution of

the Soviet Union. The Russian army is not able to engage in large-scale high intensity

warfare because of the low number of combat capable units. 8 The number of strategic

nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and Russia has been dramatically cut and

is targeted to reach a level of 20% of that in 1991. The West European states have
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reduced their defence budgets to such a level that they can no longer meet significant

military challenges out of area. Almost all modern states have abandoned conscription

and have drastically reduced their military manpower. Most countries have comparatively

low defence expenditures, with some notable exceptions, such as the United States whose

defence expenditure now equals that of all other states combined. The sheer lack of

potential for interstate conflict is reflected in the future scenarios presented in this book,

where the worst case scenario is a Cold War between China and the United States (this is

discussed in more detail below).

Clearly the major risk to international security in the time following the post-Cold war

period resides in the so-called new wars, sub-state conflicts that arise from ethnic

disputes, or failed states in regions of low development. Although Booth and Wheeler

claim that their concept of the security dilemma can be extended to non-state actors, the

notion of a security dilemma that arises between states seems to be an anachronism. For

the vast majority of states, there is no significant risk of war. It is no surprise therefore

that most of the cases analysed in this book derive from the Cold War era or before.

There is a substantial recent body of literature which argues that major war is becoming

obsolete as an instrument of foreign policy or as an activity of states. For example, the

work of Michael Mandelbaum and John Mueller, which Booth and Wheeler ignore, is

based on the observation that the costs of war have dramatically increased while its

benefits have become marginal. 9 The sources of wealth for knowledge-based economies

in a world of global trade are no longer to be found in armed conquest. In the past, at the

end of the 19th century, war was a normal, legitimate and necessary activity of states. But

the norms governing international relations have changed. Now the use of force is no
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longer considered acceptable except under very exceptional and restricted circumstances,

and war is considered to be akin to a form of criminal activity.

Booth and Wheeler briefly consider the ‘democratic peace thesis’, but take no clear

position on it and fail to appreciate the power of the normative constraints on modern
10
states with regard to the use of force against another state. Even if there are exceptions

to the ‘democratic peace thesis’ (depending on the definition of democracy, and the

historical period under review),11 nevertheless there is the 21st century liberal democratic

states do not fear military attacks by other such states, do not develop armed forces with

the purpose of using them against them and resolve their disputes in other ways than the

use or the threat of force. Not only can it be said that liberal democracies do not tend to

go to war with each other, but they are not perceived to threaten one another and the

balance of power between liberal democracies has been relevant only in the context of

responses to other external threats.12 Although the common external threat and the

conscious endeavour to overcome the national enmities in Europe which have resulted in

two world wars were undoubtedly important factors, a deeper structural principle seems

to be necessary to account for this difference in the role of military force. Among the

factors that are part of the explanation are:

- a shared value system which includes the acceptance of international norms

- the existence of institutional mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts

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- the more diffuse nature of political power in liberal democracies makes it difficult to

sustain military conflicts, unless they are relatively limited in time and their objectives are

widely accepted by the population. This generally rules out the acquisition of territory by

force owing to the difficulties of absorbing hostile populations in the political system and

the violation of political norms involved.13 It also means that domestic consent to a war

depends highly on the nature of the regime against which war is to be conducted - i.e. it

has to be credibly described as an aggressive and authoritarian (non-democratic) regime.

- the vulnerability of high-technology societies and their high standard of living has resulted

in an unwillingness to support the costs of war, both in terms of casualties and damage to

the society itself.

The work of Bruce Russett, William Antolis, Carol Ember, Melvin Ember and Zeev Maoz

has shown that there is a strong correlation between the degree of political participation and

normative constraints and the frequency of highly militarised disputes. They demonstrated

that normative constraints had a substantially more significant effect that

institutionalisation. 14 This is a truly remarkable phenomenon. If there really is a class of

states now that will not go to war with each other, this would mean that many of the

assumptions about international relations would have to abandoned. Booth and Wheeler

describe a ‘pacifist state’ as a ‘Clausewitzian contradiction in terms’, but for all intents and

purposes many modern states are virtually pacifist. 15

The original thesis of the ‘security dilemma’ assumed that the international system was

anarchic, but even though the international system remains composed of independent states, it

seems inappropriate to characterise it as fully anarchic. 16 Quite to the contrary, relations

between states are highly regulated by various layers of international laws, treaties and norms

that are by and large adhered to. Moreover, through globalisation there is now a high degree
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of financial, trade and social interpenetration that constrains the power of the state and leads

to substantial global interdependence that redefines that national interests of states. Barry

Buzan introduced the distinction between ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ anarchy. In a mature

anarchy there are various structural constraints and instability is limited by the acceptance of

codes of behaviour by stronger state.17 But this seems to be a very weak description of the

normative constraints that inhibit modern states from using armed force and the value

systems that have been adopted by many states.

To be sure, not all states meet the political criteria for admission to the European Union. But

even many states that are not full-blown liberal democracies nevertheless adhere to the norms

governing relations between states and are not posing a threat to other states. Another way of

expressing the results by Russett and others is that the likelihood of conflict is primarily a

function of the normative asymmetries between states. The degree of normative asymmetry is

particularly high with sates that have become known as ‘rogue states’. Booth and Wheeler

see the concept of ‘rogue states’ as an expression of the ‘ideological fundamentalism’ of the

Bush administrations. But the concept of a ‘rogue state’ established itself under the Clinton

administration. The definition of a ‘rogue state’ is one that does not adhere to international

law, behaves aggressively and engages in substantial human rights violations against its own

population. The aggressive behaviour includes threats or even attacks on other states, state

sponsored terrorism and the development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Iraq

under Saddam Hussein was the ideal type of a rogue state.18 Whereas most states nowadays

consider the use of force against other states illegitimate except under very specific

conditions, such a notion would have appeared outlandish to Saddam Hussein. During his

time as the ruler of Iraq, the country was permanently at war with its neighbours unless it was

contained by outside powers, and even then he kept firing at aircraft patrolling the no-fly

zone. For Saddam Hussein, international law was merely an inconvenience. When he decided
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to begin a nuclear weapons programme in the 1980s, he asked the head of the nuclear

program, a former IAEA inspector, whether Iraq needed leave the NPT. He was told that the

programme could be pursued while remaining a member of the NPT.19 The idea that he

should forego the production or the use of weapons of mass destruction because of

international conventions that he had signed up to would have appeared bizarre to a man who

killed as many people as necessary to remain in power and was not above pulling out a gun

and shooting someone on the spot personally.

The implication of this analysis is that if the likelihood of armed conflict between states is

low, then although there are frequent misperceptions, false conceptions and even cases of

cognitive dissonance among international actors, these cannot a major causative factor of

insecurity to the extent presumed by Booth and Wheeler.

In particular they ignore that in all of the major crises regions there are parties whose

aggressive intent is real and that is this aggressive intent which arises from the political

ambitions of certain political elites is the fundamental cause of the instability. Secondly, the

main threat faced by regimes in crisis regions is usually internal, rather than external, and

external aggression is an instrument to address the internal threat. Since the external

adversary has no means to mitigate the internal threat faced by the opponent, no degree of

security dilemma sensibility can ameliorate the tension.

The implication is that Booth and Wheeler are not only completely misrepresenting the

structure of international security and the sources of insecurity in the contemporary world,

but that their analysis of the cases they present is fundamentally flawed and their proposals

for dealing with them unworkable. This can be seen more clearly by looking at several of

their case studies: The end of the Cold War, common security in Europe, the threat of nuclear

proliferation, and the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

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The end of the Cold War

Booth and Wheeler reject the neo-realist explanation of the end of the Cold War, which posits

that the weakening power position of the Soviet Union, in particular the secular decline in the

Soviet economy, forced Soviet leaders to change their policy and accounts for Gorbachev’s

‘new political thinking’ and the end of the East-West confrontation.

Indeed, the neo-realist account advanced by Mearsheimer, Wohlforth, Brooks and others is

implausible. 20 While the power of the Soviet Union and its empire were clearly in decline in

the 1980s, and while this decline may well have at some time in the future rendered the

Soviet empire unsustainable, these systemic factors do not account for the timing and the

direction of the changes. As long as substantial strategic and theatre nuclear forces were

deployed by the Soviet Union, together with conventional forces sufficient to quell any

rebellion in Eastern Europe, the military position of the Soviet Union was not under

imminent threat. The economic crisis followed perestroika and the restructuring of Soviet

foreign relations. If the Soviet Union had decided to use the political and military instruments

of power in the same manner as before Gorbachev assumed the leadership, it could have

easily defended its position. The collapse of Soviet power and the dissolution of the Soviet

state itself therefore fundamentally contradicts neo-realist analysis, according to which the

perpetuation of their own existence and the maximization of their power is the most

fundamental objective that states pursue.

Booth and Wheeler, quite correctly in my view, see ideational factors, Gorbachev’s ideas

about common security and his ‘new political’ thinking as crucial. They go on to provide a

quite convincing account about how Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan began to

establish a pattern of personal trust that enabled them to transform East-West relations.
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This is a critical case study for Booth and Wheeler’s thesis of trust and ‘mitigation’ of

mistrust, but the conclusions they draw for the role of mitigation in resolving security

dilemmas are not sustainable. The central factor that they are missing is that while building

trust was important, this was only possible because the Soviet leadership had decided to end

the Cold War. To put it another way, it is only possible to build trust if the other side can in

fact be trusted. The adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union

during the Cold War was not caused by a lack of trust, but by incompatible ambitions and

interests. In other words, the hostility was real and not just the consequence of ‘unresolvable

uncertainties’.

The endurance of the East-West conflict into the post-Stalin and the nuclear era cannot be

explained as resulting from the classic 'security dilemma' postulated by realist international

relations theory. The Soviet Union was not just another state, nor just another Great Power.

The hostility towards the West was the consequence of a peculiar mixture of Great Power

megalomania and the specific requirements for the perpetuation of the Soviet power élite.

The Communist Party was the political instrument for holding the Soviet Union together and

legitimising the rule of the nomenklatura. The security services provided the means to quell

any dissent. The external threat played a crucial role since the political identity of the Soviet

Union as a state was defined in opposition to the 'Capitalist world'. The military element in

this confrontation was important because it provided a sense of objective reality to the

conflict with Capitalism.

The military was important for two other reasons. One is that it was the ultimate instrument

of power for the political élite. It was clearly essential to keep the outer empire together.

Although the military played a less important role in the political control of the Soviet Union

itself and only on one occasion was directly involved in the domestic political power
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struggles, its mere existence was a source of enormous power for the Soviet political leaders.

Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the two great military powers in the world

with a large strategic nuclear arsenal enabled the Soviet leaders to conduct a foreign policy as

a global power.

All this is not to say that the Soviet Union was not under threat. But the threat was not a

military threat per se, despite the enormous build-up of military power in the West. The

threat consisted in the continuous challenge to the legitimacy of the Soviet power élite. This

challenge came from the West, it came from domestic opposition in Eastern Europe and it

came from inside the Soviet Union itself. It was a challenge to the political value system that

governed Soviet society and externalised itself in Soviet foreign policy behaviour.

The history of arms control shows that the Soviet security dilemma could have been resolved

easily if it was simply a matter of assuring the external security of the Soviet state. Indeed,

the possession of nuclear weapons did substantially resolve the problem of external security.

If the 'security dilemma' had been the source of East-West tension, then the Cold War should

have ended with the acquisition of large nuclear arsenals. The reason why arms control

largely failed in the end was because the perpetuation of the East-West conflict (albeit in a

manner which did not allow it to get out of control) was necessary for the Soviet power élites

to preserve their own legitimacy and existence. From the Western perspective as well, the

military dimension was in many respects less important than the political dimension.

The Cold War ended when a generational change occurred in the Soviet élite and the new

leaders were principally concerned to deal with the economic decline, with the failure of the

Soviet Union to become a modern industrialised country, the social disintegration and the

disillusionment among the intellectual élite. The transformation of relations with the West

was an integral part of this process but not the primary objective. The opportunity for the new
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generation to assert itself came as the older generation allowed the Soviet Union to fall into a

state of complete political paralysis. The international environment undoubtedly played a

part. The intensity of the hostility in East-West relations was perceived as extremely

dangerous in the Soviet Union, but the previously established means of reducing tension

proved wholly inadequate. A completely new departure, a whole-scale revision of the

intellectual framework that defined Soviet foreign relations was required. The Gorbachev

programme, even though it lack precise objectives and was inconsistent in its

implementation, had the very far-reaching goal of completely redefining the values on which

the political systems inside the Soviet Union and consequently Soviet relations with the

outside world were to be based. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and many of the younger

academics who acted as their advisors had come to recognize the absurdity of continuing

relations with the West on the basis of an international class struggle. They believed that the

West was the place 'where civilisation lies'. In other words, they believed that the Soviet

Union needed to adopt many of the values on which Western political systems and societies

were based, such as democratic freedoms and human rights, albeit tempered by socialist

values.

Booth and Wheeler state that ‘to trust is to risk, but the risks of embedding trust are the path

to peace and security’. But as the Cold War demonstrates, trust is only possible or

meaningful if the primary cause of a conflict is addressed. It was the change in the values that

governed the political elite in the Soviet that ultimately enabled the end to the military

confrontation between East and West.

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Common Security in Europe

The section on ‘common security in Europe’ defines the issue in terms of NATO enlargement

and the reaction from Moscow. This account, while convincing and interesting, sidesteps the

central issue, namely the sources on insecurity in Europe after the Cold War.

Neo-realists like John Mearsheimer predicted a high potential for inter-state conflict

in post Cold War Europe. This prediction turned out to be mistaken. To be sure, there was

conflict on the territory of states which have now fallen apart, such as certain parts of the

former Soviet Union and the former Republic of Yugoslavia. 21 These conflicts can be

interpreted either as civil conflicts or post-colonial conflicts. Clearly the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the Yugoslav state, which created stability on their territories by the

constant threat of force resulted in instability and conflict. On the other hand it is important to

emphasize that European states after the Cold War turned out be not naturally prone to

military conflict. The principal objective of virtually all Central and Eastern European states

turned out to be to join various Western multilateral organisations such as NATO and the

European Union and thereby accept the consequent constraints on their foreign policies.

As becomes clear from Booth and Wheeler’s account, the dividing line in Europe after the

Cold War is between Russia (plus Belarus) and the rest of Europe. Relations between Russia

and the West are a mixture of cooperation and conflict, but the authors do not properly

identify the source of the conflict. Why should a post-Communist Russia that now seeks a

partnership with the United States be concerned about the enlargement of NATO? Why

should Russia oppose fair elections in the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine and Georgia? The

answer is that the transition of Russia from a totalitarian state to a liberal democracy remains

incomplete. Although the state proclaims its adherence to international norms, these have not
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been fully internalised by those who govern the country. The ambition to be a Great Power,

which is a fundamental belief that permeates all spectrums of opinion in Russia, is not

compatible with international norms if it involves undue interference in the internal affairs of

other countries backed up with the use of force or other illegal covert actions. Belarus has

sought close union with Russia because it remains an authoritarian state, and Russia is

prepared to tolerate Lukashenko. Other Eastern European countries, on the other hand, have

become liberal democracies and therefore have sought to integrate with Western Europe. In

other words, it is a normative asymmetry that creates this divide.

The efforts to establish collective security in Europe after the Cold War foundered quickly for

several reasons: 1. The relative security of West European states after the collapse of the Cold

War regime resulted in a deep-seated unwillingness to get involved in conflicts and security

risks that did not affect them directly. 2. Russia was not prepared to subordinate its own

security problems to a collective security regime. The failure to resolve the most basic

questions of the principles according to which a new European security order should be

created meant that no functional collective security institutions could be created.22

The difficulties in constructing a regime of common security in Europe requires an analysis

of the sources of conflict between Russia and the United States. These derive from Russia’s

ambitions to Great Power status, its failure to adopt a fully-functioning democracy and its

regard of the former Soviet space as its sphere of influence.

Booth and Wheeler pose a number of questions at the end of their section on Common

Security in Europe. The first asks whether Russia’s ready acceptance of the second wave of

NATO expansion means that Moscow was now less worried about NATO’s intentions. But

unfortunately they make no attempt at analysing the threat perceptions that underlie Russia’s

opposition to NATO enlargement in the first place. The reason why Russia’s opposition to
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NATO enlargement became so deeply entrenched had to with domestic politics and not threat

perception. After the storming of the Duma in October 1993 Yeltsin had to increasingly

defend himself against conservative and anti-western critics which induced a state of

governmental paralysis. In contrast to the account given by Booth and Wheeler, Yeltsin

mistakenly believed that he could prevent the enlargement of NATO and thus score a major

victory, which made it all the more difficult to salvage the appearance of victory from the

NATO-Russia Founding Act.23 The same political dynamics prevented the ratification of

START 2. The reason why Putin, who himself had more conservative views sceptical of the

West, could ignore the alleged perils of NATO enlargement and moved very rapidly to ratify

START 2 after he took power was because he had such substantial political support in the

Duma.

Another question asks whether ‘US unilateralism and geopolitical ambition’ was ‘consistent

with common security aspirations given Russia’s worries about the Caucasus and Central

Asia, where in addition to competition for oil, the US was steadily extending its military

presence’? 24 The ‘competition about oil’ was really about freeing the Central Asian states

from the stranglehold of the Russian pipeline system that Moscow used to limit their oil

exports and impose grossly disadvantageous terms on whatever exports were permitted.

From the US point of view, this situation threatened the economic development of the Central

Asian states and therefore posed a threat to the security of the region. US engagement with

Central Asian states was designed to promote human rights and democracy, and limit the

reestablishment of Russian hegemony over the region which threatened to violate the

sovereignty of the newly independent states.

Although the establishment of a relationship based on common security between the United

States and Russia remains fraught with difficulty, this does not mean that the concept of the
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‘security dilemma’ is appropriate here. First of all, there is no threat of armed conflict

between the two states. It remains true that the military confrontation between them is a thing

of the past. Furthermore, the United States and Russia limit the negative impact of their

rivalry, as there are many issues in which US-Russian co-operation remains vital, such as

strategic nuclear arms control, nuclear non-proliferation and regional conflicts which require

Russian support in the UN Security Council. Another way of expressing this is that although

there exists a normative asymmetry between Western states and Russia and other post-Soviet

states, this asymmetry is not a significant as that between Western states and ‘rogue states’.

The attitude to international norms in these countries may differ to some extent from liberal

democracies, and political participation in these countries is less well developed.

Nevertheless, they are sufficiently integrated into the international community so that the risk

that they will resort to armed conflict remains low.

Regimes: The example of nuclear non-proliferation

Booth and Wheeler discuss security regimes ‘to examine how far norms and regimes can

lessen fear, reduce suspicion, promote habits of cooperation and construct shared visions of

the future between mistrustful states, and so mitigate their security dilemmas’. 25 Of the three

cases they examine, the only one of relevance for contemporary security is the nuclear non-

proliferation regime. What needs to be explained when considering the phenomenon of

nuclear proliferation is why it has been so rare. 189 states are members of the NPT, including

five nuclear states. There are only four states that are not members of the NPT and that have

nuclear weapons. Of the four states that acquired nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime,

the last one to make the decision to go nuclear and that received civilian nuclear assistance

started its nuclear programme 38 years ago. On the other hand, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
 17

Belarus decided not keep nuclear weapons in their territory, but rather agreed to give them

up, and South Africa also dismantled its nuclear weapons programme. The fact that nuclear

proliferation is rare is particularly puzzling given that nuclear weapons seemingly can resolve

a state’s security dilemma in one stroke. Nuclear weapons, if Kenneth Waltz, John

Mearsheimer and many other realists are to be believed, enable weaker states to balance

stronger states.26 They deter and prevent armed conflict and guarantee the security of the state

that possesses them. Then how can it be that so few states have acquired them? One possible

explanation would be that the security regime defined by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

(NPT) has in fact accomplished what Booth and Wheeler say security regimes can achieve.

However, the proposition that the existence of the NPT as an international security regime

which is discriminatory in its very design and offers only very weak security assurances to its

non-nuclear members has persuaded states to forego such a powerful means to provide for

their security seems prima facie implausible. Booth and Wheeler make no effort to

demonstrate the effectiveness (or otherwise) of the non-proliferation regime and confine

themselves to quoting a range of opinions. They nevertheless seem to believe that the non-

proliferation regime is not deeply enough embedded and that there is a serious risk of a

complete breakdown of the regime. There are, however, reasons to believe that the non-

proliferation regime is not nearly as shaky as pessimists would have us believe and that there

are deeper reasons why proliferation has remained rather limited.

The explanation for the lack of nuclear proliferation must lie both in the development of

norms in relation to arms conflict and geopolitics. During the Cold War, both superpowers

sought to prevent their allies from acquiring nuclear weapons (although this failed in the case

of China, Britain and France). To some extent, the NPT was an instrument of this policy,

with the Federal Republic of Germany being a particular target. The end of the Cold War was

the beginning of a total transformation of the international system. The military contingencies
 18

that the nuclear powers are likely to face do not involve nuclear weapons either as a deterrent

or as a useful military tool. For example, in the conflicts in the Balkans four nuclear powers

were engaged with armed forces, but this had no relevance for their conduct or the course of

the conflict. Very few states face an external threat that would compel them to acquire

nuclear weapons. Countries that might have previously contemplated the acquisition of

nuclear weapons are no longer doing so because there is simply no need for them. Thus we

have seen how the non-Russian former Soviet republics where strategic nuclear weapons

were based permitted all of these weapons to be dismantled and South Africa gave up its

nuclear status.

Another significant factor is the development of norms which Booth and Wheeler do not

really examine closely despite the centrality of this issue for their study. In particular

international norms in relation to the use of force have changed fundamentally. It is no longer

considered legitimate to use force to support national interests (including the resolution of

territorial disputes). Rather, the use of force is only permissible under very specific

conditions, such as self-defence, or the enforcement of international law and security as

mandated by the UN Security Council (which may include humanitarian intervention).

Moreover, the use of force is subject to very stringent conditions, among which

proportionality and the avoidance of civilian casualties are paramount. While the possession

of nuclear weapons is not against international law, their use would be illegal in almost all

conceivable circumstances. Although one may question how strictly these norms are being

adhered to, they demonstrably restrain the use of force by states. Many former practices in

the conduct of warfare are no longer acceptable, such as the kind of strategic bombing

practiced during World War II, the annexation of foreign territories or the execution of

prisoners of war. Even the kind of planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

during the Cold War now looks bizarre and beyond all moral bounds.
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Booth and Wheeler repeat the commonly expressed view that the failure of the ‘permanent

five’ (P5) to live up to their disarmament obligations arising from the NPT is a threat to the

stability of the non-proliferation regime. It is true that progress towards nuclear disarmament

has been abysmally slow, even though the United States and Russia have very substantially

reduced their strategic nuclear warheads (and are set to reduce further), Britain has reduced

the size of its nuclear deterrent and China maintains an ageing minimum deterrent force. It is

also the case that this issue has played a significant role during the NPT review conferences.

Disarmament by the nuclear powers is clearly on the international agenda and is now

supported by many who previously were ardent advocates of US nuclear power, such as

Henry Kissinger. Nevertheless, contrary to such views, for the time being the stability of the

NPT regime and global security depends on the P5 maintaining their nuclear arsenals.

Without the extended deterrence provided by the United States to Japan and the Republic of

Korea, those states would have no choice but consider their responses to a nuclear armed

North Korea. Likewise American security guarantees will play a critical role in preventing

break-outs from the NPT in response to the Iranian nuclear programme. Russia needs a

nuclear arsenal in order to satisfy the political ambitions to be a Great Power, which in its

absence would force the Russian government to argued that the fact that China and the

United States are nuclear powers has a restraining effect on the situation vis-à-vis Taiwan. It

is clearly not desirable that the United States should be the only Western power with a

nuclear arsenal. Although global co-operative denuclearization is ultimately desirable, the

NPT regime with the P5 nuclear weapons state as it core seems the least worst alternative

until it becomes possible to eliminate nuclear weapons on a global basis.

Booth and Wheeler suggest that ‘uncertainties about the long-term potential of the regime to

constrain future weapons proliferation undoubtedly played a part in their deliberations’. 27

But in the case of Britain its nuclear status is driven by the stability, rather than the instability
 20

of the NPT regime.28 In the case of Iran, it is not all clear that Iran’s nuclear weapons

programme is driven by the fear of other nuclear powers arising in the region in future. For

Iran, the NPT plays both an enabling and a constraining factor in its nuclear programme. In

the context of Iran, Booth and Wheeler refer to the ‘ambiguous symbolism of the

technology’. A more precise term would be ‘cheating’. Iran’s intentions are not as

mysterious as is implied here. The official line that Iran is developing an indigenous and

independent nuclear power programme does not stand even superficial scrutiny. For a start,

Iran’s natural uranium reserves are not sufficient to run even one nuclear power station over

its lifetime. This completely rules out an independent nuclear energy capacity. Iran is not

building any nuclear power stations; Russia has built the facility at Bushehr which will be

fuelled by Russian low-enriched uranium. If Iran were seriously interested in nuclear energy

(a concern that would be hard to explain given the scale of its hydrocarbon resources and the

fact that a shortage of petrol rather than electricity is the most serious problem Iran faces), it

would not be so focussed on enriching uranium, given the world glut of low-enriched

uranium and instead build a network of power plants that could provide a true capability to

generate electric power on a significant scale. There is no clear evidence of an indigenous

nuclear power programme, but there is considerable evidence of a military nuclear

programme, including the development of the capability to enrich uranium to any degree of

purity, the determination to control both a uranium and plutonium fuel cycle, and efforts to

develop a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3 and other aspects of weaponisation.

Iran is pursuing nuclear technology at a very high political and economic cost. The question

is what motivates the regime. Since the regime denies that it seeks to acquire nuclear

weapons, there is no open debate about the potential security benefits. These are not as self-

evident as one might suppose. If Iran were to proceed with the manufacture and deployment

of nuclear weapons, not only would it go against its long-declared public policy, but it would
 21

also result in a very sharply deteriorating external security environment. Cooperation with

Russia would be seriously affected, the international community as a whole would take

further measures against Iran (which in the early stage of overt weaponisation could include

massive military attacks) and the regional actors would align themselves more closely with

the United States, which is precisely what Teheran’s foreign policy is designed to prevent.

The principal motivating factor of Iran’s nuclear programme is not external security, but

internal political legitimation. 29 The nuclear programme symbolizes Iran’s claim to be

respected and its ambition to be a regional great power. The efforts of the international

community and especially the United States to constrain the programme are, as long as they

remain within certain limits, essential to achieving this legitimating effect. Although the

Iranian leadership has sought to keep the appearance of remaining in conformity with

international law, it does not feel itself bound by it and views the Security Council with

contempt. Its unwillingness to abide by the chemical weapons convention, the biological

weapons convention and its ambiguous attitude towards the NPT, its interference in Iraq and

its international operations (including attacking US army bases abroad and the provision of

rockets and other weapons to Hezbullah) is symptomatic of an elite that fundamentally rejects

international norms as being binding for themselves.

This analysis indicates that the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime depends

critically on whether states are committed to the adherence to international law and the norms

of the international community more generally. A good case in point is China, where the

adoption of the NPT and other global arms control regimes matches the emergence of a

policy line according to which China seeks to be perceived as a responsible power that is

integrated into the international community. States that ultimately do not accept that they are

bound by international law cannot be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons by the non-

proliferation regime.
 22

The crisis on the Korean peninsula

The Korean peninsula is an important case for the arguments advanced by Booth and

Wheeler. This is because it is one of the few regions in the world where there remains a

serious risk of inter-state armed conflict (even though this risk is not as high as is sometimes

believed). It is also an important example illustrating their concept of ‘mitigator logic’

according to which the two Koreas could move towards common security on the basis of

security guarantees provided by the United States, Russia and China to the DPRK. 30

A closer look at the situation on the Korean peninsula shows that the assumptions on which

this analysis is based are faulty. The problem is that the principal source of a threat to the

survival of the regime is internal. The North Korean state is not viable politically, socially

and economically. Its rulers reject anything but very superficial internal reform, refuse to

open the country up to the world and conduct its foreign policy on the basis of threats. 31

The nuclear programme and its ballistic missiles constitute the only asset the North Korea has

in its negotiations with other powers. While Pyongyang may be prepared to make certain

concessions, such as freezing or even abandoning the production of plutonium, it is hard to

conceive of anything the United States or South Korea can offer North Korea that will

persuade it to give up the nuclear card entirely and for good.

Booth and Wheeler float the idea of a ‘different path’ that would see the development of the

Six Party Talks into some kind of North East Asian collective security regime. Quite apart

from the fact that the Six Party Talks have not yet achieved their basic task (the elimination

of North Korea’s nuclear programme), such a proposal reveals an incorrect understanding of

the dynamics of North Korea foreign policy behaviour. North Korea could never become part

of a collective security regime because the North Korean leaders never adopt and internalize

the principles and values underlying any institution that the DPRK becomes a member of.
 23

Small violations in any agreement are used as an excuse to defect as soon as the North

Koreans believe that the agreement no longer suits their purposes or that a better deal could

be had. Attempts to link various dimensions of relations with North Korea have also proven

unsuccessful, as the leaders in Pyongyang will honour those provisions that are important to

them and ignore others which are too insignificant or intangible to bring about a collapse of

the agreement as a whole. In other words, the kind of changes in the behaviour of states that

become part of institutions that has been observed elsewhere does not occur in the case of

North Korea which has defected from every agreement and institutional arrangement that it

has been a part of since 1990.

How do we explain this kind of behaviour? There are two different aspects to this.

The first is that the North Koreans only respect power, and have absolutely no respect for

norms or values. Moreover, they believe that others act in precisely the same way that they

do. From this perspective, international law and institutions have no merit in and of

themselves, but are just used as instruments of power to achieve certain objectives. This is

why the notion that North Korea should permit intrusive IAEA inspections merely because

they acceded to the NPT is incomprehensible to North Korean leaders, they see the IAEA just

as an instrument of US policy. Efforts to renegotiate and enforce agreements once they have

been reached are just part of a continuous power play, in which North Korea seeks to extract

the maximum advantage at every turn.

The second aspect is that the confrontation over the nuclear programme is merely a symptom

of a more fundamental problem for the North Korean state that is simply irresolvable. This

problem stems from the paradox that the regime cannot survive in the longer term without

fundamental reform, but fundamental reform will destroy the regime. This is true for several

reasons. First of all the regime’s entire claim for legitimacy is based on the principles of its
 24

social, economic and political organization. Without it there would be no reason for the

DPRK to exist, it could just become another South Korea and unification could take place

without preconditions. Secondly, national survival is equated with the survival of its ruling

dynasty. This places very strict constraints on reform because the hierarchical and social

control that is inherent to the socio-political organization of the country is necessary to

achieve it. But the economy of the country has essentially collapsed. It is no longer able to

meet even very basic needs of the population. Thus the regime which is politically and

economically isolated from the world community needs to find a way to extract support from

outside without weakening its political control.

The so-called ‘external threat’ to North Korea is primarily created by the nuclear programme

in the first place. There is a curious paradox that underlies North Korean foreign policy,

which is that it is fundamentally predicated on making North Korea appear dangerous to the

international community. This motivates the United States and other countries to engage with

North Korea in order to mitigate the threat, but in order for this to be sustained the threat has

to be periodically revived. This creates the seemingly inescapable cycle of conflict and

cooperation. It also accounts for North Korea’s diplomacy which to outsiders sometimes

appears erratic and even irrational. 32 The more fundamental issue is that the basic principles

of whatever agreement is arrived at with the DPRK simply cannot be fully implemented.

During fifteen years of negotiation neither side has come to the point where they were really

willing to hold up their end of the bargain. North Korea will never fully relinquish its nuclear

capability, nor will be prepared to depend on security guarantees given by external powers.

Likewise, the US will never fully accept the legitimacy of the Kim regime, or guarantee its

domestic political stability. The outside world will always continue to seek gradual regime

change. Essentially there is no solution to the North Korean problem for as long as the
 25

current regime remains in power.33 There is no settlement that would create a kind of margin

of safety according to Booth and Wheeler’s ‘mitigator prescriptions’ 34

The security dilemma: An obsolete anachronism ?

Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler describe the security dilemma as an idea whose time has

come. In their words: ‘This is because world politics have entered a new age of uncertainty,

and whose landscape is shaped by risk , danger, mistrust, fear, uncertain cooperation,

doubtful trust and insecurity.’ 35 This is an extraordinary characterisation of a world in which

international norms with respect to the use of force have become almost universally accepted

and in which most countries do not face an external enemy that threatens to attack them.

Indeed, the West has not enjoyed this high level of security and absence of an external threat

since World War II. The use of force by Western countries is no longer directed at defending

against an external threat, but rather at ‘Saving Strangers’, to use Nicholas Wheeler’s term. 36

Of course, Western governments defend their military actions out of area on the grounds of

national security. Such rationalisations are greeted with scepticism by scholars and ordinary

people alike, which explains why European states are so reluctant to commit forces. Of

course the United States has global interests, and the preservation of international order is a

common concern. But how vital the national interests are that are being defended is not

immediately obvious and remains disputed. It is a fair assessment, however, that the role of

military forces to prevent or defend against terrorism will remain very limited in future and

that intelligence and homeland security will play the main role.

When considering future scenarios, Booth and Wheeler clearly struggle to identify major

global conflicts of the future. They see the threat of a Cold War between the United States

and China as the ‘chief danger’, but they fail to elaborate on the nature and dimensions of
 26

such a hypothetical Cold War. There is no casus belli; the only point of conflict is Taiwan,

but that is being managed very successfully and relations between the two Chinas are

improving through increased human interaction and economic co-operation. China does not

have nor is there any evidence that it intends to create a regional empire akin to the Soviet

bloc, it does not seek to impose its political or social structure on other countries, the Sino-

Soviet conflict has transformed into Sino-Russian strategic co-operation and China has no

regional enemies. The instrument of choice of domestic social control by the so-called

Communist government is growing economic prosperity. Nothing would threaten this more

than armed conflict. The United States and China are deeply interdependent, which by itself

limits any potential for conflict. There is simply no basis for a Cold War between the United

States and China.

The other scenarios that they present, such as a variety of regional arms races, or a large-scale

breakout from the NPT, similarly lack plausibility, nor do Booth and Wheeler examine their

implications for global security.

This is not to deny that there exist a few crisis regions in which interstate war remains a

serious possibility. The paradox of the contemporary period is that as states have become to

feel increasingly secure, serious sub-state conflicts have arisen and international terrorism has

become a global phenomenon. Given the scale of human loss in Iraq and the intensity of

fighting in Afghanistan, one could be forgiven to be sceptical about the notion of universal

peace. But scholars need to look past appearances in order to assess the structure of the

international system. The principal failing of the approach of much the recent literature in

international security studies, including Booth and Wheeler, is that it does not recognize the

fundamental transformation of the international system since the end of the Cold War. 37 The

most important task for scholars is to understand what distinguishes those regions in which
 27

the threat of interstate conflict still prevails from those where it has been for all intents and

purposes eliminated. From the analysis given above, it is clear the power structure, the

systems of governance and the ambitions of the political elites in these regions is a principal

source of insecurity. The security dilemma in its classical form is of very limited use in

analysing these conflicts because external threats are not the primary cause of insecurity.

Herz’s original formulation of the ‘security dilemma’ was an interesting development from

realist thought. According to the assumptions of realism, relations between states in an

anarchic international system are competitive and the use of military force for the purposes of

defence or the advance of the national interest is natural. Herz assumes that there could be

states who do not intend to engage in armed conflict with other states, but even if they do not

the mistrust inherent in international relations that results in part from states acquiring

military capabilities produces a sense of insecurity and forces even peaceful states to build up

their armed forces. While there are interesting insights to be derived from this concept,

nevertheless it was already obsolete when it was proposed. It belonged into a different era,

and does not account for the real sources of insecurity since World War II. Although mistrust

and the competitive acquisition of strategic weapons did play a role in the Cold War, it was

not its fundamental cause. The internal changes in the Soviet Union that resulted in the

pursuit of an end of the conflict enabled the restoration of trust and not the other way around.

The Booth and Wheeler approach to the security dilemma is even less useful, because these

causes of insecurity are not necessarily susceptible security dilemma sensitivity or any

reassurance that external powers can provide. For these reasons, we have to recognize that

the security dilemma is a concept whose time has passed.

 28

1
John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics2:2,

pp.157-80; John J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and

Realities, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1959

2
Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2008
3
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.4
4
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.6-10
5
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.7
6
Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe, New York, NY: Twentieh Century

Fund 1996
7
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.208
8
Christoph Bluth, ‘Russian Military Policy: Constraints and Capabilities’, in Roy Allison and

Christoph Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, London: RIIA/Brookings

1998, pp.67-93
9
John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The obsolescence of modern war, New York, NY:

Basic Books 1989; Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Is Major War Obsolete’, Survival, 40:4, 1998,

pp.20-38
10
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.210-11
11
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 2002); Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of

Regime Type on

War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2

(April

2004), pp. 296–313; Randall L. Schweiler, ‘Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are

Democracies More Pacific?’, World Politics, 44,2 , 1992, pp.235-69

 29

12
For a discussion of the theoretical issues, see Robert Latham, 'Democracy and War-

Making: Locating the International Liberal Context', Millenium, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer

1993, pp.139-164; Randall L. Schweller, 'Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are

Democracies More Pacific?', World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2, January 1992, pp.235-269; for

an opposing view see John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future', International Security, Vol.

15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 49-51; for an analysis of the empirical evidence, see Alex Mintz

and Nehemia Geva, 'Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other? An Experimental Study',

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, September 1993, pp.484-503; Z. Maoz and B.

Russett, 'Alliance, contiguity, wealth and political stability: Is the lack of conflict among

democracies a statistical artifact?', International Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1992, pp.245-

267.

13
Northern Ireland is an example of the political instability generated by a territorial status

that is not accepted by a substantial portion of the population.

14
Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press

1993
15
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.208. ‘Virtually pacifist’ means that they do

not maintain military establishments adequate for high intensity warfare against an external

enemy and warfare with their neighbours is considered to be ‘inconceivable’ by all parties.
16
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power

politicsl’, International Organization, 46, 1992, pp.391-425

17
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner 1998
18
Christoph Bluth, ‘The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq’,

International Affairs. Vol. 80. No.5, 2004, pp.851-872

19
Based on conversations with David Kay, London 1993
 30

20
John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’,

International Security, 15:4, 1990, pp.5-56; W.C. Wohlforth (ed.), Cold War Endgame:Oral

History, Analysis and Debates, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press

2004; S. G. Brooks and W.C.Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War:

Re-evaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas’, International Security, 25:3, 2000/2001, pp.5-54
21
The potential disputes between various Central European states (e.g. Hungary and

Rumania) do not seem to result in arms races or military confrontations and are nowhere near

crisis point. For more detailed analysis, and support for the argument that such conflicts are

likely to be of a political and economic rather than military nature, see Jan Zielonka, Security

in Central Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 272, London: Brassey's 1992.

22
Christoph Bluth, Germany and the Future of European Security, Aldershot: Palgrave 2000
23
Christoph Bluth, ‘The Post-Soviet States and Europe’, in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth

(eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, London:RIIA/Brookings 1998, pp.323-341

24
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.164
25
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.107
26
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, New York, NY:

W.W.Noton&Co. 2003
27
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.132
28
In other words, the key motivating factor is the desire to preserve the privilege of P5

membership.
29
For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear

Ambitions, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 2006

30
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.283
 31

31
Kondan Oh and Ralph.C.Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, Washington,

DC : Brookings Institution 2000

32
Scott Snyder, Negotiating on The Edge – North Korean Negotiating Behavior,

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2002

33
Christoph Bluth, Korea, Cambridge, Polity Press 2008
34
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.284
35
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p.266
36
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International

Society, Oxford: Oxford 2000

37
Jack Snyder, ‘Myths, Modernization and the Post-Gorbachev World’, in Richard Ned

Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the

Cold War, New York, NY: Columbia University Press 1995, pp.109-126