ANG YU ASUNCION v. CA, GR No.

109125, 1994-12-02

Facts:

On July 29, 1987 a Second Amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ann Yu Asuncion
and Keh Tiong, et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 31, Manila in Civil Case No. 87-41058, alleging,... among others, that plaintiffs are tenants
or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants described as Nos. 630-638 Ongpin
Street, Binondo, Manila; that they have occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been religiously
paying the rental and complying with... all the conditions of the lease contract; that on several occasions
before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the premises and
are giving them priority to acquire the same; that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu Unjieng offered a
price... of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million; that plaintiffs thereafter asked
the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants acceded; that in reply to
defendants' letter, plaintiffs wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they... specify the terms and
conditions of the offer to sell; that when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
dated January 28, 1987 with the same request; that since defendants failed to specify the terms and
conditions of the offer to sell and because of... information received that defendants were about to sell
the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the property
to them.

Issues:

Buen Realty can be held bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried
over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the... latter's purchase of the
property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.

Ruling:

We affirm the decision of the appellate court.

An obligation is a j... uridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is
constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or
juridical tie which is the efficient... cause established by the various sources of obligations (law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct,
required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons... who, viewed from
the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.

Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting of minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes various... stages that include its
negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally, its consummation. Negotiation covers the period
from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the... time the
contract is concluded (perfected). The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of
the essential elements thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a
mere meeting of minds, i.e., the... concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause
thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the agreement,
as in a pledge or commodatum, is commonly referred to as a... real contract. In a solemn contract,
compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation of real property, is essential
in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form being thereby an essential element... thereof. The
stage of consummation begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the
contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.

Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs,
the contract is perfected when a person, called the... seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to
deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter
agrees. Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money
or its equivalent.

"A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional."

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes

CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang
Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel
was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart
invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s
gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be
heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman
accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart
did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She wasn’t
able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t want to
interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party
should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him
at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering
the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr.
Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know
how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under
Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with
the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way
to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the
same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it
was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a
causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the
petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore,
there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical
defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs. SSANGYONG CORP. (G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007)

FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged
in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the
Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South
Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma
invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its
representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless
steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the
sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37
representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract
against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In
its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open
the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos.
ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed
to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order
dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented
had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to
the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to
substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a
prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible in evidence as such?

DECISION:

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary
purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if
it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent
of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or
other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
"electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional
equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the
virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's
definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic
document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as
sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and
have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and
computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph,
telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to
the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data
message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document,"
as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and
cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a
fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original
fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate
courts.
International Corporate Bank vs. Sps. Gueco

G.R. No.141968

February 12, 2001

FACTS

Spouses Gueco obtained a loan from petitioner International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank of
Philippines) to purchase a car. Respondent spouses executed a promissory note in consideration, which
were payable in monthly installment and chattel mortgage over the car.

The spouses however, defaulted payment. The car was detained by the bank. When Dr. Gueco delivered
the manger’s check of P150,000, the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion
to Dismiss (JMD).

The bank insisted that the JMD is a standard operating procedure to effect a compromise and to
preclude future filing of claims or suits for damages. Gueco spouses filed an action against the bank for
fraud, failing to inform them regarding JMD during the meeting & for not releasing the car if they do not
sign the said motion.

ISSUE

Whether or not International Corporate Bank was guilty of fraud.

HELD

No. Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is the voluntary
execution of a wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and
necessarily arise from such act or omission. The fraud referred to in Article 1170 of the Civil Code is the
deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of obligation. The court fails to see how the
act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could
constitute as fraud.

The joint motion to dismiss cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The motion to dismiss was in
fact also for the benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by petitioner against it before the lower court
would be dismissed with prejudice.

The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise agreement and simply
stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case. Petitioner’s act of
requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss cannot be said to be a deliberate attempt on the
part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties.
Philippine Banking Corporation (PhilBank) vs. Arturo Dy, Bernardo

Dy, Jose Delgado and Cipriana Delgado

G.R. No. 183774 November 14, 2012

Facts:

The spouses Delgado entered into an agreement with a certain Cecilia

Tan for the purchase of the former’s property by the latter to be paid in

installment, or from time to time, until the Sps. Delgado are ready to execute

a deed of sale and transfer the title to Tan upon full payment. Tan however

later on found out that the property had already been transferred to the

name of the Dys and had been mortgaged to Philbank. Tan filed an action for

specific performance and annulment of the title of the Dys. The Delgados

contend that there was no perfected sale between them and Tan as she did

not agree on the selling price and that the sale and transfer of the property

of the Dys was fictitious and was only made in order for the Dys to enable

the Delgados to mortgage the property and obtain a loan from PhilBank. The

Delgados contend that PhilBank is not a mortgagee in good faith as it was

aware of the fictitious nature of the sale of the porerty. While PHilBank avers

that they are a mortgagee in good faith and should not be held liable to any

of the parties for damages. Tan subsequently abandoned her claim on the

property and the sale between the Dys and Delgados have been rules as

void which has become final and executory.

Issue:

Is PhilBank a mortgagee in good faith?

Ruling:

A finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the

attendant circumstances of a particular case. As aptly held in Philippine

National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar, "the diligence with which the law

requires the individual or a corporation at all times to govern a particular

conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which one is placed, and

the importance of the act which is to be performed." Thus, without

diminishing the time-honored principle that nothing short of extraordinary

diligence is required of banks whose business is impressed with public

interest, Philbank's inconsequential oversight should not and cannot serve as

a bastion for fraud and deceit.

To be sure, fraud comprises "anything calculated to deceive, including all

acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or

equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to

another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of

another." In this light, the Dys' and Sps. Delgado's deliberate simulation of

the sale intended to obtain loan proceeds from and to prejudice Philbank

clearly constitutes fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps. Delgado cannot now be

allowed to deny the validity of the mortgage executed by the Dys in favor of

Philbank as to hold otherwise would effectively sanction their blatant bad

faith to Philbank's detriment. As the Dys and Delgados conspired together to

induce PhilBank in mortgaging the property through fraud, PHilBank cannot

be considered as negligent or a mortgagee in bad faith.