PFR CASE DIGEST MINE

G.R. NO. L-15645             JANUARY 31, 1964

PAZ P. ARRIETA AND VITALIADO ARRIETA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

VS.
NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
MANILA UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO., INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

FACT:

THE NATIONAL RICE AND CORN CORPORATION (NARIC) AND PAZ P. ARRIETA ENTERD
INTO CONTRACT. ARRIETA WAS OBLIGED TO DELIVER 20,000 METRIC TON OF
BURMESE RICE; NARIC COMMITED ITSELF TO PAY FOR IT BY AN ASSIGNABLE
LETTER OF CREDIT IN US CURRENCY INFAVOR OF ARRIETA IMMDIATELY.
HOWEVER, NARIC FAILED TO OPEN A LETTER OF CREDIT TO PNB; NARIC, NOT IN
ANY FINANCIAL POSITION TO MEET THE CONDITION OF PNB. AS A RESULT OF THE
DELAY, THE ALLOCATION OF APPELLEE'S SUPPLIER IN RANGOON WAS CANCELLED
AND THE 5% DEPOSIT WAS FORFEITED. THE APPELLEE ENDEAVORED, BUT FAILED,
TO RESTORE THE CANCELLED BURMESE RICE ALLOCATION. WHEN THE FUTILITY
OF REINSTATING THE SAME BECAME APPARENT, SHE OFFERED TO SUBSTITUTE
THAILAND RICE INSTEAD TO THE DEFENDANT NARIC BUT WAS REJECTED.
APPELLE THEN DEMAND COMPENSATION TO APPELLANT FOR DAMAGES CAUSED
HER. IN DEFENSE, NARIC CONTENDS THAT THE SUBSEQUENT OFFER TO
SUBSTITUTE THAILAND RICE FOR THE ORIGINALLY CONTRACTED BURMESE RICE
AMOUNTED TO A WAIVER BY THE APPELLEE OF WHATEVER RIGHTS SHE MIGHT
HAVE DERIVED FROM THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT APPELLE WAVED HER RIGHTS FROM THE MOMENT SHE
OFFER TO SUBSTITUTE THAILAND RICE FOR THE ORIGINALLY CONTRACTED BURMESE
RICE.

RULLING:

NO. THE COURT SPEAKING THROUGH JUSTICE REGALA DECLARED THAT,

WAIVERS ARE NOT PRESUMED, BUT MUST BE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY
SHOWN, EITHER BY EXPRESS STIPULATION OR ACTS ADMITTING NO OTHER
REASONABLE EXPLANATION IN THE CASE AT BAR, NO SUCH INTENT TO WAIVE
HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. THEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH THE SOLE MODIFICATION THAT THE AWARD SHOULD
BE CONVERTED INTO THE PHILIPPINE PESO AT THE RATE OF EXCHANGE
PREVAILING AT THE TIME THE OBLIGATION.
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y

CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

FACT: ACCUSED JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, A PERSON NOT AUTHORIZED BY

LAW, WILFULLY, UNLAWFULLY AND FELONIOUSLY KEEP IN HIS POSSESSION,
CUSTODY AND DIRECT CONTROL A FIREARM AND AMMUNITION WITHOUT
FIRST SECURING THE NECESSARY PERMIT OR LICENSE TO POSSESS THE
SAME. THE ACCUSED THEREFORE IS FINDI GUILTY OF ILLEGAL POSSESION OF
FIREARM AND AMMUNITION. IN THE DEFENSE OF ACCUSED, HE CLAIMS THAT
HE IS ENTITLED TO EXONERATION BECAUSE HE HAD AN APPOINTMENT AS
SECRET AGENT FROM THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BATANGAS AND AN
APPOINTMENT AS CONFIDENTIAL AGENT FROM THE PC PROVINCIAL
COMMANDER, AND THE SAID APPOINTMENTS EXPRESSLY CARRIED WITH
THEM THE AUTHORITY TO POSSESS AND CARRY THE FIREARM IN QUESTION.
HE STRENGTHENS HIS CLAIMS ON ENTITLEMENT TO ACQUITTAL ON THE
BASIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PEOPLE VS. MACARANDANG2
AND PEOPLE VS. LUCERO.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SHOULD APPELLANT BE ACQUITTED ON THE BASIS

OF RULINGS IN MACARANDANG AND LUCERO, OR SHOULD HIS CONVICTION
STAND IN VIEW OF THE COMPLETE REVERSAL OF THE MACARANDANG AND
LUCERO DOCTRINE IN MAPA.

RULLING: YES. DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF THE NEW

CIVIL CODE STATES THAT “JUDICIAL DECISIONS APPLYING OR INTERPRETING
THE LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION SHALL FORM A PART OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEM … .” THE SETTLED RULE SUPPORTED BY NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES IS
A RESTATEMENT OF LEGAL MAXIM “LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM
OBTINET” — THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WRITTEN LAW BY A
COMPETENT COURT HAS THE FORCE OF LAW.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and
Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was
held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

G.R. No. 100727 March 18, 1992

COGEO-CUBAO OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUNGSOD SILANGAN TRANSPORT SERVICES, CORP.,

INC., respondents.

FACT: THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION IS GIVEN A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC

CONVINIENCE TO OPERATE A JEEPNEY SERVICES. THE PETITIONER
ASSOCIATION NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION ORGANIZED FOR THE COMMON
PROTECTION OF DRIVERS FROM ABUSIVE TRAFFIC OFFICERS WHO EXTORT
MONEY FROM THEM, AND FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE PRACTICE OF
RESPONDENT CORPORATION OF REQUIRING JEEPNEY OWNERS TO EXECUTE
DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE CORPORATION.

RESPONDENT LUNGSOD SILANGAN IMPLEMENTED BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 9,

THAT ADOPTED A BANDERA SYSTEM WHICH JEEPNEY OWNERS IS PERMITTED
TO QUEUE FOR PASSENGERS AT THE DISPUTED PATHWAY IN EXCHANGE FOR
THE TICKET WORHT TWENTY PESOS.THE PETITIONER ASSOCIATION
PERTURBED BY THIS RESOLUTION, FORMED A HUMAN BARRICADE AND
ASSUMED THE DISPATCHING OF PASSENGER JEEPNEYS. THIS ACTION LEAD
THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION TO SUIT FOR DAMAGES TO PETITIONER.
PETITIONER ASSOCIATION FOR THER DEFENSE, CONTEDNS THAT THE
ORGANIZATION WAS FORMED NOT TO COMPETE WITH RESPONDENT BUT
RATHER PROTECT JEEPNEY DRIVERS AND THEY ARE MERELY EXERCISING
THEIR FREEDOM TO REDRESS THEIR GRIEVANCES.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER USURPED THE PROPERTY RIGHT

OF THE RESPONDENT WHICH SHALL ENTITLE THE LATTER TO THE AWARD OF
NOMINAL DAMAGES.

RULLING: YES, THE COURT SPEAKING THROUGH JUSTICE MEDIALDEA

DECLARED THAT, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THAT
PETITIONER FORMED A BARRICADE AND FORCIBLY TOOK OVER THE MOTOR
UNITS AND PERSONNEL OF THE RESPONDENT. THIS PARALYZED THE USUAL
ACTIVITES AND EARNINGS AND VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENT
CORPORATION. TO CONDUCT ITS OPERATION THRU ITS AUTHORIZED
OFICERSS. THERFORE, UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE THAT
PROVIDES COMENSATION FOR DAMAGES, RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE
AWARD NOMINAL DAMAGES.
G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992

CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON, respondents.

FACT:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building. Two unitswere
leased (now unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T. Dizon.Said lease was originally
covered by written contracts and except for the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of
said contracts were impliedly renewed on a ‘month to month’ basis. One of the terms of the
lease, that of monthly payments, was violated by respondent.Upon failure of respondent to
honor the demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation which
eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U.
Ledesma (who is not a lawyer) duringthe Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from
recurring psychological ailments ascan be seen from prescription and receipts by her
psychiatrist.Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises, petitioner
wasconstrained to retain the services of a lawyer to initiate the ejectment proceeding.MTC
ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed the MTC.Respondent however found favor in the
CA because of lack of cause of action. CA heldthat petitioner failed compliance with Sections 6
and 9 of PD 1508.Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by respondent in
the courtbelow cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Issue:
Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.
Held:
When respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay,he, in
effect, was stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear inperson for the
needed confrontation and/or amicable settlement. Without themandatory confrontation, no
complaint could be filed with the MTC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

FACT:
ROGELIO BAYOTAS, ACCUSED AND CHARGED WITH RAPE, DIED ON FEBRUARY 4, 1992
DUE TO CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THEN SUBMITTED A
COMMENT STATING THAT THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED DOES NOT EXCUSE HIM FROM
HIS CIVIL LIABILITY (SUPPORTED BY THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PEOPLE VS
SENDAYDIEGO). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COUNSEL OF THE ACCUSED CLAIMED THAT IN
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PEOPLE VS CASTILLO, CIVIL LIABILITY IS
EXTINGUISHED IF ACCUSED SHOULD DIE BEFORE THE FINAL JUDGEMENT IS RENDERED.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION
EXTINGUISH HIS CIVIL LIABILITY.

RULLING:
YES. THE COURT SPEAKING THROUGH JUSTICE ROMERO, DECLARED THAT DEATH OF
THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION EXTINGUISHES HIS CRIMINAL
LIABILITY AS WELL AS HIS CIVIL LIABILITY BASED SOLELY THEREON. AS OPINION BY
JUSTICE REGALADO, IN THIS REGARD, “THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PRIOR TO FINAL
JUDGEMENT TERMINATES HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND ONLY THE CIVIL LIABILITY
DIRECTLY ARISING FROM IT”. IN SENDAYDIEGO’S CASE, JUSTICE REGALADO DID NOT
AGREE ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF THIS CASE, WHICH RELAYED ON RULE 3 IN SECTION 21
OF RULES OF COURT; A RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION.
MOREOVER, THE CIVIL ACTION IMPLIED INSTITUTED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR
RECOVERY OF CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO CAN HARDLY BE RECOGNIZED AS AN
ORDINARY MONEY CLAIM SUCH AS THAT REFFERED TO IN SEC. 21, RULE 3 ENFORCABLE
BERFORE THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ACCUSED.

IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CASE OF CASTILLO, BOTH CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILTY ARE
EXTINGUISHED. HERE, THE ACCUSED DIED BEFORE THE FINAL JUDGEMENT –
JUDGEMENT BEYOND RECALL. AS JUDGE KAPUNAN WELL EXPLAINED, WHEN A
DEFENDANT DIES BEFORE JUDGEMENT BECOMES EXECUTORY, “THERE CANNOT BE ANY
DETERMINATION BY FINAL JUDGEMENT WHETHER OR NOT THE FELONY UPON WHICH
THE CIVIL ACTION MIGHT ARISE EXISTS,” FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT” THERE IS NO
PARTY DEFENDANT”. FOR THESE REASON, APPEALANT BAYOTAS’S DEATH
EXTINGUISHED HIS CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY BASED SOLELY ON THE ACT
COMPLAINED OF, I.E., RAPE. HIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COST DE OFICIO.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

ELLOSILLO, J.:

FACT: FED D. QUITA AND ARTURO T. PADLAN, BOTH FILIPINO, WERE MARRIED IN THE
PHILIPPINES ON 18 MAY 1941, AND NO CHILDREN WERE BORN OUT OF THEIR MARRIAGE.
ON 23 JULY 1954 PETITIONER QUITA OBTAINED A DIVORCE DECREE IN CALIFORNIA AND
REMARRIED TWICE. ON APRIL 16, 1972, ARTURO DIED LEAVING NO WILL. THEN, LINO
JAVIER INCIONG FILED A PETITION WITH THE RTC FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION CONCERNING THE ESTATE OF ARTURO IN FAVOR OF THE PHILIPPINE
TRUST COMPANY. RESPONDENT BLANDINA DANDAN, CLAIMING TO BE THE SURVIVING
SPOUSE OF ARTURO DANDAN AND THE SURVIVING CHILDREN, ALL SURNAMED PADLAN,
OPPOSED THE PETITION. SHE SUBMITTED CERTIFICATE PHOTOCOPIES OF PRIVATE
WRITING AND THE FINAL JUDGEMENT OF DIVORCE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND ARTURO.
THE RTC DISREGARED THE SAID DIVORCE AND DECLARED PETIONER AS INTESTAE HEIR
OF ARTURO. ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE PANDALAN CHILDREN,
EXCEPT THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, PRESENTED PROOF OF RECOGNITION BY DECEDENT
AS HIS LIGITIMATE CHILDEREN. IT WAS GRANTED DECLARING PANDALAN CHILDREN
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE ESTE. PETITIONER ALSO RECOGNIZES THEM AS HEIRS
OF ARTURO. HOWEVER, FOR THE PART OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, SHE CONTENDS THAT
PETIONER WAS NO LONGER A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF PETITIONER DIVORCE
FROM DECEDENT AND THERFORE NOT QUALIFIED TO BE THE PROPER HEIR, RELAYING
HER CONTENTION FROM THE COURT’S RULLING IN VAN DORN V. ROMILLOR JR. THAT
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE
PHILIPPINES, PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW.
RESPONDENT CLAIMS THEREIN TO BE THE PROPER HEIR.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS THE PROPER HEIR OF THE DECEDENT DESPITE
OF DIVORCE OBATINED IN CALIFORNIA BY PETITIONER.

RULLING: YES. IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE CITIZENSHIP AND RELATIONSHIP OF

PETITIONER AND ARTURO WAS QUESTIONED, PETITIONER AND ARTURO DECREE OF
DIVORCE WAS OBTAINED THE SAME YEAR (1954) PETITIONER BECAME AMERICAN
CITIZEN, HOWEVER, PETITIONER DID NOT BOTHER TO FILE A REPLY MEMORANDUM TO
ERASE THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HER CITIZENZSHIP AT THE TIME OF THEIR DIVORCE.
THERFORE, PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM TO HEIRSHIP IS NOT VALID. SHE AND
ARTURO WERE MARRIED ON 22 APRIL 1947 WHILE THE PRIOR MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER
AND ARTURO WAS SUBSISTING THERBY RESULTING IN A BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE
CONSIDERED VOID FROM THE BEGINNING UNDER ART. 80 AND 83 OF CIVIL
CODE.CONSEQUENTLY, SHE IS NOT THE SURVIVING SPOUSE THAT CAN INHERIT FROM
HIM AS THIS STATUS PRESUPPOSES A LEGITIMATE RELATION SHIP. FOR THESE REASON,
PETITIONER AND PADLAN CHILDREN ARE THE INSTATE HEIR OF DECEDENT WITH ONE-
HALF (1/2) EACH OF NET HEREDITARY ESTATE.
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

FACT:

(15) G.R. No. L-32425 November 21, 1984

THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIA T. DAVID, defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:

FACT:

(13)G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
Leven S. Puno for petitioner.
Benigno M. Puno for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

FACT:

(12) G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997

CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACT: