VOLUME 1.

TEE POL ISH . CAMPAIGN . PART I . .

The Chief of the Army Q-ene .
ral S taf f.

First entry: 14 August 1939 (Berlin).

Last ent»ry : 10 September 1939 (G-% Zossen) .

***
******

14 August 1939

West: 1.) If French feel sure that large G-erman forces are "being
committed, in the East, they may decide to take the
. * ' "'
offensive
'
.
It must then foe assumed that both frontier mobilizations
(Prance and Germany) would at first run according to pre
arranged
' plans because of the technical impossibility
of making material changes in mobilizat ion plans on
short notice.

2.) On this assumption, the forces lined up*' on "both sides,

from the Belgian-Luxembourg "border to Switzerland,
would "be as follows:
Trance Germany:

14 Fortress Brigs /12 Divs. (5 : 7

Firs.t Draft
(7 Di-vs. Firs t~Draft 7 Divs, Second Draft (l : 13
19 = (7 Divs. Second Draft 12 Divs. IKird Draft if : 6•. *
(6 Divs. Third Draft (ACrp.i 5
<,
5 mot.Diivs.
2 Cay. Divs.
1 mecz Div. .
41 units of Div. strength 31 units of Div. strength
(possibly 44 )**
\u25a0
s

3.) France, it may/bo uxeeumod, will* s-^t in -operation its

,
\u25a0
security mobilization at the Italian frontier.
(iTorth Africa would remain unaffected.)
would have:' .: •
'
\u0084

"
.
Here they . ;

7 Divs First Draft

2 Divs Second Draft
2 Divs Third Draft
lDiv. Corsica­
3 Alpine Fortress Brigs

15 units of Div. strength

\

1
4*) On this basis, out of a total of 106 Divs. * in existence,
47 would be immediately available for the offensive* That
number could be substantially increased by, say, 20 Divs«
from the depth of the defense mobilization, if France feels
sure that we are not going to attack her* ?

%) Should Prance decide to launch an attack through Belgium,

such a* attack could be. conducted either in concert, with
Belgium or against Belgian wishes* , The latter would be
more desirable from a military point of view **, but it
is more than doubtful that it will occur, because: l)
France 1 s decisions in all likelihood are contingent on
:

Germany ls initiative, and 2) France must at least observe

. the form of diplomatic talks with Belgium. _
6.) The estimated timetable would then be as follows t
Luxembourg border; An immediate drive with the objective
to secure; Luxembourg for French operations. Within 48 hours
they could put into the fields
- :-:

1 mot* Div» )
1 mecz« Div, ) 4' Bivs« opposite Fifth Army*
2 Inf\u2666 Divs. )
Since we have nothing to send out against them, these \u25a0

French forces could reach the Germans-Luxembourg border on

the third day*
Belgian, border; The following forces could be assembled
within 4^ hours at the Franco-Belgian border, ready for
operations:

5 mot, Divs* ) (Fifth Army^inclf

1or 2 uiec-z, Divs*-): 7 to? .9 I/ivs.-opposite (3
1 or 2 Say. DJLrsv.: ) (Aachen Regt*.
(3 Divs» First draft
(2 Divs*Second draft
(2 Divs* Third draft
If launched through the area south of Sambre and Meuse
fivers, these French forces Gould not reach the Belgian-
German border before morning of fifth day*
Accordingly, on the third and fourth days, Fifth Army,
which would not yet be fully mobilized, might be faced
with a tight situation.

Apart, from the seizure of Luxembourg, which would be likely

in view of basic French security needs, a French local offen-
sive through the Ardennes corner is not likely. The reasons
are twofold t Political, i.c©, Belgium must first be made to
take sides out in the open, and military, i.e., additional ,
forces would not be available before the end of three days ?
and, not being motorized, would arrive -slowly, so that an
attack across the German border could not be started before
approximately the tenth day»

7>o Owing to the fact that the Belgian Army is able to mobilize
within four dayst 12 Divs^ of First and Second draft plus
2 mob* Divs* and the special Ardennes units (with 6 Divs*

«- 2
 of third draft follow^Eg. #thim *•* days *) it is pot
unlike1?/ that France willmarch into Belgium only after
she has attained sufficient superiority of forces. This
level may be reached on the ninth day of mobilization when
an estimated 18 E>ivs» and 3 Fortress Brigs* will become
available in addition to the force allocated for Luxembourg,
Thes^e Divs% could reach the German frontier by -M plus 11 £
day, so that, our frontier positions might be, subjected \u25a0'*
to serious pressure on M. plus 14 » The necessary regroup-
>
ing within Army Group 2 could, be effected by that time.
8«) For operations through Holland with troops of any substan- \
tial strength, the French would first have to cross Belgium*.
Considering the' time required for mobilization and covering i
the distance, such a French, force, need not be expected at f
the German frontier before the third week after mobiliza- -.1 .
tion day* Advance motorized elements of course could reach \
the line much earlier* However, in view of what we know
about French operational doctrine and the political difficul­
ties which would first have to be overcome, such a thrust
would be unlikely. Discounting the possibility of any •

serious Dutch opposition to the French, we would have to

be prepared to meet a major attack at the Ger uan-Belgian~i

Dutch border as of the beginning of the third week after

mobilization day* In the event that Belgium should permit
movement on Belgian .railroads, this date would have ' to be '
considerably advanced* . . \u25a0

.
\u25a0
X

9») In summing tip, the following conclusions are reached

a) .France is not very likely to take any steps in anticipatio
of our own moves, but rather may be expected to react
to pur measure s, move by move o Accordingly, an early
French mobilization, which would materially affect the
timetable of our preparedness measures, is imprc cable;
nor is there* any reason to expect a march through
Belgium "against Belgian wishes"

b) France will' set in operation its prepared mobilization

of minimum forces for defense, since there is no time-
to make profound changes in her feailroad plan based on
purely defensive dispositions and, moreover, the French
railroad system is oriented- -to the north-eastern frontier.
Heuss, of her total strength of 106 Divs., 59 are
allocated (44 against Germany, 15 against Italy), and
47 Divs» still available.
c) ;As regar-is the employment of the French forces, the
following assumptions may be made:

About 6. units (-2 Fortress Brigs., 2 Inf. Divs., 1 mot.

Div ,
d 1 mecz« \u25a0Div.) will promptly move into Luxembourg,
Considering the current state of French preparedness,
movement could start' within two days, so that the Luxem—
bourg-^German border would be reached in the evening of
the third day. Its mission will not be a local offen­
sive against German territory, but merely the securing
of Luxembourg territory as a French base of operations*

3
 V

About 7 -to 9 Divs. (5 mot # D^vs«"> 1-2 mecz* Divsiy

1-2 Cay« Divs.), at the curreat state of French pre­
- -
\u25a0

parednessj could cross the Franco-Belgian border with­

in two days and if unopposed reach the fortified
German border north and south of Aachen in the morning
' •
of the fifth day*
Such an advance motorized group (if and when France should
organize it, which I
- believe would' be possible only with,
the early and all-out assent" of Belgium in itself quite
­
unlikely ) would probably have the initial mission to
occupy the Belgian-Dutch operations base, and nothing
else. An offensive with long-range objectives need not
be expected of this group*

Another attacking force to be reckoned with 5Ls a concetifr

tration of about 22 Divs. < which (might be assembled at the
Franco-Belgian border on the ninth mobilization day ;.,'.
(3 Fortress Brigs..) 18 .Divs. with very strong Co^rpsand
GHq Arty OW Btrys), and 5.Q. to 60 tank Bns (includirii •

about 50 light Bns})-. Should passage through Belgium ;.;\u25a0\u25a0

come off itV! Tt,:,:!; though mainly- without using railroats>
this group* together with those mentioned before, could
launch a major offensive across the' Belgian-Dutch-German
border on about M-f1A day* .
In the follow*-up, additional 14 Divs» from ?e serves could
be fed into the drive' before the twentieth mobilization
dayj in addition to 7 a number of units with a total
strength of 10 to 12)Divs *, which would be combed out
of the quiet Maginot front arid perhaps also the* Alpine ,

front; however^ no approximate date could be set when

these forces would be available for commitment on. the
northern wing«~ '\u25a0/
10») The resulting overall picture appears in the separate \
. tabulation*. . The estimate is based on the assumption

that neither Belgium' nor Holland will oppose the French

moves.

Belgium can prepare for ccommitmen t

Border Guard within 6 hours

Mar ching units of 11 Infw and 3 Arty
Regts. (about .one«4ialf strength) within 12 hours
2 Cay. Divs c mot* and' Ardennes 'Chasseurs \u25a0
within 2 days
6 Divs* First dfaft (in addition to above) withiri 3 days
6 Divs* Second draft t! within h< days
n
6 Divs', Third draft within 12 days

Holland can prepare for commitment

8 Divs* First draft^ plus 1 light Div. within 5 days
4 Divs* Second draft later
At present handicapped by reorganization now in progress.
11.) To oppose possible- French action' "(wee 9c) by 6 Divs^
(2 Fortress Brig^w^ 2 -irifW 1mot* Div* and 1 rnecz*
Div.) at the Germn-Luxembourg bborderr r we have readjr for
commitment on third to fourth mobilization day:

- k
~
 Fifth Army sector \u0084•,•*.,'<'» 2 Divs, (l6th & 26th) |which
will about do it.
12.) To oppose possible French action by 7 9 mobile -
at the Belgian^utch^Cterman border, on both sides of
Liege., we- have reader for commitment on fifth mobilizac­
tion day, apart from Border Guard;
Fifth Army sector \u0084.* 2 MG Bns, and 1 reinf* Inf, Regt,-,
which is decidedly, inadequate.

13.) To meet a Franco-*-British all-^out offensive af ter M plus 14

(a force of about 30 Divs,') we have: , -

Army Hq 5 with 22 to 26 Divs,| including

6 Divs f foreseen in general; mobilization plan
6 Divs, allocated for Belgium
up to 10 Divs» of F ourth draft, whose combat, efficiency
%s not very high as yet; possibly ex­
, change for other Divs»
plus 2 (U later 12) D.ivs» to be taken out of Army Group *,

The trouble thus does not lie so much in the manpower as

in the deficiencies with respect to Arty and AT guns, \
The maximum that could be taken out of the Western front
(since that is all there is) j ,

14 mcd, Arty Bns*

4 light 5I »
mot^
3 AT Bns«

and out of GHc reserves:

4 nied, Arty ;Bn-s-« * /

2 light .n.
n lI
"- '•\u25a0
SAT Bnso
- ,
•

1 Eng y Ba>

a round total of 300 pieces, -not counting Divl, Arty,

They- are confronted with 1,600 pieces on the French
side, on top of which we must- bear in mind that French
Divl, Arty is stronger than the Arty of German B±vs»

Accordingly, the defensive battle at the Dutch^Belgian

border calls for transfer of.mcd, Arty from the East
:

and shifting of the ; defense line to a water (i,e», tarjk)

obstacle, i.c,, the Meuse river.
XkO With a view to forestalling the temporary crisis which

might develop in the -West, the following, proposals are

made:- .. . : .
.
a) Extension of the frontier positions to Dutch border
willbe initiated immediately by construction of field
fortifications, (to, become second line upon advance to •
. Meuse), .-.\u25a0\u25a0•

n a) Of the six Divs, tentatively allocated for the event

of an active front -"Belgium", under XXX, Corps, camou­
flaged activation of at least four, 'but better all six\u25a0?
Divs, must be started immediately* -

 d) Of the 10 Divs* of the first instalment of Fourth- draft,

six must be immediately activated under camouflage, and
put to work on the northward extension of the frontier
positions*

c) Camouflaged activation of a IT Reg't* in the civil economy.

Iforders are issued on the 15th, the Di vs# will be able to
move as of 22nd, and so, be on the ground on the 25th # Details
of disposition later] • '. \u25a0
.
15#) "ith these preparations completed, we are ready to shift
the northern wing to the WiXhelma Kanal, if so desired. by
the political leadership* Since we are weak in bridging
equipment, consent of Dutch Government would be desirable
for this movement* (Six Divs* for a 60 km front*)

l6*J Authorization of statement to Belgian

Attaches: Germany is in possession of
and Dutch MLlit*
information that the
Western poiWers would not respect Belgian and •Dutch neutrality
in the event of an European conflict. While Germany believes
that the two nations will make use of their military power
to defend their neutrality, Germany deems it appropriate to
make preparations for protection of her own borders*
- This
is the explanation for the construction of field fortifica- <
tions by 'troops* The statement is to be coupled with the
assurance^ that these preparations in no way relate to any
design on Germany' s part to violate her neighbors 1 neutrality*

17*) Reinforcement of AAA from East as soon as enemy air force

is eliminated in .Eastern theater*

\
14, August 1939 (Obersalzberg) •

First off is recognition of the fact that any political or military

success involves taking risks: In- the political field, because
there are oppositions to overcome, in the military, -because sober
, . assessment of all factors often reveals the. possibility of failure.

Clear appraisal of the factual., conditions*

- Historical facts*
Britain's position must be- viewed in terms of internal political con­
ditions* Decision in 1914* Britain would not have stepped in
if she had suspected the consequences. No nation wants a long
war as such* Britain only stands to lose. The difference between
1914 and- now is in the recognition that a wealthy nation has
little to gain,, but a great deal to lose; that every nation must
pay with~ blood; andj that even with a victorious war to his
credit, the\ victor issues diminished in strength*' This is the ,

cast*
-—
key to an understanding of the actions of men of less than heroic
Britain overburdened with jaommitments in all parts of
the world*

Fight Germany? Yes* Fight for Allies? Open question*

Fight for others? No*' :

6
 .0

In view of their experiences in World War I, there is little

chance that the opposition will deliberately run the risk of
a major war, They know that it is a different' Germany they
would hare to tackle today* 1914? Socialists-, Ghurch.

The factors involved:

Political:
Primary opponents: Poland

Britain (active), France,

Others: Russia is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out c

.thefire* Has: nothing to gain, but much to fear,,' War at the
periphery not opposed to, perhaps even welcome* Not so in center,
losing a war is as much of a threat to the Russian State as a
victorious army* Interested /in disruption of western
"
nations,
access to. Baltic*. . \u25a0

.
*
Neutrals:
—
Norway, Sweden,
from inner convictions,
irritation© **
Denmark » Will be genuinely neutral,
Britain;*.s overtures to Russia have caused,

Switzerland 5
Belgium, Holland;
/
Switzerland surely will remain neutral*
Holland: organic policy neutral; danger to Far East possessions.
'
Belgium willendeavorto remain neutral, Belgium- would be
battlefield, Gould only stand to lose* A section of the population^
with French or Jewish family ties, might wish to pull into oppos­
ite 'direction as long as the cannons do not speak* • ,
Hungary requires no mention.
Friends:
«.

Italy is not interested iin a major conflict, but would welcome

.certain adjustments* A victory of the democratic nations would
be- the" end of Italy, -^ A l&ani

Spain willlook with disfavor upon any victory of the democratic

nations* Democracies would introduce a monarchy dependent
-• .' :
on
Western Bower s o . .

Britain and France' alone must take the burden upon themselves*
Nor will the Balkan States be of any use to them.

Military;

Status of British- armament s ; Supplementary armament program passed

(Navy, Airs Ground Forces)* s o far;the Naval Program has not been
put into effect., not even started, Ihere will be no increase in
battleship strength before 1941, no increase in cruisers and
destrojrers before 1940, Additional program^ just passed,, is still
in the misty future*
Ground Forces; One class of conscripts called-* It will be months
before they are shaped into fighting units* Crews primarily needed

7
 for ,AA. Months will pass before they could be available in
'
any number.

Mrs Progress has been made in bomber and fighter "strength;

improvement in ground organizations^ No fundemental changes
in ya-ti© of bombers/fighters c No major improvement in AA
(10 to 12 pieces a month) * Three years will be needed to build
up an adequate AA force. Armament program is being in
too many areas, with resulting mutual interference.
On the whole, in the developing stage (similar to our situation
in 1934).
France;. a weakLinQi^r^g-tc^ca^^
resembles
etc. on his back* Age classes of conscripts are small, and service
for a long time has been only one year.© Armament, too, is not in
best shape. Potential of army on the whole limited*. Colonial
troops tied down*

IfFuehrer were in the place of opponents,

t
he would not accept
the responsibility for a war.
125 million lined up against 80, v
'
What are the potentialities of the British and the French?
Offensive; Between Basel and Saarbruecken hopeless. Local
successes possible. Do-or-die attack Improbable*,
Eventuality of violation of neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium
East is completely out of question.
British could give support with a few Diys*
—
and Holland ;A quick success likely to relieve pressure on the
Blockade (counter
measures!) Moreover is only a long-range affair. No immediate
relief could be afforded by any Franco-British action.-

not take the risk. Risk -of Worldwide repercussions.

cash for armament is not ava il ,
able and credit is not to
—
There
is nothing to force them into a,war» -* The men of Munich will
Ready
be had
—

any more. The only clear-headed people left are the i^ritish
Imperial General Staff and the Prench General Staff.
In the political field some British spokesmen are beginning -to
back down (Duff~Cooper) a The Press. i

Extreme measures open: Recall of ambassadors. Embargo oh commerce

with Germany, promotion of trade with Poland* League of Nations*

not lj^ved up to her promise s # *

—
Line of retreat possible; Uncertainty about Russia. • Poland has
Neutral states oppose passage
—
'through their territories. The pacts have not been ratified*
Observe formulation: "To support with all our power". -~ All this•

has touch of bad faith: Were England resolved to help^ she- would

more money into a bankrupt business.

—
have given 'money to the Poles. But the British will-not put any
Politicians take cover
behind Ironside Report. , :
Polish mentality: If Britain had made :any positive commitments,
the Poles would be much more cocky* Tapped telephone conversations!
Fuehrer is concerned lest Britain hamper showdown by last-minute
offers* . . .

Summing upji The last weeks have brought increasing conviction of Poland's
'
Isolation*

8
 V

Primary prerequisite: Clearcut military decision must be achieved

withinmeasurable time. He would expect Poland to collapse
within a week or two. Final disposition might take longer.

Second prerequisite: Resolution to fight every comer* BuHdr-up-in

West must be completed to last detail*

Relations with Russian, Loose contact, starting out ;from negotiations

! fop -trade agreement \u2666 Still under advisement whether a negotiator
should go to \u25aM
0 oscow, and, whether or not this should be a promin­
. _ ent figure*
' '
\u25a0

'. . ' . ' \ u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0'. \ ,

\u25a0

Russia dbes not feel under any obligation toward the West.,
Russians are sympathetic to dismemberment of Poland, On subject
,
of /Ukraine promise has been given regarding delimitation of
-Spheres of interest* '•<-* Baltic States? The- issue is Lithuania'"
(not the Baltic States)* Russians jwant to discuss /subject more
closely. Distrust* Want no common frontier*
—
Fuehrer in­
clined to meet half ways* / .

Fuehrer has hinted to Britain that he willapproach her with a new

offer after disposition of the overriding ,Polish question*
1
iFuehrer
'
1s attitude has registered in London* Paris, too, is no
. longer in any, doubt as to his determination*. The great drama
now is approaching its climax* The show put on recently
—
by the Brp&Eih came pf f so well because of some German indis­
v
.
cretion in/ bo a sting
' that the Fuehrers calculations had always
proved correct* . '
. .•'- \u25a0\u25a0
\u25a0
; [

The other nations must ba given proof that therer.will-.be avshoofciftg

war no matter what* (Poland willbe polished off in six or
eight weeks, even if Britain should step f in*)
'
v
:

Afternoon Session
v
If situation should develop adversely, we may be deprived of chances
i of gaining victory/ cheaply* Decision must be withheld tillk$ '
•
hours before O-^hour* . <.
\u25a0

a) Central problem is Poland* Must be carried off at all cost*

b) Situation if western front is under pressure
All-out drive against German fortified zone unlikely* Possibly
.
an attack might be latinohed by enemy violating Belgian neutral­
ity, v- No. need for a change in our attitude before the proper
time -arrives* Starting a drive to gain a better front line
cannot be considered at this time because of lack of manpower*
So, what we would have 'to do is: a) Insure protection of our
frontier with least delay* b) Investing the possibilities * for
creating new .reserve's or moving ,up existing ones*, c)'
d) Occupation of the islands and the northern corner*. *& /

Graudenz?
—-
c) East; How cari we seize the Pirschau Bridge? 1/yhat about
Fuehrer has ordered study on what could be done
***
about Dirschavi Bridge, Dirschau; (Himniler) Armored train,,
coup-de-main, Graudenz ; Possibly raiding force, in civilian

,i>

9
 clothes*
*
Divebombers practically out of question.

Slovakia has signed protective agreement*

Disposition of forces has been reviewed,. Nothing mil be taken
away from' troops earmarked for East*

Danzig will be left to its own resources*

**
Navyt Fleet of 1 cruiser and 11 submarines allocated for operation
will put, out to sea for exercise on 18 August*
Aerial attack: Gdynia? 8 divebomber groups with B;.V craft* Mixed
bombs «•\u25a0

Nuernberg] Party Rally: will decide by 15 August if it is to be

held.

Date for calling of Landwehr Divs« for West advanced to 15 »

Sum mar #*#

Morning Session,: Review of political situation.

Success, political or military, cannot be had without taking
risks* After reviewing the risks which he had to take in all
his undertakings to date, and which, to his mind_, grew pro-^
gressively smaller as he forged ahead, the Fuehrer strikes a
balance of the possible international complicatiens arising
from a German attack on Poland.

O^y Britain, apart from Poland, could come on the scene as

an antagonist, with France pulled in after her.

Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder

into a war drawn out over years© Talk of Britain wanting a
long war, is discounted* No government would go out to promote
a war which it can foresee to be a long one, Britain, knowing
war, is well aware that she has to lose in a war, and that
even a victorious war would not make up for the cost of such
a war« That is the fate of rich countries, Britain is over­
burdened with responsibilities because of the vastness of her
empire* She has no Readers of real caliber* ("The men I met
in Munich are not the kind that starts nciw.?.7orl& \,'£
Moreover the other side is well aware that it is not the
Germany of 1914 they would have to deal with (Socialism, Church).
(vftiy should Britain fight? You don't let yourself get killed
for an Ally*) Not even England has the money today to fight a
world war* Nothing can be had on credit*
France is not directly interested in waging a war*

Russia has no intention of pulling Britain's chestnuts out of

the fire, and will keep out of war* Stalin has to fear a lost
war as much as he would a victorious army. Russian aspirations
at most extend to the Baltic States,

10
 Norway., Sweden, Denmark are neutral from innermost conviction.
Deeply pertrj&bed over Britain's wooing of Russia*
Switzerland, Belgium, Holland; Switzerland surely neutral,
Holland the same, Belgium will do her best to preserve her
neutrality* As a likely theater of war, she stands only to
lose,. Possibly certain forces at this time favor participa­
tion at the side of Prance, but they will be silenced once
the guns begin to speak*

In sum, Britain and France alone will have to shoulder the

burden* Nor can the Balkan States help them any*
Appraisal of military potential of opponent;

Britain has not gained in naval power over last year. On landj
it will be months before stepped-up conscription can take effect
in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress has been scored
in the airi bombers, fighters, improved ground organization,
—
On the whole, everything is still in the developing stage, similar
to ours in 1934*

France' s potential is curtailed by the limitations of her man­

power. Colonial troops are tied down* Equipment not at its
best. Fuehrer states that if he were in the shoes of the Franco-
British statemen, he would not assume responsibility for a
world conflict. One hundred twenty-five million are lined upon
against &24

What military measures can France and Britain undertake? Drive

against We stwall unlikely, A northward swing through Belgium
and Holland rules out speedy victory. None of this would help
the Poles. Blockade works slowly and provokes undesirable counter
measures.

i^-ii.^®.s£ La 2pgrs_
.argue for the_ likelihoodjDf Britain ancl Frjan£e_refrain­
ing from_enterin^ the_ war ? _parti£tilary__sin£e_they_ are not, under any_
compulsion.
Pacts are not yet ratified* Formula; "Aid with all our power" lacks
good faith. Proof t Britain does not give Poland any money to
buy arms in other countries. Politicians are beginning to back
out, taking cover behind Ironside Report*
British and French General Staffs take a very sober view of the pros­
pects of an armed conflict and advise against it*

Further evidence that no determined action is expected on the part

of Britain may be inferred from Poland's attitude, Poland would
ie even more insolent if she knew she had the unqualified basking
of Britain, Britain has strongly remonstrated with Poland over
the latest Polish notes and is continously restraining influence.
Tapped telephone conversations with Polandi Even now Britain is
putting out feelers to find out how the Fuehrer envisages develop­
ments after Poland's disposal.

All this supports the convictions that while Britain may talk big, even
recall her ambassador, and In the end put an embargo on trade
with Germany, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in
the conflict..

11
 /

The requisite conditions ares

1») Successes must be ./ scored in Poland in the very near
future* "Within a sweek or two the world will have to
be convinced that is at- the point of collapse,
operations
The l themselves may well continue past that
date." (Six to e^ght weeks).

Zi) We must show determination to fight on all' fronts*

3») Activation of the Western front must be complete.
Separate issue : Russia*
Questions concerning the Army:
a) Advance of date for calling upholder classes required
for western front (asked' 2so,ooo, i.e. 12 Divs.) still
under advisement* Decision will '
be given on 15 Aug.
Decision on entry into Holland and northward extension
of defense line still pending*

b) Cancel Party; Rally? Decision on 15 Aug. (I am for iti)

c)> Advance notice to railroads? Decision on 15 Aug; (Xes'i).
d) Pirschau: Coup-de-main* Himmlerl Armored train?, Report
and pertinent information to be submitted.
Graudenz; Paratroops oa evening of first day*

c) Gdynia. shalling with X 5 gun* # Submit report.

f) Mobilization in East as prearranged, also for East Prussia.
Consult with Bock. v

08. Wes^ruebKng»
g) Treaty with Slovakia signed.
f_Marginal note sefagainst entries b) and c) 7}
'Our timetable is expected to run off as. scheduled.
Evening r v. Stuelpnagel (through v» Weizsaecker) :
Ribbentrop -*
Ciano |snre 5 nree
"words illegiblij% Ciano exceedingly
*
surprised # Mussolini would like to have peaoe for a few more
years* Germany's encirclement complete. Italy exhausted ;no raw
materials] deficiencies in armament^ no costal fortifications.
Nothing could be undertaken but of £ibya base. ,

General Staff estimates fighting strength Italy~Prance at lis«

Albania was a disappointment.
in near future^
Ribbentrop:' We don't need you*
-
Operations on Balkans not feasible

Ciano? The future will show*

15 Aug:» ®&kQ hr-s» Talk with State Secretary WejLzsaeckert
He confirms the picture of the situation presented yesterday* j

Chamber lain and Halifax in particular wish 'to avoid bloodshed.""

U.S. obserye-s* marked reserve. \u25a0
•
\u25a0

Concurs in- estimate of developments in ths next 10 days.

12
 15 August 1939

Up to 19 evening (A-22), no
*
changes. Other car shifts
not before 22,

Gen* Obsto KMTEL: Timetable &o be announced today:

11«) Cancellation of Parity Rally to be kept secret

X3ko hrs» lord gif^n to Transp. Chief. Office
15**3.
(Erich)
.
that Fuehrer "willgo to Nuernberg, ObdH,.
ObdH* informed
informed.
2.) All preparations f?or State ceremony at Tannenberg are
being continued* ObdH informed*
3») JJ2, decision today >ad vane ing calling-up date of Divs.
ObdH informed.

i+.^ Study question of .shifting defense line into

territory^ (Also about islands^ advance the line possibly
\u25a0

across Meuse.) (Discussed with GQu !\u2666)

5») Confirmation of conference of 14 Aug. will be sent over.
Dirschatii Send down officer* (Cleared with oru0 ru I.)
OQu 1 Two^thirds of 22nd Div.
(Decision on 17 or l£Aug,),
** —
go to Aachen; make arrangements,
Two-thirds of 253/254 th
Divs, (Are activated in West), Others as prearranged on
M plus /> day.

Denmark. les* 08.

First Bn., 16th Inf \u2666 Regt.

*****to be transferred to Sorau §
18 Aug., before start of mobilization.
Bock must start attack on Y-Day ## even if Poles are stronger.
Otherwise wait £ days, ##

Staff for OB on western touri Evacuations by Todt.

Tenth Armd Div, (Gen» Schaal) is split up in small groups,
\
for protection of railroad lines f*# (Matter put before
ObdH 15.30 hrs.O
Zossen: Berlin ) to East or to West.
Wand era : Frankfurt )
Move to Zossen 23 Aug. **#

13
 Talk over status of SS Deathhead with OKW^Friederici*

Conduct of operation on northern wing of Eastern front*

Discuss with AGP 2« (See ObdH and OQu I).
Call in for conference: Manstein, Salmuth, So denstern.
(Through Central Branch of Gen. Staff.)
Report on western operation to be submitted tomorrow* OQu I.
Zero-hour )Q430 w (Movements i£o3o) (Take up at Conf.)
C
Use ammunition sparingly*
How many troops can we mobilize?
(Take up at Conference)
Gen. Army Office. Grg.Sec
­
Liaison with Goering: Stapf? ) (Take up with Central Branch)
Liaison with Fuehrer; ? )
OKH moves from Berlin to Zossen on 24* (Central Branch)

Conference of Commanding Generals; Sparing use of ammunition. Jump-off

hour* Places and times of "surprise" remain —
unchanged,
new orders from ObdH, only Zero-hour* < Bock; Orders
—No
as given*
"Orderly progress of mobilization^ however would have , to take
its course \u2666"

Instruction for West; Siting of Main Line of Resistance* Setting

—­ —
up of ammunition dumps must not be started too early*
Evacuation by Todt Organization.
Latest situation report on Poland; Polish mobilization will He
completed on 27 Aug«j that puts us in arrears with our mobiliza­
tion. In order to keep step with their preparations^ we would
have to start mobilizing on 21 Aug.; in this manner the Divs.
of even the Third and Fourth drafts would be ready on 27 August,
With ObdH.
V.

16 August 1939

0%5 . J Conference with Oster*

I^oo • Heim reports in*

Buhle; 1*) Has a little trouble with getting the heavy equipment for
the 5 Divs. (Transport) • Check with OB

2») Tenth Armd. Div»

3») No Transport Columns 7 and 8 for West (Use Todt Organiza­

tion Column! ) No Mobile Field Bakeries for East.
4*).First step is organizing Replacement Army (X plus 6), Kext,
(on Bth to 10th day) activation of 5 Divs» with all heavy
equipment; will take about 8 to 10 days. Use personnel of
Replacement units who had 7 weeks 1 training* Completion
of training k weeks. Available for assignment at end of d
to 8 weeks* In second month of war > orders will be issued
for activation of additional 5 Divs* with all heavy equip-

- -U

 ment.

— Officer personnelto be decided upon.

——­
Training for front line employment, two months,

In addition, GHq itfty: 21 cm Hvy How,, mcd. Fd. Howij

several 15 cm How. Btrys. ifficulties due to shortage
in appropriate towing I
1P330 ObdH: Evacuation must go on under camouflage until 25 Aug.

Tenth Arrnd* Div.: 1.). Determine best time for release.

at war strength* ObdH
—
(After fifth Mobilization Day)* Organize as "Brigade"
2.) Find out whether Police
Knits (2 Regts) could be Released now*­ When? (Any time
before V Day.) (Bothjpoints taken up with Op. Sec.)
Western area: 22nd Div. )
75^h, 76th, 216th, 58th Divs. ) Adjt.
225 th, 23 Ath, 235th Divs. >
)
Gdynia, Tcaew (Dirschau) . (Submit report) . • )
) Conference
Todt_ withdraw several days before.* Parti cipation*,) at
) Frankfurt
Evacuation* Take my specialist along, )
Proposal by
yon (?)

Op. Sec.; Prepare orders for attack. Take into account enemy situation!
•\u25a0-. Objectives the same as in assembly orders, but disruption
of enemy mobilization can no longer be counted on* Allow
for panic effect of even local penetrations by armored units.

17 August 1939

Gen* Jeschonnesk
_
Grudziadz; Fuehrer Bn.)
wants no Parachute Inform ICorps.
)
Dirschau: Air Force must participate, ) Checked with ObdH.

Seventh Air Force Div. assigned to Bock. Will be committed east

of Brahe river. Make arrangements. Check with OQu I.
Ketzebruch*
*
Divebombers to support Ground Forces,
Air District Staffs for special- assignments. (Remind Army Hqs to
give close cooperation..)
:
Check with OQu I
** in Wielun
.
Fighter operation Red" area* Check with ©Qu IV.

Beginning the second day, full support of Air Force will be

\u25a0

available to Ground Forces. (Evening of first day, Warsaw).

15
 Guerilla warfare behind front. (instruct oru0 ru IV accordingly)*
(Word from) Fuehrer : As signment s :
a) Eugen Mueller —Replace: Gen. Tiemann (Eng.Corps). mobilized
Deputy Cofs, Dresden*

Taken up Choice 1 :Gen. Hollidt (Commander of a

with OB Reserve Div»)

Choice 2 :Gen« (0r u to Liebmann, where he

should be replaced by Baier or CruewelZ

b) Lt« Co1« yon (la, X Corps)^ Eoettiger, Reuss

Arfehisr-SehiHi^t [struck out]
Krebs (no replacement).

Liaison Goering: Stapf*

Friderici: Checked with OQu I.

Railway protection in Protectorate set in operation automatically
24hours after- start of assembly movement. (Maximum time allowed'
for activation^ 24 hours.) Hold back until start of assembly*
Issue order.

Canaris: Checked with 0"v I.

Hi(mmler)-Hei(drich?) at Obersalzberg. 150 Polish uniforms and
accessories (Dr, Trumler) for Upper Silesia.

OQu Iand II; Proposal regarding Tenth Armd Div# CDiscussedA with
ObdH on IB ugas trj

Mobilization of Eight Armd Div« will begin on third mobilization

of sixth day* If not on third, on ei^rbhday*
-
day at earliest, in Boeblingen* Mobilization completed on evening
Ready for commit­
ment on border on evening of eighth- jaobiliz ation lay -at^tke ear­
liest. Still need training*
Filling up of Tenth Armd* difficult as regards signal elements
Activation of 1 Co from Signal Plats in the West. Supply services
all right*. Ready for commitment on sixth mobilization day.

16
 18 August 1939

ffraakfurt/Main. Conference at Army Group 2, General orienta­

*­
tion "by,ObdH. Discussion of northern wing (enemy situation,

counter measrires). Meuse river, Wilhelnina! KaHalr

—
Southern wing.

C~in-0 Army group ? ;:_

**
Fifth Army: 25,000 &eich Labor Service

72,000 Org. Todt and other workers

(.Higher Eng* Corps Staff)

First Army: 22,000 Labor Serv., 81,000 Org. Todt

Seventh Army? 11,000 LcJbdr Serv., 5,000 Org. Todt

lotes on gnfrjft^tft 'hich ObaK must take up with Fuehrer:

Longer hours for La"bor S 3rvice

Position: ( 4*B hours) .

Order to fall, "back to collecting points in Second Line

A*

(lO lays'),
—
Industrial evacuation: difficult to estimate time required
ObdH rules that dismantling of industrial

will require 48 hours.

—
equipment mag f be started nov. Evacuations on completion;
Artillery emplacements. Aachen
—
not to >c evacuated at preset. Ruling "by Fuehrer: Last
evaluations on receipt of Y-l)i.y order.***

Evacuation: Preliminary evacnvi-tion. Banks, etc. will 'be

ir.itiated bj^- Army. Check with 6th Section) #
Others according to prearranged plan.

Questions f or Fuehrer: Can population be warned now? Sur­

veying for , .Railway Arty north of Trier: Demolition of bridges I
Is occupation of Luxembourg territory ## signal for
commencement of hostilities? Casus belli? Dirschau plan.
— —
Reinf orcein <ent east of Graudenz. =^#
'fake up with CbgjH:
1.) Zero
f .
"feour: 0420 OZW
­ QbdH

2.) Situfftion east of G-raudenz (with nfap and report notes

3.)
OQu 1) .
Authorization for demolition of bridges on Luxembourg
border

Map ObdH

OQ,u IV report; on Italy. (Entry is struck out) *#

17
 19 August 1939.

¥inter: Pirschau.
Location of demolition switches: *
T known, 1 tentatively located, 1 surmised

SS: 12 men, "briefed on locations (familiar with terrain)

Air Force: 3 Staffeln, forming 1 divebomber, group 3x9 =

2? craft (plus lead plane)

Time: X-Day, if possible "before X Hour.*

Execution of -plan:
a) 1 Eng. Co in civilian clothes, on freight train, with
armored train following "behind, in. turn followed "by mot.
Group Medem; remaining elements of Eng. Bn., AT Plat.,
mcd. ITd, How. Bn. mot., 1 MG- Co. (Armd. Reconn- Plat.).­
— •

Aerial targets: Army "barracks, power plant, RR station.

"b) Alternative 1:
night (midnight) .
In cooperation with SS., moved up during

c) Alternative 2?
only Plan,
In event of suspension
a), with civilian motor vehicles,
—
of railroad traffic

traffic must "be maintained. (Clear with sth Sec.) ***

Railroad

( No entries for 20 August 1939)

21 August 1939. /

Ganaris: $

a) Present version of guaranty pact does not meet Russian

wishes Program: Ribbentrop will go (to Moscow) eight
days after signing and publication of trade agreement
(20 Aug.)? would have to take with him draft of guaranty
pact, covering all points of joint interest to G-ermany
and Russia. Russian draft provides for exclusion of use
of force against third parties and of support to agressor-s,
art itrat ion in event of disagreements, and duration for
five years from date of ratification*

"b) Attolico 7r at I\ischl *# r Was outspoken in expressing mis­

givings. Italy won't go along. Ribbentrop was quite
annoyed* Attolico returned to Rome.
c) Belgium: (Buelow-Schwante)
1600: Weizsaecker
2400; OQu IV brings word of Russian Treaty. **#

18
Summaratign of c otential in) West :

Maximum immediate "build-up against Germany: 44 Divs*

Additional strength available against Germany: 40 Divs*
Together with British troops a total of ca. 90 Divs. may
"be reached, which means 50 Divs. on the northern wing*
French timetable (capability): Luxembourg on third day.
.
Belgian border, first wave (mot.) on sixth day. All-*out
offensive at end of two or three weeks

Artillery: France can put up 1,600 guns over and above

.
Divs. Arty on northern wing? against 300 German pieces; more­
over, French Divl Arty superior in fire power to German.

Tanks: Prance has 50 to 60 Fns. (ca. 2,500 tanks);,

Germany none (on -this front).

Intentions OKH.

22 August 1939

Leave home 0545. Staaken 0615.

000- Report to ObdL (Qbersalzberg) .
1.) Introduction: Fuehrer's directive
a) Open hostilities with heavy surprise) Mobilization
blow. ) sta,rts on jump-off
b) Achieve swift victories ) day. Some measures
) will be taken ear­
) lier.
Objective: Destruction of Polish Army.
2.) Available forces: 102 Divs.
Defense West 30 11 (with Belgium staying out)
6 tr foreseen for Belgian even­
tuality
Fourth draft 14 Tt

Not allocated 52 ti

3.) Operational plan: Based on -pincer.

- Importance of Warsaw.

Left -prong 17 Divs. plus 1 Cay. Brig.

( in original plan)
a) Balance of strength of opposing forces and maneuverabi­
lity in terrain.
b) Junction of Pomeranian and East Prussian forces. *
c}> Main effort*

Sight x>ron,g 35 Divs.

a) Terrain, roads, industry

b) Reasons for direction of drive, main concentration.

c) Echelonning (Galicia).

19
 4.) Polana: —

Poland: Strength : 33 plus 15 plus ?

Assembly. Mobilization 27 Aug.
. Armor? AT? Air?—

tions?
—
Army Group North •
—
5.) In what way does Polish "build-up cut across our prepara-*
Opportunities on Vistula,
on Uarew.
Present status of assembly -p reparations in Poland.

6.) Bequests to Air Force:

a) Support to assure initial success, fcb Vistula, at

Mlawa, to facilitate tactical assembly. Warsaw.

"b) Possibilities of airborne operations .

:00« Conference held by Fuehrer
(Qbersalzberg)
Commanding Generals (Army Groups and Armies)
.
Attended by
of the three

Services.

Morning:

I.Outline of situation and decision:

!•) Developments leading up to decision to settle Eastern

problem: Theoretically it would have been more desirable
to square accounts in the West first, but it has become
increasingly plain that Poland would be sure to take ad­
vantage of any difficult situation to atteck us in the
back. It has therefore become necessary to dispose of the
Eastern problem before tackling the West.
2.) Germany ls position at the moment is favorable for getting
the Eastern question settled. A number of factors are

hence .
in our favor today, which would not exist a few years

—
a) Personalities: On our side; Hie Fuehrer. Mussolini,
the sole champion of the empire idea today; has
demonstrated his strength in Abyssinian conflict.
—
Franco, the champion of centralized, progressive
leadership and of pro— German policy in Spain.
On the enemy side: There are no men of the caliber
hard and heroic enough to carry through the decisions,
called for by the situation, and which are especially
difficult in the case of Britain. The enemy has much
to lose, while we stand to gain only.

b) Political advantages: England is kept busy in the

Mediterranean "by tension with Italy; in East Asia,
by the tension with Japan; and in the Hear East, by
the tension with the Islamitic nations, Britain
—
has not gained anything through last war. Entering
a new war would entail changes in the structure of
the empire.
France r s position, too,
'
has deteriorated. Drop in
birth rate .
On the Balkans : The forces have been held in balance
even since Yugoslavia was neutralized by the events in
Albania. Romania is vulnerable and at the mercy of

20
 conflicts, between other powers, Turkey has n$ leader­
\u25a0...-.,
ship. .

M
A clash, which it would not be safe to put off
for four or five years, might as well come off
now,*, .
fl Army must see actual "battle before the "big final
showdown in the West; testing of the tool.*
What we want now is not a general showdown,
"but rathar the disposition of specific issues;
this is the proper procedure not only politically,
"but also from the military standpoint. 11 \u25a0

c) Poland: Polish- German relation cannot go on as they

are. Proposals on Danzig and railroad through
Corridor (currency problems) were turned down at
British instigation. Settling of the Polish conflict
must not be left to arbitration by, third parties. Che
time is favorable for a solution, so the blow must be
struck .Political risks cannot be entirely avoided. ¥o
whole decision without a risk!
3.) Reasoning leading up to the decision*

Only two nations will feel any obligation to come to the

aid of Poland; England and France. England primarily,
with Prance pulled in behind.

Britain1 s rearmament effort has not yet materially changed

the. situation in Britain's favor. (Strengthening of her
Bavy willnot become effective before 1941/42;' in the
ground forces also, the effects will not be visible for
some time yet; only air force has made progress.)
Britain's vulnerability in the air is still very great
today. Por that reason, she would like to put off an
amred conflict for three to four years.

Prance's armament is partially outdated, but its quality

is not bad. Population is dwindling." Prance cannot

afford a prolonged War.

The Western powers to have only two lines of action:

Blockade: Unpromising, because we have the use. of the

entire Danube basin.

Offensive in the West:

a) Attack on the Westwall is psychologically impossible
and also very difficult militarily.
b) Violation of neutral States. These countries have the
honest desire t,o stay neutral. Besides, Britain, too,
wants these countries to stay neutral.-*— We may there­
fore expect that Britain and Prance will respect
neutralities. This rules out any military operation
as hopeless* A "long war" is an untempting prospect.
Germany can be counted on to make a better showing
of herself in a long war than she did in 1914.

Russia will never be —

so out of her mind as to go to
war for Prance and Britain. Developments in Russia:
Dismissal of Litvinov marks end of interventionist era.
Next the trade agreement. Even before that conversa­
tions were initiated by Russia on a non-aggression
pact. German intervention in Kusso- Japanese conflict,

21
 and Baltic States. Bpssians have Informal uf fchaf t^ey are
ready to sign the pfccrt.
Direct cC4tact fcQtws.ea Sialirf and
Fuehrer. » With thr.e I have kao o k.id the weapon?" ,put of the
han^of this, ge&tr?* ..
, Poland Has been maneuvered into
a position, whera ouar military V^cto^y is assumed."
Ultimate, effect* yet tag -predicted: New course I
Stalin has written' that he promisee iMmself much for "both
Sadieal C/hanees in European political picture.
ULyffiQ ripjr^nds. on his t^jtaiy Chiefs;

!*)• detQ-,rminationt_ Counter moves "by Britain and France

laust "be expected. We must stand ftast. Build-up plan
for wes* tern, frontier willbe set ix^, operation," Iron
steadf?istness of all key men*""
2*) Qoalj^.
Annihilation of Poland, that .is, dest ruction of
her Manpower. We are not setting out* just to reach a
specific lino or establish a new fr.on, tier, Taut rather
we f£eek the annihilation of the enemy?', which we must
pursue in ever new ways.

3.) Mftans to this end: It does not matter Vhat they are,
72ie victor is n-jver called upon to vindicate his actions.
r
A'he question is not one of the justice of" our cause,
e»;"i.usively of achieving victory.

j.on: Eargjr. and remorseless. We must all steel

ours i.\ye-s against humanitarian reasoningl **~ Sr>eQ&
—
Ht<:rec snf idencf in the G-erman soldier, even ii" reverses
should occur. r Of paramount importance are !;the wedges
—
that must "be C;?iven from the southeast toward the Vistulaf
and from the north to the Iferev and Vistula, '; Promptoslie
in Meeting nev situations; new means must Toe quickly \u25a0},'
devised to dGfCL with them. :
5-) Igv' front! erf t Possibly incorporation of some ar^ras into
Ee;lch, with protectorate to the east. Military
operations need not Is e affected "by regard for future
frontiers.

111. Particulars:

!•) Start proha'bl.y on Saturday morning

2.) Slovakia: Christ) Instruct Barkhausen to strengthen

to 2ipser-r«He%idorf
assume reap
.
Slovak "borr.ei? guard. Elements of Seventh -Hr
? Slovak fliers vill "be
cnslbility that Hungary wilj not
grounded.
undertake
Div,
We
anything against Slovakia.

3«) jDirschau: /it tack with divebomber groups on Y~Day, at dawn.

Targets: Western and of "bridge and town ("barracks, power
plant, etc...). Simultaneously, start of freight train
from Mariariburg, followed "by armored train and remainder
of Group Mtedem.

4.) Q-dingen: Air attack simultaneous with Dirschauj also

blockade c^f harbor.

22
 5.) Operation of Army Reichenau *• Uo comments .
6.) 1
Eeview of e-smy situation in sector of Army Group Horth.

. 23 August 1939.

OPT Conference (Section Chiefs):

1.) Defense of Slovakia: OKH assume immediate control of

hausen) .
Slovak army (Slovak protest **) (instructions to Bark­
Security at Zipser-Heuelorf Counter^-Intell.
Sec. 11. (instructions given "by CKH to QQu IV) #
.
2.) Dirsch.au— Gdingent Bo nothing to arouse suspicion!
'
Be Gdingen: To the Fuehrer's mind* Combat Engs. are too
valuable to expend on this operation.
3.) Luxembourg: In event of J^JPrenchJ
violation of neutral i-y
ty, reconnaissance and screening elements will "be sent /

out to establish contact. Fight backl Jk.iT is to .•

protect ground force movements. (Clear with QQ,u I,

Sec. and OQu IV).
4.) Droipping of leaflets: Fuehrer reserves decision.

s*) Railroad movements to East Prussia (12,000 to 15,000 men*)

6.) Conversion to war economy and setting in operation of
war industry plan withheld for time being. (Thomas will
check with State Secretaries daily, at 1100,).

Post of Gen Q,u (Cruewellt) (Ciieck 6th Sec.)

Press Conference at G-oebbels' office at 1100.

(Wedel will see G-oebbels at 1030.)

7.) Y-Day definitely set for 26 August (Saturday). \u25a0\u25a0'So

further orders.

8.) X-Hour: 0430 or 0415 ("but still in question).

9.) Danger of Polish attack on G-erman territory aimed at

Schneidemuehl railroad line. (Would be inconvenient -— Positions?
politically, question of prestige).
Hotes for Conference (Op, Sec.) : Security measures, positions,
troops unloaded in rear) •

Cruewell (Slovakia)
Barkb.ap.seii) .. We could send down Otto (military matters,
(Check with OQu IV) \u25a0

How many days to Y-Day

Two 30.5 cm siege guns for G-raudenz

Discuss with OQ,u IVi Danger of compromising Dirschau. (See CbclH)

23
OsUr to be issued: take no troops for Dirs.c/hau from Danzig*
•

%qq% everything in there until threat fo^ Danzig "has

clefinite^r passed. Then they can W'ta|eVoutu Other \u25a0

. (:
\u25a0fcrotips earmarked for Uir^chau jgn&% "be, on spot early

\u25a0"

%ttalion) o (Op. $cc. instructed)

*"!*.
.^e saimi m °&Jlmm&£M&- Proposal of yon Br(auchitscii)r «*.

I
lvsrmti violation of r&vtT2U&^£ob^ tfe
let them come at us ancl "blow up the bri-lges. C^iscussed
with OKM on 23 Aug, 1330*)

Op* Sec. t For Leeb: Policy on fire volume in West. * What atiout
iuxoinbourg? (Op, Sec. Ho more orders necessary)

16th Inf Jtegt. (paratr.) perhaps behind right wing?

(Checked with Op. Sec.)

Ask fuehrer: 1.) Has time come for

** inputting in operation intensified
preparedness" West? (6 plus 2 Divs.)
2.) Shoulx we put in operation prearranged chedule ***
for moving up Divs. to Trench "border?
(Check Op. Sec.) (An points discussed with ObctH)

£here will "be no more orders re Y-Day and X-Eour,, Everything

is to roll automatically?

0p» See*: a) Orders on X-Hour, etc.

"b) Should we give out X-Hcur wflforehend?-??

c) Has Y~Day order gone oiit?

Should we call attention of Belgian Attache to french moMliza­
tion measures? (Check OQ,u IV)
OTpdH; Hold Otto ready for assignment to List on Y-%1 Day.
Mission: Supervise preparations of Slovak Army ordered
his orders from List. Otto needs no aide.
—
"by -list* Cooperate with Barkhausen, who is also getting

34 August 1939

Assignment Otto: Wait another week, then propose again.

QQxl I, Op. Sec. ?

1.) Freeze furloughs? Yes.. Today.

2.) Everything in order: V—Day, X~Hour. Oib&H directives

-
on Dirschau.— Y-Day order is going out* now. Assemb­
—
ly movements completed without hitch.

3.) Witzle"ben has changed "directives" in accordance with

oral instructions given in Frankfurt: We don't shoot?
first; use ammunition sparingly, etc.

24
 4.) Artillery duels in, fest. (hold back) ; probably no need
for special ins tractions.

a) Preparations ample for security..

b) Situation
** would "be easier *, if order 'Jpefens® !&ta,n

West"
checked w-iijh .
wore issued right now. '(Pointe 1, through 4
ObdH)
5.) Polish concentrations*. Inf. and Arty east of Mlava,
Eeinf or cements reported south of Danzig (3 Inf. Regts.)^
.
Two new Divs. in Bydgosz. One additional Div. south of
Katowice (O.swiecin.*) (Checked with 11th Sec, ***).
MA.CB3HSE3SL fourth Light Piv. Arrange with Army Group. *#
Ho restrictions on part of OKBi

LOOP. Jeschonneak: Goer ing concurs with yon Brauchitsch on

Luxembourg. (Tell ObdH)

Jour th Air Fleet reports that Barkhauseri has no instructions*

**# (Op, Sec 4 states they were dispatched, last night by

CKW 66iiri«rj- yesterday afternoon orders were sent "by us

directly to Army Group South and Poiirtfeonth Army.) Bratis­

laVa garrison has left foir northern "border. Barkhausen does
not know What is td gd to Zipser-Keudorf , and when.)
Air Jorce l)uild-u£) practically completed. Supply arrange-*­
ments still "being worked on.

Continuation of OQ,u I~op. Sec. conference)

6.) France. Three .draft waves called for German border,
possibly also against Italians. (Checked with 3rd Sec.)^**#

Shine bridges closed (not everywhere) .

Eailroad services alerted: border crossing points closed?
Border Guard not
yet mobilized. Evacuations on very minor scale (St.
Avould) o Preliminary mobilization Monday. Time lapse
until Prench can be ready for attack, 10 days (Friday) •

Belgium* Measures on very small scale (military fur­

.
loughs cancelled, field exercises -called off, specialists
called into service)

Holland? Border and coastal defenses again at full

strength (5Q,000>.
.
"German" ***#Brigade in southern
part (Maastricht corner)

Britain: Ho confirmation of report that British fliers

have arrived on French side of Channel Boast.

7.) Sop o rt s - from Budap es t i Poland intends to march into

t
Danzig on 24 August, afternoon,, or 25 August, morning.
(Report received by OKW) ( Notify ObdH and ICorps),
Keitel: OKW will not interfere in conduct Of operations (Jodl) •
OKH will report directly to Fuehrer. Luxembourg -~ G-oering.

Chevaj-lerie: Wartime organisation of Gen. Staff top level, ¥c

can release some personnel.

25