Caesar's Pre-Battle Speech at Pharsalus (B.C. 3.85.4): Ridiculum Acri Fortius ...

Secat Res
Author(s): John G. Nordling
Source: The Classical Journal, Vol. 101, No. 2 (Dec. - Jan., 2005/2006), pp. 183-189
Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South
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 CAESAR'SPRE-BATTLESPEECH
AT PHARSALUS(B.C.3.85.4):
RIDICULUM ACRI FORTIUS ... SECAT RES

Abstract:Many havenotedthe uniquenessof Caesar'spre-battlespeechin oratio

recta at Pharsalus,but no one accountsfor it. The briefwordsplayedupon the
soldiers'emotionsin sucha way thattheyreleasedtheequivalentofa heartyguffaw,
andsofiredthetroopstofight andwin.

n general, observes Horace, humor (ridiculum)more bravely and

I betterdecides great mattersthan seriousness:

...ridiculum acri
fortiuset meliusmagnasplerumque
secatres
(Hor. Serm. 1.10.14-15).1

Humor may well have influenced no less a matterthan the battle of

Pharsalus (48 B.C.) which, according to Caesar's account, was pre-
ceded by a brief speech that Caesar himself delivered (B.C.3.85.4).
First, some context: following reverses at Dyrrachium (B.C. 3.45.4,
63.8, 64.1, 65.1), Pompey's troops were numerically superior to
Caesar's,2better provisioned,3 and safely set upon a hill, whereas
Caesar was obliged to keep his men on the march,"for in no other
manner could Pompey "be enticed to battle" (nullarationead pugnam
elici posse Pompeium, B.C. 3.85.2). Caesar claims (B.C. 3.85.2), indeed,
that constant mobility had been a fact of life for himself and the
' For another
passage wherein the verb seco -are ("to cut") holds the technical
sense of deciding a dispute, cf. quo multae magnaeque secantur iudice lites (Hor. Ep.
1.16.42).
2
One hundred and seventeen cohorts of legionaries totaling about 47,500 men
and two thousand evocati (Pompey) vs. eighty-two cohorts totaling about 22,500 men
(Caesar). So Dilke (2001) 15-17 and Carter (1993) 211, based on Caesar B.C. 3.88-9.
Also, Pompey's cavalry outnumbered Caesar's seven to one (B.C. 3.84.4). For the vast-
ness of Pompey's foreign auxiliaries, cf. Caes. B.C. 3.4.2ff.; Dio 41.55.4.
3 Caesar admits that he was "in extreme straits" (in angustiis, B.C. 3.47.4) at Dyr-
rachium, whereas Pompey's side enjoyed "an abundant supply of all necessaries" (om-
nium rerum copia, B.C. 3.47.3). Also, "Every day a large number of ships (magnus ...
navium numerus)was gathering from every quarter to bring up stores" (B.C. 3.47.3).
4
in colle (B.C. 3.85.1). The detail must indicate that Pompey's forces held strategic
advantage on the heights: "a slope was worth a lot," Carter (1993) 207; "a strong posi-
tion on a hill," Dilke (2001) 18.
5 essetin itineribus(B.C.3.85.2).Also, movendis
... castraexeo locomoveretsemperque
castris and in itinere (both B.C. 3.85.2).

THE CLASSICALJOURNAL 101.2 (2005/06) 183-9

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184 JOHN G. NORDLING

soldiers,6for only by frequent relocations could he make use of a

more suitable provisioning for his soldiers (commodiore
refrumentaria
uteretur),' find opportunity to fight on the march (in itinere ... aliquam
occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur), and exhaust Pompey's army by
daily excursions(Pompeiexercitumcotidianisitineribusdefatigaret).
One
day, while readying the troops for yet another march, Caesar noticed
(animadversumest, B.C. 3.85.3)8 that Pompey's line had advanced into
the open, away from the protective rampart (longius a vallo esse aciem
Pompei progressam, ibid.). Hence, battle could be waged in no
disadvantageous position (non iniquo loco, ibid.). Such is the
backdrop against which to consider Caesar's pre-battle speech at
Pharsalus yet more carefully:

Tunc Caesarapud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, "Differendumest,"

inquit, "iterin praesentianobis et de proelio cogitandum,sicut semper de-
poposcimus. Animo sumus ad dimicandum parati:non facile occasionem
postea reperiemus."Confestimqueexpeditas copias educit.
(B.C.3.85.4).9
Then Caesar,when the column was right at the gates, said to his soldiers,
"We must put off the march for the moment and think about battle, as we
have always demanded. We are preparedto fight. Not easily shall we get
the chanceagain."And at once he led his troops forthin light order.

Many comment upon the uniqueness of the passage: only here

does Caesar present himself as the subject of a speech in direct dis-
course (oratiorecta).10Thus, Caesar likely provides a contrast between

6
E.g., "Caesar forbade the baggage train to stop for rest until the journey was fin-
ished (ante iter confectum)"(B.C. 3.75.1, Apollonia). Cf. also B.C. 3.75.2, 76.1, 76.4, 78.4.
7
In other words, the Caesarians were living quite hand-to-mouth. Cf. Luc. 7.236;
Plu. Pomp. 68.4; App. BCiv. 2.66.273.
8 The statement refers to an intelligence dispatch. Cf. animadversum est a
Caesaris(B.C.3.66.1).Also, animumadverterunt
speculatoribus (B.C.1.69.3, 80.3);quare
animum adversa (1.80.4); animadvertit (3.41.2, 88.1, 93.5, 94.5); animum advertissent
(3.93.1). All the examples, save the first, appear in Kraner and Hofmann (1963) 93.
9
According to Du Pontet (1978) 129. Cf. simus (Manutius) for sumus (b) in Peskett
(1914, 1979) 318, and Kraner and Hofmann (1963) 267. The translation is largely my
own, with help from the latter two resources.
10
Oppermann (1933) 84; Schlicher (1936) 223; Murphy (1949-50) 127 n. 13; Eden
(1962) 114; Rasmussen (1963) 120; Rambaud (1966) 234; Kollmann (1975) 58; Miller
(1975) 49; Mutschler (1975) 214; Carter (1993) 207. Siedler (1956) 46 counted some "546
separate instances" of indirect discourse in the commentarii,though his methodology
seems simplistic: "I was often so swept along, so hypnotized by the manner of the
telling that I frequently missed the count, even though I did retrace my steps for a re-
count". The more scientific studies of Rasmussen (1963) 15 and Hyart (1954) 171
register one hundred and ninety, and one hundred and ninety-one indirect speeches,
respectively. Caesar's twenty-one orationes rectae (cf. list in Rasmussen (1963) 6) are
easier to account for, namely, B.G. 4.25.3 (aquilifer);5.30.1-3 (Sabinus), 44.3 (Pullo);
6.8.4 (Labienus), 35.8-9 (captive); 7.20.8, 12 (Vercingetorix), 38.2, 7-8 (Litaviccus), 50.4,
6 (Petronius), 77.3-16 (Critognatus); B.C. 2.31.2-8 (Curio), 32.2-14 (Curio), 34.4

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 SPEECHAT PHARSALUS
CAESAR'SPRE-BATTLE 185

his own "remarkablyflat and non-rhetorical'speech before action"'11

and two verbose speeches of Pompeiansthat follow-first, Pompey's
vaunt that Caesar's army would be repulsed (pelleretur,B.C. 3.86.3)
before the two battle lines converged (3.86.2-4), then Labienus' re-
joinder that Caesar'srag-tag supportersat Pharsaluswere no longer
the proud army that once had put down all Gaul and Germany
(3.87.1-4). Caesar plainly desired observers to judge, then, between
his own meager words in oratiorectaand the more flamboyant re-
solves of Pompey and Labienus (also in oratiorecta)who bared their
hearts and broke their word: "The oath-takers are always Pompe-
ian."12Kollmann suggests, moreover, that rare first-person plural
forms in Caesar'sspeech at Pharsalus13create an essential unity be-
tween Caesar'scharacterand the men who would put their lives on
the line for their general,14whereas Pompey "elevates himself and
marks himself off from the soldiers."'15The point is well taken,
though first-person plural forms connecting Pompey to his men16
possibly indicate Caesar's awareness of a rapport that Pompey also
shared with followers.
Such insights, while welcome, do not account very well for Cae-
sar's effectiveness as a motivator at a moment of supreme impor-
tance. More telling in that regard is an aspect of Caesar's speech
wherein he seems to belaborthe obvious, for why else would he and
the troops have had to "put off the marchat present and think about
battle"when, to trust pertinentportions of the narrative(cf. nn. 5-6,
above), the Caesarians had done almost nothing but march about

(Rebilus), 39.2-3 (Curio); 3.18.4 (Pompey), 19.8 (Labienus), 64.3 (aquilifer), 85.4
(Caesar), 86.2-4 (Pompey), 87.2-4 (Labienus), 91.2-3 (Crastinus), 94.6 (Pompey). I
would agree with Rasmussen (1963) 17, moreover, that utterances in oratio recta in
Caesar sometimes indicate audibly louder voices, for the following stage directions
occur in the vicinity of a statement in direct discourse: hoc cum magna voce dixisset (B.G.
4.25.4, aquilifer);et id clariorevoce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret (5.30.1, Sabinus); clare,
ut milites exaudirent(B.C. 3.94.5, Pompey).
11Miller (1975) 49. Original emphasis.
12 Damon (1994) 190. For other oaths
Pompeians swore, cf. B.C. 1.76.2-3, 5; 2.18.5;
3.13.3-4. Smith (1958) 40f. points out, however, that Caesar's troops must themselves
have taken an oath "[of] a personal character" when they crossed the Rubicon.
13 Namely (3.85.4), differendumest ... iter in praesentia nobis ("we must put off the
march for the moment"); sicut semper depoposcimus ("just as we have ever
demanded"); animo sumus ad dimicandumparati ("we are prepared in spirit to fight");
non facile postea reperiemus ("we shall not easily discover an opportunity hereafter").
Added emphases.
14
"der General und seine Soldaten sind eins," Kollmann (1975) 58.
15 "Pompeius hingegen hebt sich selbst hervor, er grenzt sich von seinen Soldaten

ab," Kollmann (1975) 58.

16
... persuasi equitibus nostris (B.C. 3.86.3); ... quam a nobis telum in hostem
iaceretur(ibid.); ... et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus (B.C. 3.86.4); ... cum tantum
equitatu valeamus (B.C. 3.86.4).

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186 JOHNG. NORDLING

Thessaly for weeks," brooding, no doubt, about the disasters at

Dyrrachium?18 Caesar's brief remarks at Pharsalus hardly constitute
a pre-battle harangue in the usual sense,19 yet the effect of his words
packed a powerful punch and got the job done:
I regret to inform you, boys, that today's inspiring series of marches shall
have to be cancelledin favor of a battle I see brewing that Pompey wants to
fight with us!
Not so much the words, then, but rather their effect upon the
soldiery turned matters around nicely for Caesar at Pharsalus. The
army was itching for battle-not for more marches-and Caesar pre-
sents Pompey as the one postponing the decisive engagement (B.C.
3.84.1-2, 85.1-2). Caesar suggests, then, that the awful daily marches
were the entire point of his own and his soldiers' existence, and the
battle no big deal. This notion is absurd, of course, and the exhausted
and psychologically demoralized soldiers almost certainly caught
the irony of Caesar'sremarkimmediately. It should not be difficult
to imagine a powerful emotive response on the part of the soldiery
that Caesar-always writing for a Roman audience-would not even
have had to record. Caesar likely used both commentarii to
communicate with large, attentive audiences back home composed
of "politically significant Romans,"20representatives of a "large mid-
dle-brow readership,"21 and possibly soldiers.22 In short, all who lis-
tened to a reading of a periodic dispatch from Caesar23would have

17 At least one month separated the battles at Dyrrachium

(May 48 B.C.) from
that of Pharsalus (6/7 June 48 B.C., Julian calendar; 9 August 48 B.C., unreformed
calendar). So Dilke (2001) 14, 21.
18That there were disasters at Dyrrachium seems proven by the following admis-
sions by Caesar: ... his tantis malis (B.C. 3.70.1); ... omnis delereturexercitus (3.70.1); ... ex
incommodo (3.74.2); and tantum ... studium infamiae sarciendae (3.74.2). Still, the
"disasters" possibly were worse than even Caesar let on. According to Orosius
(6.15.21), some 4,000 soldiers fell; according to Plutarch (Pomp. 65.8), 2,000. Caesar,
however, mentions a loss of nine hundred and sixty soldiers, an unknown number of
"well-known" (notos) Roman knights, and thirty-two military tribunes and centurions
(B.C. 3.71.1). Cf. Gelzer (1968) 234-5; Kahn (1986) 354-5.
19 Cf.
Ehrhardt (1995) 120-1 for pre-battle harangues in general, in reaction to
Hansen (1993) who holds that so-called "battle speeches" are mere rhetorical
inventions that never took place (cf. "no more than a literary device," Goldsworthy
(1996) 146). Yet even Hansen (1993) 166 admits that generals "usually said somethingto
[their] men before battle" (original emphasis).
20
Goldsworthy (1998) 194. Listeners, in other words, who "would have had a
clear idea of the qualities and behavior expected of a good general," ibid. 194-5. Cf.
also Rosenstein (1990) lff., 114ff.; Goldsworthy (1996) 167-70.
21 Griffin
(1994) 699. Also, "middle Italy, to coin a phrase," Hall (1998) 29.
22
"They might well have read or listened to selections," Levick (1998) 72.
Caesar's reputation as a winner possibly made it easier to attract soldiers to his
standard cf. Smith (1958) 46 n. 2.
23
"The scene we have to imagine is one that no source happens to describe for
us. We don't even know where it took place. Perhaps in the Forum, by the Rostra or

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 CAESAR'SPRE-BATTLE
SPEECHAT PHARSALUS 187

understood how matters essentially stood between any Roman

commanderand his troops during the tense pre-battlesituation.And
soldiers in the situation can be counted on to have laughed or to
have signaled their ready willingness to have at the enemy immedi-
ately. Confestimqueexpeditas copias educit (B.C. 3.85.4) indicates that
Caesaracknowledgedhis men's resolve and let them go.
To sum up: Caesar would not have said that soldiers at Phar-
salus should "put off their march at present" because he honestly
believed they needed convincing of that concern.There was nothing
the troops wanted more than to stop marchingaround and get down
to the serious matter of fighting, for Caesar's men had been on the
march continuously since the defeats at Dyrrachiumweeks earlier.24
With respect to de proeliocogitando(B.C.3.85.4), Caesar surely real-
ized that his soldiers had been doing almost nothing but "think
about battle" since the final drubbing at Dyrrachium and the
Caesarians' desire already then to make amends (omnes arderent
cupiditatepugnandi,B.C. 3.74.2). However, Caesar understood-and
indeed sharedin-his soldiers' sense of bitter humiliation,25and thus
subjectedthem to what would become, in effect, a harsh regimen in
confidence building. At Pharsalus, then, the troops were psycho-
logically prepared to fight, and finally the Pompeians presented an
opportunity for battle (B.C.3.85.3).What would stir Caesar'stroops
to fight as never before? Not long-winded orationesrectaeof the sort
Caesar records the Pompeians told26 but, I submit, the quite
understated remarks that the commander and his men should put
off the marchat present to think about battle "justas we have always
demanded"-as if the men needed convincing of that concern!

the temple of Castor; perhaps in the Circus Flaminius; perhaps in one of the
temporary theatres set up for the ludi scaenici; after 55 B.C. perhaps in the theatre of
Pompey itself. Wherever it happened in Rome, it was surely reproduced on a smaller
scale in the main piazza of every municipium and colonia in Italy-a skilled speaker, a
rapt audience, and the cool, clear prose of a master of narrative," Wiseman (1998) 6.
Evidence for these assertions appears in Wiseman (1998) 8-9 nn. 35-8. Carter (1991) 26
suggests, moreover, that the B.C. may well have generated an even greater "intrinsic
interest" among Romans in the 40s B.C. than the B.G. had in the 50s.
24
Cf. B.C. 3.70.1, 74.2 in n. 18, above.
25 Caesar does not hide the fact, e.g., that he had been "driven from" (pulsus, cf.
Peskett (1914, 1979) 299) his earlier plans at Dyrrachium and so was obliged to "alter
his entire method of waging war": Caesar ... depulsus omnem sibi commutandambelli ra-
tionem existimavit (B.C. 3.73.1).
26
"Fatuity pervades Pompey's remarks, and the ironic preface, scio me ... paene
incredibilemrem polliceri (B.C. 3.86.2), is fully justified, as he declares that the war will
be concluded without danger to the legions and almost without casualties (86.4).
Whereas Pompey stressed the superiority of his army, Labienus, whose speech imme-
diately follows (B.C. 3.87.1-4), stresses the alleged weaknesses of the enemy. Like his
commander, Labienus ironically defends his arrogance-neque temere incognitam rem
pronuntio (87.2)," Rowe (1967) 410.

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188 JOHN G. NORDLING

Innocuous statements functioned, in effect, as a catalyst that

provoked an emotional response from the soldiery and aroused in
them a tremendous desire to fight. Thus, a hearty guffaw fired
Caesar'ssoldiers to wage war at Pharsalus,and not much else.27

JOHNG. NORDLING
Baylor University
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