CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEMANAGEMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS

PhD THESIS

AcademicYear 2001-2002

Roger Cirillo

The MARKET GARDEN Campaign:

Allied OperationalCommandin NorthwestEurope,1944

Supervisor: Professor E.R. Holmes

December 2001

(D Cranfield University 2001. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner.
ALL MISSING PAGES ARE BLANK

IN

ORIGINAL

N
 ABSTRACT

This dissertationexaminesin detail, the planning, conduct, and context of

Allied OperationalCommandduring the period from the Normandy Invasion to the
end of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the airborne invasion of Holland. These
campaignswere influenced by several factors: the nature of the Allied Coalition, the
differing views and approachto battle of the separateservices and the different
nationalities within the coalition, and the actual conduct of battle within the contextof
a largereffort, the military campaign.
The 1944campaignwas uniquein that it representedthe two year evolution of
a political-military coalition, whosecampaignconductin the field was overseenby a
fully integratedheadquartersand whosestaff was composedof membersof both the
individual servicesand separatenationalities.While this headquarterspresenteda
united front behind its admired commander,General Dwight D. Eisenhower. its
competenceto plan and control operationsin anything but the broadestsensewas
challengedat every turn by the air and groundcommanderstaskedto fight the actual
campaign.
This dissertation concludesthat the "oversight" provided by the Supreme
Headquarters,Allied Expeditionary Force, SHAEF, and its SupremeCommander.
was not in tune with both operationalrealities and practices.and was not capableof
seizing opportunity and conducting a campaign of maneuver. During the actual
execution of MARKET GARDEN, the Allied Commandsystem functioned poorly
causingthe operationto fail by the narrowestmargins.While MARKET GARDEN
has often beenportrayedas a failure of one man, of intelligence,or of poor planning,
the coalition system and the men who ran it were not capable of fighting a
complicatedbattle efficiently becauseof their inability to function as a team, rather
than as a bandof brothers,the creationof which wasthe responsibilityof the Supreme
Commander.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authorowesa tremendousdebt of gratitudeto the campaign'sparticipants

who chose to speak with me and who were kind enoughto correspond and to offer
advice;to the large army of archivists,scholars,soldiers,and writers that I have relied
upon over the years for help, inspiration, and support; to the friends that have
encouragedme to follow this road which never seemed to end-,and to the Vice
Presidentfor Educationof the Associationof the United StatesArmy, Lt. Gen. Ted
Stroup, who gave me the time to finish my writing. VAiile many have helped, the
errorsas always,havebeenmine.

Thosewhosenamesshouldbe rememberedare:

Professor E.R. Holmes, who invited me to write this dissertation, Carlo

D'Este, whose work, Decision in Norniandy, inspired me to begin; Nigel Hamilton.
whose help and encouragement have been invaluable;, Maj. Gen. Bill Stofft, Col.
Denny Frasche,and the redoubtableLt. Col. JohnHixson, who helpedme to start. Liz
Snokeand the librarians at the Staff College who helpedand who were friends: Dr.
Richard Sommers,David Keough, Louise Amold-Friend, Pam Cheneyand the staff
of the Military History Institute who helped more than words can ever express, Dr.
G.E. Patrick Murray, who offered deepfootprints to follow; Roderick Suddabyat the
Imperial War Museum; PatriciaMethvenat the Liddell Hart Centerand her staff-,the
staff of the Public Records Office, Kew; the Director and Staff of the Eisenhower
Library; Dan Holt, Dr. Timothy Nerminger,Richard Boylan, Mitch Yockelson, and
Will Mahoneyof the Modem Military Recordsbranchof the National Archives; the
staff of the Library of Congress;Dr. StephenJ. Harris of the CanadianOfficial
History Office; Tim Dube and the staff of the National Archives of Canada,John
Nelson Rickard and Fred McEvoy in Canada,who aided me in my research;Drs.
Gary Sheffield and StevenBadseyof the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst;Dr.
John House,with whom I sharedfaculty positionsand numerousoppositepositionsat
the Armor School and Staff College; Dr. Dan Mortensen,who taught me about "air
force history"; Dr. Vincent Orange,Geoffrey Perret, Dominick Graham and others
who have shared their knowledge and experience;the Army Chiefs of Military
History and historians who helped educate me: Martin Blumenson, Charles
MacDonald,ForrestPogue,Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson,Brig. Gen. John Mountcastle,
Brig. Gen. John Brown, Dr. Jeffrey Clark, Robert Wright, David Hogan, John
McGrath, John Greenwood,and Jim Knight of the Centerof Military History; good
friend and advisor Col. Tom Bowers; Lt. Cols. Brian Rauschand Jack Stube,who
walked the battlefields of Europe with me; Lt. Col. Chris and Susan Clarke and
ProfessorRaymondand Mary Helen Callahan,who havewaited for this to be finished
with more ardor than I put into it; Russell McIntyre for counsel and advice; Gen.
Gordon Sullivan, 32d Chief of Staff of the United StatesArmy, for encouragement;
StephMuir, who kept me in line, a task a hostof CavalryColonelsand First Sergeants
have tried and failed at; SandraDaugherty,Lori Johnston,and Ruth Flanaganwho
helped piece this together; and Trish JacksonNellans, who spent more time on the
MARKET GARDEN battlefields than any of the participants,and did more to make
this happenthan anyoneelse.

V
 I owe a specialthanksto the old soldierswho fought the campaignand have
joined their comrades across the river, for their help and inspiration: Generals
Matthew Ridgway, John Hackett,Jim Gavin, PeteQuesada,Air Chief MarshalHarry
Broadhurst, Charles Richardson,Hap Gay, Pete Hains, Colonel Ed Martin. and
General"SLAM" Marshall,who followed themaround,told their stories,and covered
their sins, to Lt. Gen. Jack Norton, who soldierson. To these,and for the love and
inspirationof my motherandmy family, I am eternallygrateful.

In memoryof my mother.

vi
 CONTENTS

Abstract iii
........................................................................................................................
Acknowledgments v
.........................................................................................................
List Figures ix
...................................................................................................................
Introduction I
...................................................................................................................
I. No Band of Brothers 7
................................................................................................
(see figures I and 2)
2. The Seedsof Dissension 51
........................................................................................
(see figures 3-16)
3. Decision Points 125
....................................................................................................
(see figures 16-26)
4. Creating the Prince's Greatest Fear 169
.....................................................................
(see figure 27)
5. Campaign Plan 217
.....................................................................................................
(see figures 28 and 29)
6. An Option of Difficulties 249
.....................................................................................
(see figure 28-3 1)
7. Decision, Debate, Pursuit 295
....................................................................................
(see figures 26,29,32-37)
8. Going to MARKET 339
.............................................................................................
(see figures 38-42)
9. MARKET GARDEN 387
...........................................................................................
(see figures 43-64)
10. Denouement 457
.........................................................................................................
(see figure 65)
11. The MARKET GARDEN Campaign:
An Appreciation of the Factors and Controversies
Surrounding Allied Operations in the Late Summer
and Early Fall of 1944 in Northwest Europe .......................................................479
Bibliography 511
..............................................................................................................
Figures 535
.......................................................................................................................

vii
1

LIST OF FIGURES

No. Title Page

I Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary Force, 13 February 1944i.............. 535
2 Operational Chain of Command, AEF, I April 1940 . 537
.....................................
3 Forecast of Operations to D Plus 20iii 539
...............................................................
4 German Divisions in France and the Low Countries, 2 Jun 44......................... 541
5 Operation PERCH, Positions at First Light, 13 Jun 44. 543
...................................
6 Enemy Layout, 1200 Hrs, 14 Jun 44'i 545
..............................................................
7 Layout of Enemy Formations, 1200 Hrs, 25 Jun 44..................................... 547
....
8 EPSOM Situation, Last Light, 27 Jun 44'"i 549
......................................................
9 EPSOM Situation, 30 Jun 44....................................................................... 551
....
10 Enemy Situation on Second Army Front up to 30 Jun 44 553
...............................
11 Layout of Enemy Formations in Assault Area, 1200 Hrs, 7 Jul 44'i 555
.................
12 Operation CHARNWOOD, Situation Morning 8jul 44'" 557
...............................
13 Bombing Programme Operation GOODWOOD`ii 559
..........................................
14 Operation GOODWOOD, Last Light Dispositions, 18 Jul 44..........................561
15 Setting the Scene for the Breakout...................................................................563
16 The American Breakout, Auguýst1944xvi 565
..........................................................
17 Operation LUCKY STRIKEx ... 567
...........................................................................
18 Operation LUCKY STRIKE, Minimum Intervals Between PhaseLines'"" ... 569
19 Development of LUCKY STRIKE, Plan B"x 571
..................................................
20 Enemy Dispositions on Second Army Front, 29 Jul 44 ...................................573
21 Operation BLUECOAT, Second Army Dispositions Prior to"i 575
......................
22 Operation BLUECOAT, Divisional Tasks and Heavy Bomber Targets"ii 577
......
23 The Breakout, Approximate Position 13 Aug 44"iii 579
........................................

'Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: Center Military History), 54.
of
Ibid., 159.
Second Army, An Account of Operations of the SecondArmY in Europe 1944-1945 (Compiled by the
Headquarters of the Second Army: 1945), 107.
Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 103.
Ibid., 149.
Ibid., 153.
Ibid., 112.
Ibid., 114.
Ibid., 154.
Ibid., 156.
Ibid., 118.
Ibid., 124.
x'v Ibid., 126.
". Major-General David Belchern, All in the Days March (London: Collins, 1978), 202-203.
[bid., 174.
NAC, RG 24, Vol. 10540, File 215A21.013 (D28)
Ibid.
Ibid.
Second Army, An A ccount of Operations, 212.
Ibid., 164.
Ibid., 167.
Ibid., 177.

ix
 24 FalaiseGap Situation,Evening20 Aug 44....................................................... 581
25 EnemyDispositionsin the West,21 Aug C, 44.................................................. 583
26 OperationalChainof Command,AEF, I September1944... ......................... 585
27 Airborne OperationsPlanned""' **'****** 587
.....*....***.**...............
*''*******'**********'*'*"*****
28 PostOVERLORD Terrain Estimate"'"i 589
...........................................................
29 Montgomery'sand Eisenhower'sPlans"i. 591
......................................................
30 OVERLORD Forecast.................................................................................... 593
31 GeneralizedEnemyTerrain... i *..........
595
..............................................................
32 Positionon River Seine,27 Aug 44 and21 Army Group Intentions...............597
0
33 EstimatedDispositionof EnemyForces,1800Hrs, 29 Aug 44xxxiii .................
599
34 Dispositionsand Intentionsof SecondArmy, 2 Sep44x"i. 601
.............................
35 Stagesof Advancefrom Vernonto Brusselsand Antwerp,
28 Aug to 4 Sep44.... 603
...................................................................................
605
36 Positionof ForwardTroopsof SecondArmy, 4 Sep44"x'"
.............................
37 Outline Situation,6 Sep44, ShowingObjectivesof First U. S. Army'""i 607
.......
38 The MARKET GARDEN Areax'xii................................................................. 609
39 OperationCOMET, LandingsNearArnhem'" ............................................... 611
40 OperationCOMET, LandingsSouthof Nijmegen" 613
.........................................
41 EnemyDispositions,7 Sep44"i 615
.......................................................................
"ii 617
42 30 CorpsDispositions,9 Sep44 and Intentions for 10 Sep 44
.....................
43 OperationMARKET GARDEN Plan"iii .......................................................... 619
44 The Arnhem Plan. liv 621
.......................................................................................... 3
45 AssaultArea, 101st Airborne Divisionxl. 6ý2
.........................................................

Ibid., 180.
Ibid., 215.
Pogue,TheSupremeCommand.262.
Lieutenant-ColonelT. B.H. Otway,Airborne Forces: TheSecondWorld War 1939-1945ArmY
(Imperial War Museum, 1990),Map 9.
""" NARA, RG 331,381 OVERLORD, Box 77, SHAEFSGS,Post OVERLORDPlanning Vol, I.
""Chester Wilmot, TheStrugglefor Europe(London:Collins. 1952),461.
... Generalof the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe(New York: Doubledayand Co..
1948),following 223.
"" NARA, RG 407, ML 206, Box 24143, "GeneralizedEnem Terrain, 30 Nov 44, " attachedto
"Estimateqf the Situation: Major Effort ,v
in the Koln Plain, 30 Nov 44.
SecondArmy, An Accountof Operations,189.
Ibid., 218.
Ibid.. 193.
Ibid., 196.
Ibid., 195.
Ibid.. 198.
LeonardRapportand Arthur Northwood,Rendezvous with Destinr: A Histoty of the 101"
Airborne Division (101" Airborne Division Association,1948),261. ,
""' NARA. RG 331, OVERLORD 381, COMET, Hqs.Airborne TroopsOP Instruction No. 1,6 Sep
44.
A

XH
Ibid.
Ibid., 221.
x1i,SecondArmy, An Account Operations,201.
of
'CARL, R-13333.2lArtny Group, OperationMARKETGARDEN.17-26September1944.20.
X11VL. F. Ellis et al.. Victo?
ý, in the PYest.VolumeA TheDefeatof Germany(London: Her Majesty's
StationeryOffice, 1968),28.
46 AssaultArea, 82d Airborne Division""i ........................................................... 625
47 Principal FeaturesAround Nijmegen,Groesbeek,4noGrave"'" .....................627
48 AssaultArea, British and PolishAirborne Troops"......................................... 629
49 101" Airborne Sector-D-Da(llx ....................................................................... 631
50 82d Airborne Sector-D-Day 633
. .............................................................................
635
51 1 Airborne Sector-D-Dayl
...............................................................................
637
52 EnemyTroop Locations-1Airborne Sector ..................................................
53 8 CorpsDispositionsand Intentions, 18 Sep 44 I. .
54 12 CorpsDispositionsandIntentions,18 Sep441. .......................................... 641
55 Advanceof SecondArmy from EscautCanalto NederRhine,
17 Septo 20 Sep'. 643
..........................................................................................
Ivi 645
56 1 Airborne Division Sector
............................................................................
..................................................................................
57 Nijmegen Bridge Battle1v 647
58 The Island-Schemeof Maneuver'"i................................................................. 649
59 30 CorpsSituation,Night 21 Sep441............................................................... 651
60 Battle on the Island'. 653
.........................................................................................
61 Layout of 30 Corpsand Brigadesof 43 Division, 25 Sep44"i 655
........................
62 Efforts to RescueI st Airborne Division"ii 657
.......................................................
63 MARKET GARDEN Operation:
Advanceto NijmegenandArnhem, 17-26Sep'"i 659
.........................................
64 Airborne Perimeter" 661
.......................................................................................
65 Dispositionsof SecondArmy, 30 Sep441" 663
.....................................................

"" Dr. JohnC. Warren,Airborne Operationsin World War11,EuropeanTheater.,USAFHistorical

StudiesNo. 97 (Air University: USAF Historical Division), 104.
Ibid., 108.
Lt. Gen.JamesM. Gavin, On to Berlin: TheBattlesofAn Airborne Commander(New York:
Viking Press,1978), 148.
x"" JohnC. Warren,Airborne Operationsin World War11,EuropeanTheater,USAF Historical
Studies:No. 97 (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air University, 1956),113.
x11% Gavin, Major GeneralJamesM., Airborne Warfare(Washington:Infantry JournalPress,1947).91.
Gavin, On to Berlin. 146.
CorneliusRyan,A Bridge TooFar (New York: Simonand Schuster,1974).220-221.
RobertJ. Kershaw,"It NeverShowsin September":TheGermanP`ievv ofMARKET-GARDENand
the Battle ofArnhem, September1944(Surrey:Ian Allan, 1990),42.
SecondArmy, An Accountof Operations,244.
Ibid., 240.
Ibid., 239.
Otway,Airborne Forces, Map 12.
NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 12344,OperationMarket Garden-82dAbn Div Narrative.
1v...Anthony Farrar-Hockley,Airborne Carpet.,OperationMarket Garden(New York: Ballantine
Books, 1969),146.
Ibid., 233.
Cornelis Baueron information suppliedby Lt. Col. TheodoorA. Bootee,TheBattle ofArnhem. (New
York: Steinand Day, 1967),231.
"' Major-GeneralR.E. Urquhartwith Wilfred Greatorex,Arnhem(New York: W.W. Norton and
Company,1958), 162.
" Ryan,A Bridge TooFar, 567.
"" Sir Brian Horrockswith EversleyBelfield
and Major-GeneralH. Essame,Corps Commander(New
York: CharlesScribner'sSons,1977),95.
Kershaw,It NeverShows,295.
SecondArmy, An Accountof Operations,247.

xi
 Introduction

This dissertationis the product of a lifetime of study and practice of the

military professionand has its roots in answeringa professionalsoldier's question,

"Can an air-ground campaignbe waged effectively?" I was the inquirer, then the

newest and youngest instructor at the US Army's Command and General Staff

College at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas.The American Army was then in a time of

doctrinal ferment; the Vietnam-eraArmy that I hadjoined had turned itself full-bore

to the previously unthinkable concept of winning huge, armored battles in either

Europe or, as some said, in the Middle East. I selectedOPERATION MARKET

GARDEN as a one-hour presentationto challengemy studentswith the question,

"How do you make an Air-Land Battle work?" OPERATION MARKET GARDEN

was the combined Airborne and Land invasion of Holland in September 1944,

designedto give the Allies a bridgeheadover the Rhine as a prelude to the final

offensive to capture the Ruhr and to move on to Berlin. Conceived,planned, and

launchedin a period of eight days,it wasoneof the most complex-and because its
of

mixed results,controversial-operationsconductedby the Allies in World War 11.

I had visited the MARKET GARDEN battlefields,

and had done some

rudimentarystudyof the operation.The Staff College'slibrary hadan amplesupplyof

documentation,and for to the Fortieth Anniversary of World War II, the College

beganhonoring someof its famousgraduates.Throughthis program,I

met, and was

granted private interviews with, several of the senior participants in MARKET

GARDEN. I carried on this researchduring a six-year assignmentin Europe, three

yearsof which was as a War Plansofficer in NATO's CentralArmy Group, and one
year of which was as the SpecialAssistantto the in
Commander Chief. United States

Army, Europe.Here,I learnedthe mechanicsanddifficulties of coalition planning.the

problemsof interservicerivalries, and the issuesinvolved with senior leadershipin a

coalition. This study rests heavily on that background,as well as on a decadeof

further researchand thinking.

This study intendsto shedlight on severalkey aspectsof one of World War

11'smost famousandcontroversialoperations,OPERATIONMARKET GARDEN, to

provide a military vista from to

which study how a military campaignis plannedand

how
executed, the professionalattitudesand thinking of its commandersshapeaction,

and how-after the fmal arbitration of combatitself-individual battles fit within the

contextof the greatereffort, a military campaign.

Allied Operational Command during this period will be examined by

exploring and assessingseveral of its key components.The basis for the Allied

OPERATIONAL COMMAND, the coalition itself, will be explainedin light of the

conflicts inherent in combining air and ground forces within a multinational

environment.Theseconflicts include the basic doctrinesor "approachesto battle" of

eachserviceand eachcountrybasedupon the experienceand organizationaldesignof

eachcomponentforce. Combinedwith the ever-presentstrainsof strongpersonalities,

the ability to find workable solutions by men convinced that their own service

doctrine and experienceis preeminent,lent itself to unhappycompromises,bitterly

resentedand aggressivelycontested.These resentmentsled to criticism far beyond

that called for, as plans went awry and the conditions of battle negatedfirmly-held

notionsof what constitutedmilitary success.

2
 The campaignplanning processwill be examined.not in its methodological

but
sense, in its intellectual to
aspects, demonstrate
how decisionswere made based

upon the confluence of the information available, the assetsprovided, and the

perceivedrequirementsof the operationunderpreparation.From this mentalplanning

thererosenot simply a campaignplan that was a conceptualoutline for future actions,

but also expectationsthat did not alwaysconform to the reality of the battlefield and

the enemy's reactions.This conflict betweenthe battles envisionedand the battles

fought is a key catalystin changinga plan of campaign.How the Allies actually met

this challengewill be demonstratedby examiningthe detail and logic of the original

campaignplan, and by describing the operationalresults of the early battles that

sparkedcontroversyat the highestlevel. From this controversyroseperceptionsbased

less on logic than on the preconceptionsof plans held by resentfulpersonalities,and

advocated by men often not responsible for the actual military conduct of the

operationsunfolding.

During the period examined, the campaign did not go as planned, but
some

aspects of it exceeded the original assumptions of the planners without actually

accomplishing the capture of key objectives needed to support the next phase of

operations. The decision to continue the campaign as planned, and the challenge

posed by the key commanders in attempting to reshape the basic conceptual

fi-amework that had been theorized by the planners at Supreme Headquarters

and

accepted by the Allied Supreme Commander as unalterable, posed both military and

political challenges to the unity of the coalition exceeding that which might have

3
 occurredwithin a single nation's forces.How this debateoriginatedand the resultsof

it will constitutethe kernelof my discussionof the Allied campaignplan.

The mounting and execution of OPERATION MARKET GARDEN, an

operationconceivedto accomplisha rapid thrust acrossthe Rhine. will be examined

in the light of the detail neededto launchthe operationandasa specialcasewithin the

coalition whereall the military factorsof battle were complicatedby servicepolitics,

interpersonalstrife, coalition dissent,and the misconceptionsof the would-bevictors.

Thesecombinedto producea partial victory whoserecriminationsreverberatetoday.

MARKET GARDEN itself, while only one of manydecisionpoints reachedin World

War H, exemplifiedthe complicatednatureof modemwar foughtby coalitions.

Examined in detail will be the logic of the air and ground commanders,the

commander'sintent and the assumptionsthat causedthat intent to be formed,and the

plans drawn by the subordinate commanderstasked with fighting the battle.

Moreover,the most controversialaspectsof the battle,whetherthereactuallywas "an

intelligence failure," and whether the ground forces conductedthemselveswith the

vigor and aggressivenessneeded to win through to the objective, will also be

examined.As part of this study,a detailedexaminationof the speciallycreated"First

Allied Airborne Army" will be presented-to include its backgroundin planning

operationsprior to the mountingof OPERATIONMARKET GARDEN-to illustrate

the problemsandcomplexityof interserviceplanning.

To understandthe key commandersand their ideas,an in-depth discussion

of

eachman's point of view, derived from diaries,from the official headquartersrecords

andjournals, and from living participantswho witnessedthe decisionsmadeand the

4
plans being drawn, will be part of the analysisoffered.Furthermore.
excerptsfrom the

of
confidential assessments the MARKET GARDEN battle and campaignmade by

key participantsas backgroundto the American and British Official Historians will

alsobe offeredaspart of the author'ssummary.

I havechosento use,as often as possible,the actualwords of the participants

asan part
essential of the narration,to enablethe readerto participatein their thoughts

and to judge their intentionsand plans. Having done so, my intention is to show how

operational decisions are made, to examine the factors behind decisions as the

plannersand commanderswould have analyzedthem, and to demonstratehow the

evolution of a campaignis basednot simply on a perfectly cast"Master Plan" but on

the continuinganalysis,debate,and controversythat surroundsthe eventsof battle and

the higher direction of combatoperations.Having read this study, I would hope that

my readerswould agreewith the words of one of my first mentors,repeatedhere by

his unabashedadmirer:

Great battles, like epic tragedies, are not always staged or the product
of human calculation, and disaster is less likely to derive from one
gross blunder than from reasonedcalculations which slip just a little.

S.L. A. Marshall
Brigadier General, USAR, Ret.
Night Drop: TheAmerican Airborne Invasion ofNorman4j,

5
 CHAPTERONE

No Band Of Brothers

For the Americans,therehad beenonly one strategicobject worth pursuingas

part of the "Europe First" Strategyadoptedby the Allies in 1941. That object, the

Cross-ChannelAttack on the coastof Francethat would permit America to employ

the full weight of its mobilized army, had been a sourceof contentionbetweenthe

American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committeesince the

beginningof their deliberations.Too soonto split the coalition at the war's onset,the

argumentincreaseddistrust in the partnership--a partnershipcementedfar more by

politicians than soldiers,and embracedfar more by the British who relied upon it for

survival, than the Americans,for whom the Germanwar had beenthrust upon them

by the Axis agreement,not the emotionalscourgeof a Pearl Harbor. From their first

disagreements,the American commanders,despite the obvious advantagesand

frequentbenefitsof the coalition, neverabandonedtheir contemptfor, or downplaying

of, contributions made by their Allies. Collectively, the senior soldiers,sailors, and

airmenthat oversawthe military, air, and naval campaignsof the war were no bandof
'
brothers,despitethe forcedcooperationof their governments.

The "Grand Alliance" was a marriage of convenience, a marriage healthier in

times of crisis than in good times. By 1944, with the Cross-Channel attack looming,

1The most completeand balancedpresentationsof the nationalapproachesto strategyare containedin

the official historiesof the participatingcountries.For the Americans,the most completeview is
containedin the US Army in World War II SeriesSub-series,The WarDepartment,underthe general
editorshipof Kent RobertsGreenfield,dealingwith strategy,logistics,and overall organization.The
British Grand Strateo, Serieseditedby John Ehrman(London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice)
proýidesthe Commonwealthview with a British emphasis.C.P. Stacey,Arms.Men, and Governments:
The War Policies of Canada1939-1945(Ottawa:Queen'sPrinter, 1970)offers an often ignored,
focusedview of the Canadians'problems.
the last dedicated
of the selfless, dayswererunningout. The strainsand disagreements

of Grand Strategic planning, and the conduct of actual operations in the

Mediterranean,set the stagefor the upcoming campaign.Though victorious in the

end, the operation in Northwest Europe would prove to be a contentiouscampaign

whose disagreements
would outlast the blast of war. At the root of the problem were

the nature of coalitions, the commandstructure,and the personalitiesof the players

2
themselves.

The shadow of the Great War hung over the system. Along with the experience

of administering and coordinating large endeavors came the memory of slights, real

and imagined. American military leaders scorned any-but their own ideas on the

conduct of war in general and this war in particular; their political masters were more

3 With Grand Strategy firmly in the hands the Big Three-Prime Minister
realiStiC. of

Winston S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Premier Joseph Stalin-the

conduct of operations in the field fell to "Theater Commanders" supervised by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) of the American and British armed forces.

Following frequent conferences between Churchill and Roosevelt, the CCS worked

2 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: Center of Military History. 1953.1989. ) The
creation of the command system and its actual employment are addressedofficially in this volume of
the US Army Series by the Office of the Chief of Military History (now called the Center of Military
History).
3 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr..
cd., and Stephen E. Ambrose, assoc. ed., The Papers ofDwight D.
Eisenhower: The War rears, I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 405.406; Harry Butcher. Atv
Three Years with Eisenhower., The Personal Diaq, of Captain Harry Butcher. USNR, Naval Aide to
General Eisenhower 1942-1945 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946) [hereafter referred to as
Butcher, Ati, Three Years with Eisenhower], 29,30. For example, Eisenhower calls the cancellation of a
cross-channel attack in 1942 the "Blackest Day" in history. For a sample of American vitriol, see
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, WedemeyerReports! (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958),
chapters 6-12 passim. Wedemeycr was a principal war planner in the War Department and the author
of the original "Victory Plan." He later became the American Theater Commander in China, Mark A.
Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Stratqy in World
War 11(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,2000), passim. This examines prewar
American ideas well salted with Anglophobia, and discusseswar planning and the Joint Chiefs.

S
 out the details allocated
of strategy, national and
resources, provideda directive to the

The
theater commanderconcerned. National Service Chief for the specific Allied

Theater Commander wrote and communicatedthe CCS views and orders. For

Northwest Europe, the United States Army Chief of Staff, General George C.

4
Marshall, was the executiveagent. VAiile certain theaterssuch as the Pacific (US),

SoutheastAsia (British), and the Mediterranean(British) were consideredto grant a

special oversight authority to the most interestednation, Northwest Europe was

consideredto be the purview of both countries.Moreover, with the British Prime

Minister using, and in the American view, abusinghis dual role as DefenseMinister

to inject himself into the conduct of operations,the Americans were firm in their

attemptsto endBritish control of the major campaignsof the war.

If 1942had beenthe year of resolve, 1943was the year of dispute.America

followed Britain into an unwanted MediterraneanCampaign through the North

African invasion,TORCH. TORCH had beenseenas a political necessity,not only to

offer someaspectof a "SecondFront" to the beleagueredSovietsbut also to get the

American Army involved in the German war as a prelude to the congressional

electionsin the fall.

Every aspect of 1943's campaign irritated the Americans. Marshall viewed the

Mediterranean as a "suction pump," taking resources away from the invasion of

" Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,Chapter2, Dominick Grahamand ShelfordBidwell. Coalitions.

Politicians and Generals:SomeAspectsof Commandin Two Wars(London: Brassey'sUK, 1993),
Chapters9 and 10,critiquesthe mechanicsof this arrangement.StephenE. Ambrose.TheSupreme
Commander:The War YearsofDwight D. Eisenhower(New York: Doubleday,1970),ForrestC.
Pogue,GeorgeC. Marshalt Organizerof Victo?y 1943-1945(New York: The Viking Press,1973)
Volumes2 and 3, shouldalso be consultedconcerningthe relationsof the CCSand the Allied Supreme
Commander.

9
Western 5
Europe. The Navy it diversion from their in
war of vengeance
viewed as a

the Pacific, and the United StatesArmy Air Forces,whose from

independence the

ground Army had all but been made legal by Marshall, viewed the Mediterranean

campaignas delayingthe massivebomberoffensiveit felt could win the war.

Roosevelt had ovenuled his service chiefs on TORCH. The resulting

campaigns,not only in Sicily but in the Mediten-anean-which landedthe Allies on

the Europeanmainland through the Italian peninsula-had marked the high-water

mark of British influence. During the Conference

Casablanca in January 1943, the

Allies had ageed to appoint an individual to analyze the invasion plan that the

Americans demanded.(The officer appointed Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan was

British. He had an American deputy,Maj. Gen. RaymondBarker.) The position was

called "Chief of Staff to the Allied Commander,Designate,

" or "COSSAC"; the

individual andthe plan soonsharedthe samename.

In August 1943, the COSSAC forwarded his feasibility study, most often

called the COSSAC Plan but in reality namedOUTLINE OVERLORD. OUTLINE

OVERLORD, once approved, changedthe conduct of World War 11.No longer

content to fend off Mr. Churchill's seemingly bimonthly mid-course corrections for

Grand Strategy;the Americanspressedfor a decisionon the Cross-Channelattack.

OVERLORD's approvalin August 1943,followed by the appointmentof a Supreme

Allied Commanderand his principal commanders,put Marshall and the American

Chiefs in charge of the war in its largest aspects.Every campaign, every major

5 Larry 1.Bland. cd., GeorgeC Marshall: Interviews

and ReminiscencesforForrest C Pogue
[hereafterreferredto as Bland,ReminiscencesforPogue](Lexington: GeorgeC. Marshall Foundation,

10
decision now was scrutinized through the prism of the Allied main effort.

OVERLORD. VAiile OVERLORD did not end inter-Allied bickering or even

Churchill's attempt to shapeAllied strategy,it did end British dominanceover the

military conductof the war.

The SupremeCommander'sjob was the vision of the AmericanChief of Staff,

General George C. Marshall. Almost mythical in the respect he evoked from

Roosevelt,Churchill, and the American Congress,Marshall was the architect of the

American Army and was the most formidableadvocateof the Cross-ChannelAttack

and the "Unity of Command" principle that had necessitated

appointing a Supreme

Allied Commander.A staff officer and prot6g6 of Generalof the Armies John J.

Pershing,the AmericanExpeditionaryForce'sCommanderin Chief in the GreatWar,

Marshall was cold, distant, severeand eminentlypractical.He "made" every general

in the American Army and was the coldestof judges. Though he developeda good

working relationshipwith his British opposite he

numbers, was never known to have

praised Britain or the British to any historian and quietly accepted the bigoted

in his 6
xenophobia that predominated many of senior officers.

Following the simpleprinciple that the largestforce contributorwould provide

the Supreme Commander for the European invasion, Marshall was expected by all to

1986),passim.Marshall left no memoirs;theseare the only known interviewsof the generaldoneas

backgroundfor the authorizedbiography.
' Stoler,Allies andAdversaries,is repletewith discussionsconcerningthe Americanview of their
allies; John S.D. Eisenhower,Allies: Pearl Harbor to D-Day (GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubledayand
Company,1982)coversthe formation of the coalition in lessstridentterms.For any seriousstudent,
the personaldiariesof GeneralJosephW. Stilwell (Stanford),GeneralGeorgeS. Patton(Library of
Congress),and GeneralMark W. Clark (The Citadel) haverepeatedxenophobicremarks.Of particular
note concerningthe British shouldbe the WedemeyerPapers(Stanford)and his memoirs, Wedemeyer
Reports!,ibid. On the naval side,FleetAdmiral ErnestJ. King wasa practicingAnglophobeof
legendaryproportions.Marshallkept his counsel.His only candidremarkson the war are bereft of
positive remarksfor specific allies; seeBland,ReminiscencesforPogue,ibid.

11
include himself. to be namedthe SupremeCommander.Allied ExpeditionaryForce

(SCAEF). Roosevelt, buffeted by admirers of Marshall (to include the ancient

Pershing)who claimed that Marshall could not be sparedfrom Washington,relented.

Marshall stayed on the Combined Chiefs to remain Roosevelt'schampion at the

7
conferencetable.

GeneralSir Alan Brooke (later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke),the Chief of

the Imperial GeneralStaff and Marshall's opposite number,had been considereda

for
contender the SupremeCommander
position. Churchill had offered the position to

an American in 1943as recognition of the greaterAmerican role (in numbers)in the

war effort. Able, analytical, and blunt, Alanbrooke matchedMarshall in reputation

foil to Churchill's 8 Alanbrooke's

and was regardedas the necessary enthusiasms.

generals, unfortunately, matched American xenophobia with their own brand of

arroganceand condescension,never tiring of calling their American counterparts

"
"inexperienced. 9

While the American Chief of Naval Operations/Commander-in-Chief.

United

StatesFleet, Admiral ErnestJ. King, and his British counterpart,Admiral Sir Andrew

B. Cunningham,were key membersof the CombinedChiefs, their influenceover the

groundand air aspectsof the NorthwestEuropecampaigndiminishedafter the D-Day

7Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,22-34. Note Poguediscussesthe Americanattemptto make Marshall

the SupremeCommanderfor both the Europeanand MediterraneanTheaters,and also to keephim as a
sitting memberof the CombinedChiefs.As such,he would havecommandedthe entire Allied effort
againstthe Germans.
8Alex Danchevand Daniel Todman,
eds., War Diaries 1939-1945:Field Uarshal Lord Alanbrooke
[hereafterreferredto as Danchevand Todman,Alanbrooke WarDiaries] (London: Weidenfeldand
Nicholson,2001); Sir Arthur Bryant, Triumphin the West.1943-1946(London: Collins, 1959);David
Fraser,Alanbrooke(New York: Atheneum,1982).passim.

12
decisionsfor Normandy and SouthernFrance. King's effect on the Europeanand

Mediterraneancampaignswas negative.He controlled the crucial constructionand

landing craft and LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank). His refusal to limit his
allotment of

own Pacific campaigns, and Roosevelt's disingenuous practice of "supporting

to
Europe" while refusing curb King, causedmajor strategicproblems. In decisions

involving shipping,King deferredto Marshall

General on all issuesconcerningthe
not
10
Germany.
war against

The airmen on the CombinedChiefs seeminglywagedtheir own campaigns.

by
Represented Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles"Peter" Portal of the Royal Air Force

(RAF), and GeneralHenry H. "Hap" Arnold of the United StatesArmy Air Forces,

directive for Europe POINTBLANK. 11

the airmensecuredtheir own campaign called

Craftedat CombinedChiefs level with Portal as executiveagent,it subordinatedRAF

Bomber Commandand the United StatesStrategicAir Forces,Europe (USSTAF),

directly to the CCS for operations.POINTBLANK was consideredby the CCS as a

preliminary
necessary for OVERLORD, and was seenby the airmen as a guarantee

that their operationscould not be to

subordinated those of ground forces.While the

POINTBLANK directive provideda "priority" list of targetsby type, the airmenwere

12
free to conductoperationswithin very generalcontrols.

9 Brian Holden Reid, "Tensions in the Supreme Command: Anti-Americanism in the British Army,
1939-1945," in Brian Holden Reid and John White, eds., American Studies: Essays in Honour of
Marcus Cunliffe (London: Macmillan, 1991), 270-296.
"' Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952); Thomas B. Buel, Master ofSeapower. A Biograpky of
Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980).
" General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (Blue Ridge Summit, Penn.: Tab Books,
1989); Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford (London: Heineman, 1977).
'2 CMH, MS, Historical Section, Headquarters, USFET, Outline Chronologv of Notes on the History of
Continental Operations, E. T.O., Volume 11(Historical Section, Headquarters, USFET, n.d. ), 223-227;

13
 Bomber Command's Commander-in-Chief,Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur

"Bomber" Harris, and the American Lt.

air commander, Gen.Carl A. "Tooey" Spaatz,

believers
independent in the superiorityof airpower. Spaatz
were both outspokenand

believed that the OVERLORD operation was unnecessary.While Bomber

Command's aircraft were generally confined to night operations launched from

England, Spaatzheld operationalcontrol over both the Eighth Air Force in England

Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. Spaatzhad been of

commander the Northwest
and the

African Air Force during TORCH and the Mediterranean campaign and

commandedall US Army Air Forces in Europe, bestowing some

administratively

influence over the American elementsof the MediterraneanAllied Air Forces as

Arnold's trustedagentin the Germanwar.' 3

Harris and Spaatzalso shareda uniqueadvantage.Spaatzreportednot only to

the American theater commanderbut directly to Arnold as CommandingGeneral,

United StatesArmy Air Forces(AAF), a separatecomponentof the United States

Army. Harris, at BomberCommand,reporteddirectly to the Air Ministry, Portal being

the professionalhead of the Air Force and his superior.The implication was clear.

Regardlessof "'theater"commandstructures,the airmenhad direct accessnot only to

their service superiors but to the Combined Chiefs. POINTBLANK covered a

multitude of sins, the greatestof which was the "negotiation" the theatercommander

neededto do with airmenfor support.

Sir CharlesWebsterand Noble Frankland,TheStrategicAir OffensiveAgainst Germany1939-1945.

Volume I 11,PartV (London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice, 1961), ChapterX11,passim.
13RichardG. Davis, Carl A. Spaarzand the Air War in Europe(Washington:Centerfor Air Force
History, 1993),Part Four,passim.The numberedair forces,therefore,underSpaatzs influencewere
the 8' and 15thaspart of USSTAF,and the 9' and 12' (Tactical)Air Forces.

14
 On December7,1943, GeneralDwight D. Eisenhowerwas namedSupreme

Commanderfor OVERLORD. Eisenhowerwas the choiceof Franklin Rooseveltand

was embracedenthusiasticallyby Churchill as the bestpossiblecandidatefor thejob.

Eisenhower'sown reputationwith the people of America and Britain, and with the

Allied press,was flawless.Sincehis appointmentas the Allied SupremeCommander

for TORCH, Eisenhowerhad beenseenas the internationalsymbol for the coalition.

Victory had followed his flag in FrenchNorth Affica, in Sicily, and onto the European

continent during the Invasion of Italy. Untainted by the stalemateyet to develop in

front of the GustavLine andAnzio in Italy, Eisenhowerleft the Mediterraneantheater

14
asthe symbolof Allied success.

Eisenhowerwas not the only commanderpickedby the CCS. (Seefigure I and

2.) The Allies, wanting an airmanas Deputy SupremeCommander.selectedAir Chief

Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who had been Allied Air Commander in the

Mediterranean.Tedder relished the "Deputy" title, but he also wanted operational

commandof all air assetsfor the invasion. This job, had in fact, been filled before

Eisenhowerwas appointed.In August 1943, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh

Mallory, then servingas the Commanderof FighterCommand,and a commanderwho

had beendeeplyinvolved in invasionand CombinedOperationsplanning since 1942,

was appointedas the Commander

of the Allied ExpeditionaryAir Forces(AEAF). 15

The Americans made it clear that they would not accept "a ground

" This job had fallen to General Sir Harold L. Alexander in the
commander.

14Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,33-35.
Ibid., 48.

15
Mediterranean.first as Eisenhower'sDeputyýand then as the 15'h Army Group

Commanderin Sicily and Italy. No seniorAmericangroundcommanderexistedwith

the commensuratecombat experienceto fill an "Army Group" command, so by

default, the British 21 Army Group was acceptedas the de facto groundheadquarters

for
until sufficient American groundtroops requireda promotionor new assignment
16
an Americancommander.

The groundcommanderappointedto 21 Army GroupwasGeneralSir Bernard

L. Montgomery, former commanderof the Eighth Army. 17 Montgomery was a

for
talisman the British with
soldier,and a remarkablypopularcommander the British

people. "Monty" meant victory to the British public, and to the averageTommy.

Monty was a commander who brought victory without excessivecasualties.His

victories had assuredChurchill's in during

continuance government the dark days of

1942. Eisenhower had wanted the pleasantand pliant Harold Alexander for this

"' 8
commandbut statedthat Montgomerywas "acceptable.

The Allied Naval Commander,Allied Naval ExpeditionaryForce (ANXF),

was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay,a professionalseamanwho had savedthe British

Army at Dunkirk, and whoseprofessionalismand affability made him popular with

every Allied seaman.During postinvasionoperations,he would be the key naval

16Ibid., 43-45, EisenhowerPapers,111,1609,1610.

17As such,Montgomery
replacedGeneralSir BernardPaget,who had alsobeenthe seniorBritish
Army plannerfor the (British) CombinedCommanders,had succeededAlanbrookein commandof the
Home Forces,and became21 Army Group commanderin 1943.With the exceptionof the abortive
Norway expeditionin 1940,he lackedexperienceof operationalcommandin combat.
18Generalof the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe(GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday
and
Company,1949),211.

16
advisor concerningports and shipping for the theateras well as the coordinatorof
19
Allied naval operations in support of ground forces.

Eisenhowerbrought his own Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell "Beetle-

Smith; his G-2, Major GeneralKenneth Strong; and a host of minor appointments

from his Mediterraneanheadquarters.Marshall had chosenthe G-3, Major General

Harold R. Bull, the man who was expectedto be Marshall's G-3. Marshall also

selectedLt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley to lead the American First Army. Tentatively.

Bradley was dual-hattedto create a "First Army Group" Headquarters,though its

permanent commander was not named. Bradley expected to move up to that

command.His successas an army would

commander determinethat; his promotion

was by no meansa foregoneconclusion.

Other appointmentsin the theaterincludedBritish SecondArmy Commander,

Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey,a former corps commanderunder Montgomery. Lt.

Gen. Harry H. G. Crerar was named to command Canadian First Army; he had been

the Chief of Staff in Ottawa and had commanded the I Canadian Corps for a short

period in Italy. His deputy, Guy

Major-General Simondsat 2 CanadianCorps.was the

most battle experiencedof the Canadiancommanders.Lt. Gen. George S. Patton

the
commanded AmericanThird Army. Having beenrelievedof commandof Seventh

Army after the Sicilian Campaignfor slappingtwo soldiers,Pattonby seniority and

experiencemight have had the American Army Group command.His tempestuous

temper and rampantxenophobiahad ruled out the appointment,but Eisenhowerhad

19RobertW. Love, Jr. andJohn Major, eds.,The YearqfD-Da r. The1944Diarv ofAdmiral Sir
'
Bertram RamsaY[hereafterreferredto as Love and Major, RamsayDiaq] (Hulf* University of Hull

17
 him. Bradley, his superiorat "First Army "
Group, had not wanted Patton in
retained

the theater. Eisenhower had not consulted Bradley concerning this. Patton also

functioned as the "commandee'of a mythical Army Group under the FORTITUDE

deception plan, aimed at deceiving the Germansinto believing the main Allied

20
landingswould be in the Pasde Calaisarea.

The AmericanNinth Air Forcein Englandhadmovedfrom the Mediterranean

with Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton its Eisenhower

as commander. also brought Lt. Gen.

JamesH. "Jimmy" Doolittle to commandthe Eighth Air Force.Other Mediterranean

England for OVERLORD included desertairmen Air

commandersthat migrated to

Marshals Arthur "Maori" Coninghamand Harry Broadhurst,

who commandedthe 2

21
Tactical Air Forceand 83 Group respectively.

As assigned,Eisenhower'scommanderswere the most experienced,proven

combat commanders of any Allied theater. None were strangersto combined

operations,to high-level command,or to the pressof battle. While a host of lesser,

unprovencommandersroundedout the the

commands,
subordinate key leadersall had

the confidenceof their servicesandcountriesbut not, necesssarily,

of one another.

Press,1994);Rear-AdmiralW.S. Chalmers,Full Cycle: TheBiographýv ofSir BertramRomeRamsav

(London: Hodderand Stoughton,1959).
20MHI, Papersof ChesterB. Hansen:Bradley Commentaries. Theseare unnumberednotecards
containingquestions,comments,and answerspreparedby GeneralBradleyin responseto his "ghost"
author,Lt. Col. ChesterB. Hansen.Hansen,Bradley'saide and keeperof the HansenDiary, drafted
Bradley's memoir,A Soldier's Story (New York: Holt, 1951). Bradleyheld Pattonin contemptfor his
conductin Sicily. Numerouscommentsconcerningthis and his distrustof Pattonand his motives can
be found in the commentarics.
21Vincent Orange,Coningham:A Biography
ofAir Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham(Washington:
Centerfor Air ForceHistory, 1992),passim.The fulsomeforeword to the Americanedition noteshe
"is the architectof modemairpower." British Army officers universallythought Broadhurstto be more
effective and cooperative,andthat he wasthe actualairmanrunning combatoperations.

18
 The Allied Commandwas, after all, a coalition. Publicly, the coalition faced

together,
challenges and sensitivitieswere Controversy,
respected. while airedthrough

national channels, was well known, but above all, attempts to make decisions

adversarial at the Combined Chiefs level were avoided. For the Americans. in

particular, having been by

chastened their own Commander-in-Chief
over TORCH,

the Chiefs had learnedto agreeto disagree.Inwardly, they held grudgesthat never

healed.Battles,then, were fought not simply in the meetingroom but betweenfield

whose
commanders own servicechiefs saw them as "'champions"
of their nationaland

servicepoints of view.

The differing national views on commandposed significant problems at the

operationallevel. "Unity of Command"as defined by the Americansmandatedthat

one Allied hold

commander supremecommandin eachtheaterof operations.Unlike

the Great War, national commanderswere not given the right to appeal decisions

directly to their governments,though this policy remained unofficially in force

on the CombinedChiefs. At no time during the war

through national representatives

did any government overrule a SupremeCommander'sdecisions by CCS action

prompted by a commander's disagreement,

nor was any Supreme Commander

relieved as unsuitableto the approval of America or Britain. While disagreements

were common,and frequentlyfeelingsran high, commandersobeyedordersregardless

of what they felt be

would the military consequences 22
of decisions.

Essentialto maintainingthe command,however,was that seniorcommanders

remain free to act within the purview of their own authority within their own

2' Pogue, The Supreme Command, 4 1.

19
commands. This was challenging in that the British demanded to work x6thin a

system naming a separate senior commander responsible for air, ground. and naval

operations, essentially subordinating all nations by service to one command. a tighter

"
description of "Unity of Command. While the Americans always held the Supreme

Command position in the war against Germany, the separatecommands had fallen to

British officers. This was deeply resentedby the Americans. who

senior, experienced

did not accept the "experience" argument-nor were their ideas on warfare congruent

with those of Commonwealth officers. By 1944, with the preponderance of combat

forces for first time shifting to the Americans, this brought about near revolt by the
the

American commanders whose views, through press leaks or divination. were

frequently the subject of American press discontent with British influence in running

the war. Roosevelt, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Marshall were adamant

that 1944 would be an American year-that once the invasion was launched, Britain

and her commanders would have no influence and little say in the strategy of the

23
war.

Despite its position as land base for the invasion and host to more than 200

airfields for the American air force its

and contributionas the dominantU-boat killer

and escortforce in the Atlantic war, custodianandprimary producerof specialsignals

intelligence (ULTRA), and deliverer of the tremendousweight of bombsdroppedon

Germanyby BomberCommand,Britain's dwindling groundforcewas seenas making

23This is bome out by the Americanrefusalto reconsiderANVIL, evenat the peril or OVERLORD,
Marshall's refusalto accepta British officer asGroundCommander,and Marshall's and Stimson'sire
during the Normandycampaignover newspaperstoriesreflecting"British dominance"of the war.
From OVERLORD onward,it also becameEisenhower'stask to virtually refuseany direct pleasfor
decisionsor actionsin favor of a British view to be takento the CombinedChiefs. For an example.see
Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,225-226.

20
Britain the decisively junior partner in the war in Northwest Europe. Britain's

issues.
as well as thoseof Canada(which Ottawakept to themselves),
also
manpower
for
becameprime considerations any operationslaunched.Britain could not afford

if it was to fight to the end of the war, a fact the Anglophobic

major casualties

American press frequently used by claiming the British were "'not pulling their

"
weight. American generalshabitually and disparaginglyused the word "caution-

regardingBritish to
attempts avoid unproductiveblood-lettings,
as had beencommon

in World War I. It was also used as a blanket insult to describe any American

doctrinalor philosophicaldifferenceswith the British approachto battle.

The last point was a major philosophicaldifference.American generalshad a

virtual blank check on losing both men and equipment.No American generalswere

threatenedor relieved due to heavy losses; only outright failure or national

brought
embarrassment on sackings. From 1943 onwards, British generals were

warned that manpower shortages would require the "cannibalizing" of major

24
formations to provide replacements. Moreover, as the war lengthened, with

bombardmentby planesand soon missiles,rigid rationing, the massmobilization of

women, and the return to the colors of middle-agedGreat War veterans,Britain's

national psychewas particularly Its

vulnerable. presstrumpetedany success
of British

arms, real or, in the minds of the Americans, "stolen" fiom themselves.Its war

leaders--Churchill, Slim, Mountbatten,and Montgomery--often spoke of "morale"

as the magic formula to keepthe nation functioning.

24F.W. Perry, TheCommonwealthArmies: Manpowerand Organisationin Two World Wars

(Manchester:ManchesterUniversity Press,1988),Chapters2 and4; The War Office, Manpower
Problems: TheSecondWorld War 1939-1945,Army (London: 1949);Stacey,Arms, Men and

21
 Yet, how this moralewas achieved.too, wasa key irritant within the coalition.
I-
American generalsread British newspapersand heardBBC broadcasts,and stupidly

believed that such organs should have been dedicatedto the glorification of the

American war effort and the triumph of Americanarms.They resentedany positive

commentsthat either comparedfavorably British arms or downplayedor excluded

25 werelikewisenot as objectiveor all-

Americancontributions. Americannewspapers

in
encompassing their coverageof the war, though these,of course,did not appear

within the They

theater. were, however,a frequentstimulusto Stimsonand Marshall,

who reportedto Eisenhower

the criticism of columnistsduring the first monthsof the

26
invasionthat the British werecontrollingthe war.

Most prominent amongcommandissuesat the operationallevel were those

C
inspired by personalities,and by the inherent prejudicesheld among the separate

services.Compoundedby nationalistic views, these issues-not those of strategic

policy handeddown by the headsof governmentand formulatedasplansand military

directivesby the CombinedChiefs-posed the greatestproblem to senior command

functioning.In the realm of operations,the actualconductof military actionsdesigned

to supportthe strategyhandeddown by accomplishingtasks,achievingobjectives,and

Governments,Chapter7; Carlo D'Este, Decisionin Norman4v(New York: Dutton, 1983);Chapter 15

is of particular interest.
21
* During separateinterviewsin the early 1980swith two prominentUS wartime commanders,Lt. Gen.
JamesM. Gavin and Gen.J. Lawton Collins, the authorwasstunnedby their voluntary and emphatic
commentson the British pressduring the war. This, they both volunteered,had causedgreatproblems
over -who was winning the war."
26G.E. Patrick Murray, EisenhowerVersusMontgomeq: TheContinuingDebate(Westport.Conn.:
GreenwoodPress,1996),12,19,171. Murray assesses the postwarfight of the memoirs,as well as the
problemsencounteredduring the war, including thoseof public opinion; Larry 1.Bland,ed., and
SharonRitcnour Stevens,assoc.cd., ThePapersof GeorgeCatlett Marshall, IV, "Aggressiveand
DeterminedLeadership, " June 1,1943-December31,1944 (Baltimore:JohnsHopkins University
Press,1996),550-551.

22
 establishinga jumping-off position in time or place for the next sequencedaction
C

called for by the strategy-this was the most intense in

environment the coalition.

Operationalcommandershad to harmonizethe actionsof combinedservicesin

battles and multiphased operations.Moreover, while strategy had the benefit of

modification over time, operationswere immediate, their results stark. Operations

succeeded,failed, or were jumping-off phasesto new operations. With the immediacy

of time and the gauge of successthe ruling standard,pressureson commanders

magnifieddifferencesamongcommanders.Given the disparatepersonalities,services.

and nationalities involved, conflict was commonplaceand was most intenseamong

the seniorcommanders.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower,as SupremeCommander,fell between two

stools. As the executor of the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directives, he straddled

strategicand operationalcommands.Since 1942,he had dealt in the etherealrealm of

pleasingtwo political bosses,while retaining

0 the confidenceof his military superior,

Marshall, as well as at least the nominal support of the CIGS. Alanbrooke.

Eisenhowerwas uniquely qualified to participatein the "Higher Direction of

War," but was not acceptedas a field commanderby the British. Eisenhowerhad

graduatedin the famousWest Point Class of 1915,the class the "stars fell on." By

dint of age and opportunity,this classsuppliedthe Army with 58 generals,including

the senior American ground commanderfor the invasion,Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley.

Commandingthe US Army's tank training campin World War I, Eisenhowermissed

the GreatWar. Marked early as a man of ability, Eisenhowerdistinguishedhimself in

23
the next two in
decades two realms,neitherof them in connectionwith the leading of
C
27
troopsin the field.

Eisenhower became a star in the burgeoning Army school system,

distinguishing
4:1 himself at the Commandand GeneralStaff School,the War College,

College Armed Trained

Forces. Staff
General officer, he
and the Industrial of the as a

servedboth the Assistant Secretaryof War, and later Army Chief of Staff Douglas

MacArthur, both in Washingtonand later in Manila. Promotedto colonel in 1940.he

briefly commandeda regimentand was the Chief of Staff for Third Army during the

Louisiana Maneuvers,serving under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, arguablythe Army's

besttacticianand trainer.

Following Pearl Harbor, Eisenhowerwas selectedto head the War Plans

Division of the War DepartmentOperationssection, thus becoming the principal

overseer of the Army's strategic plans. Chosen by Marshall to establish the

groundwork for the Cross-Channelattack, he was named Commanding General,

EuropeanTheaterof Operationsin June 1942.As such,he was the principal planner

acting for Marshall with the War Office Staff in London.

Eisenhower,oncedescribedby his son as "intense," was ambitious,energetic,

high strung,and an efficient administrator.Highly intelligent,he had spentmost of his

careerservingthe great.Oneof his contemporaries

who commandeda battalion,while

Ike actedas brigadeexecutiveofficer, notedthat Eisenhowertold him that his motto

27Eisenhowerdid not attendhis own branchschoolfor infantry, which focusedon the tacticsof that
arm from platoonto regimentallevel. The staff schoolcenteredon division and corpsoperations.The
War College,in Eisenhower'stime, dealt with "strategy" and the preparationof war plans.The
IndustrialCollege dealt with the industrialmobilization of the United States.Combinedwith his

24
was, "The CommandingOfficer is neverwrong with "
me. That
-18 trait never left him,

and Eisenhowershowed remarkableskill in adhering to the smallest ideas of his

Marshall,
commander. whom Eisenhowerserved,had carefully tested and selected

someonewho could act not simply on the boss's wishes, but who could perceive.

predict, and perform exactly how his superior thought. Fortified with an endless

from
number of messages the War Eisenhower
Department, acted as if he were still

down the hall from his Chief While he realizedthe necessityto succeed,his mental

29
test of every decisionno doubt had to be, "What would Marshall say9" A perfect

follower himself, he deeply resentedthe two Army Group Commandersunafraid to

standup to him, Montgomeryand Devers.

Eisenhowerproved to be an ideal subordinateto Marshall's ideasduring his

time in London. Alanbrooke noted that his first meetings with Eisenhower had
30
literally made no impression. This rapidly changedas the Americanspressednot

only for action in 1942 but for a landing in Francecalled SLEDGEHAMMER. As

Eisenhower's duties involved him with planning the second front, Churchill and

others soon saw the American in conferencesand as advocate for the War

Department'sand Marshall's views. SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, the two

serviceboth with the civilian and military headsof the Army, Eisenhowerwas exceptionallywell
preparedin the theoreticaland policy realmsof warfare.
28Brig. Gen. Bradforth Chynowcth,Bellamýv Park (Hicksville, N.Y.: ExpositionPress,1975), 101.
29Grahamand Bidwell, Coalitions, 177,
notesthat Marshallensured"Eisenhoweractedas if he were
the greatChief of the Army Staff's deputy,and his loyal agent." The thousandsof pagesof message
traffic from the War Departmentto SHAEF and the personaland official correspondence of the two
menbearthis out. JosephP. Hobbs,Dear GeneraLEisenhowers WartimeLettersto Marshall
(Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins Press,1971),offers a selectionof lettersfrom the published
EisenhowerPapers,with commentaryon the relationshipof the two men.
30Danchev
and Todman,Alanbrooke War Diaries, 276.

25
primary plans advocatedby the Americans. were producedby Brigadier General

31
Eisenhower'sPlansDivision beforehe movedto London.

TORCH, seenby the Americansas the substitutefor ROUNDUP.was placed

under Eisenhower's he
command,and was promotedto lieutenantgeneral.TORCH

demonstratedEisenhower'sobeisanceto Marshall. He ably supportedMarshall*s

intentionswhile establishinga completelyintegratedcoalition headquarters,setting

0 a

model that would be repeatedthroughoutthe Mediterranean

and Northwest Europe

32
campaigns.

Eisenhoweralso establishedhis patternof giving priority to political-military

requirements rather than operational requirements. The North Africa experience

showed that the Supreme Commander had little time to intensively supervise a ground

campaign. Following the winter stalemate in front of Tunis, Alanbrooke ensured that a

senior British commander, General the Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander, became the senior

ground commander, essentially taking Eisenhower out of the direct operational chain

33
of command.

Tunisia, however, was a watershed in Allied conunand relations. The

American setback in the Kasserine Pass battles painted the American command

31J.M.A. Gwyer, GrandStratelD,,III, PartI (London: Her Majesty'sStationeryOffice, 1964),Chapters

XXIV, XXVIII; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,StrategicPlanningfor Coalition IYarfare 1941-
1942(Washington:Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953).
32EisenhowerPapers,1,11,passim.Eisenhowerreportedhis every move and decisionto Marshall and
continuedto function almostasa memberof Marshall'soperationsstaff. While it was apparentthat the
British would haveto approveEisenhower'sgeneralconduct,the patternof telling Marshalleverything
and his Allies only what wasrequiredwasestablishedduring this time frame. Eisenhower'sinsistence
on almostdual chairmanshipof major staff functionsis describedboth in Pogue,TheSupreme
Command,49-55, ChaptersIII and IV; and in FrederickMorgan,Overtureto Overlord (London:
Hodderand Stoughton,1950),ChapterIX.
33Danchevand Todman,AlanbrookeWarDiaries. 365. Eisenhower
wascharmedby Alexander
despitehis job to keep Eisenhowerisolatedfrom operationalinfluence.

26
 in bad light, as well as prompting American discontentwith the British
structure a

The
Army commander. arrival of Patton brought a foil to what was seenas British

Bradley's
condescension. replacementof Patton, and his insistenceon an American

in
task the final drive after Alexanderhad to
attempted pinch out the American Corps.

brought American feelings to a fever pitch. The drive on Bizerte had established

American competencein their own eyes.To the British, they remained,in too many
34
mouths,"our Italians."

The incipient hostility betweenair and ground commandersbudded during

Coningham'shandling of American air units and his argumentover air support with

35
GeorgePatton. From Tunisia onwards,the AAF and RAF grew togetherin defining

air-ground operations, in which the Americans would eventually surpass their

The
teachers. RAF and British Army were driven farther apart as the Mediterranean

war went on, mainly due to Coningham's and Tedder's personal resentmentof

36
Montgomery.

The subsequent American actions of Patton's Seventh Army in Sicily

worsened feelings. Patton saw the campaign as a "horse race" designed to bring

himself, and hence the Americans, glory. Bad feelings continued onto the Italian

3i MHI, Bradley Commentariesdepictsthe deepAmericanresentmentof "British treatment"of the

Americans.SeealsoHansenDiaty for the period March-May 1943.
35Orange,Coningham,144-149,Daniel R. Mortensen,A PatternforJoint Operations:fflorld 9ar 11
CloseAir SupportNorth Africa (Washington:Office of Air ForceHistory/USArmy Centerfor Military
History, 1987),84-88. Patton,who wanteddirect control of air units, waswrong, and Coningham's
insistenceon centralizingair to supportthe main effort wascorrect.Pattonfalsely paintedthe incident
as American-Britishsquabble;in reality, it was a doctrinal argumentwhereinPattonfollowed US
doctrine soonto be replacedby FM 100-20,Commandand EmploymentofAir Povver.
36D'Este, Decisionin Normandy,218-220,
passim;Orange,Coningham,passim;authorinterview with
Vincent Orange,1997.concerninghis forthcomingbiographyof Tedder;Nigel Hamilton,Master of
the Battlefield: Monoy's;Var Years1942-1944(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company,1983),
passim.

27
peninsula with the entry into operationalcommandof Lt. Gen. Nlark '"'. Clark.

37
anothercloseEisenhowerftiend, whoseAnglophobiamatchedPatton's.

Throughout, Eisenhowerattemptedto appear to be an honest broker. He

earned the respect of the Allied staff and the loyalty of the three operational

commandersin chief, all British officers. He impressedthe CIGS as an overall Allied

coordinator,but not as a commander.It is logical that Americanand British policies

andcommanderswould clash-the armies,after all, werecut from far different cloths.

One individual commanderseemedto be a firestarter,a lightning rod for contempt,

That individual was Alanbrooke'strustedprot6g&,

controversy,and counterargument.

General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, commanderof the then legendaryEighth

Army.

Montgomery had reachedthe summit of his career by dint of unyielding

professionalism.Blunt, opinionated, and a quick study, Montgomery's ruthlessly

analytical mind fed an outspokenmanner,not designedto pleasesuperiorsor Allies.

In the GreatWar he had risen from decoratedand woundedplatoon leaderto Division

Chief of Staff. He had servedunderthe war's greatset-pieceattackspecialist,General

Herbert Plumer, and had learnedthe value of organization,training, and planning. In

the interwar, he had revised the Army's infantry manual, had twice been a staff

college instructor of somerepute,had participatedin both gas trials and amphibious

warfare tests,and had seenactive servicein Ireland and Palestine.No mossback,he

had embracedairpower and motorization. and had experimentedwith the use of

37MartinBlumenson,Mark,Clark(NewYork:Congdon andWeed,1984).
Clark'sdiaryis full of
to the"poordumbBritish,
references " andheconsistently themof -lackof drive.
accuses " In June

28
airborne forces while in Corps Commandin England. His performancein Francein

1940,and during the freneticpreparationsto meetan expectedGermaninvasion. had

in his 38
Alanbrooke's
cemented confidence operationalabilities.

Montgomery's personality was both a blessing and a curse. Confident. earnest,

he inspired great loyalty from subordinates and hatred from those who
and egocentric,

tried to control him. His personal ruthlessness with the ungifted had
opposed or who

a fear of him by many, but his attempts to bolster morale and to achieve
merited

the profitless waste of life that had characterized his view of

victories, while avoiding

the Great War, had earned him an almost messianic following among British soldiers

British He to evoke instant contempt from American generals

and the public. seemed

being popular with US soldiers whose units he visited and later

while contralily

39
commanded.

Central to the divide among the ground commandersby nationality is the

figure of Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley,the commanderof US First Army and later 12th

Army Group. As such, he led the American forces in the Normandy campaignand

would be the key ground force on

commander the continent with the largestbody of

national troops. Unlike his contemporary Montgomery

commanders, and Devers,

1944,he deliberatelydisobeyedthe ordersof his superior,Harold Alexander,regardingoperationsto

seizeRome.Nothing wasdone.
3'Nigel Hamilton, Mom: TheMaking ofa General,1887-1942(New York: McGraw Hill Book
Company,1981); The VýarOff ice, Infantq Training, Volume 11,;Par(London: War Office, 1931).
3' Hamilton,Master ofthe Battlefield, 596, citesa letter from Bedell Smith regardingMontgomery's
visits of US troops.Currentmemoirs,coloredby the "GreatestGeneration"crazein nostalgia.and
influencedby the 1950swave of telling their sonsthat -America won the war," havea distinctly
Anglophobictinge to them,with Montgomeryoften namedby men whoseranksand positionswould
havescarcelymadethem awareof the manother thanthroughnewspaperpictures.In interviewsin
1983and 1984with Lt. Gen.JamesM. Gavin and Gen.J. Lawton Collins, both told the authorthat
they "liked" Monty, and that he was"good to work for," thoughboth were quick to point out that they
didn't necessarilyagreewith his battletactics.Gavin commentedthat he had seenMonty frequentlyat

29
Bradley commanded a pure national force generally free of "in house- national

40 Beginning his in Tunisia, Bradley began to harbor

sensitivitieS. with experience

distinctly anti-British feelings, and took umbrage at slights real and imagined from his

Allies. Like most American generals, he held French colonial troops in contempt.

Patton's self-styled competition with Montgomery soured Bradley on both men.

Fanned by his own growing press as the "G. I. General," Bradley saw himself as the

US Any decision that favored anyone but 12th

protector of prerogatives and prestige.

41
Army Group he typified as"anti-American.,,

Bradley, a careerinfantryman,had seenlittle troop service.He had missedthe

GreatWar, and had spentmost of the interwarperiod eitherattendingor servingat the

Army's schools. This included service under George C. Marshall at the Infantry

Schooland extensiveserviceat his almamater,West Point. He wasthe first officer of

the Class of 1915 to be promotedto brigadier general.Soft-spoken,and outwardly

kind, he was a humorlesstaskmasterandwas quick to relieve generalofficers. He had

beenan extraordinarilygood corpscommanderin Tunisia and Sicily and was an able

infantry tactician. Undemonstrativelybut ardentlyambitious,like Eisenhowerhe was

a mindless follower of the "boss is always right" philosophy, though it might be

the front during the Ardennes,andthat he had neverseenhis own AmericanArmy commanderduring
the battle.
4"The sole exceptionto this
wasthe assignmentof the French2d Armored Division to Bradicy's army.
MontgomerycommandedAmerican,British, Czech,Canadianand Polishforceswithin 21 Army
Group. Devers;commandedboth a US anda Frencharmy.
41MHI, Bradley Commentaries,passim;Generalof the Army Omar N. Bradley,A Soldier's Story
(New York: Henry Holt and Company,1951);Omar N. Bradleyand Clay Blair, A General's Life (New
*
York: Simon and Schuster,1983).The cleareststatementsof Bradley's feelings and prejudicesare
recordedin the question-and-answer interplaybetweenBradleyand his aide andghostwriter, Lt. Col.
ChesterB. Hansen.The more subduedbut distinctly anti-Montgomcryversionwaspublishedin
Bradley's memoir,A Soldier's Story.A moreshrill and undependable posthumously-writtenand co-
authoredsetof -memoirs" was later publishedwith Clay Blair. The day-to-daybarometer,often
distant,is the HansenDiary.

30
argued he grew to see the real "boss" as Marshall, the American. rather than

42
Eisenhower,the Allied general.

Lt. Gen. JacobL. Devershad outrankedEisenhowerin the regular army and

had followed Eisenhoweras Commanderof the EuropeanTheater of Operationsin

late 1943;he later was Deputy SupremeAllied Commander,Mediterranean.He was

chosen to lead the SouthernFrance campaign and would eventually be an Army

Group Commanderunder SCAEF. Eisenhowerpossesseda distinct but unclarified

43
Devers. It is that Eisenhower
resentedhis refusal to send
prejudiceagainst possible

American bombers to the Mediterraneanwhile he was overseeingthe American

buildup in England. Whatever the reason, Eisenhower tended to avoid giving

responsibility to thosewho were not "in his "

camp. The upshotwas a remarkableset

of military decisionsthat defied logic-made solely to diminish Devers' role in the

44
NorthwestEuropecampaign.

Unable to ignore Montgomery becauseof his status as senior Commonwealth

Commander, Eisenhower attempted to downplay Devers' influence and would

abandon any reasonedattempt at creating Army Group sectors based on terrain, basing

them instead on his personal attitude to commanders.

42Bradley kept a closecar to Washingtonviews, wascareful to expoundhis pro-Amcricanmessage

during Marshall's visits, and confirmedhis "aggressiveness- in personto Marshallby expressinghis
strongdesireto fight in the Pacific after the Europeancampaignhad finished. Bradley,thoughcritical
of Eisenhowerafter the war, went to greatlengthsto visit his bossand,of the threeArmy Group
commanders,was the only one who actedasconfidantefor the SupremeCommandcr.
43EL, Interview with Devcrs.It is telling that Devers,when interviewedby the EisenhowerLibrary
and
askedabout Eisenhower'sleadershipabilities, repliedthat he wasunfamiliar with them.
" EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2467-2469.Eisenhower's
rating of Deversafter his oppositionto Ikc's plans
to withdraw from the Colmar Pocketin the AlsaceCampaignwere stinging,and in largemeasure
uncalled-for.In this February1945rating of officers' contributionsto the war, he ratedDevcrs24th of
his generals.

31
 the coalition. In
The airmen posed a special personality problem uithin

to the expected normal strong personalities, a consistent tension existed

addition

between the airmen and the ground soldiers. The Royal Air Force had achieved status

as a separateservice from the British Army in 1918. Airmen, however, used the term

"independent." It was an article of faith that not only were the airmen "separate," but

they would not be The American Army Air Force,

subordinatedto their sister services.

although reorganized as one of the Army's major components in 1942. was still an

45Arnold his statuson the CCS to the

organic componentof the A4
My. owed sitting

to to Portal. Arnold acted independently,

as if a
need provide an oppositenumber

service chief, though he deferred to Marshall-except on issues concerning air.

he
whereupon acted with equal status.It was widely believed that the AAF would

46
becomea separateserviceafter the war.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedderwas Eisenhower'sDeputy Supreme

Allied Commander.As such,he was the seniorairmanin the theater,thoughbe served

as a Deputy without portfolio. Tedder was an organizerand technocrat.His service

during the Great War was distinguishedbut not exceptional.During the interwar he

had specializedin the developmentand acquisitionof aircraft. He had becomeAir

Officer Commander-in-Chief,(AOC-in-C), Mediterranean,and had demonstrateda

genius for organization,logistics, and strategyin the of

employment air forces in the

4%In March 1942,Marshallhad streamlinedthe army by reorganizingit into the Army Ground Forces
(AGF), Army ServiceForces(ASF). and Army Air Forces(AAF). The ASF and AAF retained
commandauthority over like units regardlessof theater.The groundforceswere assignedfrom the
Zone of the Interior (ZI) to eachrespectivetheatercommander.The dual reportingsystem,designedto
bring efficiency to a servicefighting worldwide, wasa boneof contentionbetweenevcry theater
commanderand the War Departmentin Washington.
4' HermanS. Wolk, Planning and Organizingthe PostwarAir Force 1943-1947(Washington:Office
of Air ForceHistory, 1984).

32
Mediterranean campaign. Appointed Eisenhower's Allied Air Commander in 1943, he

formed a close partnership with the American and retained Eisenhower's fiiendship

47
and support.

Tedder's appointmentas Deputy pleasedEisenhowerbut foretold problems

within the commandstructure.Tedder, a firm disciple of Lord Trenchard. did not

view the army favorably.In fact, he claimed that he was the actor who had placedthe

wedge betweenthe American Army and its Air Forces,who by doctrine "supported"

48 His to was
cooperate very much seenthrough RAF-Azure
the ground arms. ability

eyes. While his service feelings may have intensified the feelings, Tedder despised

Montgomery,and nevermissedan opportunityto criticize him to Eisenhower,Portal,

his "old friend and protector" Trenchard,or the staff. Working to underminehim, he

would also try to engineerMontgomery's relief Moreover, he sought to expandhis

own brief by attempting to control the USSTAF through Eisenhower,and also to

CCS tactical Leigh Mallory.49

the
unseat appointed air commander,

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory had beenappointedon Portal's

recommendationto the position of AOC-C-in-C, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces

47Author interview with Vincent Orange.the Pentagon,1997.The authorgainedvaluableinsight from

Orangeinto Tedderand his feelingstoward Montgomery.
4' RoderickOwen, Tedder(London: Collins, 1952),196-207.Tedderviewedhis role in the
MediterraneanaseducatingEisenhoweron air power.The Americansviewedtheir changein doctrine
asthe result of their own ideas.Lt. Gen. E.R. Quesadamentionedto the authorthat the Americans
owed much of their techniquesand ideasto the British DesertAir Force.
49D'Este, Decisionin Normandy,Chapter4. D'Este hasthe mostcompletediscussionof interservicc
and interpersonalrelationsamongseniorcommandersfor NorthwestEuropeavailablein a credible,
objectivesource.While the authorhashadthe benefitof examingdiariesand correspondingwith or
interviewing severalof the war commandersstill alive in the early 1980s,it must be notedthat D'Este
and Nigel Hamilton were the last two authorsto interview thosecloseto the war commandersbefore
their agestook them. I am grateful to extensivediscussionswith both thesehistoriansover the past
decadeand admit their influence.Finaljudgmentsexpressed,however,arc unabashedlymy own.

33
 his directive in 50
November. Leigh Mallory had
(AEAF) in August 1943,receiving
Cý
been commander of Fighter Command and had held operational command positions

1937. He had the experienceof Combined Operations in supporting the ill-fated

since

Dieppe landing, and had been planning the second front as part of the Combined

51
Commanders.

Leigh Mallory was consideredstuffy and distant but was professional and

thoroughlycapable.He hadbeena premierdeveloperof Army Cooperationwithin the

RAF, and hadparticipatedin the famous1918Amienstank action as a supportingair

squadron commander.He had been Commandantof the School of Army Air

Cooperation.Leigh Mallory was despisedby Tedder, who attemptedto block his

appointment,and then to unseathim. Tedder poisonedEisenhoweragainst Leigh

Mallory, and combinedwith Spaatzto attemptto havehim removed.Failing official

action, he appointedhis favoredsubordinateAir Marshal"Maori" Coninghamas the

"AOC, Advanced Headquarters,AEAF," as a way to eliminate Montgomery's

coordinationwith him. Tedderurged Spaatzto refuseto serveunder Leigh Mallory,

and managedto acquirethe power to coordinatestrategicbombersunder his role as

soNAC, RG 24, Volume 20420,File 969(D4),COSSAC(43) 81.16 November1943,Directive to Air

CommandcT-in-Chicf, Allied ExpeditionaryAir Force.The directivestatcdthat he was"to excrcisc
operationalcommandover the BRITISH and AMERICAN Tactical Air Forces.supportingthe invasion
of North-WestEUROPEfrom the United Kingdom." Pogue,TheSupremeCommand.13,14.48.
51AWC, MS, RoyalAir Force Narrative: TheLiheration
ofNorth WestEurope. 1944-1945[hereafter
referredto as RAFNarrativel, VolumeI "The Planningand Preparationof the Allied ExpeditionaryAir
Forcefor the Landingsin Normandy" (London: Air Historical Branch.the Air Ministry, n.d.). Chapters
I and 2 cover the organizationof AEAF and the formation of 2 Tactical Air Force(2 TAF); Bill
Newton Dunn, Big Wing.- TheBiographyofAir Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory
(Shrewsbury:Airlife Publishing, 1992).This book is largely basedon the Leigh Mallory Diary, which
is heavily excerptedin the book. The original diary includesonly the period from 5 June 1944to 15
August 1944.

34
Deputy, SCAEF. Apparently,he had hopedto acquire Leigh Mallorýv*sportfolio, by

eliminating0 AEAF.

Coningham.proved an additional problem. Hating both the ArmY and

Montgomery, he sabotagedany attempts to streamline or facilitate Army-Air

53While to undermineLeigh Mallory, he would eventually

cooperation. attempting

attemptto cripple Army-Air relationsby trying to relieve the AOCs of both 83 and 84

Groups,both of whom "cooperated"with the Army. While he did engineerthe relief

of the 84 Group he
commander, was in
unsuccessfid dealing with Harry Broadhurst,

the popular, cooperative,and dynamiccommanderof 83 Group, who was a personal

he 54
favorite of Monty's and esteemedby the groundcommanders supported.

Spaatz added further fuel to the air command fire by informing Leigh

Mallory's deputy, an American, that his loyalty was to the Americansand not to his

commander.Subsequently
relieved on Leigh Mallory's demand,the new American

deputy, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, proved willfully ineffective in aiding Leigh

152
Davis,Spaatzand the Air War,294,309-319; Air Vice-MarshalE.J. Kingston-McCloughry.The
Direction of War.ýA Critique ofthe Political Direction and High Commandin War (New York:
Praeger,1955), 116-135.
'3 QuesadaInterview, 1984.Lt. Gen. E.R. Quesada,Commanderof IX TacticalAir Commandin
NorthwestEurope,and a closeassociateof Coningham,told the authorthat Coningham'shatredof the
British Army was vocal and constant,and that he was surprisedthat Coningharnwas not relieved.
Admitting that Coninghamhad taughthim much,he saidthat Coningham'smotto wasnot to support
any action that the army told him to support,and to cooperateonly if he had beenpart of the planning
and conception.
54NAC, RG 24, Churchill Mann Papers,"Lecture Air Support."
on

35
 55 formed "Niediten-aneanNlafia. " with
Mallory. Taken together. the airmen a virtual
c
56
Leigh Mallory the odd man out.

While theprincipalscameto the tableunhappy,%ithoneanother.they were, at

least during the OVERLORDplanningstage,ableto cooperateto plan and mount the

invasion. In this effort, Eisenhower'srole as coordinatorand arbiter was essential.

Cooperation,however, was ftirther impeded by something that Tank-,

' position,

i-C-
organization,or evennationalitycould not Solve, the differing -approachto battle-

philosophiesthat each service and nationality held. While Eisenhower sought to

separatenations and servicesalong operational lines, the operational level often

requireda harmonization that was affectedgreatly by the

or synchronizationof effort

tacticsand equipmentof eacharm. Given the tendencyto compareeachother's efforts

negatively,this was the foundationof muchunwarrantedcriticism at commandlevels

within the Allied camp.

During the planning stage,this first manifesteditself within the air command

structure. Tedder correctly convinced Eisenhowerthat as theater commander, he

should hold the operationaldirection of the strategicbombers,a commandauthority

that Eisenhowerhad great trouble obtaining from the CCS. Given the authority to

have strategicbombersoperate"under the direction" of SCAEF, Eisenhower's first

challengewas to settlethe disputeover their Tedder

employment. improved on Leigh

"' Davis, Spaatzand the Air War,354-355;Philip S. Mcilingcr, Vandenberg.TheLife

ofa General
(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press,1989),4445.
16The principal "Mediterranean-experienced"
seniorair commanderswere Tedder.Spaatz,Doolittle,
Brereton,Coningham,Vandenberg,and Broadhurst.Only Harris, who wasentrenchedat Bomber
Command,sharedLeigh Mallory's lack of Mediterraneanexperience.

36
Mallory's interdiction programme,creating a new design called the Transportation

Plan. 57

This plan was contestedby Arnold's airman, Carl Spaatz.He believed that

USSTAF could not only drive the Luftwaffe from the skies by direct assaultagainst

Germany'seconomictargets,but also drive Germanyfrom the war. The key target to

bring defeat,Spaatzheld, was Germany'soil andpetroleumproduction,not simply in

fields but in the for 58

oil plants syntheticoil.

Eisenhower's fight to obtain control of the air did not produce a tangible

decision to attack transportationuntil 25 March 1944.The first bombing attacksby

the Americansdid not proceeduntil May, though RAF bombing had begunin March.

Despite ongoing British participation, Churchill muddied the waters with repeated

delayingthe American 59
concernsover civilian casualties, participation.

The Transportationargumentlay at the root of Air Forcedoctrineandpractice.

Both USSTAF and Bomber Command viewed themselvesas "Strategic Forces"

operating under POINTBLANK. The "Bomber Barons" viewed their campaign as

complementaryto, but separatefrom, OVERLORD. While Spaatz and Harris no

doubt believedthat their contribution was significant in its own realm, they also held

firmly to not permitting the enemyindustryandeconomyhealingtime while the heavy

bombers supportedOVERLORD. Moreover, the specterof heavy bombersdirectly

5' Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,123-133;John L. Sullivan, Overlord s Eagles:Operationsofthe

United StatesArmy Air Forcesin the InvasionofNorman4v in World War11(Jefferson,N.C.:
McFarlandand Company,1997),ChaptersSix and Seven;Solly Zuckerman,From Apesto Warriors
(New York: Harperand Row Publishers,1978),passim.
58AWC, RAF Narrative, 1,Chapters7 - General
and 8; W.W. Rostow,Pre-InvasionBombingStrategv.
Eisenhower'sDecisionofMarch 25,1944 (Austin: University of TexasPress,1981); Davis,Spaatz
and the Air War,354-357.

37
 had happened
at Salemoand Monte Cassino.was
supportingground operations,as
rý

to
viewed asa misuseof aircraft andantithetical air doctrine.

force forces. 2
While combining the strategic bombing with the tactical

Tactical Air Force(2 TAF) and the US Ninth Air Tedder

Force, was straddlingbelief

systemsas well as mixing specializedforces.His own belief was that airpower was

bestusedfor OVERLORD in "isolating the battlefield,"' an operationalmission,rather

than for providing closesupport,a tactical missionrequiringclosecontrols.Tedder's

fence-sittingpleasedEisenhower.it gavehim on-call useof the bombers,but it also

gave Tedder, as executive agentý the role of defacto -Supreme" Allied Air

Commander-a position Arnold opposedfor any British airman.60

Both the RAF and the AAF held that not only the air forces were to be

"independent" forces but also "equal" to the ground forces within a campaign.

Surprisingly,consideringtheir feelingstoward the man, GeneralMontgomerywas a

championof this belief andwidely quotedas suchin AAF circles.His publication of a

pamphlet, "Some Notes On High Command in War," for his army was seen as

supportive,if not one of the catalystsfor the Army Air Forces'own publication of a

doctrine stating its independence

and equality,Field Manual (FM) 100-20,Command

Employment 61
ofAir Power.
and

5' Davis,Spaatzand the Air War,400408.

60Churchill wantedTedderto control all air, a way of insertingBritish
control over air operations.
Arnold had wantedSpaatzto be SupremeAllied Air Commander.
61US War Department,Field Manual(FM) 100-20:Command
andEmploymentofAir Power
[hereafterreferredto as FM 100-20](Washington:21 July 1943);NARA, RG 18, entry 294, Central
Decimal File, Memorandumfor GeneralArnold, Subject:New Air PowerDoctrine,G-3, Army Air
Forces,June8,1943, cites Montgomery'seffect: Vincent Orange,David R. Mets, Daniel R.
Mortensen,and David Spires,Air Powerand GroundArmies: Essayson the Evolution ofAnglo-
AmericanAir Doctrine 1940-1943(Maxwell A. F.B., Ala., Air University Press,1998),passim.

38
 While Tedder assuredthe airmen he would prevent their "misuse" by the

army. Tedder'sprot6g&Coningham.
attemptedto bureaucratize
the air supportprocess

as a way to eliminate army control. As he would prove later in the command, as

smooth techniqueswere worked out Coningharnwould attempt to relieve the air

62
commanderswhom he felt had grown too closeto the army.

Tedder's own successat controlling the "bomber barons" causedproblems

with Doolittle, who resentedhis influence.Nor were the tactical air forces under the

closecontrol of AEAF. It was rumoredthat Brereton,of Ninth Air Force,tendedto go

his own way from Coningham's"Forward Headquarters"that he was subordinatedto.

Brereton, who also was waging part of the pre-invasioncounteraircampaign,earned

Bradley's dislike when he failed to makeNinth Air Forceassetsavailablefor training

63
in lieu of the combat operations commanderswere then managing. It must be
his

stressedthat while the operational air commanders-Tedder, Spaatz, Coningham,

Brereton, and Doolittle-were not consideredsympatheticto army problems, their

subordinateswho commandedthe fighting elements(Broadhurst.Brown, Quesada.

and Weyland) were consideredgenuineheroesby the soldiersand their commanders.

Toward the end of his command,Leigh Mallory, too, would be seenby Montgomery

as helpful for the Army's problems.

QNAC, RG 24, Volume 10671,File 215CI.093(D3),Air Support,Air Supportin SecondBritish

Army and First CanadianArmy, Brussels,31.5.45.This documentdiscussesthe specificsof the
organizationand techniquesdevelopedfor air supportwithin 21 Army Group, Churchill Mann Papers,
Air Support,ibid.; Ian Gooderson,Air Powerat the Battlefront: Allied CloseAir Supportin Europe
1943-1945(London: FrankCass,1998),2240,43.
63David W. Hogan,A CommandPost 9ar., First Arm Headquartersin Europe. 1943-1945
at
(Washington:Centerof Military History, 2000),45,65; 'v
Sullivan, Overlord's Eagles,5-18.

39
 for however-
OVERLORD. must be
in
The resulting air campaign preparation

fight bombersa theater

considereda success,and Eisenhower's to make strategic

least for the invasion, The bombers

valueof thestrategic targeted
asset,at wascorrect.

rail
against centersin lieu of fighter-bombers rail
conducting cuttingwascontroversial

64
disputed. Beyond the of the bomber
and the results the military results, arguments

from and intensifi

icd
commanderstcndcdto drive the airmenfartheraway the soldiers,

Tedder'sdemandthat the army captureairfieldsto easethe air situation.Later, when

Leigh Mallory drew directly on the strategicbombersfor support,personalrelations

betweenthesemen would reachan all-time low.

The approachto battle by the groundcommanders divisive than for

was more

the airmen. In the air, the RAF and AAF sharedcommonideas,though their tactics

and techniques were different. For the operational ground forces, the basic

philosophieswere more subtly different, and the differencein their own equipment

and organizationaldesign distorted the perceptionsof one another,s effectiveness.

Compoundedby differing experience,nationalism,and a more personalinterchange

required for coordinatingside-by-sideground operations.it was understandablethat

participantsoften perceiveda chasmof differencerather than a common operational

view. Worse still, unlike the airmen, there was a cancer of perception that had

developed from their first battles together in Tunisia. Hard feelings begun in the

Mediterraneanhad followed the commandersto England.

'4 Rostow,Pre-InvasionBombingStrategv,72-87; Sullivan, Overlord s'Eagles,153-180.Sullivan's

analysisis the most detailednonofficial analysisand critique of the TransportationPlan. It is
particularly critical of Tedderand his strategist,Zuckerman.andtheir claims of success.

40 tý
ý
 The operational differencesreflect the Allies' Great War experience.The

British Commonwealthhad fought from August 1914to the Armistice; the Americans

enteredthe war in April 1917,but did not enter combat in substantialnumbersuntil

the summerof 1918and not with a full field army until September.First US Army

had seenbut 110 daysof action.Their scarslessdeep,the Americansexaminedtheir

short experience differently. Moreover, the interwar posed fewer common

The
experiences. British Army resumedits Empire duties,America withdrew from the

world stage.

Montgomery's view of combat reflected the collective experience of the

British Army. At the tactical level he stressedpreparationfor battle; at the operational

level he clearly saw campaignsas sequencedand timed battles, designed first to

destroy enemy forces in situ, and then to grind up the inevitable counterattacksand

reinforcements that would arrive. This reflected a deep understanding not only of the

reality of fighting a numerically larger army, but also experience in fighting the

German army, an army possessedof the tactics and talent to fight an attrition battle in

depth.65

Montgomery's views and talent matured from the desert to Europe, though his

campaigns were stereotypical due to the realities of equipment, organization, and the

6"GeneralB.L. Montgomery,SomeBriefNotesfor Senior0jfIcers tile ConductofBattle, Some

on
Noteson High Commandin War (Eighth Army, 1943);Field MarshalB.L. Montgomery,High
Commandin War (21 Army Group, 1945).21 Army Group,SomeNoteson the UseofAir Power in
SupportofLand Operationsand Direct Air Support(21 Army Group, 1944);21 Army Group,Some
Noteson the Conductof War and the Infantry Division in Battle (21 Army Group, 1944);21 Army
Group, TheArmouredDivision in Battle (21 Army Group, 1944);StephenBrooks,ed., Montgomeiy
and the Eighth Armvý*A Selectionfromthe Diaries. Correspondence and Other Papersof Field
, Montgomeq
Marshal the Viscount ofAlamein, August 1942to December1943(The Bodley Head:
Army RecordsSociety, 1991).Montgomery'spamphletsand correspondence encapsulateboth his
operationalviews and the "approachto battle" he usedin his commands.

41
terrain. In the desert,he was forced to fight a war of mobility with an infantry-heavy

army, lacking in the skills and tactics of armoredwarfare and only freshly supplied

with the gun-powerto defend its immobile troops from armoredattack.At Alamein,

he failed to control his inept armoredcorps commander,and spentpreciousfuel and

transporton leap-froggingforward airfields for the DesertAir Force in the pursuit

from Alamein. Yet Coninghamwhoseairfields were moved forward, failed to make

Rommel's one-roadretreat a "highway of death" while simultaneouslydamningthe

army for not moving faster. His Sicily and Italy campaignswere mountainbattles.a

mismatch of organization and capabilities of his heavily wheeled forces too late

configured for the deseM and now thrust on different fields. While his symphony

approachto battle was refined, he lacked the forces and space to conduct true

operations, nor was he given the weight of air effort to support simultaneous

interdiction and closesupportoperations,both necessaryfor keepinga battle fluid. 66

As events would show, Montgomery's views had adjusted to a wider but

different Europeanbattlefield, to include the new value of gun-powerthat had made

the armoredblitzkrieg impossibleexceptunder conditions createdby an absenceof

the enemy or the destruction of his forces in depth, to include his reserves.

Montgomery's plans and actions proved he

understood the difference between

operationsand tactics,andhow to usetacticsto createan operationaldecision.

Eisenhower,however,had not weighedthe battlefield but was simply

repelled
by the man. In 1943,Ike hadwritten:

66Hamilton. Master Ofthe Battlefield, 3-52.

42
 Montgomery is of a different caliber from some of the outstanding
British leadersyou have met. He is unquestionablyable, but very
conceited. For your most secret and confidential infonnation, I will
give you my opinion which is that he is so proud of his successesto
date that he will never willingly make a move until he is absolutely
certain of success-in other words. until he has concentratedenouch
resourcesso that anybody could practically guaranteethe outcome.
67
This may be unfair to him, but it is the definite impressionI received.

Eisenhowerwould spreadthis gospelbeyondMarshall to his American subordinates

and senior staff, giving licenseto the anti-Monty flavor that SHAEF.
permeated

But it was military principle, not personality,that was the real issue.The issue

of concentrationwas key. Concentration,particularly of the self-mobilepanzercorps,

was critical in the 1940 to

campaignand was used gain an decision.
operational-level

Abandoning this concentrationand the idea of sequencedoperationalobjectives to

support a strategic objective, the Russian campaign had stalled, irrevocably.

Montgomery's own observationon thesecampaigns,and his view that the British had

failed in Africa due to piecemealcommitmentof forces,influencedhis thinking. He

68
balancedtactical and operationalconcentration.

Despite his reputation for outnumberinghis enemies,that reputation is less

than accurateconsideringthat the greatestnumbersadvantage,evenat Alamein, was

in overall forces,not necessarilyat the point of attack on the Germanfront line. He

sought to have superiority of fires, enough forces to hold open a penetration,and

reserves to meet a fluid situation. Montgomery understood the German principle of

6' EL, ButcherPapersand EisenhowerPapers,11,1070-1071. In the printed version,this sectionhas

beenpurged;Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 210-211.
" Brooks,Montgoineq
and the Eighth Army, passim.This volumedemonstratesMontgomery's
,
thinking and showshis progressionof thought concerningoperations;StephenAshley Hart,
Montgometyand "Colossal Cracks". The21stArmYGroup in NorthwestEurope, 1944-1945
(Westport,Conn.: Praeger,2000), Chapters4 and 5.

43
 6"
the Schwerpunkt,concerning 9 for
4:1 concentratin main efforts or at a critical point.

The issue for all of his operationswas not "the break--inbattle," it was dealing with

enemyreservesashe "broke out."

He also stressed "grouping," called task organizing by the Americans.

Montgomery"grouped"at corpslevel. The Americantendencywasto taskorganizeat

lowest levels using a standardcorps mix of two infantry and one armoreddivision,

with the key attachmentsbeing artillery,

CIP additional ammunition for artillery. and

apportionedair sorties.The American tendencyto use armoreddivisions as a corps

standardin nonarmoredterrain,to includeholding ground,andthe British tendencyto

shift armor to reserve, or to use it only for specific attacks,was viewed by the

Americansas"cautious."

The Eisenhowerview of concentrationat the operationallevel had brought

stalemateor disasterrepeatedlyto Allied arms in the Mediterraean.His support of a

"far" landing in Casablancato pleaseMarshall,ratherthan a closerlanding to weight

his attack for Tunis, the strategicobject; his far-fetchedSATIN plan to dashlaterally

acrossTunisia without roads, transport,or logistics that brought on the Kasserine

fiasco; his wasteful landingof Eighth Army in the toe of Italy, ratherthan pushing for

a secondarmy-sizedlanding north of Salerno;and his farcical plan to outlflank the

Winter Line in Italy with a single division which hatched the too-small
and

subsequentlydisastrousAnzio landings-all of thesewere the result of staff college

maxims concerningboldnessand maneuverthat played well in crayon on maps,but

which the Germansoften turned into bloody horror-showswhen attemptedwith real

Hart, Montgomeq and "Colossal Cracks, " ibid.

44
troops. Failure. in
of course, was accorded military tradition to Ike
subordinates.

learnednothing.

Concentrationwould be a hallmark of Bradley's Normandy operationsuntil

August, after which dispersionand maneuverwould beg for a new campaignplan and

Bradley would return to the Eisenhowermodel. While American practice stressed

time and rapidity over complete planning or concentration,a key distinction from

British practice, the result when resistancewas met was stalemate,and a pauseto

in 70
concentrateand attack strengthon a narTowfront.

The key issuefor the groundcommanderswas the level of commandat which

battles were fought. Army4evel was really the lowest level from which air, artillery

groups, armored brigades or separatebattalions, engineers,signals, and a host of

supportingarms as well as transportand logistic support could be apportioned.and

constituted,at the time, the pure operationallevel of war. Corps, the largesttactical

elements,fought battles grouping resourcesand divisions provided by the Armies.

The Army Groups createdan operationaldesign for the use of the annies to support

the theatercampaignplan. The army commanderswere the key catalystsin carrying

out operations,and the Army Groupsthe key catalystsfor campaigns.Army Groups

and Armies had correspondingair headquartersthat co-locatedto ensurea seamless

battle, a systemthat had been developedby Montgomeryand Coninghamin North

70Michael D. Doubler,Closing With

the Enemv.How GIs Fought the War in Europe. 1944-1945
(Lawrence:The University Pressof Kansas,1ý94),passim.This is the most detailed
study of US
tacticsandproceduresusedin NorthwestEurope.US generalstendedto view -operations"merely asa
bigger scaleof tactics;the relation of tacticsto operationshas
not beencoveredby historians.

4S
Africa. 71 Coningham, however, Montgomery in Northwest
never co-located with

Europe,Montgomerystickingto his dictum that he to

needed be closeto the front, and

Coninghamfeelingthe army commandershouldmoverearwardto be with him.

Regardlessof country, successfulcommandersboth plannedand taskedtwo

levelsdownward.72To do less invited disaster.Montgomery'stendencyto seebattle

this way appalled the Americans, though the frequency of American division

commanders being threatened by Army commanders or relieved by Army

indicates
commanders that the Americans the but
practiced sameprocedure, without

written orders. Army Groups and Armies normally wrote letters of instruction or

operationalmemorandaas opposedto publishing formal orders or plans after the

campaignplan hadbeendevised.

The American and Commonwealthforces often misunderstoodeach other

acrosstheir formation boundaries,

a factor that becamecritical when operationshad to

be harmonized, or timed as complementaryto each other. Montgomery saw the

battlefield as interelatedsectors;Bradley, as it will be seen,did not. Eisenhower's

view, however, would be most important. As SupremeCommanderand Ground

" Hamilton, Monýv:TheMaking

ofa General,638. This wasapparentlyMontgomery'sidea.
Coningharnhad retreatedto more rearwardairfields during the battlesprecedingFirst Alamein. The
groundcommander,Gen. Sir ClaudeAuchinleck,remainedforward to commandand inspirea
faltering army. In orderto collocatewith Coningham,Monty movedthe Army Headquartersrearward,
severelyhamperinghis own battlecontrol during SecondAlamein, during both the battle and the
pursuit.As with all World War 11actions,commandandcontrol washamperedby an overrelianceon
wire communicationsand undependableAM and FM radios.
72The
author is indebtedto Oberst-Dr.Heinz Golla, GermanArmy, who asChief of ExerciseBranch,
CentralArmy GroupNATO, pointedout that the true translationof "mission tactics" as seenby the
Germanarmy provided for this and recommendedthat RichardE. Simpkin's Raceto the Swift:
Thoughtson 21st Centu?: v Warfareis the bestsourcein Englishconcerningthis topic. A discussionof
taskings"two down" is essentialto understandthis. See,RichardE. Simpkin, Raceto the Swift.'
Thoughtson 21" Century Warfare(London: Brassey'sDefencePublishers,1985),232-234.Bruce
Condell and David T. Zabecki,eds.and trans.,On the GermanArt War: Thippenfuhning(Boulder,
of
Colo.: Lynne Reinncr,2001), is a translationof the Germandoctrinal manualusedduring World War
11.

46
 Forces Commander-in-Chief,his views and his command style would shape the

upcoming campaign.

In 1943,writing to his fiiend Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,Eisenhower

outlined 1-ýs
views on Allied Command:

The true basis [for Allied unity of command] lies in the earnest
cooperation of the senior officers assignedto the Allied theater.

Referring to the position of GeneralAlexander, who was commandingthe

15th Army Group and had been designatedby the CCS as Deputy Commander-in-

Chief:

He is the Commander-in-Chiefonly of ground forcescommittedto an

operation ... he is coordinatewith the commandersof Sea and Air.
Thesetwo commandersare ordinarily with me.

The result is that I am the over-all groundCommander-in-Chief.and I

rather feel that it would be waste and duplication to assign another
individual to that particular position. Likewise, it would be a wasteto
keep a man indefinitely as "Deputy Commander-in-Chief' with no
other duties than to be just a stand-by in case of disaster to the
Commander.

Concerning the actual role of the Supreme Commander:

He is in a very definite sensethe Chairmanof a Board,a Chairmanthat

hasvery definite responsibilities.73

Eisenhowerwas describingthe problemsthat would arise with his "Deputy,"

Tedder,and also thosethat would surfaceover Montgomery'scommaýdof an Anglo-

American 21 Army Group. Further extolling his ideasin a secretdiary memorandum

in May 1944,he noted that of his three commanders-in-chieffor OVERLORD, two

were "ýtualistic" and needed more innoculation on unification. Clarifying the

47
comment for his probing Boswell. Butcher. he noted that these were
commanders

74
Ramsayand Leigh Mallory, not Montgomery.

"always
Eisenhower
Concerningthe exerciseof ground command, intended"

to establishthreeseparate "
"Commanders-in-Chief,andthat

the land force in eachnatural channelof march should have its own
directly 75
headquarters.
commander,eachreporting to my

How he would command,he explainedafter the war.

Examinationwill show that there were three great areasin which we

had to develop our operationsagainstGermanyproper and each of
theseareasdemandeda groundcommander-in-chief....
In eachof thesegreatzonesa battle line commanderwas'necessary and
each of them worked with his own tactical Air Force commander.
Above them, therewas one control only, strategy,and the allocationof
the massof the Air Forcesand logistics.That wasmy function and any
thought of inserting a ground commander between those three
76
commandersandmyself wasnot basedon logic.

The conductof operations,therefore,was his subordinates'role; his "stratee'

would overlay their operations,but no discussionor perhapsunderstandingof the

interrelationshipof the three ground commanders-in-chiefwas described,even after

the fact. OVERLORD's first challenge,the planningand executionof NEPTUNE, the

actual landings themselves,would ruthlessly test Eisenhower's"Chairmanship of a

Board," andwould mark Eisenhower'sgreatcharacterand skill in military diplomacy.

7'EisenhowerPapers,111,1420-1422.
74Ibid., 1880-1882.It is interestingthat he does
not mentionTedder,whoseentire influencewas based
on "ritualistic" practicesand who createdthe leastsmoothor cooperativeof any of the command
relationsfor the invasion.
" Eiscnhowcr,Chisadein Europe,223.
16EisenhowerPapers, VIII, 1574-1575.

48
 SHAEF's assumption of control of ground operations was far off, and

dependentnot on the planning staff's theoriesor philosophy but on the vagariesof

battle itself

49
 CHAPTERTWO

The SeedsOf Dissension

The COSSAC,Lt. Gen.FrederickMorgan,madea tremendouscontribution to

OVERLORD. The proposedOUTLINE OVERLORD that he forwardedat the end of

July 1943 openedthe door for serious considerationof OVERLORD as a "sound

operation of war." He confirmed the location of the invasion, gave the operation a

tentativestructure,initiated key Allied planningand,most important,had obtainedthe

"
President.
approval of the CombinedChiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister, and the

The great strategicdebatethat had plaguedthe Allies, namely the time and place of

the Cross-Channel attack, was given a solution. Henceforth, the operational

requirementsof the plan took over.

Churchill, upon seeingOUTLINE OVERLORD, said that it neededto be -25

percent larger.
" But decisive debateover the size of OVERLORD was squelchedat

the CombinedChiefs level. The Americans,perhapsfearing a British ploy to cancel

the operation,pushedfor its immediateacceptance.The British, perhapsfearing the

operationwould fail, wanted additional discussionof the concept.No changeswere

madeuntil January1944,after the for 78

appointmentof commanders the operation.

By that month, the SupremeCommanderdesignate,his chief of staff and his

newly namedgroundcommanderall had similarly pronouncedthe landing force to be

too small. The invasionof Sicily (OPERATIONHUSKY) had alreadyproceededwith

77 MHI, MS,
"History of COSSAC";Morgan, Overtureto Overlord, which is an expansionof the
COSSACmanuscript,descfibesthe planningand problemsin dctail.
79D'Este, Decisionin Normandy,is
the most analyticalwork on the NormandyInvasionplans,and the
beginningsourcefor any historical discussionof their development.

51
 Surely
landing,. a direct assaulton FortressEuropewould require a
a seven-division

This obvious had

however,
debate, not been by
addressed the Combined
greatereffort!

Chiefs in their early discussionsof COSSAC's plan, and world-wide allocation of

forces landing hadbeenmadewithout to

reference needs
expanded for
naval and craft

Europe. The landing craft issuewas further complicated by the proposal for a

landing OPERATIONANVEL in the southof France,

as a "
"diversion, a
simultaneous

conceptquickly seizedupon by Stalin, who saw sucha landing as a part of a massive

compression designed
envelopment to trap the Germanarmy in the west. The wish,

haunt development 79
not the reality, would OVERLORD's andeventualconduct.

Nor had GeneralMarshall, the presumedfuture commander,addressedthe

issue when Morgan travelled to Washingtonto brief him on developmentsand to

begin establishinga personalrelationshipwith the man whom he believed to be his

future boss.Marshall's failure to prompt a strategicreview of assignedassetsproveda

major blunder, eventually delaying the actual landings by a month and revising the
80
proposed"diversion" landingin the Mediterranean.

The lack of naval lift had restricted the COSSAC plannersinto crafting a

three-division assault,a deficiency that GeneralEisenhowerimmediately sought to

79GordonA. Harrison,Cross-ChannelAttack (Washington:Office of the Chief of Military History,

1951), 123.
" ChesterWilmotý TheStrugglefor Europe(London: Collins, 1952),135-138;Morgan, Overtureto
Overlord, ChapterVIII, doesnot discussthis issueregardinghis meetingswith Marshall.Apparently
Morgan wascontentto acceptthe 1943strictureson size,and did not makeissueof them with
Marshallor anyoneelse.

52
 eliminate.Montgomery.the 21 Army Group Commander.
was taskedby the Supreme

91
Commanderto revisethe plan, basedon a five-division lift for the first wave.

Five divisions offered more than a broader,strongerattack.They permittedan

entirely new Despite

concept.
operational the operation'sjoint nature,the possibilities

offeredby the enhancedgroundplan controlledthe revision for NEPTUNE, the name

assignedfor the OVERLORD landing. As long as resourcespermitted,air and naval

forceswould conform to the ground commander'sconceptwithin the limits of their

own operational capabilities.

Montgomerywas quick to seizethe opportunityto shapeNEPTUNE. Unhappy

with the size and concentration offered in the COSSAC plan. and charged by

Eisenhower to strengthenthe assault, Montgomery arrived in London intent on

widening and deepeningthe assault.By his arrival he had studied COSSAC's plan,

but was not convincedthe plan had consideredthe requirementfor ports within the

lodgementareaas the prerequisiteto the operation'ssuccess.Not mesmerizedby the

assaultalone, Montgomery's calculationsconsideredthe Allied buildup versus the

arrival of Germanreserves,and the subsequentattrition battlesthat would developas

the correlationof forcesswungtowardsfavoring the defenders.Not just more forces,

81Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe,219; Field MarshalBernardL. Montgomery,Norman4vto

the
Baltic (Germany:British Army of the Rhine, 1946),9-14; Field MarshalBernardL. Montgomery,The
Memoirsoffield-Marshal the ViscountMontgomeq ofAlamein [hereafterreferredto as Montgomery,
Alemoirs](New York: The World PublishingCompany,1958),189-191. Pogue,TheSupreme
Command,108-109;Generalof the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,Reportky the SupremeCommander
to the CombinedChiefsofStaffon the Operationsin Europeofthe Allied Expeditionaq Force 6 June
1944to 8 Mav 1945(Washington:Centerof M ilitary History, 1994)(reprint), 3; MH1, PapersofDr.
Forrest C. Pýgue [hereafterreferredto asPoguePapers],Interview with GeneralEisenhowerby Col.
S.L.A. Marshall,3 June 1946.

53
but more deployment spaceand the necessaryport facilities or shelteredbeaches

82
becameprime requirementsto be solvedby the plan of attack.

Montgomery's first objection, therefore,should have been predictable.Why

were no landings plannedwithin the key Brittany peninsula,the key to the entire

Americanbuildup plan?Major GeneralCharlesWest,the seniorArmy planner.ticked

including
off the parameters, beaches,
air support airfield possibilities-all in the

minus column rather than It

the plus. was not, however, the end of Montgomery*s

drunifire questioning of the COSSAC plan and was the beginning of a three-day

83
dissectionof the plan, its logic, andthe possibilitiesfor expansion.

Montgomery did acceptthe logic of landing in the Bay de la Seine.but he

immediatelyveeredfrom Morgan's underlyingbelief in a single key to the operation.

Morgan's plannershad, in fact, statedthat Caen'spossessionwas necessary"to avoid

defeat early in the operation." While this would be addedto the Air Force's trump,

64
airfields" as symbolizing near failure during the actual the
operation. of
nuances both

the COSSAC plan and the Eisenhower-approvedMontgomery revision, plus the

plan's subsequentexecution in Normandy, must be in

examined tandemto see the

foundationof the rift betweenEisenhowerand SHAEF, and Montgomery,that would

preventthe executionof a harmonizedcampaignplan for the restof the war in 1944.84

82CMH, Historical Section,USFET,"Outline of Noteson History of Planning," 1,providesthe most

detailedsummaryof planninginitiatives and details.A carefulassessment of both the COSSACplan
and the Initial Joint Planis essentialto understandthe NEPTUNErevision.COSSACwas also referred
to as"OVERLORD ONE" after its acceptanceand during its refinementin the fall of 1943.
83 Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield,491-495,
summarizesthe planner'spostwarinterviews, MHI,
PoguePapers,Interview with Major GeneralKennethR. McClean,11-13March 1947;Interview with
Major GeneralRay W. Barker, 16 October 1946;D'Este, Decisionin Normandy,62-67.
84MHI, MS, War Cabinet,Chiefs Staff Committee,"OPERATION OVERLORD" Report
of and
Appreciation,30 July, [hereafterreferredto asCOSSACPlan],21 (Para.96).

54
 COSSAC's outline plan froze an operational concept for all to see. Never

intended to be "a plan," the outline theorized a concept of operation within a rigidly

defined construct of both fTiendly and enemy orders of battle. While identifying key

terrain features and the necessaryports for development, and setting a 90-day schedule

for accomplishing the development of the lodgement at the Seine River, COSSAC's

outline did not plan actual operations, provide concrete intermediate objectives,

specify a line of operations, or propose an operational policy. Rather, it sketched

hypothetical phase lines and, in theoretical annexes, proposed possible axes of

85
advance.

Critical to the outline, was the limit placedon the probableenemystrengths.

beyond which the outline was not considereda "sound operation of war." This

correlationof forces,to include the critical buildup of enemypanzeror otherwisefirst-

class divisions, gave the plannersa fair, even if hypothetical,manner in which to

estimateif the both

operations, at the time of landing and during the three months

to
estimated createthe full lodgement,
would be a success,a failure, or a stalemate.As

such, thesewere the most important, yet virtually invisible, portions of the Morgan

plan. How the correlation was made, updated,and assessed,arguesthe essenceof

Allied intelligence, planning and, moreover,the processof "forecasting" seemingly

86
unavoidableat the SHAEF-CCSlevel.

While COSSAC and its staff argued against the Montgomery revision,

COSSACneveradmittedthat the enemyreactionto the original outline was predicted

85COSSACPlan,
passim.
F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligencein the SecondWorldftr, Volume 3, Part2 (New York:
CambridgeUniversity Press,1988),Chapters43,44.

55
to be larger than originally foreseenin the August 1943concept
as Montgomerywas

revising the plan. Moreover,this updatedthreat in

analysiscalled questionthe basic

lines of operationlisted as possiblein the outline annexes.The enemythreat would

87
continueto grow right up until the actuallandings.

COSSAC listed the ports of Cherbourg and the Brittany peninsula as

OVERLORD's prime objectives,but saw Caen as the key D-Day objective. Caen

becamethe campaiogn's
red herring.At ten miles from the shoreline, it was too far to

be considereda logical assaultobjective on the landing day, COSSAC's planners

solved their problem by assigninga coup-de-maincaptureby the airborne as the

logical solution.This would be accomplishedby the assignedtwo-thirds of a division

88
lift, permittedby the CCS directive.

Caencontrolled the key roads enteringthe OVERLORD areafrom the prime

Germanconcentrationareasnearthe Pasde Calais,aswell aspossessinga geographic

location at the mouth of the best avenueof approachfrom the OVERLORD area

toward Paris. From the point of the attacker,Caen would be a magnet for enemy

divisions the invasion 89

mobile counterattacking area.

Caen's attraction,however,becamean air force mantra,and its possessiona

repetitive incantation that distorted its value to the ongoing attrition battle in the

OVERLORD area.At the time of the COSSACplan's conception,air superioritywas

a major preoccupationfor the planners.With the daylight bombing of Germanyin an

87COSSACPlan,8-9 (Para.36), Hinsley,British Intelligence,3, Part2,41-87, NARA, RG 33 1, Entry

1, Box 59, File 350.09/3,"Buildup of EnemyForces," SHQ AEF, (44) 17,12th February1944.
88COSSACPlan,27 (Para.21), 8.7-90(Appendix"0"). The
plan envisionedthreelifts with an elapsed
time of 16 hours.

56
 incipient stage,the actualdefeatof the Luftwaffe asa prerequisitefor landingwas not

seenasan immediatelyviable object.The requirementto weaken,andthereafter"hold

off, " the Germandaylight fighter force fi-omthe landingareas,was as key an enabling

task for a successfulinvasion as protectingthe fleet and providing for a logistical

buildup in the invasionarea.Caenwas seenasthe key to maintainingair superiorityin

90
the invasionarea.

Montgomery's Irinaloutline provided for a "main effort" in eacharmy zone.

the object being to ensurethat OVERLORD'sprime requirementsof a lodgementarea

could not be eliminated by a single enemy concentration.The original COSSAC

plannersbaulkedat what they felt would be a dispersionof effort and lack of focuson

Caen.Morgan,had in fact, counteredthat a strengthened

OVERLORD shouldhavean

additional division in the landing, all pointed at Caen.Additional airborne lift could
91
go to the Caencoup-de-main.

The NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan promulgated by the Combined Commanders

on I February 1944 was, in fact, the only written campaign plan accepted by the 21

Army Group Commander, and the initiating planning document for ground battle

plans. Its stipulations cancelled COSSAC's outline plan, a fact resisted by Morgan,

misunderstood by Eisenhower, and ignored by Tedder and Monty's enemies at

SHAEF. It provided the very broadest of "master plans" upon which subordinate

planners could base their estimates and upon which commanders could begin their

own tactical planning. Monty intended, and indeed continued throughout the

s' COSSACPlan,22 (Para.104),98 (Appendix V, Para.1).

90COSSACPlan,4 (Paras,8- 1, Map "M B"), 8 (Paras.34-35).

57
 his
reassess orders in the
preparationand executionphase,to sharpen,modify, and

light of newly developedintelligenceand later an unfolding enemyreaction.But the

initial Initial Joint Planwasthe real "Master Plan."

The Initial Joint Plan listed its intention:

The intention of the Joint Commanders-in-Chiefis to assault

simultaneously immediately North of the Carentan Estuary, and
betweenthe Carentanestuaryand the River Orne, with the object of
securingas a base for ftirther operationsa lodgement areawhich will
includeairfield sitesandthe port of Cherbourg. 92

Theseintentions Morgan's not only

assessments, concerningCaen
overturned

focal but also regardingthe existenceof the marshyterrain that divided

as the point

the lower Cotentin in the vicinity of the Carentanarea.COSSACbelievedthe enemy

could use both to a

separate wide landing and provide a defensibleposition to prevent

a cohesive lodgement from forming, and also to block a southernmove from the

93
CotentinPeninsula. One seaborneand two airbornedivisionswould essentiallyform

"' D'Este, Decision in Nonnan4v,66-68.

92MHI, MS, and First United States Army, Report of Operations [hereafter referred to as FUSA Report
of Operations], 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, Annex 1, Intial Joint Plan, I February 1944, Para. 26;
NARA RG 33 1, Decimal 322.01 PS to 327.22, Box 47. SHAEF Summary Directives, SHAEF (44) 22.
10 March 1944, Subject: Operation Overlord, to the three -commanders-in-chief. " is an interesting
paper deserving comment. It cancelled previous COSSAC planning directives and addressesthe
command function and notes that "Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, is to command all ground
forces engaged in the operation until such time as the Supreme Commander allocates an area of
responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group. " By implication, this will be at the
end of Phase I of the operation, the establishment of the beachhead, and the capture of Cherbourg and
the airfield sites. Phase 11,the capture of Brittany, is absent from the commandladministrative
appendix.
More intriguing is paragraph 2 1, that states, "You will adhere to the broad design of the operation
as given in the Outline Plan [COSSAC] which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. "
Considering his directive to Montgomery to "direct and coordinate planning for the seizure of the
...
lodgement area and for initiating operations subsequent to the.seizure of the lodgement area," it can be
assumed that Eisenhower did not find COSSAC binding on the conduct of the campaign, except for the
idea of landing in Normandy and establishing a lodgement including the Brittany ports. This conflicts
with Eisenhower's later views on the plan.
93COSSAC Plan, 5 (Para. 17), 6 (Para. 26).

58
their own lodgement,
too far to immediatelyseizeCherbourg.
to immediatelyblock

94
the Cotentin,or to quickly link with the main beachesto the east.

Specifictasksallottedto eacharmy,both on D-Day and during the subsequent

expansionof the lodgement,

weredescribed:

The tasksof First United StatesArmy in orderof priority will be:

(a) to captureCherbourgasquickly aspossible;
beachhead
(b) to developViervflle-sur-Mer-Collevifle-sur-Mer Southwards
toward St. Lo in conformity with the advanceof SecondBritish
Army.
The main task of Second British Army will be to develop the
bridgeheadSouthof the line Caen... St. Lo and Southeastof Caenin
to
order secureairfield sitesand protectthe flank of First United States
Army while the later is capturingCherbourg. 95

COSSAChad circumscribedthe lodgementbuildup by a seriesof phase-lines

timed to meet the 90 daysestimatedto capturethe sectordefinedby the SeineRiver

and to include the Brittany ports. This time was

requirement never challengedby 21

Army Group, though the placementof the timings of the lines did change.The lines

also were influencedby the armiesthemselves,who were requiredby the Initial Joint

Plan to submit their own time estimatesfor incorporationinto buildup 96

planning.

Phase-lineswere common in military plans. British offensives in World War I

94 L. F. Ellis, Victory in the ffest, Vol. 1,TheBattle ofNormand),(London: Imperial War Museum,
1962,1993), 138-139;Harrison,Cross-ChannelAttack, 186.Týe airborneplan waschangedon 27
May to reflect new intelligenceconcerningthe locationof Germanreserves.Underthe original
concept,the US 82ndAirborne Division would havebeentaskedto try to block northwardmovement
into the Cotentinby Gen-nanreservesand establisha blocking line north of the peninsula'sneck.
9' Initial Joint Plan,Paras.64,65.
96COSSACPlan,28,29 (Paras38-6);, 30-34 (Part III, Paras.1-11), Maps"MC, " "MD, " "MF-" "MF, "
MG," "MH, " "MJ, " "MK"; Montgomery,Norman4i,to the Baltic, Map 2 BasicConceptionArmy
Plan; FUSA Reportof OperationsOct 43-Aug 44, Annex 20,25 February1944,Forecastof
Operations.The initial Joint Plandid not issuephaseline maps,which were updatedthroughoutthe
planning processusing COSSAC'sD+90 line asthe base.Montgomery'spublishedmap was the last
issuedset of phaselines.

59
frequently used them, usually codedas namedcolor lines (i.e. Blue Line. Red Line

),
etc. and American operations
also madeprovision for their use,generallyas control

to 97These lines, then, were familiar controls not

measuresen route an objective.

predicted to spark controversy.VAfile the phase-linesgave SHAEF a scheduleto

measure,they did not indicate thrust lines, major objectives,or a key to the Army

" (See
Group's main efforts.Their formal title in the plan was"Forecastof Operations.

figure 3.)

Theselines becamea bone of contentionprior to the final briefing and later

by Montgomery's critics "to prove" that he and his plans had failed.
were used

Bradley, who in February had published phase-lines in his own plan, refused to have

them displayed during Montgomery's briefing and rehearsal during EXERCISE

in April. 98
THUNDERCLAP

Montgomery'sCanadianaidehadpredictedthat the phase-lineswould become

weapons for Monty's enemies; Montgomery apparently saw little concrete in their use,

either during the in

planning phaseor explaining the progress of his campaign. He did,

however, focus on one line, the D+17 line as measure of correlating forces with the

99
predicted enemy buildup. After that date, a temporary equilibrium was predicted.

" War Department,TechnicalManual20-205,Dictionar: UnitedStatesArmY Terms[hereafter

v of
referredto asDictionary of USArmil Terms](Washington,18January1944),200. This states,"Phase
,
line: conspicuousterrain featurechosen asa placewheretroopsmay be haltedfor control,
coordination,and further orders,etc. Eachphaseline is usedas a temporaryobjectiveon the way to the
final objective." Montgomeryusedphaselines during El Alamein and most sct-pieccattacks.
" GeneralJ. Lawton Collins, LightningJoe: An Autobiograpk),(Baton Rouge:LouisianaState
University Press,1979), 191,192; Hamilton,Masterof the Battlefield,560.
" NAC, RG 24, Volume 10433,21A Gp/oon4/G(Plans),26 February1944.The issuingdocument
accompanyingthe phaseline overlaysstated:"[T]he attachedmapsforecastthe possibledevelopment
of operationssubsequentto the assault.It is emphasisedthat this forecasthasbeenpreparedas a basis
for administrativeplanningandthat its fulfillment in practicewill be dependenton enemyreactions
which cannotat presentbe foreseen. "

60
 This crossoverforecastof the potentialbuildup of both the ffiendly and enemyforces

was key in determiningthe successof the drive inland. It would hauntcommanderson

both sidesanddeterminethe tacticsof the commandersin the field.

The plans forecastdemonstratedthe broadestconceptof operationsbegunby

Morganand acceptedby Montgomery,i.e., the primacyof the landingregion.the need

for ports, and that operations might develop to the Seine in about 90 days.

Significantly different, was that Brittany, and not the Caenavenueto Paris,was to be

the point of main effort for the Allied advance,andtherewould be no westwardwheel

toward the Cotentin after the airfield areasbeyond Caen and Falaise were taken.

Thoughsignificant argumentover the depthof the British penetration,its timing, and

its failure to procure the airfield territory south of Caenwould arise, all matters of

tactics,the fact was that the overall belief alwayswas that the Brittany ports were the

key to establishingthe lodgement-the true objectof OVERLORD.' 00

Montgomery did modify the most basic assumption of the COSSAC plan, the

total dependenceupon Caen as the only key to the operation. Morgan's planners had

identified the city as the key communications hub through which any substantial

German commitment of reserves would come and the portal to the airfield country

demandedby the air planners. The plan clearly stated,

Caen,the bottleneck,remainsthe key. It is essentialfor us to seizeearly if we

are able to avoid defeat in the early stages.It is also a valuable pivot for
operationsto developthe bridgehead. 101

'00COSSACPlan,2, "to securea lodgementon the Continentfrom

which further operationscan
develop.The lodgementmust containsufficient port facilities to maintaina force of sometwenty-six to
thirty divisions." Thesewerethe Brittany ports.
'O'COSSACPlan,para.96.

61
 Montgomeryreturnedto the most basicof the Principlesof War. Maintenance

NEPTUNE's basic lodgement,

madepossibleby the
of the Objective. object was a

early development
of Cherbourgand the Brittany ports. Monty would thereforestrike

for both Cherbourg,

as well as Caen,would be an early
out objectivessimultaneously.

"to avoid early defeat" as statedby COSSAC, not as a pivot to go to

objectives,

Brittany.

Two facts of terrain dominatedtactics in Normandy and predeterminedthe

type of fighting to be expectedon each flank of the Allied front. Caen, Morgan's

focus point and the areaof most interestto the airmen,offered open rolling terrain,

with long-rangefields of fire and goodgoing for tanksandvehicles.Caenalso offered

it
other opportunitiesthat would cause to be the (critical
Schwerpunkt point or focus

' 02
of effort) of the enemy'sdefense.

From the defender'sperspective,Caen, its plain, and the high ground to its

the
northeastconstituted major terrain localities neededto trap an invader landing in

NEPTUNE's easternzone.Takentogether,they walled in the invadersand permitted

major including
counterattacks, rolling up the invasion from east to west. From the

Caenplain, artillery could fire on concentrationareasand on naval craft inshore.The

terrain eastof the Orne River along the coast,likewise, was a logical stagingareato

interdict an inland advanceby long-rangefires, including those from fixed shore

. 103
battenes.

102COSSACPlan, 19 (Paras,86,87), 20 (Paras,88-93),98-103(Annex V, Paras.1-20,Annexurc I).

Annex "V" is a detailedtopographicand tactical studyof the area.
103COSSACPlan, 16 (Para.55), 21 (Para.98). Note thoughthe plannersidentified theseproblems,the
limited-sizc assaultprecludedtheir solutionexceptby airborneforcesor commandosnot provided in
the CCS-approvedtroop list.

62
 Montgomerysolvedthis problemby widening the beachassaultand dropping

an airborne division in this vital area. This reversedMorgan's favored route of a

direct, narrow-basedassaultwith an airbornedivision (minus) seizingCaenon D-Day.

Paget's21 Army Group intelligencesupportedMorgan's concept.Assessing

the two locatableGermanpanzerdivisionswithin striking distanceof OVERLORD at

Lisieux and Laval, 21 Army Group believed that the Germanscould counterattack

with infantry againstthe British beaches(Caen)in abouteight hoursand the American

beaches(Bayeux)in aboutten. Panzerattackscould form in aboutten and 14 hours in

thosezones,respectively.

Accepting a near-clairvoyantenemy that could both read and assessthe

situation that theselandingswere not diversions,and that a 12-hourwindow during

which no heavy support or armor could land until the next tide would require the

Schwerpunktto be the beachesthemselves,Paget's intelligence predicted that the

Germans would use both divisions to attack their respectivebeachesas soon as

possible, with the vital town of Caen '

bypassed.04The implication was clear. The

airbornewould be free to take the town and to consolidatetheir hold while awaiting

the battle of the beachesto be determinedby the main force. Caen,as the "key" to

victory or defeat,remaineda viable D-Day objectivefor COSSAC.

Montgomery lacked COSSAC's comforting estimates.By 1944, Rommel's

new broom had stresseda strongerforward defense,to includethe massiveapplication

of field fortifications, mines, and the closer siting of counterattackforces. It was,

104NAC, RG24, Volume 10540,File 215A21.014(D6),21 Agp/INT/1101/4,26 August43,

Appreciationof the likely action by two reservePanzerDivisions on 'D' day of OVERLORD ONE, I-
3.

63
doctrinally, the reinstitution of the defensetactics and structureof the 1917-1918

defenseof the west. VvUle Montgomerystressedboth the break-inbattle and the need

to gain depth immediately, one additional factor lay outside of Montgomery's

influence-the effective use of reservesby the defender.Two major operationswere

to affect these,one active and onepassive.The activeoperationwas the controversial

Transportation Plan meant to interdict and, as much as possible, isolate the

NEPTUNE area.The "passive" operationwas FORTITUDE, the famed"Bodyguard

of Lies" designedto fix German attention to the Pas De Calais area where it was

believedHitler andhis generalsmost feareda landing.105

FORMUDE gave one contradictoryblessing. If successful,it would hold

Germandivisions to the northeastflank of the invasion,the prime avenueof advance

toward the final objective-the Ruhr and the critical supply path for the British 21

Army Group, which intendedto use the Channelports as its lines of communication

and supply with England.Likewise, it gave the Germansthe opportunity to commit,

piecemeal,mobile towards
reinforcements the critical easternflank of the invasion,

while retainingstaticdivisions in strengthto coverthe threatenedPasde Calaiscoast.

Thesefacts shouldhave convincedEisenhowerthat Caenwas, as it was later

termed,more a shield than a pivot for the advance,and that the Allied effort though

lacking a designatedmain effort, would rely heavily on Bradley's forcesto penetrate

the dense bocage area while Dempsey's army crumbled away the German

counterattackforces drawn both to the major avenueand siphonedoff the Pas De

'0ý NARA 33 1, Entry 1, Box 59, "Estimateof EnemyBuild-up," op. cit. SHAEF (44) 21,26 February
1944,containsEisenhower'sdirective for FORTITUDE; RogerHesketh,FORTITUDE. TheD-Day
DeceptionCampaign(London: St. Ermin's Press,1999),passim.

64
Calaisreserve.Moreover,asintelligencepredicteda muchhigherproportionof enemy

mobile divisions within reach of the beachhead,

the true of
substance the -Master

Plan" asdelineatedin the NEPTUNEInitial Joint Planshouldhavebeenapparent.

An attack basedon a mutually supportingadvance,with the British fighting

off the expectedarmor contingents,

was the only possiblecourseof action. The slow

buildup of an amphibious landing, and the unfavorable terrain requiring a high

proportionof walking infantry, tipped the scalesagainst

a rapid, deepadvance,
even if

Montgomery'sadmonishmentsto his commanderscalled for one. He was correct to

stressthe need,but the wish was alwaysfinther from the eventthan believed.In April,

Montgomeryfirst mentioned,his intent to have"stakedout claims inland" on D-Day.

By May, the new intelligencethat located21st PanzerDivision "'in the woods southof

Caen" would have eliminated reasonablehope for such a venture, unless ineptness

accompaniedtemporary surprise on the part of the Germans.No such hope was

in fact, 106
advertised.The opposite, was true.

2d Army's publishedplan phasedthe operations,with eachphase'sobject to

establisha firm basebefore the next was attempted.It was, in fact, the 1918-pattem

limited-objective attack that expecteda heavy counterpush,with the artillery and

of
machineguns the consolidatedattack force expectedto do the real damageto the

'06NAC, RG 24,24, Volume 10555,File 21502.013(D7) Ops Brit. Army. SecondArmy, An Account
ofthe Operations ofSecond Army in Europe 1944-1945 [hereafter
referredto asSecondArmY History]
(Headquarters.SecondArmy, 1945),7; 30 Corps,A Short History of30 Corpsin the European
Campaign1944-1945(Hanover: 30 Corps, 1945),Map 2, The SecondArmy Plan;D'Este, Decision in
Normandy,80,8 1. This reproducesMontgomery'sletter to his army commandersregardinggaining
depthby useof armoredforces;British commanderswere informedaboutthe possibility of 21
Panzer'slocation during Dempsey'spreinvasiontalk on 23 May.

65
 hoped beforeit reachedFalaise-
enemy.Dempsey'sarmy to makethreephase-lines

in Monty's buoyant 7 April. 107

(Seefigure 3.)
the distant object mentioned talk on

The operationsforecast
wasto meetthe line Falaiseby D+ 17. In the west. First

Army's advancewas predicatedon two thrust lines, one to the northwestfrom UTAH

beachtoward Cherbourg,and the other in a southwesterlydirectiontoward Coutances

to cut the peninsulaand then southerlytoward the Brittany Peninsula.Though these

axes through the bocageoffered little rapid movement,they likewise relied upon a

flank by 2 Army. 108

mutually reinforcingoffensivewith the eastern cleared

Monty's EXERCISETHUNDERCLAP, on 7 April, did more than provide for

the seniorcommandersa first airing of their plans.It was, in everyaspect,the type of

4-clothmodel" exercisethat the British excelledat, designedas "a joint commander

serviceexercise... to test certainaspectsof the Joint Plan." This wargamingexercise

109
was designedfor commandersdown to division level alongwith key staff officers.

The exercise posed II separateproblems for study, nine by joint Army-Navy-

Air syndicates for nine of the problems pertinent to the separateAmerican or British

sectors, and two for the entire group that affected all sectors. These contingencies

included the failure of separatesector landings, the effect of airborne failures on either

flank, to test the flexibility of the plans to permit exploitation of "a very favourable

107Hamilton,Master ofthe Battlefield,559-568,D'Este, Decisionin Nornian4l%75-78.

THUNDERCLAP was Montgomery'sfirst public airing of his conceptof operations,and the one most
controversialconcerningpostwarclaimsabouthis plan. What is lost on most analystsis that
THUNDERCLAP wasa wargame,not simply a briefing, andthe lasttime that major misconceptions.
faulty plans,or problemscould be identified; and that Montgomery'sposedproblemsunderscoredthe
ideathat commanderswould haveto adaptto the conditionsof battle.The MasterPlanwas a rough
outline for action,not an architect'sblueprint.
"' FUSA's phaselines
are includedin Annex 20 to the NEPTUNEplan. SeeFUSA Reportof
Operations,20 October 1942to I August 1944:Annex 2 (cont'd).

66
 " the effect on the total plan by enemywithdrawal by D+8, plus situations
situation,

theorizing adverseweathereffects,administrativefailures, and problems that might

develop for the air forces or along the inter-Army boundary.Taken by itself, Monty

to give his commandersand his co-service commandersa feel for the

sought
1 10
possibilitiesthat they might meet.

In May, the senior ground commandersassessedtheir plans. The 21 Army

Group appreciationpublishedon 8 May outlined coursesof action, and Montgomery

wrote the Army commanders

stressingthe need to ensureall unit plans would take

of
maximum advantage offensiveactionsto add depthto the lodgement.
The enemy's

buildup was carefully assessedfor each. Most telling of the appreciation's points

were:

e that the Germanswould by aboutD+14 sufficient

possess divisions (estimated

at 28) to hold approximatelya 100-mileline designatedas the phaseline, and

during this period therewasthe risk of the enemystabilizing the defense.

o That:

Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for

manuever and for the use of armor begin to appear. Our aim during
this period should be to contain the maximum forces facing the Eastern
flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust towards RENNES.

e That seizureof Quiberon bay offers the greatestpotential for surpriseand to

III
facilitate logistical supportrequirements.

'09NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978,101-3.5ExerciseTHUNDERCLAP, 7-8 April 44.

110Ibid.
111
NAC, RG 24, Volume 10416,21 A. Gp/00/209/64/Ops,Appreciationon PossibleDevelopmentsof
operationsto securea lodgementarea,7 May 1944;NARA, RG 331, Entry 199,Box 101,12 AG

67
 Little doubt among the senior commanderswould have existed concernin-

Monty's generalintentions.These -side

were, apparently,to maintaina consistent by

side" offensive, acceptingthat the easternflank would fight the bulk of the enemy's

Considering
mobile reserves. that either QuiberonBay or the Brittany ports were the

major follow-on objectivesof the NEPTUNE landingsafter Cherbourg,

virtually all

operationswould haveto be with

conducted the intent to supporttheir capture.

Concerning these critical operations, the British, but seemingly less the

Americans,understoodthe potential brake on offensive operationsthat the bocage

areaof NormandyUplands could become.

Comprisedof centuries-oldhedgedfields

interconnectedby nearly covered, sunken, narrow lanes, the bocage had been

experiencedby those like Alanbrooke in 1940 and were well described to the

Americans.Not only intelligencereportsdefining the physicalboundariesof the areas,

112
but alsodetailedground-levelphotographswerealsoprovided.

The 21 Army Group appreciationviewed the bocageas a dual-edgedsword to

both attackeranddefender,noting that

Military Objectives,371.3,Vol. 1,21 AG Appreciation,7 May. The appreciationnoteditself as-a

tactical study of the terrain correlatedwith the latestIntelligenceestimatesof enemycapabilities"
(para.2). It is importantto notethat the first portion of this estimate,consistingof a detailedterrain
estimateand early enemybuildup estimates,arrived in Bradley'sheadquarters through the American
seniorplannerat Monty's headquarters, who presentedit as his own work. SeeG-3 Memo, 25 April
1944,"draft of tacticalterrain study," in the samefile, which doesnot containfull documentas in
NAC file.
112FUSA Reportof Operations,Oct 43-Aug44. "First US Army OperationsPlanNEPTUNE," 25
February1944,Annex I a, Terrain Estimate, MH1, PapersofBrigadier GeneralArthur S. Nevins,
containsplanning studies,including terrain intelligence;MHI, PoguePapers,interview with Gen.
Walter B. Smith, 11-12February1947;NARA RG 338, First Army, Decimal File 381, Box 180,
Appendix VI to TIS/D.14/TOP/9.2,Terrain Appreciation,Normandy.

68
 it will not be easyfor forcesto advancethroughrapidly in the faceof
determinedresistance,but it will likewise be most ýifficult for the
113
enemyto preventa slow andsteadyadvanceby infiltration.

Optimistically, it statedthat tanks"can penetratemost of the hedgerowsand could no

doubt operatein small groupswith infantry to good advantage.

" Consideringcontrol

problemsandpossibletactical issues,the appreciationfinther noted,"The tacticsto be

employedin fighting throughthe bocagecountry shouldbe given considerablestudy

by formations to be employed" Regardless, the appreciation further noted that the

speed of unfolding operations would be hampered,problematic, and prone to

interruption as both an attack and defensehad advantagesin the bocage.Noting the

lack of Americanfocuson the postassaultbocageterrain,Bedell Smith saidthat it was

neither a lack of intelligenceor warning, but "we had to get into the country and be

bruisedby it beforewe could really takemeasureof it." 114

The plannersfocussedmost on the "battle of the bridgehead,

" the battlesup to

the D+14/17 line, the key crossover expected in the buildup of enemy forces. After it.

' 15
stalematedaction andattrition battleswould be more likely.

The airmen, however, posed their own set of requirementsthat they felt

equaled the ground plan's objectives, and which they demanded ground action to

accomplish. Caen and its open ground to the south mesmerized the airmen along with

Morgan and the COSSACplanners.From the outset,the developmentof airfields was

the prime considerationfor the tactical airmen representedboth by AEAF, and most

113NAC, 21 Army Group Appreciation, 2.

11421 Army Group Appreciation,5; S.L.A. Marshall,Men AgainstFire: TheProblemofBattle
Commandin Future War (Gloucester,Mass.:PeterSmith, 1978), 108.
1"; The D+ 14 and D+ 17 lines merged
over time in variousphaseline representations
publishedat
individual army or army group level.

69
vocally, by Air Chief Marshal Tedder.COSSAC an
established airfield development

though
schedule, the COSSACplanners'actual locating of airfields south of CAEN
0
The
was undeveloped. airfields mentionedin the COSSACplan properfall within the

D-Day objective line. The bulk of the actual airfield sites desired for the total

lodgementareawere placedafter the changefrom COSSACto the NEPTUNE plan

initial Montgomery 116

andafter the revisions.

The airmen's view of the operationdiffered significantly.Totally mesmerized

by achievingair dominance,the goal of destroyingthe Germanforcesin Normandy

and establishinga securelogdementarea and port systemheld little water in air

councils. Moreover, the mechanicsof close supportto enablethe ground forces to

achieveforce dominanceheld lessattention.While the airmenarguedover "control,"

they also bickeredover air strategyconcerningthe overall interdiction plan and how

airpower could best help achieve the conditions necessaryto launch NEPTUNE.

While this bickering progressed,the plannersdealing with ground forces began to

identify airfield sitesthat constitutedoneof SecondAmy's major objectives.117

The airfields were not precisely located by the COSSAC staff. When they were

finally added to the plan in mid-April, the AEAF planners had placed the bulk of them

below the D+ 17 line. 118

116
COSSACPlan,Map"MB. "
117EL, Walter B. Smith Collectionof World War 11Documents,Box 29, AEAF, 15 April 1944;
Operation"NEPTUNE" Allied ExpeditionaryAir ForceAir Planand map,EstimatedAvailability of
Airfield Sites;Initial Joint Plan,Para.82, statesthat "the practicabilityof this [airfield] programmewill
dependon the anticipatedprogressof operations."
IlaSecondArmj, Histog, 36-37, citesairfield locationsas part of SecondArmy OperationsPlan.

70
 The disconnectwent far beyonda lack of coordinationbetweenthe groundand

air planners.The expectationof an early occupationof the airfield ground was not

basedon current evaluationsof the enemythreat.The original Germanair threat had

making
subsided, the needto establishair parity less likely. Moreover, the southerly

airfield sites would force the ground offensive farther south than Montgomery

originally forecastfor the D+17 line. Early occupationof the sites could only work if

the COSSAC estimateof a gradualGermanwithdrawal pannedout. The airfield sites

also required a greateradvancethan the D+17 line; they required an advanceof at

least 10 miles farther in order to prevent enemy artillery or counterattacksfrom

threateningthe maintenanceof air operations.All of this would also demand an

increase"off-loading" schedulefor shipsto provide additionalunits and ammunition,

a total impossibility with the shippingandbeachmaintenance

statethat was forecast.

The ground threat expectedin May, and elaboratedupon during the 15 May

presentationof plans for the high should

command, havegiven pauseto anyoneseeing

the airfields as a quick-strikeproposition.In fact, the statedobjective of Caenshould

have beenseenfar differently by that time. Montgomeryannouncedto the assembled

commandersthat intelligence had located a panzer division immediately south of

Caen, and that two other panzer divisions could arrive in the NEPTUNE area by dusk

on D-Day, and a ftirther two by dark on D+I. By D+2 the total enemy force that could

be in action numbered five panzer divisions and a total of seven additional

divisions. 119

"9 Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, 581-589,reproducesthe notesof the entire Montgomery
presentation;SecondArm Histoq, 7, reproducesDempsey'spresentationto his commanderson 23
1944, in he ,v
May which reemphasizedthe hard fight ahead.Of note is the following excerpt:

71
 The air plan stipulatedtwo key objectives:air superiority in the NEPTUNE

interdiction the battlefield to slow the enemyrate of buildup.

area,and the effective of

Both were subjectto the divergentstrategiesof the airmen.Air superiority,however.

was the gift of the Americanair forces,not the Royal Air Force,whoseAir Marshals

soughtto dominateEisenhower'sair forces.

This air superiorityresultedfi7omEighth Air Force'sexecutionof its daylight

bomber offensive. In following its POINTBLANK directives,the American airmen

Cý
had savagedthe Luftwaffe at a horrendouscost to themselves.As Spaatzpursuedthe

oil offensivefollowing his "Big Week" strikesagainstaircraftproductionin February,

the Luftwaffe's supplyof pilots sankto crisis proportions.Moreover,while Doolittle's

strategicEighth Air Forcestrucktargetsdeepwithin Germany,drawing the Luftwaffe

to battle, Brereton's Ninth Air Force drove the Luftwaffe from its French airfields

within the NEPTUNE area.

Despitethe more favorableair situation,the timing for the captureof airfields

became an attack point for Tedder to use against Montgomery. Tedder saw the

airfields, not the ground battle for the bridgehead,as key. The stressthat Tedder

placedon this reinforcedMorgan's old conceptand the statedairfield missionscited

in the Initial Joint Plan, but becamemore divergent from the reality of the ground

correlationof forcesor what they plannedto do. The NEPTUNE revision was driven

by ports, and in Montgomery'smind it was clear that the main effort had to be the

"The recentmove of 21 PanzerDivision to the woodsSouthof Caenandthe characterof ROMMEL,

the man at the headof affairs, makeit reasonableto supposethat the reserveswill start to fight
immediatelyin the rear of the beaches,andthat it is herethat ROMMEL will try to defeatus.":
Hinslcy, British Intelligence.3. Part2,84, showsthe differencein currentintelligenceestimatesversus
the smallerCOSSACpredictions.

72
 early captureof these,with Dempsey'sforcesin nothing more than a supportingrole
4-1

regardlessof statementsmadeat the time or in postbattleobiter dicta.

Montgomerywas committed,not only by the reality of geographybut by the

endlessrepetition of certaintenetsof Morgan's plan, to the captureof Caen "on D-

Day." Demonstratingoptimism during the 15 May presentation,while stressingthe

need to drive inland deeply, Montgomery set himself up for a political trap. No

experiencedcommander,particularly with the specterof the Anzio operation still in

the air, could fail to say anythingother than Montgomerydid during the run-up to

battle. He had to appearpositive; the operationwas "on7 and no fimher forces were

available. Eisenhower's personal lack of experiencein ground battle, however,

possibly led him to seethe plan's architectureas sancrosanct.and anything less than

achieving the paper-statedobjectives"as a failure." Monty would complicatematters

by claiming the plan was "being followed." By the endof May, however,it is curious

that the senior commanderswere not wondering if NEPTUNE, even with five

divisions in assaultand three airborne divisions, was simply too small to gain the

quick victories its original plannershad sketchedon their maps.

By invasion eve, the enemy laydown was particularly daunting. (See figure 4. )

Intelligence on 4 June portrayed a ring of divisions around the NEPTUNE landing

beaches, with the 91st, 716th Infantry, 352d Infantry, 21st Panzer, and 71 Ith Infantry

divisions forming an outline of the lodgement. While the same intelligence review

denied exact knowledge of strengths and precise locations of the 352d and the 21st

Panzer, their known general locations them put them within counterattack distance of

the objective beachhead line, regardless of whether there was confirmation of the

73
 there "tank tracks north of the Caen-Bayeux "
lateral. Moreover.
claim that were

"layback" divisions the 243d in the west Cotentinandthe 346th Division west
suchas

of the Seinecould provide immediatereinforcement.

Most disturbing for thrusts south of Caen should have been the graphic

12th SS Panzer, the Panzer Lehr, and the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier
portrayal of the

divisions, all arrayed within a day's march of the Caen-Paris avenue astride which the

RAF had designated its planned airfield A total of 59 confirmed divisions,

sites.

including 9 Panzer and I Panzergrenadier, were identified in France and the Low

Countries. 120

The latest strategic intelligence assessment,however, had argued for the

adequacyof the Allied forces for invasion.

the contemplated Presented
on 23 May. it

revisited the critical force assumptionspresentedby COSSAC in determining the

viability of OVERLORD. Though it noted that the expectedGermanreinforcement

exceededthe maximunacceptableunderCOSSAC'sestimate,it contrarily arguedthat

the increasedfrontage, strength of the assault,and diminished enemy capacity to

reinforce due to the Transportation Plan offset the numerical variances. It

recommendedthat the assault go forward. Independently,the Joint Intelligence

120NAC, RG 24, Volume 10549,2lAgp/00/INT/1074,GSI 21 Army Group Weekly NEPTUNE

ReviewNO. 17,4 JUNE 1944;Ibid., GSI 21 Army GroupWeekly NEPTUNE Reviews.No. 1-16.
commencingon 14 February,showsa kaleidoscopeof Germandivisional changes.The 21st Panzer
was shownmoving into the Caensectoron 14 May, the day beforethe final OVERLORD bricring. At
this conference,Monty mentionedits presence,but showedthe sameconfidencehe did before
Alamein. As at Alamein, the numberswere not dramaticallyon the sideof the attackers,NARA, RG
331, Entry 13, Box 45. SHAEF, Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. II for the week ending3 June
1944.(All SHAEF Weekly Summariesare in this file. ) It is especiallynoteworthythat SHAEF's
Weekly IntelligenceSummarydid not locatethe 21st PanzerDivision nearCaen,or give the correct
location of the 352d. Had thesebeennotedcorrectly on 3 June,Eisenhower'sexpectationsmight have
changed. SHAEF did not post a correctGerman location for the period
prcassault until 10 June,in the
following estimate;HinsIcy, British Intelligence,3. Part2, mapsfollowing 100; Montgomery,
Norman,# to the Baltic, Map II reproducesthis map.

74
CommitteeQIQ on 25 May offered slightly larger figures for but
reinforcement. did

121
disaster.
not recommendcancellationor predict

SHAEF, meanwhile, began drafting a post-OVERLORD strategy in the

any discussions
with 21 Army Group. In the final analysisthis strategy.
absenceof
it demonstratethe difference in
and the evaluation of the campaignas unfolded,

values for the individual servicesand for each command-levelheadquarters.

The

genesisof what became"the Broad Fronf' surfacedsilently in SHAEF's hallways in

1221
late April andwaspresentedasan acceptabledraft by May's end.

The paper was not circulatedoutsideof SHAEF, though publishing it might

have met with little comment. Its promulgation, though the raison d'etre of

OVERLORD, had no influenceover NEPTUNE. The combatcommanderswere then

actually "mounting" NEPTUNE as troops moved into preassaultcontonementsand

readiedfor loading onto shipsand landing craft. Airfields were then under "
"seal, and

and interdiction missionswere being flown. The reality of

last-minutereconnaissance

D-Day, not long-term operationaland strategicplans, took hold. For the operational

battle
commanders, was at hand.

By the night of D-Day, Eisenhowersignaledthe CombinedChiefs,viaýGeneral

"
Marshall, that "All preliminary reports are satisfactory. 123The full impact of the

landings and its problemswould not be sent to the CombinedChiefs for two more

their gains,a mixed picture developed.

days.As the assaultcommandersassessed

12'Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2,83-87, Appendices9,10.

122
NARA, RG 331, SHAEF, 381 OVERLORD, Box 77, PostOverlord1,draft, May 30,1944.
123
EisenhowerPapers,111,1914,1915.

75
 Few actual D-Day objectives had been The
accomplished. D-Day objective

for ' 24 the "lateral" road

line, following the norm amphibiousoperations, ran along

by Montgomery in his THUNDERCLAP briefing. Achieving this line,

emphasized

Allied units would prevent observation,and thereforeobservedfire onto the D-Day

beaches.Caen,due its
to potentialas a strongpoint andeffectivesally port toward the

beaches, was included the line. By nightfall, the forces had seized
within

approximately 50 percent of their D-Day objective line, and worsening weather

in buildup.125
promiseda slow-down postassault

On 21 Army Group's right, the First Army had gainedboth lodgements,but at

in
significant cost the V Corps (OMAHA beach) sector.VN Corps" UTAH beach

landingsfortuitously beachedsouth of the plannedobjective,a weak point unknown

to the planners.VII Corps landed with few but

casualties, the airborne forces were

badly scatteredin their night drops, and the bocageseparatedforces that normally

would be expected to cohere into a mutually supporting force. By nightfall, the

airbornehad 50
perhaps percentof its troops and
undercommand, the force
seaborne

had yet to link with the airborneperimeterastridethe MerderetRiver. Most important

was that the Germanforcesmovedinto the Cotentin had the

caused airborne force to

be constricted into a mere bumper for the seabomelanding, and prevented the

124 This beachheadline, undercurrentUS amphibiousdoctrine,is known asthe "Force Beachhead

Line." It is definedasa "phaseline that indicatesthe generaltraceof the terrain objectivesessentialto
the establishmentof a beachhead. " This follows the planningprinciplesusedby the COSSACplanners.
It must be notedthat the "D-Day Line" assuresthe survival of the invasion,andthat its actualcapture
on the day of landing is alwaysreliant on the force ratio, weather,neutralizationof preparedenemy
defenses,and a quick breakthroughby the landingforce. It is establishedasthe immediategoal of the
landing force, but is not necessarilypossibleto alwaysbe capturedon the day of landing itself.
12*'FUSA Reportof OperationsOct 43-Aug 44,34-48; the First Army Reportoffers no last-light
assessment of its D-Day operations. It does, however, provide an extensive discussionof eachcorps'
operations; SecondAr7n History, 96,97. British D-Day operationsand the German command
,y in the history.
reactions are succinctly assessed

76
airborne Erom sealing off the Cherbourg peninsula from the south to prevent

reinforcement, as well as rapidly expanding the seaborneadvance.Moreover, the

marshy land, feared by COSSAC, had Germanreinforcementssplitting the two US

beachesas hadbeenpredicted.

V Corps' OMAHA beachlandingshadbeendisastrous.With little depthto the

landing and after suffering heavy infantry casualtiesupon landing, no armor had

struck out to deepenthe attack.US priorities, with Monty's approval,were to knit the

landing beachestogetherbeforethe Germanscould effectively reinforcethe gaps,and

126
then attemptto defeatthe landingin detail.

21 Army Group's left flank also met with partial success.The COSSACplan

had selectedthe Caenbeachesfor their lack of defensesand, in order to assurethe

plan's had
acceptance, stipulated that a favorable force ratio would be achieved.

However, since the strengtheningof the plan, beachdefenseshad been augmented,

extensiveobstaclesand minefields had been laid, and a panzerdivision had moved

within the objective area. The increaseddefensive strength, delay in landing the

subsequentwaves, and then the passing of these waves, including armor through

clearedlanes,proved to be a slow processin the rough seas.Moreover,local tactical

decisions made to reinforce the airborne east of the Orne River had slowed the

advancein favor of securing the east flank. Also, stiff fighting at one of the 3d

Division's intermediateobjectives (the HILLMAN bunker complex) had halted the

advanceshort of Caen.Confusion about the strengthof this objective hamperedthe

126
FUSA Reportof OperationsOct 43-Aug 44,3448, IWM, Montgomeq Log, 7 June.Montgomery
met Bradley aboardU.S.S. Augustaand orderedclosing of the gapsat Carcntanand Isigny. Following

77
 the flanking Canadiandivision. that might haveaddedforces
attacker's and
response,

to the attack, did not move. Available intelligencethat might havehelpedthe assault

127
troopsalso appearsnot to havebeenpasseddownward.

The hoped-for 10-mile advanceand captureof Caenhad not beenachieved.

Rather, on the left flank, 21 Army Group found panzersthreateningthe British

airborne,and German imminent

armorcounterattacks in the gapbetweenthe SWORD

and JUNO beaches.Depth could not be achievedunless the beach lodgements

themselvescould be securedfrom defeatin detail.This entailedcombiningflank-ward.

not forward attacks.The lodgementshad to be widenedand connectedto prevent

being split apart.

Monty had tipped the assaultin favor of an early captureof Cherbourg,both

0
by the weight of airborneassaultand his insistencethat the port's early capturewas

necessaryfor the invasion to but

succeed, SecondArmy's plannersand those of I

Corpshad looked at their Caenobjectiverealistically.The 10-mile distancefrom the

beachwas a significant obstacle,and the plannersmust have notedthat two separate

divisions 128
had been locatedin the vicinity at various times since February.
panzer

While Dempseystill orderedCaenasa D-Day objective,I Corps' assaultordersnoted

that the 3d British Division "should, before dark on D-Day have captured or

effectively maskedCaenand be disposedin 4epth with brigadelocalities" effectively

tied in with the I st Airborne and 3d CanadianDivision. Further,

this, Bradley was to strike west,while methodicallyclearingthe Cotentinto Cherbourgafter the neck
of the peninsulahad beensealed;PROWO 285/10,DempseyDiary, 6-9 June.
127Ellis, Victor),in the West,1, ChaptersIX, X.
12821 Army Group GSI, NEPTUNE ReviewsNo. 1-16,passim.

78
 Should the enemy forestall at Caen and the defenses prove to be too
us
to fail to capture it on D day. further
strongly organized thus causing us
direct assaults which may prove costly, will not be undertaken without
I Corps. 129
reference to
N

The multiple failures of D-Day, however,posedmore complicatedproblems

than merely achievingthe objectiveline, moving on Cherbourg,

or securingCaen.The

landing had gone forward during a weather"window," a brief period of acceptable

landings. The bad weather that followed would

weather to permit the predicted

hamperthe neededbuildup of forceswhile simultaneouslylimitingCP air operationsto

isolate the beachheadarea to Germanbuildup. Moreover, the presenceof the three

64extra"enemy divisions not foreseenby COSSAC added to the defense.Since the

formulation of the plan, the 91st Airlanding Division, the 352d Division, and the 21st

The assaultforces
Panzerhad all blocked key approachesand limited early successes.

had no recoursebut to fight different actionsthan they had planned,and onesthat did

not promise quick of

establishment the invasion or the rolling back of the defensethe

COSSACplannershad foreseen.With the enemyrespondingrapidly, the tactics of the

invasion would have to change,though the objectiveswould maintain their relevance

for overall successrelativeto the defeatof the enemy'sforces.

More than any single requirement,the invaders needed space to develop

operations.Montgomery had two options. He could attack all out in every sector,

hoping to keepthe initiative but without using the military norms of a 3: 1 superiority

in force to gain a military advantage.Or he could launch operationalattacksto gain

key objectives and then lever his advantagesfrom these.The latter approachboth

suited the Montgomery style of warfare and used concentrationto make up for

"9 Second Arm.y Histoiy, 77,78.

79
 in
deficiencies small unit or armor firepower.Artillery, including navalgunfire, could

becomea hammerin such attacks.SecondArmy's role becamebleedingthe enemy

through limited objective attacksas well maneuveringthe enemyoff vital ground,

while First Army to

movedon gaining what Montgomerytermedthe strategicobjects

Brittany ' 30
of OVERLORD, Cherbourg, and eventually, the ports.

Montgomery tried to hustle both army commanders into rapidly securing their

bridgeheads,and then to move deeplytoward their respectivemajor objectives before

the Germanscould massunits along key More

avenues. than two weeks before D-

that the interdictioneffort of the Transportation

Day, Montgomery'sG-2 had assessed

Plan would fail to isolate the battlefield. While the airmenhad successfullydropped

the major bridgesalongthe Seine,the rail lines enteringthe NEPTUNE areawere not

destroyed.At best, the TransportationPlan slowed the enemy buildup with some

' 31
degreeof attrition, mostly amongsoft-skinnedvehicles. Moreover,badweatherhad

increasedGerman ability to move forces along roads. RAF Bomber Command

bombed rail centers during the night of D-Day, and US air forces attacked road

But
movement. the argument
over air control kept the full weight of the bomber force

from respondingto every potential target, particularly within the lodgement area.

Spaatz attempted to minimize the American heavy bomber effort, and Tedder

complicated AEAFs attempts to centralize a responseby dominating the Air

132
Conferences.
Commanders'

Montgomery,Normandyto the Baltic, 63-70.

"' Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2,109.
132
AWC, MS, Air Historical Branch.RAF Narrative,Liberation ofNorthwest Europe,III, "The
Landingsin Nomandy," Chapters11,13.14.

80
 The ground commanderssaw several threats immediately developing from

buildup of forces.Two Panzerdivisions were identified as

enemyarmor and a rapid
invasion and early estimateslisted 500 enemytanks
rapidly moving toward the area,

the Caen 133

By 10 June, three Panzerdivisions were committed along
within area.

infantry divisions. As the COSSACplannershad theorized,the buildup of

with seven
failure.134
both sideswould becomecentralto successor

Though tank numbers were overestimatedat this time, the result of the

panzers' presencewas not. Indeed,it is the panzers-and their complementaryarm.

posedthe greatestsingle threat both to the existenceof the

antitank weapons-that

Allied lodgementand to any attemptsto break loose of the beachhead

rapidly being

"roped off' by the German German

defense. superiorityin quality of armor protection,

tank guns,optics, and tank-killing ranging

systems from the 88mm dual-purposegun

to the hand-heldpanzerfaustposedan problem

operational for the Allies, particularly

in the British SecondArmy sector.Put shortly,they combinedto stop or cripple every

attempt of armoredbasedforces to advanceor to defeatthe panzersin open combat.

Superior combined-armstactics also favored the Germans. British reliance on

concentration, fires, and carefully orchestrated"limited objective"or "set-piece"

133Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2.45, NAC, RG 24, volume 10549File 215A21.023.21 Army
Group Daily IntelligenceSummaryNo. 125,7 June 1944(all 21 Army Group IntelligenceSummaries
are in this file). Intelligencenoted that the Germans perceived their threat
greatest in the Cacnarea,
hencetheir immediatecomrnitmentof 21 Panzerand 12 SS Panzcrto that sector-,SummaryNo. 126,8
June,notesthat I SS PanzerCorpsis the overarchingheadquarters.
"4 Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2; Ellis, Victoq in the West,1,2 1; NAC, RG 24, vol. 10549.
File 215A21.023,21 Army Group IntelligenceSummaryNo. 12 (9 June 1944),ibid.; 21 Army Group
intelligence Summary,II June 1944.

81
 likewise set the operational pattern by the tempo of their execution.
attacks
135
preparation, and advance.

From the Germanperspective,panzerdivisionswereconsideredan operational

Capable these combined-armsdivisions were

weapon. of rapid self-movement,

in to drive the Allies into the

countedon to concentrate a massivecounteroffensive

failing a beachhead to strike a killing blow to any Allied advance

sea or, victory,

inland. Allied plannersand intelligencekeyed to

their estimates panzerbuildups from

the time of COSSAC. Montgomery recognizedthat his own ability to gain and
136
maintainmomentumwas contingenton his ability to eliminatethe panzerthreat.

Germancommandershopedto mount a decisivecounterblowcenteringon the

Bayeux area, the critical Anny boundary for the British and Americans. Several

factorsswayedbattle into this area.The vital Caenareaactedasan armormagnet.The

panzersattemptedto roll up the key left flank via the airbornebridgehead,and also to

split the Canadian/British

boundaries
west of Caenearly in the invasion.As additional

panzer divisions arrived, they were committed against the British on the more

13'Ellis, Victoq in the West,1,Appendix IV; NAC, RG 24, Volume 10560,File D4. SecondArmy
IntelligenceSummaries(all 2 Army IntelligenceSummariesin this file). Thesesummariescontain
daily informationon capturedequipmentwith greateffort aimedat tanksand antitanksystems;Terry
Copp,ed., Montgomeq's Scientists:OperationalResearchin NorthwestEurope(Waterloo,Ont.:
Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000),Chapter10,11. Montgomety'sScientistsreproduceskey studies
concerningarmor in Normandy. Shortcomings in British tacticsand training arc cxamincd in Second
Army IntelligenceSummaryNo. 5,8 June 1944,Appendix E. This summaryis typical of tank
problemsdiscussed.It is significantthat SecondArmy begancirculatingintelligenceon the strengths
and weaknesses of Panthertanks,noting that "Attack by 6 pdr., 75mm, 17pdr. weapons [is] likely to
be ineffective unlessstrikesarescoredin the areabetweenthe horizontalline of the gun mantict and
the top of the hull." Essentially,unlessthis area,lessthan a man's headhigh, is hit, the tank is
impenetrablefrom the front.
136D'Este, Decisionin Normandy,80,8 1, Montgomery,Norman4vto the Baltic, 82-85; Montgomery,
Memoirs,232; Brooks,Montgomeryand the Eighth Army, 47-54. BrooksreproducesMontgomery's
addressto the Middle EastStaff College,Haifa, 21 September1942,outlining Montgomery'sviews on
tanks,operationalpivots, and the useof armor,plus the destructionof enemyarmor. He followed these
principles in Normandy. Montgomery, who was a believer in "teaching the "
generals, lectured on these

82
 in
favorable ground the centerof the Allied sector.Correctly reading his opponent's

intent, Montgomerynotedthat the Germansconsistentlytried to pull back their armor

in favor of an infantry defenseto permit a strongpanzercounterblow.Committing his

Monteomeryboth drew the panzersto battle and preventedthe formation

own armor,

reserve. Essentially, fighting on Second Army's front was an

of an operational

attrition battle of
regardless intent or planning,and Montgomeryrecognizedthis early

in the invasion.Following the logic of SecondArmy's defensiveflank mission, by 10

June Montgomery openly spoke of "attracting panzers" to the British front, an

for the fixing missionof SecondArmy. Caen'sterrain did the

unfortunateword choice
137
"attracting." SecondArmy would haveto hold the enemythere.

The battle found, however, did not match the battle imagined, especially at

SupremeHeadquartersand within the Allied Air Force commandstructure.Neither

faction had appreciatedMontgomery'sactionsduring the reshapingof the plan or the

implications of thosechanges,and both now reactedwith alarm and disdain as events

unfolded in the field. Tedder, Coningham, and Morgan hung crepe at every

opportunity, declaring that the plan "had failed" and that the invasion had reacheda

crisis. Coningham.
appearsto have fired the first rounds during the 14 June Air

Commanders' conference, and immediately attempted to involve Eisenhower.

points frequently, but was seen as "didactic" by the Americans.He was a believerin killing Panzcrs
with artillery and wasa practitionerof the defensive-offensetactic.
137MHI, Foreign Military Studies,B466. Gen.Geyr von Schwcppcnburg,PanzerGroup West.
Germanattackplansarediscussedand mappedin B466, passim.21 Army Group Intelligence
SummaryNo. 128,10 June 1944,and subsequentreportsdetail the enemybuildup.

83
Likewise. the two airmen also attemptedto split Leigh Mallory from his ground

138
counterpart,Montgomery.

Montgomery sought to develop main efforts on both army fronts. His concern

Cherbourg he hoped that Bradley

over the early car----e of never relented, and also

would strike westward and then south from the Cotentin simultaneously. This had not

transpired. Caen left flank be developed. Rommel. the German

and the remained to

tactical commander, had matched Monty's main efforts with two of his own. He

sought to pen the Cotentin landings and to delay the inevitable fall of Cherbourg, the

destruction of which had already been authorized by Rundstedt. Infantry was sent into

the bocage to block Bradley. Simultaneously, panzers were ticketed for the west and

center of Dempsey's front while the in-place panzers continued to spar with the

in 139
airborne the east.

Failing a direct thrust into Caenduring the first two days,Montgomeryordered

a double enveloping attack. He simultaneouslyordered planning for an airborne

division to be droppedto seal the double penetrationprior to the juncture of these

attacksbehind the Germanfront. Leigh Mallory rejectedthe plan severaldaysbefore

138AWC, MS, Air Historical Branch,RAF Narrative, W, "The Breakoutand Advanceto the Lower
Rhine," 12 Juneto 30 September1944,4, Chapter1, passim;D'Este, Decisionin Normandv.Chapter
13; Orange,Coningham,Chapter15; Marshalof the RoyalAir ForceLord Arthur Tedder, 471h
Prejudice: The War MemoirsofMarshal of the RoyalAir Force Lord Tedder,G.C.B. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1966),552,553.
139MontgomeryLog, 10 June 1944;Hinslcy, British Intelligence,3, Part2,17 1.The defendershad
threeparizerdivisions and seveninfantry divisionsholding a continuousfront on 9 June 1944.
Montgomery'sevolving battleconceptcanbe tracedin his log. It is noteworthythat Montgomerysees
eachUS corpsdevelopingits own front, andwith the US V Corps' operationsto slice acrossthe
Germanfront southwestwardasa key componentof his view for Dempsey'soperations.

84
the widespreadrevolt of the airmen on the 14th. Daring but unrealistic, the initial

140
operationsfailed, renderingthe airborneplan moot.

The original Dempseyplan, that provided for maskingCaenwhile forcesbuilt

followee Moreover, the advancelisted as operationalpolicy in the Second

up, was

Army plan likewise seemedto blueprint the British actions. Focusing on the key
01

terrain listed during the planning stage, SecondArmy saw the Caen problem as

solvable by a turning in
movement concert with a move for-wardby the First US

Army. The actual attack was congruentwith 30 Corps' phaseII objective from the

original assaultplan, estimatedfor D+3AD+4.141

Theseattackswent forward on 10 June,with Dempseytaking advantageof a

gap developedat Caumontby the US I st Division. This gap had openedon 10 June,

but the front had beeneyedthe day beforeby SecondArmy's commander,who asked

Montgomeryto prod US V Corpssouthin that sector.SecondArmy's right flank,had

already been battering toward Tilly with scant success.(See figure 5.) Dempsey

ordered the 30 Corps Lt.

commander, Gen. G. Bucknall, to advancewith the 7th

Armoured Division. Moving forward the next day as part of OPERATION PERCH,

the 7th, after a ten-mile advancepassedthrough Villers Bocageto occupy point 213.

The subsequentdefeatof the force by a handful of Tiger tanksdestroyedthe myth of

140
Hamilton, Master ofthe Battlefield, 639-643.
141
SecondArm History, 26,27,80,8 1. Seekey paragraphs13-17in the reproducedSecondArmy
Operation ,v
Order No. 1,21 April 1944,and alsothe extractsfrom 30 CorpsOperationsOrder No. I that
describesDempsey'sintent concerningtaking Villers Bocageas Phase11of the preinvasionplan; Ellis,
Victo?y in the West,257,264,265. Ellis notesthat the buildup of forcesran two daysbehindand
makesthe casethat the lack of forcesat this key juncture severelydamagedDempsey'schancesof
success.

85
 Their by the of
appearance the 2d
the DesertRats. subsequentwithdrawal,occasioned
142
PanzerDivision, broughton the "crisis"declaredby the airmen.

PERCH also began a seriousdeficiency in Allied coordinationand timing.

Bradley could no* Ie proddedinto using V Corps to supportDempsey'sattack. nor

later to guard his flank. This made the Montgomerytechniqueof carefully timed,

designedto fix reservesaway from the main attack, a total

complementaryattacks,

impossibility to conducteffectively.This was the beginningof Bradley's attemptsto

isolate American operationsfrom British operations,an isolation due to the lack of

mutual reinforcing that

operations, would causeuntold casualtiesin the future and

would becomea significant factor in future military failures.What Montgomeryhad

assessedas the attacks

pre-Alamein problem of piecemeal by Eighth Army in the

desert,would becomemore and more the operationalnorm in Normandy due to

143
Bradley'sunwillingnessto act in an Army Groupbattle.

From the airmen's perspective, ground operations were failing. Caen had

failed to be taken on D-Day, failed to be taken during the first days, and had now

eluded the turning movement through Villers Bocage, an action that saw Bucknall's

corps relinquishing ground. Nor was the intelligence picture brightening. 21 Army

Group's intelligence cited movement of I SS and 2 SS Panzer divisions, along with

the transfer of 11SS Panzer Corps westward with its 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer divisions.

"2 DempseyDiary, 9 June,13June,14 June;Harrison,Cross-ChannelAttack, 376-377,describes

Bradley's action in stoppingthe US V Corps;SecondArmy History, 101-104;Wilmot, Strugglefor
Europe,307-312.Wilmot's descriptionof PERCHappearsto be the first public criticism of British
combattroops,particularly the DesertDivisions in the Normandycampaign.
143Ellis, P7ctotyin the West,1.257. Ellis saysthat Bradleydid not want to pushV Corps"too hard,"
and that his focus was on cutting the Cotentin.He doesnot explain why V Corpsneededto wait for
VI I Corpsto perform this mission.

86
This meant that up to four more of the large panzer divisions could join the battle.

most logically on the SecondArmy front. (Seefigure 6.) Intelligencecited that a total

18 divisions-six panzers, one parachute, and II infantry-now held the

of

Normandy front. While this did fall short of the of

maximum nine panzer divisions

available, intelligence did indicate that ftu-therreinforcementswere being stripped

from Bordeaux,Denmark,and Holland. Despitetheir bestefforts, the airmen failed to

144
isolatethe battlefield.

Bradley's beachheads finally linked on the 12th, and the west coast of the

Cotentin was reached on the 18th, which signaled Bradley's main effort to capture the

port. Still, Cherbourg eluded capture. The original phase-lines theorized capture by the

fifteenth day, and Montgomery assessedhis buildup in light of launching major

operations by the introduction of fresh corps in both armies. Caen still loomed as

Dempsey's major objective, along with fixing the bulk of the German panzers. With

offloading and ship turn-around delayed, force buildup and the stockpiling of

ammunition hampered large unit operations. The arrival of fresh enemy divisions

would temporarily give the advantage to the defense if they could be concentrated in a

145
counterattack.

On 18 June,Montgomeryissuedhis first written directive since the February

Initial Joint Plan. M. 502 outlined his assessments

and plans. He noted the exhaustion

'44Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2,493. It shouldbe notedthat the arrival of SS Panzerdivisions

signaleda far larger combatcapability than that of Wehrmachtdivisions. It shouldalsobe notedthat
the arriving separatepanzer-abteilung" units includedheavyTiger battalions,adding far greater
capabilities.The division force equivalentwasundoubtedlyfar greaterthan the maximumbuildup
predicted,which had not includedbrigades.army "Tiger" battalions,or dual-purposeflak corpsthat
could act as antitankunits.

87
 the Germanmobile reserves
and their inability to for
concentrate a counteroffensive
of
had delayedAllied plans.
due to lack of infantry, but noted that local counterattacks

Monty bankedheavily on "stretching"the enemyto a breakingpoint. He noted:

Caenis th- key to Cherbourg;its capturewill releaseforceswhich are

lockea in left flank holds 146
now up ensuring that our secure.

He ordered the following: Dempsey'sSecondArmy would begin a pincer

attack beginning on the 18th with 8 Corps passing lines on the right flank and

completingthe movementby the 22d. Bradley's First Army was orderedto capture

Cherbourgwhile swinging its own left flank to keep touch with SecondArmy's

offensive. Bringing up XV Corps, Bradley would then move on St. Lo. Calling for

drive and energy by all commanders,Montgomery stressedthe importance of

Cherbourgas a solution for administrativeproblemsbeginningto plaguethe buildup

and the expansionof the lodgement.

He wantedboth Caenand Cherbourgby 24 June.

A Channelstormwould changethis plan.147

M. 503, issued the next day, modified the plan. Dempsey convinced

Montgomery that 8 Corps lacked space on the Orne front, forcing a necessary

westwardshift of the corps that delayedoperationsuntil 22-23 June.As part of his

revision, Montgomery stressedthat Bradley must not wait for Cherbourg's capture

145SecondArm History; 106,Montgomery,Norman4vto the Baltic, 70,71,76,77. Montgomery

the"y Lt. Gen. R.N. O'Connor's 8 Corps.Badly delayedby the shipping problem, 8
countedon arrival of
Corps' arrival was put further behindby the Channelstorm.
'46M502,18-6-44,1-2. It is importantto notethat Monty sawDempseyalmostdaily, he saw Bradley
on the 7'. 10th,and 15thand wasin constantphonecontactwith him, not only to gain his appreciation
of the situation,but alsoto issueorders;MontgomeryLog. 15 June,providesan example.Monty's
directiveswere handwrittenby himself, thentyped and distributed.They are inconsistentlylisted as
M.---, or M----, or M-. I haveretainedtheir exacttyping in notes,but havechangedthemto M. in the
text for consistency.
147
Ibid., 3,4,

88
 " He noted that when troops
before "extending its operations to the south-west.

became available Bradley should develop operations to the southwest toward

Granville, Avranches,and Vire. He orderedstudy for an airbornelanding at St. Malo

148
to speedThird Army's commitment.

The Montgomery-Eisenhowerrelationship, stiff on its best days, grew

Morgan, Tedder, and the SHAEF staff blamed Montgomery for the
strained.

"stalemate"in Normandy.SHAEF and the airmen saw Caen,not Cherbourg,as key.

Eisenhower,seeing a flankward attack from the Caen avenue as having been the

felt Monty had failed.149

He to Montgomery,stressinghis
original concept, that wrote

Washington Eisenhower,
pressured and the Supreme following
Commander,
concern.

his practice in Africa and the Mediterranean,sent lettersto put the heat on his field

Rarely
commander. would he visit, and almostneverwould he conftont the man in the

field.

What Eisenhower,and Montgomery'scritics, failed to understandis that large

battleswere being fought, with backsto the seaand with a limited amountof artillery

Every
space.
or maneuver British advancesparkeda counterattack,sometimesseveral.

Monty's invasion plan had opted for space,but the lack of landing craft and the lack

of airlift for airborne forces had limited the amountof force that could be brought to

bearimmediately.The Allies had lost the buildup race,duenot to lack of effort or zeal

but to numbersand superiorfirepower,as in the caseof Germany'spanzerdivisions.

"'MS04,19-6-44,1-2.
149EisenhowerPapers, V11,1069;COSSACPlan,23, Para114(c). This wasnot the plan publishedin
Februaryas the Initial Joint Plan. It is, besidesa figment of Eisenhower'simagination,an attemptby
Morgan and othersat SHAEF to discreditMontgomeryby convincingpeoplethat the August 1943
feasibility study was the actualcampaignplan. It wasnot.

89
While tactical opportunities may have been lost. the overall operational success

the lodgementto the depth and width theorizedby Morgan was

neededto expand

neverpossiblewith the limited forcesthat hadbeenlanded,

particularly a
against rapid

buildup after an assaulton beachdefenses.Moreover,while Allied air was a scourge

it,
for Germanmovement,it neitherprevented nor did it sealthe battlefield. Due to the

stricturesplacedby Coningharnon close at

support, this period Allied airpoweralmost

neverinterveneddirectly in any Germanpanzercounterattack.

in
The Allies were an attrition battle, and Montgomeryattemptedto fight it

while controlling his own losses.

Merely attackingall out as
everywhere, Ike wanted,

had failed on numerousoccasionsin the GreatWar. 21 Army Groupsoughtto fight by

the rules as it understoodthem. The tactics of small unit battle-not the operational

designof large,wide-scalemaneuver---obtained.

The airmenwho hadcontributedso muchwerehelplessto do two things: First,

they could hamperbut not completely interdict ground forces' movement.German

forces had been slowed, but the fact remainedthat five panzer divisions and 17

infantry divisions had been moved into Normandy. Second,the airmen could not

removeenemyunits from the field. Bombing did not blast forcesfrom their positions.

Yet, underthe condition that "air forcesequaledgroundforces," the airmendemanded

that their airfields be capturedimmediately, despitethe fact that air superiority in

Normandy was never an issue. Tedder continually pressedEisenhower over the

90
 indicative of Montgomery's caution. At
airfields, who saw the failure to take them as
150
the sametime, Tedderoverruledthe useof heavybombersto supportmajor attacks.

in
Characteristically,Bradley'sshortcomings, forseeingthe bocageproblem, in

"failing" to takc Cherbourg expeditiously or being able to attack simultaneously

C)
desiredby the Army Group, were never criticized. The
toward the north and south as

Americans always received sympathy from Eisenhower.The British, and later the

French,neverdrew any empathyfrom Eisenhower.

For Montgomery,all-out consistentoffensiveswould permanentlycripple the

British Army and eliminate 21 Army Group's shrinking troop list. Manpower

dominating were never mentioned by

shortages, already offensive capabilities,

Churchill, who had shorted the Army of troops but who had demanded that his general

151
Three into the invasion, Montgomery had to
carry Britain's to
sword victory. weeks

demonstrate that Normandy would not be Anzio, with the Army as a beached

152
whale.

That demonstrationwould be EPSOM. EPSOM was designed to use the

maximum weight of SecondArmy in an army-controlledbattle. The air forces would

play a major part. Terrain, however,did much to the

separate availableforces.8 Corps

'50EisenhowerPapers, V111,157 1. In his commentsto the official historianin 1947.Eisenhowerdid

not stress "failure" at Caen, or that the plan had failed: Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield, 671-712,
PRO Air 37n84, Dailv Reflectionson the Courseofthe Battle by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh
Mallory [hereafterreferredto Leigh Mallory Diary], 14,16 June 1944,Hamilton excerptskey diary
material from Butcher, Montgomery, and Dempsey tracing the evolution of SHAEF-21 Army Group
relations;Tedder,With Prejudice,553-556;RAF Narrative, IV, 4,5.
"' 21 Army Group IntelligenceSummary,No. 133,18 June 1944.Britain's manpowerproblemshave
always beenconsideredthe greatestshortcomingfor the Army.
152Anzio, which had first beenplannedduring Eisenhower'stenureas SACMED, wasa boneof
contention between the Americans and the British. As at Normandy, the inability to provide landing
craft sufficient for a decisiveoperationalattack left critical force-to-space ratios short.The standard

91
 the major objective.with 30 Corpsproviding both supportingfires and a
would carry

flank protectionattack.I Corpsat Caenwould Leigh

demonstrate. Mallory promiseda

trouble with Tedder,who preferredto believe that

maximum air effort, causingmore
153
he could not commit air supportwithout Tedder'sapproval.

Dempseyplannedto make maximum use of armor in this attack. Originally

intendedto move to the eastand southof Caen,lack of spaceforced8 Corpsto deploy

in the crampedareawest of the city. EPSOM aimedat breakinga hole in the panzer

line, at gaining a bridgeheadover the Odon River, andat gainingposition to begin the

decisiveswing behind the Caenavenue.It replicatedthe PERCH turning movement

writ larger if
and, successful,would have broken the German defense into two

separatesectors.Weather, however, dogged the execution as well as the buildup.

Bradley, whose army was 10 days behind in unloading, beggedoff throwing in a

Again,
major attack simultaneously. the British it
would go alone,drawing off enemy

but 154
strength receivingno reciprocalhelp.

Storm damage from a huge Channel storm on the 17th and the already slow

off-loadingcphad delayed preparations. When forces became available, rainy skies and

repetitive weather halts kept airpower as a minor factor. The soldiers proceeded on

their own.

answerfrom the high commandin suchcaseswas"cautiousness-on the part of the field commanders.
This wasnow the constantmantraat SHAEF.
153SecondArmYHistory, 110-115,Montgomery,Norman4vto the Baltic, 77-85; Tedder, With
Prejudice,552,553; Orange,Coningham,198-199;Hamilton,Masterofthe Battlefield, 663-670;RAF
Narrative, IV, 14-16,18.
"4 DempseyDiary, 17June-19June,21 June.MontgomeryLog, 15June,18 June,20 June, 23 June,
John Baynes,TheForgotten Victor.- GeneralSir Richard O'Connor, KT, GCB, DSO, MC (London:
Brassey'sUK. 1989), 187,188. BaynescreditsO'Connor with proposingthe alternativeattackzone
west of Caen.

92
 Six panzerdivisions blocked the British sector.two were immediatelyin fi-ont

four blocked 155

the 30 Corpsapproach. (Seefigure 7.) Besidesa break-
of 8 Corpsand

in battle, Montgomery and Dempseymeant to take on the main weight of German

armor, a mission congruent with Montgomery's recently stated policy of holding

Germanarmor from the Americanfront.

Launchedon 25 June, the attacks proceededtoward Point (Hill) I 12, with

supplementaryattacksbeing made toward the ridges that cut laterally into 8 Corps*

axis of advance.More than 600 guns heralded the offensive, and the Germans

respondedwith panzersto eat at any gains made. (See figure 8.) After six days,

De sey shut down the battle. He had driven a salient of about six miles into the

enemy, but had neither broken through nor defeated the German armor. (See figures 9

and 10.) Ringed with panzer divisions, the troops in the salient fought the enemy to a

standstill. Near battle's end, Second Army estimated that it had destroyed 191 enemy

tanks. Intelligence also noted, that both the 9 SS and 10 SS Panzer divisions had

arrived in sector, a factor no doubt weighing heavily in the decision to halt the

156
attack.

Montgomery proclaimed success,a reflection of his ideas on limited-objective

attacks. Intelligence tracked enemy armor reserves and losses carefully, and

continually appreciated the capability of the defense to concentmte for a

counteroffensive, a task which the British attrition fight was designed to prevent.

Earlier, Montgomery had stated in his diary, "as long as Rommel has to
use his

I" M505,30thJune1944,listseight
panzcrdivisions:21 Pz,2 Pz,I SS,2 SS,9 SS.10SS,12SS.and
PanzerLehr.Ellis, Victoryin the West,1,mapfacing286,showssix at thebeginningof thebattle.
1.56
Hinsley,BritishIntelligence,
3, Part2.194-199;Second ArmvHisloq, 110-115.

93
 to plug holes, then we have donewell." Enemyarmor was used to
strategicreserves

fill gapsin their infantry line. With the arrival of more Germanarmor, Montgomery

for the beatingof enemyattacksand launchingfixing attacks,while Bradley.

opted

againbeggingoff an immediate on
assault his front, regroupedto attack southwards.

SHAEF pronouncedthe front as failing. Eisenhower

quickly movedoff to Normandy

to see Bradley. Cherbourghad fallen three days before, on 27 June. The subject of
157
Eisenhower'sprivate discussionscanonly be the subjectof conjecture.

Prior to Eisenhower'sarrival, Montgomeryon 30 JuneissuedM. 505, the most

far-reachingand important of his orders since the promulgationof the Initial Joint

Plan in February.From it, the final designfor the Normandycampaignwould emerge,

not a design based on COSSAC's flawed structureand the assumptionof a weak

but
defense, one basedon the actualforceson the field and without the fear of
enemy

a failed or
assault lack of a port to develop.

Montgomery's statement of policy enraged SHAEF and his critics:

My policy oncewe had secureda firm lodgementarea,hasalwaysbeen

to draw the main enemyforcesin to the battle of our easternflank, and
to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could
proceedthe easier.

157 MontgometyLog, 13 June,29,30 June.HansenDiary, 29 June 1944,claims Monty was interested

in clearingthe coastwith Canadian,British, and First Army to take Pasde Calaisand wantedto
abandonidea of attackingthe Brittany ports,which hasno basisin fact, though it demonstrated
Bradley's misrepresentationof Monty to Ike; Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander,432. SecondArmy
IntelligenceSummary,No. 26, cited 159enemytanksdestroyedduring EPSOMup to the end of 29
June 1944.The following day's summaryadded34 moretanks.SecondArmy estimatedmore than 360
tanksdestroyedduring the Junebattles.Estimatesalsonotedelementsfrom eight separatepanzcr
divisions were presentduring EPSOMbattles,with 10 SSarriving on the final day.

94
 Citing Bradley's reorganizationand restagingof forcesto the southas critical.
Cý C
he emphasizedthat he would follow a policy of retainingthe initiative, having no set-

backs,andproceedingrelentlesslywith his plan. This plan he cited as.

To hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank-

between CAEN and VII-LERS BOCAGE, and to swing our western or
right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide
sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions
to the south of Paris. 158

Tasking SecondArmy to continueits fixing missionwhile preparingto receive

a possible major enemy counteroffensive,Montgomery reiteratedthe need to seize

Caen,"the soonerthe better." For First Army, he laid out a specific direction of attack

to begin on 3 July:

The Army [is) to pivot on its left in the CAUMONT area.and to swing
southwardsand eastwardson to the generalline CAUMONT-VIRE-
MORTAIN-FOUGERES.

He further specified:

On reachingthe baseof the peninsulaat AVRANCHES, the right hand

[US] Corps (VIII Corps)to be turned westwardsinto BRITTANY and
directedon RENNESand ST MALO.

As regardsthe remainderof the Army:

Planswill be madeto direct a strongright wing in a wide sweep,south

of the bocagecountry,towardssuccessiveobjectivesas follows:
(a) LAVAL-MAYENNE.
(b) LE MANS-ALENCON

Montgomery'slast admonitionleft no doubt asto his aim:

"' M505,30th June 1944,1,2.

95
 it is highly important that when the aboveoperationsbegin on 3 July
drive '5ý'
be
they should carriedout with the greatest andenergy.

Montgomery's "policy" had in fact percolatedover a number of months,not

simply since the D-Day failure to take Caen or the failure of PERCH to execute

Dempsey'spre-Dayplans.It was apparentfrom the Initial Joint Plan that the strategic

objectsof Cherbourgand Brittany were in the west, but that the airmen had forced a

possessionof the Caen area (actually south of Caen) as a key object. Monty's chief

operationsofficer, Brigadier David Belchem,claimed that decisive in

operations the

west were consideredas early as April. Had this been so, it would have been an

unformed idea, not reasonablein Montgomery's mind until the campaignbegan to

develop.Monty's discussionsandmemosprior to the landing indicatedhis flexibility.

While he acceptedthe mask-and-encircleplan made by SecondArmy, he was also

quick to seethe logic of keepinga defenseon the left as the panzersbore down on his

forces. By mid- to late June his plans section producedan outline plan. LUCKY

STRIKE, that reflectedhis tactical situationand his acceptancethat he could not fight

the strength of the German army with his British forces, whose strength would

diminish over time. Accepting SecondArmy as the shield, he formalizedFirst Army

LUCKY 160
asthe sword with his acceptanceof STRIKE.

'*" Ibid., 3.
160NARA. RG 338, ML-200. OPLAN LUCKY STRIKE (Clearanceof Normandy.circa I July 44);
NARA, RG 33 1. Entry 34, Box 34,381-LUCKY STRIKE; RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978,First Army,
27 June 1944,101-3.5OperationLUCKY STRIKE; Major-GeneralDavid Belchem, Victoly in
Norman4v(London: Chattoand Windus, 1981),45-53; MH1, M S, Reportof the GeneralBoard,
EuropeanTheater,Study Number 1, "Strategyof the Campaignin WesternEurope1944-1945," 29-30.
The further developmentof LUCKY STRIKE. particularly LUCKY STRIKE B, can be seenas
evolving from Montgomery'sexpressedviews within the AfontgomeqLog, and also within his
directives.His obsessionwith the westernpart of the front, asopposedto the easLis also apparent,
particularly in view of his constantreferencesto ports,all in the US zone.LUCKY STRIKE completed
the "Master Plan" and was the crucial secondhalf of Montgomery'sconceptof the Normandy

96
 As with a rapid shift of effort and simultaneousattacks in the Cotentin.

Bradley did not deliver on time. This was a consistentproblem for Montgomery*s

that was basedon timing attacksalong the front to pose both threatsand
gencralship,

actual attacksin different sectors and

simultaneously, it fiu-therhelped to establisha

American
separate and British battle for Normandyin nationalistic eyes,not the Army

Group battle for which Montgomerywas responsible.

Characteristically,no talk of "American failure' pervadedSHAEF's kibitzing.

Instead, Bradley continued to shovel forces forward piecemeal, chewing up divisions

161
in the bocage by regiments, hoping to gain an adequate start line for a major attack.

No thought seems to have been given to following Montgomery's admonition to go

for Coutances, a direct concentrated attack via the St. Lo area that would have cut the

peninsula laterally, obviated much bad terrain, and bypassed seveml defending

divisions. 162

Monty attemptedto keep up the tempo within the boundsof launching corps-

sized attacks,not the "company exercises"that Tedder whined about. Montgomery's

rationale was that only large forces could prevent the enemy from concentratingon

Campaign,the first being the dual effort to take Caenand Cherbourgsimultaneously,not in tandcmas
in the COSSACPlan.
16'FUSAReportof0perations Oct 43-Aug 44,81-93; Martin Blumenson,Break-out Pursuit
and
(Washington:Centerof Military History. 1961,1984).passim.It is interestingthat the American
official accountstrainsto eliminateany cognizanceof an -Army Group battle" or any favorableWect
gainedby SecondArmy's attrition battles,Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,196(fn 7). 197(fn 8). The
offical historical account,TheSupremeCommand,by ForrestPogue(no admirerof Monty) is more
fair. Pogueattemptsto restrict the importanceof LUCKY STRIKE to footnotes,which is not the
interpretationgiven by the US Army TheaterBoard,that credits LUCKY STRIKE B (variant) as bcing
the breakoutplan. Blumcnsonobscuresthe fact that the plan existed.Nor havethe American historians
ever investigatedthe virtual congruenceof LUCKY STRIKE B and Montgomery'sdirectives.
161Montgomen,Log, 23 June 1944;Nigel Hamilton,Mono-. TheBattlesoffield Alarshal Bernard
Montgomeq (ýew York: RandomHouse,1994).302. Hamilton quotesa Montgomeryletter to
Alanbrooke:"I tried very hard to get First US Army to developits thrust southwards,towards
COUTANCE, at the sameas it wascompletingthe captureof CHERBOURG."

97
decisive counterblows,yet terrain and resources,especiallyartillery. restricted the

width and depth of objectivesfor his own For

attacks. Normandy,and indeedfor most

of the war, the corps was the unit of choice of limited objective attacks.Divisions

launchedindependent larger ' 13

rarely operationsexceptwithin the context of a aim.

While Bradley's forces continuedtheir fight, Dempseymoved to complete

Caen'scapture.Twice failing at an encirclement,Dempseyopted for a frontal assault

using maximum air support. Leigh Mallory obliged, and with the Canadians

intimately involved, both GeneralsCrerar and Simonds intended to use their fire

coordination skills to the maximum in an advisory capacity. It would become a

firepower battle using the air force for mass effect. (See figures II and 12.)

Apparently, unknown to SHAEF and virtually all of Monty's critics, the Caen

operationwas to be half a loaf at a time, with the first half being seizingCaennorth of

the river. The remainderwould follow 2d Army's consolidation.The massedbomber

164
strike supportedthis concept.

Tedder and SHAEF, however, fumed. While Leigh Mallory coordinated,

Tedderaccused"the Army of being unwilling to fight its battles," and allegedthat the

air force was being blamed for slow ground gains, Tedder hoped to engineer

Montgomery's relief, a situation Alanbrookewould never have accepted.Moreover,

Morgan and Smith, ignoring Bradley's lack of movement,blamed the stalemateon

163The Americansconsideredthe corpsthe largesttacticalunit, and for their operationsthroughoutthe

war, the corpswas the real fighting headquarterswheredetailedplanningand control took place.
Armies supplied,settasks,and coordinatedair assets;Tedder,WithPrejudice,559. Tedder's
commentshad far more to do with his hatredof Montgomerythan with his actualor theoretical
knowledgeof ground combator actualconditionsat the front. His commentalso showedincredible
ignoranceaboutthe actual battleplansfor SecondArmy and how they were carriedout.

98
Montgomery. Eisenhower, who had just spent five days in Normandy without

the British front, decidedto write a letter urging speed.Churchill

venturing toward

had 161
Alanbrooke.
accostedby Ike, blamedMonty and a row with

Dempsey's Caen attack, called CHARNNVOOD, did little to alleviate

SHAEF's ire. The airmen were unhappy with the plan, which was designed more to

the battlefield than to propel the ground attack forward. The plan. in fact. was a
seal

victim of Britain's internal Commonwealth politics. With Simonds and Crcrar

involved, Montgomery gave them leeway, a mistake for which he paid the popularity

The called the question on the use of bombers. The slow

price. resulting air plan

following the bombardment brought on further ire from Tedder. who

ground advance

to hate the Army and Leigh Mallory equally. CHARNWOOD. in fact. was
continued

based on Leigh Mallory's ideas from mid-June, and also recognized that the city was

cut by both It
a river and a canal. was designed to gain the foothold to permit the town

to be cleared, not to make a rapid move through it which was, in all probability.

impossible. 166

CHARNWOOD brought Dempsey's forces through the town, but Hitler

to
refused permit his I SS PanzerCorps to withdraw. The mouth of the avenuewas

now in friendly hands,but the crucial flanks and depth of the avenueremainedto be

'"SecondArm vHiston-, 118-121: )ZAF Narrative. 11'. 21-24; Ellis. Victon, in the West. 1.311-316;
'
Colonel C. P. Stacey, fhe Victoq Campaign, Ill, The Operations in Northwest Europe 1944-1945
[hereafter referred to as Stacey, The Victory Campaign, I 11)(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966). 152-164.
'63Danchev and Todman, Alanbrooke WarDiaries, 566,567; Ambrose. The Supreme Commander,
434435.
'" Leigh Mallor), Diar),, 14 June 1944. Second Army Intelligence Summary, No. 34.7 July 1944. No.
35,8 July 1944. Dempsey's intelligence noted that the strength of the guns and flak to the west of the
town was increasing. Following the attack. they estimated that the value of the city had been eliminated
and that its retention would be impossible; for battle description. seeSecond Arm.v Histoq, 118-12 1.

99
developed. German tanks and antitank, guns still dominated the precious airfield

Morgan had declared as the success standard for

terrain that and the airmen

OVERLORD. 167

Montgomery'sresultingM. 5 10directiveon 10July, repeatedhis policy as:

draw(ing) the main enemyforcesin to battle on our easternflank, and

to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank may
proceedeasier.

Noting a reinforcement in front of Bradley, he intended to stage Second Army

to draw force from the westernflank. That intention grew into a

operations additional

double attack plan that further split 21 Army Group's commanderfrom support at

S 168

While Montgomery's Army commandersplanned two "colossal "

cracks,

COBRA (the final product of his M. 505 and LUCKY STRIKE B), and

The
GOODWOOD, other operationsproceeded. British front, contrary to SHAEF's

jaundiced view, was neverquiescent.Becausemassiveoperations("ColossalCracks")

weren't continuous, troublemakers such as Tedder, Morgan, and Butcher, Ike's

ignored
propagandist, the constantsmall-unit fighting that comprisedlimited objective

attacks. Battles to absorbor fix reservesor to gain adequate"start lines" for major

offensiveswere continuousin SecondArmy's sector.Theseincluded operationssuch

as PERCH, DAUNTLESS, MARTLET, SPRING,ATLANTIC, and others,that saw

"7 MHl Foreign Military Studies,MS, C-024,GeneralmajorFritz Kraemer,"I SS PanzcrCorps in the

West," passim.
1" M510,10-744,1.2; Leigh Afallory Diary, 14 June;MontgomeryLog, 12 July, notesthat the two
plans coming to fruition were the long-termresult of discussionsand orders.This wasespeciallytrue
for COBRA; DempseyDiary, 10-12July. The GOODWOODvariant, offering a doubleblow, was
proposedby Dempseyon the 12thbasedon the post-Caensituation,and after discussingvariantswith
his commanders.

100
 units repulsing launching
counterattacks, limited objective attacks.or conducting firc

by
raids artillery.

Constantmovement,or the threat of constantmovement.was the only true

"fixer" to keep enemydivisions in place,and the fact that this worked throughoutthe

campaignindicates that Montgomery's plan, though not gaining significant ground.

was working, of
regardless when his concept In
emerged. one sense.theseoperations

mirrored many of the smaller battlesthat combinedto generatethe major "*battles"of

World War I such as the Somme or Verdun. Unexperiencedin such operations.

Eisenhoweraccusedthe British of not fighting and was content to have his staff

openly criticize British operations.Sensitiveto American losses,Eisenhowernever

made such chargesagainstBradley, never noted the slownessof American divisions

to adapt to the bocage,never commentedthat Bradley faced the lowest quality and

fewest numbersof the enemy, and never mentionedthat Bradley had becn warned

about the difficulty of the bocageand that extensiveintelligencehad beenprovided by

the British. Monty wasthe designatedscapegoatfor all failures.at evcry level.

The differential in considerationsbetrayedEisenhower'sinability to estimate

enemypotential, to assessterrain, or to credit any but Americansin fighting. Indeed,

three days after Bradley had confessedat the Army commanders'confercnce

that he

had "failed" to deliver the breakthroughMonty hadbeenaskingfor and ordering since

27 June,Eisenhowerwrote Bradleyon 8 July,

I well understandthat you are having tough going, both from the
ground and from the enemy.However, I am perfectly certain that you

101
 are on the right track. We must keep up the pressureon the widest
169
possiblefront on which we cancontinueto sustainthe attack.

The same day, Montgomery received a letter from Eisenhowerquestioning

why "We have not yet attempteda major full-dressattack on the left flank supported

by everythingwe could bring to bear." Continuing, Ike noted that nothing could be

done on the right flank to help exceptpossibly an "airborne operationat St. Malo."

Montgomery,noting in his own log that Eisenhower'sletter "is the first time he has

ever expressedany views on the battle," submittedhis "reasonsin writing," in the

traditional military manner,noting in his lengthyresponseboth his actionsthroughout

the campaignand his reasoning.Repeatedly,he stressedthe value of Cherbourgand

Brittany askey to his actions,andnotedhis concept:

The great thing now is to get First and Third Army up to a good
strength, and to get them cracking on the southward thrust on the
western flank, and then to turn Patton westwards into the Brittany
170
peninsula.

Unfortunately,Montgomeryfailed to statethe glaringly obvious. He hesitated

to assaultheadlonginto a qualitatively superior armoredforce heavily reinforced in

depth by antitank weaponsand backedby further armor reserves.Eisenhowerhimself

had been appalled at Allied armor's failings, and had already moved to have the

Americanordnancecorpslook into it. 171

169EisenhowerPapers.111,1986.
"0 EL. EisenhowerCorrespondence. Letter to Montgomery.dated7 July 1944(reproducedin EP
111,1982-1983),ibid., Montgomeryto Eisenhower,M-508; MontgomelyLog, 8 July 1944.
171EL, Bedell Smith Papers,SHAEF Cable Log (in), 6 July 44, Eisenhowerto Smith.

102
 GOODWOOD exceededMontgomery's 10 July design and was the Second

Army Commander'sresponseto what he felt 1721

was Bradley's failure to break out.

Dempseybelievedthat a full corps attackusing all three armoreddivisions following

an extensiveair preparationwould provide the final tip neededto topple the defenses

south of Caen.A complementary"fixing" attackto clear the Verriercs;ridge areawest

of Caen would keep the Germans from shifting armor reserves.Two facts boded

poorly for the plan. Firs4 the attack would use the narrow Cacn-airbornebridgchcad

as the start line, an areaalreadydeterminedas too small and too congestedto amass

an additional full corps and its artillery. Secondly,

the attack would be madehead-on

into the strengthof the Germandefensein depth, the very thing that Dempseyand

Montgomeryhad avoidedsince8 June.The fact that GOODWOOD would require the

sameair assetsneededfor COBRA preventedtheir simultaneouslaunching.Dempsey

fast for hugedouble 173

would go and setthe stage a assault.

As always, air support using anything other than fightcr-bombcrs raised

hackles among the airmen. As Leigh Mallory grew increasingly cooperative, Tedder

and his henchman, Coningham, resisted "cooperation. " Tedder continually attempted

to override or derail Leigh Mallory's cfforts. GOODWOOD, however, posed a

problem to Tedder. Eisenhower was enthusiastic about a great double attack. For

once, his idea of everybody attacking everywhere all the time seemed possible. He

weighed in promising support. The "blue chip" of Ike's support was to prove another

'?-'PRO,CAB 106/1061.
Notesof Conversation
between
GeneralDempsey
Commander
British
SecondArmy and Lt. Col. G.S. Jackson,Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart. DempseyDiaq. 10-12July 1944.
The "double blow" wasproposedby Dempseyon 12 July basedon the post-Cacnsituation,
and after
discussingvariantswith his commanders.

103
stumbling block in SHAEF-Montyrelations,thoughin reality. Tedder'shelpfulnessat
174
Ike's proddingdisguisedTedder'scontemptfor the Army andMontgomery.

GOODWOODwas basedon severalassumptions,both written and unwritten.

Primary among them was that the air bombardmentwould annihilate, or at least

neutralize,the Germanantitank defensein depthbuilt on the Caenavenueas well as

crateringthe flanks of the breakthroughareato preventarmoredcounterattacks.A full

corps of three armored divisions would pass through the gap created. taking the

airfield sites and "writing down" the German armor concentratedin front of the

British. Moreover, COBRA, the American breakthroughattack on the St. Lo front,

175
would follow immediatelyon 19July, asGOODWOODculminated.

Dempsey'splan harkedback to Monty's pre-EPSOMplanning that had been

scotchedby O'Connor, who again soughtto avoid cornmandin this sector,this time

believing Crockershouldbe reinforcedfor the attack.Dempseyplannedfor a decisive

operation,giving O'Connor threearmoreddivisions, with Falaiseas the objective.As

the operationneared,Monty hedgedhis bet, limiting the armoredadvanceto the high

ground south of Caen. He also stressedthe importanceof the 2 Canadian Corps

clearing their corridor and thus covering O'Connor's deep'flank-.Only then would 8

'" JohnJ.T. Sweet,Alounting the Threat. TheBattle

ofBourguebusRidge, 18-23Jult, 1944(San
Rafael:PresidioPress,1977).Sweet'saccountis basedon the former Camberleystaff ride and his
extensivetalks with both O'Connor and other participantsin the late 1960s.
"'Teddcr, 117thPrejudice,561.562. Tedder
wantedto ensurethat Monty understoodthat he was to go
all out, regardlessof air support,but Eisenhowerbalkedat sendingsucha message.
'I7*SecondArpýr Histom 123-125;Montgomery,Norman4V
to the Baltic, 97-102; EL, Correspondence
File, M-50,13 July 194

104
Corps be able"to crack about" asthe situation SHAEF,
demanded. who saw Monty as
176
break-through.
spendingthe family fortune-airpower-cxpected a massive

Airpower played a huge part in the ground commanders" plans. virtually

dominating both of the assaults planned. Neither GOODWOOD nor COBRA was

seen at the time by SHAEF or the ground commanders as possibly gaining an

decision beyond rupturing the current defense line, and it is becauseof this
operational

lack of faith that SHAEF's view of Montgomery's Sencralship hung on thin threads.

From the beginning of the NEPTUNE planning period, Tedder and Coningham had

been hostile to the Army in general and to Montgomery in particular. hlontyý dwelling

in his own egocentric bubble, was slow to see this as crippling, though he did shy

away from Coningham, tending to deal with Leigh Mallory, whom he saw as his

177
opposite number.

Using airpower to support ground attacks was an unpopular idea with the

airmen, but it had a firni root not simply in Montgomery's mind. but also in

Eisenhower'smind and thoseof the SHAEF planners.The plans section,seizing any

to
opportunity put in
Eisenhower direct control, noted in their contingencyconcerning

breaking a "stabilization of the front" that concentratedairpowcr wielded by SHAEF

"6 EL, CorrespondenceFile, Letter to Montgomerydated7 July 1944.reproducedin Eisenhovsrr

Papers,1//, 1982-1983;Correspondence File, M-508; MontgomeryLog, 12-21July 1944;NAC, RG
24, Volume 10556,File 215132.016 (D4), SecondArmy OperationInstructionNo. 2.13 July 1944;
NAC, RG 24, Volume 10556,File 215B2.016(D3).2 CDN Corps,notesfrom Chief of Staffs
meetings,2d Army, OperationGOODWOOD MEETING; NAC. RG 24. Volume 10791.Corps
Comd's Noteson GOODWOOD MEETING; BaynesýTheForgotten Pctor. 197-205.
177MontgomeryLog, 14,15 June.Montgomery'sideasconcerningLeigh Mallory consistently
improved. He believedLeigh Mallory to be a victim of dislike by Coningharnand Harris, but not by
Tedder,who did dislike Leigh Mallory. Montgomerystatesclearly that Leigh Mallory is the authorof
the -bomber in supportof groundtroops" idea,and that -he is preparedto try anything to win the war."

103
 be best 178
Heavy bombershad proven decisive in saving
would the courseof action.

the Salerno beachheadin September1943; they were therefore a clear option in

Eisenhower'smind.

Tedder,from the first, had opposedthis type of tactic, as did Spaatz,Harris.

Doolittle.179Their however,did not take airpower off the discussion

and opposition,

table. Montgomeryusedhis trustedBrigadier, Plans,CharlesRichardson,to easeair

planningwith Broadhurst,
but Coninghamremained Poor
intractable. weatherand the

obviously porous interdiction effort offered little respite to the soldiers despite the

targetingdata provided by ULTRA Unable

decrypts. to sealthe battlefield, the airmen

hesitantto try to "blow the enemyoff it, " the claim, originally madeby Tedder
were
180
for his DesertSquadrons,that was turneddown by Montgomeryat Alamein.

The ideas percolatedwith Leigh Mallory, who, betraying the airmen's dim

view of "Army "

Cooperation, began seeingairpower as the Army's best helpmate.

Leigh Mallory, however,did sharethe airmen'sview that the Army needed"to get on

with it, " and was buoyedby the intelligence estimatesthat repeatedlynoted that the

Germanbuildup was not meetingtheir expectedcapabilities.Moreover, like the other

airmen,he did not seeGermandefensivestrength,particularly of their superiorarmor-

anti-tank forces, as the in

critical problem gaining depth and the desired airfields

noted in AEAF's buildup plan. Leigh Mallory, however,did not use his reservations

NARA, RG 33 1. Post-Overlord,1,Memo from PlansStaff, 10 June 1944.

Davis. Spaat--and the Air War,453482.
'soJamesAmbroseBrown. EaglesStrike: TheCampaignsofthe SouthAfrican Air Force in EgIpt,
4ývrenaica,Lib.ya, Tunisia,Tripolitania and Madagascar1941-1943(CapeTown: Purnel, 1974),26 1.
Tedderproposedto hammerthe El Alamein positionsfor 3-4 daysto preventa slugging match"on the
bestQuecnsburyRuleslines."

106
to malign Montgomery or the Army, or to provoke the Army Group Commander's

he by 181
relief. Rather, soughta solution using airpower.

Leigh Mallory's conversion was steady, and Was recorded nightly by his

St. George for

Saunders, the AEAF Diary. Beginning with his
amanuensis,Hillary

ideason bombing that led to CHARNWOOD, he noted:

I haveneverwaited to be told by the army what to do in the air. and my

is
view not bounded, as it seems to be in the case of the army, by the
nearest hedge or stream. I said as much, though in different words, to
Monty and tried to describethe wider aspectsof this battle as I see
the
them, particularly stressing numberof Divisions he
which might be
have had to fight had they not beenpreventedfrom appearingon the
scene by air action. He was profoundly uninterested. Thý fact of the
matter is, however, that we have reduced the enemy's opposition
considerablyand the efficiency of their troops and armour even more
182
so. In spite of this, the army won't get on.

Leigh Mallory was clearly wrong aboutMontgomery'sallegeddisinterestand.

in fact, had piqued his enthusiasmby offering to break the stalementwith bomb

power. Nor had Monty ignored that the "Air Forceshave set the arenafor the Army

the army has [not] taken advantageof this situationor madeuse of it: ` as claimed by

Leigh Mallory. 183Montgomery's divisions received heavy armored counterattacks

despite"air superiority," a gift that was irrelevant on many daysdue to rain, mist, or

cloud cover. Moreover, while the majority of the airmen operatedfrom in

hardstands

administrationhampered
England,the army was loosely tetheredby across-the-beach

1" Leigh Afalloq Diaq, 14 June.

is, Ibid., 14 June 1944.
1'3Ibid., 15 June 1944.Monty's understandingof airpower.interdiction,and the relative equality of the
forcesin battle was well known and thoroughly publishedthroughoutboth the British army and the air
force. SeePamphlet,High Commandin War: Post-Ovrrlord. 1,Memo from PlansStaff, 10June 1944.

107
 by bad Montgomerywas forced to fight to break-
the
greatly unseasonably weather.

stalemate,regardlessof weather.

Despitehis views, Leigh Mallory showeda positive face to Montgomery,and

they becamemore empathetictoward eachother's problemsand plans.The air-ground

team that Monty had forged with Coningharnfor Alam Halfa and Alamein beganto

reappear, despite AEAF Forward (Coningham) and SHAEF's Deputy Supreme

Commander,who was contentto separatethe air and groundbattle.

Leigh Mallory's diversionto CROSSBOWtargets,the V-1 launchsites,added

further strain to air-ground relations. Doolittle, in particular, resentedEighth Air

Force's task of attacking them, a task handeddown by AEAF. Tedder, moreover,

by Berlin in "retaliation" for

undercutLeigh Mallory authorizinga massiveair raid on

V-1 strikes, while simultaneouslycutting off rail attacks to compensate.EPSOM,

which received little support due to weather, hardenedLeigh Mallory toward the

SecondArmy's support.He noted:

My mind is very clear on onepoint which I feel very stronglyindeed.It

is that we must be preparedto use every bit of air we've got, every
in to
single aircraft, order unstick the Army if, as I fear, it getsbogged.

Studying a photo depicting a 1,000-yardradius of obliteration around a 100-

bomberaiming point, he wrote: "I am convincedthat we can do this sort of thing to

eight different points along a battle front." Continuing with his he

reasoning, outlined

ideasthat would both transformthe campaignand radically changehis own position,

and that of Montgomery's,for the worse in many people'seyes.Seeingthat the Army

couldn't get forward on its own, he outlined his operationalconcept:

108
 We can find 6-8 "blobs", that is to say, battery positions or strong
points, along the edge of the assault area. This can be done at first light
by heavy bombers. Then an immediate follow up should be an artillery
barrage covering the first 1000 yards in the depth of the area to be
attacked. When that was lifted I should put in my medium bombers to
clobber in front of the advancing Infantry up to a depth of from 1000 to
4000 yards. I am convinced that the moral effect of this triple form of
assault would be terrific.
Finally, I should put the day heavybomberson to more distant battery
targets.If this be done, I truly believe that it would have the effect of
getting the Army through. If it is not done, then there is unhappily, a
' 8'
greatchancethat the Army will continueto stick.

EPSOM,and the failure of O'Connor's 8 Corpsto break-the front. completed

the final conversionof Leigh Mallory. Leigh Mallory knew that Tedderwould oppose

this action, but the current situationin fact was no more than a replicationof the basic
185 0
assaulton D-Day. Its very conceptionshook the roots of the Trcnchard-inspircd

anti-Army clique that ruled the RAF andwas mirroredby Spaatzand Doolittle and the

senior elementsof the AAF. Its promulgation separatedthe airmen and soldiers at

SHAEF permanently. CHARNWOOD on 8 July had begun this schism.

GOODWOOD and COBRA would finish it.

While Monty's M. 510 outlined his gcneml objectives, two battles had to be

fought: The first was to obtain useof bombersfor both plans.Tedderhad

opposedthe

use of heavy bombers in the tactical role, a reversalof his own actions while -air

commandee' for Eisenhower in the Mediterranean.He had orchestratedSpaatzs

attack to save Lt. Gen. Mark Clark's imperiled Salemo beachhead.Now, Tedder

balked at helping Montgomery,and at supportingideas

originatedby Leigh Mallory.

Leigh Alalloýy Diary, 26 June.

Ibid.

109
Moreover, Coningham, had opposed such "blitz" attacks. tactics developed by

Broadhurst,a Monty-ally and friend of the anny.I So

The DeputySupremeCommanderreportedin his diary that upon

confinn[ing] to Montgomery that his opposite number was

Coningham,and Dempsey's was Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst [83
187
Group], Montgomeryseemedrelievedto havethis confirmation.

Tedder's disingenuousnessfooled Eisenhower, not only during Normandy but

throughoutthe war. Tedder,had, while professingto Dempseythat plans for the use

of bomberswould be studied, quickly killed Leigh Mallory's attempt to bolster the

failing PERCH offensive. By the time weather, army-air relations, and tactical

planning had beenharmonized,

a blooabath,
needless a secondstymiedoffensive,and

the month of June had all expired. This was the measureof Tedder's dedicationto
188
army-aircooperation.

Tedder bridged two schools. He had supported the Transportation Plan,

essentiallyrequiring half of the sorties flown precedingthe invasion. The strategic

commanders,Harris and Spaatz, vehemently opposed diverting their bombers to

support OVERLORD, and Eisenhower'sdelayedappointmentin gaining operational

control reflectedthe power held by their sponsors,Portal and Arnold, evenagainstthe

alleged main effort of the entire Allied cause.Spaatz'smain strategic commander,

Doolittle, was frequentlyhostile to any diversion. Harris seemedto be beyondall but

generalcontrol. Spaatzsummedthe true problem in his diary after arriving in England

'" Hamilton.
Masterof theBattlefield,
Tedder,
WthPrejudice,
465467;Gooderson,
AirPowerat the
Battlefront,
134.
"'Tedder,117th
Prejudice,552.

110
 in January. 1944. OVERLORD. he feared. would preclude, -Air Operations of

sufficient intensity to justify the theory that Germany can be knocked out by

Airpower. " 189

This summedthe problem.To the Americanairmen.the AAF was fighing for

its independence.to the British airmen, the RAF soughtto justify its independence.

POINTBLANK, not OVERLORD, was their true quest.Hence.the Army's requests

for bombersupporthad to be ignoredexceptfor transportationtargets.At no time was

the division betweenthe airmenandthe soldiersgreater.

Owing his allegianceto Portal, Tedder supportedthis line until Eisenhower

exertedhis authority.On 25 June,Ike signaledMonty, saying.

Please do not hesitate to make the maximum demands for any air
assistance that can possibly be useful to you. Whenever there is any
legitimate opportunity we must blast the enemy with everything we
have. 190

Leigh Mallory had indeedresurrectedthe bomberideaas promised.and events

forced the unwilling airmen to respond.Not only Harris, who had "gardened"Cacn,

but also Spaatzand Doolittle were soon tasked.COBRA. like GOODWOOD, would

be launchedfollowing an extensiveair preparation.Monty consideredthe two plans

inseparable,as he submitteda singlerequestfor air for themboth.191

"' While the Army maintainedthe hope

of a bomberassaultto aid EPSOM.this nevermaterializeddue
to weather.
'" Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Warr:
Air Po%rr and the Land Battle in Three American
Wars (Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 225.
'90EL, Correspondence File, MSG S-54520,25 June
1944, Eisenhower to Montgomery.
'9' EL, Correspondence File. M-50,13200 July 1944. It is important
to note that Monty had requested
air from Eisenhower for GOODWOOD in M49, and from Tedder for both operations in M-53.
140830 July 1944. He noted here, -Plan if successful promises to be decisive
and therefore necessary

III
 the quick passageof three
GOODWOOD relied upon a clean break-through,

divisions throughthe enemy'sdefensivedepth, and the seizureof the high

armoured

from the start line. Originally intending the

ground approximately six miles

Bourgcbous ridge to be intermediate objective on the way to Falaise.

an

Montgomery'sdecidedto restrict GOODWOOD's objectiveto the ridge itself, but left

the door to if
open exploitation successwas immediate. He ordered that, then and

during the battle, reconnaissance

was to be pushedas far as Falaise, "to study the

form." His limiting the advanceto an objective, and then an on-order exploitation.

may have been due to the withdrawal of Germanpanzersinto reserve,signaling that

cleanbreakthroughwould be possible,or to his lack of confidencein good weather

no

for the two operationsto take place in tandem.The Armor vs. Armor plus Antitank

Gunsproblem also loomed.Bradleysoonaddedto this worry by askingfor more time.

COBRA would not be readyuntil 21 July. 192

With Tedderin tandemto Eisenhowerin hoping for a breakoutand seizureof

the Caenplain's airfield sites,more rodeon the attackthan simply a holding action for

a one-two operationalpunch. With Bradley obviously failing in the west, and Tedder

and now Marshall and Stimson carping becausethe British weren't doing
16 their

"
share, SHAEF wanted a massivevictory. So intensewas Eisenhower'sbelief that

Monty was intent on solving Ike's own problem with his superiorsand staff, that he

grew to believe or concoct the idea that a breakout from the east "was always the

thattheairforcesbringfull weightto bear.

" These forthefirestorm
wordswerethecatalyst that
followed.
192PRO,CAB106/1061, Conversations betweenGeneral NAC,RG24,Volume10791,
Dempsey; G
Branch HQ8 CORPS; CORPS COMD'SNOTES ON-GOODWOOD MEETING. " NeitherDempsey
norO'Connor offeredmilitaryreasons limitingGOODWOOD
concerning to alimited-objcctive

112
 "" 93Eisenhower'sfailure GOODWOOD
plan. to see and COBRA as linked operations.

and Ike's own ignoranceof holding, fixing, and secondaryefforts versusmain efforts.

would plaguerelationsnot only in Normandybut for the rest of the war.

GOODWOOD's tactics were crafted by Dempsey,not Montgomcry as his

critics at SHAEF reported.The reality of the small bridgeheadposedrestraintson both

mounting and maneuvering,and as in the Alamein mineficids, restricted limits

hamperedarmor deployment.Worst of the problems would be a lack of accurate

intelligenceof the locationand depthof the Germandefenses.The air preparationwas

intended not simply to neutralize lanes into the combat zone, but also to replace

artillery that could not reachinto the depthsof the defense,and to saturateit in a near-

bombardment
simultaneous its
to prevent resiting.(Seefigure 13.) 104

Leigh Mallory awaitedwhat he called "the air-blastbattle,"' noting in his diary

that the "Leigh Mallory plan" for bombing and breakthroughshould work. but

presciently said,

There are people in a high quarter who won't be sorry if it does not
succeed.But it is equally true to say that there are otherswho wish it
every success.

Tedderremainedsilent throughouttheir conferences,and Coningham,stunningly,had

becomecooperafive.Referringto Tedder,he noted,"I think he had beentold by Ike to

195
leavethings to me."

attack.Dempseybelievedit wasto clear up -misconceptions"at the executionlevel. He notedthat

Monty oversoldGOODWOODto secureair support.
'93COSSACPlan.29, Paras.4045.
'0' GoodwoodMeeting, 8 CorpsComd Notes:CAB 106,Conversation
with GeneralDempsey,
Baynes,TheForgotten Victor, ibid.
1" Leigh Afalloq Diaýy, 14th, 15th, 17thJuly.

113
 In Franccto obsmc the bombing,Lcigh Mallory rccorded:

The plan was a goodone and the air could play its full part because
we
knew wherethe defenceswere and the bombsfell on them. The whole
196
thing went quickly until IIa. m.

Leigh Mallory was partially correct. The attack rolled forward, but the

bombardmentachievedlimited results.The towns to the flanks were not neutralized

and requiredthe lead armoreddivision's motorized infantry to deploy. The surviving

in
enemy the bombedareaswere dazed,but recoveredafter sometime Tanks
passed.

in
survived rubbled towns, as did someantitank guns within the bombardment
area,

and these were manned after the shock of the bombing wore off. II th Armoured

Division drove 10,000yards,nearly to the limit of advance,and suddenlyfound itself

fighing both tanks and 88-mm guns.Congestionand caution delayed7th Armoured's

deployment,and Guards Armoured found itself mired in fights to the flanks. The

reconnaissancescreenof armored cars meant for Falaise found no passageoff the

battlefield. Germanreservesfrom the unlocatedparizerdivisions respondedquickly.

197
By day's end, 8 Corpswas in a ring of hot steel. (Seefigure 14.)

By afternoon,two contraryopinionshad emerged.Montgomery,unfortunately,

told the pressthat the line had beenbroken, and subsequentreportssoonproved him

wrong. Leigh Mallory, who had watchedthe bombingfrom a capturedStorch aircraft,

soon visited Dempseyasking for reportsof a breakthrough.Dempseyfelt the absence

196Ibid., 18th, 19thJuly; RAF Narrative, IV, 36-59.This providesthe most in-depthrecordof air
operationsin supportof GOODWOOD.
'"Second Arm Histoty. 123-128:Montgomery,Normandvto the Baltic, 100-105,Montgomerv's
Scientists.OR Report6 Bombing in OperationGoodwood,79-85; RG 24 including CorpsComd Notes
"Goodwood Meeting." Of interestalso is the statementmadein SecondArmy IntelligenceSummary,
No. 46,20 July 1944:-The so-calledtank country doesn't really exist-thcre arc too many inhabited
placesand the very successfularmourcdbreakthrough hasnow had to give placeto infantry with tank
support."

114
 of completereportswas normal after only a few hours,but Leigh Mallory "believe[d]

the real reasonfor the lack of reportswas becauseby then the Army was not making

"
muchprogress.

By the next day, Leigh Mallory reported:

[I]t does not seem to me that the breakthrough which we produced has
been exploited and pressed to a conclusion. There we were, having
helped the Army over all the preliminary gun positions of the enemy,
but it was a disappointment to the Air Force that they didn't go further.
After all, they must expect to be shot at a bit. '98

8 Corps continued battering forward, but failed to clear the ridge. In the

pouring rain on the 21st, MontgomeryorderedDempseyto shutdown GOODWOOD,

as the Canadianshad completedthe captureof Caenand its approaches.Bradley's

assault,meanwhile,went on hold due to the weather.The operationalrhythm of the

one-two punch had been lost. The synergy of being able to consumethe enemy

reservesbetweenhole-filling on two fronts had been stopped.Four hundredninety-

three British tanks were destroyed or temporarily put out of action, and 5500

casualtieswere sufferedby the 1,8,12, and2 CanadianCorps.Montgomerymovedto

coordinateanother fixing attack using the 2 CanadianCorps while he ceasedmajor

199
operationsto conservemen.

The airmen demanded Monty's head, and a manipulated and enraged

Eisenhower, they hoped, would be the headsman. Tedder pressed Eisenhower. His

false claim, that "his government would support any necessary action taken," was

intended only for one thing-to encourage Ike to demand Monty's relief. Tedder

198
LeighMallog Diary, 18th,19thJuly 1944.

115
 Portal.
approached trying to engineer
supportfor Montgomery'srelief. Failing this. he

went after Leigh Mallory, "to place on a more solid footing the arrangementsfor

control of our air forces." Upset,but sensitiveto the fact that suchan action may cost

the coalition far more than hurt feelings,Eisenhowerretaliatedas only a staff officer

would-with paper-after failing to say anything about his concernsto Montgomery

at a conferencethe day before. The correspondencefile on GOODWOOD shows

where Ike's bitternesswas born. Montgomeryhad begunhis explanationof his plan

on the 13th saying, "Am going to launch two very big attacks next week," and

specified that his assaultwould use three armoreddivisions while Bradley's attack

would usesix divisions. Eisenhower,however, responded,

[W]hen this thing is started you can count on Bradley to keep his
troops fighting like the very devil, twenty-four hours a day, to provide
the opportunity your armored corps will need, and to make the victory
200
complete.

Having reversedthe roles of the annies in his mind, Eisenhowerwrote on the

21st expressinghis disappointmentthat Dempsey'sarmy had stoppedafter breaking

throughthe front lines, and notedthat Monty's relianceon Bradley's attack (inferring

this was new becauseof SecondArmy's failure) was problematic. He noted that in

Bradley's sector,

the country is bad, and the enemystrong at the point of main assault,
and more than ever I think it is important that we are aggressive
throughoutthe front.

'" SecondArmvHistor)-, 122-128;Ellis, Victory in

the West,1,327-353;D'Este, Decision in
Normand),,38i -390.
NOEL, CorrrcspondenceFile. Montgomery,Msg. M-50,132000
July 44; letter Eisenhowerto
Montgomery, 14 July 1944;D'Estc. Decision in Norman4v,391-399;Butcher,Atv Three Years
Eisenhower,617-626;Tedder. INih Prejudice,562-570. with

116
 Adding insult to injury. he stated,

I realize the seriousness

of the for
reinforcementproblem Dempsey...
But while we have equality in size we must go forward shoulder to
1.01
shoulder,with honorsand sacrificesequallyshared.

Having already issuedM. 512. which orderedcontinued operationsto widen

the breachand to direct First Army southand east,Montgomerytartly replied.

,rhere is not repeatnot and never has been any intention of stopping
offensiveoperationson the easternflank.

He noted in his lettff, the insertion of CanadianFirst Army into battle to provide

for
concentration Dempseytoward Falaiseand noteda corps-sizedattack plannedfor

25 July. Eisenhowerfailed to reply, but steppedup his attacksvia Churchill. To avoid

further misunderstandings of simultaneous operations, Montgomery sent AL514 on the

day for Bradley's 24 July, Bradley's mission to break in. pass

planned assault, noting

divisions through the gap, and drive for Coutance and Granville. Dempsey
more

would launch a series of corps attacks east and west of the Orne as preliminaries to a

102
larger armored thrust towards Falaise..

Bradley's COBRA beganinauspiciouslywith a bombing on the start line by

his supporting air on the 24th after the operation was postponed.The next day's

bombing repeateda friendly-fire incident that killed the US Army Ground Forces

Commander, Lt. Gen. LesleyJ. McNair, who wasobservingthe operation.That same

bombing did, however, stun the entire PanzerLehr Division and lcft a hole in the

Germanmain line of resistance.COBRA groundforward. VII CorpscommanderMaj.

20'EL, Correspondence
File, Eisenhowerto Montgomery.21 July 1944.
2wEL, Correspondencefile, M-5 14,24-7-44.

117
Gen. J. Lawton Collins had modified Bradley's plan. which had been based on

Monty's M-505. Passingthe armor rapidly while the infantry was still achieving its

breakin objectives, VII Corps shook free of the defense and was soon into the

Germans' rear area.Bradley's front was neither mannedas heavily by the Germans

in depthto reform. With Dempseylaunghingprobesalong his front,

nor any sufficient

the German defensivedepth remainedin the it

east until was too late to prevent a

rupture. Montgomery who had to

refused attack enemystrengththroughoutits entire

depthhad beenproven operationallycorrect.The battle in depth, had, as in the Great

War, alwaysbeen dependentupon the enemy'soperationalreserveand the ability to

use it. The battlesaroundCaenhad both fixed that reserveand ground it up. SHAEF,

203
however,painteda different story. (Seefigure 15.)

Monty's double assault on the 25th left Eisenhower with gripes but no

substantial case. Temporarily buoyed by Churchill's mercurial disdain for

Montgomery,Eisenhowerfound that Churchill soonswayedto Montgomery'ssupport

after visiting 21 Army Group Tactical Eisenhower's

Headquarters. hopesfor relieving

or somehowoverpoweringMonty's seemingindependence
were Perhaps,
shattered.

203FUS,4 Reportof OperationsOct 43-Aug 44,96-102. SituationMap No. 6 (St. Lo South);NARA.

RG 407,103-5, First Army Plans,-ConferenceHeld in war tent-12July 1944-Gcn.Bradleyand Staff;
Collins, LightningJoe. 232-245;Blumcnson.Break-outand Pursuit, ChaptersXI, XII, XI 11,NARA,
RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978.AmendmentNo. 2-Outlinc PlanCobra, 18 July 1944.HansenDiary, 19
July, revealsthe pride and prejudiceof COBRA. The Anglophobic Hansenrecountsproudly of
Bradley's masterfulcoordinationof air supportthat,"Brad kept it an all Americanshow," keeping
RAF aircraft from supporting,wrongly alleging that they could carry only heavybombs.In Hansen
Diaq, 25 July, he recordsthat Eisenhowerannouncedfor all the scribbling aidesto hear,after
McNair's death,"I look upon heaviesas an instrumentfor strategicattackon rear installations.I don't
believethey can be usedin supportof ground troops.That's a job for artillery. I gave thema green
light on this show but this is the last one." This is an incredibleand untrueturn-aroundfrom his
position early in July prior to GOODWOOD.Nor did he forbid useof heaviesagaintwo weekslater.
The HansenDiaty sectionfor 1-31July 44 hasentire Bradley Memorandumexoneratinghimself for
his coordinationof the -short bombing." Hogan,A CommandPostat War, 104-110.

118
 Eisenhowerfalsely reportedto Monty himself on his meeting with
characteristically,

Churchill during which he had hopedto removeMontgomery,

I reportedto Churchill your generalplan plan for continuing attack in

the Eastern Sector and he was delighted to know you will have attacks
on both flanks in that sector supporting the main effort down the
middle.

Montgomery, of course,had indicated no main effort in the middle. The next day

Monty clarified the situationsimply by issuingN1.515,stating:

On the westernflank-the First US Army hasdeliveredthe main blow of

the whole Allied plan, the main effort is making excellentprogress...
The main blow of the easternflank-will be deliveredin great strength
by the right wing of the SecondBritish Army.... What it all amounts
to is that I am planning to fight the enemyreally hard on both flanks
simultaneously... The really big victory is wanted on the western
flank-,and everythingwill be subordinatedto makingit so. 204

Conceptually,Eisenhowerseemedto misunderstandthat the American and

Commonwealthforceswerejoined by a commoncampaignplan undera single Army

Group headquarters.To Ike, Monty commandedthe British, and Bradleycommanded

the AMCýCanforces.EisenhowernevermentionedDempseyas the commanderof the

eastern flank's Second Anny, nor did he ever acknowlege the British chain of

command.This was a habit of mind Bradley continued to foster in their personal

203
discussions.

Bradley's huge First Army, set to subdivide into the First and Third US

Armies on I August, looked forward to declaring their independencefrom

Montgomery. They were, however, disappointed.Informed that 12th Army Group

2'4 EL. Correspondence File, letter to Montgomery 26 July 1944; Butcher. A(v 77tree Years with
Eisenho wtwr.625,626;

119
 remain under Montgomery's operationalcontrol until SCAEF could assume
would

full control, Bradley*s staff, and particularly the volatile Third Army commander,

intended to control their own fates. Moreover, Eisenhower,whose small forward

headquarterswas in France,intendedto insert himself into the ground battle without

assumingcommand.

GOODWOOD had smashed Montgomery's reputation for all time with

SHAEF, the airmen and, in a psychological sense, with the Supreme Commander.

Rather than crediting Montgomery, the ground commander, with the unfolding victory

in Normandy, a different interpretation evolved through press leaks, Eisenhower's

own correspondence to Marshall, SHAEF's official dispatch, and the prevailing

attitude of the American press corps. None of these explained the tactics or the

difficulties of the campaign. The poetry of "attack all the time all along the front"

would cloud the issue. The airmen would continue to say the army's lack of guts, not

the aid of airpowcr for the battlefield, was an issue in explaining why the lodgement

developed so slowly. 206

While this pustule broke and infected the coalition command atmosphere,

Montgomeryachievedwhat he had wantedfrom the time of his May discussionswith

Bradley and Dempsey.He was probing deeply with armoredformations before the

enemycould reform a cohesivedefense.Moreover,he was executingwhat he laid out

201This campaignwould reachoutrageousproportionsby mid-August,when Marshallagainraiscdthe

specterof Eisenhowerassumingground commanddue to badpublicity at home.
"* Eisenhom-er Papers.11'.2074-2077;Eisenhower,Reportkv the SupremeCommander,39,61.
Eisenhowerbeganto go to great lengthsto disassociateMontgomery'snamefrom the Normandy
victory. In SHAEF's official dispatch.he denigratedMontgomery'srole, calling him a "coordinator of
activities." When Marshall begandemandingEisenhower'sassumptionof operationalcommand,he
signaled:-11]t would be a greatpity if Bradley failed to get full credit due him for his brilliant

120
 Eisenhowerin M. 512 on the 21st at the heightof Eisenhower'sragc.a swing of the

westernflank-to the south and east,with the object of capturingthe Brittanyporis and

taking the Brittany "so

peninsula, that we can developthe full resourcesof the Allies
207
in westernEurope."

On the 25th, as COBRA appearedto be floundering, the Germanoperational

the
reserve, majority of the Germanpanzcrdivisions, remainedin front of the Second

Army and the newly committed First CanadianArmy. Not wishing to insert a new

headquartersfor the easternattack-,MontgomerygaveLt. Gen. Crcrar the I Corps on

the east flank, while keeping Simonds' 2 Canadian Corps temporarily within

Dempsey'ssector.Simonds' men would jump off on the 25th. Following their role in

OPERATION SPRING, the battle for BourgebousRidge, Simonds" new mission

placed his corps opposite the strongestconcentrationof enemytroops on the entire

Allied front. Of the sevenpanzerdivisions facing Dempsey,five-plus fronted on the

208
Canadiansector.

While Simondsbriefed deepobjectives%rithan on-orderexploitation south of

the heavily fortified Verrieres Ridge, he personallybelieved his mission more of a

holding attack for Bradley's offensive,and that the force-ratioon his front precludeda

209
breakthrough. SPRING proved to be one of the bloodiest operations fought by

performancemerely becausegeneralinstructionsand policies he haspursuedhavebeenchanneled

through Montgomery."
207EL, CorrespondenceFile, M. 512,21-7-44; M.515,27-7-44.
20sNAC, RG 24, Volume 11001.11'arDiary,Lt. Gen.H.D.G. Crerar, Ist CanadianArmy, 1-31July
1944,Memorandumof Conferencewith C-in-C 21 Army Group,20 July 1944.Crerarassumed
commandof the 3rd. 49th, 5 Ist, and 6th Airborne Divisions, an all-British force; Stacey,; ictory
Campaign,111,183-185.
"9 Ibid., 186.

121
 Canadiantroops.andcharacteristicallyreceivedno commentor credit from SHAEF or

the Americans.

Coutances-the objectiveMontgomeryhad beenstressingsinceJuneand was

the object of the V Corps drive that Bradley refused to launch at that time-was

reachedon 27 July. SHAEF intelligence assessedthat the 18 infantry and 9 panzer

divisions within the battle areaactually equatedto a force of 16-10 infantry and six

panzerdivisions-due to losses.The SHAEF G-2 went on to saythat

the enemy seems finally to have realized that, if the line in

NORMANDY collapses,the game is pretty nearly up, and is willing,
therefore,to go on feedingdivisions from other sectorsto the flamesas
often asrequiredandasrapidly aspracticable. 210

SHAEF's optimism, however, had to have been restrained. Though

FORTITUDE miraculouslystill held forcesin placeboth on the north coastand in the

south of France, the enemy order of battle in the west stood at 63 divisions--46

outsidethe OVERLORD lodgementarea.Moreover,only one panzerdivision, the 2d,

was known to be shifting towards Bradley's penetration.With six divisions having

beenmilked from Brittany's original force of eight to bolster the Normandy front in

the previous days,the long-termOVERLORD object of the Brittany ports seemedan

easier target providing First Army could maintain its southernmovement and pass

Third Army throughto take the ports.211

Montgomery's intentions followed-plan LUCKY STRIKE B, a variant of the

plan producedin late Juneby 21 Army Group.That plan, which hadbeencirculatedto

both SHAEF and First US Army, now fit the planningassumptionslisted as necessary

"i 0SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 19,

week ending29 July, 2.

122
for a major operationalchangefrom the contemplatedside-by.side offensivc foreseen

in the original Initial Joint Plan in February. These conditions, a considerable

the Brittany defenseforces, a general of

weakness force in the sector
weakeningof

proscribed by the Loire and the line LAVAL-LE MANS-CHARTRES, and the

strongmobile enemysouthof the Loh-essentially a wide open flank to

absenceof a

the south cxisted-mcant that Third Army's role would shift to making a wide swccp

to block the Paris-Orleans

gap while seizing Brittany with minimal forces and not a

212
full army. (Seefigures 16,17,18, and 19.)

LUCKY STRIKE had beenpercolatingin the background,and the belief that

Brittany would not require a full-army assaulthad beenprevalentsince CarlyJuly as

German divisions began to transfer to the Normandy front. Though Montgomery's

plannershad the
produced plan in the expectationthat Bradley would shakeloose of

the bocagethe first week of July, SHAEF, and others,soughtto disassociatethe plan

from 21 Army Group and Montgomerydespitethe fact that Montgomery'sdirectives

from 213
the original plans.
outlined the conditionsand axes

Ibid., 3, order of battle map.

212Reportofthe GeneralBoardStu4r No. 1,30. The GeneralBoardreport states:-As early asJune.
the planning staffs of the Allied High Commandhad visualizedthat eventsmight developasthey wcrc
now unfolding on the ground.This particularsequenceof eventswas forecastin PlanLUCKY
STRIKE, a seriesof studiesbasedon the possibleaccelerationof OVERLORD timings. Plan B of
Lucky Strike waspremisedon ... [lists completeplan]." First Army PlansFile, OperationLUCKY
STRIKE, 2. Seeconditionsfor PlanB and accompanyingmap sketches.
213NARA, RG 319,2-3.7 CB SupremeCommand,Box 215. Letterto Chief of Military History from
Major GeneralFranklin A. Kibler, 14June 1951. Kibler, who servedas Bradley's G-3. deniedthat
Bradley took ordersfrom Montgomery,but merely informed him of his actions.He also deniedthe
existenceof LUCKY STRIKE. Kibler, however.saton the GeneralBoardand helpedauthorthe report
citing the plan asthe basicAllied strategy.It is importantto notethat Bradley and Montgomerytalked
personally,that no staff officers were present.and while mutualaccordwasthe aim, it is impossibleto
diverge from the written recordbasedon what wasclaimedafter the fact. It is also importantto note
that Montgomeryoften told his Chief of Staff or Plansofficer to developcertaincoursesof action;
Bradley likewise consideredhimself his own G-3.

123
 With new commandrelations frothing. and the Germanfront broken through.

July ended with the Americans executing LUCKY STRIKE B. Patton's forces.

committed from behind Hodges' First Army, drove south and were gaining ground

rapidly into the enemy's operational depth, where no enemy existed to stop him.

Across the front. however, the two army groups were still at grips with a strong

enemy.Bradley expressedconsiderableconcernover a possible large-scaleGerman

countcrattack.

124
 CHAPTERTHREE

Decision Points

August openednew dimensionsto the Allied campaign,the true development

of military operations and significant questions relating not simply to seizing

to
opportunities complete the NEPTUNE stageof OVERLORD, but questionsthat

would affect the conduct of the remainderof the Europeancampaign.Three facts

sigmaledthe openingof "an operationalphase." First, the creationof the 12th Army

Group alongside21 Army Group underthe operationalcontrol of a single commandcr

finally gavea substantialforce over a large enoughareato achievea true operational

decision under a single conceptof operations.Second,concertedoperationsby both

forces during August's increasingly fluid situation permitted true -operational

decisions," rather than tactical fixes to operationalproblems. The most important

result Of this was that attrition battleswere no longer required,and that large enemy

forcescould now be targetedfor destructionby

overrunningthem or encircling them.
A harmonizedrhythm, rather thanjerk-sand startsdictatedby local
conditions,could

now characterizeoperations.Third, and finally, the bickering and sniping conducted

by Tedderand the strategicair commanderswould be muffled and finally evaporateas

the tactical air forceswere able to developtheir full rangeof operationswith lessneed

for assistanceby heavy bombers, except for two more occasions during the

NEPTUNE phase. After this, the primacy of POINTBLANK, not OVERLORD,

125
 rule strategicair Moreover.
operations. for the first time, both the weight and
would

fighter-bombers be 214
battlefield.
effect of would on
apparent the

These operationalchanges,however, brought significant command changes

and problems as the original Allied command structure matured into operational

control by SCAEF and SHAEF with the elimination and creationof Not
headquarters.

simply the campaignplan, but the natureand evolution of operationsunder the plan,

sparkedconcerns,controversies,and inefficienciesthat would exceedthoseoccurring

during the first phasesof NEPTUNE. Here, the result, however, would not shapea

limited timescaleand operationsas in Normandy,but would effect the conductof the

rest of the war in Europe.

However successful,August was not to prove to be an easy month for

controlling operations. Personality, politics, and pride hampered an efficient

development of operations, which, under'the strain of events, would lead to a

dispersionof effort despitethe centralizationof command.New personalitiesentered

the fray in both the American and Commonwealthcamps,and with the addition of a

214Headquarters.Army Air Forces,Air-Ground Teamworkon the WesternFront., TheRole of the XIX

TacticalAir CommandDuring August 1944(Washington:Centerof Air ForceHistory Reprint, 1945.
1992),20,2 1, passim.RAF Narrative, IV, Chapter4; NARA, RG 33 1. SHAEF SGS314.8 to 314.81.1,
Box 27, DespatchByAIr Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallopy.Allied Expedi(ionatyAir Forces.
285-297,PRO,Air 371876,ReportBYAir MarsholSirArthur ConinghamConcerningOperationsbv
SecondTacticalAir Force Between6th June 1944and 9ih MaY. 194S,SecondPhase;Amy Air Forces
Evaluation Board,EuropeanTheaterof Operations,TheEffectivenessof Third PhaseTactical Air
Operationsin the EuropeanTheater,5 May 1944-8May 1945,23-255;Gooderson,Air Power at the
Battlefront, Chapter5. Numerousreportsaboundof fighter-bombers,particularly at Mortain, being
decisivein August, The US Amy Air Forcehastily produceda historical pamphict-Air-Ground
Teamwork:TheRole of the XIX TacticalAir CommandDuring August 1944-to celebratePatton's
supporters.Air Vice Marshal(Retired)J.E. Johnsontold the authorin conversationin 1990that tactical
air was ineffective during the early Normandyoperationsbecauseof their inability to find targets.
uOncethey got out of the com and moved,we killed them" The mobile b3ttlehad proved far more
conduciveto closeair supportthan to breakingpositionsor attackingdefenses.

126
 third Army Group looming, the cracks in the coalition threatened to bccome

213
chasms.

Following COBRA's success,Montgomery's overriding concern (besides

establishinga securelodgement)
was to obtain OVERLORD's secondstrategicobject.

the early capture and developmentof a port or series of ports for the US forces.

Through these portals, the great liberation force would be landed and supplied.

Cherbourgalone could not accommodatethis aim. The Brittany ports, the second

Lt. Gen.GeorgeS. Patton'sThird Army.216

strategicobject, werethe objectiveof

No changein strategyhad beencommunicatedto Montgomeryin August. and

he proceededbeyondthe missionsoutlined in the Initial Joint Plan. While the Initial

Joint Plan had covered operationsto capture Cherbourgand the airfields south of

Caen,it was Montgomery'sissue his Forecast Opcrationsý

of of which combinedwith
the NEPTUNE PLAN, that becamethe basisfor the campaign.21 Army Group issued

planning directives for further operations,and Bradley, -hatted"

as the -First US
Army Group Commander,
" issued planning directives to Patton in March 1944.

Bradley,assumingSHAEF's schemewould go well, would havehis own Army Group

under Ike by mid-July. Whether Bradley developed his own guidance from

Eisenhower,which is doubtful, or discussedoperationswith Montgomery, which is

more likely, it is clear that Patton'smissionsreflectedMontgomery'soverall concept

217
demonstratedin the Forecastof Operations. ConcerningBrittany, 21 Army Group

213NARA. RG 33 1, Entry 3 1. Box 211. Backgroundfiles for Despatch.

2'6 Initial Joint Plan, Section Cý Para. 26.
2" NAC RG 24, Vol. 10433,21 Army Group Planning Forecast Operations. 26 Fcbruary 1944;
of
Montgomery, Norman4v to the Baltic. Chapter 4; Third Anny. After Action Report., Third USArmy. I
August 1944 [hereafter referred to as ThirdArm. v AfterAction Report]. 1. Special Annex C. Third Anny

127
 had issued planning directives for two plans to Bradley as -Commanding General.

First US Army Group" to cover the situation unfolding in July. Issuedon 22 June

1944 at a meeting, these were followed by a written planning directive. The first.

HANDS UP, a combinedairborneand scaborneassault,had beenplannedin mid-Junc

to take advantageof the fact that divisions were being withdrawn from Brittany,

]caving low-grade,non-Germandefensivetroops in place. Following the dropping of

the British I Airborne Division in the QuiberonBay area,US troopswould be landed

on beachesin the area up to a strength of two divisions. Additionally, an airfield

would be seized for aerial resupply. Heavily reliant on both French resistance

(Maquis) and British SAS (Special Air Service) troops, the plan was predicatedon

Third Army's advanceto the south of Avranchesand Patton's force being within

"three weeks" of linking 218

force.
with the air-sea

With the German front nonexistent in front of Third Army and with not

enoughtime to mount both air and sealandings,the logical alternativewas LUCKY

STRIKE, a plan being formulatedat the time of HANDS UP but completedby June's

end. SHAEF's logisticianshad evaluatedthe plan, recommendingits considerationin

lieu of BENEFICIARY or HANDS UP. LUCKY STRIKE's two variants, "A" and

"B, " were predicatedon the remaining enemy strength within the lodgement area

OUTLINE PLAN-OPERATION OVERLORD, 1-10,Maps 1-7; TheaterGeneralBoard Stu4vNo. /,

21-26.
2"NAC. RG 24, Volume 10539,File 2l5A21.013(D17). 21/A.Gp/20720/G(Plans)dated 17June 1944;
NARA RG 407. Entry 427.101-3.5 Ist Army OVERLORD, Box 1978.21 A Gp/20698/G/(Plans),24
June 1944,Subject:SubsidiaryOperationsto further OVERLORD. Commander,British Airborne
Troops coordinatedthe airborneplanningdirectly with 21 Army Group

128
 facilitating a drive to destroya portion of the enemyforce againstthe Seinewith the

be by
destroyed 219(Seefigures 17-19.)
remainingportion to a tuming movement.

In LUCKY STRIKE A, if the enemy'sstrengthresidedin the south bet%%-ccn

the Loire and Laval-Le 21

Nians-Chartrcs, Army Group would pressagainstthe wcak-

northernscctor.while part of First Army held the southernflank. The "13- variant was

predicated on a reverse enemy disposition with its southern formations weak or

thus
nonexistent. permitting a wide sweepwith an armorcdforce along the north bank

of the Loire toward Paris where it would block the Paris-Orlcans Gap.

Simultaneously,minimal troops would be neededto clear Brittany. By August. these

conditions existed and Montgomery orderedits execution.Soon, thereafter.SHAEF

and 21 Army Group exploredan airborne"plug," to be insertedsimultaneouslyin the

Orleans Gap (OPERATION TRANSFIGURE) to be the anvil against the armored

sweep's ""O
hammcr.

LUCKY STRIKE filled out the Army Group's controversial Forecast of

operations, giving the campaign a complete "Master Plan." Despite its August

implementation,its key componentswere well known to plannersat every level to

2'9NAC, RG24. Volume 24. File 10540.File 215A21.013(D28) SIIAEF/17100/41/Plans(file 34383)-

Op "LUCKY STRIKE"; NARA File 1013.5.-Operation Lucky Strike," ibid.: NARA, ML-200
LUCKY STRIKE, ibid4l3elchem, i7cioq in Norman4r. ibid. The conceptualframeworkof this plan.
the drive to the neck of the peninsulaon the right flank. can be found in planningsketchesbegunin
April at 21 Army Group. While critics may believethis is anotherattemptto predatethe -master planý"
the planning phaseand the first look at the secondstrategicobject no doubt occurredat this timcýand
the logic of seeingthis conceptof operationas both feasibleand desirableis unquestionable.
Documentaryevidenceexiststhat this plan had receivedpriority emphasisby the plansstaff at 21
Army Group early in June.
2" Ibid.

129
include the critical shift of cffort from Brittany to the castto completethe destruction

in lodgement 221
of the enemy the area.

While the drama of Patton's rapid drive captured the imagination, the German

operational reserve-the panzer divisions-remained in front of Second Army and the

newly created Canadian First Army. The Canadians began their attack coincident with

COBRA. 222
Not wishing to insert a new headquartersfor the vital attack, Montgomery

gave Lt. Gen. Crerar I st Corps on the east flank, while keeping Simonds' 2 Canadian

Corps temporarily within Dempsey's sector. Crerar's immediate clash with his new

subordinate, Lt. Gen. J-T. Crocker (as difficult a personality as Montgomery), soon

became the trip wire for launching Crerar's Canadian nationalist campaign to assure

that his command was treated not merely as a part of the British Army but as a full

ally in a Commonwealth Army Group. It was a theme that would hamper later

operations and one that would be both invisible to and unreceiving of sympathy from

SHAEF. 223

2,
2' LC. Papersof GeneralGeorgeS. Patton [hereafterreferredto as Patton Diaty), July 7.1944;
Hamilton, Afasterofthe Battlefield, 699. Pattonwasbriefed by Bradleyon what was LUCKY STRIKE
B. Characteristically,Pattonconsideredthe ideabroachedto him by Bradley in discussionas an
"American idea." M.505 had outlined the conceptin June;Bradleywould havealso beenawareof the
plan due to work doneat First Army. Bradley,on 29 June,wrote Montgomeryconcerningthe wide
sweepto the west southof Paris:-1 feel that this is entirely feasibledue to the fact that he [the enemy]
hasplacedso much of his strengthin front of Dempsey. " Note this ideapercolatedat the time the
Americanswere believedto be capableof launchinga breakoutin the weston 3 July. Bradleyneeded
threemore weeksto reachhis startline, for what wasthencalled COBRA.
222NAC, RG 24, Volume 11001,11'arDiaq, Lt. Gen.H.D.G. Crerar. Ist CanadianArmy. 1-31July
1944,Memorandumof Conferencewith C-in-C 21 Army Group. 20 July 1944.Crcrar assumed
commandof the 3rd, 49th. 51st. and 6th Airborne Divisions, an all-British force.
223NAC, RG 24. Crerar; Vartliaq, op. cit., Memorandumof Conversationwith GOC I st BRIT
CORPS.COMMENCING 1015HRS 24 JULY 1944;MEMORANDUM ON MEETING WITH C-IN-
C 21 ARMY GROUPAT TAC HQ 21 ARMY GROUP.COMMENCING 1500HRS 25 JUL;
A4ontgomeqLog, 26 July 1944.Montgomery'srecordedentry is sympatheticto Crerar,though his
confidential note to Alanbrookeshowshis lack of faith in Crcrar's commandtechnique.

130
 Following their role in the battle for Bourguebous Ridge, OPERATION

ATLANTIC, 2 Canadian Corps' Simonds new mission placed him opposite the

of enemy troops on the entire Allied front. Of the seven parizer

strongest concentration

divisions facing Dempsey. rive-plus of the parizer divisions fronted the Canadian

2.14While Simonds briefed deep objectives with an "on-ordcr" exploitation

sector .

the heavily fortified Verricrcs Ridge. he personally believed his mission more
south of

of a holding attack for Bradley's attack-.and that the force ratio on his front precluded

2_25
a break-through.

SPRING proved to be one of the bloodiest operationsfought by Canadian

troops, and characteristicallyreceived no comment or credit by SHAEF, or the

Americans. Bradley had emerged as winning the war in Europe. Ike signaled

Montgomery,reinforcing what Montgomeryhadoutlined for him,

Above all the dislocationof enemyforcesyou haveengineeredon your

extremeright must be exploitedto the full. I am countingon you and as
226
alwayswill backyou to the uttermostlimit.

Resonatingwith the boss'sconfidence.Monty replied with his situationreport.

that,

I haveorderedDempseyto throw all cautionoverboardand to take any

risks he likes and to acceptany casualtiesand to step on the gas for
Vire.... On the West flank the battle is going splendidly.... It begins

22-4
Stacey,Victog Campaign,111.183-185;21 Army Group IntelligenceSummaryNo. 149.25 July
1944.Montgomery'sG-2 assessed that, having beenforewarnedby the abortive24 July pre-COBRA
air attack,the Germanswere preparedfor the assault.a fact that did not help troops in the targetarea.
but which assistedmovementof reservesand the preparedness of the defensesin depth.
223Stacey,Victory Campaign,Ill, 186.
2""EL, CorrespondenceFile, cable,personalfor Montgomery.July 28.1944. Eisenhowersmtesý
reinforcing Montgomery'scurrentassessment (M315). -Arn delightedthat your basicplan hasbegun
brilliantly to unfold with Bradley's initial successesý"
and that he -beg[s) of you to insist that Canadian
and 2nd British Armies carry out their assignmentswith vigor and determinationso that Bradley may
bring your plan to full fruitioný"

131
 if
to look as the generalplan on which we have been working for so
227
long is at last going to pay dividends.

As July ended, the frequent sypathetic between

messages Montgomery and

Eisenhowerseemedto indicatethat eachfinally the

understood other, that Eisenhower

seemedconfident that the campaignwould unfold both quickly and and

successfully,

that all was well within the Allied camp. Even the activation of Bradley's 12th Army

Group on I August, with Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges moving up from Deputy

Commanding General to Commanding General of First US Army, and the

introduction of Third US Army under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., seemed

uneventful, with Montgomery retaining operationalcontrol of the US forces. Once

seen by the Americans as another Declaration of Independencefrom the British,

Bradley's move to command12th Army Group lacked the comfort of an operational

SHAEF headquarterson the continent to separateit from Montgomery's plans or

228
broadcontrol.

SHAEF had believedit would be able to assumecontrol of the lodgementby

about D+45, and Montgomery's role had been loudly touted (behind his back) as
229
minimal and temporary. The hard slog on the continent failed to make the phase-

lines drawn by the planners.leaving no room either to fully developthe basesupport

areaor to provide room for a burgeoningSHAEF Headquartersto occupy.Apart from

a small camp claiming to be "a tactical headquarters,

" Eisenhowerhad few staff and

227EL. CorrespondenceFile, M-68.

22'NARA, RG33 I.
entry 201. Box 277, After-Action Report, 12thAriny Group. August 1944. This
report contains orders for activation, background of the headquarters, and order of battle and senior
personnel rosters for 12th Army Group. Complete organizational data and staff reports for the cntirc
war arc included in 12th Army Group Fi1cs.

132
limited facilities to deal with his own responsibilities, let alone to take over

Montgomery's ground conunandrole. An content

c3gcrcommander. to delegatehis

and political might

responsibilities, have moved forward to take over
administrative

didn't,
Eisenhower least 230
the campaign. at not completelyor overtly.

Success would test the coalition's mettle. SHAEF's 29 July Weekly

Intcliigcnce Summary of the prcvious week tnunpctcd succcsscsbut carcfully laid

bare the problem at hand.Bradley's forceshad yet to penetratethe operationaldepth

of the Germanforces and their open and vulnerablerear areas,but the prediction of

Germanreactionwasclear

Within the WEST, there have been quite considerable changes.

FifteenthArmy hasconsignedsomemore of its fat, and SeventhArmy
some more of its skeleton,to the battle cauldron: the enemy seems
finally to have realizedthat, if the line in NORMANDY collapses,the
game is pretty nearly up, and is willing therefore.to go on feeding
divisions from other sectorsto the flames as often as required and as
rapidly aspracticable.231

Two days earlier, when MontgomeryissuedM. 515, he soughtto fine-tunethe

swing by First Army with synchronizedmoves by Dempsey,who was ordered to

produce a six-division attack on First Army's left flank near Caumont. VII Corps'

breakthroughwould be expandedto six corpsin threearmies.He addedthat

[Tjhe main blow of the whole Allied plan has now beenstruck on the
western flank.... The armies on the easternflank-must keep up the
pressurein the CAEN area... SecondBritish Army must hurl itself

2''9 EL, PapersqfLt Gen.Harold R. Bull [hcreafterreferredto asBull Papers),Memorandum:

ProposedCommandOrganizationAfter D Day, 9 May 1944.
2'0The AmericansbelievedMonty fought the creationof the 12thArmy Group.This was not true.
have found no documentssubstantiatingthis claim.
231SHAEF G-2, Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 19,for the weekending29 July 194,2.

133
 into the fight in the CAUMONT areaso as to make easierthe task of
fighting hard il '32
the American armies on the western

OPERATION BLUECOAT, Dempsey'sattack, beganon 30 July, three days

than the deadline mandatedin M-515. Montgomery's earlier divisional shift

earlier

had placed Dempsey'sweight of effort west of the panzers.Dempsey'sattack would

block for Bmdlcy's advance,a two-corpsflank guard.Crerarwas orderedto keep the

fixed in his sector.The designedto do things.

several In seizing key
enemy attackwas

by
terrain,and runningup the eastside of the Vire River, it split the Germanboundary

of the SeventhArmy and PanzerGroup West as well as knocking the props out of a

terrain-baseddefenseand withdrawal designedto swing back the German line and

contain the Allies in front of the Seine. Dempsey'skey objective. Mt. Pincon (near

Caumont)was the last major terrain featureeastof the Vire. Attacking acrossa series

8
of perpendicularridges and streams, corps found that the increasinglyhilly country

from fires 233

offered the enemy viewpoints which to coordinate and counterattacks.

(Seefigures20 and 2 1.)

Plannedwith eight targetareasfor heavybombersaturationattack,Dempsey's

8 and 30 Corps launchedthreeinfantry and one armoreddivision in a sectoronly nine

miles wide. (See figure 22.) More than 1,300 heavy and medium bombers were

ticketedto drop their loadsfrom a mcre 1,500feet,thoughpoor visibility causedmore

than 200 aircraft not to bomb. Mt. Pincon fell on I August, and the attack continued

232M. 515.27-7-44.3.
233
SecondArmvHisroq. 163-171,Appendix B, ChapterI ll. NAC. RG24, volume 10542,File
21SA21.016(9i.Main HeadquartersFirst Cdn Army, 30 July 44, NOTES ON MEETING WITH C-IN-
C 21 ARMY GROUP.29 JUL 44. It is probablethat Montgomery'srush to move up Dempsey'sattack
was sparkednot only by the move of panzerswestward,but by the shift of divisions from the Pasdc
Calaisarea,which would free the panzerdivisions in front of Crcrarto go into local or front reserve.

134
 despiteincreasing Five
resistance. infantry and four panzerdivisions were
southward

in front of Dempsey,but only three weakenedinfantry divisions barred the axis of

in depth.As SecondArmy gaineddepth.two panzcrdivisions

attack.with no reserves

moved into sector over two consecutivenights, %%ith

a third following on 6 August.

Second Army estimated this force to include 340 tanks and 175 assault guns.

including estimated80 Tiger tanks and 125 Panthers.Mines and antitank guns %%-ere

particularly heavy in Dempsey'ssector,and Dempsey'sslowcr-moving force again

'34
becamea shield for the Americanswhoseadvancewasthen lightly opposed 2
.

Bradley's initial Army Group directive,issuedon 29 July and effectiveat 1200

hours, on I August as 12th Army Group became operational, had parrotcd

Montgomery's 27 July orders. In it, Third Army was to turn west to take Brittany

First Army drive 235

while continuedto southto Mortain-Virc.

Within several days, Bradley wrote his army commanders

privately, spurning

the official "Letters of Instruction" required by American staff doctrine. Reiterating

the formal instructions, he gave specific short-term objectives: for First Army to

secure Vire and Mortain, and for Third Army to secure a line to protect 12th Army

Group's flank while additionally seizing Quibemn Bay and b)passing St. Malo if "its

236
reductiontakestoo largea force andtoo much time.,.

Bradley's successand the shift of enemy forces over time from Brittany

spurred Montgomery to finalize LUCKY STRIKE's execution. Until this point,

2`4Ibid., 165,168; RAFNarrative, It', 70-73; Alontgomery'sScientists,87-93.

23512thArm Group Reportof0perations, V, Appendix D. 65-67.
*v
236NARA, RG 33 1. Entry 199.Box 101.12th Army Group.371.3 Military Objectives,1.-Directive for
Current Operations," 2 August 1944.

135
 Monty had ordered forces that accomplished the plan's initial objectives. but had not

fully committed his forces to the plan's entire course of action. With the Germans

conforming by maintaining strength on Crcrar's front and at Dempsey's left, wheeling

both Army Groups eastward against the Seine was possible. Montgomery also had

confirmation that Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks was en route to take over 30 Corps,

Bucknall's failing having been that "he is very slow; he does his stuff in the end but is

237
always 24 hours late'.

Montgomerybelievedthat the enemy'sdefensecould be disintegrated,having

knockedout the key "rivets" holding that defensetogether.(Seefigure 16.) His M. 516

directive finalized Third Army's swing both into Brittany and south of First Army.

SecondArmy's conforming attack to shield First Army, and the Canadianassault

from Caentoward Falaise.He summarizedhis conceptto assureits understanding:

The broad strategy of the Allied Armies is to swing the right flank
round towards PARIS, and to force the enemy back against the
SEINE--over which all the bridgeshave beendestroyedParis and the
sea.

A strongairborne,air-landedforce would land

in the CHARTRES areaat a suitablemoment-thus blocking the

gap
betweenthe Seineat PARIS and LOIRE at ORLEANS.238

Privately, Montgomery was ecstatic,and consideringthe trials

of SHAEF's
lack of confidenceand Tedder'sconspiringto effect his
relief and humiliation, he felt

that the campaign's operationswere proceedingas he had planned them. He

now

"Alonigomen, Log, 31 July,

21 August 3.
238M516,4-8-44.

136
 it
considered timcly to issue-ordersfor thedestruction
of theGcnnanforcessouthof
oj39
the SEINE.

flexible. and orientedtowarddcstro)ingthe

Theseordcrswereaggressive,

by From
cncmy maneuver. the time of the COBRA breakout.Montgomeryhad added.

within his dircctivcs. cxhortationsto his commandcrs13)ing doum what the British

Amy referred to as -operational policy" and what the Americansmore mundanely

includcd as "coordinating instructions" in their more rigidly formatted orden.

Beginning with hl. 515 ("we must securethe Brittany ports before the winter is on

he his front became 240

fluid. In M.516,
us"), expanded viewsas the more notingthe

possibility of breakingthe entire front. he noted:

To achieve this great result. very determinedand energeticaction is

necessaryon the part of us all.
Once a gap appearsin the enemy front we must press into it, and
throughit, and beyondit into the enemyrearareas.
Enemypersonneland equipmentmust be written off in largequantities.
Everyonemust go all out. a day and everyday.241

In the samedirective. Montgomery ticketed Cimm's army to attack Falaisc.

While this attack was being prepared,be issuedfinther ordersin M-517, orders that

would not only dramatically change the nature and direction of the Normandy

campaign,but would lead to a reevaluationof SHAEF's yet-to-be-unveiledcampaign

plan for Northwest Europe. Montgomery's appreciationnoted that the enemy was

falling back "to somenew line" yet unknown and that "he is definitely trying to pivot

2*"Alontgomety Log, 4-5 August 1944.

1401bid, X1.5IS.
141lbid- N1.516.

137
 the CAEN "
area. Most important, he noted that if the enemy held on a succession
on

defensive lines in front of the Canadian attack, this would provide "the
of possible

for flank to swing round his southern flank and thus cut off his
chance our right

242
escape."

He announcedhis revisedconcept:

Plan in Outline

(a) To pivot on our left, or northernflank.

(b) To swing hard with our right along the southern flank and in
towards PARIS, the gap between PARIS and ORLEANS being
closedaheadof our advance.
(c) To drive the enemyup againstthe R. Seine,all bridgesover which
betweenPARIS and the seawill be kept out of action.

The Canadians would drive to Falaise to assist Dempsey, then shift their main

effort to their left toward Lisieux-Rouen as the battle shifted eastward.Dempsey

would lead with his right toward Argentan and eastward.Bradley's Army Group,

while simultaneouslyclearing Brittany with minimal troops, would bave its "main

businessto the east." Moving east,MontgomerydesignatedBradley's right (Patton)as

the main effort. But his plan went beyondthe original "press the enemyagainstthe

Seine"plan that he announcedearlier.The maneuverhad changedfrom frontal attack

to turning movement.He directed12thArmy Group:

Plans will be madefor the right flank to swing rapidly eastwards,and

then north-eastwardstowards PARIS; speedin this movementis the
basisof the whole plan of operations.

212
M. 517,6-8-44.

138
 Reiteratinghis intention for an airborneplug to be insertedin the OrleansGap.

he ftirther directed Bradley to incorporatethe plan being coordinatedby British I

Airborne Corpswith SHAEF "to block the escapegap for the enemybetweenPARIS

and "
ORLEANS.

Perhapsmore dramatically, in noting how far and formal the air-ground

operationaldimension had evolved with Leigh Mallory and not Tedder calling the

he
shots, addedan entire sectiontitled "Air Support.
" Incorporatingboth a "weight of

effort" and specific taskingdecision,it stated:

The Air C-in-C has beenaskedto direct the air effort so as to ftirther
the generalplan....
In particularhe hasbeenrequested
(a) to direct his main power to help the rapid swing of our right flank
toward the SEINE.
(b) to prevent all the enemy movement across the SEM between
PARIS andthe sea,so far asis possible.

Montgomery's new operational policy was:

It must be impressedon all commandersthat now is the time to press

boldly and to take greatrisks.
If we can achievethe intention asgiven in para5 above[Intention], and
achieveit quickly, we shall havehastenedthe endof the war.243

The evolving campaign, however, was dogged by Bradley's own desire for

independenceand Eisenhower's new role as kibitzer in residence. Thus, the

problematic circumstancesof battle, which had not changedappreciably from the

earliestdays,again were screenedthrough a prism of nationaljealousiesand distrust

aswell as fannedby the politics of SHAEF andthe airmen.

243
Ibid., M.517.

139
 Again, theseproblemscenteredon 21 Army Group's role in dealing
C with the

main strength of the enemy's armor and his easternfront quality SS Divisions.

Additionally, the problems of a lack of infantry replacements;grave artillery

ammunitionshortagesdue to high expenditureratesandthe inability of the across-the-

beachsupply systemto keeppacewith constantbattle; the necessityto stop battle to

coordinateheavy air attacksas deepsubstitutesfor artillery-,and the bureaucratically

slowed-motionresponseof the airmento shift air attacksto supportfriendly efforts or

to challenge enemy counterattacks,meant that maintaining fire and movement

superiority in a fluid situation teeteredas much on local luck as on the timing and

coordinationby commanders.

GOODWOOD had underscoredthese issueswith 500 burning Allied tanks

and thousandsof Allied casualties.Eisenhower,the airmen, and the Americanshad

respondedby citing Montgomery's"caution" as the problem.Yet here,Montgomery

had changedhis own ruleson attrition; he would pressattacksregardlessof casualties,

rather than recock to "tee up" another battle. He was determined to finish the

lodgement phase of the campaignwithin the 90-day period outlined by the 1943

planners, the fast-approachingwinter rather than the unsupportedlogic of a three-

month campaignbeing 244

his operativeconcern.

The enemy, however, was neither defeatednor on the ropes. The apparent

slide to defeat, envisioned due to the "pivot" of the enemy line from Caen to

Avranchesand the passageof Third US Army's armor to fan out in an unprecedented

270-degreearc west, south, and east seeminglycould not be stopped.The German

244
MontgometyLog, 4 August 1944.

140
 in the
High Commandwas of two minds assessing first week of August. Hitler's

fighting withdrawal to a line,

defendable probablyon the far side of
generalswanteda

the Seine.The Fuhrer, operationalizingthe Germantendencyto counterattackevery

to
advance, wanted a counteroffensive cut the thin neck of the Allied line at

Avranches. The Vire-Mortain area would be the concentrationarea for Hitler's

245(Seefigure 16.)
panzers.

Montgomery's operations followed on BLUECOAT's success to press its

right, with Dempsey and Hodges shifting corps to close the gap at Vire (that British

reconnaissancetroops had to
abandoned) permit the commitment of the US V Corps

and XIX Corps. While Americans battled to gain abandoned ground, a valuable

lesson-that battles developing along "Allied" boundaries cannot be easily shifted to

accommodate short-term tactical necessities without close cooperation and the

surrender of command of units in place rather than ground already held-was again

demonstrated and lost.246

Meanwhile, the Caen-Falaise problem again loomed as key in a campaign

based upon multiple, complementary attacks. No longer content to merely fix panzers

in the area, Montgomery wanted a general advance to assist the swing of 12th Army

245JoachimLudewig, TheGermanRetreatFrom France in 1944,Draft EnglishTranslation(Freiburg:

RombachPublisherMilitary ResearchOffice, 1994),43-53.
246CM H, Diary
ofMajor W.Sylvan,2-5,August 1944,DempseyDialy, 2-5 August, D'Este, Decivion
in Normanotv,423; Patton Diýry, ibid. Boundaryissuesposedfatal resultsseveraltimes throughoutthe
war and were most difficult at Army Group boundaries.In this case,Montgomeryaccededto
Americandesiresto have maneuverroom to introduceanothercorpsin their narrow sector.Having
failed to keep up, the Americanattackfailed, thoughanalystshavedamnedMontgomeryfor the move.
Montgomerydid not want to introduceThird Army until room had beengainedin turning the corner at
Avranches.Montgomery'sview was basedpurely on spaceto conductoperations.Lack of spaceto
developoperationswould prove critical in slowing the following operations.Bradleyand Patton
viewed this as a political move on Montgomery'spart. Wheneverprovenwrong on military counts,it
was always Patton'sand Bradley'spolicy to blameMonty. More timely intelligenceconcerning

141
Group and the inside turn of Dempsey's Second Army. Falaise would be the internal

pivot point for 21 Army Group's full shift to the east and northeast. The operational

facing the debutante army, however, was the sanie one that faced every major
problem

21 Army Group offensive. The enemy "had the advantageof dominating ground, good

247
,, (Seefigure 23.)
fields of fire and very stronglyprepareddefenses.

Crerar designated Simonds to lead the attack, code-named TOTALIZE. Prior

to receiving the warning order for the Falaise attack, Monty had asked Crerar to "keep

the Boche worried'ý-an order which the Canadian passed on to 2 Corps to "'put on

248
further prods to continueto pin the enemydown.,, Crerarlaid out the basicconcept

for Simonds on 3 August. Late on the afternoon of the 4th, Montgomery, Leigh

Mallory, Crerar, Simonds,Broadhurst,and Crerar's airman, Air Vice-Marshal L.O.

249
Brown of 84 Group,discussedthe plan.

Simonds' attack was to be the true combatdebut of the CanadianFirst Army,

and Crerar and Simonds,

gunnersboth, were to ensureit was a fire-supportedattackto

rival the Canadianoffensive of August 1918.Bomberswould, in the GOC's words,

provide "overwhelming fire." Moreover, Simondshad addeda new dimensionto the

attack-60 improvised armoredpersonnelcarriers made from gun-stripped"priest"

self-propelledartillery mounts.Simondsinsistedthat the infantry be carriedonto their

Germanintentionswould havepreventedsomeof this problem.ULTRA's frequentlast-minute

decryptsdid not provide adequatetime to reactat the operationallevel.
2" NAC, RG 24, Volume 10494,File 212CI. 8000(DI7), The CampaignIn North West Europe6 June-
8 May 1945:A Review,para.54. Brig. C.C. Mann, CBE, DSO. (Mann, Chief of Staff of First
CanadianArmy, deliveredthis asa lecture.A shorterversionwasdeliveredearlier in the war
concerningoperationsin 1944.)
248Crerar War Diaty, I August 1944,NAC RG 24, Volume 10798,"War Diaries," 2 CDN Corps,
nA
"Notes for War Diary 'G' Branch,Main Hq. 2 CDN Corps," n.d. Crcrarhad issueda warning order to
Simondsconcerningan attacktoward Falaiseon 28 July.

142
 actual objectives, it would be a mountedbattle. Assessingthe terrain as requiring a

double breakin battle, and favoring the Germanuse of their long-rangeweaponsas

well as counterattacksby their close reserve(the 12 SS PanzerDivision), Simonds

intendedto strip them of long-rangeobservationand direct fires by attackingat night.

He outlinedwhat would be the controversialelementof the plan:

In essence,the problem is how to get armour through the enemygun

screento sufficient depth to disrupt the German anti-tank gun and
mortar defence, in country highly suited to the tactics of the latter
combination.

Appreciating that "it requirespractically the whole day bomberlift to effect"

the destructionor neutralizationof the armor-mortardefense,and that if two defense

zonesare to be penetrated,a pausewith the loss of speedand momentummust be

" he made his plan. The only alternativewas a successfulinfiltration and

accepted,

night penetrationof the first line, with the bombersdeployed against the second.

Breaking the battle into phases,Simondsprojected the first breakin for 2300 on 8

August, using full bombersupportand two infantry divisions plus two tank brigades.

The secondline, to be broken by the attack of two armoreddivisions (the "break-

through"), would be assaultedtentatively at 1200 on D+I, also following a heavy

bomber assault.An exploitation would follow by the two armoreddivisions plus a

fresh infantry division leap-froggedforward. On the eve of the attack, Simondshad

predicted that the enemy would react immediately to fill the gaps createdby the

preparatorybombing, but that an immediatemove by the attackersclosely following

the bombing would negateany attempt by the reserveto restorethe front line. He

249Ibid., Crerar War Diaq, 4 August, ibid., Appendix. 1. Remarksto SeniorOfficers CDN Army,
OperationTOTALIZE, 2.

143
 the battle would begin in the areabetweenthe enemy's
thereforepredictedthat real

defenses,and that the secondline could not be effectively defendeduntil after first

250
light.

Crerar held an orders conferenceon 5 August, giving a formal addressto

0
initiate the operation that included his operational ideas concerning initiative,

weaponsusage,ancl momentum
maýmI2&img in the attack.Afterwards,printed copies

were circulatedto commandingofficers.Having beengiven more than a week to "tee

up" this operation,Crerarwasdismayedto firid that the defensehad side-steppedinto

the line two fresh infantry formations-the 272d and 89th Infantry Divisions-and

had shifted the previous front owners, the I SS and 12 SS ParizerDivisions, into

reserve. Crerar widened Simonds' front with the Polish Armoured Division to

accompanythe 4th CanadianArmoured Division in the "second break-through"

phase.Simondsagreedthat the key would be maintainingmovementfor the attack in

its early phases to offset the strengtheneddefensesin depth. Simultaneously,

Montgomery's latest directive, M. 5 17, had outlined his own advanceto the Seine,a

key elementof which would be the First CanadianArmy's seizureof Falaiseto permit

its full eastwardwheel onto the axis Lisieux-Rouen,to place it in its pre-D-Day

plannedsectorto clearthe Channel 251

Coast.

2"0NAC RG 24, Volume 10649,File 215CI.016(DI5). 2 Aug 44, Memorandumto Maj. R.F.L.
-Gen.
Keller, GOC 3d Cdn Inf Div., Appreciation,OperationTOTALIZE, I Aug 44; Outline Plan
(TOTALIZE) n.d.; Appreciation,7 Aug 44, EnemyReactions.2 CDN CORPSINSTRUCTION
NUMBER FOUR OPERATION "TOTALIZE, " 5 Aug 44.
211MontgomeiyLog, 5 August 1944;RG 24, Crerar Papers,1.File 958C.009(040),"Notes on
TelephoneConversationwith 2 CDN Corps, 1745,7 August, OperationTotalize"; Crerar War Diary,
ibid., Memorandumto Lieut.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerarfrom G.C. Simonds,Licut.-Gen.,"Operation
Totalize," 6 August 1944.Montgomeryvisited Crerarand emphasizedthe necessityof the armor
closely following the bombing strike, as we]] asthe relationshipof Crcrar's operationto the ongoing
Mortain counterattack.

144
 12th Army Group's activation had done more than just salve American

sensitivities.Bradley's own operationshad propelled him into a new realm. He had

written Eisenhowerin late July noting that his First Army Headquarters,
"is riding

high." Bradley noted that he had predictedbeing in Coutancesin 48 hours, and was

252
behind. Two days later, Bradley concern,
expressed telling VIII
now only slightly

Corps' CommanderMaj. Gen.Troy H. Middleton that:

Some people are more concernedwith the headlinesand the news

they'll make tha[n] [i]n the soundnessof their tactics.I don't careif we
get Brest tomorrow or ten dayslater. If we cut the peninsula,we'll get
it anyhow.But we can't risk a loosehinge.

The criticism was of Middleton's new boss, the Third Army commander.

Bradley, whosemistrust of Patton'sjudgment from his experiencesin Sicily had not

yet subsided, then went forward and personally overrode and bypassedPatton,

orderingthe 79th division to build up nearthe areain question.During the conference

with Middleton he noted, speaking of Patton:

He's not used to having three or four Germandivisions hit him. He

doesn'tknow what that meansyet.

While Patton later took the verbal assaultwell when they met over the incident,

Bradley's G-3 spokevirulently to Bradley'saide,noting that

Patton's orders specifically directed that he build a firm line before

turning, his movement was a violation of the [12th Army] group
directive that he hadbeengiven. 253

252EL, Correspondence,Letter Bradleyto Eisenhower,28 July 1944.

253
HansenDiaq, 2,5 August 1944.The G-3, Brig. Gen.A. Franklin Kibler, complainedlater that
Pattoncontinuedto ignore ordersand plans.

145
Patton. in fact, had orderedthe 5th Armored Division to that samearea. so Patton

Patton to
moved assemblea three-division force to hold the
cancelledtheseorders.

"
"hinge, the 4th Armored and 8th Division to move on Rennes,
and the 6th Armored

into 254
Brittany.
and 83d Division to presswestward

Bradley's earlierprescienceproved incorrectconcerningthe Brittany ports. but

SHAEF's
deadlyaccurateconcerningthe threatof a counterattack. intelligencenoted

that the Germanshad failed to form a hinge upon which to turn their front due to First

but divisions from the Caen front

and SecondArmies' attacks, that panzer migrating

launchedlimited counterattacksnearVire on 3 August. SHAEF estimatedenemytank

strengthat about 1,300, and noted that four panzer divisions belonging to the 47th

Panzer and H SS Panzer Corps had moved westward after thinning their eastern

sector.The panzer threat had shifted from the Caen front, but Dempseyand Hodges

"shared"the panzerdivision symbolsfronting their lines, roughly threedivisions each,

with the newly arrived SS PanzerCorps in front of SecondArmy. SHAEF, however,

did not predict a counterattackas a possiblecourseof action. Rather,they questioned

how long the Germanswould maintain forceson the Pasde Calais front while their

Normandyfront 255
crumbled.

ULTRA and other intelligence,however,had portrayedmore specific threats.

The formation of the Fifth PanzerArmy from the batteredPanzerGroup West and the

shift of divisions along the front were accuratelyportrayed.Moreover, on 6 August

2.
'4 MHI, PapersofLieutenant GeneralHobart R. Gay, Third Amy Chief of Staff Diary (incl. Maj.
Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey), 2-3 August 1944; ThirdArmy After Action Report,1,16-20.
255SHAEF G-2 Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 20 for the week ending5 August 1944,1-4, and
Order of Battle Maps;NARA, RG 407, Box 1956,First Army Estimates,21 June-31October44, G-2

146
severalsignal interceptswarnedof the attack toward Avi-anches-using 116th.2d, I

SS,and 2d SSPanzerDivision under47th PanzerCorps-that would be launchedthe

next day. Additional signals were transmitted and decryptedthroughout the night

Bradley's Hodges' 256

headquarters.
warning and

The corps at the point of impact,Major General"Lightning Joe" Collins' VII,

had no advancewarning of the Germanattack and was executinga relief in place of

257
one division by anothershortly beforethe attack. This division. the 30th, prevented

a breakthrough,with elementsof four attacking panzer divisions, losing about 80

tanksthe first day.The full weight of both the 9th and2 TacticalAir Forcesresponded

with great success.SecondArmy fought heavily at this time; Mount Pincon hadjust

fallen, and two British corps worked hard at fighting off panzerswhile continuing

258
their swing to the eastand southeast.

Neither Montgomery nor Bradley was shaken by the attack. Hodges'

headquarterswas confidentit would stop the panzers,its current intelligenceestimate

heading its assessmentof enemy capabilities with the words, "When the current

EstimateNo. 13,1 August 1944.First Army's G-2 had earlierpredictedthat the most likely enemy
courseof action would be to defendon a line Trouville-Falaise-Mortain-Renncs.
256Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2,238-245.
257Collins, LightningJoe, 250,251. In discussionat Fort Leavenworth,Kansas,in 1983.General
Collins assuredthe authorthat he had receivedno warning of the attackfrom ULTRA or any other
source.Bradley had beencautiousaboutthe "hinge" sincethe beginningof Patton'sturn toward
Brittany, and Collins statesthat both he and Bradleywere concernedaboutestablishingthemselveson
defensiveterrain to preventa fatal Germanattack.
258SHAEF G-2 Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 21 for the weekending 12 August 1944,2, Map
EnemyOrder of Battle in WestNormandy;SecondArmYHistory, 168-173;Short Histopyof 30 Corps,
18-21, Maps7-9; FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-Feb 45,1 August 1944-February1945,1,5-9;
M HI, Ninth Air Force: April to November1944:Army Air ForcesHistorical Study No. 36,1945,169-
171;RAFNarrative. IV, 73-84;.ývlvanDiapy, 7 August 1944,Sylvannotesthat Ninth Air Force
claimed 109tank kills on the day the attackbegan.

147
 "59 Montgomery's first to the
Panzer attack is defeated or contained. .. . response

attack was to ask Leigh Mallory to shift the entire weight of air to attack the panzers.

Montgomery noted,

This enemy concentration at MORTAIN, and attack westwards

towards AVRANCHES, is a real mistake; if he persists here I will turn
the southern wing up northwards to ALENCON and ARGENTAN. and
260
get in behin .

As First Army blunted the German counterattack, Simonds' Canadians began

TOTALIZE at 2330 hourson 7 August.A gain of five milesjustified the uniquenight

attack. The momentum, however, was broken by the overly complicated set-piece

Simondswas unwilling or unable to call off the bomberstimed for the

attack plan.

secondphase,so units sat for six hours after they had the
penetrated defenses,
as the

next echelonfiltered through in a passageof lines to their start line. The momentary

advantageof a break in the defensehad been lost. The secondattack was marred by

short-bombingby four US bomb groups of the 8th Air Force flying in support.The

Germansstopped4th CanadianArmouredwith a hastily thrown togethergun-line,and

the Polish Armoured Division found itself facing fresh reservesof Tiger and Panther

'59FUSA G-2 Estimate,"G-2 EstimateNo. 14,8 August 1944";FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-
Feb 45,43-13, HansenDiary, 8 August 1944;5ývlvanDiaq, 7 August 1944;ThirdArmY COSDiapy
(Gaffey) 7 August 1944.The aides' diariesreflect the lack of emotionat the top concerningthe German
attack.
260MontgomeryLog, 7 August 1944;Montgomery'sScientists.173-180. RAFNarrative, IV, 84-92;
Gooderson,Airpower at the Battlefront, Chapter3. Montgomerynotedthat the air forcesclaimed 120
tank kills. An analysisof air supportat Mortain is found in Montgomery'sScientists.Goodersonoffers
commentaryon the resultsof air force claims being investigatedon the ground,and the furor raised
over Army operationalresearchteamsstudyingcloseair supporteffectiveness.Coningham,of course,
refusedto cooperate.

148
 TOTALIZE halted II 261
August. Falaiselay
tanks. after a nine-mile advanceon some

nine miles away.

Hitler's insistenceon a counteroffensivedoomed his Normandy forces and

played into Montgomery's operational design for a drive to the Seine. With

BLUECOAT's culmination with the captureof Mount Pincon on 6 August, and the

pocket now formed by the defendersof Mortain, the advanceof Patton's XV Corps

toward Le Mans madea clear but different courseof action-an envelopment.rather

than destroying the enemy against the Seine-was obvious. The 7 August situation

map placed three panzer, eight infantry, and one parachutedivision in front of 21

Army Group; four panzer,one motorized,and two infantry divisions in front of First

Army; and two panzer and three infantry divisions on Patton's eastemfront. None

were complete, rested formations, and all had been badly battered. With Crerar's

Canadiansalready preparing to cut the German line in front of Dempsey with

TOTALIZE on a narrow front, Patton's continuing advanceoffered more than just

toward the Seinein 262

the
easing run one sector.

A tuming movementhad beenthe centerpieceof LUCKY STRIKE B and had

been ordered in M. 515 and M. 516. Variations of the plan also offered a more

northeasterlyaxis toward Paris with the objective for an "armored force" centered

there on the Seine River between Dreux and Paris. Sketchedabout 20 June, this

2" NARA, RG 338, ML-2250, ReportNo. 146,Historical Section,CanadianMilitary Headquarters,

"Operationsof the First CanadianArmy in North-WestEurope,31 July-I October44- RAFNarrative,
IV(Preliminary Report),5-15; Effectivenessof Third PhaseTacticalAir Operations,92-100. Leigh
Mallory Diaq, 8 August 1944.Both Leigh Mallory and Coninghamwitnessedthe short-bombing,
Mallory
Leigh was highly critical of the 8th Air Forceeffort, claiming he did not believethe "smoke
and dust obscuration"excusefor the bombing.
262Third ArmYAfter Action Report,1,Operations
map for August 7,1944.

149
 possibility was noted by Montgomery in his log on 7 August when he mentioned
4P

turning the southernwing northward.(Seefigure )

19.

Before the Mortain attack,Bradley,when discussinghis future plans,noted he

wished to bypassParis from the south and cut off the Germanarmies in front of the

British, "right up to Dieppe." More revealingly,his aide, Major Hansen,summarized

the discussionconcerninga requirementto move toward Calais(apparentlydue to the

I rocket threat):

[H]e [Bradley] replied that military contingencies require that

campaigngo as it is planned-that the closestway to the rocket coast
will be aroundthroughParisup to the coast.We are on the way, Army
boundarieshavealreadyswungto the east.

Hansenfurther elaboratedon Bradley'splans:

Gen hopes to build up on Domfront-Le [Mons) and there collect

supplies necessary for movement. Supply may limit the rapidity with
which we move towards Paris. Gen hopes to get going by September.
When attack to Paris gets underway, Airbor[ne] will get three
divisions. 263

Hansen, whose brief did not inc)ude attending meetings with Montgomery. or

apparentlyreadingoperationsdirectivesandplans,furthernoted:

His [Bradley's] airborneplan for employmentof armor in swift thrust

towards Paris and destructionof Germanarmy of 26 divs now facing
us is most ambitiousyet. He views [it] calmly, weighsits mathematical
chancesand plots it deliberately.Worked the whole thing out in a
series of definite lines tonight, assigningbulk of mission to Third
Army.

Finally, quoting his general,Hansennoted:

"First Army will have plenty of fighting to do where they are now. "64
I-

213
HansenDiary, 6 August 1944.

150
 The failed counteroffensiveat Mortain, TOTALIZE's gain toward Falaise.

Montgomery's earlier directives, and obviously Bradley, who had embraced

Montgomery's plan as his own, left the door wide open for an envelopment.But

would the be
movement the operationallydecisiveturning movementearlier sketched

in M. 517, or would it be a tighter, tactical envelopmentseeminglydemandedby

out

the battlefield situationas paintedby intelligence?

That answercamefrom Bradleyon 8 August as Eisenhowervisited 12thArmy

Group. Bradley and Eisenhowertogetherdecidedthat a move northward by Patton

toward Argentan would bag the remnantsof the German Seventhand Fifth Parizer

Armies. Executingthe turn presumedthat Crerar's Canadianswould gain Falaiseand

that Pattoncould effectively be turnednorth if the longer move toward Alencon could

be temporarily halted. Montgomery agreed,perhapstoo hastily. The move would

effectively mask much of the Allied force from participatingin the trap, and time, not

necessarily maneuver mass, would determine the success of the envelopment.

Moreover, a tight envelopmentlessenedthe possibility of catching the entire enemy

265
force at the river itself whenthey defiled to cross.

264Ibid. It is interestingto note, Hansenfurther adds."Meanwhile we aideslive in Mortal Fearthat

Pattonmay unjustly crab [grab?] credit for the breakthroughwhich was madeand sealedbeforehe
becameactive."
20MontgomeryLog, 8 August; Reportofthe SupremeCommander,43; Montgomery,Norman4vto the
Baltic, 124-130;Eisenhower,Chisadein Europe,275; HansenDiary, 8 August 1944;Bradley,A
Soldier's Story, 375,377. Virtually everyoneinvolved took credit fýr the idea.As confirmation of his
minor status. Bradley's "Boswell" displaysno knowledge of his boss'smomentous decision.
Montgomeryappearsto have seenlittle diversionin his original plan and ignoresEisenhower's
"presence." He statessimply, "I orderedBradleyto halt that spearheadthere [referring to Pattonnear
Le Mans], and then operatestrongly with 3 or 4 divisions northwardsto ALENCON." Of those
claiming credit, Montgomerywasthe one responsible,as Eisenhowerissuedno order, verbal or
otherwise,and Montgomeryretainedoverall commandof groundforces.Bradley ignoresEisenhower
in his accountand fails to signal a changein plan, but takestime to denigrateMontgomery,saying,"As
field arbiter on boundariesfor Ike, Monty becameresponsiblefor coordinatingthe maneuversof all
four Allied Armies." Significantly, the issueof "fixing the enemy"by continuedattackplus destroying
him in place,was criticized by Bradleyas"squeezingthe enemyout of the pocket."

151
 Montgomery did, however,record the connectivityof the new move with his

intentionsas statedin M. 517; he saw Falaiseand Alencon as not simply

undiminished

the key to capturing the retreating but

Germans, as a maneuverto ensurethat "our

SEINE be ',266
The day, recognizingthe limitations of
advanceto the will easy. next

Bradley'srecommendation,he recorded:

I instructed Bradley that, while operating with his right toward

ALENCON, he must be ready to strike quickly from LE MANS
towards CHARTRES and PARIS. If the Germans slipped out between
ALENCON and FALAISE, then we must swing our right forward to
PARIS quickly---asin M. 517.267

Patton seized the reins, full well feeling the advantageof having minimal

opposition. Road clogs, not combat, were his largest impediment. Patton's capable

chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey, recordedthat Patton's orders,written on the

8th but not delivered until morning on the 9th, listed as the purpose of the orders:

[T]o drive the Germanarmy, heretoforeconfrontingthe First American

Army and Second British and CanadianArmies along the channel
268
coast,againstthe SEINEbetweenPARIS and ROUEN.

Simonds' attack, battered by German panzer reserves missed by the

bombardment,forced a reevaluationof the Falaiseattack.Crerarand Simonds,a true

gunners'union, plannedanotherset-piecewith a massivebomberassault.Convinced

that Harris, not Doolittle, could do a betterjob basedon the earlier short bombing,

Crerar askedfor Bomber Command'snight bomber force to strike in daylight on 14

266Montgomety Log, 8 August 1944.

267Ibid., 9 August 1944.
26'ThirdArm CqJSDiary (Gqffiiýi),August 8,1944,12th ArmYGroup Reportof Operations.V, Letter
Instruction ,v
Number Four, 8 August 1944,77,78. Gaffey, citing Third Army Letter of Instruction,8
of
August 1944,shouldhavenotedthat Patton'sorder exceededhis brief. His ordersfrom Bradleywere:
"Advance on the axis ALENCON-SEES preparedfor further action againstthe enemyflank and
...
rear in the direction of ARGENTAN."

152
August. (Seefigure 23.) Shifting the axis of attackwestward,the new thrust followed

690-bomberassaultwith a push by two infantry divisions and an armoreddivision.

a

"TRACTABLE, " Simonds' new effort shifted the direction of attack westward.

adding miles to the approach and avoiding TOTALIZE's original path. In addition to

the standard staggered defense, approximately ninety 88-mm guns dotted the attack

The plan encountered TOTALIZE's double problem: how to break through the
zone.

defense; how to get the armored force beyond the gun-line. Smoke, not darkness, was

269
seenas the best way to screenthe attack.

The attack was bombedduring the secondair-phasebut continued,repeating

Simonds' use of armoredpersonnelcarriers.The ground fighting soon devolved into

fending off Germanarmoredcounterattacksand breakingthe antitank screenlaid out

th '170
in depth. Falaise fell on the 16 after heavy fighting. 2

As Patton swept westwardand the CanadianFirst Army recockedand fired a

secondmajor salvo from the north, the centerfront bore greatweight but little notice

in the Allied camp.(Seefigure 24.) Dempsey'smen beganto turn southand eastward,

while Hodges' First Army continuedits The

movement. Germansattemptedto fight a

strong delaying action on all quarters while moving westward toward the funnel

causedby the advancingAllied armies. Given the tightening trap, Germanvehicular

269ML 5220, CanadianHistorical ReportNo. 146,15-17.Worsestill, the Germanscaptureda complete

corpsattackorder about 12 hoursbeforethe attack.This causedat leastone AT batteryto be moved
forward to contestthe attack.
270
Ibid., 17-21.

153
 by the pocket's shrinking size and confined to roads.becameair
moves,constricted

British 171
fighters.
targetsravagedby Americanand

As the situation Montgomery

developed, to
stressed Dempseyand Crerar the

to dominateroadsby artillery fire during darkness,

and had designated
army
necessity

define the ring: Crerar (Falaise), Dempsey (Conde), and Bradley

objectives to

(Argentan). Earlier (by 10 August) intelligence had noted that six panzer divisions

were reforming for attack on Mortain, intelligence that Montgomery met with the

phrase,"Now they are doomed.

" He reactedquickly to intelligence indicating that a

withdrawal would take place by closely coordinating Dempseyand Crerar, Bradley

would coordinate operationsfor the First and Third US Armies. M. 518 reflected

Montgomery's belief that the Germanswould fight betweenthe Seineand the Loire,

and that any withdrawal from their generalline of Caen-LeMans would necesitate

blocking 12thArmy Group's moves.He modified his original intentionto

concentrate our energies on closing the gap behind the main enemy
forces, so that we can possibly destroy them where they are now.

The new pocket would be defined by a meeting of Second Army and Canadian

First Army at Falaise, while 12th Army Group formed on the line Alencon-Sees-

Carrouges. The wider net defined earlier would remain as a contingency mission, as

would as airborne planning for the Chartres area. Given the known circumstances,

211SecondAriny Histort, 174-178;FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-Feb 45,1,14-16; Leigh

,
Mallory Despatch,60, para.296; BreretonGreenhous,StephenJ. Harris, William C. Johnston.and
William G.P. Rawling, TheCnicible of War. Official History ofthe RoYalCanadianAir Force. 111
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press,Inc., 1994).317; RAF Narrative, IV, 99-102.Leigh Mallory is
highly critical of groundcommandersfor failing to move "bomb-lines," permitting his aircraft to attack
targetsmore closely. The Canadianofficial history lists phenominalkill claims.

154
 Montgomeryhad accountedfor everyoperationalline, he left the fine points of tactics

in
to thoseactually conimandon the field.27.1

Identifying the actual units within the trap, as to both type and strength.

becamean imperative to determinehow wide the trap should swing, but estimates

varied even as the battle continued.First Army's G-2 estimatedthat elementsof 17

divisions plus corpsand flak troopswere trappedon 15 August a total of about50.000

troops if none escaped.Significantly, under "Enemy Capabilities," the same report

listed that the enemycould continue to hold open the shouldersof "the FALAISE-

ARGENTAN gateway," and that the highestprobability was that the enemy's next

sequenceof actions was "to fight a seriesof delayingactions in rearguard while he

retires to the SEINE and the MARNE." British SecondArmy's G-2 tracked enemy

formationsbut did not speculateon their strengths.Patton'sG-2 estimatedthat on 18

August approximately 75,000 troops and 250 tanks remained in the pocket. The

enemy, to date, had extricatedabout 25,000 men to the east of the Seine, and had

approximately 150,000troops remainingin the Fifteenth Army's 13 divisions in the

the Pasde Calais and the lowlands. SHAEF listed 18 divisions within the pocket by

19 August, but made no strengthestimate.Montgomery'sG-2 told him on the 15th

that the bulk of the "fighting portion" of the German army had been trapped; he

estimatedthat though someadministrativeechelonshad exited the corridor, the bulk

273
of the enemystill remained.

2.72
M. 518,11-8-44.
273First Army G-2 EstimateNo. 16,15 August 1944;SecondArmy Intelligence
Summaries,74-78,
August 1944;Third Army G-2 EstimateNo. 7,18 August 1944;SHAEF Weekly Intelligence
SummaryNo. 22, week ending 19August 1944.

155
 Montgomery set three priorities for the forces circling the pocket: that the gap

be kept around the pocket, and that

must be closed, that constant pressure must

forces be headed to the northeast. He ordered Crerar to extend his

escaping must off

Trun, Bradley to westward to link with the Canadians. As

attacks west to and extend

further insurance, the next day he transferred an armored division to Crerar to

further from Lisieux. Crerar's moves, if quick, he felt. might

reinforce a envelopment

Germans.
" 174
-captureover 100,000

Falaisewould be consideredone of the decisionpoints of the campaign.As

in Juneand July, operationsagaindevelopedheadquarters-centric

with the operations

Montgomery
interpretations. again followed traditional Visiting
commandprocedure.

or calling his he
commanders, followed up orders and conversationswith written

directives, including his assessmentsof operations and their relationship to his

intentions. He kept Eisenhowerinformed by both messageand letter. as he did the

CIGS. At the front, appearances

never strayedfrom the image of a band of brothers,

275
working to finish a campaignwithout strife or controversy.

The headquartersput differing interpretations on the battlefield actions,

interpretationsthat illustrate the extent of hostility that undergirdedbasic decisions

within the coalition and which made mush of the of

appearance a band of brothers.

2'4MontgomeryLog, 15-17August 1944.

2" Murray, Eisenhower
versus Montgomety, passim, Martin Blumcnson, The Battle of the Generals:
The Untold Storv of the Falaise Pocket-The Campaign That Should Have Ifon R'orld Kar // (New
York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), passim. The "Falaise Gap" has spawned a virtual cottage
industry of claims for Allied failure, generally divided along national lines. With the exception of
Patton and his acolytes, the diary material of the key players is generally absent the hatred manifested
by postwar commentators. Falaisc is a large part of the American attack on Montgomery and the
British. Any belief that the war could have been won there, as claimed by some, can be dispelled by
merely counting the number of German divisions that were not engaged there and still holding the
north coast. For example, the figures cited by Blumenson are inflated and based upon suspect sources.

156
SHAEF buzzed with unprecedentedsmugness.Eisenhower had began writingLI

Marshall weekly letters outlining "his decisions" on the campaign,decisions that

Montgomery's
remarkably paraphrased M-series of "General Operational Situation

and Directive[s]" that emanatedfrom 21 Army Group following every meetingwith

276
Monty's commanders. Once terrified that OVERLORD would meet the Anzio

landing's fate of stalemate,Eisenhowernow reported that he had cooperatedin

in 277
Normandy.
the
creating strategyused

The southernswing, however,had been making spectaculargains and, with

Pattonesqueflair, Third Army's commandersoonconvincedBradleyand SHAEF that

he was in a "horse race" with the British. Patton, Eisenhowertold Marshall, is the

',178
646marching
wing' of a greatenvelopment.

The successof that marching wing, however, became a major bone of

contention within Allied command circles, especially since Bradley focused his

energyon the and

envelopment beganto view the annihilation of the Germanarmies
279
in the pocket as his military masterpiece. Montgomery saw a wider operational

maneuverdesignednot merely to finish the enemy west of the Seine, but also to

complete the entire campaign in the west. As part of this, he viewed the wider

envelopmentand the openingof the OrleansGapto a wide operationalmove south of

216EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2059,2071.
2'nIbid., 2059; "Our Strategyis to swing the right flank of the Allied Armies toward Paris,hold the
Paris-Orleansgap and to force the enemybackon the Seine."
27'EL, ButcherPapers,LettersEisenhowerto Marshall,August 10,1944; August 11,1944; Diary
Entry, August 11,1944.
279Bradley,A Soldier's Story, 375. Bradleytold Secretary the TreasuryHenry Morgcnthau 9
of on
August,"We're aboutto destroyan entirehostile army " after which, "[W]c'll go all the way to the
. ..
Germanborder."

157
Paris and thenceto the coastas both decisive.and insuranceagainstproblemsin the

280
tight, pocket envelopment.

Bradley had halted Patton's push north on 13 August, influencedby ULTRA

intelligencethat identified elementsof threePanzerdivisions moving to hold openthe

for the trapped enemy to flee. The same day, Dempsey

shouldersof the pocket

recordedthejoint decisionof Montgomeryand Bradleyregardingclosing the pocket:

So long as the Northwardmove of Third Army meetslittle opposition.

the two leading Corps will disregard inter-Army boundaries. The
whole aim is to establish forces across the enemy's lines of
communications so as to impede-if not prevent entirely-his
281
withdrawal.

This understandingBradley apparentlysought to ignore, and the legend of

282
Monty's ordering a halt was spreadboth by Bradley's staff and Patton. Moreover,

as intelligencebeganidentifying movesof "divisions" within the pocket without the

precisionof identifying strengthsand capabilities,Bradley continuedto seePattonas

the sole solution. He refusedHodges' requestto shift boundariesto permit VII Corps
283Bradley beganmoving forcesto the northeast
an aggressivemove toward the gap.

in
to conform with a wider envelopment front of Parisby Third Army. On 16 August,

the day the Canadiansclosed on Falaise, Bradley ordered V Corps to shift its

'goHansenDiary, 12 August. HansenattacksMontgomery'sseekingto take terrain, and not to follow

the "principle of destroyingthe enemy." Montgomery,Norman4vto the Baltic. 269-270;M.516,
M.517, refutesthis claim, which is probablyrepeatedfrom his boss.Bradley.
28'DempseyDiary, 13 August 1944.
282HansenDiary, 13 August 1944.Hansenrecords:"it is suggestedin G-3 that we were orderedto
hold at Argentanratherthan to continueto drive to Falaisesinceour captureof that objectivewould
infringe on the prestigeof the forcesdriving southand preventthem from securingprestigevalue in
closing the trap."
283SvIvanDiary, 13 August 1944;HansenDiary, 14 August. Hansenclaimsthat the opportunityto
closethe gap had beenlost due to Montgomery,andthat the drive to the Seinewasthe proof of this
admission.

158
headquarterseast to assumecontrol of two of Patton's divisions. Seekingto speed

Patton
operations, placed them under his own chief of staff and severalstaff officers

to form a "provisional corps" that he intendedto launch into an attack. The V Corps

commander,upon his arrival, disapprovedthe dispositions,plan, and arrangements,

he halted for full day to his 284

and the attack a make own plan.

The Americans further extendedeast and closed with the Polish Armoured

285
Division at Chamboison the 19th. At the closeof the pocketbattle, elementsof six

panzerdivisions attemptedto break out from within or to batter the Polish Armoured

to break a hole from without, indicating that the battle for the pocket had not been

easy,nor had the enemybeenwilling to despite

surrender their position. Montgomery

recordedthat elementsof fourteendivisions were "more in than out of the "

pocket. He

noted that thesewere mostly infantry divisions, and that the SS and panzers,though

mauled, probably Airpower

escaped. had taken a terrible toll on Germanequipment

but againhad failed to sealthe 286

battlefield.

Coningharnrailed at ground commandersfor their use of "a rigid Inter-Army

Group boundary" that precludedtargetingduring the closing of the gap. Considering

284Martin Blumenson,"GeneralBradley's Decisionat Argentan(13 August 1944)," in Kent Roberts

Greenfield,ed., CommandDecisions(Washington:US Army Centerof Military History, 1959,1987),
401418. Blumenson,the Americanofficial historian,miscastsMontgomery'sintentions,404.
28"FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-Feb 45,14-18 and SituationMap 1; Blumenson,Breakoutand
Pursuit, 507, fn 7; 527-530;History of V Corps(Headquarters,V Corps,n.d.), 182-188,operations
maps 16-20August 44.
286MontgomeryLog, 19 August; Montgomery,Normandvto the Baltic, seemap 25; SecondArmy
History, 175-181; SecondArmy which, accordingto Brýdley,did little but squeezethe Germans'out,
sufferedmore than 5,000casualtiesfrom 13 to 21 August,aswell asthe lossof 101 tanksdestroyed
and a further 118damaged.The numberof enemythat escapedis estimatedto be 20.000to 40,000,but
their actualsurvival during the retreatis unknown.LargePOW haulswerenettedin late August and
early September,further cloudingthe issue.

159
 this another case of army rigidity, he blamed army generals for preventing
Cý
287
-completing the work of the air forces in an annNIation role.

The pocket battle had preventeda deliberatewithdrawal and expeditedthe

288
wider envelopmentto completethe plannedlodgementposition. Focusingon the

Falaisepocket, however,had preventedthe wider turning movementfrom gathering

L-
greaterspoils. First Army, and not the Third, should have provided the bulk of the

envelopingand Exing force west of the Seinewhile Pattonracedoff toward Paris.as

Monty and Patton had individually envisioned.However, the battle of movement

continuedat a fasterpacebeyondthe pocketas the attacksand exploitationoperations

of earlyAugust evolvedinto a pursuit operationby 12thArmy Group.21 Army Group

battledthe only forcesmaintaininga defensiveposturein the West.

The invasion of Southern France, OPERATION DRAGOON, began on 15

August. Under the temporary control of the Supreme Allied Commander,

Mediterranean, the DRAGOON force was planned to come under SCAEF, as was the

21 289
operational control of and 12th Army Groups. Recognizing this future,

Montgomery met with his commanders on the 19 August to shape the campaign's

next phase.

On 20 August, M. 519 announcedMontgomery'sintentions.To completethe

destructionof the enemy forces in northwest France,his plan was to continue his

battle,

287Coningham,Report Operations2 TacticalAir Force, 71-73,)ZAFNarrative, IV,

on 112
2" SecondArmy History, 182.A 11SS PanzerCorpsorder indicatedthat a four-line delay and
captured
withdrawal to ihe Seinehadbeenplanned.
289pogUC:TheSupremeCommand,265-266,272-278.

160
 [t]hen to advancenorthwards,with a view to the eventualdestruction
forcesin 290
France.
of all enemy north-east

As always,Montgomerybeganhis directive with his "operationalpolicy" for

the future. He called for relentlessattacks,stating:

I call on all commandersfor a great effort. Let us finish off the

businessin recordtime.291

Montgomery orderedthe reduction

of
4the bottle" that had been the Falaise

pocket while directing that 12th Army Group's wide along

envelopment the south
01
bank of the Seineto Louviers and Elbeuf to continue severingthe Gennan lines of

withdrawal to the Importantly,

Seine. he directedthat Bradley

take advantageof any opportunity to securea bridgeheadover the

SElNE in the MANTES area,or anywhereelse.

He also directedthat 12thAnny Group

[a]ssemble its right wing west and southwest of PARIS, and [it] will
capture that city when the Commanding General considers the suitable
moment has arrived-and not before.

The captureof Paris was to be on Eisenhower'sordersonly, but this was not

the key intention published in the directive. Montgomery's 18th section defined his

vision
operational and intent for finishing the It
campaign. was, he thought, in accord

with Bradley's own ideas,a perceptionthat would be changedin the next days. He

directedBradley's forces:

Having securedPARIS, or passedto the south of it, 12 Army Group

will advanceto the general area ORLEANS-TROYES-CHALONS-
REIMS-LAON-AMIENS.

290M-519,20-8-44.
29'Ibid.

161
 It will be so disposedin this generalareathat it retainsthe ability to
operate north-eastwards towards BRUSSELS and AACHEN, while
simultaneously a portion of the Army Group operates eastwards
towardsthe SAAR.
Alternately,the whole Army Groupmay be requiredto move to the
292
N.E., on the right flank of 21 Amy Group.

21 Army Group's own tasks involved destroyingthe forces "in the bottle,"

then moving rapidly to the Seinewith 2 Army preparingto move to the Pasde Calais

and Canadian First Army taking Havre "very early." As with his Normandy directives

for the breakout strategy (M. 505) and then the execution of LUCKY STRIKE B

(M. 517), this directive was intendedto becomean outline campaignplan, fine-tuned

as operationsdeveloped.
Montgomery,however,had recognizedboth his position and

the necessityfor future coordinationof a campaign.He statedearly in the order:

GeneralPolicy for ForwardMovement

As the situation develops,the SupremeAllied Commanderwill be
issuingordersregardingthe generalmovementof the land annies.
Meanwhile, we must be so disposedthat we can very quickly develop
operationsin any way he requires,and to meetany situationsthat may
suddenlyarise.
As a first stepwe havegot to crossthe SEINE, and to get so disposed
beyond it-tactically and administratively-that we can carry out
293
quickly the ordersof the SupremeAllied Commander.

Crossing the Seine had been Montgomery's idea-an idea unanimously

approvedwithout considerationboth at SHAEF and at 12th Army Group. The order

reflectedthe mood of "getting it over in recordtime," but it also put on hold the basis

for the OVERLORD logistical estimatethat called for an operationalpauseto build up

forcesand supplies.It also presupposedthat Pattonwould fulfill his ordersto capture

'92
Ibid.
"3
Ibid.

162
the key Brittany ports of St. Malo, Lorient, and Brest, as well as open Quiberon Bay.

the key underpinningsto the OVERLORD campaignagreed to by the Combined

Chiefs in 1943.Montgomery'splan called for First Army to shift north, requiring a

radical turn by his three armies

northern-most with Patton'sThird Army continuing on

294
its unopposedrampageto the east.

SHAEF's weekly intellfigence estimatenoted that the enemy had suffered

lossesof about 200,000 men, including 80,000 prisoners,with only a 10 percent

rate. (Seefigure )
25. The report further statedthat the general
withdrawal
replacement

begun was now confined to the enemy's last route-the Seine river crossings.

Elementsof sevendivisions, all shifted from the Calais area,were identified within

the areanow being swept by 12th Army Group's turning movement.Stating that the

enemy's "battle front has fallen "

apart, the report noted that drastic measureswere

being taken by the Germansto control their own lines of communication,including

merging unit fragments("cannibalism") basedon panzerelements,with no evidence

of any planned defense line being apparent. Estimating that about 20 division

equivalentsexisted for the 30 division headquarters

identified, SHAEF stated that

about 500,000men comprisedthe Germanforce west of the Seineand north of Loire,

with about 100,000of them in the Brittany Peninsulaor the ChannelIslands. Most

significantly, intelligence listed under "Enemy Capabilitiesý'

the new propaganda

'94Ibid., M.519; RolandRuppenthal,Logistical Supportof the Armies,2 Volumes(Washington:Office

of the Chief of Military History, 1953,1959);21 Army Group,AdministrativeHistory of2l Army
Group, 6 June 1944-8May 1945[hereafterreferredto as21 AMY GroupAdministrativeHistory]
(Germany:21 Army Group, 1945),passim;Chief of Information,USFET,AmericanEnterprisein
Europe: TheRole ofthe SOSin the Defeatof GermanY[publishedcommerciallyas RandolphLeigh,
48 Million Tonsto Eisenhower(Washington:Infantry Journal,1945)).

163
 effort launchedwithin Germanyto convincethe populationthat it had its back to the
295
wall, andthat superhumaneffort would be requiredto survive.

Despitethe dramaplaying out in the newspapersand the bold arrows moving

acrossFrance,the enemywas fragmented,not destroyed,and only the continuedspeed

of Allied movement could guaranteekeeping the enemy from forming a cohesive

defense.Bradley's dreamof cutting off the enemy'sretreatin front of the British came

to fruition; as First Army drove its XIX Corps directly north to reach Elbeuf. and

spreadthe XV Corpsnorth of Pariscrossingthe Seineat MantesGassicourt,V Corps

took Paris and VH Corps spreadout acrossthe Seinesouth of the great city. Unlike

Patton'smanuever,this pursuit by 12 Americandivisions cut into the remainingmeat

of the enemyFifth PanzerArmy and compressedthe bulk of the remainingenemyin

the West 296

northward across the Seine and toward the coast. Patton meanwhile,

pressedeastto Troyessouthof Paris.

21 Army Group's fight, however, moved more slowly, as it reduced "the

bottle" while shifting to crossthe Seine.Having cancelledairborneoperationsin the

Orleans Gap, Montgomery and SHAEF looked to employ the airborne army,
now
designatedas SHAEF's reserve,in the Pasde Calaisareaor somewhereto speedthe

advanceup the channelcoastto the V-1 and V-2 launchingsites.O'Connor's 8 Corps

'95SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceReportNo. 22 for

week ending 19August, 2-6; EnemyOrder of Battle
in West Normandy(map); EnemyOrder of Battle in the West(map).
196
' FUSA Army Reportof0perations Aug 44-Feb 45,30-37.

164
 paid the price of successas its transportwas takento supportthe move of the Second
297
Army northward.

On 26 August, Montgomery issued his last orders as "ground forces

"
commander. He repeatedas his intentions,the taskshe had identified as confronting

21 Anny Group:

To destroyall enemyforcesin the PAS DE CALAIS and FLANDERS,

andto captureANTWERP.

His plan beyondthe immediatetaskswas:

[t]o advanceeastwardson the RUHR.

Montgomery's operationalpolicy stressedthe urgencyof the situation. He stressed

that the requirementfor set-pieceoperationsanddetailedpreparationwas over:

Speedof action and of movementis now vital. I cannotemphasizethis

too strongly, what we have to do must be donequickly. Every officer
and man must understandthat by a stupendouseffort now we shall not
only hastenthe end of the war, we shall also bring quick relief to our
families and friends in England by over-nmrung the flying bomb
launchingsitesin the PAS DE CALAIS.298

Ordering Crerar's Army on to Dieppe and then to Bruges,he also directed a

corps' diversion to take Havre with minimal forces, noting that for the Canadians,

"the main business lies to the north, and in the PAS DE CALAIS." For this

"business," the Airborne Army would be droppedaheadof Crerar's First Army with

planning for the operationto take place at Army Group. Monty left no mysteryas to

2" NARA, RG 407,21 Army Group,99/21-26-99/21-150,Box 1817,"21 Army Group WOSTEL No.
12,period up to 2400 hrs. 24 August 1944"; Montgomery,Normandyto the Baltic, 135-139;Chapter
10.A "WOSTEL" was a "War Office, SummaryTelegram."
299M. 520,26-8-44.

165
 how this was to be done.He designatedCrerar'smain effort as his right. emphasizing

that enemystrengthcanbe dealtwith by outflankingoperationsand"right hooks.'

Crerar assessedthe position for his two corps commanders,Crocker and

Simonds, saying:

It is clear that the enemy no longer has the troops to hold any stronger
position-or to hold any positions for any length of time-if it is
aggressively outflanked or attacked. Speed of action and forceful
tactics are, therefore, urgently required from commanders at every level
in First Cdn Army. We must drive ahead with utmost energy. Any
tendency to be slow or "sticky" on the part of subordinate commanders
be
should quickly andpositively eliminated '300
.

Dempseywas orderedto ignorehis flanks and to advanceto Arras-Amiens-St.

Pol, both to continuemoving throughnortheasternFranceand Belgium and to place

forcesto supportthe executionof the airborneoperation.As with Crerar,Montgomery

issued specific operating instructions for the Army:

The Army will move with its armouredstrengthdeployedwell ahead-,

its passagenorthwardsmust be swift and relentless.By this meansit
will cut acrossthe communicationsof the enemyforces in the coastal
belt, and will thus facilitatethe operationsof CanadianArmy.301

Having been given power to coordinatethe left boundaryof the 12th Army

Group, and given somedegreeof authority over US First Army's operations,Monty

noted that its axis of advancewould be Paris-Brusselsand would establishitself at

Brussels-Maastricht-Liege-Namur-Charleroi.

Montgomeryspecifiedtacticsfor his commanders:

"9 1bid.
300Crerar War Diaty, August 1944, Appendix 11, Memo 26 August 1944.
301M. 520,26-8-44.

166
 The proper tacticsnow are for strongarmouredand mobile columnsto
by-passenemycentresof resistanceand to pushboldly ahead,creating
alarm and despondencyin enemyrearareas.
Enemy centresof resistancethus by-passedshould be dealt with by
infantry columnscominglater.
I rely on commanders of every rank and grade to "drive" ahead with
the utmost energy; any tendency to be "sticky" or cautious must be
302
stamped on ruthlessly.

The last days of August saw the war of movementbear fruit. By D+79,24

August, each Allied army had reachedits D+90 phaseline save those portions of

Patton's Army still pennedoutside the ports. The limits of the lodgementthat had

been designatedby the COSSAC plannershad been reached,but the vital Brittany

ports neededfor the Americanshad not beencaptured.

Eisenhowerhad announcedhis intention to assumecommandof the ground

armies beginning I September by messageon 19 August rather than personally to his

senior subordinate commanders. While stressing the options open for the pursuit in

several messages, he issued no formal orders until 29 August. On that day, he

announced an attack on a broad front using the two army groups then under his

command, with priority to the northern thrust which was to be supported by the First

Allied Airborne Army. 303

Montgomeryfelt that his issuanceof M. 519 markedthe end of the Normandy

Campaign;however,it did not mark the end of the OVERLORD plan's requirements,

nor did it solve the critical issuesof commandand Paris

strategy. was liberatedon 25

August by elementsof the Free French 2d Armored Division, and the 4th Infantry

302
Ibid.
'O'EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2077-2079;2100-2102.

167
 Division from the US First Army. MontgomerydeclinedEisenhower'sinvitation to

visit Paris with Bradley, the sameday, SHAEF formally informed him that SCAEF

would take commandof groundforceson I September.Montgomerywas not the only

one who lost forces; Eisenhower'sauthority over the Allied Strategicbombing force

was shortly to be revokedexceptin timesof emergency.SHAEFbecamea "Supreme"

headquarterswith limited influenceover the Allied air or seacampaign.Its function.

had beendefined by Eisenhower'sdirective, which beganwith the words. "You will

enterthe continentof Europe." The Allied ExpeditionaryForceshad accomplishedthe

original OVERLORD task. It was now Eisenhower'sand SHAEFs responsibility to

completethe victory. SHAEF was now a ground headquarterscommandingforcesin

304
the field. (Seefigure 26.)

301
MontgomeryLog, 20,27 August 1944,NARA, RG 331,322.01PSto 327.22,Box 47, C.C.S.
304/12,12 February1944,"CombinedChiefs of Staff Directive to SupremeCommander,Allied
ExpeditionaryForce."

168
 CHAPTER FOUR

Creating The Prince's Greatest Fear

Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his countly with troops
for its defense, as that ten thousand men descendingftom the clouds,
might not, in ma?ýv places, do an infinite deal of mischief before a
force could be brought together to repel them.
Benjamin Franklin, 1784 303

The German landing of gliders and reinforcementby parachute forces in

operations
complementary to seizethe Belgian fortressof EbenEmaeljolted military

observersworldwide into "

seeingthat a new mannerof war, "vertical envelopment,

could changethe face of air-groundbattle. OPERATION GRANITE, the actual glider

assault, was complemented by additional special operations supporting CASE

0
YELLOW, the massassaultin the west by Hitler's armies.OPERATION NIWI, the

landing of small parties of combat engineersin light Storch aircraft to createabatis

to
and other obstacles French 306
military movement,alsotook placesimultaneously.

The reality of an attack from the air was not new, and had in fact occurreda

month before the attack in the west saw its use.The Germanshad air-landedtroops in

Norway in April 1940,during OPERATION WESERBUNG(WESER CROSSING),

the attack on Denmarkand Norway. Here, airborneand air-landedforces seizedkey

307
airfields and strategicpoints to supportship-landedforces.

30.5Sign kept in the office of the CommandingGeneral,First Allied Airbome Army, 1944.
306CMH, MS, CharlesKirkpatrick,
ed., TheAttack on EbenEmaeln. d.; JeanPaulPallud,Blitzkrieg in
the West.,Thenand Now (London: After the Battle, 1991),78-93; C.S.D.I.G. (U.K.), GenobstStudent
and GenmajBassenge,Hisimy of GermanAirborne Forces,24 September1945.
307T.K. Derry, TheCampaignin Norwa (Nashville: Battery Press,1995);The Admiralty, Tactical and
Staff Duties Division, TheGermanCampaign,y In Norway, 1948;Headquarters,NorthernArmy Group
and SecondAllied Tactical Air ForceStudyPeriod, 1974,"Norway," partsone and two.

169
 Neither operationwas basedon a new idea.Parachutingtroopsor the transport

by air-landing aircraft had been theorized in World War I by American

of troops

Brigadier GeneralWilliam "Billy" Mitchell and had beenpracticedon a limited scale

US Army Air Corps by luminaries such as then-Captain Claire L.

within the

Chennault.Russiaintroducedairborneforcesin a massexercisein 1936attendedby

Major-General Archibald Wavell, who reported on it, and Germany unveiled an

airborne force in 1937.The shock of its use,however,causedimmediateresponsein

308
both the combatantarmiesandthosearmiesnot yet engaged.

Britain's responsewas to form an "Airborne Corpe' in June 1940, under

Brigadier F.A. M. Browning, a Grenadier Guardsmanwho had participated as a

commanding officer in Eastern Command's anti-airborne exercises in the late

309
OS.
193

The experienceof war shapedthe ardor and azimuth of the airborne forces.

The successfuloperationby Germanairborneand air-landedforcesin the invasion of

Cretehalted further major Germanairborneoperationsdue to the Germans'own risk-

for
assessment probablefuture losses,
though minor
several operationswere launched

later in the war. Additionally, Germanairbornetroops becamemore a "fire-brigade"

308Arnold, Global Mission, 84; Claire Lee Chennault,Wa ofA Fighter. TheMemoirsof Claire Lee
Chennault,ed. RobertHotz (New York: G.P. Putnam's ,v
Sons,1949),16,17; JohnConnell, Wavell:
Soldier and Scholar (London: Collins, 1964),182-183.
309Lieut. T. B. Otway, DSO,Airborne Forces: TheSecondWorld War 1939-1945Series(The War
-Col.
Office, London: Imperial War Museum,1990),21-36.

170
 hold key areasof the front to
or act as normal infantry. The
of elite troops used to
310
Allied experience,however,led to far different conclusions.

Allied airborne operations reflected a changing doctrine plus operational

Browning's original charter, under the supervision of Combined Operations

realities.

Headquarters, led him toward precision strikes in the form of raids or the seizure of

key tactical points by small bodies of men. Staunch opposition from Bomber

Comm,md, fearing the dispersion of multi-engined bombers for conversion into troop

also stymied both training and the creation of large

carriers or as glider-tows,

formations. Moreover, the creation of glider-borne forces from the redesignation of

formed regimentsas glider troops was opposedby the Royal Air Force due to the

of pilot training and towing that would fall to the airmen as part of this
requirements

scheme.Browning's ideas, however, shapedthe British airborne forces and, as a

result, were a driving factor in the employment

of British airborneforces throughout
311
the war.

As an evolutionaryforce, the airborneconceptwas driven by the personalities

of the as
commanders well as operational and
requirements Browning's
achievements.

dominantideaswere that airborneforcesshouldbe employedas divisions and that the

overarchingplanning, organizationaland administrativeduties required to maintain

the force shouldbe centeredhigher,on Airborne Corpsandon Headquarters,Airborne

Forces,and not on individual division commanders.Browning achievedthesegoals

310Airborne Operations:A GermanAppraisal (Washington:US Anny Centerof Military History,

1989), 1-23.The original authorand editorswere Germangeneralsunderthe supervisionof General
FranzHalder.The principal authorof this studywas GencralmajorHellmuth Reinhardt.
311Otway,Airborne Forces,ibid.; Major Victor Dover, TheSk-vGenerals(London: Cassell,1981),
ChapterIV, passim.

171
during 1941-1944. Operationally, Browning's force evolved from the raid stage

(Bruneval, February 1942) to the use of dispersed battalions (Tunisia. 1942) and to the

large brigade-sized forces (Sicily, July 1943). In each case, Browning had been
use of

to "adviser" status, and the operational concepts came from Army level or
relegated

Combined Operations' planners. The concerted use of a complete airborne division as

part of a larger operational plan would not come until the invasion of Northwest

Europe-the Normandy invasion. The lack of airlift had hampered the operational

employment of the British airborne forces in the past and would become the key

in 312
consideration their use.

The American experiencewith airborneforcesshowedsomeparallelsboth in

its evolution and in the politics of the supportfor such forceswithin the overarching

command US
Headquarters,
structures, Army Ground Forces,and Headquarters,US

Army Air Forces.As with the British experience,airbornedevelopmentwas greatly

personality-driven,and its oversight was given to senior ground officers who by

assignment or personal belief became airborne advocates. Starting from an

platoon
experimental in 1940,by 1943the force included an "Airborne Command,"

four divisions, and severalseparateregimentsor battalions.As with the British, it was

used in battalion operations (Tunisia, 1942), regimental operations (Sicily), and

Division-minus operations (Italy, 1943). Its large-scaledebut would also be the

Normandy invasion. Unlike the British force, it had several "fathers" both

organizationally and operationally, but their purpose had always been to create

divisions as the Germanshad done. Organizationally,the American airborne forces

312 tway, Airborne Forces,

chapters3-11, passim.

172
differed significantly from the British, and unlike the Royal Air Force, the commander

of the AAF believed it to be an "air weapon" of great potential and dedicated

air assets for its support while simultaneously demanding a say in their
significant

313
use.

As with the entire 1944 campaign,the MediterraneanAllied experienceand

the COSSAC plannersfound their mark in shapingattitudesand plans for the use of

airborne. From the start, airborneplanning produceda battle over command.assets.

forces,and tacticalmissions.COSSAC'splannershad specifiedtasksfor the airborne.

and detailed drop-zoneinformation was included as part of the planners' working

31421 Army Group's assumptionof the planning responsibilities

papers. modified

thesegreatly,but battles fannedby personalitieserupted.The Americans,particularly

Major GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, took issue and offense at any higher-imposed

plan and particularly harbored resentment over Browning's I Airborne Corps

Headquarters,a resentmentfueledby his belief that it existedsolely "to take over the

American "315
entire airborneeffort.

313JamesA. Huston,Out ofthe Blue: USArm Airborne Operationsin World War 11(West Lafayette,
Indiana: Purdue University Studies,1972), ,v
Chapters
2-6. passim,CMH,MS. Major John Huston,
Airborne Forces(Washington:Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954),Chapters1-5,passim;
Clay Blair, Ridgwqvs Paratroopers:TheAmericanAirborne In World War// (GardenCity, N.Y.: The
Dial Press,1985);Kent RobertsGreenfield,RobertR. Palmer,and Bell 1.Wiley. TheArmv Ground
Forces: TheOrganizationof Ground CombatTroops(Washington:Historical Division, LjS Army.
1947),93-98,339-350.Out of the Blue is the editedversionof the otherwiseunpublishedUS Army in
World War 11official history volumethat wasdroppedfrom publicationdue to funding. Hustonwas its
sole author.
314SeeCOSSACPlan87-91, Appendix "0"; Major GeneralJamesM. Gavin, Airborne Warfare
(Washington:Infantry JournalPress,1947),374 1.
315Interview, Lt. Gen.JamesM. Gavin, Ft. Leavenworth.Kansas,1984by author,GeneralMatthew B.
Ridgway,Soldier: TheMemoirsofMattheis,B. Ridgwqyastold to Harold H. Martin (Westport,Conn.:
GreenwoodPress,1956,1974),66-67. Ridgwayreferredto Browning ashis -sparring partner."

173
 Morita mery's battle with Leigh Mallory over airbornemissions,both during
go
NEPTUNE's planning and early in the invasion,also exposedgravephilosophicalor

doctrinal differences that festered along with personality issues. These attitudes

316
continuedthroughoutthe campaign.

Both the American Army and the British forces possessedprinted doctrine

establishingbasic views and tenets

organizational for the use of airborne forces, and

SHAEF had produced a detailed Operational Memorandum outlining the stated

317
requirements for operational planning of such operations. Tactical usage and

operational missions, however, remained the responsibility of the employing

commanders, and the definition of those missions. and the views of those

commanders,shapedthe detail of tactics and proceduresprior to deployment.The

natureof the airbornemission itself posedcomplicatedproblemswhosesolution was

sought by creating a series of headquartersto plan, coordinate, and eventually

commandairborneoperations.

Central to the issueof airborneemploymentwas also the one of troop lift and

glider-tows. The AAF had addressedthis problem with a large troop-carrier effort

in
centralized Europeunder IX Troop Carrier Command,a componentof the 9th Air

Force that provided tactical air support for Bradley's 12th Army Group. British

transportaircraft were not centralizedformally, but were providedby the RAF's No.

38 and No. 46 Groups.While Browning had previouslysoughtto centralizeairborne

"6 Harrison,Cross-ChannelAttack-,186;EL, CorrespondenceFile [Leigh Mallory],

A EAF/TS/836/Ops. 3,29th May 1944,Employmentof Airborne Forcesin Operation"OVERLORD."
3" NARA, RG 331, SHAEF G-3 AdministrativeSubjectFile, "OperationalMemoranda, " Operation
MemorandumNumber 12,13th March 1944,StandardOperatingProcedurefor Airborne and Troop
Carrier Units; Otway,Airborne Forces,Appendix F.

174
forces and to provide an overarching tactical headquarters, SHAEF, encouraged by

Washington's views on airborne, sought to unify the airborne forces and troop carriers

318
under theater control.

Washington'sairborneviews percolatedthroughout1943and 1944,leadingto

increasedsupport by both Marshall and Arnold. Arnold believed that the use of

airborne troops had been discoveredas a sound theory by General"Billy" Mitchell

and heartily approvedtheir usein Sicily. Uter, he the

supported creationof the I st Air

CommandoGroup to supportMajor-GeneralOrde C. Wingate's operationsand the

aerial invasionof Burma that took placein March 1944.319

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the CommandingGeneral, Army Air

Forces, however, held stronger views on airborne employment. Arnold's staff,

believing that airborne forces should seize "strategic objectives," proposed a 5-6

division air drop nearParis as a componentof OVERLORD. Eisenhower'srefusal to

acceptthis proposed"airhead" as a preludeto an air-deliveredarmy and a mooring

point for French resistancefighters raised the ire of both generals.Arnold accused

Eisenhower of thinking tactically. Eisenhower believed that the relative ground

immobility of the airborne divisions would prove their doom if a rapid link with

ground forces wasn't established.Marshall, eventually straddling both viewpoints,

withdrew from his early disappointmentbut urged Eisenhower to seek bolder

320
employmentof the airborneforce after OVERLORD.

318Otway, Airborne Forces,ChaptersV. Vl; Huston,Out

ofthe Blue, 57-64.
319Arnold, Global Mission, 398,442.
320Arnold, Global Mission. 520-522;Marshall Papers.IV, 284,285; Bland,ReminiscencesforPogue,
465-466;EisenhowerPapers,111,1736-1739.

175
 The SHAEF staff s own conclusions paralleled Washington's in one sense:

be centralized under SHAEF. On 20 May

they proposed that all airborne operations

1944, the G-3 headquarters on the level of Army Group to

recommended creating a

forces the AEAF remained the overseer of Troop

unify control of all airborne while

Carrier forces. The Airborne Subsection of G-3 would form the nucleus of this new

3ZI
headquarters.The plan received Tnixe(l support.

21 Army Group recommended that such an organization could work-, but that

any changesshould be implementedwhen the SupremeCommander

assumedcontrol

of ground forces in NEPTUNE. 12th Army Group objected to SHAEF's scheme,

that
recommending a American
separate airbornecommandbe formed.Not only were

doctrine, equipment,and staff requirementsdifferent, they held, 12th Army Group

noted that carryingall the American forcesavailablewould requirethe entiretheater's

troop carrier assets.No "combined" command was wanted. SHAEF's control of

322
airborne forces through the respective army groups was their answer. Their

underlying logic was clear. Bradley intendedassuringthat American divisions could

never be part of an Allied operationsupporting21 Army Group. The British would

323
havetheir own force.This logic would persist.

Eisenhower's"conversion"to massvertical envelopmentshadbeenassuredby

Marshall's interest in airborneoperations.Before leaving the Mediterranean,he had

32'
Huston,Out of the Blue, 76.
322
Ibid., 77.
323NARA, RG331, SGSDecimalFile, 322 1st AAA, entry I. Box 38, SHAEF/17281/Ops/Ops (A),
Subject:Airborne Forces,30 July 1944;Ninth Air Force,Subject:Organizationand Contemplated
Operationsof Air Army, 28 July 1944;Hqs AEAF, Organizationof CombinedUS/British Airborne
Troop Headquarters,17July; Bull Papers;Bull informed Bradleythat Ridgway's intent to form an
airbornesectionat 12thArmy Group would probably fail.

176
 Chief Staff I do believe in the airborne division. " Now.
written to the of saying, not

after his disagreement with Marshall and Arnold4 he moved to use them en masse

the bickering that had characterized the NEPTUNE planning. While his staff
without

designed tighter controls for an airborne command, he wrote Marshall that he was

behind OVERLORD's beaches combining "a big

attempting to visualize an attack

in conjunction with a deep and heavy penetration by airborne

armored attack

troops.1,324

Eisenhower'sown ideasexceededhis staff s recommendationsand reflected

more Arnold's philosophy than those of his This

commanders. would becomemore

apparentas directives for planning were issued and missions were sought for the

airborne command,but other factors may have spurredthe SupremeCommanderto

action. Eisenhower'sown role as the future groundCommander

neededdefinition, not

simply as a writer of directives for individual army group commanders,but as a

who
commander affectsthe battlefield situationand intervenes
to seizeopportunityor

prevent This
disaster. had beenthe argumentfor his total control of theaterair assets.

Once establishedas ground supremo, he would need a strategic reserve to be

committed on his order in concertwith any army group maneuverthat he directed.A

separateheadquarters
under the operationalcontrol of SHAEF was to
essential keep

thesereins in his hands.Implicit in its use was that the reserveforce could be readily

324
EisenhowerPapers,111,1736-1739,1878; Eisenhower'sconversionobviously camefrom
Marshall's discussionswith him in Algiers. The verbaltussleover the rejectedplans likewise solidified
Marshall's interestin Eisenhower'smind.

177
 to any front, irrespectiveof national sector.An airborne force was the only
moved
325
commandthat fit this bill.

Eisenhower proposed that the organization combine command of both the

troop carriers and the ground forces to optimize training and planning. For battle. a

corps commander would command on the ground until his force linked with a ground

army that would provide overall command and administration. Until then, the air

commander would provide logistical support. The proposal was approved by

Marshall, Arnold, and Spaatz, but Leigh Mallory questioned AEAF's role if such a

headquarters were established. Moreover, Leigh Mallory reminded Eisenhower that

the air transport groups of the RAF would have to be assigned for missions by the Air

Ministry, as they were neither organic elements of 2 TAF or AEAF nor assigned for

SHAEF. 326
operations to

Eisenhower increasingly saw the airborne force and its use as a struggle

the
against weatherclock. He notedin a memoto Smith on 23 June 1944:

By September20, at the latest, we can count upon the beginning of

After
winter weather. that dateair will
operations be spasmodic.

His concernsrevealboth his operationalideasandhis problems:

The air representsthe one important factor in which we enjoy

tremendoussuperiority. As a consequenceof these facts we should

32"'
NARA, SHAEFSGS381 Post-Overlord,Volume 1, S"AXF11%rj0%130ps, 11 May 1944-pogue,
TheSupremeCommand,269. S"KEIF's plans staff, PTOduced an outline plan in May to commit the
ic TeseTvtonlabout'D+'2cjunder cenain conditions.The plan entailedusing airborneforcesto "to
strateg:
seizean areain the centreof PARIS by air transportedforces,from which we shoulddeny the enemy
crossingsover the SEINE,divert his reservesfrom the main battleand generallydisrupt his
communicationsand control. The force envisagedfor the task was four divisions.. minus artillery,
transportationand impedimenta.
" .
3" Eisenhower
Papers,111,1988-1989;
Huston,Outof theBlue,77-79;Otway,AirborneForces,202;
NARA,322 1st AAA file.

178
 strive in every possibleway to make maximum use of our air during
the next 60-90days.This includeseverytype of air operation,suchas:
a. Normal closesupportof groundforces;
b. Smashingof communicationlines;
c. Neutralizingof CROSSBOW;
d. Airborne operations;

e. Supply of troops by air.

He summarizedhis view on the air campaign,saying,

The direct attackagainstGermanyis of secondpriority as comparedto

the necessityof getting all the abovetasks in hand, but in any event,
there will unquestionablybe sufficient days when other types of
operations are impracticable,to continue the striking assault upon
Germany, and there will be days during the winter when this can
likewise be carriedout.

He continued,saying,

The one place in which we must make sure there is continuousand

energeticstaff planning is in the airborneoperations.This should not
be limited to Airborne Divisions but should be extended, where
practicable, to include the transportation and temporary supply of
327
normal Divisions by air.

Besides setting the tone for "his" campaign once he replaced Montgomery,

Eisenhower began fishing for an airman as the most likely commander; he suggested

Major GeneralJohn KennethCannon,then the CommandingGeneralof the Twelfth

318
Air Force in Italy. This search for an airman, oncejoined, was debated by the senior

airmen in Washington and in Europe. Eisenhower finally recommended four

with
candidates, Major GeneralHoyt S. Vandenburg,Leigh Mallory's deputy, at the

top of the list. The job fell to Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, then

327
NARA RG 338 SHAEF Office of Chief of Staff DecimalFile May 43-Aug 45, Box 65, entry 1.
Post-OvcrlordPlanning,Memorandumfor Chief of Staff; EisenhowerPapers.1//, 1946-1948.
328
Ibid.

179
commandingNinth Air Force, on Spaatz's but
recommendation possibly on Arnold's

329
insistence.

EisenhowernamedBreretonas Combined
Commander, Airborne Forceson 27

July 1944,and simultaneouslycreatedthe US XVIH Corps (Airborne) under Major

330
GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway. The precisefunction and authority of Combined

Airborne Forces, however, was still a matter of discussion,a discussionthat had

started in May and theoretically had been decided on 20 June, when Eisenhower

approvedthe basiccommand Brereton's

concept. directive,dated8 August 1944,gave

him wide administrative and training responsibilities over the airborne force, to

include overseeingtheir reconstitution after battle. Brereton's primary operational

responsibilitieswere definedin paragraphL(g. ) of his directive:

The preparation and examination in conjunction with the SHAEF

Planning Staff of the outline plan for the employmentof Airborne
Troops and preparation of detailed plans for the employment of
Airborne Troops in conjunctionwith the Ground Forceand Air Force
Commanders.

Breretonaskedthat his headquarters

be designatedas the First Allied Airborne

Army (FAAA), stating that the assignment of British, US, and Polish forces, would

merit such a nameto further "the esprit de corps of the units."' Eisenhoweraccepted

this as, well as clarifying AEAF's role and that of the troop carriers.On 16 August,

329LC, Papersof GeneralCarl A. Spaarz[hereafterreferredto asSpaatzPapers].PersonalFile, 1944-

1945.Following a seriesof teletypeconferencesand messages, EisenhowernamedBrcretonbased
upon Spaatz'srecommendation.VandenbergreplacedBrcretonat Ninth Air Force.Teletypemessages
in Spaat.
- Papers.Cannonand Vandenbergwere both consideredtoo junior to command,as a
lieutenantgeneralof someexperiencewould be neededover Browning,who would serveas a Corps
Commander.In the event,Brcretonactually was"junior" to Browning in time in grade.
330NAR.A, RG 331 entry 253, Box 4, First Allied Airborne 322, Reorganizationand organization,
SHAEF/322-3/0&E, 27 July 1944,RG 331, Entry 253, Box 38,322 1st AAA, Organizationand
CommandFirst Allied Airborne Army. FAAA Headquarterswasannounced18August 1944,

180
 First Allied Airborne Army was created.from the nascent Combined Airborne Forces.

with the formal assignment of operational command of British Airborne Troops.

XVIII Corps (Airborne), IX Troop Carrier Command, and the Combined Air

Transport Operations Room (CATOR). Since CATOR controlled 38 and 46 Groups,

RAF, their operational assignments were assured. Lt. Gen. F.A. M. Browning was

named as Deputy Commanding General while also retaining command of I Airborne

Corps.331

Breretonhad, in fact, influencedmore than simply the renamingof the force

and was not simply a creative operatorexpressinghis own ideas. Washingtonhad

planted firm seeds,and they were about to bear fruit. Breretonand Spaatzmet with

Eisenhowerat Brereton's headquarterson 17 July, and the topic of airborne forces

was discussedin detail. Brereton, not knowing his own command might change,

followed up the meeting with a memorandumoutlining his views. He

strongly

recommendedthat all US airbornedivisions be put underNinth Air Force.As he saw

it, the air commanderwould not only ensuretransportand training for the
airborne,
but would personally direct air support operationswhile the
ground commander
fought the ground battle. He noted that commandin an airborne
operation"'must be

vestedin a single commander... a necessityto coordinateair drops,aerial protection

for transports,and air support." This would, in effect, createa single fighting air-

ground command. Moreover, under this system, AEAF would be relegated to

CombinedAirborne Headquartershad openedon 2 August. Ridgwayformally assumedcommandon

27 August 1944.
331RG 33 1, Box 38.322 Ist AAA File: Headquarters,
CombinedAirborne Forces.subject:
Designationof CombinedAirborne Forces,4 August 1944;SHAEF/1728I/Ops (A) Redesignation
of
Airborne Forces,9 August 1944;SHAEF AG 322-1 (First Allied Airborne Army) GCT-AM,

181
coordination, but actual command would stay within US channels from SHAEF

(Eisenhower)to USSTAF (Spaatz)to Ninth Air Force(Brereton).

This contradictedLeigh Mallory's view that AEAF should

remain responsiblefor all air aspectsof airborneoperations,while the

Airborne Commanderwould control all groundoperations.

Moreover,asLeigh Mallory definedairborneoperations,he sawthat,

From time of take-off to landing,an airborneoperationbeing a purely

air operation-mustbe the responsibilityof the Air C.-in-C., who must
retain the power of veto.

EisenhowerrejectedBrereton'sviews and assuredLeigh Mallory that

the air movementplan is an indivisible air operationand, of necessity,

will be preparedby the Air Commander-in-Chief and the Airborne
Commander.

His final statementwould prove ironic:

Your responsibility for air support, subject to the decision of the

SupremeCommander,is of course,unquestioned.

Smith later confirmedin writing the stateof responsibility,that

the CommandingGeneral,First Allied Airborne Army will control the

air lift of the First Allied Airborne Army and that the responsibilityfor
Air Commander-in-Chief. 332
supportingair operations restswith the

Assignmentof Units, 16 August 1944;SHAEF/17281/l/Ops(A), Reorganizationof Airborne Forces,

19 August 1944.
332Ibid., 322 Ist AAA file: MemorandumSubject:Organizationand ContemplatedOperationsof an
Air Army, 28 July 1944;Headquarters,Allied ExpeditionaryAir Force,Subject:ORGANIZATION
OF A COMBINED US/BRITISH AIRBORNE TROOP HEADQUARTERS,17thJuly 1944;
SHAEF/17281/Ops(A) 31 July 1944,Subject:Organizationof a CombinedUS/British Airborne Troop
Headquarters;SHAEF/17281/Ops(A),I August, Subject:Organizationof a CombinedUS/BRITISH
Airborne Troops Headquarters;SHAEF/17281/i/Ops(A),19 August 1944,Subject:Reorganizationof
Airborne Forces.

182
 The sameday Brereton'sorderswere published,Eisenhowershowedhis impatience

with the job at hand.He sentthis memo to his chief of staff, who passedit on to the

new commander:

Brereton should be working on his new job instantly. Pleaseinform

him that I am particularlyanxiousaboutthe navigationalqualifications
of the TransportCommandcrews.He is to get on this in an intensive
way. He is to keepme in touch with his progress.There is nothing we
are undertaking aboutwhich I am more concernedthan this job of his.
I want him on the ball with all his might.333

Washington'sviews, however,would never be far from Eisenhower'smind.

Obviously, his March tussle with Arnold remained a concern. Arnold's views,

essentiallyrubber-stampedby Marshall, could not be ignored either by the Supreme

Commanderor by Arnold's own man,Brereton.Theseviews, simply stated,were that

an air army should be flown into an airhead.Arnold, in fact, sharedthese views

throughout the Army Air Forces. Seeking to influence the airborne operations in

support of ANVEL, Arnold both recommendedand reviewed plans. Writing to the

Mediterranean Deputy Allied Supreme Commander, Lieutenant General Jacob L.

(Jake)Devers,he stated,

I believe that the employment of airborne forces in

mass has
tremendous potentialities which we have not yet exploited. As long
as
we have the general initiative and can control the air, we should bear in
mind the potential value of those forces as a means of avoiding or
breaking stalemate periods as well as a means
of spearheading main
ground efforts.
Sooner or later the opportunity of mounting
a well-planned mass
airborne operation will be exploited and we are looking forward to
it
giving our maximum support. 334

333Ibid., Memorandumto Chief Staff, 2 August

of 1944,"DE."
334RG 18, entry 294, decimal312.1 Operations
-k, letters,Ltr Arnold to Lt. Gen.JacobDevers,26 July
1944.

183
 did. however.
Eisenhower.who was not an addresseeof this correspondence.

receive all key summariesand cables going to the including

Mediterranean, those

airborne
recommending supportfor the invasionby Arnold and his staff. With this as

part of his daily Cable Log at SHAEF, the War in

Department, keeping Eisenhower

informed, was also reminding him of their views concerningairborne operations.

Moreover, Spaatz, who was kept informed of everything by Arnold, apprised

335
Eisenhowerof the CommandingGeneral,Army Air Forces'views on this issue.

Devers,as the former EuropeanTheaterof Operations(ETO) commander.and

now the Allied Deputy SupremeCommanderMediterraenanTheater,was seenas a

great friend of airpower, having been responsiblefor supporting the American air

buildup in England in 1943. His air commander,Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker, had %Titten

Arnold, furtheringthe discussionbegunby Arnold on the topic of an air army, a topic

which he had Spaatzand others looking into. Eaker had recommendedCannon as

commander,but waxed further on the subject seeing it as the solution for ground

operations.He stated:

If we had an airborne army headedby a bold, energeticJeb Stewart

[sic] type of a fellow, I think he might shortenthis war in Europeby
almost a year. In short, you will seethat I am for your airbornearmy
everyway from Sunday.It is the boldest,most forward looking concept
which I haveseenyet in this war. I think it might be a critical operation
againsta bold, versatilearmy, flushedwith successand supportedby a
strong air force. If an airbornearmy captureda group of airfields and
we set our tactical air forces down on them we could absolutely
preventenemytanks from disturbing the airborneforce and could also
preventenemyartillery closeenoughto do it any damage.

333
Ibid.

184
 The "Jeb Stuart" Eakerhad in mind was JakeDevers.Devers,who would lead

the invasion of Southern France, by then was consideredpersona non grata by

Eisenhowerand, of course,did not fit Eisenhower'sbelief that an airman neededto

in forces' 336
commandCombinedAirborne Forces to
order assurethe air cooperation.

The "approved" Army Air Force doctrineappearedto follow the pattern that

Wingate had set in Burma, an experimentthat Arnold had furtheredand which he

believedto be universally applicable.Eisenhowerboth understoodthis idea and was

apparentlymoving not only to centralizethe airborneplanningand executionprocess,

but also to finiher the "air-landed"division aspart of futureoperations.In July, he had

that
requested the War Department
give three weeks' training to every other infantry

division ticketed for the EuropeanTheaterin the useof the C-47 transportaircraft and

337
gliders asmeansof transportation.

Creating the headquarters,however, did not solve arguments over actual use of

the force. SHAEF's planners had categorized operations into two types:

An airborne operation proper, in which up to the three airborne

divisions are landed by parachute and glider and maintained by
parachute and glider. For such an operation the capture of an airfield or
construction of an air strip is not essential.
An airhead in which the airborne forces seize an existing airfield or
construct strips on which air landed formations can be put down and on
be landed.338
which maintenance stores can

33,Ibid., Ltr. Lt. Gen. Ira Eakerto Arnold, 14July 1944.

33'RG 331,322 1st AAA files: msgs.E-3646,Eisenhowerto AGWAR, 5 July 44 and E-37012,9 July
1944;PROWO /203/ 5213, Forcesof Long RangePenetration:FutureDevelopmentin Burma.
Memorandumby BrigadierWingateoffers a comparisonwith Wingate'sviews.
33gNARA, RG 33I, SHAEF SGS,2. Employmentof Airborne Forcesin Overlord, PS-SHAEF(44) 30
(Final) Memorandumby PlanningStaff, 18August 1944.SeeDraft, 14 August, for a detailed
appreciationtitled "Airheads." This appreciationforms the basicplanningestimatefor possible
operationsdelineatingforces,capabilities,time estimateson availability of aircraft. aircraft limitations,
and outlinesof basicdataon airfield and terrain capabilitieswithin rangeof FAAA's aircraft. This

185
 The Eisenhower-Amold "airhead" strategy was but one possibility for its

Both typesof had

operations The
restrictions. airborne,it was felt. could
employment.

defenditself for days,after which the armor threatwould be too great,the

only several

up to six divisions, was at the

airhead,which claimed the possibility of supporting

terrain the so it too had to be reachableby a

mercyof weather, and,of course, enemy,

relieving force. The Army's deputy commanderand the American of

commander the

XVIII Corps (Airborne) would be the prime interpretersof whether any airborne

operationwasa "sound operationof "

war.

Their respective armies had published airborne doctrine of a remark-ably

Indeed, the prime missions and uses for the airborne force seemed
similar nature.

identical. The tactics however, varied; this was reflected by the

nearly of employment,

American British Airborne divisions. The

organizations and equipment of the and

for had already by standardized by SHAEF in March,

planning airborne missions

during the planning for OVERLORD. This was to be the planning model for use by

First Allied Airborne Army, but no standard doctrine for airborne tactics had been

339
attempted.

Both Browning and Ridgway had battled to get airborne forces viewed as a

strategicweaponused en masse,but Ridgway,particularly, viewed any strategicuse

study wasnot publishedas part of the final memorandum.Earlier drafts,dated4 August and 28 July,
containadditionaldetail. All drafts arein the samefile.
339Ibid., United StatesWar DepartmentTraining Circular, 113,9 October1943,Emplqvmentand
Training ofAirborne and Troop Carrier Forces;British War Office, May 1943,Airborne Operations
PamphletNo. I General(Provisional); SHAEF OperationalMemorandumNo. 12,13th March 1944;
NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420,File 969(D20),SHAEF/2297/4/Ops,Employmentof Airborne Forces,
19 January1944.

186
 340
of his corps by Montgomery's 21 Army Group as anathema. SHAEF's planning

section,however,had an active file of outline plans, and Brereton'smission was to

on the ball with all his might." ConsideringEisenhower'sfever to use airborne.

66get

one of theseexistentplansseemedmost likely to be executed.

The lack of an airborne headquartershad not stoppedoperational airborne

planning since the creationof COSSAC.SHAEF's airborne subsectionof the plans

staff and Montgomery'sown 21 Army Group plannershad deviseda seriesof outline

plans as contingenciesfor NEPTUNE. These were extant in July when Brereton

entered the picture, and the ongoing planning demonstratedclearly the state of

thinking in the airborne arena.Browning's I Airborne Corps had been the primary

"filter" for airborne plans conceivedat SHAEF, or at 21 Army Group. Only one

airbornedivision existedas the availableairborneforce until the withdrawal of the US

airbornedivisions from Normandyin July. This division, British I st Airborne, was the

main force for any of the contingencyplanscreated.

During THUNDERCLAP, Monty had referred to using "air hooks"

of brigade

or division strength to keep the situation proceeding according to plan. (See figure

27.) Some of these detailed plans were initiated as early

as May and included

operations to reinforce the beachhead (TUXEDO and WASTAGE), to pull forward

the beachhead (WILD OATS), to seize ports in the Brittany Peninsula or to cut them

off (BENEFICIARY, SWORDHILT, and HANDSUP), to block the enemy's line of

retreat (TRANSFIGURE), or to support the movement on the north coast by seizing

'40MHl. Papersof Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks,TheParks

Diag, August-Septemher 1944[hereafter
referredto as Parks Diwy] passim.ParkswasChief of Staýi,First Allied Airborne Anny. His diary

187
key areas or ports (BOXER. AXEHEAD. and LINNET). Additionally. dropping

airborne troops in conjunction with operations on the Caen-Falaiseroad was

examinedtwice. Thesewere essentiallyMontgomery'splans and, due to the available

forces, almost all British 341Additionally, 21 Army Group coordinatedSAS

affairs.

which
operations, Bradley, Parks,and Breretondisparaged
as "harassingoperations"

unworthy of the Allied Airborne Army. These operations remained under

342
Headquarters,Airborne Forces, but were orchestratedby SHAEF. No similar

special operationscapability then existed in the American forces, though the OSS

(Office of Strategic Services) Jedburghteams did have the ability to coordinate

343
resistancegroups.They werenot, however,a functioningpart of FAAA.

During the interim period, as organizationalproblemswere being solved in

order to create a combined airborne command, SHAEF's planners considered21

Army Group's planning with I Airborne Corps as their airborne program. This

program covered broad areasalready in planning for possible implementation.In

outlining them for the long-sufferingLeigh Mallory, who wantedclarification, these

coveredthree eventualities:a seizureof a port in Brittany; a drop in conjunctionwith

an armoredthrust toward Paris from the lodgementarea;and two separateplans for

operations to support crossing the Seine either north or south of Paris. SHAEF

and its thinking. Relevantconferencenotes

constitutesthe bestoperationalrecordof the headquarters
and memosare appendedto the diary entries.
341Otway, Airborne Forces,206-212,MHI, PapersofLt. Col. ChesterB. Hansen,Op Thunderclap;
NAC, RG 24, Volume 10539,File 215A21.013(1)17),21 A. Gp/00/450/Ops(A): Overlord: Operation
Hands-Upis an exampleof a completedoutline plan.
342Parks Dia?y, II August 1944;Lewis H. Brereton,TheBreretonDiaries: The Warin the Air in the
Pacific, Middle East and Europe.3 October 1941-8May 1945[hereafterreferredto asBrereton
Diaries] (New York: William Morrow and Company,1946),333.
343SJ. Lewis,Jedburgh Teamsin Supportofthe 12thArm.y Group.August 1944(Fort Leavenworth:
CombatStudiesinstitute, 1991).

188
 believedthe possibilities for the first would be in August, for the secondfrom mid-

August to mid-Septemberand crossingsin the north possiblein September,and in the

south in October. When published in mid-July, this estimate still followed the

that
assessment the lodgement
would be by
established despite
September the lag in

344
the earlyphase-linearrivals.

The rapidly evolving situationin early August and the creationof First Allied

Airborne Anny did little to spur new planning. Brereton's headquartersshifted for
a
jobs, but the "trigger" for launchingairborneoperationsremainedwith Montgomery

and his increasingly unwilling subordinate,Bradley, and no serious plans were

advancedbeyond those alreadyon the boards.Moreover, in Eisenhower'smind. he

fate 345
remainedthe solearbiterof the of any airborneplan.

Mid-August, and the impending doom of the German forces within the

"NEPTUNE" area, prompted new efforts to seek the "mass

envelopment" promised
by Eisenhower to Arnold
and Marshall. SHAEF issued two planning directives to

FAAA, the first on 16 August, with a categorization

of priorities following on 18

August 1944. Brereton's small staff, and their counterparts at I Airborne Corps
and

the still organizing XVIII Corps (Airborne), soon tumbled to create plans following

six contingencies. As stated, these were:

Priority I-Oper-ation NORTH of the Lower Seinebetweenthe OISE

and Rouento facilitate the crossingof our advanceforces.

3" NARA, RG 331,

entry 1, Box 65, Folder373/2 volume I Employmentof Airborne Forcesin
OperationOverlord, 27 July 43 thru 24 December45, SHAEF/24500/00/3/Ops, 14July 1944,"Future
Airborne OperationsIn Furtheranceof 'Overlord'."
343Parks Diary, 15 August 1944.This had beenSHAEF's view sincethe beginningof the NEPTUNE
planning.

189
 Priority H-Operation to seizethe crossingsover the Oise bemeenthe
Seine and Compiegne,to protect the right flank- of our advancing
forces.
Priority 111-0peration NORTH of the Upper Seine between
FONTAINEBLEAU and JUVISY to facilitate the crossing of our
advancingforces.
Priority IV-Operation NORTH of the River SOMME between
PERONNE and ABBEVILLE to facilitate the crossing of our
advancingforces.
Priority V-Operation NORTH of the River AISNE in the
neighbourhood of SOISSONS to facilitate the crossing of our forces
advancingfrom the SOUTH.
In conjunction with Allied ExpeditionaryAir Force and 21st Army
Group:
Priority VI-Operation to seizethe ST OMER areawith the view to
hindering the withdrawal of enemycoastal forces from the PAS DE
CALAIS coast.

SHAEF stipulatedthat planning theseoperationswould be completedby 25

August except for operations north of the Seine, which had a target date of 7

346
Septemberor later. Existing operationsTRANSFIGURE, BOXER, AXEHEAD,

and LINNET actually fulfilled several of the priorities, but SHAEF, or 21 Army

Group, still failed to fulfill the dreamof "a strategic"operationwith all but a few of

theseplans. Only TRANSFIGURE and BOXER offered strategicresults, and these

if
only a massive catch of enemy forces were made or if a deep-waterport were

capturedalong with maintaininga rapid pursuit. While planning for theseoperations

was prudent,the reality of using the Airborne Army as anythingmore than a tactical

or operationaladjunctto the then rapidly unfolding operationalsituationwas meeting

the problemof diminishing returns.

346RG 331, ibid.. Airborne

operationsto assistcrossingsof the SEINE-Dircctive, 16 August 1944;
APPENDIX 'A' to PS-SHAEF(44)30 Final dated 18 August 1944,SUBJECT:AirbomcOpcrations
To Assist Our OverlandAdvancc-Dircctive.

190
 Arnold's dream and Eisenhower's enthusiasmto fulfill it also met with

internal problems-the same problems that had plagued the coalition since its

inception.Nationalism, serviceprejudices,and the personalityproblems by

enhanced

the uncontrolledenthusiasmsof the nationalpressmadea concertedeffort to support

and utilize the Airborne Army as it was intended very difficult. Remark-ably,

consideringArnold's views, the problemswere American-inspired.

Browning continuedto respondto 21 Army Group, following the established

pattem-with outline plans to fit Monty's long-termideasand with detailedplanning

and coordinationwith groundarmy commanderson order-as specific contingencies

to
appeared be possible.But apart from Breretonand his staff, the Americansdragged

their feet. Beginning in July, Major GeneralMaxwell Taylor, the commanderof the

101" Airborne Division, answeredSHAEF's query concerningthe mounting time for

an airborne operation. If accepted,his estimateof thirty days would have thrown

plannersinto a frenzy as they realizedthat "opportunities"must be seena full month

or more out in order to capitalize on the Airborne Army's capabilities. SHAEF's

August directives proved it believed the opposite to be true. In the Mediterranean

Theater, airborne missions had been conceivedon a short timescale,and no one

347
seriouslyquestionedor studiedthe resultsof suchan assumption.

347USAF Historical Division, Airborne Missionsin the Mediterranean1942-1945:USAF Historical

Studies:No. 74 [hereafterreferredto asAirborne Misionsin the Med] (ResearchStudiesInstitute,Air
University, 1955),passim,MHI, Papersof GeneralMatthewB. Ridgwqv,PersonalFile,
Correspondence, "Lessonsof Airborne Operationsin Italy, 25 October1943." Ridgway urgedthat the
airbornedivision be usedonly as"a division" andcited problemsof piecemealcommitmentof forces
in the Mediterranean.While Ridgwaymadeextensivecommentson the useofairborne divisions,his
main points includedthat the airbornecommandershouldparticipatein planning,but the timescalefor
preparationwasneverdiscussed.

191
 Moreover, Bradley saw airborne operationsas both limited and. as August

his fuel that were being carriedby IX Troop

progressed.a threatto air-supplied stores

CarrierCommandunderthe aegisof CATOR. He particularlysawany commitmentto

Ms 348
support 21 Army Group's operations as nonbeneficial to own.

Most importantly, FAAA found itself supporting two opposing cliques.

Montgomery saw utility in the airborne, and had consistently kept his planner,

Brigadier Charles Richardson,and Browning's planners in constant contact both

furthering the outline plans on the planners'boardsand exploring possibleplans for

the unfolding campaign. Throughout, Monty considered Browning to be "his"

airbornecommander.Likewise, the anglophobicRidgway,who had stumpedto create

an American airborne corps under his own command, became Bradley's self-

designated"airborne commander"to preventFAAA from supporting21Army Group.

FAAA's staff soon becamesegmentedsupportingtheseopposinginterests.and this

state of affairs continued well into the secondmonth of FAAA's existence.First

Allied Airborne Army was dominatedby Americans,and the Deputy.Browning. was

very much the odd man out. This situation was by

exacerbated the fact that tactical

planning for the ground operationswas conductedin Browning's I Airbome Corps

headquarters,whereas the "air plan," and essentially the outline concepts for

were
operations, producedat Brereton's by
headquarters his AmericanG-3.349

349Bradley,A Soldier's Stoq, 401,402: the Bradley Commentaries

notedhis preferenceof aerial
resupplyand the problemof coordinatingan airborneoperationwith an ongoinggroundoffensive.
349Parks Diary, August-Septernber,passim.The daily situationas it unfolds for a seriesof four plans,
TRANSFIGURE, LINNET, LINNET 11,and COMET. asone wherethe Americanscontinueto look
for a way to support12thArmy Group in lieu of their designatedmissionof supporting21 Army
Group.

192
 Further complicating matters was the state of First Allied Airborne Army's

headquartersas it evolved.One day after his assumptionof command,Brereton,who

still temporarily the

commanded Ninth Air Force,"occupied" his former headquarters

as the ffiture home of the CombinedAirborne Forces.Ninth Air Force, awaiting the

arrival of Hoyt Vandenburg,

was in the midst of moving its main elementsto France.

Assured facilities, and most important, good communicationsby remaining in his

previous Brereton
headquarters, met with four Americanbrigadiergeneralsand setthe

"tone" for FAAA. One-his current Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Vincent

Stralun-would soondepart.The other threeprovidedthe senior staff of his airborne

command.Brigadier GeneralFloyd L. Parks,a groundofficer, would be Chief of Staff

and in reality, the commandglue for his new command.Brigadier General Ralph

Stearley,who camefrom commandingNinth Air Force's First Tactical Air Division,

was namedG-3. Brigadier GeneralStuart Cutler becamethe Plans chief A former

assistantdivision commanderof the newly forming 13th Airborne Division, he had

beenchief of the airbornesectionof Bradley'sheadquarters

sinceMay.350

Breretonmadekey decisionsconcerningthe staff. He disagreedon severalkey

points with the Eisenhower philosophy and had stated such in a previous letter to the

Supreme Commander. Having received a directive governing his terms of command,

Breretonchoseto interpretthemwith an Army Air Forceseye.351

Brereton's first meeting with his principal staff generalson 3 August 1944,

importantly defined its own "doctrine" of operations,a doctrinethat would have far-

350
Parky Papers,Box 3, ConferenceNotes,CombinedAirborne ForcesHeadquarters, 3 August 1944.
FAAA was locatedat Sunninghill Park.Browning's headquarters
wasat Moor Park.
351
322 1st AAA, Brerctonto Eisenhower,28 July 1944.

193
 in FAAA's fh-st combat operation. "Accepting7 SHAEFs staff
reachim, results

50 percentparticipationby Americanand British officers, Breretonstated

proposalsof

he would implementthe SHAEF staff plan to savetime but as

would makechanges he

Designating the American -G" for use in his

saw fit along the way. system

headquarters,Brereton statedthat the Adminstration and Logistics (G-I/G4) would

work closely together. He asked for a British officer to head G-2, as one of the

concessionsto the British. with Park's summary stating, "They have the means

to
through their own channelsand access more than we have.
" This meant ULTRA,

SOE (Special Executive).

Operations, He askedfor
and perhapsagentreportsthrough
352
Browning's Chief of Staff, BrigadierWalch, for thejob.

Breretonstatedthat an airmanmust headthe G-3 sectionfor two reasons:

First, the operational side of airborne operationsis an air operation

until you deliver troops where they are to be delivered. Second.no
control over ground forces [by FAAA would be exercised]except to
the air supportthey need. 353

Breretonsaid the G-3 must be an American,and he choseStcarley,an airman.

Parks thought Cutler should have been appointed to the job due to his airborne

planning Brereton,
experience. however, made Cutler the Deputy Chief of Staff for

334
Plans,but notedthat Stearleywould retaincontrol of executingoperations.

Park's cryptic notesconcerningplanningdeservedirect quotationdue to their

effect on operations:

352MHI, Parks Papers,Box 3, ConferenceNotes,CombinedAirborne ForcesHeadquarters,August 3,

1944.He did not obtain Walch, who wasnot. as Breretonmay haveassumed,an ULTRA-indoctrinated
officer. Brercton'sG-2 wasan American,Col. J.A. Celia.
3*13
Ibid., 1.
3"' Ibid., 2.

194
 Planning

The tactical ground planning was decidedupon as not being half as

important as the air planning. Must get a competentair staff. The air
plan must be drawn by
up us and AEAF is responsible for executionof
it. This meanswe must get the very bestair plannersandalsoairborne.
General Cutler stated that the planners must have a common
conception[to) what our threejobs are [and] what the organizationof
the Staff will take in order to proceedwith the other work at the same
time.
CG statedthat other organizationshavehad a period of organizingand
training but we do not havethe time.
This is an air operation(s).Two requirementsthat are not [ours are to]
parallel5plan to a minor degreeof training and actual movementof
3
troops.

Unknowingly, Parks had identified First Allied Airborne's key operational

shortfalls. The air attitude that an airborne operationwas an air-delivery operation,

that the groundphasewas relatively lessimportant,and that AEAF would executethe

FAAA plan was an invitation to disaster-a disaster that would eventually be

forthcoming.

Browning's absencefrom the Headquarters(he lived andworked at I Airborne

Corps),and what would becomeRidgway's favoredtreatmentby Parks.Bradley,and

Brereton, also would not bode well. Parks developedclose ties with Bull and his

deputy, Brigadier General Arthur S. Nevins, at SHAEF. While Brereton and Parks

would frequently visit SHAEF and 12th Army Group, there was but a single visit to

21 Army Group, and none to I Airborne Corps or Second Army, who would assume

commandin battle of the major operationsunderdiscussion.

355Ibid., 3.

195
 Yet, as August progressed and the skeleton FAAA staff created a

of
smorgasboard unused,outline plans, little indication of the true state of affairs

leaked either to SHAEF or to the two Army Group commanders.If anything. the

hectic planning phase begun by the SHAEF directives and priorities list helped

produce the training in coordinationand teamwork that would be neededwhen the

actualcall for battle came.So it appeared,until Septemberapproached.

Brereton, respondingto Eisenhower'sfiat, had taken the bull by the horns.

Immediately,he confirmed with Major GeneralRalph Royce, Leigh Mallory's new

American deputy,to coordinatetheir positions concerningthe airlift of supplies.Put

shortly, Brereton stated that FAAA, who controlled CATOP, would haul nothing,

spendingits time training and preparingfor combat.Royce convincedBrcrcton that

limited hauls of woundedand emergencyitems would be possiblewithout stymieing

his training efforts. This was acceptedin principle at SHAEF, though SHAEF did

mandateair shipmentsin August. 356

The same day Brereton and Royce talked, SHAEF added the US 101st

Airborne Division to the troop list for OPERATION TRANSFIGURE to reinforce

Montgomery's alert notice for LUCKY STRIKE B. Given that this operationwould

support 12th Army Group in the Paris-OrleansGap, Ridgway had been quick to

recommend adding a US division, It was immediately apparent that, despite

Browning's role as Corps Commander for the operation, it was viewed as an

3"' MHI, Parks Papers,Box 3. ConferenceNotes,7 August, 1944.Meeting

with GeneralRoyceand
Colonel Bagby.

196
Americanfamily affair, with two British divisions to be commandedon the groundby
357
the US Third Army after it relievedthe airhead.

TRANSFIGURE'splanning displayedthe nationalisticand serviceissuesthat

0

plaguedplanning by FAAA. Leigh Mallory immediatelycomplainedthat his planners

had beenignored,a chargethat Parksunfairly assuredhim Browning had beenguilty

of Once Leigh
consulted, Mallory to
acceded the basicconceptof operations,quickly

informing Parksthat AEAF "had all air necessaryand that he [Leigh Mallory] would

be responsiblefor all air cover and air protection." Later, a perturbed Brereton,

realizing that FAAA was losing the initiative in planning airborne operations,

informed his staff that they "were out of the picture here," and immediately sought

intelligence and plans appreciationsfrom SHAEF and the Army Groups. Brereton

intendedto be the catalystfor the useof First Allied Airborne Amy. 358

TRANSFIGURE's cancellation on 18 August left the field open for a shift in

operations that favored the northern approach. SHAEF ordered preparation for

BOXER to seize the Boulogne area and to expedite capture of the flying-bomb sites.

357MHI. ParksPapers,Box 3, "Discussionwith GeneralBradleyfrom my point

of view," 7 August
1944.Parks Diaq, 5 August 1944;Parks Diary, II August 1944;ParksDian,, 14-15August. Parks
notesthat Cutler and Browning had beenalertedthat "GeneralMontgomeryhad directedthat 'LUCKY
STRIKE B' be reviewedand held in readinessfor executionon shortnotice." This confirms that
Montgomeryhad soughtthe wide exploitationthat he had plannedin late Juneprior to Falaisc,and that
Bradleyand Pattonwere reactingto plansin existence.SHAEFconfirmedtheir interestin this plan on
II August. Dcten-ninedthat his "Falaiseenvelopment"would be decisive,Bradleywaveredon the
"Long Hook." He askedthat FAAA considerdroppingdivisionsslatedfor TRANSFIGURE,to close
"the pincer." He objectedto FAAA's warningthat a 72-hournotice wasrequiredto launchsucha drop.
On 14 August, FAAA was informedthat "EAGLE" (Bradley)was"not enthused"with
TRANSFIGURE plan. The next day, 12thAG's stancechangedasit wasmadeto notethat SCAEF
directedthat TRANSFIGUREmust be implemented.
3"sMHI, Parks Papers,Box 3, ConferenceNotes, II August 1944,NARA, 322 Ist AAA,
SHAEF/17281/l/Ops(A), 19August, 1944,"Reorganizationof Airborne Forces," confirmed Leigh
Mallory's authority of veto over airborneoperations.Brcrcton'sconcernwasnot only perceptive,it
statedthe problem that would dog his operationsthroughoutthe war. FAAA's insertionunderSHAEF,
without close links to the Army Groups or the air denied
headquarters, it key information as operations
unfolded.

197
Almost immediately, parallel planning and preparations for AXEHEAD to support 21

Army Group's Seine L114NET-the seizure of the Tournai area in 21

crossing, and

Army Group's zone of advance-were begun. BOXER and LWNET utilized US

airborne divisions under British command, with LINNET essentially absorbing

359AXEHEAD, however, was very much the

Ridgway's command under Browning.

legacy of Montgomery's own pre-OVERLORD planning. Crerar's Canadian First

Army had begun study of this operation in March, with the airborne planning added to

360
the original concept.

In this case,however,Eisenhowerhad initiated this new planning. using both

361Eisenhower's
De Guingand and Tedder as catalysts for ground and air planning.

two-fold intention was not merely to maintain the momentum of his campaign,

apparently, in any direction, but also to assure the use of his airborne assets before

weather eliminated the possibility of large-scale airborne or airhead operations. More

important, Eisenhower probably agreed with his G-2, who advised that "the primary

object of any airborne operations should be to assist in the annihilation of the main

362
GermanArmies in France.,,

359Otway, Airborne Forces,212-213.NARA, RG 33 1. SGSBox 65, entry I Vol 2. -Employmcnt of

Airborne Forcesin OperationOverlord." Directive to LicutentantGeneralLewis H Bructon. 16
August 1944,Subject:Airborne Operationsto assistcrossingsof the Seine-Dircctive.
360NAC RG 24, Volume 10452.21A Gp/00/9I/G (Plans),I March44. 'NEPTUNE'-Dircctivc to First
CanadianArmy; APPRECIATIONAND OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATION AXHEAD DATED 8
MAY 44, NAC, RG 24,Volume 20420,File 969. (D20), 21 A Gp/20748/G(Plans)16August 44.
Subject:Boundariesand SEINE crossingsites.
361NARA. RG 33 1, SGSSHAEF, Box 65. entry 1,373/2 volume 1. "Employmentof Airborne Forces
in OperationOverlord, MSG SHAEF, CPA-90226,TOR 162330BEisenhowerto Air Chief Marshal
Tedder,MSG SHAEF, FWD 12912,to AGWAR, 161650B,Vol. 2. Memorandumfor Chief of Staff,
"Outline Planfor Airborne Operationto assist12 and 21 Army Groupsin Crossingthe River Seine."
36'NARA, ibid., Memorandumfor
the Chief of Staff, "Allied Airborne Armies," 21 August 1944.

198
 However, logistics shortcomingsplayed a role. Bradley viewed airborne

operations as a threat to his pursuit toward Lorraine. This was encouragedby

SHAEF's G4 planners,who drafteda messageannouncinga 1,000-tonper day airlift

capability for either Army Group. Montgomeryand Bradley had alreadytappedthis

sourcein August, but its long-termviability becameof particular concernto Bradley,

363
from whom airbornepriorities hadbeentakenaway.

Breretonhad beenconcerned,however,with more than the trend to air supply,

which he as
characterized "inimical to the maintenance
of the degreeof proficiency

required to lift airborne "

troops. Noting the short-term, frenetic nature of the ten

airborne plans created since D-Day, he shifted responsibility for problems to the

ground forces while avoiding any hint that SHAEF and the SupremeCommander

might be culpablealso,sayingin a letter to Eisenhower,

Many of the plans were cancelled owing to the fact that 21 Army
Group was unable to give a timely indication of what operations they
required and a reasonably accurate forecast as to the timing in relation
to ground operations. I conclude, therefore, that the mounting of
airborne operations in relation to ground operations, when very close
cooperation, timing and contact is required, is very difficult of
achievement in a war of movement. I believe that unless the Supreme
Commander can give an accurate indication of the trend of operations,
which I realize is difficult in a quickly moving situation, airborne
operations should be confined to strategic objectives phased in relation
to the main battle but not closely dependent thereon in time and
364
space.

363
NARA RG 33 1, SHAEF/I 16/4/GDP,II August 1944,Supplyby Air in AdvancedAreas,and draft
cable,attached,"Supply by Air. " Final publishedletter is 24 August 1944that endedthe allocated
2000 tons daily on 25 August.
RAIbid., Letter, Breretonto Eisenhower,August20,1944. It is importantto notethat the -tcn
operations"were plannedby Browning's I st Airborne Corps,not FAAA or XVI II Corps(Airborne).
Someof Brercton'sviews, particularly concerningthe freneticnatureof the planning,comesfrom
Browning's letter to him, dated 18 August.The quotedparagraphin Breretonis a nearliteral lift from
Browning. Moreover,Brereton'sdesirefor "strategicmissions"is alsoparaphrasedfrom Browning.
What Breretondid not repeatwas Browning's appealfor a cleardirectiveon commandand control of

199
 Brereton's letter pointed out a belief transcendingthe ground commanders*

inability to decide or place priorities; he offered up both contingenciesand far-

He
reachingchange. questionedthe value of the operationscurrently on the boards-

operationsthat, of course,pulled First Allied Airborne Army away from commitment

in supportof American forces.He claimed that plannedoperationsagainstCalais and

Boulogne,followed by ground link by 21 Army Group, might appearto be -strategic

operationsof high "

value, but that this depended"primmily upon whether it is the

intention to defenda line from the English Channel "

to the castor southeast.
enemy's

He noted that this operation,or operationsto the castof Paristo the limit of 75 miles

would be possible from English fields on short notice. At the time of his letter.

SHAEF's intelligence officer was stating that " the battle front has fallen apart." an

365
additionalprod in Brereton'sfavor.

Perhapsthe most far-reachingimplication of Brereton'sletter cameearlier in it

within a different context. He noted that three questionsmust be answered:Should

British basesprovide a near-futureoperation?Should French basesoffering longer

operationsbe used?Or should a launch from Englandbe contemplated,with a move

of troop carriers to Franceto follow? Noting that Frenchbases-not in Normandy,

which would grant little rangeadvantage,but from nearParis-would make possible

operationsas far eastas the generalline, Karlsruhe-Frankfurt-Donmund,Le, the Saar

and the Ruhr on the west bank of the Rhine.Breretonendedby droppingthe gauntlet:

airbornetroops.SeeParks Papers,Box 3. Letter, Headquarters,

Airborne Troops(Main), IS August to
Lt. Gen. Louis [sic] H. Brereton.
365SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 22. for
weekending 19August 1944,4.

200
"I must emphasizethat continued cargo carrying will render the Troop Carrier

366
Commandunfit for a successfulairbornecampaign.

Eisenhower hedged. His reply noted that he shared Brereton's concern

regarding the question of supply versus airborne capability, but he offered no comfort

conceming the timing of ground and airborne operations other than his agreement that

it is difficult to coordinate such operations. Nor did he feel it was necessaryto move

elements of the Airborne Army, troops or planes, to France, h

thou2, he noted that

following the possible landings near Calais, the dropped divisions might be left on the

367
continent.

Eisenhower'sresponsewas, in fact, no decisionwhen a operationaldecision

was warranted. justifiably,

Brereton, wanteda priority missionin the campaignplan, a

priority that Arnold supported.Contentto await events,Eisenhowerchancedneither

the boldnessof imagination to prepareto attack the enemy rear nor a decision to

launch forces. Both points of view illustrated the chasm that

neither perceived.
Brereton,imbued with the belief that an airborneoperationis an air operationand of

value againststrategictargets,wantedto move away from a shallow-distancelink-up

operation.Eisenhower,seeingthat any large drop could trap enemy forces in close

proximity to an Allied maneuverforce intent upon relief of the airborne,would accept

that his strategicreservehad beenwell spent,but he was hesitantto order his reserve

employedmerely to employit.

3"0BrereronDiaries, 20 August, 333. Most important,Breretonknew he wasoperatingfrom a position

of strengthdue to Arnold's supportand Marshall's interest,not as a mercsubordinate.
367Ibid., Eisenhowerto Brereton,22 August 1944.

201
 Brereton's view, practical or not. was the view of 3 Visionary airman.

be -air-minded.-
Eisenhower'sview was that of a practicalgroundsoldier orderedto

Only the circumstancesand outcomeof battle could prove either commanderright or

But, had
Eisenhower
as theatercommander, temporarilyscotchedthe idea of a
wrong.
369
strategicairhead.

What neither man had accomplished was the end of the parallel plans for

BOXER and LITJNET, now that TRANSFIGURE had been removed from the boards

on the 17th to provide air-transportcd tonnage and as AXEHEAD moved forward

without apparent need of airborne support. Moreover, the Airborne Army

Headquarters seemed more inspired by Tedder's personal interest in airborne

operations than by their possible value to 21 Army Group. The political reality was

that Tedder was maneuvering to eliminate Leigh Mallory, ostensibly by helping the

new Airborne Army. The price of this was to help Monty, though TeddeT avoided

him. 369
coordinating with

While BOXER strainedRidgway'sbelief systemsby offering American troops

to help the British, it would be a yet unconceivedoperation.LINNET 11,that surfaced

open conflict. Tedder had becomethe proponentof the idea that clearing the coastof

3"' BrereronDiaries. 333. On 14August, Breretonquotesin his diary a messagesentby Arnold to

Eisenhowersaying.-in view of the situationin Francetoday.what is your plan in a very broadoutline
for the employmentof the Brcretoncommand?Troop Carrier planesare not comparingat all favorably
with combatplanemissions(other than supply andtraining) accomplishedand hoursin the air?-
3" Parks Diary, 17 August. ConferenceNotes. 17August 1944;Parks Diao-, 18,20 August.
EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2070-2071. Parksrefersto BOXER operationasthe -Tedder Operation"and
detailshis involvement.Eisenhowerseemedhappyto let Tedderinfluenceairborneplanning. Parks
noteshe withheld key informationon Tedder'sforward planningduring a planningconferencewith
Montgomery'sPlansOfficer. CharlesRichardson.The implication wasthat the airmenhad dccidcd
that they and not the groundcommander(Montgomery,who by Eisenhower'sdirective. was the
commanderto be supported)would selectthe specific areasfor future operations.More interestingis
that SHAEF,Tedder,and FAAA decidedto shelvethis "secret" plan without ever revealingit to 21
Army Group.

202
 the V-2 rocket sites would finish the Germanhigh command.The north coast,not

Bradley's advance,capturedthe airmen's fancy. Rangewas a critical factor. Without

moving to the continent,the Metz-Saar

approachwas by
unreachable a large airborne

force firom British bases.Tedder believed seizing a port was too difficult for an

airborne force, so he essentiallysupportedan area "drop and link" with a ground

370
maneuverforce that includedan airfield seizure.

FAAA's azimuth had been set with BOXER, but not in the commanding

general'smind. With Breretonbelieving that he and Eisenhower-and not the Army

Group commanders-should be involved, he strainedto sell a purely air-inspired

operation. He asked for Eisenhower's"schemeof maneuver,

" in order for him to

coordinatedirectly with SHAEF. Operations

UNDERSTUDY and FIELDS OF ETON

apparently passed between Brereton and Eisenhower, or more likely Tedder, though

no planning records confirm their existence, their objectives or state of planning. The

reality then, was for FAAA to execute BOXER, the major operation being pushed at

higher levels.371

Parks, hoping to prevent Montgomery from hatching ideas of his own,

informed I Airborne Corps that requestsfor airborne plannersby 21 Army Group

must be referred to FAAA. De Guingandaddressedthis at a conferenceat 21 Army

Group Main to coordinateBOXER. He statedthat Montgomery'saim was

to concentrateon a north-eastthrust, destroythe enemythere, occupy

the coastalregions and the low countriesand establishairfields from
which to strike into the Ruhr region. After obtaining Paris and

"0 Parks Papers, Conference Notes, 17 August 1944; Parks Diary, 18,21,24
August 1944.
371Ibid., 21 August 1944.

203
 marshalling a sufficient force 12th Army Group to strike casm-m-dinto
372
the Metz area.

While Montgomerystill actedas de facto groundcommander.his "intentions-

took into account Eisenhower'sdual-thrust plan. It was stated that capturing the

Brittany ports would delay a thrust toward Metz for perhapsthree weeks. and De

Guingandestimatedthat a major airborneoperationwould be launchedin the middle

of September.21 Army Group, however,herewas speakingof BOXER. then still on

the boards.The 21 Army Group Chief of Staff also indicatedthat. once dropped,the

airbornewould be retainedunder First CanadianArmy control for in

operations the

coastalsector for an unknown period. Brercton stressedthat such a plan would rule

out a further airborne operation supporting any operations until after the fall

campaign.He emphasizedthat any plans for employmentmust keep -the long-range

in
development mind at the sametime. .373

Brigadier Williams outlined the estimatedenemy opposition for the entire

front as "23 divisions" plus reservescapableof transferfrom other fronts. Sevenof

the 23 divisions faced Bradley, five were pinned to the coastalregion, and a total of

eight remainedto be committed againsteither 21 Army Group or 12th Army Group.

He also noted that the selectedobjectivearea,the vicinity of Boulogne,gaveconcern

due to flak belts that would cause a dogleg, straining the range of the transport

aircraft. Naval craft, cooperatingwith an amphibiouslanding, would not ferry troops

ashoreuntil the coastalstrip had beenclearedof coastalbatteries.Williams statedthat

Doullens;offered the greatestgroundadvantagein blocking significant escaperoutes.

312Parks Papers,HIGHLIGHTS OF A MEETING HELD AT HEADQUARTERS21ST

ARMY
GROUP25 AUGUST 1944.

204
 Brereton thought that the operation in the "Boulogne area ... would not

" He noted that the airbornedecision should be what the

answeryour requirements.

Airborne Army could deliver within their capabilitiesthat would fit 21 Army Group*s

Having thus shifted the ground plan to Doullens, Brereton appearsto

requirements.
374
have crafted an adequatecompromise without abandoninghis independence.

Significantly, Montgomery was absentfrom the 'Vlans" meeting, having stated his

intentions. His staff had acceptedthe plan, which cancelledBOXER and sent the

planners looking for suitable drop and landing zones for Lille, Arras-Cambrai,or

Doullens.Lille, which was favoredby Brereton,was acceptedas the priority targetby

21 Army Group. In moving up the targetdateto 3 September,SHAEF had to accept

that air-transportof suppliesby troop carrierswould end by 28 August. Moreover. in

adding 52d (Lowland) Division to the troop list at Montgomery's request,Brereton

told his Chief of Staff that he would changethe commandplan. Hitherto, Browning

and I Airborne Corps would have commanded the airborne troops. Brereton now

segregated the British troops into I Airborne Corps and the Americans into Ridgway's

XVIII Corps. FAAA would "command both, " Ridgway was told. LINNET looked like

it was on. 375

Parks directed Stearley to investigate creating

an advancecommandgroup in the LINNET areain the event that the

Commanding General proceeds to the combat zone to actively
commandBritish andAmericanCorps.
373
Ibid.
311Ibid. Breretonignoredthe groundplanners'concernsover seizingLille due to its size,industrial
buildup, and the implicit requirementof establishingmilitary control over a hugecity. Brercton,
concernedaboutthe airstrip, said Lille wasan importantgroundobjectivebecause-it would facilitate
the advanceto the northeast."
3""Parla Diary, 26,27,28 August 1944.

205
No changesin command were announcedfor the airborn'ephase. however. and

Browning was designatedasthe Airborne Task ForceCommander.However.signals

insert XVIII Corps (Airborne) in later phase, with FAAA'S

were planned to a

commandechelonfollowing. Here,Breretonclearly his

exceeded reach.His command

directive did not stipulatetactical ground command,thoughperhapshe assumedthe

by field
corpswould commandthemselvesuntil relievedand takenundercommand a

army. His own control of resupplyand coordinationwith AEAF for air supportwould

havebeenmadesimplerhad he remainedat SunninghillParkor coordinatedthrough I

376
Airborne CorpsRearat Moor Park.

Montgomery,meanwhile,had beengiven authorityto commit FAAA to assist

377
21 Army Group's advance. LINNET, additionally, was to be reinforced with

anotherdivision to be flown in. While priority would go to the US 17thAirborne if it

could be operationally ready by 15 September, the US 94th Division was to be

designatedas aerial reinforcement by airlanding if the 17" Airborne was still

378
considerednonoperational.

The LINNET mission,asstatedby FAAA to its commander,was to:

376Ibid., 28 August. NARA, RG 331, SHAEF, G-3, Entry 256,"Linnet" Book I

and 2: Operational
Signal Requirementsfor Headquarters,First Allied Airborne Army, 30 August 1944;First Allied
Airborne Army SignalCommunicationInstructionNo. 1, OPERATION LINNET, Army
CommunicationsDuring PhasesIII and IV of OPERATION LINNET; Minutesof CorpsCommanders
ConferenceHeld At Moor ParkAt 1600Hrs 28 Aug 44.
377
ParksDiary, 30 August.
37'Ibid., 31 August, ParksPapers,Box 3, Memorandumfrom Cutler for Chief Staff, 30 August
of
1944.

206
 Seizea firm basein the vicinity of TOURNAL Belgium. secureand
hold [a] bridgeheadover the ESCAUT river and control the principal
leadingthroughTOURNAI, LILLE, andCOURTRAI. 379
roadnets

Intelligenceestimatedthat the maximumenemyforce that could be marshalled

against the airborne area in the first week of operations was two divisions (12

battalions) with a total of 28,500 troops from all formations, including 20,000

divisional troops of all types.All enemytroops were estimatedto be of low calibre,

with the enemy armor in the projectedoperationalarea "believed to be extremely

380
IOW.,,

In launchingthe operation,Montgomeryintendedto cut the enemy's line of

retreat and to create conditions for a vertical envelopmentof enemy forces caught
381
betweenhis advancingArmy Group and the LINNET airhead. LINNET had gone

farther than any operationplanned to date, but three days before "Y" day, a crisis

arose.

On I September, Brereton ordered that planning for an alternate target for

LINNET concentrate on the Aachen-Maastricht Gap. He "informed" the Deputy

Supreme Commander that, in the event that LMET is cancelled, the operation

would be redirected onto the new target. Browning was informed in a letter which,

after referring to his outline plan for the operation, stated:

2. An alternate target area has been selectedfor this operation as

indicatedbelow:

3" NARA, RG 331 entry 29A, Box 119,"OperationLinnet," HeadquartersFIRST ALLIED

AIRBORNE ARMY, Task Forcefor OperationLINNET, 27 August 1944.
390"Linnet Book 2." HEADQUARTERSFIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, Outline Planfor Allied
Airborne Operation"LINNET, " 29 August 1944.All relevantplans,messages, and planning
documentsare containedin this file in -Linnet" Books I and 2.
381Ibid., 21 A Gp/20760/G(Plans),Subject:OperationLinnet, 31 August 1944

207
 a. Mission.
(1) Seize a fu-m base in the general area LIEGE-
MAASTRICHT.
(2) Seizeandutilize an existingairfield for airborneresupply.
(3) Secureand hold the bridges over the River MEUSE from
LIEGE to MAASTRICHT, both inclusive.
3. Y Date:
382
5 September.

Only three days before, Eisenhowerhad confirmed, in his first directive as

" that First Allied Airlvrne Army would. in conjunction with

"Ground Commander,

Montgomery,

plan and direct the employment of the entire Airborne force which is
made available to the Northern Group of Armies to expedite the
its 383
accomplishment of assignedmissions.

No hint of this mission had beengiven to Montgomery,who still countedon

LINNET, nor was any discussionoffered to 21 Army Group for an alternative if

LINNET went the way of TRANSFIGURE,BOXEI?,and the earlierplans.The sector

chosenby Brereton was, in fact, not within 21 Army Group's boundariesbut was

assignedto Bradley's 12thArmy Group.This plan surprisedthe Airborne Army staff

and should have stunnedBrowning, who was aware that First Airborne Army was

under 21 Army Group's operationalcontrol for planning.Brcreton.for whom the air

didn't seem to be effected by ground boundaries,had, of course, continued with

Ridgway in seekingemploymentfor XVHl Corps,ostensiblyin a period during which

they were to support 21 Army Group. "LINNET Il, " as it was being called, would

382Parla Diaty, I September1944,Linnct Book 1. Hdqs,FAAA, I September1944,Subject:

AlternateTargetArea for Airborne Operation"LINNET. " Brerelon Diaries, 31 August, 336.
Brereton'saccount,which probablywascraftedafter the event,is mistakenon the dateordered.The
HeadquartersWar Diary kept by Parks,aswell aswritten notification of the change,confirms the date
as I September.
383EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2100-2101.

208
 reverseEisenhower'sdecision. Characteristically,
the free-wheelingBrereton sought

to inform SHAEF throughTedderratherthan throughBull, who probablywould have

disapprovedthe venture in Ike's name. Given that I Airborne Corps was virtually

4-cocked
and readyto fire," Breretonhad madeno changein the airbornetask force's

command,thoughhis intent may havebeenclearly to eliminateBrowning. The logic

was clear. The bulk of I Airborne Corps would be American troops, with XVIII

Airborne Corps inserted for command of the two American divisions. The force, if

droppedin the Liege-MaastrichtCorridor, would link with US XIX Corps and would

on
communicate Americanlinks. Was I Airborne Corpsthen even Obviously
needed?

not.

Discussionon I September,however, revolved not around going to Liege-

Maastrichtbut aroundexecutingLINNET as planned.Air Marshal Hollinghurst, who

had not been consulted before Cutler cut the air plan, was upset, but as yet no

command crisis seemed apparent. Tedder, whose hammer over the Bomber barons

remained significant, was ftirther involved over weather issues. Leigh Mallory, who

should have been coordinating LINNET's tactical support (which included heavy

bombers), was strangely unconsulted. Parks did visit SHAEF, informing Bull of

LINNET H's preparation. Bull believed the original LINNET would be executed, but

noted that the 52 (L) might be left off the task organizationto ease logistics-a

recommendation that had not been broached to Browning, the Task Force
384
Commander.

394Parks Diary, I September1944.Note that Browning wastold, not asked,aboutthe 52 (Lowland)

decisionby Parks,though Parksdid not believe Browning would acceptthis and no doubt would speak
to Brereton.

209
 On 2 September,Breretontold Parksthat he haddecided

that the iactical situationnow wan-antedcancellationof LINNET and

recommended that an operationin the Liege gapbe undertakenandthat
we could mount suchan operationon 36 hoursnotice.

This, Breretonstated,he would signal to Eisenhowerimmediately,and Parks

immediatelyinformedBrowning and Hollinghurst of Brereton'sactions.That night, I

Airborne Corps informed Parks that Montgomery had cancelled LINNET due to

weather,andthat new planswere being investigated,but that the troopswould remain

on the airfields to accommodatethe launchingof LINNET II. Calling Montgomery's

Chief of Operations(Belchem),Parksfound that he did not know of LINNET 11and

that Richardson (Plans) had only a vague notion that the idea existed. While

Richardsondiscussedthis with Parks, Parks also informed him that a plan using

British troops for a seizureof airfields near Rotterdamwas under study. Parks then

385
convinced Brereton to see Eisenhower on 3 Septemberafter speaking with Tedder.

Early on 3 September,Stearley, the G-3, informed Parks that Brereton

Ih
intended to tell Eisenhowerhe would launch LINNET Il on the 4. While Parks

immediately notified the airmen to finalize their plans for the next day's missions,

three headquartersappearedunconsulted:I Airbome Corps, who would executethe

operation; 21 Anny Group, whose priority had just been usurped;and 12th Army

Group, in whosesectorthe actualoperationwould takeplace.

Montgomery's Brigadier Plans, Charles Richardson,on 2 Septemberhad

recommendedthat the Polish Airborne Brigade,maderedundantby the addition of the

52d (Lowland) Division to LINNET, be assigneda coup-de-mainmission on the

210
MeusebridgesbetweenMaastrichtand Liege to assistBradley,who later turneddown
386
the proposal.

But it was no brigadecoup-de-mainthat Breretonwasproposingashe traveled

to seeEisenhower
on the original date selectedto executeLINNET. Only on that day

was Browning's Headquarters

publishing "INSTRUCTION NO. I, " a revisedoutline

plan for LINNET Il. Browning listed as the plan's "INTENTION" that

Airborne Corpswill preventthe enemyfrom withdrawing acrossthe R.

MEUSE from inclusiveMAASTRICHT to inclusiveLIEGE.

A new troop list naming only the I st, 82d, and 101st Divisions was included, with

Airborne Corpslandingto provide commandandcommunications.Division planshad

387
yet to be rawn up.

The original LINNET had beencancelledas the groundforcesmoved forward

and the airborne lay grounded due to weather. Second Army was getting its stride in a

pursuit that would rival Patton's best August days. Lt. Gen. Brian Horrocks' 30 Corps

was in the van. with three armored divisions moving abreast, covering a fifty-mile-

wide sector-the Corps de Chasse that Montgomery had so mistrusted after his North

African Campaign.

Brereton's revelation to Stearley was soon revealed to Browning. Browning's

operations officer called Parks, apparently as the formation commanderswere

meeting,stating:

85Ibid., 2 September1944.
386GeneralSir CharlesRichardson,Flashback:A Soldier's Story (London: William Kimbcr, 1985),
187.

211
 The consensusof opinion was that if the expedition were mounted
tomorrow morning the drop would be bad and we must be preparedto
acceptan extremelyraggeddispositionon the ground.

Parksresponded,sayingBreretonwould acceptsucha result.Three-quartersof

an hour later, Browning spoke personallywith Parks, advising him that it was his

opinion-and that of his commanders-that Tuesday,5 September,would be the

earliestthe operationcould be mounted.No mapshad arrived, and with sorting and

distribution the next day, they expectedthat no real planning could begin until the

morning following the arrival of the maps.

Parks,however,continuedto push the operationforward basedon a predicted

weather window scheduling the drop for the next afternoon and the following

morning, before the weather was scheduledto turn bad for a day. Parks informed

Browning, who refused to push the operation forward. Parks stated that Brereton

would be making the decision upon his return from SHAEF, but that his "Warning

to
order" was meant save Browning time if Brereton ordered the operation to go

forward.

Brereton returned, stating that the Supreme Commander, Deputy Supreme

Commander, Smith and his deputy had all stated that the operation should go forward,

contingent upon the approval of Montgomery and Bradley, who were conferring on

the subject. That evening, Browning was greeted at the formation commanders'

meeting by Brereton, who stated that "the operation would have to be mounted
I
tomorrow or not at all." Browning restatedhis views concerningmaps and briefing.

38'NARA, "LINN ET Book I, " Headquarters, AirbomeTps, 3 September1944,"INSTRUCTION NO.

J." This two-pageoutline appearsto be the only formal planningdonefor LINNET 11,
with no
overlays,maps,estimates,or ordersin existence.

212
Brereton stressedthat "the situation with regardto the disorganizationof the enemy

was one which demanded

that be
chances "
taken, and that only ordersor bad weather

would causeit to be postponedor cancelled.

Afterward, Browning spoke to Brereton alone, stating that he 'Vroposed to

in
submit writing his protest and those of his division "
commanders. Brereton asked

Ridgway, after Browning left, if his "division commanders" included the two

American commanders.Ridgway statedthat they might offer an opinion prior to the

decision being made, but that once a decision was made, they would carry it out.

388
Brereton had what he wanted. In his mind, he had already fired Browning and

replaced him with Ridgway after successfullymoving the airborne operation from

Montgomery's area.

Within an hour, Belchernwarned Parks that LINNET H would probably be

scrubbed, and that another operation would replace it. Shortly thereafter, a messenger

arrived with Browning's written protest. Brereton's plan, however, had misfired.

Within twenty minutes,De Guingandcalledwith orders:

The Second Army advances on the line BRUSSELS-ANTWERP,

September 6th, directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and moving around
the north side of the RUHR requiring airborne operations of one
British division and the Poles on the evening of September 6th or

388Parks Diary, 3 September1944;BreretonDiaries, 337,338; NARA, LINNET Book 1, Noteson

Conferenceat Moor Park,3 September.Brcrcton's diary, which appearsto be a postfactocreation,
repletewith errors,and which bearsremarkableresemblanceto the ParksDiar),, repeatsthe episode
verbatim but addsmaterialconcerningBrcrcton's intent to relieve Browning; Parks.who was not privy
to Brereton'sconversationwith Ridgway,hasno suchstatementin the Headquartersdiary. Brcreton
apparentlyalso wrote a letter to Browning.Neither appearsto havebeenmadepublic, and Brerctonhas
no suchcorrespondence in his papersat the EisenhowerLibrary; the actualconferencenotesdo not
reflect either Parksor Brereton'sstatementof "tomorrow or not at all" for the operationand statethat
one decisionwas madefirm: the operationwould be executedon Tuesday(5 September)at earliest.
Theseconferencenotesare absentfrom the HeadquartersDiary (Parks)and the separatefile of
conferencenotesin the Parkspapers.Thereis no doubtthat a confrontationtook place.

213
 Morning of September7th to securebridges on the RHINE between
WESEL and ARNHEM.

The airborne would seize the bridges and the ferries operating there intact. The

Rotterdam plan, which had not yet been assigned a name, would be set aside. Asking

for a 1,000-tons-per-day airlift, Parks informed De Guingand that aerial supply would

have to be coordinated with SHAEF. Informed of the change of events, Brereton

stated that the "next move" for the Headquarters was to initiate steps to move the

the Airborne Army, i. the American formations, to the Continent for

remainder of e.,

future operations.389

The Paris airfields, not the Rhine, were Brereton'sgoal. He would ensurethat

Bradley gained the use of XVIII Corps. Brereton's was very much an American

not
agenda, an Allied one. The Airborne Army existedin Brereton'smind because
of

Arnold and Marshall and it was,to him, a proof of the Americanair weapon.Using it

to supportthe British was neverhis goal or that of Washington.

LINNET H had torn asunderthe film of unreality that had coveredairborne

planning. One of the critics of the airborneplans createdat Sunninghill Park referred

to Brereton'sstaff as "a bunch of enthusiasticcookswho viewed plans like creatinga

390There was no doubt that
salad, and afterwards added the Germans to taste."

Brereton and Ridgway resentedBrowning and that, having trapped him "refusing

orders," they would have liked to see him off, with Ridgway made Deputy Army

commander.Yet the planning problems during the August festival of plans had

nothing to do with Browning. Instead,they were due to the perceivedneedto use the

389
Ibid.

214
 airbornequickly. not simply as a way of employingtwo corpsof picked troops,but to
. Cý
justify the tremendousair and personnelassetsthat had been sunk-into the airborne

forces. This urgencyhad beenpassedon by SHAEF daily, and FAAA acceptedthe

challenge with relish.

Brereton wanted to work directly for Eisenhoweras a free-lance.the airman

who would changethe ground picture by a brilliant "strategic" blow from above. It

was doubtful that either Browning or Ridgway had revolutionary views other than

using their forces as tactical adjuncts to an ongoing ground operation, though in

Browning's case he was more ammed to fitting his operation to a wider scheme,

whereasin Ridgway's case there had never been a case of his proposing anything

other than a massdrop and linkup.

Eisenhowerhad createdthe Airborne Army as an Allied affair. Recognizing

that it would be Eisenhower,and not Brereton,who would haveto acceptBrowning's

resignation,Browning, in discussionwith Brereton,agreedto withdraw his letter and

forget that there had been a severe disagreementover LR,4NET 11. Given that

Browning's corps would be executingthe next operation regardlessof whether he

held the twin titles of Corps Commanderand Deputy Army Commander,both men

had little choice but to forget the incident. But the atmospherehad changedfor the

known 391
new operation asCOMET.

390interview with GeneralSir John Hackettby author,Fort Leavenworth,Kansas,1984.

391Parks Dian? September1944;BreretonDiaries, 338. Breretonsaysthis eventtook place on 4
,6
September,Browning wasthen away at Dempsey'sand Montgomery'sHeadquartersplanning
COMET. Parks,whosediary is the only headquartersdiary, statesit wasthe 6th. Moreover,Browning
states,falsely, that he withdrew his letter knowing that Ridgwaywould commandLINNET If.
LINNET 11wasalreadycanceled-almost at the momentof receiptof the original protestor
"resignation," if therewas one.

215
 CHAPTERFIVE:

Campaign Plan

As NEPTUNE's planning devolved from high-level decisionsdealing mainly

force allocation and command,the operational and tactical planning for the
with
in 392
by
operation was supervised the air, ground, and naval commanders chief.

Absenttheir influence,the SHAEF plansstaff developedtheir vision for the campaign

followin- NEPTUNE
0

" SHAEF's triumvirate of senior British officers charged

The "Joint Planners,

with campaign development,began drafting the post-OVERLORD strategy in the

in discussions 21 Army 393

Group. The first
spring, the absenceof any with staff

its (which becamethe genesisof "The Broad Front") very early in

surfaced memos

May, and after weeks of internal staffing, presenteda final memorandumto the
394
SupremeCommanderby May's end.

This memorandumpaper was not circulated outside SHAEF, AEAF, or

ANXF. For SHAEF, the "Broad Front" was the basisfor its liberation campaignand.

from a command perspective, was its main effort to exert and retain operational

control-a control that had temporarily been delegatedto the conunandersin chief

then executingthe NEPTUNE landings.

392Eisenhower
refused to name Montgomery as ground commander in chief. though for all intents and
purposeshe functionedas suchas21 Amy Group Commander.(Seechapterone for discussion).
'93Theseplanners
were: Brigadier K.G. McClean(SHAEF); CaptainP.N. Walter, R.N. (ANXF),
Group CaptainH.P. Broad,R.A. F. (AEAF).
394NARA. RG 33 1. -OVERLORD 38 1." Box 77. Post-OverlordPlanningVol. 1, February1944 25
to
Sep44.

217
 In terms of Grand Strategy, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff

Committeecontinuedto exert pressureto cancelthe invasion of SouthernFrance in

decisive in Italy. This argument,which the US Joint

order to continue a campaign

Chiefs had relegatedto Eisenhoweras the "unbiasedAllied commander"to decide.

Eisenhower'stime and energywhile his staff crafted"options" for

consumedmuch of

his just-beginningcampaignin NorthwestEurope.The SouthernFrance did

argument

not end until early Augzustand helped solidify the US Chiefs and their agent.

Eisenhower,in opposingany further British influencein strategicor evenoperational

matters,to include eliminating British commandinfluence.Meanwhile, Eisenhower's

both in Normandy in follow-on 395

hampered.
participation and the planningwas

The often-touted"Broad Front Plan" was, in fact, not a plan at all but a study

titled "Post-'Neptune' Coursesof Action After Capture of [the] Lodgement "

Area.

Part Il of the study, entitled "Method of Conductingthe Campaign," was published

severalweeksafter Part 1. Staffedwithin SHAEF, the paperwas never finalized into a

separateguidance document for senior commandersnor, more important, was it

promulgatedas a full-blown campaignplan with specific taskings, force

boundaries,

priorities, and complementarylogistical and air plans. In itself a crude offering, its

importanceequaledthe COSSACandNEPTUNE plansfor its influenceon the war in

NorthwestEurope.

'9* Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,108-121.While Churchill and Alanbrookesawcorrectly the Grand

Strategicissuesover removing landingcraft from the Mediterraneanand ANVIL, Montgomerytended
to seeonly the shortageof landing craft as an operationalissueand urgedEisenhoweron thesegrounds
aloneto cancelANVIL in order to provide for landingsby I May. As mounting ANVIL was
Marshall's desire,in no way would Eisenhowerever seekits cancelation,thoughhe wasforced to
acceptits postponementuntil August.

218
 The Post-NEPTUNECoursesof Action memorandumwas the initial offering

" independentsituation-basedanalysesand
in a veritable landslide of "forecasts,

to
guidancemessages the that
senior commanders loosely comprisedEisenhower's

"master " 396This of trickling short-term guidance invited

campaign plan. process

continuous debate, gross redefinitions, and confusion as to Iong-terrn objectives.

Rather than harmonizing flexibility during its campaign, SHAEF's secretive

theorizing and Eisenhower'stendencyfor short-termdirectivesbecamethe centerof

continous disjointed arguments over the campaign's most basic intention-an

intention that was given to the SupremeCommanderas a directive. Eisenhower's

directive from the CombinedChiefs stated:

You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the
other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of
Germanyandthe destructionof her armedforces. 397
.

Freddie Morgan, Ike's Deputy Chief of Staff, defined the problem.

398
OVERLORD was an operation with no statedobject. Finding that object-and

constructing a campaign plan to achieve it-was SHAEF's challenge beyond

mounting the invasion. As COSSACs planners' had selectedNormandy for the

CombinedChiefs to approve,SHAEF's Joint Plannersdecidedhow best to reachthe

'9' Post-OverlordPlanning,1; Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe,228,229; US War Department,FM

100-15,Field ServiceRegulations:Larger Units [hereafterreferredto as FM 100-15] (Washington: 29
June 1942);The War Office, Field ServiceRegulations,III. Operations-HigherFormations(London:
1935).Eisenhowerclaimedthat a formed campaignplan, nevervaried from in its key components,had
beencreatedprior to D-Day. Both the Americansand the British definedessentialcomponentsfor
campaignplanning in their Field ServiceRegulations.
397RG 331, SHAEF 322.01PS,Directive to SupremeCommander,Allied ExpeditionaryForce, 12
February1944,1.
398Morgan, Overtureto Overlord, ix.

219
object not defined by the NEPTUNE plan. Eisenhower's acceptanceof their

399
recommendationwould put his mark,on the campaign.

Part 1,"Coursesof Action After Captureof the LodgementArea," dated3 May

1944,laid the foundationfor the campaignplan. The plannerssoughtto define "the

heartof Germany"in light of the CCS directive.Believing that Berlin was too far east.

the plannersstated,

A study of economic and political factors shows that the only area in
the WEST of vital economic importance to GERMANY is the RUHR.
If she were to lose the* RUHR, and consequently FRANCE and
BELGIUM, she would lose sixty-five per cent of her present total
production of crude steel and fifty-six per cent of her present
production of coal. While no other area in the WEST is vital to [the]
GERMAN war economy, failure to keep the RUHR in production
would rapidly starve GERMANY of the means to continue the war.
Moreover, the effect on GERMAN morale of a penetration of
GERMAN soil would be enormous; and, if that penetration included
the RUHR, GERMAN hopes of carrying on the war for any length of
time would be 400
slight.

Having pronouncedthe Ruhr as the key objectivefor the Allied Expeditionary

Force,the plannerscould do no lessthan estimatethat Germandefensivepolicy in the

west would center on "keeping the Ruhr in production, " using "all available resources

to defendthat vital areaas soonas it is threatened.

" They concludedthat

an attack aimed at the RUHR is likely to give us every401

chance of
bringing to battle anddestroyingthe main GERMAN forces.

3" Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe, ibid.; PostOverlord,1,passim.No formal guidancetasking for the

Joint Plannersis in the SHAEF records.Moreover,Eisenhower,who often dealt by memoon such
occasions,left no evidenceof formal interventionfor the post-Overlordperiod's planning in its early
stages.
400PostOverlord,1,"PS-SHAEF(44) 11, PlanningStaff SHAEF, 3' May 1944,Post-NeptuneCourses
of Action After Captureof LodgementArea, SectionI-Main Objectiveand Axis of Advance, 1.
401
Ibid.

220
 Having designatedthe Ruhr as the key objective.the Joint Planners'analysis

of the topographicavenuesto reachthat obj ective was the most importantdiscussion

of geographic considerations since COSSAC's selection of Normandy for

OVERLORD. Analyzing NortheastFranceand the Low Countries,four areasstood

out for the movement of large forces. Following British staff practice. these were

notedfrom right to left facing the enemy,

a south-to-north (See
orientation. figure 28.)

The Nletz Gap, southof Gennany,wasnotedas:

a possible opening into GERAkNY, but the country is broken and

woodedand topographically the
canalises attack.Even if the RHINE is
reached4 the narrow RHINE valley offers an unsatisfactoryapproachto
the RUHR. Moreover.the greaterpart of this mute offers few facilities
402
for building airfields.

North of this area,the plannersnotedthe region often seenas an obstacle.but

more often the sceneof attack, the Ardennes.The sceneof decisiveactionsin 1870.

1914,and 1940,its drawbackswerenoted:

The ARDENNES themselves, although not a complete obstacle, afford

a very difficult passage to a mixed force and are easily defended.
Furthermore, any advance through the ARDENNES will lead into hilly
and heavily wooded regions extending from AACHEN to the
HUNSRUCK, SOUTH of the MOSELLE. The whole of this area
few 403
offers aircraft sites.

Violating their own orientation, they skipped an avenuenorth to Flanders,

Britain's area of strategicinterest from the Great War, but one which had brought

untold difficulties. The plannersobjectivelynotedthe problems:

The plain of FLANDERS is intersected by water obstacles and

considerable areas subject to inundation. It provides traditionally
40'
' Ibid., 2.
403
Ibid.

221
 difficult going in the wet part of the year. There are many airfield sites,
but construction and maintenance would be difficult in the winter
404
months.

Using the techniquefavored for staff papers,the best course of action was

enumeratedlast, and in completedetail:

The route NORTH of the ARDENNES on the general line

MAUBEUGE-LIEGE, although it becomes a fimel with the most
formidable obstacles at the neck in the area ROERMOND-DUREN-
LIEGE-MAASTRICHT, is, from the topographical point of view, the
easiest approach to the RUHR. Good airfield sites are found
throughout the greater part of the route, although the terrain is less
favourable for this purpose about ATH at the entrance of the ftinnel
405
neck mentioned above.

Knowing the weight of effort of the entireAllied groundoperationmight ride

on their analysis,the Joint Plannerswrote a careful but flexible summarythat in fact

becametheir asyet unstatedrecommendation:

To sum up, from a topographical point of view the only suitable axes
of approach to the RUHR are:

a. NORTH of the ARDENNES on the general line MAUBEUGE-

LIEGE.
b. SOUTH of the ARDENNES on the generalline VERDUN-METZ-
SAARBRUCKEN.
Both are only, relatively speaking,"gaps." Eachcontain[s]possibilities
for defence,which increasestowardsthe EAST: topographycanalises
the attackers on to narrow fronts in both cases.In the NORTH,
however,are more suitablesites for airfields than in the SOUTH; and
the Northern route leadsdirectly to the RUHR. The Southernroute, on
the other hand, only leads directly to the comparativelyunimportant
objectivesof the middle RHINE cities: and a wide turning movement
through the RHINE valley would haveto be madeto reachthe RUHR.

404
Ibid.
405
Ibid.

222
 From a topographicalpoint of view the MAUBEUGE-LIEGE route,
forms the best 400
RUHR.
therefore, axis of advanceto the

While topographyweighed heavily, the "size' of the avenuesdiscussedin

namelyhow many divisions. airfields, and logistic

terms of friendly maneuver-mass,

areascould fit into each region, was never analyzed.Perhapsfeeling this analysis

premature,the plannersmoved on to the enemy,noting that the Siegfiied Line "'apart

from the coastal defenses"constitutedthe sole prepareddefensesto be considered

usableby the Germans,and ruling out the Maginot Line as a defensein reverseand in

disrepair.Consideringthe existingdefenses,especiallyin front of Liege and Metz, the

plannersstatedunequivocablythat:

Existing prepareddefences,therefore,do not influencethe decisionas

407
to whetherthe Northernor Southernroute shouldbe selected.

Certainly, the enemydefenseat the time of the lodgement'scapture,the goal

of NEPTUNE, would influencethe campaignplan. The Joint Plannersbelievedthat a

total deploymentto the West of 55 divisions, with 20 retained in coastal defense

positions, was most likely. A widespreadabandonmentof areassuch as Norway,

Denmark, Italy and the Aegean would net 26 more divisions, but these, they felt.

would never materialize. While predicting Southern France would not be held,

that the Germanswould define the battle areaas Holland,

SHAEF's plannersassessed

Belgium, and the Channel Coast once the lodgementhad been achieved.With the

increasinginability to replacemen and material, they predicted that huge sacrifices

406
Ibid.
407Ibid., 2. It is crucial to note that the "disrepair" the defenses
of reflectedtheir stateat the time of
analysis.The plannersdid not notethat thesecould be part of a reinstateddefense,a factor that did
materialize.Moreover,the key factor-timc to establisha defense-also wasnot considered.The

223
would not be made anywhereby the Germans"except in defenseof a vital areasuch

as the RUHR."

The planners assumedthat if the lodgement deploymentwas achieved as

planned,a force of 36 divisions would be in the Allied force by D+60, evenly divided

betweenthe US and British Army Groups,and

thereafterthe BRITISH forceswill NOT be increasedand may become

a wasting asset,while US forces will increaseat an averagerate of
408
somefour divisionsper month.

The Allied Air Forces,assumedto haveachievedunchallengeablesuperiority,

would be influencedby the campaignplan significantlyas

the support that they will be able to afford our land operations will be
considerably affected by the axis of advance selected, as on this will
depend the availability of airfield sites on the Continent and the degree
of support which can be afforded from bases in the UNITED
KINGDOM. 409

Prior to their final assessments,

the Joint Plannerslisted a paragraphmarked

"Deductiorf':

The main deduction we can draw from this is that there will be no great
disparity in land forces for a considerable period. In fact, it may be as
long as eight months after D Day 'OVERLORD' before the Allied land
forces can be assured of a steadily increasing superiority in the number
divisions in the field. 410
of

The deduction went beyond assuming force ratios; it establisheda key

consideration that confined future action even before it offered an analysis and

Siegfried Line and the Metz and Maginot defenseseventuallyclaimedmorethan 100,000US

casualties.
408
Ibid., 3.
40' Ibid., 4.

410Ibid., 3,4.

224
 comparisonof coursesof action. In rough terms. it -situated the appreciation.
"' As

stated,this said:

We must, therefore,avoid a line of advancewhich leadsus to a head-

on collision with the main GERMAN forces without opportunity for
manoeuvre.In the early stageswe must make all possible use of
deception,surpriseand manoeuvre,including the use of airborne and
seaborneoperationsand threats to cause the GERMANS to extend
their forcesand lay themopento defeatin detail.

As operationsprogressand our superioritybecomesmore marked.wc

must advanceon a front sufficiently broad to threatenan advanceby
more than one of the "gaps" into GERMANY. By so doing we should
be able to keep the GERMANS guessingas to the direction of our
main thrust, causethem to extendtheir force, and lay the GERMANS
opento defeat in detail.

Throughout the operationswe must exploit the superior Allied air

forcesto the greatestpossibleextent.411

The plannersfelt that air considerationswould be concernednot with defense.

but with the offensiveuse of the air forcesto continuebreakingthe Germaneconomy

and supportingland Any

operations. land advancewould not halt air operations,but a

northernaxis would facilitate operationsagainstthe Ruhr and NorthwestGermany.A

southernadvancewould tax shipping and transportationin that the 250-300 mile

maximum operationalradius for fighter aircraft would precludesupportingoperations

from the United Kingdom and require the forward placementof airfields. Tactical

fighters, in any case,neededto be basedon the continent,requiring placementof at

least 75 percentof airfields within 60-70 miles of the forward line of troops.Airfield

411
)bid., 4.

225
 logistics would then be critical issues.more favorably found on the
availability and
412
northernroute.

The Joint Plannersnoted that the port capacity of the lodgementarea. even

built up, would be insufficient to supportthe forcesneededto defeatGermany.

when

Noting the quick turn-aroundfor the Channelports and their location on the northern

axis, the plannersestimatedthat theseports would "enablea fasterrate of advanceto

be maintained." Given the shortageof shallow-draftshipping, theseports would be

in to
essential order maintain the rate of buildup of US forces. Antwerp, the largest

port on the route assessed,

wasnot mentionedby the Joint PlanningStaff in relation to

the campaignduring 413

this stageof planning.

Based on these premises,the planners finished their appreciationwith an

enumerationanddiscussionof coursesof action,noting four broadpossibilities:

a. To advanceSouth-Eastfrom the lodgementareawith the intention

of cutting off the GERMAN forces in the SOUTH of FRANCE-
thus attemptingto dealwith the GERMAN forcesin detail.
b. To advance Eastwardsfrom the lodgement area with the main
threat directed SOUTH of the ARDENNES on METZ and the
SAAR.
C. To advancein a generallyNorth-Easterlydirection with the object
of striking directly at the RUHR by the route NORTH of the
ARDENNES.
414
d. A combinationof b. andC.

"2 Ibid., 4-5. It shouldbe notedthat most RAF fighter aircraft were"short-]egged," with far less
operationalrangethan their Americancounterparts,which were designedas long-rangeescorts,not
short-rangeinterceptors.
4'3Ibid., 5; PostOverlordConcurrences.The Commander,ANXF contestedthis statement,noting that
after D+60 the main flow of men and materialwould be in cross-Atlanticshipping,"for which most
Channelports are unsuitable."
414
Ibid.

226
 The Joint Plannersdiscussedthe ramifications of eachwithin the parameters

of their "deduction" and the basic assumptionsidentified. Beginning in the south.the

plannersnoted that a drive southeastwards

from the lodgementareatoward Dijon or

Lyons might isolate and destroythe Germanforcesin SouthwestFrance,particularly

if the thrust was in conjunction with landings in SouthernFrance. Such a thrust.

however, would be nondecisive and would outrange medium and light bomber

supportfrom the United Kingdom. Logistics from the OVERLORD ports would also

be difficult for such a thrust. Not recommendingthis approachas the "main axis of

advance," the plannersnotedthat

a subsidiaryoperation of this type would be of value if it could be

carriedout without diverting forcesfrom 415
our main advance.

The advancedue eastfrom the lodgementtowardsMetz, the secondapproach

identified, would gain good airfield terrain and traversegood armor terrain, initially

favoring a quick approachto the gap. Stretchedmaintenance(logistics), the lack of

ports, and the undoubtednecessityto rebuild railways would pose problemson this

approach,as would as the belts of terrain pastChalonsthat would narrow an approach

toward the German border. The distance of this approach would prohibit the

employment of tactical bombers from the United Kingdom. The Metz gap was

summarizedwith two statements:

[T]his line of advancedoes not directly threaten the RUHR. It is

considered,therefore,that the axis of advanceshould not be directed
exclusivelyon the METZ Gap. 416

415
Ibid., 6.
416
Ibid.

227
 The third approach,(third from the south) an advance by
northeast the route

north of the Ardennesfrom the lodgement

area,statedthe planners.

[w]ould ensure a secure left flank resting on the Channel and the
to
maximum use of our sea power open up and operate the Channel
ports progressively with our advance, thus greatly easing a our
maintenanceproblem. We should be in good airfield country and
within rangeof air bases in the UNITED KINGDOM. Moreover, such
an advancewould be a direct threatto the RUHR.

The plannersnoted that water obstacleswithin the approachwould hinder the

use of armor and that along with a narrowing gap at the border would favour a

defender.Their assessment
of this was telling:

It would confine our advanceto a narrow front, with little opportunity

to carry out any form of surpriseor outflankingmovement.Our lines of
communicationwould be open to counter attack by GERMAN forces
to our Eastern flank; and the GERMAN garrison in Southern FRANCE
would be able to make good their escapeand to enter the campaign in
417
the NORTH .

The planners, rather than comparing avenues and then assessingthem.

concluded their avenue analysis:

It is consideredthat this coursealoneshouldnot be adopted,as it leads

only to a head-oncollision of the opposingmain forces on a narrow
front, with no opportunityof manoeuvre.418

Having failed to note the size of avenues,the weatherconsiderations,and the

enemy defensepossibilities on each,or having rank orderedavenuesby priority, the

plannersoffered a half-pageanalysisof an advance"through both the METZ Gap and

NORTH of the ARDENNES." Rather than assessing,it bore the language of a

conclusion,beforethe conclusionwas offered.The plannersbeganby saying:

411
Ibid.

228
 An advance on a broad front both NORTH and SOUTH of the
ARDENNES would have the great advantage that the whole of our
forces would not be irretrievably committed to one or other of the
comparatively narrow "gaps." We should have the advantage of
manoeuvre. and the ability to shift the main weight of our attack.
thereby increasing the possibility of gaining surprise. The enemy would
be compelled to extend his forces, and our initiative would enable us to
keep him in a state of indecision as to whether our main thrust was
in NORTH SOUTH 419
coming or .

Clearly, the plannersemphasizedthat the multiple threatsof defendingseveral

4-gaps"simultaneouslywhile attempting to maintain defenseson the coastal strip

would stretchthe Germandefense,

particularly if "a deeppenetration"north or south

of the Ardennes was achieved.They held that the situation theorized following a

single penetration,north or south,would permit the Ardennesto be developedwest of

the line Liege-Luxembourgfor lateral communications,as the enemywould probably

not maintain sucha salientas the Ardennes,despitetheir normal tendencyto hold the

maximum amountof defensiveterrainpossible.

Reiteratingtheir abhoranceof meetingthe enemyhead-onin "a narrow front."

the plannersstatedthat a mutually supportingadvanceastride the Ardenneswas the

most beneficial mode of advance, offering possibilities for surprise, deception,

achieving superiority of force, and the defeat in detail of the enemy defensewhile

permitting the flexibility to shift air force elementsto supportattacks.

The planners offered their "conclusion" in the 29th paragraphof an often

redundant appreciation, which was more appropriately their recommendation-a

recommendationthat would be offered later in a separatedocument:

418
Ibid.
1'9Ibid., 7

229
 In the light of theseconsiderationsit is concludedthat the bestmethod
4-- heart GERMANY
of undertakingoperations aimed at the of and the
defeat of her armed forces would be to advanceon two mutually
in to
supportingaxes, order retain flexibility of manoeuvre:
a. With our main axis of advance on the line AMIENS-
MAUBEUGE-LIEGE-theRUHR.
420
b. With a subsidiaryaxis of advanceon the line VERDUN-METZ.

Having positedwhat they consideredto be a thoroughanalysis,the plannerson

30 May 1944 set forth in "Section H: METHOD OF CONDUCTING THE

CAMPAIGN"' their principal recommendations.Following only a week after their

first sectionhadbeenapproved,the key to this studywas

the assumptionthat the GERMANS will contestour advanceright up

to the frontiersof GERMANY.421

Section H offered the first scheduledbuildup of Allied forces to D+330,

showing a progression of primarily American divisions being added. This buildup

would bring a superiority in infantry for the Allies no sooner than D+200, though the

Allies were predicted to have a definite superiority in armor following the

lodgement D+90 (Sep 4).422The in fact,

establishment of the at planners, stated that

4'0Ibid. Note that this sectionwas approvedon 23 May 1944by the Chief of Staff after presentation
and discussion.
421PostOverlord381, SHAEF (44) 11 (Final), 30" May 1944,Coursesof Action After Captureof the
LodgementArea Section11-Mcthodof Conductingthe Campaign,1.
42-1Ibid. Divisions were the "measureof strength"shorthandadoptedby the staff, a measurethat was
both unsophisticatedand incredibly misleading.The plannersoffered no discussionof combatpower
superiority,the factor of weaponsquality, or the effect of weatheron air operationsthat were assumed
to be a key componentof the Allied force's power. More misleadingis that both the Americanand
Commonwealtharmieshad hugecontingentsof armor,artillery, antitank,and engineeringassetsin
separatebattalions,brigades,and otherunit structuresrating below divisional formations,but attached
for combatmissionsto corpsor armies.Nor werethe accompanyingfighter-bomberand medium
bomberwings and groupssupportingthe armiesadequatelyconsideredpart of the calculusof battle, as
opposedto the logistical bill of lading that wasuppermostin most mindsand measuredin division
"slices," which do not equateto fighting power.While the additionallogistical requirementswere part
of the logistical estimate,the additionalweight of this combatpower found no sophisticatedsystemof
analysisby the operationsplanners.Of particularnote shouldhavebeenthe weight of airpowcr, which
was limited by national boundaries and not applied in a centralizedor mission-centricrole asthe
airmen claimed it shouldbe.

230
the Allies would maintain unchallengedsuperiority in naval. air. and airborne forces.

including the lift capability for oneamphibiousassaultdivision from D+60 onwards.a

capability thoughtbestto mount a threat"to containcoastalgarrisons." Reflecting the

influence of the air planner,airfield captureand constructionwere seento be prime

for 423
requirements any advance.

The planners recommendedconducting a campaignthat would prevent an

orderly withdrawal to subsequent

river lines
(defense) that would prolong the Allied

advance.They outlined what may be assumedto be a recommendedoperational

policy-

Our object must be to force the enemy to fight on ground favourable to

armoured forces and in firont of areas where communications offer
suitable targets for our superior airpower. After every such action we
should use our air and armoured forces to harass the enemy's retreat
and give him no time to reform, at the same time using our airborne
forces to facilitate the crossing of rivers and other natural obstacles.
Our amphibious forces should be used to contain the enemy's coastal
424
garrisons.

Key factorsassessed
asaffecting the Allied courseof action were logistics, the

captureof Paris,topography,Germandefensepolicy, the availability of airfields, and

the weather affecting operationsafter D+90.425With the invasion yet to begin, the

plannerslaid out contingencies,as had the COSSACplannersfor the lodgement,but

with the same "theoretical" basis, lacking preknowledgeof the lodgement battle

outcome, actual German strengths and dispositions, and realistic battlefield

'23 Ibid., 2.
424Ibid., 2,3.
425Ibid., 2-6.

231
 Upon this, the SHAEF Chief of Staff was willing to base his
assessments.

for
recommendation the campaignplan.

Logistics, as for COSSAC's outline plan, lay at the root of the operational

desigri. The predicted phase lines that became bones of contention during the

lodgementbattle provided the most basic logistic assumption.Plannersfelt that by

D+60, the maintenanceand buildup for the British forces would be handled by

Mulberries (prefabricatedartificial harbors)and over the beaches,while the American

forceswould be receiving supportfrom Cherbourg,St. Malo, and the minor ports of

Brittany and Quiberon Bay, not at full capacitybut in a rising tide of maintenance

support.At the sametime, Brest and Nanteswere predictedto have beencapturedby

this time but not yet opened.

British forces were to turn north to captureRouen and Havre before severe

weatherset in and,becauseof shorterlines of communication,were seenasbeing able

to mount attacks toward these ports a full month before US forces could thrust

forward southof Paris.Havre's capture,the JPSpredicted,would end the dependence

on over-the-beachmaintenance,but the plannersmadeone firm statement:

However, until after the developmentof ANTWERP, the availability

426
of port capacitywill still limit the forceswhich canbe maintained.

The planners estimatedthat Havre would be neededuntil Dunkirk and the

Belgian coastports-and "possibly" Antwerp were openedfor the British. US forces

would be suppliedfrom Cherbourgand Brittany as well as from Havre, which would

be transferredfor US use. Railway repair was consideredto be a limiting factor for

'2' Ibid., 3.

232
 any advance after crossing the Seine. Due to coal requirements. the planners

that
recommended the coal fields nearValenciennes
be designated
asan objective.

The plannersstressedthat Paris was an important objective worth capture.as

its loss would deprive the Germansof a main centerof communications.The heavy

logistical pricd noted as a "civil affairs commitment" would require the operationof

its 427
Havreto be completedto assure accomplishment.

The thumbnail topographicdescriptiongiven by the plannerscited the areas

both west and eastof the Seineas being favorablearmor country, but noted that the

rivers astride any axis of advance would be substantial obstacles.The rivers in

questionincludedthe Seine,the Somme,

the Scheldt,the Dendreand canal,the Albert

Canal,the Meuse,the Maasand the Rhine.The OiseandMarne,that had defendedthe

Paris line in the Great War, were seenas possible "switch lines" for the German

defenseof Paris.The plannersnoted:

From a topographical point. of view, therefore, we must endeavour to

force the enemy to fight in the good tank country and at all costs
...
avoid granting him to
respite perfect defences along the river lines.428

DUKWs, LVTs, and amphibiouscargo carrierswould be neededto speedthe

seizureof bridgeheads 429

that would pennit a sustainedadvance.

The plannersacceptedSHAEF's G-2 estimateof 22 April as the structurefor

their enemydefenseassessment.
This predictedthat the lines of the Seine,the Somme

to the Argonne,the Flanderswaterwaysand the areasof Maubeugeand Argonne,and

'2' Ibid.
428
Ibid., 4.
"9 Ibid. DUKWs were amphibioustrucks; LVTs
were "landing vehicles,tracked."

233
the line Antwerp-Namur-theMeuse the
would comprise enemy's defensive
successive

lines. The enemy's final line, indeed their "last resort," would be to withdraw their

remaining forces, fOllowing their separatedefense "

"stands, to the "network of
430
waterways covenng the SIEGFRIED Line and on the SIEGFRIED Line itsel f..,

More restricting to any Allied plan was the deductionoffered by the planners

that the Gennans would "hold strongly the coast NORTH of HAVRE" while

maintaining strong forces on the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterraneanto resist

landingsuntil isolated.Repetitivelycalling for a fluid campaign,the plannersstressed

431
the necessityof mountingthreatsto fix Germandefensesto the coasts.

The Joint Plannersrepeatedthe COSSACstaff s preoccupationwith airfields.

noting the limited capabilitiesof the tactical air forcesto developtheir full capabilities

from basesin the United Kingdom. The planners recommended that to do so.

seventy-five per cent of the fighter airfields should be within sixty

miles, andthe remainderwithin ninety miles of our forward troops.
Further,the plannersnoted:

It is also desimble that airfields should be sited so as to allow the

maximum concentration of the force as a whole in support of
operationsin any one sector.

Estimatingthat the airfield terrain of the projectedlodgementwas poor until just west

of Paris, the plannersstatedthat theseareaswould haveto be developedprior to any

breakout. Thereafter, the northern axis offered superior airfield terrain in the US

430
Ibid.
131
Ibid., 5

234
 though this should not slow the developmentof the southernaxis. Prior to
sector,
432
it
Verdunthe groundwas seenasgood,afterwards, would be a limiting factor.

The 90-day estimate, imposed by COSSAC and unchallenged by any

subsequentstaff or commander, implied a greater limitation-the possibility of

0 weather.The 36-day delay of D-Day imposedby the shortageof landing

worsening
further into good campaigning weather, and the planners noted that bad
craft ate

would greatly hinder the use of naval forces for maintenance. assault. or
weather

threat to the coastal garrisons. Significantly-especially in light

mounting a credible

of the tremendous engineering and logistical effort needed to support the tactical air

forces, and the "operational imperative" to capture good airfield territory-the effect

433
of fall or winter weatheron airpower,was not mentioned.

As in Section1,the plannersstateddeductionsfor their vision of the campaign

to be launched:that an early exploitation to the Seine from the lodgementshould be

made;that the offensive should carry as far as the Sommeto cover the port of Havre.

that Paris must be isolatedor captured;that a direct thrust to the Maubeugeareamust

be made to force a withdrawal from the Pas de Calais; and that the North French

coalfields should be seized.Finally, the plannershinted at what they believed would

be a culminatingpoint for the advancewhenthey statedthe necessityof the:

432
Ibid.
433Ibid. Consideringthe repetitivenatureof the -method of campaign"sectionfrom the coursesof
action portion, it is strangethat weatherlimitations playedso little a factor in describingair operations.

235
 ST COPY

AVAILA L

Variable print quality

 forcing of the ANTWERP-NAMUR position with a view to opening
up the port ofANTWERP preparatory to the undertaking of operations
lines further EAST, finally SIEGFRIED Line. ''-"I
against the and the

Significantly. the planners asserted:

Operations in South-West FRANCE would not in themselves

contribute to the accomplishment of our mission but we may be
pressed for political reasons to dispatch forces there as early as
41S
possible.

The history of the Broad Front paper is less clear than was claimed by the

Supreme Commander, nor does it advance recommendations beyond maintaining

offensives toward the "two gaps" noted in Section 1. Eisenhower notes that the

strategy was approved on 31 May. but the staffing of the paper Indicates that this

on- was not necessa ily seen as a bluep int, a plan, or anythiing
-vis Inn bey nd a concept
g .0

of' operations. When forwarding the final draft, SHAEF G-3 H. R. Bull, in his

summary memo to the Chief of Staff, stated,

This paper is principally of value as a basis for procurement

'-"('
plannin(,.
L-

Importantly, SHAEF issued no subsidiary or subsequent plans to the Initial

Joint Plan of I February and, unlike COSSAC's "plan. " copies of this paper were not

circulated to lower levels below ANXF and AEAF. Eisenhower's "approval" is not

re-olsteredin the SHAEF files. Of more import was the fact that this paper was never

Ibid.. 0. Each of these deductions was later listed as a "Phase" and described in some detail, with
further rationale for operations. I have chosen to exclude their discussion as the campaign overtook
these considerations, and that planning at 21 Army Group had already accommodated most of the
considerations.
"' Ibid., 9: F,isenhower, Crusade in Europe,
maps following 224,228.229. This seems to confirm that
AN VIt. was not unanimousIv seen as essential to OVERLORD, despite Eisenhower's assertions that
the staffhad studied the problem of having an open flank.

236
staffed to the Combined Chiefs. who had, of course. approved the COSSAC Outline

Plan and reviewed the NEPTUNE variant published in February. SHAEF. by

eliminating the Combined Chiefs' right of review, was essentially taking them out of
437
the decision process.

Bradley beganto look actively at a post-NEPTUNEcampaignin mid-August.

in a seriesof meetingswith his commandersand planners,he beganto sketchout an

attack by 12th Army Group to the Germanborder and on to the Rhine. Bradley. who

met with Eisenhower on five occasions in early August, was no doubt in full

of
possession Eisenhower'sideasand intentionsand would have been fully awareof

"the Broad Front," as Montgomerywas not. These Bradley beganto modify into a
438
plan of his own.

Bradley continuedto plan for the northernswing of the XIX and XV Corps to

the Seine and acrossthe Seine, but following a conferenceto coordinatethis with

416RG 331, SHAEF/18008/Plans, G-3, Post-'NEPTUNE'Courscsof Action after captureof the

lodgementarea.SectionII-Method of conductingthe campaign.Bull had concurredwith both
segments of the study and recommended their approvalby the Chief of Staff.
4" Eisenhower,Crusadein Europe,ibid. Ike laudsthis study in his memoir.but distortsboth the scope
of the paper-which DOESNOT includethe picturehe describes-and goeson to fabricatea single
masterplan for the entire campaignin Europe.The purposeof the accompanyingmap in Crusadeis
likewise a fabricationon Eisenhower'spart. (Seefigure 29.) Divisionswere neverdisplayedin the
original phaseline studies.The Eisenhowermapimplies both a weight of effort decisionand an
articulatedlogistic plan to supply the divisions depicted.Neitherexistedat this time. PRO,WO 205
660. A copy of part I of the Broad Front Paper,dated3 May, found its way to 21 Army Group's plans
section,whereit wasreviewedby the Americanplannerand marked"NOT APPROVED." The key
conductof the campaigncomponentdoesnot appearto havesurfacedat 21 Army Group from any
source.It is doubtful that the first part had beenbroughtto Montgomery'sattention,and the author has
beenunableto find evidencethat Montgomerywasawareof the sectionof the Broad Front
recommendingthe structureof Eisenhower'sPost-OVERLORDCampaign.
43'The "Broad Front" conceptpaperdoesnot appearin 12' Army Group's plans files, nor in the poor
collection of papersretainedby Bradleyor his aide.The headquarters plans files are suspiciouslybcreft
of paperfrom this period, to include an exclusionof FUSAG (First US Army Group) files, which
shouldhavebeenretainedafter FUSAG wasredesignatedthe 12' Army Group,but which seemto
have vanished.Conjectureon Bradley's planningcan be madeby commentaryinsertedin the aide's
diary, and from a seriesof memorandabeginningin mid-Augustthat havesurvived.The Patton Diary
also indicatessomediscussionon long-termplansbeginningin early July, when Pattonmovedto the
continent.

237
Montgomery,,Bradley met with Pattonto plan the move of his Army eastwards.This

Seine(XV) to Ninth Army control for

plan-that the corps west of the would revert

supportingthe Tournai airbornedrop, while the 12IhArmy Group "coiled for the next

move'ý--was unknown to his nominal (Montgomery).

commander The intent of this

move was clearly stated:

The Twelfth Army Group then consistingof the First andThird Armies
439
will move directly towardsthe RHINE in the areaof the METZ Gap.

Having alreadybeeninformed three daysearlier of Montgomery'sown plans.

on 20 August 1944Bradley issuedOperationPlan NORMANDY TO THE RHINE, a

conceptdramatically different from Montgomery's plans and within the confines of

Eisenhower's Broad Front concept (which was still unbriefed to Montgomery).

Bradleyannouncedin a paragraphtitled "Directive" that:

This tentative plan for future operations is published for the

information and planning of all concerned. Details herein are subject to
final approval of higher authority and to change according to the
440
situation.

Bradley intendedto insert Ninth Army's Headquarters,with the US XV Corps

to act as the requiredflank guard for Crerar's Canadiansthrustingtoward Rouenand

beyondto the Pasde Calaisto act in concertwith a plannedairborneoperation,either

439NARA, RG 331, X11Army Group, Box 24143,12'hArmy Group Memoranda.Memorandumfor

Record19 August 1944,-Additional Notestakenat ConferencebetweenGeneralBradleyand General
Pattonat 1730hours, 19 August." Thesenotesarc interestingfor severalreasons.This separateset of
notesdoesnot cover this plan. Thesenotesclaim, falsely, that they werebasedon "general plans for
operationsas determinedin conferencebetweenhimself, GeneralMontgomeryand General
Eisenhoweron this date." Montgomery,in fact, had not attendedthis conference.
440RG 331, Box 24143,X1I Amy Group OperationalPlans
and Studies,OperationPlan Normandyto
the Rhine,20 August 1944,1. As with many US recordsin NARA, the mapscited for the study arc
missing.

238
BOXER or LINNET. Bradley'sown conceptionfor the remainderof his Army Group.

the First and Third Armies,was in line with Eisenhower'sbasicplan.

12IhArmy Group'splan was that, following the Falaiseoperation,it would

regroup and resume its advance to the northeast in zone, cross the
SEINE, encircle PARIS and continue the advance to seize the crossings
441
of the RHINE River from STRASBOURG to MAINZ inclusive.

Hodges' First Army would encircleParis by driving to the Rheimsareawhile

Third Army would advance on order toward the Neufchateau-Toularea. While

Hodges was required "maintain contact" with 21 Army Group, his major mission

would be to launch a "rapid advancewith an armored-motorizedinfantry force to

442
,,
seizethe crossingsof the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to MAINZ inclusive.

Patton's Third Army was also to "be preparedfor ftirther rapid advancewith

armored-motorizedinfantry to seizecrossingsof the Rhine River from Strasbourgto

Speyer inclusive. " Additionally, Patton would have to prepare to dispatch forces south

of the VosgesMountains through the Belfort Gap to securethe upper Rhine Valley.

Reducingthe Brittany peninsula,one of the key objectsof the NEPTUNE operation,

was listed as the fourth of Patton'stasks-a task that revertedto the VIII Corps,which
443
by then receivedlittle pressureto finish quickly. It was a task that had beenprimary

in the original OVERLORD concept,and one of the

of Third Anny's assigmments

"true objects" of OVERLORD that Montgomeryhad spokenof in his early plans.

"' Ibid., Patton Diarj,, August 19,1944. Bradleyhad intendedto offer a weakened,inexperiencednew
Headquartersthe Ninth Army asa sop. Pattonresentedthis and commentedon it.
442NORMANDY TO THE RHINE Plan,2.
443Ibid. Bradley's plan makesno mentionof the SouthernFranceinvasionforces,now renamed
DRAGOON forces.ANVIL had beendroppedas a codenameat Churchill's request;he saidhad been
"Dragooned" into acceptingthe Riviera landings.

239
 Three days before the publication of NORMANDY TO THE RHINE, a

remarkablyunawareMontgomerymet with Bradleyto vent his own ideason the Post-

OVERLORD Strategy.As always,Bradley's silenceMontgomerymistook for assent.

His outline notesfor their discussion,in their entirety:(Seefigure 29.)

1. After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army Groups should keep

Cý
togetherasa solid massof forty divisions which would be so strong
that it needfearnothing.This force would move north-eastwards.
2.21 Army Goup,on the westernflank, to clearthe channelcoast.the
Pas de Calais, West Flanders, and secure Antwerp and South
Holland.
3.12 Army Group to form the easternflank of the movementand to
move with its right flank on the Ardennes-being directed on
Aachenand Cologne.
4. The whole movement would pivot on Paris. A strong American
force to be positionedin the generalareaOrleans-Troyes-Chalons-
Reims-Laon,with its right flank thrown back along the R. Loire to
Nantes.
5. The Dragoonforce coming up from southernFranceto be directed
on Nancy and the Saar.We ourselvesmust not reachout with our
right to join it andthus unbalanceour strategy.
6. The basic object of the movementwould be to establisha powerful
air force in Belgium, to securebridgeheads over the Rhine before
444
winter began,and to seizethe Ruhr quickly.

Montgomery's memoir explanation is apt for what he saw as his plan's key

points:

In its simplest terms this was the German "Schlieffen Plan" of 1914 in
reverse, except that it would be executed against a shattered and
disorganized enemy. Its success depended on the concentration of
Allied strength, and therefore of maintenance resources, on the left
445
wing.

444
Montgomery, Memoirs. 239.
445,
Ibid.

240
 Monty summarizedhis views in his periodic messageto Brooke that night.

Received at 1030 on 18 August, it equaledMontgomery's earlier challengeof the

COSSAC
near-sacred outline, whoseoutdatedtenetshad harried the 21 Army Group

in shapinga campaignto meetthe requirementsof the moment.Unawareof a decided

line of operation,Montgomerywas again "proposing change"in what he felt was a

Zý
lacunaof guidancefrom SHAEF and from a "SupremeCommander"pereniallyabsent

from the front. It was his proposedMasterPlan for the continuationof the campaign:

M99 cipher 18Aug TOP SECRET

Personalfor C.I.G.S. from Montgomery.
Have beenthinking aheadabout future plansbut have not (repeatnot)
discussedsubject with IKE. My views are as follows. After crossing
Seine 12 and 21 Army Groupsshouldkeeptogetheras a solid massof
some40 divisions which would be so strong that it needfear nothing.
The force should move northwards.21" Army Group should be on
western flank and shouldclear the channelcoastand the Pasde Calais
and west Flandersand secureAntwerp. The American armies should
move with right flank on Ardennesdirectedon BrusselsAachen and
Cologne. The movement of American armies would cut the
communicationsof enemyforces on channelcoast and thus facilitate
the task of British Army Group.The initial objectsof movementwould
be to destroy Germanforces on coast and to establisha powerful air
force in Belgium. A further object would be to get enemyout of VI or
V2 rangeof England.Bradley agreesentirely with aboveconception.
Would be glad know if you agree generally.When I have got your
reply will discusswith Ike.

Two hours later, four copies of this messagewere delivered to Brooke's

446
Military Assistant. Brooke, en route to Italy and later to the Quebecconference,did

not see the plan, but the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Nye,

446LHC,Papers Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke[hereafterreferredto asAlanbrookePapers], M99

of
cipher, Rccd. 18 Aug 44. Note that his digestfor Alanbrookedeletesthe specific detailspertainingto
12' Army Group that were raisedwith Bradley,but addsdetail suchasthe V-missile sitespertinentto
the BCOSstrategydiscussions.

241
signaled Montgomery Alanbrooke's approval of the concept. Unk-nouingly.

Montgomery was about to fuel a fire that determined the fate of the campaign.

Montgomery's logic for proposingaction was faultless.SHAEF had failed to

give guidance; Eisenhowerhad neither spoken with nor signaled Monty since 13

August.Consideringthat 12'hArmy Group hadbegunits wide swing up the west bank

of the Seine and that the original phase-linesfor the OVERLORD lodgementwere

essentially occupied, Brigadier Belchem's postwar statement understates the

commandrequirement:

In good time, before we reachedthe Seine, the British would have

expecteda clear-cutmasterplan to suit the changedconditions,which
rendered obsolete the assumptions that had been made during the
before D-Day. 447
planningperiod

Still in operationalcontrol of both Army Groupsand as the seniorconunander

on the ground (an allegedly inviolate American operational principle, at least when an

American is in charge),Montgomery had every right both to expect to be consulted

over future to
action and receivehis commander'sintentions,as well as to expresshis

own ideasand plans for the future. Eisenhowerhad obviously given theseto Bradley,

but decidedto announcehis own changesin a staff conferenceon 20 August, Monty

then being off trying to coordinatethe closing of the Falaisegap and the sorting of his

own Army Group for operationsin a different directionacrosssomeAmerican lines of

"8
communication.

"' Major-GeneralDavid Belchem,All in the Day's March (London: Collins, 1978)212,213.

448MontgomeryLog, 21 August 1944.A
numberof historiansand Montgomery'sofficial biographer
misleadinglystatethat this conferenceoccurredon 19 August. Eisenhower'sappointmentdiary.
reproducedin the EisenhowerPapers,V, Montgomery'smessages to Brooke,and the TAC LOG of 21
AG haveno record of this allegedconferencefor commanders.Bradleydid not attend,but Smith, Dc

242
 That Bradleyhad not previouslyinformedEisenhowerof Monty*s ideasof the

17 August is unconscionable;Bradleywas a cautious,career-mindedman who viewed

Ike as his bossand his opinion not that of someforeigner(especiallyMontgomery)as

the determinant of his future. Bradley had everything to gain in keeping Eisenhower

informed. Eisenhower,in facL agreedwith this andhad sownthe seedsfor a complete

emotional break from alleged"British dominance,

" not just from pique inspired by

Tedder, Morgan, and SHAEF's staff, but from definitive "front channel" guidance

from GeneralMarshall. Marshall had signaledEisenhoweron 17 August referring to

adversepublicity concerningBradley'sbeingunderMontgomery'scommand:

[T]he Secretary[Mr. Stimson] and I and apparentlyall America are

strongly of the opinion that the time hascome for you to assumedirect
exerciseof commandof the Americancontingent.I think you will have
to consider this matter very carefully becausethe reaction here is
seriousand will be, I am afi-aid,injectedinto the debatesin Congressin
the next 24 hours.449

Eisenhower needed no caution to "have to consider this matter very carefully. "

From the time of his direction to mount ANVIL, he had been waging a campaign to

dominate the plans for Northwest Europe with Marshall's strategy. ANVIL's conduct,

and its placement under an American commander, was designed to eliminate the

Mediterranean as a serious theatre of war. The Americans would run the "suction

pump" in reverse and remove their best formations from Clark's Fifth Army and

effectively halt any seriousoffensivesin Italy.450

Guingand,and seniorstaff from SHAEF were present.This wasnot anotherof the SHAEF "Monty
refusesto visit" conferencespopularly cited by historians.
449Marshall Papers,4,550,55 1.
450GeneralMark W. Clark, CalculatedRisk (New York: Harper
and Brothers,1950),368-372.Clark,
whoseAnglophobia is unchallengeable, agreedwith the British analysisof the MediterraneanStrategy

243
 in an emotional meeting on 9 August. Eisenhower had con&onted an

Churchill, Southern France landing

overwrought who attempted to reverse the
45
decisionin favor of a continuedoffensive in Italy- 1 Refusingto add his supportto

for
that debate,Eisenhower(as spokesman the AmericanChiefs on ANVIL) had dealt

a deathblow to the British Mediterranean Ike

strategy. had essentiallyendedmilitary

discussionof the issue,much as Marshall had personallyquietedClark in Italy. That

Montgomery
chore accomplished, (who had been demonizedby SHAEF's staff. by

the American by
generals, the airmen,and by in
Eisenhower private to his aidesand

had
commanders), to be eliminated from influenceand from publicity concerningthe

war. This was especiallytrue now that had

success beenobtained.Monty, who could

be blamed for the stalemate,was never to be permittedcredit by the Americans for

any of the breakout or capture of the lodgement.It was an election year and. more

important,Marshall's confidencein Eisenhowerwas at stake.Ike intendednot only to

take command,he intended to put Monty in his place. As SupremeCommander.

432
Eisenhowerintendedthat the NEPTUNE campaignbe seenashis own.

in the post-Rome-capturephase,and soughtto keephis Fifth Army intact for a drive into Austria. He
discussedthis personallywith Marshall,and viewedthe subsequentdecisionsas"political. "
451Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,225-227;EisenhowerPapers,11'.2065,2066 fn 1.
452Eisenhower,Reportofthe SupremeCommander,39,61, EisenhowerPapers,IV. ibid., 2074-2077.
Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,ibid., 263. EisenhowerdenigratesMontgomery'srole by rcferring to
him as a "coordinatorof activities." Poguerepeatsthis by claiming that Montgomery'scommandhad
become"that betweenthe direction of an operationand the coordinationof a joint effort." If this is
true, it is becauseEisenhowersetout to underminehis subordinate'sauthority.or that Bradley choseto
disobeyor be disloyal to his operationalcommander,an Americantrait in coalitionspracticedby
Stilwell in Burmaand Clark continuouslythroughoutthe Italian Campaign.Eisenhower's19 August
cableto Marshall downplaysMontgomery'srole aswell as defineshow Eisenhoweralwaysintended
to divorce Army Groups.By itself, this is one of the mostrevealingof the signalssentduring the war
and underscoresnot only the self-generatedhostility concerningcommandthat Eisenhowerhad built
up within himself, but alsohis long-termplans,which he had not sharedwith anyoneexcepthis
immediateentourageor Americans.

244
 Ike had begun this offensive with a three-point responseto Marshall: that

Bradley deservedcredit, not Montgomery-,that in his owm plans, he had always

intendedto separatethe army groups;and that he had beenin overall chargeof every

dimensionof the campaign.Testily respondingto the litany of presschargeson both

sidesof the Atlantic, he replied:

It seems that so far as the press and the public are concerned a
resounding victory is not sufficient; the question of "how" is equally
important. 453

Alluding as much to his own role as that of his American subordinate,

Eisenhowerstated:

[I]t would be a greatpity if Bradleyfailed to get the full credit due him
for his brilliant performancemerely becausegeneralinstructions and
he
policies pursued have been channeledthrough Montgomery. 454

Noting his staff s ideasas well as his own concerningthe plan for taking over

the control of groundforces,he stated:

In forecasting probable developments it was clear to us months ago that

about D plus 60 an American army group would be formed and soon
thereafter the battle against the enemy in Normandy should be won and
diverging lines of operation would then indicate the desirability of
cutting loose the Commander in Chief of the army group of the north
from the anny group of the center. Detailed, day by day coordination of
tactical arrangements would then be in the hands of these two group
Commanders in Chief, with broad coordination and allocations
determinedby 455
me....

453EisenhowerPapers,IV, ibid.
454Ibid. Montgomery
might havemadethe samecasefor himself after Eisenhowerbecame"Land
ForcesCommander."
455
Ibid., 2075.

245
 Finally when DRAGOON comes farther north. we will have
Commanderin Chief SouthernGroup.456

Ike continuedhis messagewith the following,

Some time ago I ordered my staff to be ready to function on the

Continent by September0... no major effort takes place in this
theaterby ground,sea,or air exceptwith my approvaland that no one
in this Allied commandpresumesto question my supremeauthority
457
and responsibilityfor the whole campaign.

Eisenhowerclearly had decidedto assume"direct exerciseof command," a

foregoneconclusionfrom his appointment;however,the clarity of his intentions had

yet to be aired. Ike had donenothing to maintaina bandof brothers,insteadpermitting

bickering and backbiting while he awaited the destruction of others, like Leigh

Mallory, by his favored subordinates.Strong leadershipwould have curbed this; he

demonstratednone.Nor had he ever approved"every major effort" ashe had claimed.

with the exceptionof using bombersto supportgroundtroopsandthe too narrow turn

towardsFalaisethat failed to destroythe enemy.Air and groundoperationshad fallen

more to the respectivecommandersthan to SHAEF, whoseplans section produced

nothing usable, and whose G-3 section did little more than read operationsplans

forwardedfrom 21 Army Group.458

It was characteristicof the men that Eisenhowerdid not tell Montgomerythat

he would assumecommandsoon and that a campaigndirective

would follow, but

4%Ibid., 2076. Note

the term DRAGOON replacedANVIL asthe codenamefor the Invasionof
SouthernFrance.Also, that the northern,center,and southernArmy Groups
nevershedtheir numbers
and were eventuallysimply referredto by them,ratherthan by their geographicarrangementas
preferedby SHAER The southernArmy Group wasthe Sixth.
457
Ibid.
458 The G-3 sectionin fact failed to updateor refine their Broad Front
analysis,which never matured
pasta typed draft with crudepencil sketchesand mineographed,cartoon-like
maps.

246
 to his
chose use staff, and that Montgomery,fighting a battle. askedhis Chief of Staff

to explain his ideas.Ike was no commander.He shirked the "hard" argumenteven

with his American commanders using Smith or Bull to convey potentially

confrontationalnews. Moreover,as Monty wrote his own directivesand did his own

operational thinking, it was always clear that 21 Army Group plans were

Montgomery's,not a potpouri of choicesofferedup by the staff. Eisenhowergenerally

acceptedhis staffs proposalsand had them draft directives. This in fact had been

done by the time Montgomery had learned of the changesin both command and

strategy.The staff had provided a plan and Eisenhower,compelledby Marshall, had

filled in the executiondate.459

Accedingto Montgomery'srequestto delay sendingthe directive, Eisenhower

no doubt consideredDe Guingand'sarrival at SHAEF with Montgomery's "points"

for discussionto be part of his Stationsof the Crossin dealingwith the British. As he

listened to and then deniedChurchill so often, hearingFreddieDe Guingandwas no

more than a pro forma duty as"Allied" commander.

Montgomeryincludeda copy of the points carriedby De Guingandto SHAEF

in his messageto the absentCIGS,via Lt. Gen.Nye at the War Office:

1. The quickestway to win this war is for the greatmassof the Allied
armiesto advancenorthwards,clear the coastas far asANTWERP,
establisha powerful air force in Belgium, and advanceinto the
RUHR.
2. The force must operateas one whole, with great cohesion,and so
strongthat it cando thejob quickly.

459AlanbrookePapers,6/12/30,EisenhowerPapers.IV, 2087-2089.Eisenhower'sintentionswere sent

to the CombinedChiefs on the aftemoonof 22 August as SCAF 67.

247
 3. Single control and direction of the land operationsis vital for
success.This is a whole timejob for oneman.
4. The great victory in N.W. France has been won by personal
command.Only in this way will future victories be won. If staff
control of operationsis allowed to creep in, then quick success
becomesendangered.
5. To changethe systemof commandnow, after having won a great
victory, would be to prolong the war.

Failing to accept Montgomery's points as outlined by De Guingand,

Eisenhower traveled to Montgomery's headquarterson 23 August at the British

commander'srequest.Their meetingwould changethe carnpaign,but its arguments

require analysisof three factors: strategicrelevance,operationalrelevance,and the

effect of commandon any of the possiblecoursesof action. Moreover,thesefactors

should be assessedas a military appreciation,not merely a political or personality

conflict. Strategy,the Duke of Wellington observed,is an option of difficulties; it is

theseoptionsthat shoulddetermine in
the verdict on the next step the c=paign. 460

4WAttributed to Arthur, Duke Wellesley.

of

248
 CHAPTER SIX

AN OPTION OF DIFFICULTIES

By late August 1944,the end of the plannedOVERLORD campaignhad been

but
reached, its true object had not been The
achieved. lodgement
areadeterminedby

the original COSSAC planners,boundedby the Seine and Loire, had all but been

occupied. The original port objective, Cherbourg,had been capturedand was being

for
reconstructed use after extensiveGerman demolitions. The Brittany port of St.

Malo had beencapturedon 17 August,but the critical ports of Brest, St. Lorient, and

Nantes had not. The essenceof NEPTUNE had been to establishthese ports, not

simply for immediate supply, but for the deploymentof the more than 30 divisions

still waiting transportin the United The

States. invasionof SouthernFrance,
renamed

DRAGOON, had gone forward on 15 August, its object to captureand develop the
461
key Riviera ports of MarseillesandToulon.

Logistics, as much as designating a concentratedoperational thrust line,

underlayMontgomery's proposalfor a concentratedthrust, though the possibilities of

developing such an offensive as originally conceivedwould meet with increasing

modification as the situation developed along the dispersed front ordered by

Eisenhower. Any option, however, was always laid over a history of cautious,

pessimistic forecasts. SHAEF's G-4 had estimated in April that demolition of

461TheSeventhUnited StatesArmy: Reportof Operations:France and German),1944-1945[hereafter

referredto asSeventhArm Reportof Operations],1,passim;Jeffrey Clarke aný RobertSmith
,v
Thompson,Riviera to the Rhine (Washington:Centerof Military History, 1993), 198; Field Marshal
Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Reportby the SupremeAllied CommanderMediterraneanto the Combined
ChiefsofStaffon Operationsin SouthernFrance August 1944[hereafterreferredto as Wilson, Report
by SACMED] (London: His Majesty's StationeryOffice, 1946);PRO,WO 205,21 A
Gp/511/1I/G(Plans) 18 Feb44, Subject:SubsequentMaintenanceof British and US Forces-
'OVERLORD!

249
facilities by a withdrawing enemywould average25 percentuniversally.except that

level devastation least 50 for facilities within 30

this of would climb to at percent

miles of the Seineor any port and also for facilities within 20 miles of the coastline

north of Dieppe, the actual planned forward maintenancearea for 21 Army Group.

Worsestill, at leasta 75 percentlevel of demolition was predictedfor the ports of Le

462
Havre,Rouen,and Dieppe,all key logisticscentersin the Allied logistical scheme.

The landing and transportationof suppliesfrom the ports of Brittany and the

Seineports were estimatedto be a significant brakeon operations.The supply of the

total complementof landed OVERLORD forces at the Germanborder without the

developmentof Antwerp was estimatedto be achievableat aboutD+240.The forward

army depot areasat that point were estimatedto require a shipmentof almost 26,000

463
tons daily alongsidethe shipmentof supplyreservestotaling nearing 189,000tons.

Early planning, in fact, had theorized the advance of either both Arnij, Groups

abreast, or the 21 Ar?ny Group alone to the northeastif the Brittanýyports had not

beendeveloped.The lines of communicationessentialfor theseadvancesrequiredan

unrestricteduse of the ports from Cherbourgto Caenfor the British forces,while the

American forces would require the use of ports from Nantes to Chartres,possibly

requiring

4'2NARA, RG 331,
entry 35, Box 228, SHAEF/E/9007,4April 1944,Subject:Post-OVERLORD
Railway ConstructionStudy, 1; NAC, RG 24, Volume 20568, File 952.013(DI23). MS "Liberation
CampaignNorth West E'urope,Administrative DevelopmentFromthe End of June44 to Openingof
Port of Antwerp Nov 44" [hereafterknown as"Liberation Campaign"](4
vols.), passim.
463RG 331, Entry 35, Box 228, SHAEF/1062/LogP. 25 March 1944,
SUBJECT:Logistical Planning-
Post-"OVERLORD"Operations,Tab A, "AssumedPhasingPostOverlord, RepresentingOptimistic
Estimateof Process,and Tab B, "EstimatedTonnagesRequiredto SupportEachAdvance."

250
 a comparatively long preliminary stand-still until these lines of
464
communication are organized.

From the beginning, logistics was seenas the arbiter of any operational thrusts,

the formation of fully

as the planners appreciated that ports, reserves of supplies,

functioning army rear maintenance areas, and the operation and construction of

airfields would require a two-week period of reorientation (under the original estimate

D+50 to D+65) before any major reorientation of planned thrusts from the original

be 465 Considering that none of the "optimistic"

maneuver planned could made.

by the NEPTUNE phase-lines permitted the development of

advances predicted

facilities as originally forecast, any rapid movement

supply, port, airfield, or rail

forward would require either a prolonged logistic pause, or drastic efforts to support

units, or variations on the thrust-lines selected. The logistics planners

selected

considered this early in NEPTUNE's execution, though no comment on the Broad

Front concept cpnceived by the Joint Planners was made.

In mid-June, "Post-NEPTUNE" Operations Administrative Appreciation No.

1, of 17 June 1944, offered an estimatebasedon the planners' latest effort, "Post-

NEPTUNE Planning Forecast No. I, " which offered a Broad Front scheme of

maneuverfor D+60 to D+330 and a new setof phase-linesand a buildup forecastinga

force of 63 Allied divisions on the continentby D+300. Along with it camea forecast

464SHAEF/1017/6/LogP, 4 March 1944,Logistical PlanningPosW'OVERLORD"Operations,

Minutes of meeting, 1430hours,2 March 1944.Italics are the author's.
"' Ibid., Annex A, 3. It shouldalso be notedthat a key logistical planning figure was the "division
slice," a term encompassingthe numberof personnel/vchiclesrequiredfrom divisional to theaterlevel
to maintain a single division. For the Americans,the planning figure for a divisional slice was40,000
men and 7,600 vehiclesand for the British, 40,000men and 8.000vehicles.Additionally, three
equivalentdivisions" were addedto British forcesfor Indcpen. dentTank Brigadesand LOC Brigades
in the initial troop list.

251
 be by dates. Considering their impact on the land battle.
of ports to captured certain

these should be noted:

Rouen D+95
.........................
Dieppe D+100
........................
Le Havre 13+110
....................
Boulogne D+195
....................
Calais D+200
.........................
Dunkerque D+210
.................
Antwerp D+280466
.....................

The American port of Brest would be used primarily for the landing of troops

and vehicles and the ports south of the Loire were not considered part of the

maintenance of American forces. The early capture of ports in the American sector

were forecast as:

Cherbourg D+7 (this varies from FUSA estimate, D+ 17)

..................
Granville D+17
....................
St. Malo D+26
.....................
St. Nazaire D+40/90
.................
Nantes D+40/90
........................
Quiberon Bay D+40
.............
Brest D+50
...........................
Lorient D+50
........................

466MHI, Papersof ColonelFrank Osmansk![hereafterreferredto as OsmanskiPapers],SHAEF G4

Division, 381 (GDP) SHAEF 11062nlGDP,"Post-'Neptune'OperationsAdministrative Appreciation
No. 1,17 June 1944,1,2. Note that AnnexureA of this documentcontainsa completediscussionof
the "summary of manoeuvre"forecastby the G-3 plannersaswell asplanningmapsdelineatingphase
lines and illustrating the developmentof advancebasesand forward depotareas.This appreciationwas
not approvedand forwardeduntil 3 July 1944.

252
 467
All ports were expected to be producing some tonnage by D+60- In addition

to supplies,bulk POL (petrol, oil, lubricants)delivery in tonnagewas predictedto be

468
in excessof 13,200tons daily by D+90 and 15,271 tonsby D+ 180.

Rail transportationwas to be a key element of any movement beyond the

lodgement area. Allied airpower had done much to devastatemain rail lines. the

Germansdemolished that 469

Lines were needed
withdrawing most of which remained.

from the Brittany ports to maintain US forces and to supply the Paris area. British

forceswould needrail supportdramaticallyafter the period D+90/120 as they moved

up the coast, but if the phase line developmentforecast for both operations and

logistics were met, much of the rail capacitysouthof the Seinewould revert to US use

lines 470
as the Channel
ports and their rail wererestored.

The logisticians offered three inescapableconclusions among their many

observations:

1. That port capacities would support forecast operations only if ports were captured

and developedper the No

forecast. margin for additional capacitywould exist except

for the ports southof the Loire, which werenot scheduledfor use.

467
Ibid., AnnexureC.
418Ibid., AnnexureK. Note that the G4 plannersestimatedthat the supply requirementfor a divisional
slice was 800 tons daily for an operatingUS division-,500 tons daily for a stagingUS division; and 700
tons daily for an operatingBritish divisional slice. (SeeAnnexureD).
469Administrative AppreciationNo. 1,7; JosephBykofsky and Harold Larson,Tile Transportation
Corps: OperationsOverseas(Washington:Centerof Military History, 1957,1990),242-244;The War
Office, Transportation:TheSecondWorld War 1939-1945,ArmY(London: 1950), 147-149;The War
Office, AdministrativePlanning: TheSecondWorld War 1939-1945,Army [hereafterreferredto as
AdministrativePlanning) (London: 1952),ChapterXV, passim,AppendicesE, F.
470Administrative AppreciationNo. 1,7.

253
2. That of
reserves supplybeyond21 days be
would not acc=ulated until late in the

campaigndue to port development.

3. With the known road/truckcapacity.the movementof storesinland could be met

if development 71
only the rail plans were met!

While ports and their developmentdominatedthe administrativeplan, it was

known that the shift of ports northeastwardby the British would reducetonnageand

distancefor their own forcesand that the prime supportof the American forceswould

come first through the Cotentin ports, and then through their developmentof the

Brittany ports and the Quiberon Bay project. As a result, the logistical planners

estimatedthat:

The main thrust by the US forcesfrom the lodgementareais not likely

to takeplacebeforeD plus 120.

Moreover, the Americansrequiredadditional sustenanceas their forces grew.

It was notedthat:

Soon after the capture of PARIS about D plus 135, it will be advisable,
in view of the length of the [lines of communication], to form a second
US advanced base in the neighbourhood it will thereafter hold a
...
major part of US reserves brought in after this period, except those
required further forward for greater accessibility. 47.

Logistics, of course, was the most complex of the Allied relationships.

Operationssuch as air were driven by urgencyof time; logistics had a theology all its

own that the major Allies neveragreedupon.The OVERLORD debateover adequate

shipping was indicative of this, but now the mechanicsof delivery took on a

4" Ibid., 8,9.

4'2
Ibid., 12.

254
 the determiners seemedto be facelessbureaucrats.
overly
remark-ablerole, of which

complicatedprocedures,and men who consistentlywarned againstdoing some plan

but who never seemedto advise the commanders"what they can do." Worse, the

machineryfor logisticshadneverbeenfine-tunedto the reality of war.

Eisenhower'sown role in failing to preparehis American theater "COMZ"

(Communications Zone) was a significant problem. While reforming his overall

ETOUSA (EuropeanTheaterof Operations,US Army) organizationand un-naming

his hated logistics chief, Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, as Deputy Theater Commander,

Eisenhower had not solved the same problems that overshadowedthe first great

American ExpeditionaryForce commander,Generalof the Armies John J. Pershing.

His field commanderscontinuedto bicker andblamelogisticians;for supplyproblems,

problems were not solved, and Eisenhower, fearing a showdown with the Chief of

Army Service Forces in Washington, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, was remarkably

timid in complaining or demanding a more effective structure when visited by

473
Somervell'stroubleshootersin April 1944.

Moreover, the stopgap measures favored by the ground commanders brought

horror to the planners, who saw that they led not only to diminishing returns but to

unquenchable future demands. These would be unfilled due to the impending

473SteveR. Waddell, UnitedStatesArmj, Logistics: TheNorman4vCampaign,1944(Westport,Conn.:

GreenwoodPress,1994),Chapters1,5; Grahamand Bidwell, Coalitions, Chapter12; John Kennedy
Ohl, Supptvingthe Troops:GeneralSomervelland AmericanLogisticsin World War 11(DcKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press,1994),227-229.Eisenhowerwasa masterplayer in US Army
politics and fcarcd Marshalland his henchmen,the headsof AAF and ASF. Given Somervell's
tremendousstandingwith Marshall,Eisenhower'scffectivenessin dealingwith supply issueswas
neutralizedin the sameway his dealingswith air issueswere for fear of antagonizingArnold. While
Eisenhowercomplainedto his subordinates,he neededa crisis in the winter of 1944beforehe would
act. Even then,the crisis had to be paintedasreflecting neitheron Marshall's War Departmentnor on
Eisenhower'sown theater.

255
 disaster trucks at a high tempo for
maintenance of running unseTviced and aircraft

indefinite periods. These trucking lines, the Red Lion and Red Ball Express.were

delivering rates adequateto sustain movement,but not to stock supplies and fuel

forward, a spiraling diminution of future capabilities. The use of air transPOrt,

temporarily solved by the formation of CATOR (the Combined Air Transport

Operations Room) for assigning priority lift, was directly in opposition to

Eisenhower'sown creationof the First Allied Airborne Army, whosecharter was to

combine air transport and airborne forces to mount combat operations. FAAA

demandedthat air transport of supplies stop for the training of troop carrier and

airborneunits, a direct blow to the groundcommanderswishing only supply. Bradley.

474
the biggestbenefactorof air supply,steadfastlyopposedairborneoperations.

Eisenhower, therefore, had more than simply the allocation of forces to

predetermined avenues as a problem. Montgomery had stressed the operational

concept of a concentrated operational thrust, both to Bradley and Alanbrooke and to

Eisenhower via De Guingand in his "pointe' paper. Yet, in these written

communications, he failed to gain acceptance on the obvious element of priority of

logistics, the basic conclusion that had driven him to propose the maneuver itself As

he sought to meet with Eisenhower, this topic would be

one of his key points, no less

than a determinant of how operations would progress. And, in the argument, as time

made the logistics situation more unfavorable, Eisenhower viewed the Montgomery

proposal as "exclusionary, " not a rationale for continued decisive action. Thus,

logistics became the sword that cut the

cord to the other key elements of

474
21Arm,v GroupAdministrative
History,31-61;"LiberationCampaign, for
" 3345. see Four
Chapter

256
 Montgomery's proposal,which were the thrust itself. and commandand/or control.

neither of which followed Eisenhower's preconceptionas defined by the Joint

Planners.Though Monty was offering a logistical stopgap,Eisenhowerneither saw

this, nor did he hark back to the obviousconclusion-that the Americanshad failed to

carry out their part of the OVERLORD in

plan capturingports-nor would he permit

temporarily halting the American advancewhile Montgomerymoved up to establish

base hadbeen by
foreseen 475
the planners.
the Seineports as

Clearly, the Brittany to

ports were essential the American portion, indeed,the

larger portion of the Allied Campaign Plan. Yet, by 22 August, the day that

EisenhowerdisapprovedDe Guingand'sproposalon Monty's behalf, the Americans

had done little to fulfill the original concept.Brest, which had beenPershing'smajor

for deploying the AEF, was likewise chosen for the new AEF for the same
port

Its
reasons. facilities,
deep-water port capabilities,and open approachto the Atlantic

made it the prime port consideredfor Eisenhower's follow-on force of American

divisions. Yet Brittany's ports still tied up four divisions, including a pricelessasset,

an armored division, parked in the bocage outside of a port-a totally useless

instrument and a stark commentaryon Bradley's knowledge of mobile, armored

476As before in Normandy, Bradley could fight in two directions, a

warfare. not

problem that would arisecontinually,but not simply in the Americancamp.

discussionof effect of First Allied Airborne.

45
'*
Alanbrooke Papers, 6/2/3 1: M99, M52 1, Appendix B. It should be remembered that the object of
OVERLORD was to gain a lodgement capable of supporting 26-30 divisions.
476 ThirdArmj, AfterAction Report, I Situation Map, 21 August 1944; Patton Diaýy, 4,13 August;
Hanson W. Baldwin, TigerJack (Fort Collins, Colo.: Old Army Press, 1979), 42-46. Patton's haste to
turn into Brittany both the 4" and 6" Armored Divisions, arguably the two best formations of armor to
serve in his Army throughout the war, demonstrated that the Americans more than Monty were
concerned about following the original NEPTUNE design. Indeed, the 4' Armored's tempestuous

257
 Montgomery'sadministrationposedmore uniqueproblems.Closeto his main

base,the War Office handledsupply and administrationuntil late in the Normandy

campaign, and his own need for rail and long-haul road supply did not match

Bradley's forceson the outsideof the Allied armies,the "marching wing" spokenof

so dramaticallyby Eisenhower.
While Red Lion was as much a stopgapas the overly

praised Red Ball Express,the frantic supply techniqueusing long-haul trucks made

more sense in Montgomery's 21 Army Group sector as he was actually moving

forward toward his planned advancedbase area and the major ports to supply his

GermanWest Wall.477
campaignagainstthe

Montgomeryhad foreseenthis. In March, he had initiated planningby Crerar's

headquartersfor AXEHEAD, the crossingof the Seine and seizureof his planned

administrativebaseand ports on the Channelin conjunctionwith the SecondBritish

Army.478AXEHEAD was unpopular with the SHAEF logistic planners, as was

LUCKY STRIKE, becauseboth jeapordized a methodical move forward while

commander,Maj. Gen.John Wood, arguedthat -we are winning the war the wrong way (in the wrong
direction)" when orderedwestwardby an irate Patton.Onceit was clearthat Brestand Loricnt would
be defended,releasingthe armor, the only self-containedand self-mobileformationsin the American
campshouldhavebeenobvious. Bradleyheld back. Pattonremainedsilent on the topic. 6" Armored
"contained" Brest and then Lorient, not beingrelievedof duty in the bocagcuntil 12 September.
Contraryto the Germans,who consideredtheir panzerformationsto be their true operationalweapon,
the Amcricans--dcspitc their printed doctrinc-nevcr graspedthe operationalimport of concentrating
armor or using it as an operational-levelweapon;interview with Maj. Gen. PeterC. Hains Ill. 1991.by
author.
477"Liberation Campaign," ibid., AdministrativePlanning, 52-54,88-91; 21 Army Group
AdministrativeHisto?y, 33-34,46-47. During early September,some 1,400British trucks were found
to havedefectivepistons;how many of thesetrucks were-non-runners"on any specific day is not
clear.nor is the time spanof the problem.
478NAC, RG 24, Volume 10452,"OperationAXEHEAD," Volume 10433,HQ Airtps/2500/80/G,3
June44, "Employment of an Airborne Division During AXEHEAD."These two files contain
information on the forecastsfor NEPTUNE, and detailedplanningguidancefor the assaultacrossthe
Seineto seizethe Seineport areas.Indicationsarethat AXEHEAD's conceptualplanning beganearly
in March, the earlier files being destroyedwhen replacedby moredevelopedplans.Includedin f Ile is
discussionfor useof 79" Armoured Division's specializedvehiclesknown as-Funnies," special
engineerrequirements,outline planning for attackson Le Havreand Dieppe,planning directivesfor

258
 establishing dumps, depots, pipelines, and rail from the "scheduled- openings of

ports. Moreover, AXEHEAD led to an unpopular notion that 21 Army Group's 16

divisions would move forward past D+90 while 12tbArmy Group built up storesand

reserves.Nor did SHAEF's logisticiansseeMonty continuing simply to move up the

in The
coast a continuousmaneuver. plannersestimatedthat the Seineports would not

be captured until D+120 and, until "developed," would require an additional one-

479
month "stand-down"by Montgomery'sforces.

That the ostensibly logistics-cautiousMonty had both advocatedand then

executed LUCKY STRIKE-focusing on the battle at hand while pushing for the

to
wider envelopment the coastcombinedwith an executionof AXEHEAD, despite

the obvious logistical risks for the future-must haveinspiredadditional to

resistance

SHAEF's support for any plans he advanced.Lt. Gen HumphreyGale, Eisenhower's

Chief Administrative Officer, was one of Montgomery's critics at SHAEF. Helping

Monty, even to hurt the Germans,was anathemaat SHAEF. This was especiallytrue

headedby 480
since SHAEF's G-4 PlansandMovementsSectionswere Americans.

AXEHEAD, an inventory of landingcraft available(for planningpurposes)for a "Provisional Naval

Assault Force" and two detailedappreciationsof currentplanningby CrerarconcerningAXEHEAD.
479Roland Ruppcnthal,Logistical Supportofthe Armies,I (Washington:Office of the Chief of Military
History, US Army, 1953),461,487; NARA RG 407, Entry 427, Box 1978,1' Army 101-3.5
OVERLORD, "21 A Gp/20698/G(Plans),14June 1944," Directive to CommandingGeneralFirst
United StatesArmy Group,"SubsidiaryOperationsto further OVERLORD." This memoand its
attachmentsoutline the relative issuesof HANDS UP, LUCKY STRIKE, BENEFICIARY, and
CHASTITY (QuiberonBay project) asseenby 21 Army Group. It showsthe continuity of plansthat
were expressedin Montgomery's"M" seriesdirectives;NAC RG 24. Volume 10540,File
215A21.013(D28)hasmost completelogistical assessments and overlaysconcerningLUCKY
STRIKE. It also includesthe completelogistical "problems" appreciationof having"minimal time"
betweenphaselines-the actualsituationthat developed.
480MHI, OsmanskiPapers.The headof the planssectionwrote a bitter memoir attackingthe Field
Marshal.See"Field MarshalMontgomery" in his papers.Eisenhoweralso apparentlydealt directly
aroundthe SHAEF G4 with them while planningto keepthe Americansmoving, if needbe at the
expenseof the British. Seememoson wide envelopmentincludedwithin the papers.Montgomery
thought Gale was incompetentand blamedhim for logisticsproblemsin Italy during the 1943
campaign.

259
 SHAEF also relied heavily on poaching on 21 Army Group's organic

transportationassetsto supply 12th Army Group. This was apparentnot only during

the breakout phasefrom Normandy, but also during the encirclementoperationsfor

the Falaisepocket. The turn north acrossthe Seinecontinuedthis trend. Given the

delayed start of the invasion, the predictablegale seasonwhich would close down

over-the-beachsupply operations,the failure to captureand developtheir own ports,

and the to land

perceivedneed simultaneously more divisions anda supplyreservefor

them, the specterof "wintering in Normandy" for 12th Army Group loomed as a

possibility in August despite the operationalsuccessesof NEPTUNE. Five British

truck companieswere given to Bradley on I August and were laterjoined by British

rail engineers to support American construction. These loans were extended to

operationsbeyondthe Seine.Air transportof supplies,

of course,
all went to US forces

few 481
exceptfor a scheduledsorties.

Centralto the unsolvedBrittany port problemwas the CHASTITY Plan. or the

Quiberon Bay Project. QuiberonBay, northwestof the Loire Estuary,was chosenfor

the creation of a large artificial port to offset the needto developthe Loire ports of

Nantes.and the heavily defended U-Boat base at St. Nazaire. It required the

neutralizationof St. Nazaire's batteries,and the captureof Belle Isle that dominated

its approaches.Once established,it offered the possibility of deferring the captureof

St. Nazaireand Nantes.

CHASTITY was crucial for more than just portage.SHAEF was pressedto

reducethe amountof shippingallocatedto supportingNEPTUNE, a large backlog of

48t ,
Liberation Campaign," 19-21.

260
which was awaiting unloading.Due to the projectedwithdrawal of critical -coasters-

after D+42, this would require that US

deeper-draft Liberty ships assumea greater

load. This meantthat lighterswere neededuntil the projectedD+90 period. Quiberon

Bay's shelteredbeach,four nearby minor ports, and a local rail and road network

be
would not only more efficient, but would also makepossiblethe transferof future

arrivals of divisions from the more distant Brest port, the Cotentin or St. Malo ports.

be US First Third Armies, 482

and would closerto the and respectively.

The late captureof Brittany ports, the rapid advance,and the failure to capture

Brest all led to different for

considerations CHASTITY. QuiberonBay was reachedby

5 August, but the key Belle Island positions were not fully clearedeven two weeks

later. The creationof the full anchoragethen was held in abeyanceat the height of the

turn both into Brittany and eastwardstowardsthe Seine,at the exact moment when

logistics was beginningto showits greateststrain.

The conductof the Brittany Campaignwas the culprit. Montgomerycontinued

to namethe Brittany ports within his operationaldirectives,but the focuson "business

to the east" left Bradley to managehis own forces, and he and Patton ignored
483
Brittany. Moreover, the American Theater Commander,Eisenhower,for whom

American supply and deployment were key responsibilities, failed to ensure his

American subordinatesunderstoodthe full implications of the entire Brittany plan.

492GeneralBoard Study,No. 1,21,22; CMH MS, ML-754, Outline Chronolo&qfNotes on the

Histoty of ContinentalOperations,11,3542.
4" Bradley's ascensionto Army Group Commanderleft Montgomerywith broadoperationaldirective
control but far lessability to discussindividual objectivesand tacticswith Bradley,who grew
increasinglyprickly under British command.Monty might havesuggestedthat the divisions "masked-
by the Bradley-inspiredtight envelopmentat Falaisebe transferredto Third Army to clear the southern
Brittany port areasof QuiberonBay and St. Nazairc,but this wasone of the hazardsof a coalition

261
Brest, the port selected for deployment. did Quiberon Bay. which had been
not equal

carefully chosen by the Chief of Movements of CONIZ to solve the problem of

supplying Third Army. However, the reduction of Brest was claimed by ANXF as

essential before attempting to maintain Quiberon Bay as a base. Bradley, of course.

do 484
strained to neither.

Patton, who had permitted Wood's 4'h Armored to turn eastwardwithout

capturingits key objectiveswhen the enemy'sdefenseswere unfortned.and without

replacingthe armor with attackinginfantry, gainedgroundbut lost a chanceat solving

485
his own problemsbeyondthe Seine. Eisenhower,who had written to Montgomery

in late July stressingthe needto captureBrittany, and who, more than anyone,was in

daily contactwith and obviously superiorto Bradley,had failed to stressthe need to

assureCHASTITY's implementation.

Eisenhower'sfailure to deal with this issuethroughoutthe first three weeksof

August also demonstratedhis inability to balance Supreme Allied Command.

American Theater Command,and his "'oversight" of the battlefield. CHASTITY's

lingering silent death required major attention if either the Broad Front or

whoseprotocol openly discourageddiscussionof operationswithin anothernation's opcrationalscctor.

This practicewould be a fatal flaw later in the campaign.
484Outline ChronologvofNotes. ibid. Neither AmericanOfficial History, TheLogistical Support the
of
Armies, 1,nor Blumenson,Breakoutand Pursuit adequatelyexplainsthe CHASTITY Planand its
variant supportingplans, BENEFICIARY, HANDS-UP,and SWORDHILT, nor the failure of Bradley
and Pattonto pressfor the captureof the ports,which they told SHAEF on 9 August would be sccurcd
'within a few days." Nor is the delay of the decisionto cancelCHASTITY for one month into
Septemberby SHAEF explained.The completechronologyand excerptsof the issuesand plans can bc
found only in the cited documentpreparedby the theaterheadquarters.
4" Harold L. Mack, "The Critical Error World War I L" National DefenseUniversity: National
of
SecurityAffairs Paper81-1; (DefenseTechnicalInformationCenterAD A097275),4-12. Mack was
the Chief of Movementsfor COMZ. He blamesBradleyfor failing to inform Patton.His
unsubstantiated criticisms of Montgomeryaretypical of Americanstaff officers passingon
headquartersgossipand thejingoism that pervadedthe Americanarmy. Most of this discussionis
irrelevantto his topic.

262
 concentratedthrust strategy was to be implemented and a continued offensive

23 August, had been 4st'

done.
As
maintained. Monty andEisenhower
met on this not

The logic of the situation. as graphicly portrayed by the planners in their

forecast,was to immediatelymount an attackto the northeast,to clearthe coastand to

Seine 487
Paris. A full press to
capture the ports simultaneousto an encirclementof

executeAXEHEAD, and the cancellationof air supply to mount airborneoperations

to
either capturethe Boulognearea(BOXER) or Tournai (TRANSFIGURE).mounted

a considerablelogistical threat to Bradley and his anxiouscharger,Patton.Executing

0

either plan essentiallywould cancelBradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE plan.

These options poseda large problem to Eisenhowerin his considerationof a rapid

thrust to the northeastor two "equally" balancedthrusts SHAEF's

eastward. planners

were not the only logisticiansseeinga problem with executingAXEHEAD in lieu of

an operational and logistical pause.21 Army Group's "Q" estimate for 17 August

warned that a pursuit beyondthe Seinemight outstrip the ability to developLe Havre

and Rouen in time to supporttheseoperations,though the plannersstressedthe need

to continue developingtheseports as they would also affect the feeding of Paris and

the future support of the Americans.More important to Montgomery's plans, the

British estimatenotedthat the

small channel ports in the area DIEPPE must be developedto the

maximum ... since in the event of a quick advancethesewill give us
the only intake by sea until we reach ANTWERP-ROTTERDAM.

486GeneralBoard StudyNo. 1,21, OutlineChronologvoffttes, 39; SHAEF

consideredweather
considerationswould requirecaptureof QuiberonBay by I October.SinceBrestdid not fall until 18
September,and no attackshad beenmadeto completethe captureof Belle Island,the plan apparently
was dropped"for the present."
48'NARA, RG 33 1, Box 75. MAPS D+90 and D+120to accompanyPost-NeptunePlanningForecast
No. 1, May 1944.

263
 Circumstanceswill decide whether BOULOGNE and CALAIS are
488
opened.

The same estimate stressedthat the Americanswould continue to need a

2,000-ton daily The fact for the future. however.

air transport of supplies. satisfactory

was that following the opening of Le Havre, the British would be able to operate

without over-the-beach maintenance, a benefit that would subdue the weather risk

lines for the advancing Army Group. This. of

plus provide shorter of communication

course, presumed Le Havre was not handed over to the Americans. which was

SHAEF's intent to make up for Bradley's failure to develop his own ports.489

The "Q" appreciationof 21 Army Group recommendingthe location of the

Army Group's maintenancebeyondthe Seinestressedthe operationalsituation of the

enemy following their escapefrom the Alencon-ArgentanGap. Stating that the

to
enemy,unable reform a defensiveline, be
would pursued,and noting the benefits

that an Americanadvanceoffered,the appreciationstated:

We must ensurethat the pursuit of the retreatingenemyby the British

and Canadian armies shows an equal disregard for maintenance
limitations.

Stating that continuing a pursuit and its maintenancebeyondthe Seinewas the sole

for the British forces, it 490These were

problem outlined possiblecoursesof action.

soonfinalized.

489
"Liberation Campaign," 35, quoting Q Plans21 A Gp WD Aug 44 Appx H, Q Plansof 17 Aug 44
HS/WD/NWE/9/l. H
489
Ibid.
490Ibid.. Q Apprcciation,21 August, 21 A Gp/5552/9/Q.

264
 21 Army Group's long-term plan for logistics was issuedon 22 August. the

day of the Eisenhower-DeGuingandmeeting. It outlined a four-stageplan for the

developmentof the areaeastof the Seineas the British advancedbase-in the areaof

Le Havre, Rouen, and Dieppe. The Seine ports, it assumed,would always be

needed-if not for British operations,then to supportthe feedingof Paris and for the

supportof American operations.Assumingthat the CanadianArmy would operateon

the Army Group's left, clearing the coastalsectorwith two corps, while the Second

Army operatedtoward Amiens with the American 12thArmy Group to its right, the

plan additionally theorized an advancetowards the Somme. For this operation. it

stipulatedroad maintenancebeyondthe Seinebut rail and road maintenanceup to the

Seine during Stage 1. Stage 2 would require the capture a port for maintenance,

I
probably. Dieppe, while Dempsey's army continued to be based on the rear

miffitenance area. During Stage 3 following the capture of Le Havre and the minor

Seine ports, the forward base would be stocked and the development of forward ports

such as Rouen and Fecamp would begin. Stage 4 would see the transition from the

Normandy rear base to sole supply from the advanced base as stocks were "eaten

down.,,491

Significantly absentfrom any "Q" appreciationat this juncture is the port of

Antwerp. The planning for TALISMAN (renamedECLIPSE),concerninga complete

collapse of the enemy and a subsequentrush into Germany by the Allies, named
492
Rotterdam and Hamburg as the key logistical bases for the 21 Army Group.

491NAC, RG 24, Volume D63, File "OP PLANS", 21 A Gp/5541/2/Q(Plans).

22 Aug 44, Development
of British Advance BaseEAST of the SEINE, 1-4.
492
Ibid.

265
 for British though it is
Antwerp, however,was not yet seenas essential a advance.

doubtful that 21 Army Group's MGA (Major General,Administration).had yet been

advisedof Montgomery's for

plan a thrust deepinto the Ruhr andbeyond.

On the Allied right, the Americanswere advancingaway from their ports and

deliveredfrom eitherAntwerp (D+240 capture)or the

were not due to seesustenance

Riviera ports for an extendedperiod. Nor were these ports within the realm of

operationalplanning on 22 August. The Americans had not abandonedtheir pre-

NEPTUNE logistics plan, nor had significant operationalguidancefocusedlogistical

planning for The

specific maneuvers. broadestand most undefinedof "fronts," the

phase-linesperiodically issuedby the G-3 forecast,appearedto be the only guidance

493
for internalplanningby SHAEF.

"Forecasts"'by Eisenhower's plans staff provided "a basis for calculating

future requirements.
" Beginning in May, the plannersperiodically circulated these

amongplans staffs at SHAEF, AEAF, and ANXF, but did not apparentlysendthem

"downward" to the Army Groups. At various times, instructions concerning these

included:

[C]opies of this forecastmust not be distributedofficially outside the

headquartersof ANXF, SHAEF, or AEAF; nor must it be quoted
officially in correspondence.

Such commentsaccentedthe theoreticalnature of the work. The G-3, in a

memo to the Chief of Staff conceminga requestfor a forecastby the British Chiefs of

Staff, cautioned,

493NARA, RG 331, SHAEF PostOverlord Forecasts,Plans370-32,SHAEF/18008/I /Ops, 15 April 44,

Subject:Post-'NEPTUNE' PlanningStaff Forecast.

266
 In a matter of this kind the answerswill be largely guess-work.but an
attempthas beenmadebý the plannersto producewhat they consider
be
to a reasonableguess. 44

The forecasts, however, provide an accurate barometer of SHAEFS

at different periodsand a reflectionof what Eisenhowerhad beenbriefed.

assessments

Besidesthe phase-linesthat had cometo shapeimpressionsof successand failure, the

forecastsalso includedsummarystatementsconcerningkey issuesor problemsas seen

by SHAEF or as reported by the lower headquarters.With the impending dissolution

of AEAF and the lesser role of ANXF, these forecasts most likely became the

planners' soliloquies-their own versionof reality.

meeting,theseestimateshad been
By the time of the Eisenhower-Montgomery

obsolete for a month. The last forecast, No. 1, had been introduced by a memo

pointing out that:

At D+270 an offensive will be launched NORTH of the ARDENNES

with the object of capturing the RUHR. A subsidiary offensive will be
launched at the same time SOUTH of the ARDENNES towards the
METZ GAP. It can be taken that by D+360, IRANKIN''C' conditions
have 495
will arisen.

Unknown to Eisenhower during his discussions with Montgomery, the

DRAGOON forces would reach---ontheir D+30 (14 Septemberý-the position they

had forecast for DRAGOON D+120. The DRAGOON forces had rapidly captured

Toulon and Marseille and were able to close their over-the-beachsupportoperations

by mid-September.Being the beneficiariesof a full four-week accelerationin

port

414Ibid., SHAEF/I 8008/l/Plans,27" May 1944,Post-'NEPTUNE' PlanningForecast

No. 1;
SHAEF/18008/l/Plans,GCT 370-32 Plans,Memorandum,27 August 1944,Forecast Progress-
of
Operation'OVERLORD.'

267
 forecasts an expandedminor harbor
clearance,plus exceedingover-the-beach and

the DRAGOON forces granteda logistical supportcapability that was not

plan, were .

by
challenged the shippingallottedto that part of the firont.

DRAGOON should have been a major consideration in Eisenhower's

it Rather than the Southern France

estimates; characteristically, was not. seeing

landings and the Riviera ports as assets, he saw them as Wilson's problem until

handed over to SHAEF, thus maintaining an overly strict adherence to coalition

be barrier for
protocol and lines of responsibility. Mentally, there seemed to a

Eisenhower to seeing the unfolding campaign. Southern France was not a part Of

Eisenhower's maneuver plans except to link up at an unforecast future date. The

logistical implications of absorbing the Southern France force seemedfarther still. 49"

At day's end, Eisenhowerseemedto have three choices:to support a single

line of operationsuntil logistics were improved by port clearanceand capture, to

dispersehis resourcesuntil his advancepeteredout due to lack of maintenance..

or to

order an operationalpauseas foreseenby the planners.Having ruled out a pause.he

was left with Monty's proposalfor a thrust

concentrated or that of his staff to advance

on a broadfront.

495Ibid.. SHAEF/18008/l/OpsPost-'NEPTUNE'PlanningForecast.9 May 1944.RANKIN was a

contingencyplan for troop movementin the caseof Germansurrender.This later wasreplacedby
TALISMAN and eventually,late in the war, ECLIPSE.
496Ruppethal,Logistical Support,1,28,29,117,118; Clarke and Smith.Riviera to the Rhine,Chapter
XI, 576, Table 1; Wilson, Reportb.v SACMED.3847. Eisenhowerfirst communicateshis ideasto his
commandersregardingSouthernFranceaboutthis time, and in SCAEF67.22 August. Of significant
importanceis the fact that the SouthernFranceports outproduccdAntwerp wheneverconvoys
supportedlanding supplies.This posesa significant questionasto whetherthe southernports and not
Antwerp shouldhavebeenconsideredthe prime supplierfor Third Army. a decisionthat would have
given Pattona one-monthjump on adequatesuppliesduring the fall campaign.Moreover.it calls the
questionon the true result of stripping the Mediterraneanof naval resourcesto favor a Pacific advance
by the Americans.

268
 Logistics,the dominatingforce of strategy.momentarilytook a rear seatto the

strategic and operational picture as it appearedtoward August*s end. "Victory

Disease" dominatedthe Allied councils of war. The rapid pace of operationsduring

August led to the destruction of both the German Seventh Army and the successor of

Panzer Group West, the Fifth Panzer Army. The resulting intelligence picture,

estimatedat every level of senior command,fosteredan assurancethat old plans or

new should be implemented immediately to complete the victory achieved in

Normandy.apparentlyregardlessof logistical shortfalls.

The highestcommandechelonstrumpetedvictory in more strident tones than

the field headquartersstill fighting the battles.The Joint IntelligenceCommittee,who

acted as the all-source integrator for the Allied high command, predicted on 14

August that military defeatGermanywould occurbeforethe endof 1944,continuinga

trend of strategicoptimism that grew with eachreport until fall. 497

SHAEF's Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 22, for the week ending 19

August, summarizedthe effect of the greatturning movementleaving only the Seine

as an escaperoute for the remainingGermandivisions facing the 21 and 121hArmy

Group. More than 200,000men were lost by the enemyand an additional 75,000men

were trappedin Brittany and the ChannelIslands-60 percentof the total force in the

West. Intelligence estimatedthat the enemy had committed about 1,700 tanks to

4" Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part2,366,367; John Ehrman.GrandStralegý, V, August 1943-

September1944(London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice, 1956),396-403.

269
battle, 700 of which were now destroyed; 600 of the remaining 1.000
perhapsonly C
498
werebelievedto be "runnem.

SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 23 offered a more dramaticProof

of a favorablesituation,not simply in the map graphicsof a tighter pocket of enemy

trappedagainstthe Seine,but of a general

with representations withdrawal from the

south and southeastof France.The final word given on enemy capabilities was

unadomed:

The August battleshavedoneit; the GermanArmy in the West has had

it. (T]he armies of Rundstedt,of Kluge, and of Model, are
... ...
committed willy-nilly to what must shortly be the total surrenderof
more than two-thirds of FRANCE.... Two anda half monthsof bitter
fighting havebroughtthe end of the war in EUROPEwithin sight.
...
almost within reach.The strengthof the GermanArmy in the WEST
has been shattered,PARIS belongsto FRANCE again,and the Allied
Armies are streamingtowardsthe frontiersof the Reich.499

Victory diseasewas not merely an intelligence phenomenon.Eisenhower

enumeratedthe enemylossesin a specialmessageto the CombinedChiefs, not only

as another confirmation of his own supreme command, but also feeding the

impressionthat the enemyhad been defeatedin the field.500Witnessing the enemy

destruction, the American press-distracted from their blame and critique of the

"stalemate" and "British dominanceof Eisenhowee'-now were keen to feed their

readersunadornedclaims of impending enemycollapse.The sourcesof these ideas

were, of course, the army press camps.Bradley had told his court correspondents

about the great psychological damagea penetrationof the German border would

4" SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 22.3.14.

499SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 23,4; EnemyOrder Battle in
of the West,25 August
1944(map).

270
have-setting the scene for his own planned thrust. SHAEF's correspondents began

reporting victory. Universal euphoria seemed rampant in the Allied camp, even

Eisenhower this in his own dealingswith

though appearedto attempt to mute subject

501
the press.

Prior to D-Day, an internal SHAEF study noted that the Germanscould not

hope for Allies, but hope that war wearinessor dissension

a victory over the might

Summingup, it noted:
amongAllies might granta compromiseagreement.

In any eventthe Nazi leadersmust realizethat for them there can be no

hope of survival under any peaceterms. For them, their position of
power, indeed their very existence,would depend on GERMANY
being able to stave off fmal defeat for as long as possible. Thus
German policy could have only one object-to prolong the war and
502
inflict maximumdamageon the Allies.

SHAEF intelligence,however,had not appreciatedtwo eventualities:that the

Germans would base their defenseforward in Normandy and not fight a classic

withdrawal along successivedefense lines, and that Hitler's own generalswould

attempt a coup based upon the

assassinating Fuhrer. The first had seen the near

destructionof the GermanArmy in the West,but had left the Allied armieswithout an

adequate posture
maintenance to mount a final offensive into the vitals of the Reich.

The second, while commented upon at the highest levels, brought no serious

considerationthat Germanywould based

self-destruct on the leadershipcrisis at hand.

50'EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2102-2104.
'0' With the exceptionof Patton,whosefrequentfulminationsare not food for supportableanalysison
the subject,no Allied generaleither predictedthe time neededto finish the victory or venturedany date
for victory, knowing full well that they would haveto deliver on such"promises." The generalbelief
amongAllied generalsseemedto be that victory was achievablein 1944or shortly after the new year.
302 NAPLA,RG 33 1. Entry 22, Box 168,"JIC Correspondence, " SHAEF/CIS/102/INT,SHAEF
CombinedIntelligenceStaff, AppreciationNo. 3,4" April 1944,1,2.

271
Hitler and his decisions,one sourcenotedýwere a benefit to the Allied war effort.

Killing him might strengthenthe Germanmilitary's ability to defendits borders-50ý

Thus, defeatingthe remainderof the GermanArmy in the West would be

critical. The Luftwaffe had been crippled by the air battles of 1944. the U-Boat

6-scourge"'
that had frightenedChurchill had beeneliminated:the 1,000-mileEastern

Front still "fixed" the bulk of the GermanArmy to preventan invasion by the Red

Army, a crucial factor in maintaininga favorableforce-ratioin the West. A ground

thrust in the West penetratinginto the industrialheartof Germanywould eliminate the

Germanindustrial ability to supportthe war and might end the war quickly. Equally

important, the GermanArmy in the West, unableto abandoneither the industrial or

populationbasesof their own homeland,

would be broughtto battle and destroyedby

the temporarilysuperiorAllied armies.

Time, of course,was the major issue.A decisive force, able to destroy the

GermanArmy in the west as well as its industrial basein short order, was necessary.

With the demonstratedGerman ability to rebuild units, to tap the huge unused

potential of the young,the old, and slavelabor, and the continuedability for dispersed

industries to amass new weapons, the strength differential of the Allies would

evaporatewith time. Whereand how to aim and concentratea decisiveblow or blows

was the basic argumentbrewing between Eisenhowerand Montgomery, but more

accurately,between the Americans and the British.504Fed by the victory disease

503
' SHAEF IntelligenceSummary,No. 22 for week ending 19 August 1944.6.21 Army Group
IntelligenceSummaryNo. 158,27 August 1944,2.
104SHAEF's
planning staff had selectedthe most acceptableoption, one which permittedthe
Americans,namely Bradley,to operate-independently," a policy that had beenunderscoredby
Stimson,Marshall, Bradleyand,despitehis "Allied" hat, Eisenhower.While, Montgomeryhad

272
rampant in Washington,in London, at SHAEF and. to a degree,within the Army

Groups, the validity of the strategyadopted-and the operationaldesign that would

spring therefirom-should have been the controlling factor in any military decision

taken.

SHAEF's Broad Front strategypaper had namedtwo objectives:the RUHR

and the SAAR, eachbehind one of the two best "gateways"into Germany.Each was

named the objective of the national Army Group facing that sector. The Planning

Staff, however, had masked key considerations,ignored significant military and

economicfacts, the factors

and oversimplified geographical involved.

SHAEF's CombinedIntelligenceStaff (CIS-later renamedJoint Intelligence

Committee, SHAEF), was charteredto "keep under constantreview the military and

political situation in the area for which SCAEF is responsible.

" Producing military

the
appreciations, committeehad from
representation eachnation, service,and special

section,as well as from the political It

advisers. had a coordinaterelationshipwith the

War Office JIC, which provided its 505

own appreciationsto SHAEF. A primary

producer of appreciationsused by the SHAEF G-2 for his own reports and Weekly

Intelligence Summary,it would have also beena key sourcefor the Joint Plans Staff

(JPS)that produced"Broad Front."

The CombinedChiefs hadnamedthe heartof Germanyas SHAEF's objective;

the Joint Plans Staff had expandedthis to the Ruhr and the Saar. This varied,

proposedthe alternativeplan, the concentratedthrust wasembracedby both Alanbrookc and Churchill

in turn, the British COS Committee,and the War Cabinet.The argumentwent beyondpersonalities-it
was political. It seemedto havelessto do with endingthe war than showingwho was in chargeand
could get credit for winning the war.

273
however,from the critical CIS AppreciationNo. 3 that the
predated BroadFront study

and which was heavily drawn upon by the Joint Planners,

who significant
reproduced

Broad Front study. The Combined

portions of the appreciationwithin their own

Intelligence Staff had noted two economic areas of primary importance: Berlin-

(alsonotedas the political centerof the country) and the

Leipzig-Dresden-Magdeburg

Ruhr. Accepting, as the JPS would, that the Berlin areawas too far to the East to

affect SCAEF's in
conductof a campaign the west,the CIS insteadbalancedthe Ruhr

againstother industrial areasin the west. Noting the importanceof oil and rubber to

the economy,the CIS estimatedthat the most accurateassessment

could be derived by

506
estimatingcapacityin steelandcoal production.

The percentageof productionarrivedat wasestimatedas:

CrudeSteel Coal Production

RUHR 50 percent 38 percent(inc SE KOLN)

SAAR 5 percent 3 percent
NE FRANCE/ALSACE 11 percent I percent
BELGE/LUX 4 percent 7 percent
Restof EUROPE 30 percent 43 percent

The economic analysis of the 36-40 million tons of crude steel produced

annually and of annual production of the 296 million tons of hard coal statedthese

conclusions:

[I]f GERMANY were to lose the RUHR (and consequentlyFRANCE

and BELGIUM) she would lose 65 percentof her presenttotal steel
production.

'0i NARA, RG331, Entry 22, Box 168,'JIC Papers,

' JICSHAEF(44) (Final), 8h July 1944,Directive
to Joint IntelligenceCommitteeSHAEF, Annex A.
306 CIS AppreciationNo. 3,2.

274
 The loss of the RUHR together with that of FRANCE and
...
BELGIUM, would deprive GERMANY of 56 percent of her total coal
507
production.

The CIS identified another area of economic interest-the Middle Rhine

This area, it stressed. "is

(Coblenz-Frankfurt-Mannheim-Karlsrahe-Strasbourg).

economically insignificant.
" Further, the staff noted that coal production mostly fed

local uses,so the loss of the Ruhr would affect other areasless,but that the loss of

steel would eliminate Germany's ability to support several military campaiggns

simultaneously. Thus:

Failure to keep the RUHR in production would rapidly starve

GERMANY of the meansto continuethe war.508

As the destructionof the Germanforcesin the West had negatedmost of the

forces estimatedto remain following the captureof the lodgement,the more critical
4D
section in the CIS Appreciation (Part H, German Conduct of the Campaign in the

West), that was still relevant in late August revolved around the topographic

estimates.These included NortheasternFrance, the Low Countries, and Western

Germany. Importantly, the CIS Appreciation containeda detailed set of maps and

estimatesthat includedthe areawithin Western 509

Germany. (Seefigure 28.)

The Broad Front analysishighlightedthe terrain prior to arriving at the "gaps"

or gateways into Germany, but deleted the CIS analysis of the terrain within

Germany-a critical error consideringits import to planning for the campaign.This

attitude is also reflectedby the G4 Plansphaselines. Not estimatingthat the armies

107Ibid.
508Ibid.
CIS AppreciationNo. 1, Part 11,22April 1944,2, AnnexurcsA and C.

275
would be far into Germanyprior to -Conditions of RANKINI IC` obtaining. the

campaignto breachthe border, not to fight the GermanArmy within Germany.was

emphasized.This is a major differenceunderlyingthe Broad Front and concentrated

thrust strategies,despitethe fact that they both listed as the object the destructionof

the GermanArmy and the captureof the Ruhr. Moreover,it was the terrain that not

only permitted movementand determinedlogistics capabilities,but also grantedthe

defenseor attackan advantage,while presentingobstaclesor grantingavenues.it was

the natureof the terrain that determinedboth the deploymentandtacticsof battle-the

entire essenceof operationaldesign.Not seeingoperationswithin Germanyas part of

the campaign'smaneuverwas a deploymentissuethat would haveto be facedsooner

than forecast,andwasan issueMontgomeryhadaddressed

in his conceptof operations,

but which had not beenexaminedby SHAEF's planners.510(Seefigure 30.)

The CIS appreciationexaminedthe difficulties of the terrain north and south

of the "gaps" examinedand later acceptedby the Joint Plannersfor Broad Front,

concludingthat:

[F]rom the topographicalpoint of view alone,it is extremelydifficult

to attackfrom the WEST on a largescale.

The CIS noted that eventhe two gapshad problems.In the north, the avenue

of approach

is roughly ft=el shapedwith the funnel formedby the ALBERT Canal

and the MEUSE which narrow to form the neck between
MAASTRICHT and LIEGE, EAST of which it is possibleto debouch
on to the RHINE Plain in the direction of the RUHR. Even this 'gap'
has a seriesof defensivepossibilities running NORTH-SOUTH across
the PLAINE BRABANCONNE.
5'0CIS AppreciationNo. 3, Post-NcptuneAdministrative
Appreciation.

276
Canals and rivers-the Dyle. the Meuse.the Dendre.the Senne.and eventually the

Roer-of course,providedthe obstacles.

The "South Gap," likewise,

is only relatively speaking a "gap." It too, is crossed by a succession of

potential defensive lines running NORTH-SOUTH.

In addition to high plateaux, heavy woods would canalise any advance, with

approazhes carefully covered in depth by the Siegfiied Line, which was termed

"exceptionally strong"511

It was not until after Eisenhower made his campaign decision that significant

terrain studiesconcerningGermanyappearedin the American and SHAEF campsat

the command level. 12th Army Group produced a 1:1.250,000scale map entitled

"Generalized Enemy Terrain" during the late fall, and beginning in November

circulated terrain estimates for individual areas through the medium of Weekly

Intelligence Summaries.Likewise, SHAEF published terrain analysesthrough its

Weekly Summaries,leaving unansweredthe questionof how much the commanders

knew prior to their original selectionof the campaign'smajor direction.512(Seefigure

31.)

"' Ibid., CIS Appreciation,Part 11,AppendicesA, 1-2, B, C. It is significant that concerningthe entire
appreciation,the LONDON JIC assessed that far too little significancewas given to the effect of the
strategicbombing campaign,which, in their words, gavethem"doubt[s] whetherGcn-nanywould have
the ability to fight a prolongedcampaignin the West." SeeJ.I.C./676/44,81hMay 1944,in
accompanyingfile.
5'212" Armv Group Report Operations,III, G-2 Section,PartsI-IV, 69-72. Mapsare includedas
of
specialstuýics.No studieswere doneof the -middle ground" betweenNormandyand the German
border by 12' Army Group. This showsthe relative dependence of the Army Group on terrain and
specialintelligencefrom theaterlevels.Seeindex of studies,Plate1,also study "GeneralizedEnemy
Terrain Centraland SouthernGermany," 1:1,250,000both in map box accompanyingVolume Ill.
(Reproducedas f igurc 3 1.)

277
 The British and Canadiansworked more methodically. Extensive terrain

done D-Day. 513

It must be stressed
analysesof the Channel
Coastwere prior to also

that Montgomerydid hours of his own "terrain analysir in his map trailer. was a

Belgium, Flanders.
and had
veteranof campaignsfought in NortheasternFrance, and

conductedmanybicycle tours of the battlefieldsfollowing the GreatWar. He was also

an avid studentof the military history Britain's army, which campaignedin the
of

in in
sector question the early Montgomery
1800s. and his generalswere familiar-

from their own experiencesas commandersand staff officers in the First World

War-not only with the terrainbut with the difficulties of weatherand seasonpeculiar

514
to Europeancampaigning.

Eisenhower had helped author the American Battlefield Monuments

Battlefield Guide while in Washington and later, while on leave from the

Commission'sParisoffice, had driven from Paristo Brussels,to Bonn, to Coblenz.to

Heidelberg,to Neustadt,to Zurich. This route circumscribesmuch of the geographyin

question,and though valuableas an impressionistictour, it did not provide a detailed,

systematic, military analysis of terrain avenues, water-courses,bridging, road

conditions (save for the road traveled), or the for

major planning considerations the

deploymentof forces.Moreover, he did not traverseany of the terrain avenuesfrom

west to east as his armies would have to fight. Bradley first entered Continental
515
Europeon D-Day; he had no experienceof the terrain.

513NAC, RG 24, ibid., OperationAXEHEAD files, March-August44, arc an example.

514Hamilton, Montv: TheMaking ofa General,passim.
""' Daniel D. Holt and JamesW. Lcycrzapf, eds.,Eisenhower:ThePrewar Diaries and Selected
Papers,1905-1941(Baltimore: the JohnsHopkins University Press,1998);map titled Routeof
Gruber-EisenhowerMotor Tour, August 28 to September13,1929 following 282.

278
 While personal experiencemay have confirmed the ability to campaign in

winter, conquer obstacles,and supply and move an army over limited tracks on

sodden ground, what the impending strategydebate lacked was complete. honest

analysison the part of SHAEF. Naming the southern"gap" a secondaryroute neither

adequatelyexplained nor assessedthe problems and gains fi7omusing this avenue.

Even a cursory inspectionof SHAEF's maps,deletedfi7omthe Broad Front study by

the Joint Planners.who "borrowed" most other materialfi7omthe CIS study, indicated

that the southern route led not to adequatemaneuverground for deploying large

forces, but to increasinglyconstrainedapproachesthat possessedthe sameproblems

of the northern route but in larger scale and without any great military benefit.

Moreover, as the economicestimatesproved,the Saarwas no greatwar-sustainer,nor

was it the populationbasethat the Ruhr and northernGermanywere at this time in the

war. Instead,it was a terrain black hole that, once fought through, exited onto further

constricted avenues leading away from the Ruhr, and off to Berlin or to

Czechoslavakiaand Polandin CentralEurope.(Seefigure 3 1.)

Theseterrain avenueswere the Kaiserslautern"Approach," no real avenuebut

a cut through the woodsbetweenthe Hardt and Pfalz Hills that led to the Rhine plain,

a narrow lowland running from Baselnorthwardto Frankfurt, a lateral obstacleand a

narrow trench-like avenuewhich debouchedin the Frankfurt area.Frankfurt canalizes

movementand is sidedby the Odenwaldto the south,the SpessartMountains to the

east, the Vogelsbergto the northeast,and the Taunus Mountains to the northwest.

Small corridors,the Fuldaand Wetterau,climb throughthe foothills of the Vogelsberg

and Taunusmountains.Passingthe Ruhr far to the eastnorth of Kassel,a debouching

279
 by Rotharbirge farther north. the
force would fmd its rear flanked the and,

lay
Teutoburgerwald.To the northeast the Harz Mountains.These"corridors" share

they lowland areas that would cramp two

similar characteristics: are watered,

deployeddivisions, and until the Hessianhills are gainednorth of the Hohe Rhon,

for is
maneuverroom two or more corps not found.This is excellentdefensiveterrain,

with narrow mobility corridors that are easily blocked, flanked, obstacled,and prone

516
to poor off-road movementin wet weather.

Thus, besidesaiming a large part of the American forces at a secondary

objective-the "economically insignificant Rhine cities'ý--after fighting for the

Saarland,the southern"gap" fimneledthe Americanforcesinto constrictedterrain that

would hamper their deploymentagainst the major statedobjective. the Ruhr, and

should the Red Army be held by the Germans,

the westernapproachto Berlin. a

contingencythat nevershouldhavebeeneliminatedby SHAEF's Moreover,

planners.

the southernapproachgrantedthe enemytime by permitting a defenseon terrain that

wasnot operationallydecisiveto endingthe war quickly.

The Northern Plain of Germany offered the best avenue for large unit

movement;it was heavily roaded,led directly acrossthe Ruhr's northern cities, and

continuedon to Berlin. The most extensiverail network in Germanywas located in

this area. This approach was flat but laced with water obstacles,and off-road

movementwould have been hamperedin heavy rain or the late fall. Winter would

"" NARA, RG 407, ML 206, Box 24143, ML 206.The author's is based 12" Army Group
analysis on
Map study,"GeneralizedEnemyTerrain, Nov 44" attachedto ML 206, "Estimateof the Situation'
Major Effort in the Koln Plain, 30 Nov 44" and personalinspectionof the ground(Reproducedas
figure 3 1). The authorhasextensivemilitary experienceconcerningthis area.He servedas a war plans
officer at CentralArmy Group, NATO, 1987-1990,and servedin armoredcavalry units in the Fulda-

280
 offer better movementonce the ground was frozen. The open terrain lent itself to

aerial observation,and hencemadeit difficult for the enemyto establishdefenselines

until late fall brought poor flight conditions. The approachon the Dutch-German

border had the benefit of bypassingthe Siegfried Line Defences,once the former

Dutch defensesof the Grebbe Line (prewar "Fortress Holland") and the Belgian

defensesof the Albert Canaland Meusewere captured.In late August 1944,this was

the optimum maneuverapproachfor both concentrationand speedof advance,for

perhaps 60 days, as November and December would begin to minimize its

517
advantages-a condition that would prevail until spring.

Given the terrain and the influenceof logistics,a detailedcorrelationof forces

would have added immeasureablyto the debate. On 23 August, the day of the

Eisenhower-Montgomerymeeting,the following division-sizedforceswere available

to SHAEF in the approximatelocations:

21 Army Group (Montgomery) (17+3)* Northwest Europe: Seine

River/Normandy.
Armoured Divisions: Gds, 7 lh, II Ih 79th 4 th CDN, I" Pol.
,
Infantry Divisions: 3d, 15th 43d, 49th 50th, 5 I't, 53d, 5 9th 2d CDN, 3d
, ,
CDN.

Airborne Divisions: 6th

Armoured Brigades: 4 th 8th 27 th Tank, 33d, 34 th Tank, 6 th Gds, 2d
,31"
CDN.

Frankfurt corridors. 1977-1980and 1985-1987.The -two-corps" estimateis basedon frontagesfor

World War 11corps.
17
*' 2 Army IntelligenceSummaryNo. 92,4 Sep44,2,3,6-9, Map App. E.; SummaryNo. 93,5 Sep44,
Map App B; SummaryNo. 101,13 Sep44, App A. Geographically,this "approach"is the widest flat
approachacrossnorthwesternEuropeand extendsas far asthe Urals,hencethe EasternApproachesto
Berlin. The bestappreciationof this ground in NOT found in SHAEF files, but in open-sourcematerial
during the Cold War. For examples,seeHugh Faringdon,Confrontation: TheStrategicGeographyof
NATO and the WarsawPact (London: Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1986),passim;and Hugh
Faringdon,StrategicGeograpkv.NATO, the WarsawPact, and the Superpowers,2d ed. (London:
Routledge,1989),passim.The SHAEF mapcollection in NARA is badly organizedand incomplete.It
hasterrain studiesfor this areain 1945,but noneearlier.

281
 Independent Bdes: Special Air Service. I' Belgian Inf. Royal
Netherands.
12'hArmy Group (Bradley) (21) Northwest Europe: Seine, Brittany.
Normandy.
ArmoredDivisions: 2d, 3d, 4th,5th 6th 7h, 2d FR.
.
th th 1h, 9th 29th Oh th, 79th,
Infantry Divisions: 1', 2d, 4 28th. ,3 35
80th 90th, ,5 ,8 , .
83d,
,
SHAEF (Reserve)(5+1 'equivalent'): England
First Allied Airborne Army.
th
Airborne Divisions: I BR., 17 82d, 101'

Airlanding Divisions: 52d Lowland

Brigades:I" Pol.

*These brigadescontainedenoughtanks to be consideredtank-only

equivalentsof an armored division. Given army artillery and other
independentinfantry units, a conservativeestimatewould be that they
would equateto 3-5 division equivalents.

* *In theaterbut not consideredoperationallyreadyuntil 15 September.

Divisions undeployed (ETOUSA) in theater

h, Ih, Ih
94 95 17 Airbome,** 91h
Armd,**
*arrived in theater before 30 August 44. Additionally, the force
"follow-on" in forces actually deployed included in divisions: 5
arrivals in September,9 in October,4 in November,2 in December.
The plannersestimateda 30-dayperiod was requiredto makedivisions
from in 518
time of arrival theater.
operational
6thArmy Group (Devers)underAFHQ, Mediterraneanuntil date to be
determined,expectedto be no later 30 September/Southof France:
Montelimar-Grenoble.This force was available for planning purposes
only-
Armored Divisions: I' FR
Infantry Divisions: 3d, 36Ih 45,h, I" FR, 3d Algerian, 9thColonial.
,

5" CARL. Army OperationalResearchGroup ReportMemorandumNo. E.20, -Some Statistics the

of
North West EuropeCampaignJune 1944to May 1945." 2-3, notesthe following strengthsfor 31
August 1944: 12' Army Group, 613,00men; 21 Army Group,537,000.

282
 519
Airborne Divisions: I" Airborne Task Force

Eisenhower then had 37 divisions on the continent. the equivalent tank,

strength(British only) of no lessthan threemore,the airborneequivalentof six more

in England, the expectedarrival within a week of four more to be operationalby I

October,and a force of eight divisions to be transferredupon mutual agreementof the

SupremeCommanders,whoseultimate operationalplan would be decidedby SHAEF.

Arrayed againstthis growing force, which would increaseuntil the following

spring, was a retreating enemy whose strength in the west was determined (by

SHAEF's estimate)to be the equivalentof sevenpanzerand 13 infantry divisions.

west of the Seine and north of the Loire. Within days, SHAEF's evolving estimates

placed the strengthat 33 divisions on the entire westernfront, including the scattered

remnantsof eight panzer,eight infantry, and one para division in the 21 Army Group

sector. Nine divisions were arrayedalong the ChannelCoast,reachingto the Zuider

520
Zee. Within three days of the meeting, the G-2 of the 21 Army Group would

estimate that the enemy had suffered approximately400,000 casualties in killed,

wounded,captured,or pennedin the coastalports and a loss of approximately 1,500

521
tanks of the 1,700estimatedto havebe deployed. As the toll of prisoners,destroyed

""' EL, SHAEF G-3, WAR Room Summary,No. 78,23 August 1944,Ruppenthal.Logistical Support
ofthe Armies, 11,Table 8-Divisional Buildup in the EuropeanTheater, 282-283;Wilson, Reportýv
SACMED,3440; Ellis, Victoi:y in the West,1.Appendix IV, 521-532.Americaninfantry divisions
would also add the equivalentof onetank battalionand onetank destroyerbattalionper division,
normally from the Army Group-pool." Thesein equivalentstrengthwould havedoubledthe armored
divisions assignedto Bradley's forcesin total numberof tanks/armoredtank-killers.
520SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummary,No. 22,19 August 1944,3, No. 23,26 August 1944,2-3;
Order of Battle Map, "Enemy Order of Battle in the Westas at 25 August 1944." Thoughthis map is
for threedaysafter the meeting,therewas little changein known enemydispositionsduring the
interval period.
52' 21 Army Group IntelligenceSummary,No. 158,27 August 1944,1; CharlesB. MacDonald,The
SiegfriedLine Campaign(Washington:Centerof Military History, 1963,1984),5. The American

283
 by increased.
these figures
or abandonedvehicles,and enemyunits attacked strafing

would only becomebetter for the Allies for the immediatefuture.The GermanArmy.

shortof the West Wall. wasseenasteeteringanddecimated.

Military plansarebaseduponuniversalelementsthat. while namedýformatted.

all must be consideredto translate

or sometimessubdividedinto severalsubelements.

a plan into an operationalorder. These are: Assumptions,Situation. Intelligence.

Mission or Task, Intentions,Conceptof Operationsor Method. Administration and

Logistics, and Commandand Control. Plannersupdatethese to meet changesand

convert the "plan" into a directive or order prior to its implementation.At lowest

levels, the "plan" minus the assumptionsequalsthe actual order, as that which was

6'assumed" is by 522
now replaced the situationas known.

Montgomcry, as a didactic, ex-staff collcge instructor,was rcnowned for his

ability both to dissect and distill situations and to explain them in directives

accounting for these elements. The "appreciation" (British) or "estimate of the

situation" (US) was an inseparable component of his basic intellectual processes.

Eisenhower, the staff officer, trusted the staff estimate, and as he became a senior

commanderand found lesstime to analyze,tendedto supportstaff recommendations.

Moreover,as an "overall commander,

"' he wasresponsible
to directandcoordinate,

official historian,CharlesMacDonald,estimatedAllied superiorityat 20: 1 in tanks,2.5: 1 in artillery.

and total air superiority asbelongingto the Allies.
4
*" Both Americanand British -orders" consistedof theseelementsbut underdifferent names.The
abovedescriptionattemptsto harmonizethe titles of the subelements.

284
not to commandand executespecific forces The
or operations. '*ho%%*"
of things he left

523
to others.

Montgomeryquestionedall analysisuntil he had mentally "emsedthe board"

it
and reconstructed ruthlessly.Moreover,he mergedhis intentionswith his methods,

essentiallycutting the cloth to fit his coat, a practice ingrainedin men who have the

responsibility of executingtheir own plans. The SHAEF estimatesignored method

below the thin tissue combining strategywith operationaldesign, thus selectincyan

"'object" and avenueand leavingthe mechanicsor evenbroadconceptsfor conductof

the campaign to others, even when these methods were neither optimal nor
524
practical.

The situation under discussionon 23 August reflectedtwo realities. The first

was a decision relying upon an estimate and courses of action based on assumptions

totally irrelevant to the actual situation as known and remaining secret to anyone but

the SHAEF planners and senior staff. Against this was judged a proposed course of

action based upon a sound but risky appreciation independently derived from the

situation as known. The 23 August meeting, however, went further. In legal terms,

Montgomery was forced to defend himself against evidence he was never allowed to

'523
Eisenhoweroncebitterly criticized an attemptto comparehim with commanderswho were not
6-ovcralloperationalcommanders, " i.e., SupremeCommanders.He usedthis commenton different
occasionsconcerningboth Pattonand Montgomery,who did not haveto "take into accountall
factors."
521SHAEF's belief in a single, determineddrive into the heartof nine panzcrdivisions
unremitting,
and hundredsof antitankgunsasthe simple"breakoutin the eastsolution" in Normandyis a casein
point. SHAEF never followed Ludendorfrs dictum, "A strategicalplan which ignoresthe tactical
factor is forcdoomcdto failure." SeeErich von Ludendorff,Ludendorfl"sOwn Story. 11(New York:
Harperand Brothers,1919),221. While Ludendorffdid not proveto be a successfulpractitionerof his
own theories,his ideaneverthelessis correct.

285
 be known it
after was used in a trial whose verdict was
see and which could only

predetermined.

ExaminingSHAEFs assumptions,hadhe beengiventhe "Broad Front "

paper.

Montgomerywould havebeenjustified to attackthe following assurnptions:

"rhe main deduction" of the Allies' not having a disparity in forces for an

extendedperiod and that it might be eight monthsafter D-Day beforea superiority Of

divisions in the field could be achievedwas.in fact. nonsensicalat August*send. Fc%%'

formations directly in front of the Allies were up to strength,but then becamethe

for
cadre rebuilt formations,a stateof affairs that could only have beenpreventedif

Germanywere penetrateden masseand a final decisivebattle fought while the Army

in the westwas weakand disorganized.

The Joint Plannershadarguedagainst

a line of advancewhich leadsus to a head-oncollision with the main

GERMAN forceswithout opportunityfor maneuver525

While the weakenedstateof Germanforcesnegatedthe requirementto avoid

"head-on collision" of forces, Montgomery's concentrated blow did provide for

tactical maneuver, as some units fronting the enemy would obviously be on the flanks

of the enemy who was penetrated, or opposed by an enemy in many cases unable to

form cohesive defense lines. Moreover, the operational threat to both the southern

66gap"via Metz-Saarbrucken, and the Rhine plain east of the Vosges through the

Belfort Gap, would be made possible by the DRAGOON forces of 6'h Army Group

allowed for in the Montgomery concept. That SHAEF's plans had not assigned a

52.
lPostOverlordCourses
of Action,2.

286
 theoretical mission for DRAGOON. basedon the idea that the advanceon Metz was

theorizedby SHAEF as talcingplaceafter D+270, is remarkable.

The SHAEF plannersdecrieda concentratedadvanceas confining the Allies to

a "narrow front," devoid of surpriseand maneuver.leavingthe advanceopen to flank-

526
counterattacksand permitting the SouthernFranceGerman formations to escape.

Montgomery's conceptallowed for complementaryoperationsby the 6thArmy Group,

moreover. Eisenhowerdid have the opportunity to form a mobile task force. an

armored corps, to link with the SeventhArmy, while retainingPatton's Army for the

northeastwardthrust. This corps,ideally, would then be attachedto SeventhArmy, its

forces and logistics then being centeredon the Riviera ports. This mission was

accountedfor by the SHAEFJoint Planners,who notedthat

a subsidiary operation of this type would be of value if it could be

carriedout without diverting forcesftorn 527
our main advance.

Ratherthan being "irretrievably committed"to one "gap," the operationsof the

6th Army Group would logically be the force on the obviously subsidiary"gap," not

the much stronger 12Ih Army Group, as desired by Bradley. This is a key point;

assigning the 6Ih Army Group as the subsidiary advance retains some semblance of a

supportingaxis," aswas most desiredby SHAEF, but proportionsit to meet

Gfimutually

326
Ibid., 6.
127 :
Ibid., 5; SeventhArmy Reportof Operations,11,335-357.It must be notedthat Pattonwas, in fact,
orderedto handover the XV Corpsin late September,with the 2d FrenchArmored Division, the 79"
Infantry Division, and the 106' Cavalry Group (Mechanized).

287
 by
its subsidiaryrole. not off-balancingthe attack assigninga largerforce to the stated

528
secondaryattack.

The "Ardennes" sectorthat createsthe broad front. and not dual thrusts. was

implies blocking force

not ignored by the Montgomeryplan. Montgomery'splan a

Cologne (Koln) be
within the Ardennes,as the Rhine Plain as far south as would

assaultedand the tactics of his extendedflank would be handledby the American

Army Commander,not specifiedby the 21 Army Group Commander.At any rate. the

Roer River approacheswould require some force to block as far south as the

MonschauCorridor in the Arderuics-Eifelarea,and lateralcommunicationsalong the

Liege-Luxembourgline most likely would have been permitted as foreseenby the

if th 529
Joint Planners 6 Army Groupmaintainedthe southernaxis.

But not every deductionor statementmadeby the plannerswould have been

contested by Montgomcry-only their context. For example. their statement of

operational policy, congruentwith the basis for his own proposal, retains almost

propheticalirony for thosewho opposedhim, and it thereforedeservesreiteration:

Our object must be to force the enemyto fight on groundfavourableto

armoured forces and in front of areaswhere communicationsoffer
suitable targetsfor our superiorairpower. After every such action we
should use our air and annouredforces to harassthe enemy's retreat
and give him no time to reform, at the sametime using our airborne
forces to facilitate the crossingof rivers and other natural obstacles.

528SHAEF War Room Daily SummaryNo. 78,23 August, lists Patton'sThird Army
with four corps,
and seveninfantry and four armoreddivisions.The SeventhUS Army then possessed only the VI
Corpsof threeinfantry divisions.
5'9PostOverlord Courses Action, 7. Note that this
of would also alleviatelogistical problemsby
"dropping off" infantry divisions to block the mid-Rhinelandarea.Thesecould be maintainedby
reducedlogistical scales.

288
 Our amphibious forces should be used to contain the enemy's coastal
530
garrisons

To Eisenhower, the Broad Front plan did retain some elements of

Montgomery's concerns,thoughthe planners'primary belief proved the unraveling,of

their logic,

the assumptionthat the GERMANS will contestour advanceright up

531
to the frontiers of GERMANY.

The completelydifferent situationshouldhavecauseda new evaluationby the

SHAEF Joint Planners.None was forthcoming.Just as SHAEF had no answerfor the

forward defense chosen by the Germans, they failed to see options to seize

opportunity. believed,
Eisenhower falsely,that moving forward the previously decided

upon strategy filled this vacuum, and that, in retrospect,he had not varied from

SHAEF's masterplan. His decision,however,did not stifle dissentwith the choice,

dissentfired by the fact that key elementshad not beensolvedevenby moving up the

original Broad Front advance.The logistical support of the armies and tactical air

forces had not beenaddressed,nor did Eisenhoweracceptor seemto understandthe

operationaldifferencebetweenhis choiceand the alternative.It was the essenceof the

difference that plaguedIke's decisionand causedMontgomeryto extendthe decision

into a debate.

The conceptual differences underscored the nature of Eisenhower's

generalshipversusMontgomery's.Montgomery'sfollowed a definedoperationalview

';30PostOverlord Coursesof Action, Section11,2-3.

131Ibid., 1.

289
that embodiedthe componentsof operationalart and the more simplified "principles

by both 53"
of wax' accepted nations.

Montgomeryhad definedboth an operationalobjective(the destructionof the

German army) and the geo-economic-politicalobjective stipulated by the SHAEF

analysis(the Ruhr), and provided for a sequencedoperationalmaneuveror threat. an

advancetoward Berlin. The principles of Maintenanceof the Objective, Offensive

Action, Concentration,Mobility, and Cooperationwere all incorporatedinto his plan.

Moreover, Montgomery's plan followed US operational doctrine concerning the

"main effort" for which the northernapproachwas to be designatedby Eisenhower.

The main attackor main effoM by the Americantext book dermition.was:

[a]ttack into which the commanderthrows the full weight of the

offensivepower at his disposal,attackdirectedat the chief objectiveof
the campaignor battle; main effort.533

Readingftirther in the Americantextbook,the secondaryeffort (which Bradley

was to commandunderBroadFront) was,in fact, listed as"a holding attack":

Supportingattackmadeto hold the enemyin check.divert his attention

from the main attacking force, and prevent his reinforcing his troops

532While the term "operationalart" did not exist in westernmanualsin 1944.Montgomeryboth

understoodand had practicedits elements.In November1944he publishedhis ideasconcerning"thc
art of war," entitledSomeNoteson the Conductof ffor and in December.reissuedSomeNoteson the
UseofAir Power in SupportofLand Operationsand Direct Air Support,a veritablecatechismfor air-
land battleoperations.Both were publishedby 21 Army Groupaspamphletsbasedon his earlier
Eighth Army pamphlets.Both the United Statesand the Commonwealthhad accepted-doctrine"
concerningoperations.Thesewere both expressedin eachnation's Field ServiceRegulations.and both
nationspublisheda "higher formations"manual:for the United States,I'M 100-15;for the Unitcd
Kingdom, F.S.R. Volume 111.
533Dictionary of US Army Terms, 162;US Army, FM 100-5,Field ServiceRegulations:Operations
[hereafterreferredto as FM 100-5,1944] (Washington:War Department,15 June 1944), 110,111.
John 1.Alger, TheQuestFor Victory: TheHistory ofthe Principlesof War (London: GreenwoodPress,
1967).The appendixlists a completechronologicallist showingthe developmentand terminology of
the principlesby nation. Seealso, pages240,241,244,247,249-251.

290
 along the line of the main attack; containing attack, secondazy
534
attack.

An abbreviated appreciation for 22 August would have recognized the

following factorsin the shorthandusedby planners:(Seefigure 29.)

Aim: Captureof the Ruhr and the Destructionof the GermanArmy In

the West
Coursesof Action:
I. A single concentratedthrust using the preponderanceof 12 and 21
Army Groupswith its left flank-on the Channeland its right on the
Axis AACHEN-COLOGNE to seize the Ruhr, destroy enemy
forces in sector,and to preparefor future operationson the Axis
RUHR-BERLIN.
2. A dual thrust using 21 Army Group in the north on the Axis
LIEGE-'AACHEN-RUHR to seize the RUHR and 12th Army
Group on the Axis METZ-SAARBRUCKEN-MANNHEIM.
3. A dual thrust using21 Army Group to seizethe ChannelCoastand
ANTWERP, and to protect the northern flank of the MAIN
EFFORTvia METZ-SAARBRUCKEN-FRANKFURT-RUHR.

Discussion:
Courseof Action 1:
Can achieveoperationaldecision by destroyingenemy forces and
strategicobject of captureof the Ruhr directly.
Concentratessuperior air and ground forces on the most direct
avenueandon a specifiedaxis.
Takes advantageof the best avenueboth to the Ruhr and beyond
for further operations.
Concentratesall armor on bestarmorapproaches.
Moves towards supply ports and permits full use of one army to
captureports.
Directly threatensthe V. I N. 2 Rocket/Missilelaunchingsites.
Permitscomplementaryoperationsof two army groups.
Permits formation of an operationalreservefrom units temporarily
groundedor not immediatelyneededwithin the axis of advance.
In rangefor useof Allied Airborne Army.

534
Dictionary of USArnti, Terms,136.

291
 in rangeof U.K. basedaircraft.
Abandons operational surprise once launched except by use of
groupingor airborneforces.
enemydefensearea.
Concentrates

Course of Action 2:

Permits maximum use of forces on widest frontage to stretch

enemy defense.
Permits varying of maneuver between axes.
Moves away from ports (Normandy) but closer to ANTWERP-
MARSEILLES.
Forms Cohesive Front to enemy.
Uses all available avenues.
Stretches own combat power and disperses forces on divergent
axes.
Disperses armored forces.
Abandons superiority of forces.
Will eventually "beach"' all forces due to lack of maintenance
before achieving final object.
Requires phased attacks due to logistics and operational pause of
several months.
Does not achieve operational and strategic object in shortest
amount of time-protracts the campaign.

Courseof Action 3:

Gives largestflank and frontage(Channelto Antwerp to Ardennes)

to second-smallestArmy Group.
Doesnot developbest avenueof approach.
Does not take advantageof 6Ih Army Group as they are masked
from adequateavenuesinto Germanborderandbeyond.
Concentratesbulk of forcesin worst airfield country.
Reduces two-thirds of ground force to objectives that cannot
achieveoperationaldecision.

Discussion: Course of Action I provides the quickest possibility of

achieving operationaland strategicdecision while focusing forces on
clearing ChannelPorts and Antwerp. It also optimizesuse of ground,
airfields, concentratedarmored forces, and weather during critical

292
 period of four-six weeks remaining for adequate flying/maneuver
weather.It takesadvantageof temporaryenemyweakness.It directly
threatensthe missile threat to the U.K., and releasesstrategic and
tactical air forces from CROSSBOW missions. Course of action 2
divides forces and places largest and hardest supporled force on a
secondary approach, which exits onto restricted maneuver ground
farthestfrom the designatedobjective.It is hardestto supportby local
airfields or by air from U.K. and is generally out of range of U.K.
basedairborne forces.It is generallyout of range for complementary
operationsto assistnorthernarmy group. Courseof action 3 abandons
all advantageof temporary superiority, air superiority, or logistical
use of DRAGOON force from developin,.its full
supportand restricts535
operationalpotential.

These factors should have been examinedformally by the SHAEF staff and

discussedwith the Army Group Commanders,including Devers. More important,

SHAEF's G-3 should have prepared a complete draft plan delineating clear

boundaries based on force-spaceratios, appropriateobjectives, and the expected

follow-on deploymentfor 12Ih Army Group through the Brittany ports. Also to be

included would be the forces (and their sustenanceand buildup) absorbedfrom the

Mediterranean, following the attachment of the 6th Army Group from the

Mediterraneanforces to SHAEF. In preparingsuch a plan, the key operationaland

logistical factorswould havebeenaddressed

andcould havebeenstudiedby the Army

Groups tasked to execute operations. The initiation of such planning was

Eisenhower's responsibility as overall commander. Failing to back his own

discussionswith an in-depth analysisby his own staff, and armed with a shabbily

done, out-of-date outline memorandum,Eisenhowerwas forced to decide the key

operational plan of the post-OVERLORD campaign based upon the independent

535
Author's estimate.

293
briefmL,s of two advocates.and the knowledgethat he had beenorderedby Marshall

to assurethat "the Americancontingent-was firmly underAmericancommand.

While the advocatesoften describedthe plans in terms of overall ground

command,it must be stressedthat when Montgomeryproposedan operationaldesign

and control structurefor the two Army Groupscurrentlyunderhis operationalcontrol.

he did not specify a maneuverplan for OhArmy Group exceptin generalterms, nor

did he advocateassumingcontrol of it. SCAEF would give direction both to the two

Army GroupsthroughMontgomeryand to Devers,essentiallypermitting a weakened

Broad Front. Devers' force would fix enemy attention to the Metz approach and

perhapsthe Belfort Gap,aswell asprovide for the defenseof the southernfront. More

important, accepting Montgomery's operational design at no time precluded

Eisenhowerfrom assumingcompletecommandand coordinationof all ground forces

while executinga concentratedthrust in the North. The true issuewas strategyand its

operationaldesign,not command.

While the operationalfactors seemedclearcut.command-thc great bugaboo

of coalitions-emerged to dominatewhat shouldhavebeena cleardecision.

294
 CHAPTERSEVEN

Decision, Debate, Pursuit

Montgomery flew to see Bradley on the morning of 23 August, vainly hoping

that he would support the concentratedthrust plan. Having already issuedhis plans

and having in his mind successfidlyand geographically himself

separated from the

hated Britisher, Bradley announcedhis support for Eisenhower's idea of a Dual

536
Thrust, or Broad Front. (Seefigure 29.) Returningto his own tactical headquarters.

Montgomery awaited the SupremeCommander,intent on pleading his case for a

thrust
concentrated his Had
under command. he known the truth, he would have been

more deflatedthan by Bradley'sapparentturn-around.

The afternoonbefore,Eisenhowerhad signaledthe CombinedChiefs of Staff.

Alanbrooke's copy arrived in the evening. It elucidatedseveralkey points: that the

"final system of command," made possible by communications for the accompanying

air and naval sections,

would permit a transferof commandto SHAEF of all forcesby

I September.(See figure 26.) While stating that the air situation would remain

"coordinated"by SHAEF,the

coordination between the 21" and Twelfth Army Groups, will

terminate coincidentally with the establishmentof SHAEF on the
Continent.

536Patton Diaty, 23 August. Pattonnotedthat Leigh Mallory had visited Bradleythat day, supporting
Monty's -four armies" turning north. Pattonrailed againstsendingtanksthrough Belgium, "where
tanks arepractically uselessnow. and will be wholly uselessthis winter." The oppositeis true. Belgium
is a superioravenueof approachaiming directly into the industrialheartof Germany,vice Lorraine,
where Pattonadvocatedgoing. Additionally, Pattonnotes:"I told Bradleythat if he, Hodgesand
myself offered to resign unlesswe went east,Ike would haveto yield but Bradleywould not agreeand
said we owed it to the troopsto hold on becauseif we left, the pickings [other generalsas
replacements]were poor."

295
 Ren=ing the Amy Groups by their geographic locations. Eisenho%,
-*Cr

for
assignedobjectives each.He directedthat Montgomery's21 Army Group. called

the Anny Groupof the North by SCAEF,would

operateto the Northeastward,securingsuccessive basesalong the coast

with its final basepossiblyANTUERP.Eventuallyit will be directedto
advanceEastwardgenerallyNorth of the ARDENNES.The 21 Army
Group will probably be reinforced by the entire Airborne Command
by to
and suchother units as are necessary enable it to accomplishits
first and immediatelyimportantmissions[that Eisenhowerdefined as
capturingthe Pasde Calais).

The 12'hArmy Group.calledthe Army Groupof the Center.he directedto

advanceunder GeneralBRADLEY [read not under Niontgomcry] to

the East and Northeastof PARIS, from which areait can either strike
Northeastward[to assistMontgomery] and later advancethrough
...
the Low Countries, or, if the enemy strength in that region is not
greaterthan I now believe,it can alternativelystrike Eastward.passing
Southof the ARDENNES....
The speedof Bradley's advanceto the region East of PARIS will be
governed by the speed at which the ports in BRMANY can be
cleanedup, and our supplysituationimproved. 531

Eisenhowerreleasedthe StrategicAir Forces-to resumemaximum pressure

againsttargetsin GERMANY," but noted they would remain on call only when the

groundbattle's requirementsso demanded.lie notedthat when the Army Group of the

Southwas placedunderSCAEF,it would

continue to maneuver to support the advanceof the Army Group of the

538
Center.

537
AlanbrookePapers6/2/30, SCAEF67 222655B.AGWAR for the CombinedChiefs of Staff.
EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2087-2089.In later messages
he refirs to it as-the NorthernGroup of
Armies."
538
Ibid.

296
 Thus, having committed himself both to a commandstructure and to what

appearedto be a courseof actionplacing both the "Centee' and "South" Army Groups

south of the Ardennes,any discussionbetweenthe generalswould not be open to

of
acceptance a different courseof action. Bradleyobviously convincedEisenhower
to

weight the Directing

southernapproach. 21 Army Group on its "'final base" and only

"eventually" moving east,Eisenhowerappearsto have beenconvincedby Bradley to

accept the by
course of action not recommended either the CIS or later, the JPS

estimates.He appearedto be open to making the secondaryavenuethe main effort,

it 539
without ever naming so, thusavoidingcontroversy.

Montgomery spoke with Eisenhower alone, asking Bedell Smith and

Humphrey Gale to wait until the two commandersaired their views privately.

Montgomerysummarizedthe meetingin his M- 108to the CIGS. It said, in part:

Ike cameto seeme today.After a long and weary discussionhe agreed

on our left flank we must clear the channel coast and establish a
powerful air force in Belgium and invadethe Ruhr. He also considersit
necessary to invade Saarand would like to split the force. After further
discussionhe agreedthat left flank movementmust be strong enough
to achieve quick successand it was then suggestedthere would not
(repeat not) be enough left over for Saar operation at present. The
problem of Commandand control was then discussed.It seemspublic
opinion in America demandsBradley shall hold his commanddirectly
under Ike and shall not be (repeatnot be) subordinatedto me. I said
that left flank operations into Belgium and beyond would require
careful co-ordination and control and that one commandermust do
this. This was finally agreed.

531Bradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE Plandoesnot mentionsupportfrom eitherthe 21 or 6'

Army Groups.Nor doesit clarify how his two armieswould be suppliedup to and beyondthe Rhine.
Eisenhower'smessageis congruentwith the principlesadvancedby Bradley'splan. The Joint
Planners,as mentionedpreviously,recommendedthat -the axis of advanceshouldnot be directed
exclusively on the METZ Gap." Should21 Army Group be confinedto seizingand establishingbases
on the Channelup to Antwerp, the advanceon the Ruhr becomesexactly this. Eisenhowerconsiscntly
would claim after Septemberthat the -northern group" of armieswasthe "main effort," while ignoring
all the ramificationsof sucha statement,claiming to give themactualpriority asexpectedby
Montgomerywould be -exclusionary."

297
 before final published. he
Notin- he expecteda draft directive the orderswere
a

statedhopefully,

I think discussionwas valuableand clearedthe air and there is a good

5,0
hopethat directivewill be what is wanted.'

In his oum log, he added severalpersonalnotes. He said that he offered to

serveunder Bradley,so important it

was to have coordinate
onecommander the push.

This MontgomerysaidL"horrified him." by

Encouraged Eisenhower'swillingness to

let him

fighting on the left flank as between21

co-ordinatethe movementand
Army Group and 12Army Group,

the strategy,not the commandissue,was the problemMontgomeryfelt. Ile statedthat

Eisenhowcr,

is terrified of public opinion in Americaand is trying to find a solution

541
that will not put Bradleyunderme.

More revealing, Monty in his description in his log that he

recordedearly

prefacedhis remarksto Eisenhower

thusly

I made it quite clear to whateverhe decided.that would be donc-and

loyally. But he must be in no doubt everas to my views on the subject,
if, after hearing my views, he decidesto disregardthcm-that is his
businessand he hasa perfectright to do so.542

Montgomeryhad no right to expectto be the groundcommanderin chief and

had beentold officially in Junethat the commandwould devolve to Eisenhower.that

-w AlanbrookePapers,6/2/30, M- 108,23 August 1944.

'4' Montgomeq Log, 23 August 1944.It is clear that Montgomerybelievedthe power to coordinate
duplicatedhis role in Normandy,at leastas far asthe operationsof the left flank of Hodges' forces
were concerned.Bradley.as it will be seen,neveracceptedthis.
542
Ibid.

298
 the Army Groups would thereafter be referred to geographically. that these Arm%,

Groups would organize into "two distinct zones of advance on the continent. - and that

21 Army Group would be reinforced by either an American Army or at least a

543
reinforced corps.

American forces were in the ascendantnumerically, and the preponderance of

ground forces would, by the period of NEPTUNE's forecast end, be American.

Having failed to provide an American combat general of sufficient seniority and

combat experience to merit the "ground commander in chief' designation, the

be Eisenhower's job. 544

Americans had always considered overall ground command tQ

Lt. Gen. Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS), had been present

in Monty's tactical headquarters on the night of the 22 August and, after hearing of

the results of the Eisenhower-Dc Guingand meeting, had cautioned Monty not to bring

on an Allied command crisis, that' the coalition and not command was the key

545
consideration.

While it was apparent that Montgomery believed that the required close

control of a concentratedthrust could not be handledby the SupremeCommanderand

the SHAEF staff, he appearedfar more concernedaboutexecutingwhat he believedto

be the correctplan than aboutretaininggroundcommand,thoughlosing was no doubt

14'Ellis, Victory in the West.1,83, citing SHAEF 17100/5/Ops,I June 1944.Eisenhower,on 19

August, drafted a letter to Monty statinghe would assumecommand;the draft existsin the SHAEF
OVERLORD 381 file aswell as in the EisenhowerPapers,IV. 2077-2079.Its receiptis not
acknowlegedin the MontgomeryLog or any messages to the CIGS. It is possiblethat this letter-and
the directive noted"as attached'ý--wasneversentto Monty, asthesepoints were to be the subjectof
the 23 August meetingand no messageto Montgomeryseemsto refer to this directive concerning
commandarrangements.-TheSHAEF I Junemessagelikewise appearsmissingfrom the SHAEF files.
Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,44; Harrison,Cross-ChannelAttack-,116,105-118passim.
Hamilton. Masterofthe Battlefield, 810.

299
 blow to his substantial
ego. He thereforepressed for
Eisenhower the 12 divisions Of
a

the First Army. a contingencypermittedby Eisenhower'splanningguidanceOf I June.

but more importantly,a sizableforce that. alongwith Dempsey'sarmy. would permit

a full-bloodedthrust on the primary avenueof approach-a.thrust that be

would made

by First US Army. This thrust would go into the Ruhr, not merely accompany

Dempseyto Antwerp as flank protection.54

Eisenhowerrefusedattachmentor operationalcontrol of an American Army.

statingthat, politically, Americanopinion demandeda firm detachmentof British and

American forces, and that his orders, in this American election year. were to

accomplish that separation.Montgomery believed that Eisenhower.however. had

accededto the key point desired,in Montgomery'swords,

that kft flank operations into Belgium and beyond would require
careful co-ordination and control and that one Commandermust do
547
this. This was finally agreed.

From Montgomery's discussion, this clearly mcant that the general

coordinationand operationaldirection of the northernthrust would be his. Moreover,

he believed this would include First Army's direction of attack. the only logical fruit

having 548
of such responsibility. Moreover, considering Eisenhower's immediate

with Monty, it is clear that both men consideredboth the plan and the
correspondence

subject of commandsettled.On 24 August, Eisenhowerwrote that he was issuing a

*'4 Montgomery, Memoirs, 24 1. He does not mention the I June document. but had obviously
considered that it was more likely to achieve acceptance of "the plan" versus -the plan & command"
option and had carefully considered what force would make his concept viable. as wcl I as supportable
logistically.
447Alanbrooke Papers, M- 108,23 August.
548Montgomery, Memoirs, 241-242.

300
 confirmatory directive. He noted Monty's mission of clearing the coast, securing

Antwerp as a baseand eventuallymoving on to the Ruhr and, seeingthe campaignas

phased,stated:

By the time Antwerp is reachedthe generalstrengthand composition

of the forcesneededfor the later task [i. e., taking the Ruhr] will have
beendetennined.

Besides feeding Montgomery's expectation that the campaign was still

consideredflexible and situation dependent,Eisenhower"confirmed" Montgomery's

ideas concerning control of the northern attacksbut stoppedshort of authorizing a

concerted push into the Ruhr. This letter also inserted both the seeds for

misunderstandingand the direction of Montgomery'sactionsfor the critical period of

August and September,not simply in the location of Eisenhower'smain effort, but in

the commitment of the Airborne Army, SHAEF's only operationalreserve.The key

passagesstated:

Bradley's Army Group will be directed to thrust forward on its left,

with its principal offensive mission, for the moment, to support the
Army Group of the North in the attainment of the objectives noted
above. He will likewise be directed to clean up the Brittany Peninsula
as rapidly as possible, protect against any threat against our
,
communications from the general area of Paris, and to begin building
up. out of incoming forces, the necessarystrength to advance eastward
from Paris toward Metz.
You, as CommandingGeneralof the Army Group of the North, will be
given the authority to effect the necessaryoperational coordination
between your advancing forces and Bradley's left wing. Mechanical
details for effecting this will be left to you and Bradley.

Proceedingfurther, Eisenhowerstated:

We must immediatelypreparedefinite plans for the employmentof the

entire airborne force so as to speedup the accomplishmentof the
missions that you must attain rapidly in the Northeast.Unlesswe use

301
 the Airborne Army, assuming it is practicableto do so. we will not be
using all available assetsand there would be no excuse for insisting
upon the deployment of the major part of Bradley's strength on his
extremeleft.
Bradley is coming to see you this morning with instructionsto bend
every effort toward speedingup the deployment of his forces in that
direction. The fasterwe do it the more certainwill be our successand
the earlier will come our opportunity to advanceeastwardfrom the
Parisarea.

In closing, Ike notedthat speedwas a necessity,and that SHAEF's logistics staff had

him
assured 549
the plan was supportable.

Montgomery's log recordsthat he was certain that this "coordination" came

with a limit. He noted,

It is clear to me that when the northerntasksarc completed,then the

whole Americaneffort will go off into the SAAR andcentralGermany.

Montgomery recorded that he and Bradley confirmed a boundary and that

Hodges'First Army

can produce up to nine divisions ... and these will be directed to

BRUSSELS-LIEGEarea,on the right flank of 21 Army Group. 550

Eisenhowerreportedhis intentionsto clear the northeasternsector and seize

Antwerp to Marshall, but indicatedthat Bradleywould clear Brittany,

to provide for the necessarymaintenanceand the acceleratedflow of

divisions into this theater.

Eisenhowerindicated Bradley would build up eastof Paris before driving to

Metz, but statedthat the importanceof the objectivesto the northeastrequiredhim to

$49EL, CorrespondenceFile, Eisenhowerto Montgomery,24 August 1944;EisenhowerPapers,IV,

2090-2092.
$50
Xfontgomeq Log. 24 August 1944.

302
 concentratethere,and not to attempta simultaneousmove to the east.He noted that

he was anxiousto attackeastwardto the French-Germanborder,

but there is no point in getting there until we are in a position to do

somethingabout it. 551

While SHAEF seemedhesitantto publish a directive too far in advanceof the

I Septembertakeover,the Army Group commandersissuedorders basedupon their

discussionswith SCAEF and eachother. With troopsalreadyin Paris,Bradley issued

"Letter of InstructionsNumberSix" on 25 August.Orderinghis forcesto resumetheir

advanceto the northeast,to crossthe Seine the of

andcomplete encirclement Paris,he

directed that the "main effort initially on the left (west) flank prepare for further

advanceinto "
Gen-nany. Most important, he listed as Third Army's primary mission,

after advancingto Reims,to

[b]e preparedto continue the advanceon Army Group order to seize

the crossingsof the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ
(both inclusive).

Patton's secondarymission was to use VIII Corps to complete Brittany's

552First Army's carefully drawn to supportthe plannedairborne

capture. advancewas

operation LINNET. but Patton's indicated"directions of attack" clearly were planned

to cross the Rhine south of the Ruhr, with eight infantry divisions and one armored.
553
Two of Patton'sarmoreddivisions comprisedthe Brittany force.

Eisenhoiver Papers.IV. 2092-2094.

12'hArmv Group Reportof Operations.V, G-3,85-87, plus accompanyingmap,Annex No. I
OperationýIap.
"3 Ibid.. seepara.2 c. "Troops." A -direction of attack" is a restrictivemeasurespecifyingthe exact
route of attack to the objective. It is rare for an army group to specify exactly how an objective is to be
approachcd.Bradicy's instructionsspecifiedthesefor eachof the First and Third Army's corps.

303
 Montgomery's M. 520 was issuedthe next day. (Seefigure 32.) Montgomery

listed his Army Group's tasksas continuingto the northeastdestroyingthe enemy,to

z

securethe Pasde Calais,andthento secureAntwerp. He specified:

Having completedthesetasks,the eventualmissionof the Army Group

will be 554
to advanceeastwardson the RUHR.

Montgomery followed Eisenhower'sdirections to the word; he was, in fact,

rapidly organizing the campaign specified, but to maintain flexibility he directed

Crerar's Army to keep its main weight to the right flank and to deal with enemy

resistanceby "right hooks." Speed, as he and Eisenhoweragreed, was critical.

Montgomerydirectedhis main-effort army,Dempsey'sSecond:

The Army will move with its armouredstrengthdeployedwell ahead;

its passagenorthwardsmust be swift and relentless.By this meansit
will cut acrossthe communicationsof the enemyforcesin the coastal
belt, and will thus facilitate the operationsof the CanadianArmy.

Monty specifiedhow his armored"blitz" would be conducted:

The proper tacticsnow are for strongarmouredand mobile columnsto

by-passenemycentresof resistanceand to push boldly ahead,creating
alarm and despondencyin the enemyrearareas.
Enemy centresof resistancethus by-passedshould be dealt with by
infantry columnscoming on later.
I rely on commanders of every rank and grade to "drive" ahead with
the utmost energy; any tendency to be "sticky" or cautious must be
555
stamped on ruthlessly.

Montgomery had given 30 Corps the nod to spearheadthe advance,hoping

that Horrocks would lead the pack. O'Connor, whose desert laurels had not been

burnished in EPSOM, GOODWOOD, or BLUECOAT, had been "grounded" in

1ý4
M.520.26-844.
W Ibid.

304
 Normandy and his main transportassetstaken to support SecondArmy's advance.

Within a week, his armor had also beentakenand placedin the van of attack. Second

Army advancedwith 30 Corpsand 12 Corpsafter shakingout from their original one-

corps frontageto the First US Army's left as it moved on to the Seineand beganits

assaultat Vernon. Threeother crossingswere madenorth of Paristo give 12 Corpsits

own bridgeheadand to provide crossingsites for Crerar's First Army to move on Le

Havre and Dieppe. 556

The pursuit for both Army Groupsrequireda careful logistical regrouping,a

reapportiomnentof transport,and carefullY drawn boundariesto pemiit each force

adequateroad spaceand crossing sites. During this period Bradley and Dempsey

clashed over use of roads, and Bradley, perhaps "getting even" for his Sicilian

campaignexperience, both provokedand ignoredBritish concerns.The British press

reported Dempsey'soffhand commentson the affair, and this minor incident festered

along with many rapidly growing feelingsof hatewithin the American 557
camp.

These feelings. fed by Patton's histrionics and "off-the-record" commentsto

the American press, were encouraged at 12'h Army Group by their SHAEF

556SecondArmYHistoq. 182-190.Baynes,TheForgotten Victor, 222-226,ChapterSeven,passim.

O'Connor fclt slightedby being left out. and his biographerimplies that O'Connor, not Horrocks,
would havedone a bctterjob both in the pursuitand during the GARDEN operationhad 8 Corpsbeen
2d Army's spearheadcorps.
ýý7MH1. PogmePapers,Pogueinterview with Bradley,6 November1946;EL. Correspondence File,
Eiscnhowcrto Dempsey,12June51,2 June5 1; Dempseyto Bradley, May 25', 1951; Bradley,A
Soldier *sStorv. 383. Dempseywas reportedin the pressasnoting that Americantraff ic on his roads
had slowed his advanceto the Seincduring the turn to the north. After the war Bradleydescribedto the
official historian that -Dempsey'schargewasone of the greatestinjusticesever doneto the American
Army." This incidcnt neverended.Dempseybristledover what he consideredwas a misstatementby
the pressand wrote Eisenhowerin 1951after Bradleyrevisitedit in his memoirs.Bitter feelingshad
beenfannedby the First Army Staff (formerly the II CorpsStaff), who had also felt slightedin Sicily
during the Patton-Montyaffair: after COBRA, they felt that they, not the British, were the great
contributorsin NEPTUNE. The plain fact wasthat sufficient maneuverspaceand roadswere needed
and that parking the First Army in front of the SecondArmy when forceswere being arguedover for
supportinga northernthrust was ignoranton Bradley's part.

305
counterparts,who saw the -coming of Eisenhower"as the end of their nemesis,
559
Montgomery,who hadberatedtheir COSSACplan. Had Eisenhowersteppedup to

the land-commandplate, this might have died. Eisenhower'sconspicuousabsence

from the field, his tendency to permit the Army Groups to negotiate their own

positions without firm guidanceor support,his contradictoryprivate statementsand

to
correspondence Marshall, Bradley,and Montgomery,and his remarkablefailure to

issuea long-term"masterplan" ratherthan short-termguidancemessagesgaveall his

competingcommandinterestslicenseto debate,
argue,and in Bradley'scase,sabotage

coordinatedplans for Men

a cohesivecampaign. would die, time would be lost, and

the campaignwould be skewedin Septemberdue to thesepractices.While the issue

of strategywas a real one, the issue of command-not just who exercisedit, but

how-would be the determiningfactor in turning a favorablestrategicsituation into

victory. This was SCAEF's responsibility.

As the American official history for the campaign noted, at this time

Eisenhower'sforces had a superiorityof 20 to I in tanks,2.5 to I in field guns, and

total air supremacyover the battle areas. Yet this advantagewould be fleeting.

Intelligence had gilded their estimateswith gold-lacedprophesiesof early collapse,

and Eisenhowerignoredthe Maintenanceof the ObjectivePrinciple for the old rubric

of pursuit stated in American doctrine, "The is

pursuit conductedon a broad front,"

and that during a pursuit, the commander"utilizes all meansto maintainthe continuity

551%
Hamilton. Nfasterofthe Battlefield, 741-754.Montgomery'sbiographertracksthe discontentwith
Montgomerybcst. Unpublishedcommentsto be found in the EisenhowerLibrary in the Butcher
Papet-s.Pajers ofKqv Summersb. v (Diary), and at the Military History Institute in the Bradlev
Commentaries.

306
of the attack and to exert a relentless pressure on the defeated enemy."559The fact

most unacceptableat SHAEF at this time was that the pursuit was rapidly coming to

an end due to the broad-frontpursuit's inability to be supported.Both Montgomery

and Bradley had arguedfor a way to maintainan attackoncethe enemyrecoveredand

supplies had to be rationed severely-,Eisenhower'splans, however, made no such

accomodations,yet.

On 29 August as virtually every Allied army was in hot pursuit on European

soil of a retreating,batteredWehrmacht,Eisenhower
publishedhis fust directive for

SHAEF's campaign.(Seefigure 33.) Eisenhowerannounced,

It is my intention to completethe destructionof the enemyforcesin the

West and then advanceagainstthe heartof the enemyhomeland.

Repeatinghis original ordersof 24 August concerningadvanceto Antwerp, he

restated that the left wing of Bradley's advancewould act in conjunction with the

"Northem Group of Armies" with the

principal offensive mission of assistingthe Northern Group of Armies

in the destructionof enemy forces west of the Oise and south of the
Somme. It will then advancerapidly acrossthe Somme,preparedto
continue to the advanceto the northeast.... The Commander-in-Chief
Central Group of Armies will build up our incoming forces east of
Paris. prepareto strike rapidly eastwardstowards the Saar Valley to
reinforce the Allied advancenorth and west of the Ardennes,and to
assist the advance of the SeventhArmy [still in Devers' DRAGOON
Forces]beyondDijon. 560

Montgomery's 21 Army Group was given authority to draft, "in conjunction" with the

First Allied Airborne Army, a plan

559FM 100-5.1944.151.153.

307
 for launching an airborne assault to insure the destructionof the
retreating enemy forces. Planning and initial employment, in
coordination with the Allied Naval and Air Commandersconcerned,
will be as directed by the Commander-in-Chief Northern Group of
Armies.

Montgomery's own control of the northern advance was limited by his

authorizationto effect coordinationwith Bradley,but not to haveoperationalcontrol

over any elementsin Bradley's sector. As ground commander,Eisenhowershould

have coordinated operations, not Montgomery, who was forced to deal without

authority with Bradley, whose actions demonstratedthat he never intendedto offer

of cooperation,not act in harnesson a singleplan.

anythingbut the appearance

Nor was the First Allied Airborne attachedto 21 Army Group,whoseauthority

extendedto planning until forcesactually landedon the ground.Brereton'scommand

umbilical cord to SHAEF and his invisible authority lines to Spaatzand Arnold were

likewise neither cut nor curtailed. In every casewith Bradley, Hodges,or Brereton,

561
Montgomeryhad to rely on agreementto gain compliancewith any plan or order.

Montgomerydecidedto usethe airbornearmy at Tournai (OP LINNET) on 29

August and, while waiting for the weatherto clear,briefed Alanbrookeon the current

situation. Montgomerynoted that despiteBradley's to

agreement move nine divisions

toward Belgium, with the lack of a -ground C-in-C, and no air C-in-C," problemsmay

arisebecause

5""EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2100-2102;NARA, RG 331, Overlord 381. Msg FX-86983,and SCAF

256/24.August 24,1944. On the 24", Field MarshalWilson and Eisenhowerbegancoordinatingthe
changeof commandstatusfor the southernforces.
ý"' I bid.: MontgometyLog, 29 August 1944.notesthat he had failed to be given powersof operational
direction. He recordedhis disagreementwith the coordinationof the left wing, and that he would
discussthis auainwith Eisenhower.
n

30S
 Eisenhower's ideas for the future were that 12 Army Group should
head off eastwards [to the] to the SAAR; Third Army (Patton) was
already heading for FRANKFURT alone, and may well get into
diff iculties. 562

On I September,as Eisenhower"took commanddirectly" of both the 21 and

12th Army Groups,Montgomerywas promotedto Field Marshal, an event met with

563
derision in the Americancamp and at SHAEF. The day, however,beckonedfuture

command issues, not affected by promotions in status or rank. The operational

situation swung further toward a decision on advancingnot merely "on" but "into"

Germany,a decisionput off by Eisenhoweron the 23d, his letter on the 20, and his

directive on the 29th.

On 2 September,Eisenhowertraveledto 12'hArmy Group's Headquartersand

met with Bradley, Vandenberg, Hodges, and Patton. Eisenhower's corrunanders

stressedthat continuing the Americanmovementeastwould obviate the "future great

battle of Germany," as Pattonrecordedin his diary, but Pattonalso notedthat "waiting

would causea battle for Germany.

" Despitehis to Montgomeryand his later
messages

explanations, Eisenhower chaired a meeting that essentially pulled the American

effort southwardaway from the direct approachinto the Ruhr. In addition to assigning

objectives for eacharmy, decisionswere madeto reattachthe 79'hDivision to Patton

after the clearanceof the "Pas de Calais-Le Havre"; that the 6th Armored would be

reassignedfrom Brittany; and that priorities for supplieswould be to V Corps of First

ý"2.tfontgomeiy Log, 29 August 1944,Danchcvand Todman,Alanbrooke WarDiaries, 586.

Alanbrooke was not so pessimistic,but stated,-[I[t remainsto be seenwhat political pressureis put on
Eisenhowerto move Americanson a separateaxis ftom the British."
56*;EisenhowerPapers,IV. 2110; Patton Diaq, September1,1944. Eisenhowerwrote a fulsome
congratulatorynote. Bradley,apparently, did not. Pattonrecordedcynically Eisenhower's public praise
for Montgomeryat a pressconferenceheld to underscoreIke's total control of groundoperations.

309
Army and to Third Army. Severaldaysearlier.Pattonhad met urith Lt. Gen.William

H. Simpson,whose Ninth Army Headquarterswould begin assumingcommandof

564
units in Brittany.

Bradley And his generalswere convincedthat victory was in their graspand

that only Montgomeryand the air force's plans to drop airbornetroops,thus cutting

off their air transportof supplies,could slow their victory. HansenrecordsBradley as

saying,

Give me 8,000 tons [of supplies]eastof Parisand we'll get going. I'll
stop effort over on the eastflank almostaltogetherand turn everything
toward Germany.We can start nine divisions almost immediately.Six
shouldcertainlyget to the Rhinevery quickly.

Hansen'sown recordexpandson this view:

General expects to be on the Rhine a week from Sunday [10

September] if Ike will give him the go ahead sign on the movement he
wants to make. Had we been able to go, perhaps we should have been
565
there today.

Eisenhower'sstatedoperationalvision remainedone of severalpunches-one

toward the Pasde Calais area,one to the areatoward Brussels,and one castof Paris.

Montgomery still viewed the possibility of a single, seamlessoffensive along the

ChannelCoast,with the inside force wheeling due eastthrough Liege-Aachen-Ruhr.

5(4Patton Dian-, August 31,1944; September2,1944; Third A

rntv COSDiary, I September44:
EisenhowerPýpers. V, appointmentdiary. The Chief of Staff diary, Third Army notesthat Third Army
was stoppedthat day for lack of fuel and recordsthe meeting.The EisenhowerDiaty and Patton Diary
statethis meetingwas held on 2 September.The Patton Diary, 2 September1944.also comments,"Ike
is all for caution. sincehe hasneverbeenat the front and hasno feel of actualfighting." Pattondamns
the Servicesof Supply Chief, J.C.H. Lee, decrying Eisenhower'scommentthat the Communications
Zone had donea miraculousjob, "whereaswe considerthat they havefailed utterly and probably lost
us a victory before winter, through their inability to keepus suppliedwith gasoline." No commentwas
maderegardingPatton'sfailure to capturethe American-rcquiredports.
565HansenDiaýr, I September.Eisenhowerfailed to give Bradleypermissionto move 12diArmy
Group due caston the 2d. The 10' of Septemberwould havegreatsignificancefor the campaign.On
that day. Eisenhowerwould give Montgomerypermissionto seizea Rhinecrossing.

310
As his ordersand reorganizationof both Crerar's and Dempsey'sforcesindicated,he

566
intended both to concentrateandleadwith annoredforcesand airbornelandings.

Eisenhower'svision modified Montgomery's concept of sequentialpunches

on opposite flanks as usedin Normandy,a frontageonly one-eighththe length that a

move to the German border entailed. Heavily influenced by the "victory disease"

spread by his intelligencesection,Eisenhowersaw thesenot as coordinatedor timed

but
punchesor attacks ratherextensionsof an all-out pursuit on all fronts. Intelligence

clearly pointed out the weaknessof the enemy,but a careful study of the remaining

order of battle indicated that the Germanswere in a good position to contest the

clearing of the north coast and could move forces to block penetrationson key

avenues.Montgomery wantedall availableforcesto steamrollerthe remainingenemy

divisions as well as to concentrateastridethe northerntwo avenuesin a sectormore

than 100 miles wide. Eisenhower'sidea that the enemywould be "stretchecl"ý--ancl

thereby unable to resist-addressed neither force-to-spaceratios nor the rapidly

diminishing returnsof the dispersionof logistical 567

resources.

Within severaldays of issuing his directive, the operationalpicture changed

significantly, requiring Eisenhower to promulgate a concept for his campaign.

SHAEF's G-2 trumpetedthe goodnews:

The German Army in the WEST is no longer a cohesiveforce but a

number of fugitive battle groups,disorganizedand even demoralized,
short of equipmentand arms The enemy, in fact, has been out-
...
generalledand out-fought and is no longer in a position to offer serious
resistanceon any line shortof the WEST wall ... And so, GERMANY

Monipmeiý- Log, 31 August 1944.

$67By stretchinghis own forces.he assuredthat they would not be strongenoughto breakthrough
rcsistanccwhcn it formcd. or havethe logistical wherewithalto shift forcesto concentrate.

311
 is inevitably facedwith continuedwithdrawal in the WEST and on all
her fronts for she doesnot now disposesufficient forces.particularly
annour,to competewith the Allied armies.568

SHAEF had unsophisticatedmeans to assessenemy troop strength or

capability but assessedthe enemy's 50 nominal divisions as equating to 27 with a

rough strength of two panzer and 10 infantry divisions north of the Ardennes, two

panzer/panzer grenadier divisions and four infantry divisions south of the Ardennes,

one division in Southwest France, and one panzer and two infantry divisions escaping

from the Rhone Valley. Five divisions were penned in the ports designated by Hitler

569
as "fortresses.

The operationalpicture beggedthe questionof the soundnessof Eisenhower's

decision to advance on all fronts. The remaining strength of the German Army

remainednot only in the north on the routeto the Ruhr,but in the key port "fortresses"

that SHAEF neededcapturedto fully developthe theater'sadministrativebase.With

Allied armor temporarilyrampagingwith impunity, any major changesin deployment

had to be made immediately, before dispersionand logistics forced the advancing

troopsto remainon their currentaxesof advance.

At the time of the Eisenhower-Montgomery

meetingin August, Patton'sThird

Army had pushed almost to the Seine south of Paris, its spearheadsreaching

Fontainbleau.By the time Bradley'scommandersmet with Eisenhowerten dayslater,

Third Army had reached the Meuse at Verdun-Commercy.Its cavalry elements

"s SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 24.2 September1944,4.

46Q Ibid.. 2. SHAEF neverconducted-force ratio" or equivalentcombatpowercorrelationsper front for
its army groups.armics.or forcesin general,nor did they focuson combatpower analysison
individual avenuesof approachexceptin very generalterms.This was much of the problem in the
Normandy beachhead.and it pcrsistcdthroughoutthe campaign.

312
 patrolled the Moselle betweenPont-a-Mousonand Nancy. Both Patton's XR and XX

Corps reported -no established[enemy] front line." 570Hodges' First Army had

extendedits XIX Corpsacrossthe Belgianbordersouthof Tournai, its V Corpson the

line Cambrai-LeCateau,and its VII Corpsto Mons to the southof Charleroi,bagging

25,000 571
an additional prisonersin the process.

21 Army Group, however, was not outdone. Dempsey's SecondArmy had

crossedthe Seineand the Somme,and was disposedwith the GuardsArmoured, I Ith

Armoured. and Vh Armoured Divisions from Douai to Bethune to Lille on 2

September. Dempsey'sintentions were to move on Brussels,Antwerp, and Ghent

572
without stoppingto consolidateor resupply. (Seefigure 34.) Crerar's two corpshad

advancedwith the 11CanadianCorpson the right and forward and the British I Corps

on the coast. The First Army's mission had been to completethe destructionof the

Germanarmy northwestof the Seineand to capturethe ports of Dieppeand Le Havre.

By the end of August, three division-sized bridgeheadshad been establishedon the

Seineand. while infantry proceededtowardsthe ports, Crerarpassedthe 4'h Canadian

Armoured and the Polish Armoured Divisions forward in column on his right flank.

Dieppe fell on I Septemberwhile armoreddivision spearheads

reachedthe areanorth
573
of Abbeville. (Seefigure 35.)

170Third Arnn-After Action Report./. 61-63; Operations

maps,21 August, 31 August, 15 September
1944.11.StatýfReports.G-2.2 September.LXI-LXII.
FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-Feb 45.1'930-37, Situation Map No. 4 (AMIENS-LILLE-
CHARLEROI). Most of theseprisonershad escapedthe "FalaiseGap."
SecondArm Histon%193.Map -Dispositionsand Intentionsof SecondArmy on 2 Sep44.
(Reproducedas *vfigure ý5.)
NAC. RG 24. Volume 10636.Reportby GEN. H.D.G. Crerar,CB, DSO,coveringOperationsof the
First CanadianArmy from 24 AUG-I" SEPT 1944;NAC, RG 24, Volume 10542,File 215A21.016(9).
Montgomcry senta messageto Creraras his armor coiled for maintenance,saying,"IT IS VERY

313
 had
21 Army Group's spearheads moved 150 miles from 28 August to 2

Septemberand, with the enemyforming no coherentfront, Dempsey'sforces struck

out toward its key objectivesof Antwerp and With

Brussels. bad weatherdelaying the

air drop at Tournai, LINNET was cancelledwhen the US First Army continued its

advance, overrunning the intended target area. Montgomery had wanted the I

Airborne Corps to move toward Ghent,thus anchoringhis flank while SecondArmy

continuedits advance,but discussionswith Bradleyon 3 Septemberproduceda new

Army
agreement. Group boundaries
pointing castdefinedthe axesof advanceof both

Montgomery'sand Bradley'sArmy Groups.From the point of view of operations,this

was a far-reachingdecisionaffecting the rest of the campaignin Europe.SHAEF was

not present at the conferencedeciding upon these boundaries,nor was there any

apparentdiscussionfrom the SHAEF G-3.574

The new boundarygave Bradley operationalresponsibility for the area south

Dempseydescribedthe inter-
of the line Toumai-Wavre-Hasselt-Sittard-Garzweiler.

army boundaryin more dramaticterms:

It will run just SOUTH of a line BRUSSELS-DUSSELDORF, which

gives the whole of the RUHR to me. We will, if possible,by-passthe
RUHR to the NORTH andcomein behindit nearHAMM. 573

Montgomery,as he frequentlydid, followed up the conferencewith a general

-M" directive to confirm the detailsof what had beendiscussed.He announcedas his

intention in M. 523:

necessarythat your two Armd Divs shouldpush forward with all speedtowardsST OMER and
bcyond. NOT rpt NOT considerthis time for any div to halt for maintenance.Pushon quickly."
ý14Afonigomeq Log, 2-3 September1944.

314
 (a) To advanceeastwardsanddestroyall enemyforcesencountered.
(b) To occupy the RUHR, and get astridethe communicationsleading
from it into Germanyandto the seaports.576

His general concept was to have Second Army complete the capture of Brussels-

Ghent-Antwerp, with 12 Corps echelonedback to await Crerar's clearanceof the

Bruges area. Crerar's own advancewas to halt in this area "until the maintenance

situation allows its employmentfurther forward." His exactplan for the SecondArmy

and his understandingof what Bradley had "agreedto" laid the groundwork for his

later decisions(seefigures36 and37):

SecondArmy

6. On 6 September.the Army will advanceeastwardswith its main

bodies from the generalline BRUSSELS-ANTWERP.Before that
date light forcesmay operatefar afield, asdesired.
7. The western face of the RUHR between DUSSELDORF and
DUISBERGwill be threatenedfrontally.
8. The main weight of the Army will be directed on the RHINE
betweenWESEL and ARNHEM.
9. One division, or if necessarya Corps, will be turned northward
towardsROTTERDAM andAMSTERDAM.
10.Having crossedthe RHINE, the Army will deal with the RUHR
and will be directed on the generalarea OSNABRUCK-HAMM-
MUNSTER-RHEINE.

Operationsof 12 Army Group

11. First US Army is being directed to move its left forward in
conjunctionwith the advanceof 21 Army Group.
12.First US Army is directing its left two Corps(7 and 19) on:
MAASTRICHT-LIEGE
SITTARD-AACHEN
COLOGNE-BONN

ý" DempseyDiaq, 3 September1944.Brusselshad been

given to SecondArmy in 21 Army Group
AmendmentNo. I to M 520,29-8-44.
ý*bM.523.3-9-44.

315
 13. First US Army will assist in cutting off the RUHR by operations
against its south-eastem face, if such action is desired by Second
Army. 577

Eisenhowerhad met with his Americancommanderson 2 September,but had

not seen Montgomeryfor any length of time since 23 August. In the meantime,he

remainedat SHAEF's "forward" headquarters,

at Granville, France,some400 miles

from the front. He announcedhis "campaignplan" on 4 Septemberby message.This

messagestatedin part:

Enemyresistanceon the entire front showssignsof collapse.

After reviewing the enemysituation.he estimatedthat the only courseof action open

to the Germansfor preventingcollapsewas to reinforce their retreatingforces with

divisions from within Germanyor other fronts to block the key entriesto the Ruhr and

the Saar,this contingencyEisenhowernoted as being doubtful, as the enemywould

placea priority on defendingthe Ruhr approach.He stateddefinitively-

Our best opportunityof defeatingthe enemyin the West lies in striking

at the RUHR and at the SAAR, confidentthat he will concentratethe
remainderof his availableforcesin the defenseof theseessentialareas.

Having announcedhis chosencourseof action,he stated:

My intention continuesto be the destructionof the enemyforces and

this will be the primary task of all elementsof the Allied Expeditionary
Force.

His conceptof operationsby groupsof armieswas statedas:

The mission of Northern Group of Armies and of that part of Central

Group of Armies operatingnorth-westof the ARDENNES is to secure

5.!
- Ibid.

316
 ANTWERP, breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the
RUHR and then seizethe RUHR.578

Given the importanceof the Ruhr in the Allies' estimates,it was clear to

Montgomery that Eisenhower not only had targeted his forces for the main objective,

but also had confirmed that Bradley would closely cooperateand that this directive

thoroughly supportedhis M. 523, issuedthe day before.

Assuming that the messagefollowed the standard missions in priority,

Bradley's missionssouthof the Ardenneswereclear

The missionsof the CentralGroup of Armies, exclusiveof that portion

operatingnorth-westof the ARDENNES,are:
A. To captureBrest
B. To protectthe southernflank of Allied ExpeditionaryForce
C. To occupythe sectorof the Siegftied Line coveringthe SAAR and
then to seize FRANKFURT. It is important that this operation
should start as soon as possible,in order to forestall the enemyin
this sector,but troopsof CentralGroup of Armies operatingagainst
the RUHR north-westof the ARDENNES must first be adequately
supported.
D. To take any opportunity of destroyingenemy forces withdrawing
from south-westand southernFRANCE.

The final paragraphcontinuedthe ill-defined commandauthority of 21 Army

Group over First Allied Airbome Army:

The First Allied Airborne Army will operate in support of Northern

Group of Armies up to and including the crossing of the RHINE and
then be prepared to operate in large scale operations in the advance into
GERMANY. 579

" EisenhowerPapers,11'.2115-2118 NARA RG 33 1. Overlord 38 1, msg. 13765,4 Sept 1944.This

52
,
messagewas drafted by the G-3, Maj.-Gen. Bull, on 3 Septemberand was reviewedin conferencewith
Spaatzand two of his air commanders,and with Bull. Eisenhowerstrengthenedthe words concerning
FAAA from the draft. -will operatein accordancewith existing instructions."
5,1114
Ibid.

317
 Eisenhower'sdirective was not meantto bow to Montgomery'splan nor even

to grant priority for it. More importantwas the accompanyingstaff paperthat went to

Eisenhowerunseenby the Commanderof 21 Army Group, though its contentswere

obviously inspiredby the 2 September

Americans-onlycommandmeetingchairedby

Eisenhower.The accompanyingpaper,called [the] "Advanceto Breachthe Seigfiried

[sic] Line Appreciation," revisited the issueof forcesto favor an advanceby Third

Anny. The tactical situation,it stated,posed

an opportunity to breachthe Seigfried [sic) Line by rapid aggressive

movement by the Third Army on the SAAR and thence on
FRANKFURT. Estimatesindicate that the minimum forces for this
operationshouldbe about sevendivisions. From the logistical point of
view, however. Central Group of Armies only can say whether this
would be possible without prejudicing operations north of the
ARDENNES. As US ground forcesare now distributed,the operation
appearspracticableonly if a corpsof threedivisions is withdrawn from
the First Army effort and made available to the Third Army, thus
leaving First Army with two corpsof threedivisionseach. 380

The 14th" 15th and 16th paragraphs of the memo contradicted the logic of the
,

SHAEF's G-2 Enemy Order of Battle Map, publishedon 2 September,that showed

unengagedenemydivisions holding the ChannelCoastas far as the hook of Holland.

Theseparaggaphs
stated:

In view of the relative weaknessof the enemy northwest of the

ARDENNES. it is consideredpracticableto reducethe strengthof the
Allied forcesmaking the main effort without prejudicingits success.In
fact. it is considereddesirable to do so to maintain the speed of
advance.If one US corps is withdrawn from theseforces,the Northern
Group of Armies will have its own fourteendivisions plus the support
of the First Army (UNITED STATES) with six divisions. The First

590NARA. RG 331. Overlord 381. SHAEF/17100/18/Ops(A),"Advance to Breachthe SEIGFRIED

[sic] LINE Appreciation. 1. SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 24; Patton Diary, 30 August
1944:Patton. ffarAs / Knew It, 120.Pattonstatesthat he had madethis argumentto Bradley and Bull
on this day. but that SHAEF did not concurwith it. He referredto this as-the most momentouserror of
the war.- Four days later. it appearsthat Bull is making Patton'scasefor him to Eisenhower.

318
 Allied Airborne Army of approximately four divisions will also
supportthe NorthernGroup of Armies. Therewill thereforebe twenty-
four divisiorls for the accomplishmentof the main object.
This reduction in strengthof the First Army would releasea Corps of
three divisions for operationselsewhereon the firontof Central Group
of Armies. Whetherthis extra Corpscould be usedin an offensiverole
dependsupon the logistic situationwhich is a matterfor CentralGroup
of Armies. It is not consideredthat operationsshould be conducted
towardsthe SAAR at the expense,logistically, of the main operations.
Should it prove possible to operate against the SAAR without
prejudices to the main operationsagainstthe RUHR there are many
advantagesto be gainedby anticipatingthe enemyin the occupationof
the SAAR sector of the SEIGFRIED [sic] LINE and striking at
FRANKFORT [sic] without ffirther delay.

The staffs recommendationwas precisely what Eisenhowerwanted to hear,

and to believe:

GeneralBradley has full authority to transferunits from First to Third

Armies. Therefore,no instruction to him in this respectis necessary.
Should. however.the SupremeCommanderbe called upon to make a
decisionon this question,it is recommendedthat:
a. First Anny be reducedto two Corps and given first call on US
logistical resources;
b. Third Army, reinforcedas required,be pennitted to advanceon the
SAAR as soon as this can be undertakenwithout prejudice to
operationsnorthwestof the ARDENNES;
C. A Corps be held in Army Group reservein the PARIS-TROYES-
[area] for useasnecessary. 581

Thus, Eisenhowerwas given his "staff's recommendation,

" which was in fact,

based on personal friendships and politics rather than on military considerations.

Having already decided that the Saar would have equal verbal weight in all

discussionsof objectiveswith the Ruhr, despitethe obvious falsehoodof the matteras

identified by the JIS appreciation,Bull's appreciationof the forces available, their

5" SEIGFRIED [sic] LINE Apprcciation, 2.

319
 capabilities, and the stated ability not "to prejudice operations north of the

ARDENNES"' by stripping away forceswas sophistry,not a careful appreciation.The

false positive enemypicture implied was in contradictionto Eisenhower"sown G-2's

estimate. Bull's paper was in fact, low-grade staff work. Bull had "situated the

appreciation."

At the heart of the problem was SHAEF's own "appreciation."" Using

statementssuch as, "The enemyhas no prospectof a rectificationof this dismal state

" dramatic, incredibly 582

of affairs, while was wrong. The much vaunted ULTRA

failed to identify German moves within Germanynot only to strengthenthe West

Wall. but to create panzer brigades from burnt-out EasternFront divisions or to

rapidly reequipand reorganizedivisions from the streamsof stragglersunstoppableby

the "air supremacy"that had meant so much. Moreover,SHAEF seemedignorant of

the tactical problemsat hand.

The ports all had to be reducedby force,requiringthousandsof tons of bombs

and artillery as well as troops.Oncecaptured,eachwould requireup to two monthsto

be clearedof mines,debrisand sunkenships,and engineershad to rebuild facilities as

well as rail and road links from eachport to the outside.Never was the victory disease

more prevalent than among Eisenhower, the SHAEF staff, and America's self-

proclaimed thruster. Patton. Patton's fantasy of going to Frankfurt with seven

divisions was a recipe for nondecisionat the operationallevel, even if it could be

accomplished.Moreover. it ignored every factor of terrain, enemystrength,logistics,

and weather, besides hamstringing airpower. Besides failing to guarantee any

582,
SHAEF Wcckly SummaryNo. 24,4.

320
 operational decision, SHAEF's planners had failed to consult their own logisticians,

who contributed nothing to the directive. Once the directive was sent, the logisticians

convened finally to assesswhat could be done. The 4 September directive rivaled

Eisenhower"s TORCH plan for failing to concentrate on getting to the primary

583
objective.

Also of import as the daysof fall turnedto rain, was the greatweight given to

First Allied Airborne Army. It was not, in fact, the sameasaddingfour divisions to 21

Army Group. As July and August had alreadly shown, it was difficult to bring an

airborne operationto fruition. Nor were the airmen and airbornecommandersintent

on letting their forcesbe used for campaigningonce dropped.Seize,hold, and leave

quickly were their watchwords.Intent on a safedrop and a rapid link, Breretonand the

Americans intendedto keep US divisions out of 21 Army Group's order of battle for

any but a yery short time. Melding this mindset to an opemtionally significant

objective was a challengenot yet accomplished.

Most ludicrous was the implication that the forces available north of the

Ardennes were a coordinatedforce headingfor the Ruhr. They were not under one

commander following one plan. First Army's left neither supportednor acted in

concert with Dempsey and Brereton's divisions were not under Montgomery's

commanduntil dropped,and then for a limited period.Nor were the "14" divisions of

21 Army Group availableto pressto the Ruhr. In Crerar's Army, I Corps was spread

from Le Havre to Abbeville and Crerar was debatingwith Montgomerythe problem

5" Pogue.TheSupremeCommand,258.259. The Chief of Staff of IX EngineerCommand,which built

airfields for 9" Air Force.estimatedthat supportpossibilitiesfor Patton'sdivisions would be heavily
restricted.and estimatedthat perhapsno more than threedivisions could be supplied.

321
of laying siegeto Boulougne,
Calais, Dunkirk. and besides
Ostende. reachingto the

Scheldt,an air-line distanceof 90 miles. Dempseyhadyet to recoverhis 8 Corps from

Normandy,and his remainingcorpsdriving toward Bredaand Eindhovenwere halted

at the Dutch frontier In

awaiting airbornesupport. reality, only five divisions and two

armored brigades were available for a drive either eastwardor northward once

Antwerp was cleared.Any force driving eastwardwould haveto rely heavily on First

Army to carry the Licge-Aachen-Cologne

corridor. the true highwayto the Reich.And

Bradley refused to synchronizehis lcft with theseefforts. From this -attack," Bull

thought removing divisions would speedthe processof penetratingthe Siegfried

Line? How?

Eisenhower's directive was transmitted at 1755, no doubt crossing

Montgomery*sM-160, which was transmittedat 2055. Given the state of SHAEF's

communicationsand its isolation, Eisenhowershould have understoodthat Monty

would havecommunicatedsomethingafter the 2 Septembermeeting,but probablynot

so soon. Montgomery's Liaison Officer at 12th Army Group informed him that

Bradleywould split his suppliesevenlybetweenHodgesand Patton.This bodepoorly

for a concertedthrust on the Ruhr by Dempseyand Hodges,as Montgomeryrecorded

in his log:

First Arrny, on my right, is being scaleddown in consequence;and its

right hand Corps is being directedround to the southof the Ardennes;
only two corps 7 and 19,are comingon with me on my right....
584
I feel very strongly that a big decisionis required.

""Montgomety Log, 4 September1944.The day before.he notedhis belief in a strongthrust

"
somewhere. Appreciating he
the terrain, stated."The country leading into Germany via METZ and
FRANKFURT is very hilly and wooded,and is good for defence.It is easy'going' round north of the
RUHR.-

322
 M-160 was a devastatingappreciationthat contradictedthe yet-to-be-seen

Eisenhowerdirective. In nine short paragraphs,Montgomerycritiqued the situation as

he saw it, stressingthe logistical problemsthat would only increaseand revisiting the

objective and the objectof the OVERLORD campaign:

1.1 considerwe havenow reacheda stagewhere one really powerful

and full-bloodedthrust toward Berlin is likely to get there and thus
end the Germanwar.
2. We have not enoughmaintenanceresourcesfor two full-blooded
thrusts.
3. The selectedthrust must have all the maintenanceresourcesit
needswithout any qualification and any other operationsmust do
the bestit can with what is left over.
4. There are only two possiblethrusts,one via the Ruhr and the other
via Metz andthe Saar.
5. In my opinion the thrust likely to give the bestand quickestresults
is the northernone via the Ruhr.
6. Time is vital and the decisionregardingthe selectedthrust must be
madeat onceand Paragraph3 abovewill then apply.
7. If we attempt a compromisesolution and split our maintenance
resourcesso that neither thrust is full-blooded we will prolong the
war.
8.1 consider the problem viewed above as very simple and clear-cut.
9. The matter is of such vital importance that I feel sure you will
agree
that a decision on the above lines is required at once. If you are
coming this way perhaps you would look in and discuss it. If so,
delighted to see you [for] lunch tomorrow. Do not feel I can leave
battlejust 585
this at present.

No meeting of the minds was possible, for both commandersviewed the

situation from prejudiced vistas. 12th Army Group's battle had encouraged

Eisenhowerto start the DoubleThrust theorizedby the Broad Front concept.Patton's

ý" EL. CorrespondenceFile, M 160,4 September1944.Monty

also hand-wrotca letter to Eisenhower
on the samedatethanking him for his congratulationson promotionto Field Marshal.Judgingfrom the
tonc of his message.letter, and log entries,he consideredthat therewasno chasmin their relationship

323
Third Army had beenhaltedon 30 Augustdue to lack of fuel. BradleyrestoredThird

Army's equal issueof fuel First Army on 5 September,

and Patton decided,if
with

necessary,he would continue his attack by pretending to reconnoiter and then

reinforcing his advanceas an attack. Patton moved out toward the Moselle, the

Siegffied Line, and in his mindý"the Rhine." The sameday, Bradleytransferredthe

79thDivision from the XIX CorpsnearMons to Patton'sXV Corpson his right flank,

586
a move that Eisenhowerhadapprovedon 2 September.

Fuel. however.remainedthe main issue.Bradley's equalizationof supply for

both First and Third Army belied any claim by Eisenhowerthat the northern thrust

had "priority.,,587While Monty countedon a full-blown attackby First Amy toward

Aachen. Bradley disregardedthis concern for attacking directly into the industrial

heartof Germanyin order to reestablishhis heartfeltplan, the five-corpsassaultsouth

of the Ardennesthat he had proposedin the NORMANDY TO THE RIIINE plan.

Patton*sforces moved forward as his supplies increased,and he ordered his two

advancingcorps,the XII and XX, to seizeNancyand Metz, respectively.Pattonadded

and that he wasexpressinghis professionalopinion, not challengingEisenhower'sright to command.

Montgomeryhad seenIke for -10 minutes"on the 26, their last substantialdiscussionwas on the 23d.
"" Pation Diary. September3-5,1944: MHI, PoguePapers.Bradleyinterview
with Pogue.Bradley
stateshe pcrmittcd Pattonto stop when he felt it wasnecessary.
'I. CMH. RoyceL. Thompson.Historical Division, Services Supply.MS, "ETO Field Commands
of
GasolincStatusAugust-September1944," StudyNo. 21,1948,16,36. Patton'sThird Army on I
Scptcmbcr'*rcquired"450.000gallonsof gasoline,10,000gallonsof diesel,plus lubricants; 110,600
crc dclivcrcd. Packagedgasoline(in cans)wascomputedat a rate of 276 gallons per long ton.
gallons %%,
Bulk gasolinewas computedat 368 gallons per ton. As a very rough estimate,an American field army
in September1944requircdabout 1.100tons of fuel daily. Patton'sArmy, temporarily undera 2,000-
ton-pcr-davsupply limit (2 September),requested1,500tons daily in fuel, 500 in rations/suppIies. See
COS Thh-hrm. r biaýy. 28 August-2 September1944.

324
a flourish to his plan; he orderedXH Corps to be to
prepared rush forward to seize

588
Mannheimand establisha bridgeheadon the eastbankof the Rhine.

Hodges' First Army was the key to any American participation in a

concentratednorthern offensive or any direct attack on the Ruhr. It had begun its

swing north on Dempsey'sflank with nine divisions, three of them armored.Bradley

in his 2 Septemberconferencehad madeclear that the right (southernmost)corps,the

Vth, was to have priority of supply. Fronted betweenSoissonsand Compiegne,V

Corps wheeleddue eastwardwith two infantry and one armoreddivision with its new

boundariesstretchingfrom the Grand Dutchy of Luxembourgto the southernBelgian

border. On 4 Septemberit pushedtoward the Meuseand beyond.589By 6 September,

V Corps had captured Sedan and, as gasoline shortages halted its armor, enemy

resistance stiffened about 8 September. By 10 September, the corps had entered

Luxembourg City and prepared to cross the Sauer River and then move on to

Coblenz. 590

Hodges had told his corps commanders,"It is my desire that the advanceof

First Anny shall not be stoppedfor lack of supplies." Supply economies,however,

had fallen short of this goal, thoughthe Army was arrayedfrom right to left almost on

the Germanborder.Hodges' G-2 reportedfour infantry and sevenpanzerdivisions to

the Army's front, in a strengthapproximatingtwo infantry and two panzerdivisions.

Liege. directly on the gatewayto Germany,had fallen on the 81h

, and by II September

588Tliit-(1.4i-tti. 4.lier, 4ction Repdrt. 1. September 4 (D+90); ibid., Annex 2, Operational Directive, 5
%-.
Scp 44. XI.
5'9 VCorps Histoq. 228-234.containsoperationsmaps,orders,and overlaysaswell as a narrativefor
the advance.
5" Ibid.. 235-242.

325
divisional patrols had enteredGermanyin V
the and VII Corps sectors.Bradley's

of the 5:2 tonnageallocationsbetweenFirst and Third Armies to a 1:1 ratio

reduction

had beenhardestfelt in XIX Corps,which had barelyreachedthe Dutch border near

591
Maastrichtwhen the Army haltedon 12 September.

The result of Hodges' priorities was a refused left flank leaving a gap between

21 Army Group and First Army. On Bradley's bidding, Hodges had pushed toward his

right. ostensibly to gain crossings on the Meuse, but leaving the XIX Corps' troops in

the more open sector into Germany grounded for lack of fuel. While First Army's

other corps were at the Siegfried Line, XIX Corps was leapfrogging its units and was

still 20 miles from the border. More important, with the Siegfried Line at its weakest

and the enemy retreating in disarray, Bradley had withdrawn the 79th Division from

the extreme left flank of his army group to be moved to Patton's right-hand flank,

several hundred miles away. Perhaps more critically, at the same time he had moved

the 5th Armored Division from its assembly area near the 791h,to accompany V Corps

its 592
on advance towards the hills and woods of the Ei fel.

From the point of view of sitting on the bestterraincorridor into Germanyand

beyond,and 12thArmy Group's assignedmission of supportingthe 21 Army Group,

XIX Corps should have beenFirst Army's main effort and an obvious candidatefor

59'FUS.4 Report OperationsAug 44-Feb 45,3846; SituationMap No. 5, LIEGE-AACHEN-

of
DUREN.
"2 CMH Files. 8-3.1 AW, MS. Historical Division, EuropeanTheater Operations,Breachingthe
of
SiegfriedLine, 1,Chapters.1.Ill. VII. Vill, XII. (This is the theater"first draft" of the official history.
It is not to be confusedwith XIX Corpspamphletof samenamelisted in bibliography.) Bradley's
action is in concertwith the -infantry view" that every corpsneededan armoreddivision. Bradley
makesno mentionof this in his memoirs,and his own operationsfiles are strangelyempty concerning
this period: the intelligencefiles for this period are missing.The official historianshedslittle light on
the decision,thoughthe theaterhistorian's preliminary history hasexcellentmaterialand maps
concerningXIX Corpsproblems.Additional materialis found in the CombatInterviewsSectionof the
TheaterHistorian's Files. RG 407.

326
 the addition of another armored division. Instead, XIX Corps was grounded and

strippedof a division which, at the height of the "fuel crisis," was transportedlaterally

acrossthe length of the Army Group's own lines of communicationto be committed

in a secondaryoperation.A four-division thrust by XIX Corps, then, was ruled out,

Corlett being denied the ability to make a key thrust conceptuallysimilar to that of

anotherXIX Corps Commanderin anotherarmy, Heinz Guderian,had madein 1940.

From the point of view of ground alone, Corlett was the key to the Schlieffen-in-

reverseplan that drove Montgomery'sintentions.Bradleyhobbledhim at the time the

Germanswere weakest.

Bradley,as a self-professedmasterstudentof terrain,must haveknown this.593

The joint decision of Montgomeryand Bradley to extendthe Army Group boundary

beyond Brusselsand into Germanyhad given Bradleythe bestterrain approach.From

a geographical perspective, the two avenues identified for SHAEF's Broad Front or

double thrust were within the confinesof 12thArmy Group's boundaries.The northern

terrain approachbeggeda heavy concentrationof armor which, in the hands of a

"German" or like-thinking general (or following Montgomery's operational policy set

forth in M. 520), would haverushedthe enemy'sdefensesas they were still unmanned

and perhapslinked with airborneforcesto crossthe waterways.This had happenedin

594
reversein 1940in the samesectorduring the seizureof EbenEmael. In 1944,with

the Rhine and the Ruhr ahead on an eastward axis, its logic was undeniable.

5" The author willingly atteststo Bradley's ability to reada tactical map. During severalon-the-ground
studiesof the Tunisianbattlesof Bradley's corpsoutsideof Bizerte,especiallythe four-division assault
from Choigui Passnorthward.the author wasimpressedwith the precisionand careof Bradley's
terrain estimateand attack plan. Bradley,like Montgomery,wasa masterof the set-picceattackat
corps level.

327
Moreover. such an advancewould have been an American operation.with Second

Army relegatedto protecting its north flank and operationalcoordination logically

" Eisenhower.This would

being performed by a strong "ground forces commander,

havebeenthe obvious result had LINNET 11beenagreedupon.but it was shunnedby

Bradley.

Having insistedon an advanceto the eastinto the Saar,Bradleysabotagedhis

own and henceMontgomery's advanceon a northernroute by hamstringingHodges

with fuel reductions and stripping away troops. Patton's thrust might have been

staggeredas the "one-two punch" that Eisenhowerhad originally seenas the armies

had turned north. The 2 Septembermeetinghad releasedboth Pattonand V Corps to

resurrect12'hArmy Group's southernattackas its own "main effort."

Hansen's diary records over time the evolution of Bradley's thinking that

crippled the northern thrust. Bradley's mental state concerning Montgomery's

influence had reachedparanoic proportions and this manifesteditself in Bradley's

mind as battlefields geographicallyseparatedinto American and British sectors.

Geographyand the smaller size of the 21 Army Group, however, precluded this,

though Bradley still advocated it. His aide recorded Bradley's reaction to the

newspapercoverageof Montgomery's"command"of groundforces:

I get along with Monty fine enough.But, we've got to make it clear to
the American public that we are no longer under any control of
Monty's.

ý44Alexander McKee. TheRacefor

the RhineBridges: 1940,1944,1945(New York: Steinand Day,
1971). Part 1.examinesthe 1940operationsin this area.

328
 To Bradley, that meant having his own separategeographicarea, and not

participating in joint or complementaryoperations.Having encouragedhis own press

" Bradley, still under 21 Army Group's "operational

camp to report -his successes,

direction," had savagedhis aide for passingon a messagefrom Montgomeryinquiring

of the military situation in Paris, saying, "What the devil businessis that of his?"

Similar outburstsfollowed British attemptsto coordinateboundariesduring the move

toward Brussels.Bradley had no doubt harboredanti-British grudgessince Tunisia,

but Patton's never-endingrants fueled the discord in his mind. That the egocentric

Montgomery seemedblissfully unaware of Bradley's hatred complicated matters,

particularly when Bradley 595

disagreement.
simply "listened" ratherthan expressing

Bradley's solution was to fight his "own" sector,the Saar.He followed another

Missourian. John J. Pershing,in believing the advanceto victory lay only through

Lorraine. Eisenhowerhad agreedwith Montgomerythat the key approachnorth of the

Ardennesneededmore troopsby placing First Army alongside21 Army Group.When

Bradley accededto Montgomery's change in boundaries,Hodges found himself

fronting on the Liege-Aachen-Cologneapproach,the primary avenuenamedby the

SHAEF planners.Hansenrecordedhow Bradleywantedto fight:

Gen's [Bradley's] original plan called for supply schedulethat would

assignsupplyto Third Army, hold First [Army] in placeuntil Third got
on the Rhine.Now it is plannedto shootboth annies,on to the Rhine in
force and for that reasonit has been necessaryto hold them up for

HansenDian-, 25 August 1944;Patton Dian,, passim,MHI, Bradley Commentaries,passim.

Patton.as previously mentioned,had long advocatedthat Eisenhowerwas"over-persuaded"by Monty
and that the British had soughtto diminish all Americaninfluenceor credit for victory. Bradley
consistantlyheld that the British would meetno resistancein the north and that no Americantroops
should be committedon the northernavenue.On I September,HansenrecordsBradleyas saying:I
told Ike when he was herethat Monty didn't needanythingto help him in his effort that [sic] what he
had was plenty and that he wouldn't find any oppositiongoing up there-that we shouldturn east,
through [throw) everythingwe got into Germanyand by Krist [sic) we can."

329
 supply.When both are up to the Rhine.the forceof the effort will go to
the First Army which will then gain a bridgeheadandtogetherwith the
British Army plan to cut off an[d] isolate the Ruhr from the rest of
Germany, the British fqom] the north and we from the south. If
possible,we shall extenda bridgeheadon the far sideof the Rhineas a
basefor futureoperationsin the Third Army sector.

that Eisenhowerforesawa
Thus, it was clear in 12'hArmy Group Headquarters

doubleenvelopmentof the Ruhrýwith Bradleyacting in concertwith 21 Army Group

after Bradley's Army Group fronted on the Rhine.This meantthat the much talked-

about seizureof the Saarwas not consideredan immediatepreludeto moving Patton

deeperinto Germany,at least as long as logistics was considereda brake on large-

scalemaneuver.

Noting the British successat Antwerp, Bradleyintendedto take over "la [sic]

havre" for US use if the British could supply themselvesthrough Antwerp. Bradley

saw this not only as a major solution to his problems,but as an out that would allow

him to screen and not capture Brest immediately, an objective that still defied

Americanefforts.5"

On 4 September, 21 Army Group's own situation offered operational

possibilities outstripping thoseof Patton's surgeto the Meuse.Dempsey'sarmy had

moved more than 250 miles in the six dayssince28 August.(Seefigure 35.) Brussels

was captured on 3 Septemberand Antwerp on 4 September.Crerar's men were

outside Le Havre and in Dieppe and St. Valery, and were moving toward Boulogne.

Troops, however, were scatteredand their next moves dictated by the necessityto

51*HansenDiaq. Sept.5".

330
 maintain momentum rather than securerear areasor leapfrog administrative areas
597
forward.

The I Vh Armoured Division entered Antwerp, and Guards Armoured captured

Louvain. Montgomeryrecorded:

The situation now is that we hold a ring from the seaat ANTWERP,
south-westwardsthrough LILLE-BETHUNE-ST. POL-and along the
CANCHE river to the seaat LE TOUQUET.
To the north of this line are many Germans, possibly 100,000 and they
598
cannot escape.

Believing this to be the situation,he had transmittedhis M. 160 questioninga

Double Thrust advanceand reiterating his appreciationthat a concentratedall-out

be
attack madenorth of the Tracing
Ardennes. the "trap" in which he hadjust placed

h
the German 15 Army with Dempsey,he began conceiving a replacementfor the

cancelled LINNET I and an alternative to the plan developedby Brereton to drop

forcesin the Liege-Maastrichtareaaheadof 12h Army Group. Bradleyhadwantedno

part of the scheme.and Monty saw the trap in relinquishingthe "reserve" grantedby

Eisenhower.He recordedhis logic-logic that would remain steadfastfor the most

critical fortnight of the campaign:

We shall have to sit back in the BRUSSELS-ANTWERP,pretending

we do not mean to go towards the RUHR; if we advanceopenly
towardsthe RHINE the Germanswill blow the bridges-which would
be awkwardas north of the RUHR it is a very big river, in fact almosta
sea.

Going further, he decidedon a courseof action:

ý97CARL, N-13336. D.T. I. (War Office), Advanceof 30 CorpsAcross River Seineto Brusselsand
Antwcrp. 24 August to 4 September1944,NAC, RG 24, Volume 10636,Reportby Gen. H.D.G.
Crerar covering Operationsof First CanadianArmy from 24" AUG- I SEP 1944;NARA, RG 407, M L-
227. Box 24145.OperationASTONIA. Captureof Le Havre. 10-12September1944.

331
 We shall want a big airborne drop to capture the bridges over the
RHINE and the MEUSE. 599

The staff collegeinstructor,blindedby -Maintenanceof the Objective." sought

a way to solve all his by

problems using the marching force to gain a bridgehead

acrossthe "very big river" while maintaining his momentumtoward the Ruhr. The

airborneoperation,called COMET, would grab a bridgeheadwhile two corps of the

Second Army moved north of the Siegftied Line and around to the rear of the

objective. The unsolved problems, however, grew larger as reports filtered to his

tactical headquarters.

Antwerp, the objective most desiredby SCAEF, had been taken with docks

and facilities intact, but it remainedto be madeusable.Antwerp was located at the

end of the roughly 50-mile-long ScheldtEstuary,and the Germansheld the banks in

force but as yet, had not thoroughly mined the long approachto the harbor. Ramsay

had signaled the day before, warning of the problem; Dempsey, Horrocks, and

Roberts,the division commander,had not beenadvisedof what was obvious on any

map. And Horrocks, he

accuratelystating wasno Napoleon it
when cameto the higher

practice of war, had failed to mount an attack to cross the river before the German
600
defensescould congeal.With Dempsey'sconcurrence,Horrockspressedeastward.

491moqszomety
Log, 4 September.
500]bid.
0,00Love and Major, RamsavDiarv, 131, WO285/10,DempseyDiary, 4,5 Sep44; Lt. Gen. Sir B.G.
Horrockswith EversleyBelfield and Maj.-Gen. H. Essame,CorpsCommander(New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons,1977)80,8 1; Maj-Gen.G.P.B. Roberts,From the Desertto the Baltic (London:
William Kimbcr. 1987).207-210; L. F. Ellis et al., Victorv in the West,Vol. 11:TheDefeatof German. v
(London: Her Majesty's StationeryOffice. 1968), 5,6; Major Ned Thornburn,First Into Antwerp (The
Castle.Shrewsbury:4" Bn K.S.L. I. MuseumTrust, 1987).

332
 Thus Antwerp was not available even for the month-long "clearing" process

estimated for the estuary. Still considering his own logistics to be based on the

Channel Ports which Crerar was inexorably clearing, Montgomery did not see

Antwerp as an immediateobjective worthy of stopping the momentum east,which

would not only be stoppedbut would also requirea forced crossingof significant size

and preparation if the enemy fortified the Rhine. Nor did Montgomery see the

problem as Eisenhowerdid. In Monty's mind, Bradley was responsiblefor capturing

his own baseand port area,and he was seenvia Eisenhower'sdirectives as moving

601
rapidly to fully developthe ports in his own rear.

The Fifteenth Army continued streamingnorthward from Boulogne into the

"Breskens pocket" formed west of 30 Corps, and was able to cross the estuaryinto

north Holland and behindthe Rhine.Unlessthe estuarycould be sealedEromthe north

side. it would provide an escape route for the 100,000 troops Montgomery had

thought he had bagged.The problem was that 21 Army Group was too small to handle

the frontage it faced. Dempsey's30 Corps was stretchedfrom Antwerp to Louvain,

about 30 miles. 12 Corps, Dempsey'srefusedleft flank, had not advancedpast the

Scheidt south of Ghent. 8 Corps remainedgroundedsouth of the Seine.Crerar was

equally stretched.I Corps was clearing the Le Havre peninsulaand reachednorth on

the coast to the Somme. Simonds' 2 CanadianCorps moved north of the Seine,

clearing the flying bomb sitesinland, and on the coastwas moving on Boulogne.Ten

'O"'Libcration Campaign," 52-64. This traceswith reproductionsof messages and studiesthe

convolutedassessments of Antwerp in relation to the advance.The key belief at 21 Army Group was
that the clearanceof the Channelports then being undertakenwould support21 Army Group and
would be availablein lesstime, and that operationalopportunitycould be soughtwith time to spareto
open the port. Antwerp was a key issueto Bradley,who had not developedhis own port; 21 Ann.y
Group AchninistrativeHistoq, 34-36.

333
divisions covered an area of roughly 300 miles' frontage,with their main logistics

base about 400 miles to the rear of the farthestelements.Germans"held" in their

coastal fortressesor moving north of the estuarywere estimatedby Montgomery to

number about 100,000 men. The German Fifteenth Army, though composed of
602
splinteredformationsand stragglers.outnumberedDempsey'sspearheads.

At 21 Army Group, the truer picture that soon emergedwas that the situation

wastotally fluid at the tactical,operational,andstrategiclevels.At no time was a clear

statementof priorities from the top down In

more needed,yet more absent. classic

terms,the pursuit teeteredon its culminatingpoint, and only a focusedshift in effort

could maintain momentumin some-but not all-areas. Eisenhower'sdirective was

obsolete upon issuance,and only Eisenhowercould direct actions to achieve an

operationaldecisionsomewhere.The threegroundcommandersin chief were helpless

to achievetheir individual goals with the forcesand sustenance

at hand. Eisenhower

had thought he had 6'decided.

" but it was obvious to Montgomerythat the machine

would soon fail to work. Ike and Bradley,riding higheron "Victory fever," ignoredthe

signs.

Moreover, CHASTITY was permitted to die a silent death and Bradley,

releasing Patton from his failure, assignedthe Ninth Army Headquartersto clear

Brittany. It had beena month since Patton's spearheads

had reachedthe CHASTITY

area.The key rail, road, and beacheshad neither been securednor developed.With

Antwerp in the bag, Eisenhowerdecidedthat Montgomerywould be responsiblefor

002
Second&mv Historv, 192-197.NARA, RG 407, ML-2250. Historical Section,CanadianMilitary
Hcadquarters,kistorical ReportNo. 146,"Operationsof First CanadianArmy in North-WestEurope,

334
 providing Bradley not only with Le Havre as a port, but with Antwerp for Bradley's

sustenance-despitethe fact that the new American LOCs (lines of communication)

603
would cut acrossMonty's LOCs at a 90 degreeangle.

While Dempseyshifted corpsto prepareto crossthe Meuseand Rhine Rivers,

aiming at the Ruhr as targeted in early September,Montgomery and Eisenhower

debatedthe strategyfor the assaulton the West Wall. Monty found it offensivethat, as

a field commanderwho operatedout of a handfid of trailers with a small staff, he

would have to fly 400 miles to the rear to visit Eisenhower's5,000-manheadquarters

while scoresof generals,air marshals,and admirals,and more than a thousandfield-

grade officers existed to run Ike's battle. Eisenhower,whose nose had consistently

beenout of joint sinceNormandy,wanderedSHAEF's halls publicly damningMonty

to his personal staff and visited his American commanders,but had refrained from

seeing 21 Anny Group's commander.Avoiding personal discussion, Eisenhower

characteristicallysent letters and messages,perhapsfearing that many of the written

if in 604
statements, presented person,were easilyopento refutation.

31 JUL-I OCT 44." 3743. It shouldbe notedthat by 20 September,2 CanadianCorpswould "hold"

about half of 21 Army Group's total frontage.
60ýRuppenthal.Logistical Supportofthe Armies,11,104-109.
"4 It shouldbe an item of comment,but hasescapedthe criticism of Americanhistorians,that
Eisenhower'saidesand staff kept (and manypublished)diariesquoting Eisenhower'spublic attackson
his subordinates.Monty in particular.No suchdiary appearedfrom Monty's camp,nor is thereany
evidencethat Monty criticized Ike or any commanderin front of his junior or personalstaff. While
Monty kept up a frank correspondence with his superior.Brooke,Eisenhowercriticized Monty in
spadesin private meetingswith Marshall.It is also interestingthat Americansconsistentlyconsider
Montgomery's insistenceon closed-door,private meetingsonly betweencommandersto havebeen
snobberyon Monty's part. Privateand thus frank discussionsbetweencommandersis a common
practiceamongsenioroff iccrs. Ike, the staff man,liked to be surroundedby his own staff to prevent
confrontationsor to divert questionsthat he himself could not answer.Eisenhoweralso told S.L.A.
Marshall in a 1946interview that he alwaystraveledforward to visit commandersand did not prefer
conferencescalling his commandersrearward.In Montgomery'scase,Ike had to be coaxedto visit,
and Ike's preferencefor hugestaff conferencesin the rear is well documented.At its largest,SHAEF
would total more than 16.000personnel.

335
 Considering what had transpired since his his
meeting %%ith American

Eisenhower's Montgomery's M. 160 had to be more

commanders, considerationof

carefully thought out. The reply, in fact, was draftedin toto by the staff and approved

-victory disease"was pronouncedin this message,an

by Eisenhower.Eiscnho%ver's

be
appreciation which, by the time of the second part's arrival, would already

contestedby Eisenhower'sown G-2. Granville's were

communications not expert and

Eisenhower farther the 605

battlefield. The reply, sent on 5
put out of touch with

September.arrived at Montgomery's headquarterson the Vh and the 9h, with the

second part arriving first. This did not help matters,as the secondpart softened

Eisenhower'sreply to the concentratedthrust. By the 91h.the entire messagewould

havereadas follows:

1. While full
agreeing with your conception of a powerful and
blooded thrust toward Berlin, I do not repeat not agree that it
should be initiated at this moment to the exclusion of all other
maneuvers.
2. The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has been
destroyed. We must immediately exploit our successby promptly
breaching the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine on a wide front
and seizing the Saar and the Ruhr. This I intend to do with all
possible speed. This will give us a stranglehold on two of
Germany's main industrial areasand largely destroy her capacity to
wage war. whatever course events may take. It will assist in cutting
off forces now retreating from south west France. Moreover, it will
give us freedom of action to strike in any direction and will force
the enemy to disperse, over a wide area, such forces as he may be
able to assemble for the defense of the west.
3. While we are advancing we will be opening the ports of Havre and
Antwerp, which are essential to sustain a powerful thrust deep into
Germany. No re-allocation of our present resources would be
adequateto sustain a thrust to Berlin.

'05Author intcrvicw with Col. EdwardMartin, formerly seniorAmericancommunicationselement

commandcr.SHAEF. 1944-1945.

336
 4. Accordingly my intention is initially to occupy the Saar and the
Ruhr, and by the time we have done this, Havre and Antwerp
should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts you
mention. If [In] this connectionI have always given and still give
priority to the Ruhrýand the northernroute of advance,as indicated
in my directive of yesterdaywhich crossedyour telegram.[M 1601.
Locomotives and rolling stock are today being allocated on the
basisof this priority to maintain the momentumof advanceof your
forces,and thoseof Bradley northwestof the Ardennes.Pleaselet
me know at once your further maintenancerequirementsfor the
606
advanceto andoccupationof the Ruhr.

Montgomery had, in fact, not received Eisenhower's4 Septemberdirective

until the 6th and immediatelysignaledEisenhower

concerningit:
,

You can relyon 21 ARMY GROUP to o all out 100 percent to further
destroy 6,97
forceS.
your intention to enemy

Montgomerywas convinced,as his 8 Corps still lackedtransportto move and

his two armiesoperatedwith two open flanks, that if the Ruhr was to be struck before

the enemy withdrew into the Siegfried Line, it would require a concentratedassault,

an assaulthis own two-corps2 Army was not strong enoughto deliver immediately.

He also knew. from his liaison to Bradley, that Bradley's forceswere both dispersed

and shy of supply. rendering their "run to the Rhine" certain to fail. In the meantime,

Montgomeryshifted corps,hopedto sealthe bleedingtrap north of the Scheidt,and to

rush the Allied Airborne Army into a coup-de-mainof the Meuseand Rhine bridges.

As enemyresistancestiffened,and the final (first) part of Eisenhower'ssignal

arrived. Montgomeryimmediatelyreplied,calling the questionon priority:

Have now receivedthe whole of your Directive No. FWD-13889dated

5 Sept.

M*EL. CorrespondenceFile. Cable5 September;EisenhowerPapers.IV, 2120.

00"EL. CorrespondenceFile. M-169.6 Sept. 1944.

337
 Have studied your directive No. FWD-13765 [4 September] carefully
and cannot see it stated that the northern route of advance to the RUHR
is to have priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually,
XIX US Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could
you send a responsible Staff Officer to see me so that I can explain
things to him. 668

Bradleyhadneverpublishedanotherdirectivemodifying his offensivelisted in

his own Letter of InstructionNo. Six, dated25 August. His Letter of InstructionsNo.

Five had merely shifted responsibility for Brittany to the Ninth Army. Moreover, it

had now becomeapparentthat, besidesgroundingXIX Corps,Bradleyhad shifted an

infantry division from the primary avenueof advanceto Patton's southernflank. It

was intuitively obvious, evenin Granville, that an assaulton the eastfaceof the Ruhr

would need a complementaryattack through the Liege-Maastricht-Aachenavenue.

Despitehis presenceat the 2 Septembermeetingauthorizingthe move, it is probable

that Eisenhowerdid not know that First Army's assaulton the West Wall was leaving

behind a corps. This fact, plus the planning for COMET, the crisis of supply, and

Montgomery's insistencethat a priority following the text-bookdefinition of the Main

Effort be made,forced Eisenhowerto act. He went forward.Crippled with a bad knee,

he flew to Brusselsin his C47 Dakotato meetMonty. 609

EL. CorrespondenceFile, M-181.9 September1944.

FUSA Reportof OperationsAug 44-Feb 45. Map No. 5. LIEGE-AACHEN-DUREN; EL, Smith
Collection of World War 11Documents.SHAEF War RoomSummaries,September1-10 1944;
AfontgometyLog. 9 September1944.

338
 CHAPTER EIGHT

Going To MARKET

COMET was intendedto solve multiple strategicand operationalconundra.It

addressedthe greatest strategic objective, the rapid destruction of the enemy's

to by
capability resist offering a quick bounceacrossthe Rhine; it provided for the

envelopment of the remaining enemy clinging to the coast; and it promised the

establishmentof strong forceswithin striking distanceof the Ruhr without having to

penetrateand reduceany portion of the Siegfried Line. Moreover, it was the boldest

use of airborne forcesby the Allies yet seenin the Europeantheater.But it was not a

unique solution, nor was it even uniquely British, though it would be aI Airborne

Corps show. It was a multiple-bridge coup de main combined with a rapid ground

advanceof a heavily armoredcorps.The Germanshad shown the way in 1940,and it

had becomepart of Montgomery'srepetoire.

Montgomery had attachedairborne forces to practice bridge coup-dc-main

operationswhile he commanded5 Corps in England in 1941.No doubt inspired by

the Eben Emaeland Holland operationsof May 1940,Montgomeryhad beenthe first

senior British officer to include airborne forces in exercisesin World War II. In the

invasion of Sicily in 1943, he planned three brigade-sizedbridge coup-de-main

operationsto speedEighth Army's passageon the main route running up the eastern

coast: for I Airlanding Brigade at the Ponte GrandeBridge near for

Syracuse, the 2

ParachuteBrigade to capturethe road bridge south of Augusta,and for I Parachute

Brigade to capture the Ponti di Primesole Bridge over the Simeto River south of

Catania,which would link with a sea-landedCommandoforce. While the 2 Parachute

339
Brigade mission was canceled,the other two were launchedand achieved mixed

results. Bad navigation,gliders separatingfrom their tows, and the shootingdown of

friendly aircraft by the Allied naviesplaguedthe missions.Both bridgeswerecaptured

and temporarily held, but in both casesthe airbornewere forced to relinquish their

capturesdue to the failure of the groundlinkup force to speedilyreachtheir objectives

as they fought up the narrow Sicilian road. While the Ponte Grande bridge was

temporarily lost and then almost immediatelyrecapturedas the ground forcesarrived.

the secondobjective was also retakenintact by 13 Corpsas the removalof chargesby

the airbornetroops firomthe PrimesoleBridge likewise savedit from destruction.The

lessonsof the operationwere not lost. Ironically, one of the battalionsat the Primesole

Bridge was commandedby Lt. Col. John Frost,and the linking corpswas commanded
C
610
by Lt. Gen. M. C. Dempsey.

American airborne commanderMatthew B. Ridgway's hard feelings against

the British beganin Sicily. Additionally, the lack of training of the aircrew involved

and the differencesin forces also createdperceptionsthat were later hard to dispel,
611
and in somecases,neverwere.

A coup de main of the Orne River bridgeshad also beena primary featureof

th Division's Normandy 612

the 6 British Airborne operation. The ideaof capitalizing on

"'o Field Marshal Sir B.L. Montgomery,El Alameinto the River Sangro(Germany:British Army of
the Rhine. 1946),96-101: Hamilton. Monty: TheMakingofa General.309-310;Otway, Airborne
Forces. 119-123.125-130;Airborne Missi:ons in the Med, 41-55. Dover, TheSk.y Generals,72-79;
Maj.-Gen.John Frost,A Drop TooMan.v (London: Buchanand Enright, 1982),Chapter 12,passim.
"" Dover. TheSkYGenerals,ibid.
02 NARA, RG 33 1. Entry 256, Box 37, Reporton the British Airborne Effort in Operation
'NEPTUNE' by 38 and 46 Groups,RAF, 11,passim,Lt. Gen. Sir R.N. Gale. Withthe SLxthAirborne
in,,Vorman4v(London: SampsonLow, Marstonand Co., 1948),ChapterFour, passim,StevenE.
Ambrose,PezasusBri4Ze.June 6.1944 (New York: Simonand Schuster,1985);JohnC. Warren,
Airborne Operationsin World War 14 EuropeanTheater,USAF Historical Studies:No. 97 [hereafter

340
 the airborne to negatewater hazardswhile maintainingthe momentuminto Germany

appearsto have beensolely Montgomery's,not that of his plans staff or the staff of I

Airborne Corps. At the moment Antwerp was being captured, Montgomery had

completedconceptualizingan airborneoperationto replaceLINNET.

Initiation of the operation followed the methodologythat had been standard

with Montgomerysince Normandyand by First Allied Airborne Army since August.

On 3 September,Monty and Dempseydiscussedan airborneoperationto support30

Corps' mission of securing a bridgehead on the Rhine between WESEL and

NIJMEGEN. The next day Dempseymet Browning, De Guingand,and Miles Graham

at 2 Army's headquartersto discussthe captureof "NUMEGEN and ARNHEM. " The

following day, this orders group met Montgomery. Browning, De Guingand, and

Grahamdiscussedthe concept,after which Browning reportedto Dempseyto finalize

details. Dempsey,under whoseArmy I Airborne Corps would operateoncedropped,

and who would assigna corps for the ground phaseand linkup, took control of the

details of the ground plan. Browning then returnedto First Allied Airborne Army to

develop the outline plan into a coordinatedoperation.613The airborne troops for

COMET would come from I Airborne Corps, and the airlift would be supplied by

RAF 38 and 46 Groups under Air Marshal Hollinghurst. BecauseCOMET was a

"British operation," Brereton,Parks,and the American-dominatedstaff at Sunninghill

referredto as Warrcn,.4irborne Operations.EuropeanTheater](Maxwell A. F.B., Ala.: Air University,

1956),78-80.
613NAC. RG 24, Volume 20402, File 969.(D24), "Operations-2"dBritish Army Sep/Dec44," 21 Army
Group TOPSECMost ImmediateCipher MessageNo. D/19,3 SEP44; DempseyDiary, 3-5 SEP44;
Wontgoineq Log. 4 September.The datefor COMET's main attack(groundphase)was now 7
.
September.permitting a full day attackto the Eindhovenareaprior to a dusk coup de main, which had
originally beenscheduledfor 6 September.As with every plannedairborneoperationsince
NEPTU&E. the dateswould continueto slip.

341
 Park did not involve themselvesin modifying detail or in "approving" the concept.

Instead,they worked to supportthe Field Marshal'splan. XVIH Corps,would remain

free to supportBradley.(Seefigure 38.)

Montgomery had approved Dempsey's outline plan on 5 Septemberand

recordedit in his log:

(a) 30 Corps, with Gds. Armd. Div. and II Armd Div. leading, start
off at 0700 hrs. on 7 Sept.from LOUVAIN and ANTWERP areas.
The movement is northeast, directed on EINDHOVEN and
BREDA.
(b) The I British Airborne Div. plus the Polish Para. Bde., will be
landedon the eveningof 7 Sept. (before dark) in the generalarea
ARNHEM-NUMEGEN-GRAVE to seize the bridges over the
RHINE and MEUSE.
(c) If the weatheris bad and the airborneforcescannotoperate,then 30
Corps will not go beyond the line EINDHOVEN-BREDA. The
corpswill advance beyond this line when the air forcesdrop.
(d) Gds. Armd. Div. will be directed on GRAVE-NUMEGEN-
ARNHEM.
(e) II Arrnd. Div. will be directed on BREDA-TILBURG-
HERTOGENBOSCH,andon to the RHINE crossingto the north.
(f). 12Corpsto take over ANTWERP and left flank 614
protection.

Montgomerywas relying on surpriseto makethe coup de main, but his ground

plan still relied upon someforcesturning toward Bredaand thencetoward Rotterdam,

as specified in his M. 523. The main force would go eastbetweenWesel and Arnhem,

with the Americans on the right. COMET supportedthis plan; it did not signal a

longerdrive northwardson the right flank exceptto get over the Rhine and behind the

614.
Ifoqgonieq Log. 5 Scptember.

342
Siegfried Line on the enemy's right flank. 12 Corps would keep the enemy from

from 615
the Antwerp area.
escaping

COMET proceeded,basing the force on I Airborne Division, commandedby

Major-General R.E. "Roy" Urquhart. FAAA had been notified of the new operation

on the evening of 3 September,

shortly after LINNET 11'scancellation. 21 Army

Group had that day exploredplanning for an airborneoperationfor seizing Rotterdam,

but this had been set aside for COMET. While one half of LINNET's airlift was

releasedfor air transport, the remainderwas dedicatedto the air drop for the new

operation.On 4 September,FAAA issueda directive to Browning formally initiating

616
planning for COMET.

Directive "Operationon the River RHINE," dated4 September,said:

[Y]ou will immediately prepare detailed plans for an airborne operation

along the River RHINE between ARNHEM and WESEL.

Following the Americanpractice,it designateda "mission7l:

Land in suchareasas will permit of your seizing intact and controlling

all bridges and ferries over the River RHINE and its branch from
ARNHEM to WESEL, both inclusive.617

The air planning for COMET encountereda snagnot seensincethe Normandy

drop-the considerationof enemyair defensesasa primary factor.The day before,US

P47 fighter-bombersflying at 1,200 feet along the plannedLINNET air mutes had

615M. 523: DempseyDia)y, 5 SEP44.

t.16Parks Diaty, 3.4 September1944.It shouldbe rememberedthat Breretonand Browning still had
not -mended fencer over Browning's 3 Septemberprotestover LINNET 1I's plannedexecution.See
ChapterFour. The formality of FAAA's directive to plan COMET establishedthat FAAA had accepted
the plan in principle. Brcreton,asever.retainedhis power to -veto" any plan.
ol, NARA. RG 33 1. V AAA. -Operation Comet," Operationon the River RHINE, First Allied
Airborne Army. 4 September1944.

343
been heavily damagedby ground fire believed to be from enemy motor columns

retreatingtoward Germany.This led Air Vice MarshalHollinghurst at the air planning

conference to estimate that C-47 losses for COMET would be 40 percent. The

Airborne Army's Chief of Staff and Operationsboth stated that such losseswere

unacceptable,

unless the Commander-in-Chief [of 21 Army Group] demanded the

mission as absolutely necessary to the successof his movement north
618
of the Ruhr.

While the ongoing planning modified the concepteliminating a possibledrop

at Wesel and substituting Arnhem, the Allied Airborne Army also awaited the

removal of 46 Group's aircraft to the Mediterraneanfor a mission to Greece.

Simultaneously,FAAA moved aheadon their own initiative with a plan to proposeto

SHAEF to drop the US XVIII Corps (Airborne) behind the Siegfried Line near

Cologne.They also worked on Brereton'spet project, moving the US airborne corps

onto the continent in the Paris area.What was telling about this diversity of interests

while under notification for planning an "Op" was that debate erupted between

CATOR and FAAA as to whether the RAF groups were actuallYassignedand not

merely taskedby the Allied Airborne Army. CATOR believedthat they were assigned

to FAAA. The Allied Airborne Army statedthat they had heardsuch,but had never

seenan authorizing document.Thus, not being sureof its own assignedorganizations,

Brereton'sheadquartersreferredthe problem

613Parks Diary. 4 September1944,ConferenceNotesof Meetingin Chief of Staff's Office, 4

Scptcmbcr1944.The conferencenotesindicatethe G-3 statedthat. "the Ruhr operationwas not very
feasibledue to intcnsc flak. and the distancewas at the limit of operations-too far for [double-tows]
gliders to bc brought in.- Bad weatherpreventedan immediateaerialphotographicrun of the area.
This was done on 6 September.

344
 to AEAF, SHAEF, and the groups concerned to see if authority is
firm. ' 19

The ground chain of commandhad no such problem focusing. Functioning

more as a corpscommanderin SecondArmy than the sparewheel in an operationthat

consistentlydownplayedthe importanceof the groundbattle--the raisond'etre of the

airbome-Lt. Gen. Browning worked with Urquhart and the Polish commander,

Major-GeneralStanislawSosabowski.Browning had four brigade-sizedelementsfor

the initial drop and had planned to bring in 52d Lowland Division in an airlanding

operationto reinforcethe northernairheadon D+2.

Intelligencegiven to the Airborne Corps from First Allied Airborne Army was

general and contained little that was useful for operationalplanning. Mirroring the

SHAEF intelligence estimatesand spreadingvictory fever, it almost seemedto be

published "for the encouragementof others." On 4 September, FAAA noted:

Enemy still appearsincapableof halting Allied advancesnow

nearing
Germanfrontiers.Appreciateenemymust make supremeeffort to
slow
down the paceof withdrawal in order to gain time for reftirbishing
of
West Wall defenses.Latter badly neglected and depleted of large
proportion fire power but still considerableobstacle. Probable that
enemywill attemptto withdraw proportion of infantry and armour into
reserve, while covering with expendableinfantry, but at present no
evidencethat enemycan disengage. 620

619ParAsDian-, 5 September1944,Notesof meetingin Chief of Stafrs Office, 5 September1944,

,ifarshall Papers. It', 572. The commitment of US aircraft for this Churchill-inspiredmissionto Greece
had personallybeenopposedby Gen. Marshall. Brerctonhad wantedto substituteUS aircraft for the
committcd British aircraft so as not to shift aircraft alreadypreparingfor an operation.It is an
interestingcommentarythat the useof 100transportaircraft had reachedthe CombinedChiefs of Staff
levcl for decisionand had drawn firm guidancepersonallyto Eisenhowerhow to act in the matter.
*210NARA. RG 33 1. Entry 253. Box 3. FAAA, GeneralFile, 319.1, First Allied Airborne Army, G-2
SummaryNo. 1.4 September1944,2. FAAA's intelligencesectionwas apparentlythe last sectionto
be filled. Air intelligencewas obtainedthrough Wing and Group Channelsfrom IX Troop Transport
Commandor the RAF Groups/Air Ministry Channels.Ground intelligenceprovidedto the divisions
was from parentheadquartersasassigned,and thereare no recordsindicatinga competent,functioning
G-2 operationat this time that could assistthe divisions in planningother thantheir drop zones.

345
 I Airbome Corpsestimatedthat the Germanforcesin 21 ArmY Group's sector

were withdrawing to the Siegfried Line behind the generalline Aachen-Ruhr.They

believed that "low-quality" coastaldivisions were withdrawing to the areanorth and

northeastof Arnhem. Though intelligence for the area along the River Rhine and

north of the river estimatedthe flak to be "very considerable,

" I Airborne Corps

believedthat 30 Corps' advancewould negatethe flak southof the river as and as far

eastas Tilburg.

I Airborne Corps noted that 30 Corps would "adjust" its advancefrom its

stagingareas,"so that the surpriseof the Airborne landingswill not be prejudiced."

Browning announcedas his intention that I Airborne Corps

will seizeand hold the bridgesat the following places:

(i) Over the MAAS at GRAVE
(ii) Over the RHINE at NIJMEGEN
(iii) Over the NEDER RUN at ARNHEM [sic]
so asto passthroughthe GUARDS ArmouredDivision.

Browning's plan incorporated concepts previously planned for

TRANSFIGURE and LINNET. The basic conceptremaineda surpriseairborne drop

with a rapid linkup by advancingground forces.30 Corpswould assumecommandof

I Airborne Corps upon linkup, with both corps under 2 Army. As the northerranost

bridgeheadwas the key to the operation, I Airborne Division would concentrateat

Arnhem as soon as possibleafter the bridgeswere secure,while the Polish Parachute

Brigade held the Nijmegen area.Both TRANSFIGURE and LINNET were concerned

with seizingand controlling areasduring a fluid tactical situation; COMET requireda

different approachto battle. According to the publishedplan, beginningat 0600 on 8

346
 September, three coup-de-main parties each in six Horsa gliders would independently

seize one of the designated bridges, holding the structure until relieved. Two-thirds Of

the I Airborne Division would arrive by parachute at 0800 in the first lift, carrying out

parachute drops for 90 minutes. The second lift, including the remainder of the

division, I Polish Brigade, and the corps headquarters, would arrive either in the

evening or early the following morning. The 52 Division would arrive by air landing

621
on an airfield improvisedby 30 Corpson D+2 (10 September).

The planned landing and drop zones reflected the compromise required

between seizing the objective and finding suitable terrain for large-scaleglider and

parachutelandings. Flak was an overriding concern,determining not just the routing

of aircraft but also landing- and drop-zoneselection.Recognizingthe needto capture

the bridgesby surpriseto preventtheir destructionor reinforcement,the coup-de-main

teams were subjected to the highest risks. Two hundred eighty-one aircraft for

parachutetroops and 368 glider tugs would comprisethe first lift, and 114parachute,

323 gliders, and 144 supply aircraft would make up the secondlift. The third and

fourth lifts would bring in the balanceof the Polish Brigade,aviation engineers,the

main componentof the corpsheadquarters,

additional signals,and the 52 (L) Division.

Urquhart's I Airborne, with I Polish ParachuteBrigadeundercommand,would need

360 tons of suppliesper day, and 52 (L) Division would be suppliedcommensurate

with its own landing, eventually to require an additional 220 tons daily. Parachute

aircraft would be flown by the US IX Troop Carrier Command's 52nd Wing, and

62'MHI, Papers CollectedbrMajor GeneralFL Parks."OperationComet," Hq/Atps/2559/G.6 Sep

44, HQ Airborne Troops Olý InstructionNo. 1. Browning's order noted,"There will be no advance[of
SccondArmy] from the RHINE bridgeheadsbeforea port betweenHAVRE and ANTWERP is
operating.-

347
glider tows would be flown by the RAF 38 and46 Groups.During the actualmission,

all known flak positions along the corridor would be attackedby 8th Air Force and

aircraft from the Air Defenceof GreatBritain.622

Two parachute"drop zones" (DZs) and four glider landing zones(LZs) were

planned. The target area of Arnhem and Nijmegen was split by the Rhine (Neder

Rijn), Waal, and Maasrivers that flow graduallyfrom about30 feet abovesealevel in

the eastto below sea level in the west. The land itself is polder, lowland reclaimed

from the seaby dikes or dams.Southeastof Nijmegenthe polder risesto 275 feet, and

northeastof Arnhem it reaches360 feet. Scatteredpatchesof woodlandare north and

623
northwestof Arnhem and south,southeast,and southwestof Nijmegen.

North of the Rhine, LZ "S" and DZ "X" wereassignedfor the Arnhem Bridge.

Located approximately five miles west-northwest of the city of Arnhem, they were

locatedamidst heavywoodsthat would masktheir view from the city. (Seefigure 39.)

LZ "S" lay between the Arnsterdarn-ArhernHighway and was bisected by the

Amsterdam-Arnhemrailway. DZ "X" adjoinedthe LZ to the south and was between

the highway and the Neder River north of the town of Heelsum. The terrain was
624
generallyflat.

DZ "Y" was a triangulardrop zonepointing eastward,locatedfive miles south

of Nijmegen
Q
in the "Y" formed by the Maas-WaalCanal and the Maas River. (See

'22NARA. RG 33 1. IAAA, OperationComet,Supply Dropping COMET, 9 Sept44, IX TCC, 1,2;

HQ AirTps/TSIý1559/G. 7 Sep44, Total Aircraft requiredfor Coup-de-Main,I" and 2"dLifts; Field
Ordersfor 52d Wing and 38' Group, passim.The landing areasfor 52d (Lowland) were either to be
improvised airstripsbuilt by the American 878' Aviation EngineerBattalion or DcclenAirfield
(northeastof Arnhem). if captured.
6"-%
NA PA. RG 33 1.1AAA. OperationComet.Hq. 52"dT.C. Wing, 6 September1944,F.O. No. 6,
Annex 1. Intelligence, 1.

348
figure 40.) Located in a northeast-southwestline approximately eight miles south-

southeastof Nijmegen in a wooded tract were LZ's "TY', "T' and "L. " "Z" was just

eastof Grosbeek;
"U" was south of Grosbeekand eastof Mook, and "1: ' lay between

625
the highway and the MaasRiver.

Urquhart's plan was for I ParachuteBrigadeto reinforceand hold the Arnhem

bridgeheadafter the bridge was seizedby coup de main. They would land on DZ "X"

4 ParachuteBrigade,landing on DZ "Y, " would relieve the coup-de-mainforce at the

Grave Bridge and cover the MAAS river bridgehead.I Airlanding Brigade, landing

on LZ "Z, " would relieve the party

coup-de-main at the Nijmegen Bridge and hold the

Waal bridgehead.The Polish Brigade would land on DZ "P" in the secondlift to

relieve 4 Parachute Brigade at Grave. When relieved by 30 Corps, I Airborne

Division would concentratebetweenArnhem and Elst, with I Polish Airborne in the

vicinity of Nijmegen. The Independent

ParachuteCompany would mark-drop and

landing zones prior to the main drops, and the Divisional Recce Squadronwould
626
reinforce the coup-de-mainpartiesat the Arnhem andNijmegenbridges.

The actual coup-de-main plan was the hardest to fulfill. Browning sent

Dempseyan immediatemessageconcerningthe coup-de-mainparties,saying:

In view of complete lack of LZs and DZs near bridges after study of
maps and photos on my return here it
consider essential to land coup de
main glider parties on each bridge night 7/8 Sep. Then bring in first
main lift airborne force early daylight 8 Sep otherwise surprise

1124
Ibid.
62.11
Ibid.. John Baynes,Urqhuart ofArnhem: TheLife ofMajor GeneralR.E. Urquhart, CB, DSO (New
York: Brasscy's,1993),78.79. Of somenote is the absenceof comparisonof the drop zonesaccepted
by Urquhart for COMET and later thoseusedin MARKET. both in his own book and in his
biographer'slife.
o2t.PRO.WO 171-393.1 Airborne Division OperationInstructionNo. 8, Confirmatory NotesOn
Division CommandersVerbal Orders.

349
 impossible. Must warn you that strong protest against latter has been
lodged here by Air C in C.627

Argument over the tactics of bridge seizure,the role of surprise,daylight or

night assaults,and the air plan would resurfacewithin severaldays, and the basic

conceptfor COMET would changestill again.Dempseyhad meanwhilerefined with

Browning the plan to include the seizureof a bridge over the MeusenearNeeboschto

permit flexibility within the targetarea.Dempseyat this time still recognizedthat 12

Corps would contain the Fifteenth Army, but that during COMET, "maintaining a

strong left flank" and "speedis 628

essential"werepredominantconsiderations.

Horrocks' 30 Corps Operation Instruction No. 23 Operation "COMET"'

outlined the crucial groundlinkup to I Airborne Corps:

30 Corps will advanceto and securea bridgeheadover the RHINE in

the area WEST of incl NUMEGEN and dominate the area to the
NORTH.

Horrocks' plan statedthat using two armoreddivisions, an infantry division, and an

armoredbrigade,

30 Corps will advancewith GuardsArmd Div right, II Armd Div left.

50(N) Div move forward by boundson II Armd Div Route.629

Horrocks' corps would have some800 tanksand,with all armsand servicesincluded,

approximately100,000men. For this force,he designatedtwo axesof advance,"Club"

027PRO.WO 205/192 (153751) TopsecCipher MessageD/57 of 7 SEP44. The original plans called
for a coup de main at 0430 hoursfollowed by the parachutedroppingof main force at 0800. Later
plans for 10 Septembermovedglider assaultto 0600. The fact that Leigh Mallory was approving and
disapprovingplans for transportsindicatesthat AEAF was still consideredpart of the airborneapproval
processas part of the mid-August agreements.Leigh Mallory's own influence,however,was rapidly
waning.
e2sNAC. RG 24, Volume 20420, File 969.(D24), SecondAnny, Minutes of Chief of Staff's
Confcrcnce.5 September1944;Dempseýv Diaty, 5 Sep44.
629PRO.WO 171-341,30 CorpsOperationInstructionNo. 23 Operation"COMET," 6 Sep44.

350
 and"Diamond." Club Route,the Corps' right avenueandthe track for GuardsAnnourcd,

would later bear an ominous tale: It followed the main road from Mech-Ghcel.

Oderode-Nijmegen-Amhem-Apeldom.
Arendonk-Eindhoven-St. The I Ith Armoured's

"Diamond" Route beganafter a trip from Antwerp to pick up the road from Tilburg-

Within two days of the order's

Hertogenbosch-Zaltbommel-Tiel-Renkum-Ede.

issuanceand with the stiffening of resistance,Horrocks Shifted 50th Division to

"Diamond" with the I Vh Armoured to trail GuardsArmoured up the Corps "centre-

line." Horrocks apparently saw resistanceas stiffer closer to Antwerp than on his

flank-toward Germany, that

an assessment later 630
would prove true.
outside

Though Horrocks' mission was essential,the airborne plan was the key to

success.While 30 Corps' double thrust to the north would assurewrapping up the

Fifteenth Army and establishing a base north of the Rhine, Holland's multiple

be
waterwayscould easily used to form defenselines to break the momentumof any

advance.With off-road vehicular movementhamperedby the water-lacedpoldcriand,

the necessityfor rapid movementto preventdefenselines from stabilizing was crucial.

Only a simultaneoussurprise strike by airborne forces could accomplishthis. Most

critical was the simultaneousseizureof bridgesand key areas,not simply to prevent

their destructionbut to freezeall movementof enemyreserveswithin the battle area.

By constricting the enemy's arteriesdeepwithin their own rear, the ability to mount

counterattacks,to form blocking positions,and switch lines, or to reinforcedefended

localities would be eliminatedor degradedwhile aiding the momentumof the Allied

6toIbid. The standardconfiguration for an armoreddivision was 246 cruisertanksand44 lights. The
independentarmoredbrigadepossessed190cruisertanksand 33 lights. '-Club Route" was the ccntre-
line nameusedby 30 Corps throughoutthe NorthwestEuropecampaign.

351
advance. Often lost on analysts, this form of ground interdiction could be

accomplishedonly by the seizureof the bridgesand roadsspecifiedin the plan as well

as dominatingthe sectorsassignedto the airbornedivisions.

Most ominousfor the Allies was the transferto the north of the First Parachute

Army under General Kurt Student, the founder of the German Fallschirmjaeger

(paratroops). German commandershad been drilled since before the Normandy

invasion that immediateand violent responseto any parachuteincursion was critical

to prevent an air-delivered enemy from forming up, seizing their objectives,and/or

establishingdefensiveblocks. No man was more imbued with this philosophy and

could transferit to his subordinatesin more rapid ordersthan Student.First Parachute

Army would take control of the remnantsof the retreatingforces to the immediate

west of the intendedtarget area.Though ULTRA decryptsidentified both Studentand

his commandas early as 6 September,theseidentificationsdid not appearin 2 Army's

Intelligence Summary until 16 September, and not before MARKET in the

intelligence of 21 Army Group, who published no summaries from 12 to 18

September.Unit identificationson the Albert Canal did appearon 8 and 9 September

631
in SecondArmy intelligence.

The plans for COMET, expected to be executed with only 72 hours'

preparation,were simple in conceptand basedon the expectationthat 30 Corps would

force a penetration,and that the coup-de-mainpartieswould be reinforcedby the main

force of paratroops,who in turn, would be quickly reachedby the armor. Daring in

6" Hinsicy. British lntellýzence,3. Part 2,382: SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 104,16

September1944,1. SHAEF did not show I ParachuteArmy in its 9 SeptemberWeekly SummaryNo.
25. but showedit in the following week's publishedOrder of Battle Map.

352
 concept, COMET relied heavily upon the belief that the enemyforces in depth were

retreating, not under command of formations, and in organizational and moral

disarray. SecondArmy's Intelligence SummaryNo. 91 for 3 Septemberasked and

answereda key question:

The whereaboutsof enemyarmour is still somewhatof a mystery,and

it has not put in an appearanceon SecondArmy front today. It is
probablymoving back to GERMANY on our right flank-.
There is no sign of any German stand in a big way but we must
presume all possible will be done to defend the frontiers of the
REICH. 632

Reports of thousandsof prisonerstaken daily indicated that the enemy was

indeedfragmented,its formationssplintered,and the strengthof the enemywithin the

Siegfried Line inconclusive, though no reserve formations within Germany were

identified. On one day, Second Army's PW cages processedprisoners from 40

633
formations.
separateGerman With the American victory at the "Mons Pocket" and

Crerar's advancebeginning to ring Calais and Boulogne, SecondArmy noted five

divisions tmpped in the remainderof Belgium and offered little hope for Fifteenth

Army to escape"by land.

" 634

Weather delayedCOMET but Horrocks believed that 30 Corps should have

attacked immediately, since they had fuel for a 100-mile advance.In retrospect,at

leastone airbornecommanderwould regretthat an advanceas far asZon hadnot been

632SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 91, Up to 2400hrs. 3 September1944,1,2. This was, in

fact. preciselycorrect.
03)SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 93,5 September1944,1.
C..%4
SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNos. 94,95,6-7 September1944.

353
attempted immediately, thus shortening the run to the Rhine planned for Guards
635
Armoured
.

The issue of seizing the bridges before they could be blown, however,

remainedparamount.The Germanshad provento be amongthe world's best military

engineers.Their leaving a series of key bridges intact along the line of advance,

simply, was somethingthat no one believed would ever be possible.Moreover, the

Germans had already initiated engineeringreinforcement of the terrain defenses.

Extensivedefensiveinundationswere madealong the coastfrom Calais to the mouth

of the Scheldt and along the major rivers running through northwest Belgium past

Ghent and as far as Antwerp. The effect was not only to form barriers to offensive

operations to capture the coastal ports, but also to separateDempsey's forces by

inundationswithin his sector.636

The decision for COMET madelate on 3 Septemberwas for a temporaryhalt

of the SecondArmy, with the promise of a quick advanceplanned to begin on 6

September.This was delayed in stagesto the 7Ih Ih and then the I Oth As with
,8 .
LINNET, the airbornewas the sticking point. Moreover,COMET had shifted the line

of advance northwards on two mutually supporting routes, off-balancing the due-

eastwardoffensive by SecondArmy that was previously meantto be tightly tied with

First US Army's assault.Hodges' assault,however,had beenstoppedin XIX Corps

sectorby lack of fuel. A gap was developingto the southand east,while intelligence

6" Brian Horrocks,Escapeto Action (New York: St. Martin's Press,1960),205; Maj. Gen. Stanislaw
Sosabowski.Free4t,I Served(Nashville: Battery Press,1982), 194.
WOSecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 89,1 September1944,SummaryNo. 91,3 September
1944.Both contain extensivemapsand studiesof waterobstaclesin Belgium and SouthernHolland.

354
 now warnedthat the FifteenthArmy's trappedtroopswere moving north of the Neder

Rijn into northwestHolland.

ULTRA had warned on 5 Septemberthat Fifteenth Army had been given

orders to maintain coastalfortressesat Boulogne,Calais, Dunkirk, WalcherenIsland

and Flushing Harbor, the Antwerp bridgehead,and along the entire Albert Canal line

to Maastricht. While these orders had been transmitted on 3 Scptcmber-the day

before Antwerp's capture-decrypts clarifying theseorderswere not transmittedto 21

Army Group until late on S Septemberand on 6 September,the day originally meant

for COMET's debut. On 7 September,decryptsprovided Montgomery information

that Walcherenwas to be fortified and that Fifteenth Army would conducta fighting

withdrawal to defend the line Zeebruge-Bruges-Ghent as well as to begin crossing

troops at usable ferries. Mines and attempts to block the estuary were to begin on 8

September. On the same day, intelligence warned that 25,000 troops had already

1,37
(Seefigure 4 1.)
crossednorthward.

Intelligence also warned that COMET's progress would be more heavily

contested.SecondArmy's Intelligencenotedthat:

there are more enemy troops between the ALBERT Canal and the
lower RHINE than there were three days ago. In this connectionit is
worth pointing out that enemy rail communications in Western
GERMANY have not yet been pulverised to the sameextent as they
were in NorthernFrance....
Ferries across the Scheldt are doing a roaring trade, and all of 15th
Army that can get away is making North acrossthe river. The enemy's
intention is reasonablyplain: enoughmust be left to keepus out of the
ports... and to hold a perimetersouthof the SCHELDT, but apart from
theseforces.all the remainderof 15thArmy that are to fight againmust

0? Hinsicy. British Intelligence,3. Pam 2,378-379.

355
 somehowcross the river. Targetsgalore are likely to be presentedto
Air Forcesin 638
the process.
our

COMET, originally meant to be executedon 6 September,was changedfor

late on the 7thor early the next morning on the 8th. Weatherwas the culprit causing

the delay, along with additional preparationneededby the airborne.The "36-hour"

preparationrule handily adoptedby Breretonwas always unreasonable.Intelligence,

mapping,briefings, and rehearsalsfor ground troops took time, as well as the normal

troop-leading steps needed to prepare division- and corps-sizedoperations. This

included the shifting, staging, and movementof "sea tails" and "ground tails," the

huge truck and baggagetrain neededto support immobile airborne divisions when

linked to ground forces.Brerqtonhad downplayedthis, and his own staff, dominated

by the conceptthat an airborne operationis merely an air operationto which ground

troops are attached,and whose needsare subordinatedto the air, unwittingly courted

disaster.These delays now meant that Montgomerycould not react to the Fifteenth

Army's moves without negatinghis investmentin time lost in halting while awaiting

COMET's preparation,in the belief that it would be repaidin largeoperationalgains.

As LINNET 11 demonstrated, Brereton was a sloppy planner who

639
overestimatedhis headquarters'ability to adequatelyprepare plans. He rushed

6)8SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 96,8 September1944.

639Author interview
with Lt. Gen. E.R. Quesada, 24 October 1984, at the Staff College. Quesada
stressed that Brcreton showed little or no attention to detail and left strong subordinates alone as long
as he (Brcreton) looked good. It is also known that Arnold considered Brercton "a loose cannon." Most
anti-Brereton material (which is substantial) is anecdotal. He left a remarkably clean paper trail and his
correspondence with or private files in Arnold's papers are sparse enough to encourage the belief that
the file had been sanitized. Bradley disliked and had little respect for Brereton, particularly after
COBRA. It has also been said that Brercton and Coningham had poor relations. Brcreton had a
checkered past with the British, had actually supported Monty at Alamein, but had been "shamed" into
leaving the India theater due to his personal conduct. Brercton's competence and his role in the loss of
the American Air Force in the Philippines have been defended by Dr. Roger G. Miller of the Air Force
History Office. who is preparing a biography.

356
additional studieswhile his staff should have focusedon COMET, particularly issues

of counterflak, intelligence, and the actual mechanicsof seizure of objectives. lie

offered a huge menu of half-baked selectionsdesigned to fit the appetite of the

moment.

As COMET ground forward, additional planning on other operations

continued. Montgomery's headquartersinquired as to the feasibility of an airborne

operation to clear Walcheren Island and solve the Antwerp problem, a study

immediately shelved by First Allied Airborne Army as unworkable for airborne

640
troops.Called INFATUATE, the plan later becamea First CanadianArmy mission.

The additional plans were the product of Ridgway's desire (with Brereton's

blessing) to use the XVIII Corps (Airborne) under a US flag against objectives in

Bradley's sector. NAPLES Land 11were planned in First Army's area beyond the

Siegfried Line east of Aachen and to establish a bridgeheadon the Rhine near

Cologne; MILAN I and MILAN H were in the Third Army sector and included a

Siegfried Line breachnear Trier and a Rhine crossingnear Coblenz.Also in Patton's

area were CHOKER I and CHOKER 11,featuring a Siegfried Line breach near

Saarbruckenand a Rhine crossingbetweenMainz 641

and Mannheim. The plans for the

First Army area were all hatchedir) outline form during the month of September.

Simultaneousto this planning, of some import, is the SHAEF/First Allied Airborne

Army connection concerningTALISMAN, regardingan airborne strike on Berlin's

6"0Brereton Diaries. 340-34 1.

"'Ibid.; CMH. MS, -History of the First Allied Airborne Army, 2 August 1944-20May 1945"
[hcrcaftcr referredto as-FAAA History"], 61-66. Detailsof theseoperationsare found in the specific
file folders in RG 33 1. IAAA. 381 Plans.Additional materialis found alphabeticallyin CMH, MS
Chronology of Notes.The MILAN/CHOKER serieswere proposedin Octoberand November.

357
 airfields and the naval base at Kiel in the event of a German surrender.Airborne

planning was initiated for this contingencyin Septemberbasedon the release of

SHAEF's updatedcontingencyplan in the event of a collapse of Germany.Thus,

Brereton'sheadquarters,
in fear it might not be preparedfor a future operation,rarely

focusedon thejob at hand.642

While TRANSFIGURE, LINNET I and 11,and the early plans showed that

Breretonwas quick to approveconceptsand offer his own ideas,he did not appearto

connecttheseoperationsto groundoperationsat the time. He personallygraspedlittle

of campaignplanning and was buffeted by the whims and kibitzs of Tedder, who

increasinglysaw the airborneforcesas his personalpreserve;by Bull at SHAEF, who

felt Eisenhower'seagernessto deploy the force; by Ridgway,who interpretedBradley

for him and who continuouslyattempted"to sell" airborneplansat 12'hArmy Group;

and most importantly by Arnold, who wonderedwhy his "airborne army," a desired

piece in his future independentair force, was not winning the war through air-

deliveredtroops,a new form of airpower.

Eisenhowerand his staff, meanwhile,had offered no guidance.Brereton also

continually pressedto move First Allied Airborne's headquartersand its troops on to

the continent near Paris. This reflectednot only Brereton's view that he would be a

player on the scene,but the fact that FAAA, by default,could not operatefrom British

W Ibid. This
plan was later called ECLIPSE.

358
 basesin much of 12th Army Group's sector.Leaving the airborne in Englandmeant

643
being condemnedto Montgomery'ssole control for operations.

Hitherto, Browning had been the principal airborne planner. His views had

dominated most of the pre-NEPTUNE ideas at 21 Army Group, and he was relied

upon heavily by both Montgomery and, by default, Brereton, whenever operations

were planned in Montgomery's sector. BENEFICIARY, TRANSFIGURE, LINNET 1,

LINNET 11 I Airborne Corps 6"

and were all assignments. Detailed planning for these

operations had been finalized by Browning's staff with the respective air transport

commanders, most notably Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst. Now, Major General Paul

L. Williams (IX Troop Carrier Command), recently returned from commanding the

ANVIL airborne operations, had been inserted within the advisory chain for

COMET. 645

The ground battle in SecondArmy's area continued to affect the COMET

operation. The unrelenting pursuit of 30 Corps had inflicted more than 40,000

casualtieson the enemyfor a loss of less than 1,400men and 42 tanks. Dempseyhad

to contendwith the simultaneousrequirementsto rest, refuel, and refit, with the more

643Brereton Diaries, August-September, passim; Parks Diayy, August-Septcmber, passim. These

diaries arc the best sources of influences on Brcrcton. with the Parks Diary serving as the superior
source and one which records Tedder's and Ridgway's influences. Paris had been an early theme with
Brercton, who did not comprehend that the logistical effort needed to move and supply the FAAA on
the continent would cripple the advancing annies.
'" Lt. Gen. Gavin told the author in a 1983 interview that Ridgway believed Browning was trying -to
get control- of the American airborne forces by establishing I Airborne Corps. Ridgway "sold" this
idea to Eisenhower when trying to create his own airborne corps command, in which he succeeded.
This was XVI II Corps (Airborne). Ridgway, like Bradley, was paranoid over the British influencing or
gaining control of US troops. This was a popular theme with Bradley, and it hampered any attempts to
coordinate or control combined operations.
N., Many of the parachute aircraft for COMET were from Williams' command. Hollinghurst. however.
was tccbnically the troop carrier commander. though as with all air operations, every air general
seemed to have the right to veto every detail.

359
urgent time pressof regroupingfor COMET aswell ascapturingthe neededstart-lines

for the 30 Corps divisions. Meanwhile, advancinginfantry divisions still needed"to

mop up" bypassedenemyformations,gatherprisoners,secureflanks and rear areas,

and stage forward supplies for the dash to the Rhine. German airfields were

rehabilitatedas 2 TAF beganto leapfrogits 646

forward.
wings

As if to posit Ludendorff s dicta that strategyfollows tactics (or here, more

accurately, "operations"), Guards Armoured Division became a key influence in

determining the fate of the campaign. Major-General Allan Adair's immediate

objectives-a bridgeheadon the Albert Canal and then on the Meuse-EscautCanal-

and his distant divisional objective-the town and bridges of Eindhoven-were

essential to meeting COMET's time schedule. Enemy resistanceto his armored

advance on two separateaxes demonstratedthat the pursuit was over, and II

Armoured Division's failure to gain a canal crossing north of Antwerp before its

regrouping indicated that the hardeningof the enemy sectorwas not merely due to

local defenses.Bridgeheadson the Albert were not developeduntil 8 Septemberand

647
loth.
on the key De Groot bridge on the Escaut,on the (Seefigure 42.)

Elementsof four Germandivisions were identified within the 30 Corps sector

on 7 September,including fragmentsof the I SS PanzerDivision and a handful of

parachutebattle groups.(Seefigure 41.) Theseunits functionednot simply as a block

to Allied advance,but were in effect the "straggler line" designedto recover the

fragments of escaping fonnations still percolating through the Allied lines. This

6"0SecondArmr Hisron?,195-197.

360
hardened crust, the subsequent slow regrouping of Second Army, and the failure to

seize a bridgehead on the Escaut Canal short of the Dutch frontier, called the question

on COMET's viability as a lightning strike to seize a Rhine bridgehead. 30 Corps'

start line was farther from the river bridge objectives than intended, and two

additional water barriers remained in between. Most importantly, it appeared that the

shattered enemy had congealed, but the question remained, how thick was the enemy

did lay beyond it? 648

crust and anything substantial

Three significant areas evolved during the week between COMET's

conceptionand the seizureof the De Groot bridge. Logistics, an evolving intelligence

picture, and a rapidly changingground situation forced new "appreciations"at every

level from theaterto the smallestfighting unit.

The 4 Septembertaking of Antwerp, to include its port facilities, seemedto

changethe logistics picture as well as to cover Bradley's failure to scizethe necessary

ports to develop CHASTITY and the Quiberon Bay project. Brest, now a matter of

prestige rather than a necessity,had been shuntedonto an unknown, Simpson, to

capture.Moreover. it left opento interpretationa key tenetof Eisenhower'sargument

for the ANVIL landings in SouthernFrance:that the Marseilles group of ports was

essentialto the OVERLORD campaign.Having achievedMarshall's goal, to stymie

and stop the Italian campaign,Eisenhowerhedgedon pressingfor shipping through

"7 SecondAnnr Histom 198-199,Appendix "K": Captainthe Earl of Rosseand Colonel E.R. Hill,
TheSton, ofthe GuardsAnnoured Division (London: Geoffrey Blm 1956).99-122. Maj.-Gcn. G.L.
Verney. TheGuardsArmouredDivision (London: Hutchinson,1955).89-98.
"" I bid.. 199-202.Note that Horrocks' -COMET- plan would havetakentheseon the move had it been
launchedon 7 September.

361
 the Mediterraneanas Rooseveltand Marshall combined to press for a more rapid

prosecutionof the in 649

allegedlysecondarycampaign the Pacific.

From the perspectivesof the 21 and 12Ih Army Groups, Antwerp meant

different things. Montgomery's administrative plan, based on the 21 August

Administrative Appreciation,was basedupon maintenancefrom the Seineports, with

the delay of opening a more forward base until Rotterdam and Hamburg were

650
captured.

Logistics becamea wedge that not only drove apart operationsbut began to

split loyalties concerningcommand.Having receivedthe secondhalf of Eisenhower's

directive on 6 September,Montgomeryrecorded:

So everything is to be split-forces, air, maintenance, transport, rolling

stock, etc., etc.
I can see no good results obtaining from this decision; I fear it is
exactly what the Germanswould like; I fear an early endto the German
war is not now likely.
The great and outstandinglessonfirorn this war is the importanceof
concentrationof effort; we now chuck that overboard.

Montgomery,clear in his mind as to why this had happened,namedEisenhoweras the

problem:

'" EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2105,2106,2107; Ruppenthal,Logistical Supportof the Armies, 11,108.

Eisenhowerduring this period waveredconcerningthe Mediterranean.On 30 August he told Marshall
it might be necessaryto supportDRAGOON throughthe Bay of Biscay;the next day he said that the
Italian campaign-assumedaddedimportance," not due to its operationsbut as a possiblefoil to
"fanatics" who might wageguerrilla warfare in the interior of Germanyafter it collapsed.On 13
Septemberhe finally askedWilson, Dcvers,and the Mediterraneancommandersto investigatecreating
supply capabilitiesto supportThird Army.
0-10
-Liberation Campaign," 4346, CampaignAdmin. Development,"21 Army Group Administrative
Appreciation: Location of the Advance Baseand Maintenancebeyondthe River Seine." The M. G.A.,
however.describedthe British targetsas Antwerp and Rotterdamat a meetingat SHAEF on 26
August.

362
 He issuesinstructions without first discussingthe repercussionswith
651
his subordinategenerals.

In reality, Monty meant "without discussing it with the 21 Army Group

commander," for Montgomeryknew that Ike had held a conferencewith Bradley and

his army commandersprior to issuinghis directive splitting the forces.

In this light, the surprisecaptureof Antwerp, particularlyas Crerar'stwo corps

having seized only one port were stretched from Le Havre to Boulogne-offcred

perplexing challengesboth logistically and to the accomplishmentof Montgomery's

long-rangeintentions regardinga northern envelopmentof the Ruhr. From a tactical

and operational perspective,Crerar's Canadianswere the logistical foundation for

Montgomery'scampaignuntil well into the Ruhr. Dempseyrecordedhis meetingwith

Montgomery'sadministrativechief on 7 September,asCOMET awaitedlaunching:

In the existing conditions operations are strictly limited by the

administrative situation, and until we can get the Channel ports
(preferablyBOULOGNE and DUNKIRK) which will land some 5000
tons a day, until DIEPPEis working, which will land 4000 tons a day,
and until we get a regular air lift of 1000 tons a day, SecondArmy
cannot be developedbeyondARNHEM. When theseports have been
far 652
openedwe can go as asMUNSTER.

Antwerp's own role, evenin Dempsey'smind, was hazy. Openingits northern

approacheswas a priority, but was clearly a secondarymission given to his flank

651Alontgomety Log. 6 September 1944. Montgomery was quick to note that Eisenhower's directive to
Montgomery had received a low priority at Eisenhower's headquarters, marked -important" as
opposed to "top to
priority- which all command messages senior commanders were. Had Monty
wished to say that this was deliberate. and that this had never happened to any other senior commander
at any other time during the he have been on good grounds concerning the second half of
war, would
that statement, and might'charitably be said to have probable cause concerning the first. Deliberate or
accidental, this was a serious error on SHAEF's part and should have resulted in the firing of the signal
officer responsible. Worse, the upshot was to convince Montgomery that SHAEF was farther out of
touch with the front than he had feared.
0-52
DempseyDiaty. 7 SEP44.

363
 corps. An hour after his recordedmeeting with his administrativechief, he saw Lt.

Gen. N.E. Ritchie of 12 Corpsand ordered:

One division in ANTWERP ready to move NORTH and go for

WALCHEREN Peninsula;
One division SOUTH of ANTWERP ready to move towardsBREDA
to protectthe LEFT flank of 30 Corps;and
Onedivision holding the ring from ANTWERP to GHENT.653

Having met with Montgomery prior to the other two meetings, and with

Montgomery in daily meetingswith his administrativechief, this was the picture in

Dempsey'smind as reflectedby the 21 Army Group's commandersintentions,which

still centredon going east to the Ruhr. At the sametime, Montgomerynoted in his

diary that the two forward corpsof SecondArmy would still-be able to operate"on by

boundsto BERLIN."

More important, Montgomery believed, correctly, that:

12 Army Group pays no attention to any orders it may have received

about the priority of the northernthrust; its total availablemaintenance
is split equally betweentwo Armies; this actually gives priority to the
Third US Army as it haslessDivisions employed.

Bradley's actionswere seenby the 21 Army Group commanderas a reflection

of Eisenhower'slack of grip on his own forces,feedingMonty's persistentbelief that

Ike was "unf it" to leadthe land armies.Monty stated:

Eisenhowerhasno ideawhat is going on.654

0" Ibid.
14Afonkizomen,
t-. Log, 7 September1944.Montgomeryincreasinglysaw SHAEF's staff as culprits
combining to iecp Eisenhowerisolatedfrom the reality of the battle situation.Seefurther log entries
for 7 Septemberand beyond.

364
 Montgomery thus saw the immediate logistical famine as a command issue

basedupon failing to establisha priority, more for transportationassetsthat were in

short supply, than for port facilities, which were in the processof being capturedand

cleared. He continued to see the final opening of Antwerp not simply as a channel

control and derniningoperation,but alsoas a subsequenttask for First CanadianArmy

on the seawardflank. Ritchie could help by limited operationsnorth of Antwerp.

INFATUATE, turned down by Breretonas an Airborne Army mission, senta further

signal that strategically,SHAEF saw no immediacyin Antwerp asa target.

Indeed, considering that First Allied Airborne Army was the theater's only

reserve, and Antwerp was the primary goal of the theater's immediate ground

campaign,a clear directive to complete the opening of Antwerp should have been

issued. Tedder-whose contempt for Montgomery not only included walking

SHAEF's halls louding enumeratingMontgomery's"mistakes," but also attemptingto

define ground tasks for 21 Army Group through Eisenhower-expressedhis strong

beliefs to Breretonthat the Rotterdamport shouldbe the key airbornetarget.653

While the flak concentrationson the coastmight well have precludedsuch an

operation. a close discussion of it with Eisenhowermight have clarified the key

variant in views amongSHAEF, 21 Army Group,and 12thArmy Group. That variant

was time. The driving force separatingthese headquarterswas the perception of

opportunity that the victory diseasehad inspired, but which each of the respective

W Tedder attempted to
convince Eisenhower that as Deputy Supreme Commander, he was deputy for
all operations. not simply air. Moreover, considering he felt that airpowcr and ground power were
equals. he saw no problem with designating ground objectives to support his air campaign. These werc
mostly airfields. but later an odd symbiosis that supports this belief would develop between him and
Montgomery over an air plan designated HURRICANE. that would be advanced by Tedder in October
1944.

365
commandersviewed throughthe prism not only of his own commandbut of his own

problems. As such, how fleeting an opportunity they perceivedvaried not simply by

intelligence on enemy forces deployed,but weatherprojections,logistical forecasts,

artillery ammunitionsstates(which grew critical at this period), replacements(which

grew to crisis proportionsnot just betweenthe British and Canadians,but soon to be

among the American divisions also), and a host of military considerationsof every

kind.

The time variant had also modified the logistical plan and the perceptionof

what it had always been. Montgomery should have been advised in detail of the

American logistical view, particularly since it was Lt. Gen. J.C.H. Lee, Eisenhower's

American servicesof supply commander,and not SHAEF's G4, Lt. Gen. Humphrey

Gale, who really forced the Antwerp issue.As with everything from Eisenhowerto

Montgomery, it came in writing rather than in discussion,as Ike was not fond of

speakingwith his British subordinate.

The "time" viewpoint no doubt was enhancedby Antwerp's capture,but its

capture, as was known by all at the time, meant nothing if it couldn't be used.

Antwerp's use,however,was Lee's solution to his own dilemma.Threeweeksbefore,

the weekly meetingof chief administrativeofficers at SHAEF hadagreedthat:

the development of BREST for intake of US divisions and their

equipmentwas of highestpriority as soonBREST is captured.

CHASTFIY, however, was seen as tentative, and General Gale asked the

plannersfor

366
 a forecastwhat the overall tonnagecapacityand requirements
would be
15'hSeptember for 1,56
on the and the need this scheme

Despite this lack of urgency in deciding or forcing an operational solution,

ports remained the concern of logistical planners. Noting the British targets of

"Antwerp and Rotterdam," Monty's administrative deputy offered up Lc Havre and

Rouen to the Americans, though Lee stated he believed study would support the

for Brest.657Moreover, distance from

priority as the advance continued, the road

current ports forced rapid rail restoration as a key to diminishing trucks needed for

long hauls. Lee transferred both locomotives and rolling stock to help 21 Army

Group, but the Americans continued to review "CHASTITY's practicality" weekly

despite its obvious benefits in saving long hauls of troops and equipment by road or

658
rail.

The continuing problem was not simple. Commanderscould makea logistical

investment for the future, focusing on opening ports such as Antwerp, Brest, or

Quiberon Bay, or continue to pressadvances,hoping to reach immediateobjectives

before administrationbroke down. When and how logistics would break down was

problematical. Stopgapmeasuressuch as the Red Ball and Red Lion truck runs, the

reduction in port offloading to free trucks for long hauls, and the continuing

rehabilitation of the French rail system added to tonnagesdelivered beyond any

original forecasts.This, plus the economics taken in operating measuresand the

6"6NARA. RG33 I. SGS. entry 1, Box 55. File 33718 Volume I I, Chief Administrative Officer
Conferences. Meeting of Chief Administrative Officers Minutes of Weekly 22d Meeting, 19 August
1944.1.2.
Weekly Meeting of Chief Administrative Officcrs Minutes of 23' Meeting, 26 August 1944,3.
Weekly Meeting of Chief Administrative Officers Minutes of 241 Meeting, 2d September 1944.

367
intemittent use of air transport, gave a false positive outlook on continuing

opemtions.

Montgomeryhad simplified the answerby pressingfor one advance,at least

until the logistical situation had been improved. Bradley had pressedfor his own

advance,virtually ignoring his own solution by finishing the captureof the southern

Brittany ports. By themselves,thesewould have solved 12thArmy Group's problems

in mid- to late Septemberhad they beenfully approachedin mid-August. Moreover,

Bradley's eastern advance eliminated the "self-healing" logistical problem of a

northernadvance.Aiming Pattonto Metz insteadof Aachenmeantthat the necessary

force to take Antwerp, the V-2 sites, and the Channelports held by the remnantsof

the Fifteenth Army, plus an advance on the Ruhr, could not be maintained. Bradley's

choice forced an "advanceor ports" alternativeon Montgomerythat would not have

obtainedif there were three full armiesoperatingnorth of the Ardennes.With such a

force, the Allies could havehad an advanceand seizedadequateports simultaneously.

Eisenhower's4 Septemberdirective had reversedreality. Recognizingthat the

German Army in the west was not capableof an immediate cohesivedefense,he

ordereda generaladvanceand the seizureof two substantialareasof Germanywithout

recognizing the logistical improbability of supporting sufficient forces to do so. By

doing so, he had transferredthe onusto succeedon his subordinatesashe withdrew to

his watersideheadquartersfar from the front.

Failing to be forced by logistics to choose,Eisenhowerfacedthe nuancesof a

changing intelligence picture. Dempseyand Horrocks had already felt the changeat

the front. SHAEF and the senior headquarters,however,had to respondby changing

368
 their plans. Strong's intelligence section summarizing the week ending on 9

Septembernoted the Allied attemptsat encirclementhad now reachedthe stagewhere

the actual "battle for the REICH is beginning." SHAEF assessedthe 48 "nominal"

divisions located in the west as equating to four panzer divisions and 20 infantry

divisions. On Eisenhower'sright, a wide gap still existedthrough which the German

NineteenthArmy was escaping,though this equatedto no more than three divisions.

The German First Army, fronting on Patton's forces, received two "low grade"

infantry divisions as reinforcements,and three panzeror panzcr grenadierdivisions

remainedin the line, with two more being rebuilt behind the front. SHAEF noted that

Fifth PanzerArmy had "disappeared"and that the armor both north and south of the

Ardennes

seemsto have beenwithdrawn from the line and much of it has been
reported either in layback positions or on its way out altogether,
presumably for refit, not to say rebirth. In the NORTH, panzer
elementshavebeengoing out via LIEGE, and splitting into two parties,
going WEST and NORTH; in the SOUTH, two panzcr groups are
crystallizing [sic] in rear of METZ and NANCY. On the whole, the
group SOUTH of the ARDENNES seemsthe more active and possibly
the larger.659

On Eisenhower'slefL or northern,flank opposingMontgomery,Strongnoted:

Fifteenth Army is now isolated and its ten divisions cut off on the
FLANDERS Coast, though some may escapeby ferry or by the sea.
The approachesto HOLLAND ahead of the British advance are
meantime only blocked by the natural water obstaclesand by the
meagre resourcesof C-in-C NETHERLANDS, amounting to one
division and someoddments."60

*- SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 25 for the Week Ending 9 September1944,1.5,

"0 Ibid.. S.

369
importantly, no panzer divisions or equivalentswere noted in the 21 Army Group

area.

SHAEF's analysts,furthermore,predictedthat evenwith transferingdivisions

from other fronts, no more than a dozendivisions could be scrapedup in the next two

months.

They estimatedthat 200,000 men had escapedthe furnaceof the Normandy

campaign,predictedthat "many" of the 70,000troops in Belgium would make good

their escape,and that with perhaps30,000 replacementsfrom within Germany,the

to
strengthavailable man the West Wall would be about 300,000men, or roughly 15

divisions. They noted further that:

It is most unlikely that more than the true equivalent of four

panzer/panzer grenadier divisions, with 600 tanks, will ever be found.

By September's end, with intratheater transfers, perhaps 20 division equivalents

661
would exist in the west.

With the capture of Romania and its oil fields, and the continuing attacks

againstsyntheticoil production by the USSTAF, Germanyfaceda dim future, but its

military capability to defend was not eliminated. Moreover, as the SHAEF analysis

continued, it provided, without comment,a detailed study of the German Siegfried

Line. The Allies having reachedthe West Wall, this study should have influenced

operations,as the original CIS Staff Studyconcerningterrainhad failed to do.

In terms used by a German military writer, the study describedthe line's

defenses as "tactics dug into the ground." Meant to be a continuous

370
 obstacle
antitank-/antipersonnel covering the prewar Germanborder, the defensezone

extendedin depth to furnish "a densezoneof cross-fireto sealoff any penctmtionof

the forward position." The German line reversed the Ma&ot design, which

comprisedmassiveforts in shallow depth.The Siegfried Line consistedof numerous

small positions in extensivedepth. Admitting that the line was designedas a skeleton

of a defenseupon which additional field works, artillery in depth,and reserveswould

be used, the basic defenseconcept still required the counterattackstyle of German

defenseused since the Great War to maintain its integrity. While the current stateof

the line was speculated upon, the unalterable characteristic of the line was

unchangeable:

In general,the fortifications are strongestbetweenSTRASBOURGand

TRIER. Specially stong areas are OFFENBERG (opposite
STRASBOURG), KARLSRUHE, the BIENWALD gap,
PIRMASENS, ZWEIBRUCKEN, SAARBRUCKEN, TRIER and
AACHEN. At all of these there arc, in addition to the main line,
reservepositions which are also fortified in depth. Moreover,between
KARLSRUHE and TRIER, there is a stop line, lightly fortified and
NOT of greatdepth,running 15 to 40 miles behindthe fronticr.662

Without stating the obvious, Strong's latest estimatehad begunto put an end

" His previousestimatehad termedthe

to SHAEF's "victory disease.

GermanArmy in the West [as] no longera cohesiveforce but a number

of fugitive battle groups.

Eisenhowerhad respondedby openinghis 4 Septemberdirectivewith the words,

663
Enemyresistanceon the entire front showssignsof collapse.

661Ibid.

662SHAEF SummaryNo. 25, "The Siegfried Line," 1,24.

t-03SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 24.4; Eisenhourr Papers,IV. 2115.

371
The specterof an enemymanninga fortified line with 15-20 divisions and rebuilding

a panzer force to a strength of 600 tanks was not indicative of a crumbled force.

Moreover,the location of the enemy'sstrengthandthe potential strengthin depth and

number of positions of the Siegfried defenseshad to be taken into account. The

depth
greatest of the Siegfried Line lay between12thArmy Group's boundaries,
with

the southernflank most heavily defended.Additionally, the current panzerdivisions

operatingwere known to be forming in front of Third Army's axis of advance.

Bradley's views of this increasedresistanceare unrecorded,though his aide

claimedthat Bradley questionedSHAEF's estimateandthe

picture [Bradley] to
got on our ability maintain armies of our own for a
SiegfriedLine 664
push through the on our routesof advance.

He also told Pattonthat

we must take Brest in order to maintain the illusion of the fact that the
US Army cannotbe beaten. 665

Bradley and Patton blamed their supply problems on COMZ and Lee, who

made no friends by moving his into

headquarters Paris at the height of the gasoline

shortage.Despite numerousconferencesat SHAEF and with COMZ, both Bradley

and Patton remainedstrangelysilent on the uncapturedports and unclearedareasthat

be
were meantto supply basesfor 12thArmy Group.

"'4 HansenDiaq, Sept. 10'. The relevantG-2 estimatesand files for this period are missingfrom the
official 12dArmy Group records.The enemypicture in divisions can be replicatedby referring to the
12" Army Group daily situationmaps,copiesof which are kept in NARA, RG 319, and also at CMH.
05 Patton Diary, September9,1944. Note that the Ninth Army, which had assumedthe clearanceof
Brestand the drinany Peninsulaas its mission,was assignedthreeinfantry divisions and one armored
division, all formerly Third Army Divisions. VIII Corpswas likewisetransferredfrom the Third to the
Ninth Army.

372
 Third Army's G-2 noted the resistancemet along the Moselle River from the

crossings on 5 September,and three days later cited that among the German

capabilities assessedwere: the ability to both defend and delay Mt of the Moselle

while bringing forward reserves;local armoredcounterattacksagainstspearheads;

and

the potential to defend and delay the Third Army in its zone of advance while

counterattackingfrom the south-and that a delay, trading spacefor time to cover the

manning of the Siegffied Line, was possible.No longer did Third Army report "no

cohesivefront lines" for its enemy.166

On 8 September,Bradley pressedHodgesto advancehis armor more quickly

in the V Corps sector,claiming that GermanpanzerattacksagainstPattonwere due to

V Corps' lack of progress.First Army's advances,however,registeredbetweenfive

10 daily front despite 667

and miles along the entire gasoline shortages. Bradley's

preoccupationwith Hodges' right flank was a portentof future operations.

First Army, however, prepared for entering Germany on a broad front.

Originally meetingscatteredresistancealong its front as it turned eastward,the First,

0
like the Third Army, met new resistanceafter it movedthroughLiege on 8 September.

V Corps clearedthe entire Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,while VII Corps moved on

Aachen from the southern approach. XIX Corps moved toward the Maastricht

appendix, with its left flank refused at Hasselt. Hodges intended that Collins, his

6'* ThirdArmY.4fier Action Report.11,G-2, LXIV, Daily IntelligenceSummary,8 September1944.No

Germandivisional identificationsarc noted in the reportsfor the beginningof September.SHAEF's
SummaryNo. 25 indicatedthat the major enemyformationsfronting on Third Army were 3 Para.26
SS.27 SS. PanzerLehr. 48 Inf. 15 PanzerGrenadier.and an additionalinfantry division moving into
sector.Third An-ny's publishedoperationsmap for 15 Septemberindicateselementsof threePanzer
Grenadierdivisions, four infantry divisions. and two parachutedivisions.Third Amy then had six
infantry divisions and threearmoreddivisions.
*67HansenDiaty, 8 September1944.

373
 favorite commander,be the Army main effort. With Gerow's V Corpsbeing prodded

by Bradley, a cohesiveattack by SecondArmy and First Army's left-handcorps was

impossible, thus ignoring the ideal attack terrain north of Aachen.668 By 10

September,consideringthe crisis in his supply, Hodgeshalted the V Corps advance

669
due to ammunitionshortagesand cautionedhis corpsto halt if they met resistance.

Dempsey's Second Army held up COMET. Montgomery had opted for

groundingone-third of Dempsey'sArmy's strength,taking their transportto keep his

columns going. Thesehad now stopped.As the airborne operationwas delayed,the

ground attack evolved from its original continuous sweep from "Louvain and

Antwerp" to Horrocks' current COMET plan that called for an immediateseizureof

the Corps start line, Eindhoven-Tilburg-Breda.Firm resistanceand continuedshifting

of troops had prevented this effort. The distance from the De Groot bridge on the

Escaut Canal to Eindhoven had not been spanned. Dempsey had continued to put off

launching COMET, and on 8 September, he indicated to Horrocks that COMET could

be launched no earlier than the night of 9/10 September. Dempsey put the delay to

continuing bad weather, but the next day Montgomery made clear a more serious

issue:

The stiff resistanceon the line of the Albert Canalhaspreventedquick

progressby SecondAmly. The airbornedrop is thereforeput back, we
cannot drop the airborne troops on the RHINE and MEUSE bridges
until the leading Corps of SecondArmy has got to EINDHOVEN. It

4*8FUSA Reportof OperationsAug44-Feb 45,1,38-44, SituationMap No. 5 LIEGE-AACHEN-

DUREN. SHAEF War Room Report, 10 September1944.During this period, when Hodgesand Patton
receivedequaltonnages,First Army usedapproximately571,000gallonsof fuel daily. Hodgeshad
five infantry and threearmoreddivisions.
"" Hogan,A CommandPost War, 147.
at

374
 looks as if the whole airborne drop will now have to be on a far bigger
670
scale.

Montgomery issuednew ordersto Crerar and Dempsey,but did not cancelor amend

COMET. Theseorderswere:

CanadianArmy
(a) To takeover GHENT from SecondArmy.
(b) To captureHavre
(c) In the Pas de Calais to capture BOULOGNE, DUNKIRK, and
CALAIS in that order.
(d) Then to clear the area of the mainland enclosed in the line
BRUGES-GHENT-NICHOLAS.
(e) Then to capture the islands at the mouth of the SCHELDT, i.e.,
WALCHEREN and others, so as to open up the port of
ANTWERP.

SecondArmy
(f) To operatenorthwardsacrossthe MEUSE and the RHINE, through
EINDHOVEN and ARNHEM, and secure the area ZWOLLE-
ARNHEM-UTRECHT. Later it will move eastwards to the
MUNSTER-HAMM area.671

Thus, MontgomeryassignedCrerar'spriorities: to clear his flanks and rear and

capturethe Channelports, then to clear the areanorth of the Rhine to openAntwerp.

This permitted Dempsey's advance across the Rhine. But at the same time,

Montgomery receiveda signal from the VCIGS regardingcurrent intelligenceon the

V-2 rockets attacking England. Given the new enemy threat, and his own military

670Demps4ývDiaýv. 8 SEP44; AlontgomeryLog. 9 September1944;A1anbroo4ePqpcrs,M/184.9 Sep.

Montgomeryalso signaledAlanbrookeemphasizingthat the airbornedrop could not start prior to
SecondArmy reachingEindhoven.
o7lAfontgomen,Log, 9 September1944.Montgomeryhad impressedon C, ciat his role in maintaining
the advance. ýAC. RG 24, Volume 11001,War Diary G.O.C.-in-C First CanadianArmy, I Sep44-30
Sep44. -Memo to Comd Corps,9 September1944," notes:-it follows that a speedyand victorious
conclusionto the war now depends,fundamentally,uponthe captureby First Cdn Army of Channel
ports which havenow becomeso essential,if administrativeproblem is to be solvedi.e. LE HAVRE,
BOULOGNE, DUNKIRK. CALAIS. and generallyin that order of importance."

375
objectives, it was expectedthat Montgomery would relate theseproblems and their

solution to a commanddecisionrequiringconcentrationof effort:

I am more and more convincedevery day that unlessEisenhowerwill

concentrateon one thrust, and put everything into it, then we shall
672
makeno progressand the war will be prolonged.

While the apparentstalemateon the Eindhovenroad may have prompted the

review of attack plans, the accrual of intelligence did not bode well for the current

COMET plan. Dempsey's intelligence on 8 Septemberstated that the presenceof

parachuteand other troop reinforcementsdefinitely indicated that the number of

enemy troops betweenthe Albert Canal and the Rhine was growing. The following

day's analysis.noted that the areassouthwestof Antwerp still remainedto be cleared,

that numeroustroops behind stiff rearguardswere waiting to cross the Scheldt,and

that the rearguards on the critical Albert Canal were receiving fresh reinforcement.

While Germanarmor was expected,no divisional armorhadbeenidentified.673

Dempsey'sown assessment
concerningCOMET grew dark:

It is clear that the enemyis bringing up all the reinforcementshe can

lay hands on for the defence of the ALBERT Canal, and that he
appreciatesthe importanceof the areaARNHEM-NIJMEGEN. It looks
as though he is going to do all he cando to hold it. This being the case,
any question of a rapid advanceto the North-East seemsunlikely.
Owing to our maintenancesituation, we will not be in a position to
fight a real battle for perhapsten days or a fortnight. Are we right to
direct SecondArmy to ARNHEM, or would it be betterto hold a LEFT
flank along the ALBERT Canal, and strike due EAST towards
in
COLOGNE conjunctionwith First Army9 674

072Ibid.
"" SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 96, Up to 2400 hrs. 8 September44,1; SummaryNo. 97,
Up to 2400 hrs. 9 September44,1.
V4Dcmpseýv Diaq, 9 SEP44.

376
 Dempseyhad yet to clear the enemyfrom southof the Escaut,but the question

he posedrequired not simply a recastingof Montgomery's operationaldesign,but a

major decision concerning the execution of Eisenhower'sBroad Front strategy.On

balance,what Dempseyproposedcould be a simple reorderingof priorities, but one

that would favor the escapeof the Fifteenth Army and the of
establishment a heavy

German presencein Holland north of the Rhine. To move on the Ruhr would have

guaranteeda longer campaignto free Antwerp as well as installing a long, open front,

albeit acrossthe Rhine along SecondArmy's entire rear. Neither Crcrar nor Dempsey,

even with the move of 8 Corps from Normandy,would have the divisions to counter

sucha threat.

Montgomery certainly felt the pull both rearward to clear the coast and

Antwerp and, after Nye's messageon the V-2 threat, toward Rotterdam.Given the

size of his forces, shifting priority to these objectives would stop any eastward

advanceby SecondArmy and commit 21 Army Group to a prolongedoffensive in

north Holland, the results of which would favor the airmen for airfields but would

probably eliminate 21 Army Group from any advanceon the Ruhr. Additionally, it

would require the commitmentof the American divisions not yet deployedto fill the

vacuum north of the Maastricht-Aachen approach unless Third Army shifted

northwards and Patch's SeventhArmy, reinforced by new divisions, took over the

Saar approach. Sixth Army Group would then be given an expanded role and,

theoretically, its supplies could come from the Marseilles port group. This was a

major reordering of the front, in line with the emerging appreciationsof enemy

377
resistancebut not catering to the idea of a 1944 defeatof the Germansthat was then

675
rampantin Washingtonand London.

Eisenhower,who had yet to assumecommandof the DRAGOON forces,had

planned for no such eventualities.If Eisenhowerplayed to form and entrustedonly

"his boys" with great responsibilitiesas in the past, and consideringhis estranged
676
feelingstowardsDevers,he would nevergive Deversa significant role.

From Montgomery'sperspective,COMET becamemore necessary,not simply

to bounce the Rhine, but to seal North'Holland and permit Crerar to systematically

move northward. This would not only clear the ports, but also deal with the Antwerp

and now the V-2 threat while SecondArmy maintainedits advanceto threatenthe

Ruhr. In order to do so, he neededEisenhower'scommitmentto sustainhis advance,

and that of Hodgesalongside.

On 6 September,Montgomery had signaled Eisenhower emphasizingthat

Eisenhowercould

rely on 21 Army Group to go all out 100 percent to further your

intention to destroy enemy forces.677

0.75
CMH. MS. 2-3.7 AE. P-9, RoyceThompson.ProposedCCSDirective to Eisenhowerto End ETO
War in 1944.As late as October,Marshall debatedsendingEisenhowera directive to end the war by
the end of 1944.This was believedto havebeeninitiated by Eisenhower's13 Septembersummarysent
to the CCS, and was discussedinformally by the CCS in Septemberandpursuedthroughoutthe month
of October.Seealso Ehrman,Grand Strate&n,.V, 377-404,passim.
676EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2466-2469.This, of course,dealt primarily with Americans,over whose
careerfateshe held total control. His continuing irritation with Montgomerystemmednot only from
the fact he (Eisenhower)was appointedby the British government,but from the fact he had not
-chosen- Monty, who thereforewas not beholdento Ike for his job. Ike, like his benefactorMarshall,
trustedonly thosehe knew and consideredin his camp.So, also,did Montgomery.Ike's feelings
toward Dcvcrs are reflectedin his continuedattemptsto belittle his contribution to Marshall.
07 EL, CorrespondenceFile, M-169,6 Sept. 1944.

378
Despite his distaste for the conunandarrangements,Montgomery had demonstrated

no indication that he would attempt to have them changed. fie did, however,

recognizethat the decisionpoint for maintainingan adequatedoublethrust concerning

priorities had passed.Bradley, having equalizedsupply to both the First and Third

Armies, was holding his own on neither avenue of approach. Intelligence had

indicatedthat Pattonwould soon be opposedby the rcrnnantsof Germany'spanzcrs,

and that the refurbishment of enemy forces was outstripping the Allied ability to

maintain an COMET's
advance. limited force and the new situation to the northwest

at Antwerp would require a new plan. Montgomerywanted Eisenhower'ssupport in

initiating one.

The split directive, missentby SHAEF, promptedthis. Monty signaled,noting

the receipt of the missing parts:

Have studied your directive No. FWD-13889 carefully and cannot see
it stated that the northern route of advance to the RUHR is to have
priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually, XIX US
Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could you send
a responsible Staff Officer to see me so that I can explain things to
hiM. 678

Eisenhower chose to come himself. He had last seen Montgomery on 26

August and then only for a few minutes. Considering that he had committed the

theaterreservefor Montgomery'suse,that the longestflank-for any Army Group was

still the unclearedChannel Coast, and that the key to his logistical problems was

seeming more and more pointed to Antwerp, his only course of action as -ground

forcescommandee'was to go forward to seefor himself, hearhis commander'splans,

"SEL. CorrespondenceFile. M-181.9 Septcrnbcr1944.

O.

379
and outline his campaignplan. Monty had askedfor this meetingon 4 September,
and

though Eisenhower had met with Bradley at least three times and even with his

American army commandersduring this period, Eisenhowerignored the northern

flank. He would not go forward to speakwith Dempseyor Crerar on their situations

until later in the campaign,and his meetingswith Montgomerywould be forcedby the

situation,not by his own desireto actively commandgroundoperations.

The IOh of September, 1944, was a day of decision that changed the

Northwest EuropeanCampaign.That morning, while conferring with Browning and

Dempsey,Montgomery ordered an increasein COMET's force, deciding to employ

the entire airborne force of First Allied Airborne Army-, he noted that "enemy

" 679If
resistancethere is getting stronger. an assaultto the east and the use of the

Wesel Arnhem discussed,

this 680
Dempsey,
airborne at vice were was not recorded.

who had alreadyquestionedthe enemy's strengthnorth of the Neder Rijn in his own

diary, noted:

In view of increasingGerman strengthon SecondArmy front in the

ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN areathe employmentof one airbornedivision
in this area will not be sufficient. I got from C-in-C his agreementto
the useof threeairbornedivisions.

Dempseyreturnedto his headquarterswith Browning and,accordingto his notes,

fixed with him the outline of the operation.He can be ready to carry
this out on 16 Septemberat the earliest.
674
tfont.gomeryLog, 10 September.
,

"0 RichardLamb, Alontgomervin Europe.1943-1945:Success Failure? (New York: Franklin Watts,

or
1984),214. Richardson,Flasiiback-,186.Lamb saysthat Dempseyhad called to recommendan
airbornedrop at Weselvice Arnhem, but that the V.2 messagefrom the War Office that morning (it
was actually the day before) decidedthe issue.No record of any suchdiscussionwas madeby either
man, nor did Dempseyrecord his disapprovalof the new plan. Weselhad beenruled out early in
COMET's planning due to heavy flak, a fact that Dempseywas awareof, he would not have
reinstitutedan airborneplan even if the Weseladvancewasagreedto.

380
Later that afternoon,Horrocksreceivednew instructions.Dempseyrecords:

[1] gave him the plan for the operationto be carried out by Airborne
Corps and 30 Corps-with the co-operationof 8 Corps on the RIGHT
and 12 Corpson the LEFT.

The complementaryground attack, planned as a thrcc-corpsoffensive, was named

GARDEN. O'Connor's 8 Corps was to be brought forward and Ritchie's efforts

shifted eastward,requiring an investmentboth in time and suppliesbut permitting a

heavy assaultto stearnrollthe enemy's strengtheneddefense.Following his meeting

691
with Horrocks,Dempseymet with Broadhurst.

While there is no doubt that Montgomery and Dempsey were in accord

concerning the details of the new operation, Dempseytook over its planning and

coordination. As with EPSOM, CHAMVOOD, GOODWOOD, BLUECOAT, and

other operations, Dempsey commanded the tactical forces, with oversight, not

interference. from Montgomery. 682

Eisenhower arrived at Brussels airfield and, due to his injured knee, the

conferencewith Montgomerywas held within the aircraft. Montgomeryrecordedthe

meetingfor Alanbrookevia Nye:

AMDentpseýyDiaq.10 SEP44. Dempseyrecordsthe rangestatusof Broadhurst'ssquadrons.

Considcringthat Broadhurstwould statethat he wasnot informed of the operation,it is inconceiveable
that the man who was coordinatingair supportfor COMET would not be kept abreastof the change;
PRO.WO205 /192,21 A Gp/001432/Ops/A,II September1944.Outline Plan for RevisedOperation
-COMET. " Note that this memoat 21 AG by Belchemstatesthat operationis -to lay a stair carpa"
02 Hart. Afontgoniet),and "Collossal Cracks."passim. Many haveaccusedMontgomeryof
overcontrol. and assumed that Dempsey was a cipher. The archival record for this operation does not
support that view. For the only serious discussion of Dempsey, Crcrar, and Montgomery's relations
with them. sce Han. The Persian Gulf war demonstrated that even with modem communication it is
difficult for the seniorheadquartersto control operationson the battlefield and that the headquarters
fighting the battle shouldbe the lowest level headquarterswherecommunicationsand a completearray
of assets.to include air. logistics, specialintelligence, and reserves, can be employed. In World War 11,
this was an Army-level headquarters.

381
 I said it was essentialhe should know my views and the action to be
taken was then for him to decide.I gavehim my opinion on the needto
concentrateon one selected thrust vide my M160 of 4 Sep. He did
NOT repeatNOT agree.I said that in para4 of Part 4 of his 13889of 5
Sep he stated he had always given and still did give priority to the
RUHR and the northernroute of advance.He then said that he did not
meanpriority as absolutepriority and could not scaledown the SAAR
thrust in any way. He said he had not meantwhat was in the telegram
as regardspriority for the RUHR thrust.
But we have got no further. I foresee considerable delay before I can
build up enough strength to develop operations northwards towards
ARNHEM and UTRECHT as I have not the transport to get forward
any maintenance and bridging. A great deal of bridging will be
683
required.

Tedder, who attended the meeting, sent the following description of the

meetingto Portal:

Today (10 September)I accompaniedEisenhowerin Brusselsto meet

Montgomery. In our discussionthere the advanceto Berlin was not
discussedas a seriousissue,nor do I think it was so intended.The real
issueis the degreeof priority given to the Americancorpsoperatingon
Montgomery's right flank and the extent to which Montgomery
control(s] his operations. A useful discussion then followed.
Montgomery, however, made great play over the word "priority" and
insisted that his interpretationof the word implies absolutepriority if
necessary to the exclusion of all other operations. Argument on such a
basis obviously futile and Eisenhowermade it clear that he could not
accept such an interpretation. It is impossible to fight both hands at
present, and date for the left hook has not comeyet and could not come
until north army group maintenance was based secretly [securely?] on
Channelports.
I feel the discussionclearedthe air, thoughMontgomerywill of course
be dissatisfiedin not getting blank cheque.It will help to insure Ruhr
thrust doesget properpriority which we all feel it shouldhave. 684

0.83
M. 186quotcd in Nigel Hamilton. Moniy: TheField Marsha 1944-1976(London: HamishHamilton,
1986).53.
14NARA. RG 319, AMSSO to OCTAGON CAS FROM D/SAC, 111531September1944,Extracts
C.
from D/SAC Diary, PogueSecretFiles, 27 March 1947.Italicized words addedin diary not in
message.Seealso shortenedvariant in Tedder, With Prejudice,571; LHC, PapersofSir Humphrey
Gale [hereafterreferredto as Gale Diaq], 10 September1944.Gale,who accordingto most accounts
was excludedfrom the meeting,sayshe was called into the conferenceafter it had goneon for a while

382
 Sir Humphrey Gale noted Montgomery's refusal to clear Antwerp

immediately, but did not equate it with the need to maintain momentum at least to the

Rhine. Gale never recorded the subtleties in the operational plans, nor did he see

Montgomery as doing anything but "going to play for his own hand," inspired only

because of his replacement as ground commander. He did, however, agree, that the

Hodges' 685
supportof northerncorpsneededto be addressed
.

Eisenhowerrecordsthat he had stressedthe needto close to the Rhine on all

fronts, and that Antwerp's openingwas Montgomery's

priority, though he noted that
taking Arnhem would

merelybean incidentandextensionof our eastwardrushto theline we

for
needed temporarysecurity [the "6
Rhine].

Montgomery did not need permissionto launch an expandedCOMET. First

Allied Airborne Army remainedper the 4 Septemberdirective under his planning

authority, though no doubt existed that SHAEF could withdraw that authority. it is,

however.doubtful that Eisenhowergripped the relevanceof what was at stake,as he

and was attackedwith -recriminationsby Montgomeryand Graham"concerningdetailsof transport.

He accusedMontgomeryin his diary of discussion.stating,-My own view is that MONTGOMERY
never intended to go to BERLIN and that he wanted that Eisenhower had prevented him from
... proof
ending the war in a few days."
0.95Gale Diaiý*. 10 September1944.Montgomery.of courseýwas not refusingto clearAntwerp; he had
assignedthe missionto First CanadianArmy. in whosesectorthe port had beenassigned.Gale's
commentswere typical of the SHAEF staff. He knew little of what was transpiring on the battlefield
and was upsetwhen it disrupted his methodicalsupply plans based on the phase line forecasts. His
argumentshould have been with his own boss, Eisenhower, who controlled all ground forces.
00% Eisenhower.Cnisadein Europe,307; EisenhowerPapers.W. 2135, fn 5; CorneliusRyan.A Bridge
TooFar (New York: Simon and Schuster,1974),76 In, Major-GeneralPLE.Urquhartwith Wilfred
Grcatorex.Arnhem (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,1958),4; Hamilton, Alonrw TheField
%farshal. 64. In old age Eisenhower told his biographer that he not only agreed to MAliKET
,
GARDEN. he insistedon it. He also granteda vitriolic interview tojournalist CorneliusRyan.whose
descriptionof the 10 Septembermeetingis often quoted.Ryanhad severalkey factswrong concerning
that day. to include the presenceof Browning -in the wings- and repeatingthe fabricatedand famous
bridge too far- comment.

383
 remaineduncomprehendingthat the enemydefensehad congealedeverywhereand

that his pursuit was over.

Montgomery believed that the closure to the Rhine on all fronts was not only

logistically impossible but increasingly doubtful, as the "destroyed"

armies that

Eisenhower had described in his early September directive were obviously

rapidly

regaining strength. The argument really was over concentration, at least temporarily,

on a line of operations.

Eisenhowerhad recordeda confidentialmemorandumon 5 Septemberstating

the following:

Two weeks ago when General Montgomery insisted upon a whole

American Army moving to the northeaston his right flank I told him
that he did not needthat much strengthto destroythe Germansstill on
his front. With his usual caution he felt it imperative that we make
certainof no halt in operationstowardAntwerp andBrussels....
I now deem it important, while supporting the advance on eastward
through Belgium, to get Patton moving once again so that we may be
fully prepared to carry out the original conception for the final stagesof
this campaign. 687

Neither man had withdrawn from his August conceptions,but Eisenhowerhad, in

fact, been proven wrong, as even a casuallook at the enemy order of battle maps

published by his own headquarters

would 688
indicate. The bulk of the enemy force

remainingin the West was in the northernsector.Montgomerydid needforcesto gain

both Brusselsand Antwerp, and in fact neededmore forcesto maintain an eastward

07 EisenhowerPapers,IV, "SecretOffice Memorandum," September5,1944,2121-2122.

683SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaries,Nos. 22,23,24,19 August 2 September,1944;Enemy
to
order of battle maps.

384
 movementor to clear Antwerp. He could not do both. Moreover,the concentrationof

logisticsto gain a line on the Rhine wasnot there.

Eisenhowerknew this and so warnedMarshallon 4 September,saying:

The closer we get to the Siegfhed Line the more we will be stretched
administratively and eventually a period of relative inaction will be
imposed upon us. The potential danger is that while we are temporarily
stalled the enemy will be able to pick up bits and pieces of forces
everywhere and reorganize them swiftly for defending the Siegfhed
Line or the FJiine.689

if Eisenhowerheld to this line during the 10 Septembermeeting, he was in fact

contradictinghis own belief that his forceswere about to take both the Ruhr and the

Saar.At Antwerp, he noted the "line neededfor temporarysecurity" was the Neder

Rijn, henceArnhem was mandatoryasan operation.But what of Bradley'soperations,

690
andtheir relation to thosein the north?

As Montgomery prepared his improved COMET, Bradley issued a new

directive, Letter of InstructionNumberEight. Bradley'sordersfollowed Eisenhower's

policy:

Twelfth Army Group advancesto the East to securebridgeheadsover

the RHINE from MANNHEIM to KOLN both inclusive.

His directivesto his armieswere:

First Amly.
(1) Continue to advance to the East to secure crossings over the
RHINE River in the vicinity of KOBLENZ, BONN andKOLN.
(2) Make contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north)
flank.

t'S9
EisenhowerPapers.IV, 2118-2119.
b9o
Eisenhower,Chisadein Europe,307.

385
 Third Army.
(1) Continue the advanceto the East in zone and securecrossingsof
the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM and MAINZ. If
sufficient forcesbecomeavailableto Third Army, it will also seize
a bridgeheadin the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.
(2) Protectthe southflank Eastof ORLEANS inclusive.

Ninth Army.
(1) Reduce the BRITTANY Peninsula and protect the south flank
along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS inclusive.

Bradleyoffered no conceptof operationsthat would haverequiredestablishing

a priority. Instead, the tasks applied bore equal weight except for the note on

administration:

Armieswill haveequalprioritiesof su?ply exceptthat the captureof

the BRESTareawill havefirst 6
priority.

More importantly, he relegatedXIX Corps to a passiverole, acting neither in support

of nor in concertwith SecondArmy. This shift in priority assuredthat no concentrated

thrust by the British and Americanscould be made.

While these orders were issued,Dempseyand Browning beganplanning to

launcha strengthenedattack.Browning's arrival at First Allied Airborne Headquarters

prompteda hastyassemblyof the key generalswithin the command.The staff rapidly

producedan outline directive for PLAN SIXTEEN. Within severalhours,a new name

emerged:MARKET.

"' 12'4Arm Group Report

of Operations, V, G-3 Section, "Letter of Instruction Number Eight, 10
September ,v
1944."

386
 CHAPTER NINE

MARKET GARDEN

The First Allied Airborne staff dubbed the replacementfor COMET "Plan
692
Sixteen" until an official code word could be assigned Despite American
.
sensitivitiesover the use of the American divisions, there was neverany questionof

Montgomery's authority concerningcommitting FAAA to a larger operation. The

Chief of Staff, Parks, visiting SHAEF forward on 9 September,had been told that

XVIII Corps (Airbome) was availablefor an operationagainstWalcherenIsland and

the Scheldt,and that all of FAAA was available to Montgomery"until the Rhine is

" As with most SHAEF decisions,there was a contrary clause, seemingly

crossed.

designed by the SHAEF G-3, to put themselvesback in the decision loop. The

commitment of the entire Airbome Army was to be referred to SHAEF not for

operational reasons,but becauseSHAEF had committed half of their transportsto

transport duties. Given the directive committing them to Montgomery, this was

assumedto be a mechanicalrequirement.Brereton'sG-3, however,had informed 21

Army Group that US forceswere not available for a Walcherenoperation,and cited

Williams' disapprovalof the plan. The G-3 assumedthat XVIII Corps would support

the Americans,and though Parksknew better,no record exists of FAAA disabusing

21 Army Group of this belief prior to the decisionto abandonCOMET.693

"92Brereton Diaries. 339,340; FAAA had only nine operationson the booksat the time. British V
Airborne Division, however,had plannedfifteen. The original draft order is marked"Operation
Sixteen." "SIXTEEN" wasproposedby I Airborne Corps.
693Parks Diatý-,9 September1944.3,6; BreretonDiaries, 340,34 1; "FAAA History," 68; Otway,
Airborne Forces,214. Much of FAAA's effort at headquarterslevel at this time was takenup in
fighting transportrequirements.CATOR, the subsetcreatedto manageairlift and run by FAAA, had
beenrelegatedto a "plane provider" by SHAEF's G4 "Priority Board," who decidedon transport
missions.Brerctonattemptedto haveTedderfix this, but MARKET intervened."FAAA History"

387
 Sunday, 10 September,proved fateful. At 1430Browning telephonedFAAA

with the warning order,recordedby Parks:

[Eisenhowerand Montgomery]desiredthe LINNET force employedin

the COMET areaexceptthat it shouldextendftirther south...
[Browning] had told them that the 15'hor 16Ih was the earliest date
possiblethat this could be done...
Eisenhower promised to make all air transport available for the
694
operation.

Brereton called the plans conference for 1800 at his headquartersat

Sunninghill Park, Ascot. Presentwere: Brereton,Browning, Williams, Hollinghurst,

Parks,Stearley,Cutler, J.M. Gavin (CG, 82d Airborne), A. C. McAuliffe (Divarty CG,

101" Airborne), and a host of staff officers from I Airborne Corps and XVIII Corps.

The GOC I British Airborne Division, R.E. Urquhart, was not present,nor was I

695
Airborne Division represented.

Browning read aloud the outline plan, and this was followed by statementsby

the various commandersor principal staff officers. The outline listed as Browning's

intention:

Airbome Corps will capture and hold crossingsover the canals and
rivers on SecondArmy's main axis of advance.

The key paragraphsof the plan arereproducedbelow:

recordsthat the WalcherenOperationwas to be part of INFATUATE, with the intention of seizingthe

easterncausewayof Zuid Bevelandusinga parachutebrigade.It wasto be launchedin conjunction
with a seabornecrossingof the West Scheldeand a landwardthrustalong the isthmusof the Beveland
Canal. It never maturedbeyondplanningstagesand,due to the tactical situationof the First Canadian
Army, was plannedto occur in late October.Breretonsaysthat he had disapprovedthe useof airborne
forces in INFATUATE on II September,thoughthis did not appearto havebeenformally conveyed
to 21 Army Group. Otway notesthat disapprovalwassentto 21 AG on 21 September.
04 Parks,Diary. 10 September1944.
C-45
Ibid.. Minutesof Meetingcalled by CommandingGeneral,First Allied Airborne Army, held at 1800
hours, 10 September1944,1.

388
 METHOD

4. ]British Airborne Division

Will land and capturethe ARNHEM bridgeswith sufficient bridgehead
to passformationsof SecondArmy through.

101 USAirborneDivision
Will seizeand hold the bridgesat NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the
same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground
between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK is imperative in order to
accomplishthe Division's task.
82 US Airborne Division
Will seize the following on the Second Army's main axis to ensure the
speedy pass through of that Army to the GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and
ARNHEM crossings.

a. Canal crossing 3596 [DE GROOT, Junction de' la Meuse a

L'Escaut, timber decking on steel trestles*]
b. WALKENSWARD

c. EINDHOVEN
d. Bridge in square 4425 [Wilhelmina Canal, ZON, a 2-span steel
girder swing bridge*]
e. ST OEDENRODE
f. VEGHEL

g UDEN

52 (L) Division
Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airfields are
available.
LIFTS
696
5. In principle as for LINNET
.

The key statementsor decisionsmadeduring the conferenceincluded:

* that the operationwould not takeplacebeforethe 15thor 16th(Browning);

CMJNARA. RG 33 1. SHAEF, Entry 256, "Operation Market", Book 3, First Allied Airborne
Headquarters.Airborne Army OperationReports,1944,Operation(Sixteen)"MARKET, " Outline
Plan. 10 Sep44. Specific information on bridge coordinates/targets
[*] found in Bridge Details,
appendedto Engineer& Topo. 0.1.2. G-2 (Int) Div. SHAEF, Market Book 3 file.

389
 e that FAAA would conform to 21 Army Group's "intentions and desires" and

that timing would be the greatestfactor to establish(Brereton);

* that the rangeto the targetareawould not pennit a doubleglider tow, and that

singletows for gliderswould be used(Williams);

e that the 101" would take the southernair route and the 82d the one north of it,

requiring a reversalof missionsas originally assignedin the outline plan. The

82d would be briefed by I Airborne on their plans [COMET] (Williams;

approvedby Brereton);

e that the operationwould be namedMARKET;

* that a drop commencing at daylight would preclude adequatecounterflak

preparationand that an eveningdrop would give a full day for preparation;this

negateda two-lift operationin one day (Stearley);

* that the 101"" missions would be decided and briefed the next day

(Browning);

e that the date for MARKET would be decided on the evening of II

697
September.

Flak soon came to the fore as the most significant problem in the target area

and was discussedduring the morning of the II Septemberat the routes-and-timings

briefing with Gen. Williams. The divisions soon found that their missions were at

647ParAsDiaq, ConferenceNotes, 10 September,14.

390
 698
oddswith the air transportcommander'sviews. Flak, not the necessityof a surprise

air landing to seizebridges,would determinewhat the air transportcommanderwould

permit.

In the I" Airborne Divisi6 area,the samedrop zonesdesignatedfor COMET

were approved,minus the LZ designatedfor the coup-de-mainglider operation to

which Leigh Mallory had previously objected. Additional drop zones and landing

zones were added to accommodatethe three-day delivery of the division in the

vicinity of the original COMET areas,with the exceptionof the Polish "K" drop zone.

Assumingthat the division would be formedin the objectiveareaand that its presence

would eliminate flak, this drop zonewasaddedsouthof the town of Arnhem.

In the 82d Airborne Division area, Gavin planned with Colonel John

Oberdorfer, the A-3 of IX Troop Carrier Command, a series of drop zones that

straddledthe high ground specifiedas vital in the outline plan. The LZ designatedfor

the coup de main in COMET north of the NIJMEGEN Bridge was ignored.

In the 101" Airborne Division area, the commander,Maj. Gen. Maxwell

Taylor, protestedhis assignedmissions, and turned down drop zones indicated by

Browning that he believedwould scatterhis division, eventhoughthey were designed

to establish the crucial first "stair carpet" designedto achieve a quick linkup and

passagefor the 30 Corps force. Brereton supportedTaylor in this argument.Taylor

also was supportedby a virtual soviet of US Army generals,including Ridgway and

69SThe appointmentof Williams as air transportcommanderis not recordedand apparentlyhappened

prior to the 10 Septemberconference.It can be speculatedthat he was appointeddue to the useof two
American divisions to be transportedand becausehe commandedthe far larger troop carrier force.
Browning was retainedas missioncommanderdue to his planningof COMET and becausehis corps
would fit within the British 2 Army structuremore easilythan Ridgway's XVIII.

391
 Cutler, all decryingthe plan and statingthat it negatedUS doctrineby not employing

"'
the 101 Airborne asa division.699

The disagreementin fact, smackedof more thanjust a division commander's

nonacceptanceof the plan. Rather,it harkedback to American disatisfactionduring

the LINNET planning. Brereton informed Parks,probably acceptingTaylor's views

that:

The proposal regarding dropping 101 Division along an axis of 30

miles in length is consideredto lessenthe chancesof accomplishment
of the presentmission. Such dispersiondestroystactical integrity and
renders it incapable of fighting as a Division and presents
insurmountableproblems of re-supply. Each of the small groups is
susceptibleof being destroyed in detail and of [not] accomplishingits
mission.

Breretonsaid that as an airman he opposedsucha conceptdue to problemsof

finding numerous drop zones, and supplying and defending against flak on scattered

drop zones.His own views (or thoseof Williams) had dominateddrop-zoneand route

selection.He said:

I proposeto group the three Divisions in following areas:ARNHEM,

NIJMEGEN, UDEN, so that eachmay be capableof assembly(into]
sectors of divisional action in least practicable time and that two
divisions will be mutually supporting.The Divisions at NIJMEGEN
and UDEN will be capableof strong coordinatedoffensive action to
the Southeast.

Brereton'sconcerns,however,were not simply tactical.He and Ridgway were

still intent on -selling" airborne for an American operationat MARKET's expense.

Parksnoted:

('99MH1. Papers Clay Blair (author Ridgway'sParatroopers),Letter BG StuartCutler to Clay

of of
Blair. 20 February1984.5. Cutler is incorrectas to the time of day that Brerctonwas informed of
MARKET. Taylor doesnot mention incident in his diary.

392
 Ridgway has talked to Bradleyand Hodges.There is a strongdesireto
support the bridges across the RHINE in about ten days. If the
American Division[s] go in MARKET I will have left only the 17th
[US] and 6th[British] Airborne, both in very inferior stateof training. I
700
recommend,if possible,that one Division be kept out of Market.

Parks brought up the topic at SHAEF, gaining Smith's and Bull's concurrence

on the 101" dispersed drop, but neither intended overruling the Army Group

commander's plans, feeling that Montgomery should have the final say. Smith refused

the idea of removing a division from MARKET, stating that the entire Airborne Army

was available to Montgomery until he crossed the Rhine. Smith, however, agreed to

Montgomery 701
ensurethat returnedthe airbornedivisions after MARKET .

Brereton wrote Dempseyconcerninghis objections and orderedTaylor and

Parksto seeDempseyon 12 September,an action unknown to Browning. American

objections to MARKET were not the only reevaluationsof the operationunderway.

While the airmen and ground commanders met to plan the air operation, Montgomery

met with Graham,his logistician, and was given stunningnews.GARDEN could not

go forward until 23 SeptemberunlessSHAEF increased21 Army Group's supplies.

Monty immediately signaled Eisenhower:

I have investigatedmy maintenancesituation very carefully since our

meeting yesterday.Your decisionthat the northernthrust towards the
RUHR is NOT to have priority over other operationswill have certain
repercussions.... The large scaleoperationsby SecondArmy and the
'00Parky Diaq, II September1944:Recordof TelephoneConversation,GeneralBrereton-General
Parks,1630hrs, II September,1944.Parkswas at SHAEF when phonedby Breretonand immediately
registeredhis commander'sviews.
"' Ibid., Smith and Bull had no brief to "approve" drop zones,as tacticswas not SHAEF's
responsibility. Parkswas no doubt lining up supportin casethe British demandedthat their plan be
acceptedin toto. This also flies in the face of the allegedAmericanprinciple of "never telling a
subordinatecommander"how to executea mission,a myth commonlyrepeatedby historians.Smith,
who generallyactedon the logic of argumentsratherthan on their nationalbasis,wascorrectto say
that Montgomeryshouldhavethe final say.As will be seen,Monty had delegatedthe "say" to
Dempsey.who was the officer in tactical command.

393
 Airborne Army northwardstowardsthe Meuseand Rhine cannotnow
take place before 23 Septemberat the earliest and possibly 26
September.This delay will give the enemy time to organize better
defensive arrangementsand we must expect heavier resistanceand
slower progress.... Above facts show you that if enemyresistance
continuesto stiffen as at presentthen NO greatresultscan be expected
702
until we havebuilt up stocksof ammunitionand otherrequirements.

The courses of action open to Eisenhower were clear- he could cancel

MARKET and perhapsredirect the operationsfor the entire front, opt for a later and

obviously lesspromising operationif the worseningfall weatherpermittedit, or back

Montgomery with enough logistical support to push the operation forward but no

more. Neither man would have expecteda shift to a northern concentratedthrust.

Eisenhower intended to send Smith to see Montgomery to organize support for

GARDEN and apparently did not answer the signal.703

This decision was not made in isolation. That day Ekeheld a bedside

conferencewith Bradley, Smith, Bull. and Strongto decideif Patton'sarmy shouldbe

curtailed to support Crerar's in No decision 704The 12th

supply. was made. of

September,therefore, would becomea critical day, at every level from theater to

division, as key decisionswere madenot just in relation to MARKET GARDEN, but

in shapingBradley's operationsaswell.

1702EL. CorrespondenceFile, M-192, Sept. 11,1944. Dempseyspentthe 11' reviewing his

administration.and visited his corpscommandersto inform themoperationswould not begin prior to
23 Septemberunlesshe receivedadditional supplies;Demps4ýy Diary, II SEP44; 21 ArmYGroup
AdministrativeHistory, 37-39,47.
'0' No responseis filed in Eisenhower'scorrespondence.nor doesMontgomerymentionreceivinga
signal in his mcmoirs.
704EisenhowerPapers,IV. fn. 1.2130. No memorandumfor this
meetingexistseither in the crucial
PostOverlord 381 file or in Bradley's OperationsPlansand Memoranda.Eisenhowerwas bedridden
with his kneeinjury.

394
 On 12 SeptemberEisenhowerreceivedapprovalfrom the CCS of his SCAEF

78 signal (9 September)outlining his broad front strategy.The Chiefs, in their reply,

drew attention:

(a) To the advantages of the Northern line of approach into

GERMANY, as opposed to the Southern. They note with
satisfactionthat you appearto be of the samemind.
(b) To the necessity for opening of the Northwest ports, and
particularly ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM before the bad
in. 705
weather sets

Eisenhowerreceiveda secondmessagein the form of a letter from Bradleyon

13 September,downplayingMontgomery'scommentson the slow movementof XIX

Corps,a fact he attributedto the requirementto build bridgesnearLiege and to some

petrol shortages.He notedthat:

First Army statesthat they now haveon handsufficient ammunitionfor

five days' fighting and enoughpetrol to carry them to the Rhine. With
the supplies coming forward even at their presentrate, he [Hodges]
should be capable of a considerableeffort for a week or ten days
without any relianceupon air supply.
Third Army states that they have enough ammunition on hand or in
immediate sight for about four days fighting and enough petrol to carry
them to the Rhine.706

Bradley noted his intent to shift Patton's boundary northward and to

concentratethe threearmies-First Third, andNinth-after SeventhAnny was able to

move northward from 6th Army Group. More important, Bradley described that

RG 331 PostOverlord 38 1,1, SHAEF Incoming Message,ReferenceOCTAGON 16,12 September

1944:EP IV. 2124-2128.Eisenhowerhad told the chiefs,"The first operation[of his campaignplan) is
one to breakthe Siegfiied Line and seizecrossingsover the Rhine.In doing this, the main effort will
be on the left. Then we will preparelogistically and otherwisefor a deepthrust into Germany." Thus,
Montgomerywas correct in assumingthat operationsnorth of the Ardenneswould receivepriority and
that the Saaroperationwould be a secondaryeffort whosesupportshouldnot havehamperedeither
Dempseyor Hodges.Bradley's actions,supportedby Eisenhower,belied this.

395
Hodgeshad receivedmore suppliesthan Patton,averaging3,300 tons versus2,500,

and that the projected increasein suppliesof 2,000 tons daily for the Army Group

would be divided to favor First Army. Patton's advancetowards the Moselle, he

707
noted,would be stoppedif he hadnot achieveda bridgeheadby 14 September.

From Eisenhower'sperspective,his Double Thrust was continuing to work,

and Montgomery'splan could go forward without hindering the American advance.

These two operations,in Eisenhower'smind, continuedto be independentand not

complementary,and XIX Corps,as Bradley had stated,was to continueits flank guard

mission for First Army "due to the gap" betweenArmy Groups.Bradley, in fact, had

no intention of stoppingPatton'sadvanceto favor Hodges,

andhad conspiredwith the

Third Army commanderto keep it going, knowing that Eisenhowerwould never halt

his friend's success.The issueof fuel and supply priority was also falsified. Bradley

had kept the logistics priorities even and during the period 10 to 16 September,the

difference in fuel deliveries favored First Army by only 32,440 gallons, or roughly

4,600 gallons per day, during a period where nearly a million gallons of fuel were
708
issuedto the two armies.

100Ibid., Lctter Bradley to Eisenhower,12 September1944,1. Receipttime of this letter is stamped13

Scptemberat SHAEF. Bradley's claim that XIX Corpswassupportedwas untrue,nor did his
descriptionof affairs fit First US Army's situationor the ordersof its commander.
"07
Ibid.. 2.3.
'08MH1. PoguePapers,Pogueinterview with Bradley, 1, Patton Diary, September12,1944, Patton,
WarAs I Knew It. 130,CMH MS. Study No. 21, Thompson,"ETO Field CommandsGasolineStatus,
August-Septcmbcr1944."

396
 The 12th of Septemberappearedto signal an improvementin the operational

situation at 21 Army Group. Le Havre fell, netting 10,000prisoners.The operation

had beena major Joint Operationlaunchedby First CanadianArmy andthe RAF.709

Smith had aisured Montgomery's execution of his plan, as was Eisenhower's

wish. On 12 September
at Monty's headquarters,
Smith had promised 1,000tons of

suppliesdelivereddaily to the Brusselsrailhead.Monty, taking this as a major change

concerning strategy, noted:

Bedel[l] Smith was sent to see me and promised everything that I had
been asking for weeks; the northern thrust against the RUHR is at last
to be given priority. 710

Unmentioned,either in his diary or to Brookevia an "M" signal,were Smith's

concernsabout Germanstrengthin the Arnhem area.Smith pointed out the increasing

strength of the enemy, and asked if the spearheadcould be made stronger with added

troops landed Arnhem. 711 He did for MARKET's

airborne aroun4 not argue

cancellation or express disapproval of the general concept of the plan at the time.

"" Reportby Gen. H.D.G. Crerar,8 November,1944coveringOperationsof First Army from 2-30
September1944,1-4, RAF Narrative, IV, 132-136,Stacey,Victory Campaign,111,329-336;Canadian
Army Historical ReportNo. 146,40-44.
Montgomen,Log, 12 September;EL, Correspondence, M-197,122000 Sept.Montgomerythanked
Eisenhowerfýr assistanceand designated17 Septemberas D-Day for MARKET.
MHI, PoguePapers,Interview S.L.A. Marshallwith Walter B. Smith, 10-19.Smith noted:"I went
up personallyto talk to MONTGOMERY aboutit [Market]. Our G-2 indicatedthat therewere partsof
3 armoreddivisions in and aroundwherethe First Airborne wasto drop. Montgomeryridiculed the
idea and laughedme out of the tent. But GENERAL STRONGwasright aboutit. We thoughtthe drop
was too weakly weighted but MONTGOMERY laughed at the idea.
" In a 1947interview with Forrest
Pogue,Smith repeatedthe three-armored-di vision strength,but said21 Army Group Intelligence
peopledeniedthis. Maj.-Gen. KennethStrong,Intelligenceat the Top: Tile Recollectionsofan
Intelligence Officer (London: Cassell,1968), 149,notesthat Eisenhowertold Strongto accompany
Smith to seeMontgomery,but that Smith raisedthe objectionsconcerningenemystrengthalonein
conversationwith Monty. Strongdoes not mention dateand no corrobarative evidence hasbeen found
by author in Montgomery'spapers,Smith's papers,the War Diary of 21 Army Group, or the Chief of
Staff's recordsof meetingsat SHAEF that a separatetrip, beyondthe 12 Septembervisit, wasever
made.Ryan,A Bric4geTooFar, 158,Lamb,Montgomeryin Europe,226, and othershavepaintedthis
trip as almosta "stay of execution"requestmadeon 15 Septemberin light of ULTRA evidence.Lamb

397
 Intelligenceon 12 September,however,was not as clear as was later claimed.

Williams, the 21 Army Group G-2, publishedIntelligenceSummaryNo. 159that day,

the first since 28 August. Arnhem had been an "intelligence target" since 6

September,when Williams first briefed the known enemysituationtherefor COMET.

Williams didn't like the plan, but found no reasonto call for its disapproval.On 12

September,Williams noted that the best defensefor the Rhine, as being practicedby

the enemy,was the denial of seaports by the enemy,noting that WalcherenIslandhad

now beenaddedto the list of "fortresses." He notedthat the secondaryline of defense

consistedof the water lines forward of the Rhine and "the somewhatmossy West

Wall." He reportedthat the Germanpresshad touted that the Allies did not intend to

seeka decisionin the Ruhr,

but on the Southernflank along the Longwy-Toul line by tearingopen

the West Wall on the upperRhine and in the SaarandPalatinate.

Williams noted that German reinforcements, in the form of new division

identifications, two panzergrenadierdivisions from Italy, and possibly the 21 Panzer

division, were locatedin this sector.Model, the new C-in-C West,had issuedan order

of the day stating:

At this time the Fuhrer needsto bring new troops and new weapons
712
into operation.Soldiers,we must gain time for the Fuhrer.

The advance of 30 Corps had cut off escaping infantry moving toward the coast; the

panzer divsions already withdrawn from the line had no reported fate. Williams

intelligence
is incorrectin a numberof factsconcerning anddates;Ryanwasunaware
of ULTRAand
perhapsrelieduponEisenhower's memoryor fabricated
thedate.As Ryanwasunwareof ULTRA,
and Eisenhower,Montgomery,Brereton,and Strongwere unawareof the photosseenby Brian
Urquhart. it is probablethat the 15 Septembermeetingneverhappened.
71221 Army Group IntelligenceSummaryNo. 159,12 Sep44,1.

398
 assessedthe sevendivisions identified blocking the Antwerp approachas equivalent

to threedivisions. The remnantsof 1,2, and 12 SSPanzerDivisions were identified in

retreat in front of First Army, and 116th Parizersoutheastof Liege. Williams' map

indicated that the greatest parizer strength in identified "divisions" was between

Aachen and Trier. South of Eindhoven,"Para and GAF elts (elements]were noted,

713
with 6 Para[regt] on the flank." SecondArmy's IntelligenceSummaryfor the same

day reflected the same dispositions but offered no information concerning panzer

division refits or locations.714

First Allied Airborne Army's G-2 noted no additional dispositions; but

repeatedinformation concerningnewly formed panzer brigadesbeing rebuilt from

division shells (with 33 panthertanksand II assaultgunsin a panzerbattalionplus a

panzer grenadierbattalion). This was believed to be the extent to which divisions

be
might rebuilt. This information 715
waspassedon to I andXVIII Airborne Corps.

Thus, as far as estimateswere concerned,MARKET GARDEN, with its

enhancedground and airborne components,appearedto be a viable operation, its

added strength offsetting the reorganizing enemy. ULTRA had tracked the

reorganizationplans of C-in-C West for panzerswith decryptson 5 and 6 September,

locatina 2d and 116thPanzerin Holland and noting that 9 SSand 10 SSPanzerwould

refit in Holland in the Venlo-Amhem-s'Hertogenbosch

area.Its parentorganization,H

SS Panzer Corps, was said to overseethe refit from Eindhoven. By the time of

Ibid.. 2-3. overlay, "Enemy Dispositions,12 Sep.-

'14SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 100, to 2400 hrs. 12 Sep44,
up part 11Order of Battle.
7" NARA. RG 33 1, First Airborne Army G-2 SummaryNo. 8,11 Sep44,2; SummaryNo. 9,12 Sep
44. The sameinformation concerningpanzerbrigadesis includedin SecondArmy Summary,No. 100,
12 September1944.

399
Smith's visit, 2d and II 6th Panzerwere locatedon the American's front and neither9

SS or 10 SS Panzerhad been located. Concerningtheir importanceto MARKET

GARDEN, the estimatemadeby Williams wascrucial:

9 SS and 10 SS were last identified in the great retreat on First US

Army front. There cannotbe much left of them. What thereis is out of
716
the line and may havefound its way into Holland.

At the division level, assigningdrop zoneswent ahead,but the Taylor-Parks

visit to Dempseynot only promptedanotherpersonalrift, but substantiallychanged

the original concept for MARKET. Upon reading Brereton's letter demanding

Dempsey
changes, said, "Yes, "
absolutely. The new drop zoneswould land the 101"

Airborne Division minus a combat team betweenEindhovenand Breugel, with the

task of seizing bridges at both localities. A combat team landing at Veghel would link

the 101s' to the 82d Airbome. Dempsey noted that though he had patrols within five

miles of Eindhoven, he intended no further advance that would alert the enemy and

demolition first bridge. 717Later that day, Dempsey coordinated the

prompt the of the

move of O'Connor's 8 Corps to the right of 30 Corps. That evening, the decision to

launch MARKET on 17 September was made by Montgomery and Dempsey at 21

Army Group. FAAA, that moming, had ruled out any discussion of a night drop due

718
to a "no-moon" period.

"1621 Army Group IntelligenceSummaryNo. 159,12 September1944,3. This was the last summary
publishedby Williams prior to MARKET GARDEN.
-,. Parks Diaiy, 12 September1944.The actualletter cannotbe found in the Parks Diary of FAAA
records.but can be found at CARL, as part of DocumentRS-17582.Hqs FAAA, II September1944,
-Short Estimateof the Airborne Operation'Market'. " The ParksDiary essentiallyexcerptspartsof the
letter in the diary text.
718 DempseyDiaq, 12 SEP44; NDU Diary ofMajor GeneralMaxwell TaYlor,Septembcr12,13,
1944.Parks Diaty: Minutesof Staff Conferenceat FAAA. 0900 hrs, 12 Sept.44. Dempseydoesnot
mcntion the dccision to changethe 101' missionor the visit of Taylor and Parks.Taylor definedthe
ncw mission in his diary as,"holding of threepoints only canalcrossingsfrom E[indhoven]." A

400
 The 13thof Septemberwas usedto fmalize the plan for MARKET GARDEN

and to hannonizethinking at theaterlevel with that of the Army Groups.

The SecondArmy staff conference,held at 1500 hours published the final

plan. (Seefigure 43.) The confmnatorynotesstated:

OBJECT OF THE SECOND ARMY

To place Second Army including airborne forces astride the Rivers
MEUSE, WAAL and NEDER RHINE on the general axis GRAVE
[coordinates deleted]-NIJMEGEN-ARNHEM and to dominate the
country between the RHINE and the ZUYDER ZEE thus cutting off
betweenGERMANY HOLLAND 719
communications and .

DempseydesignatedZero Hour at 1300hours on 17 September.Prior to the

launch, 12 Corps would continue clearing the area up to the Meuse Canal and

establisha bridgeheadover it. 8 Corps would move onto 30 Corps' right, assuming

control of II ArmouredDivision in place.For the GARDEN phase,Dempseyordered

that:

British Airborne Corps:

I Airborne Division including Polish Parachute Brigade capture
bridges over NEDER RHINE at ARNHEM and to dominate the
surroundingcountry.
82 US Airborne Division is to capture bridges over MEUSE and
WAAL in area GRAVE and NIJMEGEN and dominate intervening
area.
The plan for the employmentof 101 US Airborne Division will be
made direct between Commander 101 Airborne Division and
Commander30 Corps. Commander101US Airborne Division arrives
BRUSSELSI 100hrs. 14 Sep.

"combat team" in US parlancewas a regimentplus artillery and combatservicesupportelements.A

US regimenthad threebattalions.Taylor apparentlyhad to be orderedby Brerctonto brief Browning
on changes.Browning wasjustifiably indignantthat he had neitherbeeninformed nor allowed to
discussthe plan with Dempsey.
719NAC, RG 24, Volume 20420,File 969.(D24) Ops 2ndBritish Army-Sep/Dec44, Noteson Chief of
Staff's Conferenceat SecondArmy at 1500hrs. 13 SEP44, dtd 14 Sep44.

401
 30 Corps
101 US Airborne Division is to captureand dominateall crossingsover
obstacles on the main axis of 30 Corps i. e. road HECHEL-
EINDHOVEN-VEGHEL-UDEN-GRAVE.
30 Corps will passrapidly through the corridor establishedby British
Airborne Corps and 101 US Airborne Division [under command,30
Corps] and will establishitself on the high groundin the areabetween
ARNHEM and the ZUYDER ZEE.
[8 Corps] will progressivelyrelieve 30 Corps of responsibility for its
RIGHT flank and will captureinitially WEERT and SOERENDONK.
8 Corps will later advanceas far NORTH as the MEUSE and possibly
beyond.
[ 12 Corps] will progressively relieve 30 Corps of responsibility for its
LEFT flank and will capture initially RETHY, ARENDONCK and
TURNHOUT and later advance as far NORTH as the MEUSE and
720
possibly beyond.

Lacking adequateaircraft and glider tows, the crucial airborneoperationwould

be spreadover three days,with the first drop taking place on D-Day, the secondthe

morning of D+l, and the third the morning of D+2. VAiile 83 Group, RAF, would

provide closeair support,US close air supportpartieswould be also be presentin the

airborne formations and at SecondArmy. 30 Corps would carry enoughbridging to

span the three major water obstaclesbut would move it forward only on order as

needed.Bridgescapturedwould be supplementedby new-built bridges;bridgesblown

would be built if the bridgeheadswere held by airborne troops, and bridgeheads

if bridges demolished held by 721

assaulted the were andnot the airborne.

The same day, Browning issued his final Operation Instruction No. 1,

confirming commandarrangementsand missionsalreadygiven, but noting that 101"

Airborne would

120 Ibid.,
2,3.
721Ibid., 3,4. Additional detailshavebeen
omitted.The entireorder was six pageslong.

402
 seizebridgesand defiles on 30 Corps' main axis of advanceto ensure
the speedypass-throughof that corpsto the GRAVE-NIJMEGEN and
722
ARNHEM crossings.Definite locationswill be notified shortly-

The 101" would be subordinateto Airborne Corps for the flight and drop, and to 30

Corpsfor groundoperationsuntil returnedto I Airborne Corpsby SecondArmy.

The unity of the original commander'sintent, the bridge coupsde main that

would help lay "an airborne carpet," had been broken-a fact unknown to

Montgomery at this time as oversight for all operational planning had passedto

Dempsey.On the operational level, Monty felt he was being both supportedand

enthusiasticallyhelpedby both Eisenhowerand Bradley.Bradleyvisited Monty on 13

September-a satisfactorymeeting,accordingto Monty, who recordedin his log, "He

is a most awfully nice chap." As in most dealingswith Bradley,Monty did not notice

that the Trojan Horsetacticsof appearingto be fiiendly and then working againsthim

were at play, a fact 723

that he did not realizeuntil much later.

Ike's own message to Monty that day also bespoke encouragement and

confidence. He promised 500 tons by road, and 500 tons by air except during

MARKET, to the 21 Army Group until I October,and that he would assistin freeing

for 724
up airborne forces openingthe Scheldtor providing some other support. The

sameday, Eisenhowersent a finther directive to his commanders,amplifying his 9

7" CARL, DocumentRS-11583,HQS AIRTRPS/TS,OperationMarket OperationInstructionNo. 1.

723MontgomeryLog, 13 September;HansenDiary, 13 September;Bradley,A Soldier's Storv, 416-418.
HansenrecordsRidgway's aide asdescribinghis dislike of Browning, and that XVI II Corpý
commanderwantedto jump on the Rhinebridgesin Bradley's sector.No contemporaryrecordof
Bradley's action towardscancellingMARKET are extant,though he claims in his 1951ghosted
memoirsthat he called Eisenhowerclaiming that Monty had left him holding the bag on their
"previously plannedjoint offensive." Consideringthat Bradleyhad strippedXIX Corpsof a division
and that XIX Corps wasshort of fuel, this is a preposterousclaim.
724EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2133-2135.

403
Septemberdirective. He listed as possible options "a single knife-like or narrow

thrust" or

to drive forward through the enemy's western frontiers to suitable

positions on which we can regroup while preparingthe maintenance
facilities that will sustainthe greatbulk of our forceson the drive into
Germany.

Any operations,he felt, required the developmentof ports to support the

advance,with the Northern Group clearing the Channel ports and Antwerp, the

Central Group, Brest, and the Southern Group, Marseilles. While assuring the

understandingthat Antwerp was a requirementfor a northern thrust to the Ruhr, he

delineatedboth a maneuverschemeand specifictasksto outline his campaign:

The general plan is to push our forces forward to the Rhine,

...
securing bridgeheads over the river, seize the Ruhr and concentrate our
forces in preparation for a final non-stop drive into Germany. While
this is going on we must secure bases....
The maneuver plan is to push hard over the Rhine on our northern
flank with Northern Group of Armies, First US Army and the First
Allied Airborne Army, with the Third US Army, except for a limited
advance explained below, confined to holding and threatening action
until initial objectives on the left are attained.
Northern Group of Armies, swinging generally northward from its
present position, will advance promptly to seize a bridgehead over the
Rhine and prepare to seize the Ruhr.
The Central Group of Armies must push its right only far enough, for
the moment, so as to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the Moselle
and thus create a constant threat to the German forces and prevent the
enemy from reinforcing further north by taking troops away from the
Metz area. As quickly as this is accomplished all possible resources of
the Central Group of Armies must be thrown to the support of the drive
of the First US Army to seize Bridgeheads near Cologne and Bonn, in
preparation for assisting in the capture of the Ruhr.
After Northern Group of Armies and First US Army have seized
bridgeheads over the Rhine the Third US Army will advance through
the Saar and establish bridgeheads across the Rhine. If, at an earlier

404
 date, maintenanceof the Third US Army becomespossible, this
advancewill be initiated at that time.
After attainmentof the Moselle bridgeheadsabovedirected,operations
on our left will, until the Rhine bridgeheads arewon, take in
priority all
forms of logistical support except for (a) adequatesecurity measures
and continuousreconnaissance by forces on the right; (b) necessary
for the developing 725
resources securing and ports.

Eisenhower'sdirective, thanking him

Montgomery immediatelyacknowleged.

for his assistance,and noting that 500 tons' road lift would be neededuntil 7 October

when r3il acrossthe Seine would be in operation,and that he had coordinatedhis

operationswith Bradley.Most important,he stated:

Am arranging to develop as early as possible operations designed to

enable the port of Antwerp to be used. Now that Havre is captured am
moving Headquarters First [Canadian] Army and 49th Division up to
Antwerp at once. Am grounding and immobilizing 51't Division at
Havre and using the whole of its transport to enable this move to take
726
place.

From the Supreme Commander's Perspective, 21 Army Group was moving to

seize his primary objectives, and was acceleratingattempts to clear the coast and

move on to clearing the Scheldt to open Antwerp. Two huge movementswere in

train--one to clear the coastalports and begin the clearanceof Antwerp's approaches,

and one to gain a bridgeheadover the Rhine. From the perspectiveof any planneror

commander,the messageclearly implied that the British airbornedrop and the First

Army drive constitutedthe Allied Main Effort, and were a concertedpart of the same

"to hard 727

maneuver push over the Rhine on our northernflank."

... EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2136-2138.This

messagehasbeenreproducedonly in its key parts,and
enumerationhasbeenremovedfrom the paragraphs.It was transmittedto the CCS and British Chiefs
of Staff as M sg SCAF 8 1.
726EL, Correspondence, M.205,14 1000Sept.
727 EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2137.

405
 Bradley did not react enthusiastically to the directive despite his

foreknowledgeof its contents.His aide, Hansen,recordedhis commander'sire with

the Eisenhowerplan to weight the left flank, saying:

Brad is opposedto this, sensingthe possibility of a breakthroughin

the V Corps sectorwhere sharppenetrationshave alreadybeen made
or in the area of the 3rd Army which then may pinch the Ruhr from
the south and plunge through to the Rhine. Ike, however, has his
heart set with Monty on main effort to the north. Where penetration
has now been made by 4th Division and 281h Division into the
Siegfried Line there is every indication that Line is not sufficiently
manned. [Refers here to Luxembourg] G-2 has estimated that the
Germancannotmuster strengthin the line until first week of October.
Essentialthereforewe break through now. Brad's plan is to favor the
First Army with supply for main effort in their sector which Ike
prefers but he does not wish to weaken the Third Army which
reported today that it in
crossed strength.... Patton swears, "There is
in front through to the Rhine." 728
nothing of us; we can go clear

Montgomery's own operationaldesignwas completedand discussedwith his

army commanderson 14 September,

after which he issued the written directive,

M. 525, that constituted his design for "the MARKET GARDEN Campaign." (See

figure 44.) In his generalsummary,he assignedclearing the mouth of the Scheldtas

the First Priority for the CanadianFirst Army. He emphasized:

Our real objective, therefore, is the RUHR. But on the way to it we

want the ports of ANTWERP and ROTTERDAM, sincethe captureof
the RUHR is merelythe first stepon the northemroute of advanceinto
Germany.

Intention.

728HansenDiary, September14'. He recordsthe next day that Bradley"representsthe American

view," and that Bradley's reply to being carriedalong with Montgomery'soperationis I will not have
the tail wag the dog." Bradley's view of his supply problemscontinuedto be -COMZ is not doing its
job. " Patton'sclaims of a clear advanceinto Germanywere false. His own intelligencethen portrayed
the effective combatstrengthin front of his threecorpsas equatingto eight divisions, with 67,500 men
in defensewith 90 tanks and assaultguns.The G-2 further estimatedan availablereserveequatingto
six divisions with 53,500combatantsand 80 tanks.SeeThirdArmy AfterAction Report,//, Staff
Reports,LXV, 13 SeptemberIntelligenceEstimate:Estimateof EnemyStrengthin Third US Army
Zone.

406
To destroyall enemywest of the generalline ZWOLLE-DEVENTER-
CLEVE-VENLO-MAASTRICHT, with a view to advancingeastwards
and occupyingthe RUHR.
First CanadianArmy
8. Completethe capturefirst of BOULOGNE,and thenof CALAIS.
9. DUNKIRK will be left to be dealt with later; for the presentit will
be merelymasked.
10.The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards
operationsdesignedto enable full use to be made of the port of
ANTWERP.

Airborne troopsareavailableto cooperate.

14. Subsequently[to clearanceof North Holland and ROTTERDAM],
CanadianArmy will be broughtup on the left (or northern)flank of
SecondArmy, andwill be directedon BREMEN and HAMBURG.

SecondBritish Army
15.The first task of the Army is to operatenorthwardsand securethe
crossings over the RHINE and MEUSE in the general area
ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN-GRAVE. An airborne corps of three
divisions is placed under command Second Army for these
operations.
16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line
ZWOLLE-DEVENTER-ARNHEM, facing east, with deep
bridgeheads to the east side of the IJSSEL river.

From this position it will be preparedto advanceeastwardsto the

generalareaRHEINE-OSNABRUCK-HAMM-MUNSTER.
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards
HAMM, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards
along the eastern face of the RUHR.
17.The thrust northwardsto securethe river crossings will be rapid
...
andviolent, andwithout regardto what is happeningon the flanks.
Subsequentlythe Army will take measuresto widen the area of the
initial thrust, andto createa secureline of supply.

12 Anny Group
19.First US Army is to move eastwardsas follows:
(a) 5 Corpsis directedon BONN.
(b) 7 Corpsis directedon COLOGNE.

407
 (c) 19 Corps carrying out flank protectionon the northernflank of
the Army, -alongthe inter-Army Groupboundary.
20. The Army is to captureBONN and COLOGNE, and to establisha
deep bridgehead,some 10 miles in depth, on the east side of the
RHINE.
21. The Army is then to advanceeastwardsround the south faceof the
RUHR. This operation will be timed so as to be coordinated
carefully with the move of SecondBritish Army round the north
faceof the RUHR.
There will be very close touch betweenGeneralBradley and myself
during theseoperations.729

Receipt of Eisenhower'smessageconcerningsuppliesthat morning, plus his

M. 525, solidified Montgomery's campaign concept though he had not yet

own

13 September directive from Dempsey,

Eisenhower. who had
receivedthe campaign

decided not to press on to Eindhoven to prevent a stirred homet's nest, continued

regroupmentand detailed coordination with his corps To

commanders. the south,

Hodges,whose G4 had informed him the army had eatendown its supply reserves,

had stopped V Corps' advance due to artillery ammunition shortages.Hodges,

however, permitted "Lightning Joe" Collins in VII Corps to conduct a

"reconnaissancein force," a mission which was extendedto V Corps while XIX

Corps remainedstatic. VII Corps penetratedthe West Wall in the Stolberg corridor

south of Aachen, but soon found itself stoppedby German The

reserves. V Corps,

which had penetratedthe Ardennes,soon halted, but by 13 September,

the natureof

battle had changed.First Army was now facing a strongerenemyand the pursuit was

over. On 17 Hodges
September, shut down operationson First Army's front in order

729M. 525,14-9-44,1-3; EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2134.This is an abbreviatedform of the directive

maintainingoriginal paragraphenumerationbut exccrptingsomedetail. It is importantto note that
Montgomery'sstatementconcerningclosetouch with Bradleyis neithera wish nor an unauthofizcd
statement.Eisenhowerpromisedsuchin his 13 Septembermessage.

408
to build up supplies.Bradley's logistics shift to Pattonhad permittedthe Germansto

bar the door in the Maastricht-Aachen-Stolberg

corridors. The main gateway into
730
Germanywas closed.

As troops moved to airfield stagingareasand gliders were loaded, the final

detailsof the airbornedivision planswerebriefed.Upon thesedivisions. the '*airborne

carpet," the true fate of MARKET GARDEN rested.

Taylor's publishedplan for the 101" Airborne solidified his modified role for

his division. It accountedfor a three-daylift using432 parachuteaircraft and 70 glider

tows (Waco, CG4A gliders) on D-Day, 450 gliders on D+I, and 382 gliders on D+2-

(Seefigure 45.) It listed as its conceptof operations:

101" Airborne Division will land by parachute and glider in daylight

on D, D+I, and D+2 Days, in the Zon-Vechel area with the mission of
seizing and holding the principal stream and canal crossings at
EINDHOVEN, ZON, and VECHEL in order to assist the advance of
the British 2nd Army northward along the EINDHOVEN-GRAVE
highway. 731

On D-Day, three parachuteinfantry regimentswould land: the 501" on DZ

"A"; the 502nd on DZ "C"; and the 506th on DZ "B". The northern force landing on

DZ "A" would secure the canal and stream crossings in the Vechel area. These

included two rail bridges to the west and northwest of the town as well as small

bridges spanning the Aa River and Willems Vaart Canal. This force and its captured

objectives would provide the key link between the two American divisions. The

northernmostof two concentrateddrop zones, DZ "C" was used to constitute the

130FUSAReport OperationsAug 44-Feb 45.1,38-46, Map No. 5. LIEGE-AACHEN-DUREN;

of
Hogan,A CommandPost at War, 147-149;Collins, LightningJoe, ChapterX111,passim.

409
 division reserve,and block the Zon-St. OederodeRoad,as well as to seizethe small

bridge south of the town on the Dommel River. From there,a detachmentwould also

be sentto the southwestto capturethe bridge at Best spanningthe Wilhelmina Canal,

an alternateroute for 30 Corps' But

advance. the DZ "B" force was key. It would

capturenot only the Zon bridge on the Wilhelmina, but would haveto march south to

Eindhoven to capture the city and take the Dommel River bridges south of the
732
town.

None of the 101" objective bridges was large, but each would require a

replacementspan or bailey bridge if the original was blown by the enemy.The key

link for the 101" on Club Route was the Zon Bridge. The bridge, with trees and a

built-up areabetweenthe targetand the drop zone,was not plannedasa coup-de-main

target. A flat field, suitable either for paratroops or several gliders, lay directly to the

eastof the north end of the bridge but was not used.

Taylor's plan concentratedhis division for the drop, but it placedno unit near

its primary objective for a coup de main. The Zon bridge, the first of the southern

bridges,was about I to 1.2miles straight-linedistancefrom the edgeof Drop Zone B

and was separatedfrom it by a patch of the Zonchewoods and the small clump of

housesat Otiesburg.The seriesof small bridgesat the southernend of EindhovenJay

731
NARA, RG 407, Decimal 3101-3.9,Field Order #1 with Annexes,MARKET-101" Airborne
Division, 14 September1944.
732
Ibid.

410
about eight miles from the Zon bridge. Valkenswaard was six miles south of
733
Eindhovenand sevenmiles north of the 30 Corpsstart line for Club Route.

The original outline plan for MARKET agreed to by Montgomery, Dempsey.

and Browning had placed the 101"" southern objective and southern drop zones near

Valkenswaard, both to shorten the linkage distance to 30 Corps, and to provide a close

to find
envelopment of the enemy's rear area, approximately where one would expect

the en(.my artillery gun line and close combat reserves. GARDEN, unlike COMET,

was not designed to start at Eindhoven. Taylor's protest assureda full 20-mile cushion

of enemy terrain between Horrocks' lead tanks and the 101't Airborne first lift, not the

seven miles desired by Montgomery and Dempsey. More importantly, Taylor's plan

lengthened the distance that Guards Armoured Division would be expected to fight to

734
a minimum of 13 miles.

The intelligence estimate for the 101", based heavily on photographs,

accurately pinpointed antiaircraft threats, obstacles, and visible minor defenses,

including weapons pits, slit trenches, and a number of probable machine gun

locations. Its accompanying map trace displayed the division's only enemy order of

battle information, but no tactical analysis was offered. It showed that in front of 8

Corps, three "divisions'ý--3 Para with 1,000 men, 354th Infantry with 8,000 men, and

the 272d Infantry in depth with 1,000 men. Around the nose of the 30 Corps salient

pointed at Eindhoven were the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier "division" with 3,000 men and

733
All terraindescriptions
arebasedon 1944mapsandphotos.Theoriginalroadhasbeenoverbuilt,
Valkenswaard is nowessentially
a suburbof Eindhoven, bridgesarewithinthetown,and
thesouthern
Otiesburgis nowa smallvillage.

411
30 tanks,the 9 SS PanzerGrenadier
"Division" with 1,500men and 10 tanks,and the

10 SS Panzer Grenadier"Division" with 1,000 men and five tanks. Between the

Wilhelmina. Canal and the Maas, it displayed the 509 Security "Battalion" as
735
64
unlocated .

Gavin's 82d Airborne Field Order, published on 13 September,listed its

concept of operations (see figure 46):

82d US A/B Div, (less dets), will land by Prcht and Gli commencing D
Day S of NIJMEGEN; seize and hold the hwy bridges across the
MAAS River at GRAVES [sic] and the WAAL River at NIJMEGEN;
seize, organize, and hold the high ground between NIJMEGEN and
GROESBEEK; deny the roads in the Div area to the enemy; and
div. 736
dominatethe areashown[overlay omitted of sector).

Gavin divided the division into "Force A" and"Force B" for two separatelifts,

"A" landing D-Day. Within Force A were the 505th Parachute Infantry, to land
with on

DZ "N"; 504th Infantry,

Parachute to land on DZ "0"; the 508th Infantry,
Parachute
on

to land on DZ "T"' with a field artillery battalion and pathfindersto convert "T" into

LZ "r' for the Force B landings.For the secondday, "N" and "T-' would be usedfor

glider Us to bring in the 325thGlider Infantry Regimentand two glider field artillery

battalions.

As had Urquhart and Sosaboskibefore him, Gavin stipulatedthat one of the

four bridges on the Maas-Waalmust be seized.All four would be attacked in the

734Under the original concept,GuardsArmoured alsowould havebeenwithin the rangefan of Amy

artillery groups;the Taylor variant requireda shift of gunsforward for support,an impossibility on a
single road designedfor a link and pursuit on the "stair carpet" envisagedby Montgomery.
73'NARA, Field Order #1,
op. cit., annex 10, EnemyOrder of Battle (overlay).
736NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 12420,82dA/B Div FO#II -Opn MARKET, 1.

412
 737(See figure 47.) Gavin's plan, while ensuring that the
hopes of seizing one intact.

designated-the Groesbeek Ridge-was held, and that a secure link- with

vital ground

the 101" was made, was a defensive plan that did nothing about the problem of

Nijmegen or more important, to assure a coup de main of Nijmegen's vital road

bridge. Gavin's drop-zone geometry theoretically created a 25-mile perimeter for the

division, to be held by fewer than 7,300 men landing in the first lift. The planned drop

zone nearest the Grave Bridge was almost two miles away, the nearest to the

Nijmegen Bridge was between five and six. Gavin had wanted to send a battalion to

the bridge, but Browning told him not to, stressing that securing the Grave Bridge and

the Groesbeek Ridge had priority, ind that losing either of them would cause the

failure of GARDEN and the probable destruction of his division. The night before the

operation, Gavin gave the regimental commander of the 508'h Parachute Infantry oral

orders to send a battalion to seize the bridge upon landing-an order the regimental

commander understood was to be accomplished only after he had captured his primary

objectives to the east of Groesbeek Ridge. No force, then, would press for the

Nijmegen bridge in the early hours of the operation.738

The intelligence estimateof the 82d benefited from the British study of the

area during COMET. The division G-2, Maj. Walter Winton, provided a prescient

appreciation:

737Gavin, Airborne Warfare,97; Sosabowski,Freely I Served,140-143.

'" NARA, RG 319, Correspondence, CMH Filcs, The SiegfriedLine Campaign,MHI, Papersof
LieutenantGeneraIJamesU. Gavin, Letter Gavin to TheaterHistorian,25 July 1945;Letter to Chief
of Military History from Lt. Gen. Browning, February1955;Letter to Chief of Military History, Brig.
Gen. R.E. Lindquist, 9 September1955;authorinterview, 1999,with Lt. Gen.JohnNorton, who was
the Division G-3 during MARKET. Gavin ordereda battalionsentto the bridge on the night of 17
Septemberupon finding out the 508' had madeno moveto the bridge. Norton remembersthat

413
 it is reported that one of the broken Panzerdivisions has been sent
back to the areanorth of ARNHEIM [sic] to rest and refit, this might
produce some 50 tanks. We may thereforereckon that the forces from
ROTTERDAM to the Germanfrontier might comprisea regt from 719
Div, a regt from 347 Div, remnantsof 70 Div, a few mobile bns, some
scrapedup static troops and one Panzer division, much the worse for
wear.

Noting that perhaps4,000 SS training troops were believedto be in Nijmegen

along with the units identified, he assessed:

an estimate of a divisional strengthin this areamay not be far wide of

739
the mark.

Urquhart'sI Airborne Division,s plan was confirmedby Browning'slast written

instructionsto I Airborne on 13 Septemberdesignatingthreepriority tasksin order.the

captureof the Arnhem bridge or a bridge; the of

establishment a bridgeheadsufficient

to permit the deploymentof 30 Corps north of the NederRijn, and the destructionof

the flak in the division sector to permit the safe passageof subsequentlifts. No

junction point with the 82d to the southwas establishedin order "to preserve [the
...
division's) southernbombline," thuspermittingfire-rangingair attacksbetweenNijmegen

and Arnhem. No prediction or timescalefor a linkup waspredicted,only that:

The time at which you are to expect junction with 30 Corps leading
troops will be notified to you from Corps Headquarters as soon as it is
definitely known. 740

On 12 SeptemberUrquhart issuedhis plan dividing the force into three lifts,

the first comprising I ParachuteBrigade, I Airlanding Brigade,the Division's tactical

Browning told him to await newsof 30 Corps' positionwhile securinghis perimeterand waiting for
the rest of his own division to arrive.
739NARA, 82d A/B F.O. 11, op. cit., Annex I C, Order of Battle Summary,II September1944,1.
740PRO,WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Report,Annexure'B': Operation"MARKET" Instruction
No. 1, Hq. Airborne Troops (Main), 13 September1944.

414
headquartersand the division recce squadron.A light field artillery battalion (less a

battery)and engineersand assortedsupportwould also go in. The secondlift landing

the next day would bring in 4 ParachuteBrigade and the balanceof the Airlanding

brigade, light battalion, and resupply.The third lift would bring I Polish Parachute

741
BrigadeGroup. (Seefigure 48.)

I ParachuteBrigadewould land on DZ "X. " Its primary mission was to seize

and hold in priority the main road bridge at Arnhem and a pontoon bridge located at

the turn in the river, about one Hometer west of the road bridge. The rail bridge,

about four miles southeastof the drop zones south of Osterbeek,was ignored,

it
probably as was outside the division's plannedperimeter.After the seizureof the

main road bridge, I ParachuteBrigadewould seizeandhold DZ "K" southeastof the

bridge for the arrival of the Polish brigade. I Airlanding Brigade would land on LZ

"S" to secureLZs "S" and "E' and DZ "X. " Its primary responsibility would be to

hold the division zone for the secondlift, protecting DZs "Y" and "X" and LZs "S"

and "Z. " It would also protectthe landing of Polish gliders on LZ "1: ' during the third

lift. The division recce squadron,less a troop in reserve,would seize the Arnhem

bridge in a coup de main under control of I ParachuteBrigade. 21 Independent

ParachuteCompanywould mark all LZs and DZs. The glider pilots would form two

battalions,one in division 742

reserveand one under control of I Airlanding Brigade.

Following the issuanceof Browning's written directive on 13 September,Urquhart

issuedadditional instructionsforbidding the destructionor preparationfor destruction

741Ibid. Annexure'C: Oper?tion 'MARKET' I Airborne Div OpInstr. No. 9, Confirmatory Notes
on
GOC's Verbal Orders, 12 Sept.44, sheet1.
742
Ibid., sheets3-4.

415
 of bridges and directing that all ferries and bargesin the division areabe brought to
743
,
the north bank "so asto safeguardthem for futureuse.

I Airborne's situation,and henceits plan, was the most precariousof the three

airborne divisions. While the 101" lay at the tip of a projected20-mile advance,and

the 82d at the tip of a 43-mile advanceby 30 Corps, I Airborne had to count on

Adair's armor moving 64 miles to reachthe Arnhem bridge,and about 60 to link with

the Polish brigadesouth of the town. While COMET had provided for the seizureof

the Grave and Nijmegen bridges,MAPXET's plan left Nijmegen for a later assault,

and no "carpet" existedfor the to

armor roll up on the "island" betweenNijmegen and

Arnhem. Among the worst of the division's manyplights was its forceddispersion.As

its full strengthcould not arrive in less than three days,it would be three days at the

earliest before it could consolidate itself Its D-Day landing strength was three

parachuteand three airlanding battalions, with the latter remaining to protect the

"airhead" for subsequentreinforcement and supply. The division's move to the

objective, therefore,was a three-battalionattack separatedon individual routes,to be

followed by the movementand seizureof the northernhalf of Arnhem by 4 Parachute

Brigade and the western section of Arnhem by I Airlanding Brigade, a total of six

battalionsand the balanceof the division.

When Maj. Gen. Richard Gale, the GOC of 6 Airborne in Normandy,

examined the plan on Browning's invitation, he was appalled, saying that the entire

division should be dropped near the bridge or, at minimum, move to the bridge

following a coup de main. He claimed he would resign if he had to carry out the 1

143
WO 171-393,AnnexureW; I AirborneDiv. Op.InstrNo. 10,AdditionalNotesonOperation

416
 '44
Airborne plan. Still, Browning could offer no solace to Urquhart, nor was the

conversationwith Gale evermentionedto him, for the airmencontrolledthe drop.

Hollinghurst had ruled out closer drop zones, and Williams had denied

Hollinghurst's requestfor 38 and 46 Groups to fly double lifts on D-Day for the I

Airborne, the secondlift coming in at dark or later. More important,perhaps,was the

madethat the ground southof Arnhem was unfit for massglider landings
assessment

due to ditches and the existenceof few roads. The Horsa glider neededwheels to

permit its heavy loads to be extractedby removing the tail assembly,a factor that

ruled out "no wheels" landingson brokenterrain.While it was a matterof later debate

as to whetherflak was the primary discriminatorin landing so far from the objective,

certainly the specterof dividing the division by the river-with parachutistslanding

on the island and gliders landing as planned-might have played heavily in

considerationof gaining an airheadfor the secondlift. Given the slow buildup over

three days necessitatedby the lack of airlift, no one would risk splitting the division

fiirther. The British airheadwould haveto be north of the river.745

The signals capability of the division also promised a potential for disaster, a

situationalreadywell known fi-omthe planning for COMET. With drop zonesranging

from five to eight miles from the objective, and the dispersal of the division's

battalions,the short-rangecapability of the division's standardradio setsprohibited a

MARKET, 13 Sep44.
7," Red Berets '44 (London: The IllustratedLondon News,
1994),72-73; Martin Middlebrook,Arnhem
1944: TheAirborne Battle, 17-26September(Boulder: WestviewPress,1994), 17,18.
74*sOtway, Airborne Forces,263,292,293.

417
 controlled battle employingany form of reserveto exploit oppommity. to maneuver.
746
or to preventdisaster.

I Airborne's intelligencehad studiedthe sectorsincetheir warning order of 3

September.During COMET, division intelligence had appreciatedthat there were

6-sevenmobile battalions" of 20 Mobile Brigade in the Zwolle-Zuthen area northeast

of Arnhem. The intelligence officer also noted that the Germanshad assessedthe

value of bypassing the West Wall defensesand assumedthat portions of four

divisions out of contactmight be usedto cover the river crossings:

The GRAVE-NIJMEGEN-ARNHEM route therefore may be guarded

by the best part of a low category division, possibly a mobile Bn and of
by Flak troops. 747
course

This assessmentwas strengthened on the morning of 10 September with the

commmentthat

the fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed from the
748
remnantsof battereddivisions seemsunimpaired.

On the eve of MARKET, the written assessment

for I ParachuteBrigadesummarized

the division's dilemmaconcerningenemyinformation:

[A] reportedconcentrationof 10,000troops SW of ZWOLLE on I Sep

may representa battle scarredpanzer division or two reforming, or
alternatelythe result of the emptyingof ARNHEM and EDE barracks
to make room for fighting troops; though a likely role for the training
units would appearto be digging the WAAL line.
To sum up: there is no direct, recent evidenceon which to base an
estimateof troops in the immediatedivisional area.The capacityof the

746Lewis Golden,EchoesfromArnhem (London: William Kimber,

1984),VI I I, passim.
747PRO,WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division PlanningIntelligence
SummaryNo. 1,6 September1944,
1-2.
PRO,WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division PlanningIntelligenceSummary,10 September1944,2.

418
 normal barracks at ARNHEM, VELP and EDE is nearly 10,000 and
billeting possibilities are considerable; moreover ARNHEM itself, if
the enemy's main defensive line is on the WAAL, will be a vital centre
on his L of C, and will inevitably contain a number of troops which are
out of the line: it will be strongly defended as soon as the line is
manned, but at present may be emptier while the available troops are
digging trenches or conducting their fighting withdrawal from the
ALBERT 749
canal.

Thus, from the perspectiveof the three airborne division commandersnear

week's end, eachhad discomfortingplans, yet eachhopedthat the enemywould not

recoversufficiently to preventhis success.Eachsaw a hazy collageof Germanforces,

lessfrightening than thosearrayedagainstNEPTUNE. Whateverpersonalterrorsthey

had, they led their divisions in planning and rehearsalsas if successwere not just

reachablebut inevitable.

The ground force plan, GARDEN, left less flexibility in execution than the

airborne plan. While dispersionand an attack from the sky might temporarily open

doorsto unforeseenopportunitiesfor the airborne,Dempsey's for

plan called a narrow

sectorattackby three divisions, the centerdivision advancingon a single road. There

was little doubt that the single road, Club Route,was key to GARDEN's successand

the survival of I Airborne Corps, with 30 Corps' survival dependentnot only on

shatteringthe enemy defensethroughout its depth, but on Horrocks' flanks being

coveredin a shortamountof time by 8 and 12 Corps.

30 CorpsOperationsInstructionsNo. 24 replacedthe original COMET ground

plan. At its beginning,it outlined an intelligencepicture estimatingthat:

749PRO,WO 171-393,1 Airborne Division Report,AnnexureD: Para.

I Bde. IntelligenceSummary
No. I dated 13 Sep44,2.

419
 The total German force, including both remnantsof formations now
FRANCE and FLANDERS and reinforcementscoming from
quitting
GERMANY and satellites, is quite inadequateto offer prolonged
resistancealong any line.

While noting a division-sizedforce was probablybeing it

reconstituted, noted

its be poorly trained for antitank work, though it

also that antiaircraft gunnerswould

was estimatedthat:

is
Enough available for every major nodal and water crossing to be
allotted a troop of six 88 mm.
Armoured reservesof more than squadronsize are most unlikely to
the front.750
appear on corps

Horrocks;statedhis intention:

30 Corpswill advancewhen orderedat maximum speedand securethe

areaincl NUNSPELT to excl ARNHEM.
...

in
Armored support regimental strengthwould be attachedto both the 101"'

and 82d upon arrival in their sectors. A second, subsidiary axis was provided part of

the way, making the main axis DIAMOND. The subsidiary, HEART, which ran from

Valkenswaard-Leende-Geldorp-Nunen-Gemert-Volkel, was to be used only by

fighting troops. The intention was to switch traffic temporarily if part of the main

route became unusable. The lead element of 30 Corps, Guards Armoured Division,

was ordered to proceed at maximum speed to Arnhem, to bypass Appeldorn, and to

dominate the area "NUNSPELT to excl APELDORN. " If the major bridges (or

bridge) were lost, 43 Division would assault and bridge the gap. 43 Division would

advance on order at maximum speed, eventually consolidating from Apeldom due

'" PRO,WO 171-341,30CorpsOperationInstructionNo. 24 Operation

"GARDEN," 15Sep44,1;
98-99.ThiscontainsHorrocks'personalordersgivento his
Horrocks,CorpsCommander,

420
 link I Airborne north of Arnhem. The 50thNorthumberlandDivision
south to with

would follow and seize a river crossing over the Ijssel at Doermond.An extensive

751
bridge train was availableon order.

GARDEN differed significantly both in scaleand intent ftom COMET, but in

case the 30 Corps final objective was a bridgeheadover the Rhine, with
each

GARDEN adding an advanceto the Zuider Zee. COMET planneda51 -mile advance

beginning at Eindhoven,GARDEN a 99-mile thrust beginning south of the Belgian-

Netherlandsborder. In the first plan, Dempseyhad planned for a single division

besidesGuardsArmoured and I Airborne to reachbeyondthe Neder Rijn, with the

air-portable52 Lowland Division (to be flown into Deelenairfield) addingperhaps15

miles to the ground requiring capture.In the new plan, both the 43 and 50 Divisions

were addedto GuardsArmoured to form the force north of the I Airborne with the 52

air-landing at Deelen. Under COMET, Horrocks had two mutually supporting

armored divisions in the advance; now he had one, with the flank corps each having

an armored division. Most significantly, HorTocks expected "to roll up the airborne

carpet," with fully 40 of the first 64 miles dominated by airborne troops who would

"pass" the rapidly moving armor forward. As such, and considering the narrowness of

his sector, his Corps was march ordered for a pursuit, not a sustained attack. (See

figure 43.) In COMET, he had expected to advance the first 30 miles without airborne

support, but against neglible resistance and a retreating handful of stragglers or

battered units.

commanderson 16 Septemberat Bourg Leopold. In theseorders,Horrocksstressedthe needto reach I

Airborne in 48 hours if possible.

421
 Only the enemyand weatherseemedthe unknown factors.and weathercould

be predicted and waited upon. Two ULTRA-capableheadquarters,Brereton's First

Allied Airborne Army and Dempsey's Second Army in operational control of

MARKET GARDEN, publisheddaily intelligencesummaries.Of particular note for

intelligencewas the location and size of panzerdivisions. On 13 September,Second

Army noted that 2d and 9th Panzerhad beenlocatedin the US sector,and that 1,9,

10,and 12 SSPanzerdivisions had

been seen in small packets but there is no reason to suppose that any of
these formations is operating or indeed is in condition to operate as a
division at this time. 752

In summarizingenemystrengthsand capabilitiesalong the westernfront, First

Allied Airbome's G-2 made the following assessmenton IS September.

In [the] north, enemy can not be expected to stop [the] Allied drive
over Rhine unless reinforcements are made immediately available. Still
no evidence that anything except remnants 15 Army is arriving in
Holland 753
.

The following day, the FA.AA G-2 addedthe following under"miscellaneoue':

Evidence enemyhas increasedstrengthin line Antwerp-Hasselt.It is

attributable partly to arrival of parachute troops and partly to
754
reappearance of elementsof 15Army.

The published estimates,however,did not reflect every parcel of intelligence

received,nor did they portray the controversythat ragedat various commandlevels.

On IS September,Williams at 21 Army Group spokewith the Lt. Col. Tony Taskerat

'5' Ibid., 2-13. Despitethe designationof elementsof Club Routeas Heartor Diamond,the main road
hasbeenforever rememberedas"Club Route," and its subsidiarygenerallylost to historians.
752RG 24, SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 101, to 2400hrs.13 Sep44,1.
up
713 NARA, RG 331, First Allied Airborne Army G-2 SummaryNo. 12,151715Scp'44,3.

422
First Allied Airborne Army concerning the imminent publication of SHAEF's weekly

summary, noting that elements of two SS panzer divisions were refitting in the

Arnhem area. No firm agreement with SHAEF's assessmentwas reached, with the

Airborne G-2 disbelieving the presence of 10 SS, and Williams accepting that the

headquarters or trace elements might be there but the actual force was

755
unsubstantial.

ULTRA had produceda seriesof clues pointing to the Arnhem area. On 6

Septemberthe key indicator was decryptedregardingthe refit of 58th PanzerCorps

moving to Koblenz, but also ordering H SS Panzer Corps to Army Group B,

transfering it to Eindhoven to direct the rest and refit of 2d, 116th, 9th Panzer

Divisions, and Heavy Assault Gun Abteilung 217. Thesedivisions as well as 10 SS

Panzer were to move to the area Venlo-Arnhern for refit.756On 9 September,9th

Panzer was moved to the Aachen-Liegesector to go into German SeventhArmy

757On 11 September, 10th SS Panzer

reserve. was located east of Maastricht,

to
according a division report dated 5 758
September. The following day, decrypts

indicatedthat the 2d and II 6th PanzerDivisions had migratedto the GermanSeventh

759
Army's front. On 13 September,a decrypt cited orders for Luflotte 3 requesting

flights over the BeeringenBridgeheadto ascertainwhetherthe British

reconnaissance

force stagingtherewould move north, or eastwardtoward Roermond.Simultaneously,

"4 Ibid., G-2 SummaryNo. 13,16 Sep44,3.

711MHI, PoguePapers,Interview with Brig. E.T. Williams.
756Author's possession:Msg XL 9245,060103Z/9/44;seeHinsley,British Intelligence,3, Part.2,
383, fri. 96. This seriesof messagecopiesfrom CARL; originals can be found in PRO,DEFE files.
757Author's
possession:Msg. 090734Z/9/44.
758Author's
possession,Msgs: 112347Z/9/44and 121808Z/9/44.

423
 it was asked if it could ascertainwhether US forces would move north against

760
Maastrichtor eastagainstAachen.

On 15 September,a messagewas decryptedstating that a German nightly

appreciationon 9 Septemberidentified 30 Corps betweenAntwerp and Hasseltand

that a possibleadditionalcorps(army)of up to 14 divisions with 800 to 900 tankswas

moving forward. The Germanestimatewas that the British intendeda thrust on both

sides of Eindhoveninto Arnhem, so a photo reccewas requested.This appreciation

also accounted for a possible attempt to encircle German forces in the western

Netherlandsfrom the areasof Nijmegen and Wesel.761Severaldays later, a further

decrypt clarified that the Germanswere concernedabout identifying whether the

762
major thrust expectedwould go to Arnhem or Aachen. The sameday, another

decrypt revealedthat Army Group B Headquartershad moved to Oosterbeek,four

763
kilometerswest of Arnhem.

At I Airborne Corps, the General Staff Officer 2 (intelligence), Maj. Brian

Urquhart,requestedphoto imagerycoverageon 12 Septemberthat was returnedon the

15'h,with a series of low-oblique photos showing

German tanks and armored vehicles within easy range of the I

Airborne Division's main droppingzone.

'" Hinsley, British Intelligence.3,

part. 2,383.
'60Author's possession,Msg:130241Z/9/44.
761Author's possession:Msg: 151612Z/9/44.
762Author's possession,Msg; HP 9 131313Z/9/44.
763Author's possession,Msg: HP 220,15 Sep44; seealso Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part.2,385,
fn. 108.

424
 Already distraughtover what he felt was an ill-conceived operation,Urquhart

was relieved and placed on medical leave after an impassioneddiscussion with

764
Browning, who did not act on what he felt was inconclusive.

Beginning 14 September,two telegramswere dispatchedto what the resistance

to
referred as "British "
Central, the intelligence clearing and decoding organization

that operated under M16. The first telegram was received and decrypted on 15

September,the seconda day later.The text of the first said:

Evaluation B. with following text: SS Hohenstaufl[sic]along Yssel.

Units from this division noticed from ARNHEM to ZUPTHEN and
along road ZUPTHEN-APELDORN. H.Q. perhapsat EE[F]DE. Field
Fortifications arebeingbuilt alongYSSEL.

The secondtelegram,decrypted.
on the 16th stated:
,

Eval. B. text: Ref Telegram of 151hSeptember at Arnhem. Meldekopf

[Kampfgruppen] Hohenstaufl., This is the assembly place of members
of the SS Division previously reported. Also at Arnhem Meldekopf
[Kampfgruppen] Harzer presumably forming part of a unit situated
south of Arnhem.

The secondmessagewas garbledin decryptionand was correctedverbally by phone

in London. 765
with Dutch representatives No record has been found to indicate that

either messagewas forwarded to 21 Army Group.

764Brian Urquhart,A Life in Peaceand War (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,1987),72,73.
Urquhart sayshe was surprisedby a commenton the 9' and 10' SS Panzcrasrefitting in the Arnhem
area,a fact he sayswas confirmedby the Dutch Resistance.This could only have beenthe 12
SeptemberIntelligenceSummary,which did not locatethem in the Arnhem area,RAF Narrative. IV,
147,reportsthat limited air reconnaissance was flown due to weatherand statesthat "tactical air
reconnaissances were carriedout over the proposedairbornelanding zonesbut they appearedto have
yielded little, if any, useful information aboutmovementsof the enemy." Urquhart's"Dutch source,"
moreover,hasnot beenverified by documents.Moreover,it is uncertainand improbablethat I
Airborne Corpshad a Dutch liaison officer during the planningphasewho might havepassedon the
information. No suchwritten intelligencefrom the Dutch appearsin 21 Army Group or 2 Army
records.
764PRO,CAB 106-1133,Correspondence, NetherlandsMilitary Attacheto the CabinetOffice, 30"
March 1953.

425
 SHAEF publishedWeekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 26 for the week ending

16 September,the day beforeMARKET GARDEN's scheduledstart. Hidden on page

7, the following appreciationwasoffered:

First ParachuteArmy has energeticallytaken over the ANTWERP-

HASSELT Sectorfrom C-in-C NETHERLANDS. but has contributed
little more than the glamour of its name,that little being remnantsof
the two or threeparachutedivisions.
Seventh Army was late in getting reinforcementsbut it has now
received9 PanzerDivision, to someextentrefitted, from the SOUTH.
and also one panzerbrigade,with probably more infantry to come as
the threat to the Fatherland develops in this area. Moreover 2 SS
Panzer Division, and perhaps I SS Panzer also, have come off
comparativelywell in the way of tank replacements,though 12 SS
Panzer remains very shadowy. 9 SS Panzer Division, and with it
presumably 10, has been reported as withdrawing altogether to the
Arnhem area ofHOLLAND: there theywillprobably both collect some
depot in CLEVES. 766
new lanksfrom the reported the area of

The accompanying order-of-battle map marked 11 SS Panzer Corps as

"unlocated, " but centered it near Eindhoven. The larger-scale map graphics of the

entire front located the corps at the Dutch-Germanborder between Munster and

Osnabruck. The assessmentfor the nominal strength of the 14 Panzer/Panzer

GrenadierDivisions in the west was a probableequivalentof five divisions. The 31

infantry divisions locatedon the front were equatedto 2 1. The four divisions of First

Parachute Army facing Second Anny were rated as equaling three infantry
767
divisions. Citing enemy losseson all fronts in the west as amounting to about

900,000men,the G-2 statedflatly that:

766SHAEF Weekly IntelligenceSummaryNo. 26 for

the weekending 16 September1944,7. Italics arc
author's.
767
Ibid., 6.

426
 No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counter-
defensive.768
offensiveor evena successful

Browning's own instructions,issuedon 13 September,were not unrealistic in

their assessment
of enemyarmor in the entire MARKET areaand should be seenas

the bestlarge-pictureestimateavailableto the divisionsthat would fight:

The enemy is fighting determinedly along the general line of ALBERT

and ESCAUT canals from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive
MAASTRICHT. His line is held by the remnants of some good
divisions, and by new arrivals from HOLLAND. They are fighting well
but have few reserves. The total armoured strength is probably not
more than 50-100 tanks, mostly Mark IV. There is every sign of the
enemy strengthening the defences of the river and canal lines through
ARNHEM and NUMEGEN, especially with flak, but the troops
manning them are not numerous and many are of low category. The
flak 169
is sited for dual purposerole-both AA andground
.

On the 16 September, Dempsey sent Browning his final instructions,

confirming their understandingof the plan and adding, "My very best wishesto you

and all your splendid chaps." 30 Corps would begin its advance "seventy minutes after
770
10 1 startsto drop. ,

At 1630hours on 16 September,the staff weatherofficer issuedhis four-day

forecastfor southernEngland,the North Sea,and the battle area.Basedon adequate

771
conditionspredicted,Breretongavethe greenlight for MARKET .

768Ibid., 8. This is a far cry from the panickedassessment

claimedby CorneliusRyanand othersthat
promptedStrongand Smith to fly to seeMontgomery.Ryan,A Bridge TooFar, 157-159;Strong,
Intelligenceat the Top, 149.
769CARL, R-11583,HQ/AIRTPS/TS,13 Sep44, OperationsInstructionNo. 1,1.
"o PRO,WO 285-15, Headquarters,SecondArmy, 16 Sep44, Ltr. Dempseyto Browning.
771PRO,WO205/623,Headquarters,First Allied Airborne Army, Office of Staff WeatherOfficer, 16
Sep44; PRO 205-693,OperationMarket Garden,Weather,1-3. While the weatherappearedmarginal,
it was considered"good for the time of year," with somecloudsand morning fog.

427
 MARKET's air programbeganthe night of 16/17 September
as 282 bombers

from RAF Bomber Commandhit flak positions along the northernroute along with

During the morning of 17 100

September, RAF bombers struck
selectedairfields.
Walcheren, 852 bombers from Eighth Air
coastal batteries and shipping near and

Force attacked 112 flak positions along both routes to be used by the troop carriers

and glider tows. A total of 1,546aircraft and 478 gliders comprisedthe air train that

dropping 1300 hours. Pathfinders had

began parachute troops at approximately

drop landing 772

before. In 80 minutes' time, a total
markedselected and zonesshortly

by further 13,781landedby glider in the first

of 16,500troops arrived parachuteand a

3,690
lift. Subsequently, into
more parachuted the battle areaand a further 905 flew in

773
by airplane,making a total of 34,876troopsdeliveredby air.

The air landings achieved complete tactical surprise. Transports and men

suffered few lossesen route to the battle area.As Browning had stated,the operation

would have to succeed,"bottom to top," making the early seizure of the 101"

Airborne Division's objectives essentialto 30 Corps' rapid movement.(See figure

49.) Assault teamsfrom the 506thParachuteInfantry on DZ "B" left without waiting

for unit assembly to move toward the Zon bridge and two smaller bridges, an

estimated2.5 miles away. Scattered

enemyresistance
was met. Arriving to within 100

yards of the bridge almost three hours after the drop, the assaultteam watchedthe

Germansdestroy the bridge by demolition. Some troops swam the canal, and the

712Wesley Frank Cravenand JamesLea Cate, TheArmy Air Forcesin World War 11,Vol. 111,Europe:
ARGUMENTto VE-Day,Januaq 1944to May 1945(Washington:Office of Air ForceHistory, 1988),
603-604;RAF Narrative, IV, 145-150.
773CARL, N-5787-1, Hqs. First Allied Airborne Army: Allied Airborne OperationsIn Holland
September-October1944,2.

428
entire 506th Regiment held a 2,000-yard-deepbridgehead south of the canal by

midnight.

The 502d ParachuteInfantry on DZ "C" took two hours to assemblebefore

marchingon St. Oderodeandseizedthe bridge over the Dommel after a skirmish. One

company sent to the Best bridge was driven off by counterattackafter initially

capturingthe bridge.

Landingon DZ "A" and on an unplannedareato the north, the 501" Parachute

Infantry seizedthe two highway bridgesand two rail bridges spanningthe Aa River

and the Willems Vaart Canal.While someresistancewas met, all objectivesand the

774
town of Vechelwerecaptured.

The 82d Airborne Division beganits drop at 1305and completeddropping its

regimentsby 1328.(Seefigure 50.) The 505thParachuteInfantry madea compactdrop

landing on DZ "N. " It was taskedto seizethe town of Groesbeekand the key ridge

dominatingthe division area,as well as to block the approachesto the southand east

of the division. The 508th ParachuteInfantry, tasked to send a battalion to the

Nijmegen bridge and to protectthe westernflank of the division, failed in their bridge

mission. The 504thParachuteInfantry, landingon DZ "0, " fannedout to seizebridges

over the Maas Waal Canal at Heuman (bridge 7) and Blankenberg(bridge 8.) One

companywas droppedeastof the river and seizedthe key Gravebridge. The bridges

774101" Airborne Market Annex No. 4; Tactical Operationsof the Division, 1.

429
at Hattert (bridge 9) and Honinghute (bridge 10) were also the objectives of assault

intact. 775
detachments. Only bridge 7 over the canal was captured

I Airborne Division's assault,led by I Airlanding Brigade, began with the

153 Horsa to
gliders arrive on LZ "S" beginningat 1300hours. (See figure
releaseof

5 1.) Thesewere followed by 154Horsaand 13 Hamilcar gliders landing on LZ "Z. " I

ParachuteBrigade began dropping on DZ "X' at 1355 hours. Consolidating their

landings,the bulk of the divisional reccesquadronand the three parachutebattalions

began moving on separateroutes to the Arnhem bridge, their plan being to have 2

ParachuteBattalion capturethe bridge while the 3 ParachutýBattalion assistedfrom a

northerly axis. 2 Para was also to capture the rail bridge and pontoon bridge, if

possible,along the way. I Battalion

Parachute was to hold the high groundjust north
776
Arnhem. Landing to SS training battalion, two of the battalionsand part
of next an

of the recce squadron were embroiled in a series of ambushes,with only one

parachutebattalion, a troop of antitank guns, engineers,signals, and the brigade

headquartersdetachmenteventually reaching the north end of the Arnhem road

777
bridge.The Germansdestroyedthe pontoonbridge and the rail bridge.

The H SS PanzerCorps, noted to be refitting in the Arnhem area, had the

remnants of two formations, 9 SS "Hohenstaufen"and 10 SS "

"Frundsberg. (See

figure 52.) Both were no more than brigadegroup strength,about 3,000-3,500 men

but with about an equalnumberof men availablein combatservicesupportelements.

7" NARA, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 12344,Opn Market-82dAbn Div Narrative, 1944,1-3. It should
be notedthat the "coup de main" drop zone for the Gravebridge wasnot approvedduring the planning
phaseby IX Troop Carrier Command.It was-coordinated"betweenthe transportpilots and the
regimentalcommanderjust prior to the actualdrop.
"6 1 Airborne Division Report,Annexure 'N', "Story of the I ParachuteBrigade." 1.

430
Hohenstaufenwas then bereft of tanks and, Frundsberg'sstrengtheventuallyrose to

about 50 tanks. Both received orders quickly for immediate action, with 9 SS to

remain and defend Arnhem, and 10 SS to move southwards,

occupy the Nijmegen

road and rail bridges,and defendthe town. With no coup-de-mainforce holding and

blocking the bridges,this action negatedthe surpriseachievedby the initial parachute

drops and ensuredNijmegen's reinforcementfrom the north while splitting the Allies

778
by occupyingthe "island" betweenNijmegenandArnhem.

Initially, both the 101" and 82d met scattered resistance and, at least

temporarily, had numerical superiority in each of their sectors. Critical to their

survival would be the rapid penetrationof the "crusf' separatingthem from 30 Corps

and the transit of GuardsArmoured Division. In eachsector,a major water obstacle

blocked movement.The Zon bridge was gone, and the alternative bridge over the

canal at Best was in enemyhands.The Nijmegen bridgeswere in enemyhands.The

Arnhem bridge was blocked from the south. Dempseyhad believed that reaching

Arnhem would be an operationrangingfrom two to five days,but everythinghad been

predicated on complete "carpets" south of Nijmegen to Eindhoven and the

777Ibid.; Frost,A Drop TooMany, Chapter15.

778Wilhelm Ticke, In the Firestormofthe Last Years
ofthe War: /1. SS-Panzel-k-orpswith the 9. and
10. SS-Divisions"Hohenstaufen" and "Frundsberg" (Winnipeg:J.J. FedorowiczPublishing,1999),
222-233;RobertJ. Kershaw, "It NeverSnowsin September": TheGerman ViewofMARKET-
GARDENand the Battle ofArnhem, September1944(Surrey:Ian Allen, 1994),321-322,326-327;J.
Dugdale,PanzerDivisions, PanzerGrenadierDivisions,PanzerBrigadesofthe Arm and lVaflenSSin
West, Autumn 1944-February 1945.ARDENNES NORDWIND. Their ,v
Detailed
the and and Precise
Strengthsand Organisations,VolumeI [Part /J September1944Refitting and Re-equipment(London:
GalagoPublishing,2000), 77-93; Marcel Zwarts, GermanArmored Units at Arnhem.September1944
(Hong Kong: ConcordPublicationsCo., 2001), passim.AssessingGermanstrengthis difficult because
of the constantreinforcementgiven to the major formationsduring the battle. Kershawattemptsto
provide a daily order of battle with strengthsapproximated.Zwartsoffers several-snapshots"but does
explain the differencesin combatand supportstrengths.The issueof numbersreinforcesGeneral
Hackett's commentsconcerningbuilding combatcapabilities.(Seefn 787.)

431
 the bridges779
The the American division
simultaneoustaking of major . airmen and

commandershad negated this plan; the replacementconcept of "moving to the

objectives"from a tight airheadwas too slow for the task.

Horrocks announcedhis attack time upon notification of I Airborne Corps'

takeoff. Zero hour designated at 1435 following preparatory fires begining at

was

1400.30 Corps "rolled up" behind a 350-gun moving barrage centering on Club

Route, with 5 (Guards) Armoured Brigade leading the division. Guards Armoured

planned its in
advance two phases.Phase one would be the initial advance and capture

of Valkenswaard. Two battalions supplied by the 50 (N) division would cover the

flanks of the advance. The division expected to concentrate south of Eindhoven until

to "bound" forward through the 101" Airborne. Phase Il would constitute the
ordered

final two brigades "up" beginning at first light on

advance toward the objective with

D+I 780
With nightfall at 1847and total darknessat 2005,the division intendedto halt
.
for the first night.

Once past the last fall of artillery shot, Guards Armoured rapidly met

losing
resistance, nine tanks quickly in While
ambush. rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft

flying in a "cab rank" of continuousflights to supportthe armor, did much to advance

the column, Valkenswaard,where Adair had planned to harbor his lead units until

daylight, was not reacheduntil dark. The following day Guards Armoured pressed

779Urquhart,Arnhem,4; FAAA, Airborne Operationsin Holland. 1, Major GeneralSir A] Ian Adair. A

Guards'General. TheMemoirsofMajor GeneralSirAllan Adair (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986),
162-164.The FAAA Reportnotesthat Dempseyexpectedto reachthe Zuider Zee in 2-5 days,and to
link with I Airborne Division betweenD+I and D+3.
'80CARL, R-13333,21 Army Group Operation"MARKET GARDEN" 17-26Sept 1944[hereafter
referredto as21 Army Group MARKET GARDEN];Appendix L to part 11,Extractsfrom Guards
Armoured Div 0.0. No. 12,15 Sep44,93-95; Section8: 30 CorpsOperations17 September.37-39;

432
 toward Eindhoven,where it linked with the airborneat 1700hours. One brigadehad

unsuccessfullyattemptedto bypass Eindhoven, and the airborne, failing to gain a

bridge at Zon, had attackedagain at Best, where the bridge was finally destroyedby

the Germans.A new bridge was rapidly built at Zon during the night, and tanksrolled

it
forward on at first light, 0615, 19 781
September.
on

GuardsArmoured had been opposedby "the Regimentvon Hoffman." The

101" had correctly identified one kampfgruppefrom the 10 SS Panzerthat had been

attachedto the First Parachute

Army and providedits only real armor supportwith 15

Mk IV selfpropelledpanzeýaegerantitankguns,a motorizedbatteryof field guns,and

a collection of "regiments." Along the road, the Germansestablisheda series of

"blocks" in depth; Valkenswaardhad been the second.Two others awaited on 18

September, one in Aalst and another at Eindhoven, both delaying Guards Armoured

from reaching the 101st. The necessity to build bridge

a at Zon negated the "second
bound" plan, which had been meant to take them through to the Nijmegen bridge
and

beyond.782

The second day's thrust by 30 Corps was threatened by moves not yet seen.

The road running northwest from Eindhoven to Utrecht, west of Arnhem, marked the

sectors of three "divisions, " really brigade-size kampfgruppen, running from south to

north, the 85th, 245th, and 59th. Student deployed the 59th against the 101"" western

PRO WO 171/605,War Diary 5' Armoured Brigade,GuardsArmoured Division, Sep 17'. Brigadier
Gwatkin credits"Typhoons" with -wonderful assistance.
"
781
SecondArm History, 220-221.
*v
782Kershaw,It NeverSnows,
situationmap facing 192;chapters,2,3, and 7.

433
and northwestern flanks, holding Best and threatening the division's drop zones. The

h
85, and 245thlay in Ritchie's path.

GARDEN's flank corpsweremeantto draw off enemyreservesfrom attacking

Club Route. (See figure 53.) O'Connor's 8 Corps launcheda night crossing of the

Escautcanaleastof 30 Corps' boundaryto pass3 Division, whosetask was to extend

to the northeast,reachinga depth of approximately10 miles. 0' Connor intended,at

that point, to launch II ArmouredDivision to the areaeastof Eindhovenborderedby

Deurne-Helmond.Besidesbroadeningthe baseof Dempsey'sattack, 8 Corps would

move on order to the Maas, covering 30 Corps. Commencingat midnight on 18

September,3 Division (which had motor-marched300 miles from France on 17

September)launchedits attack lessthan 18 hoursafter arriving in sector.At the same

time, 50 (N) Division was transferred to 8 Corps, to continue developing security in

depth for Horrocks' attack, but now under O'Connor's supervision. II Armoured

passed through the bridgehead by noon on 19 September, with recce moving toward

783
the objective area.

Lt. Gen. N.E. Ritchie's 12 Corps was to widen the attack approximately 15

miles to the west, launchinga night crossingof the EscautCanalby 53 (W) Division

at Lommel.during the night of 17 Septemberto protect30 Corps' flank and to prevent

the enemyfrom attemptinga breakouteastwardtoward Germany.(Seefigure 54.) The

15 (H) Division was to expand the Gheel bridgehead,and Ritchie was to pass 7

Armoured Division on order to seizethe areaborderedby Boxtel, Hertogenbosch,

and

'83Second Anny Histo)31,244-246.

434
 Tilburg. 12 Corps met considerableopposition,and by the end of 19 September.no
784
progresswas madetoward contactingthe 101" flank
southwest .

Montgomeryknew by nightfall on 17 Septemberthat his plan for seizing the

bridges had only partially succeeded,but considering the expected growing

opposition,he felt that "we had madea very good beginning" Dempseybelieved that

the airborne operation was developing satisfactorily, as had Guards Armoured's

attack He met with the three corps commanderson the morning of 18 Septemberto

arrange for O'Connor's takeover of 30 Corps' rear areas. Dempsey's intelligence

called the current operation "a parallel-in-reverse"of the 1940 aerial invasion of

Holland, hinting that signalsintelligencehad receiveda plethoraof information from

enemy reporting the airborne drops. Intelligence

the no-longer-security-conscious

further noted elementsof the 9 SS and 10 SS PanzerDivisions as "new in the canal

area," and noted:

There are reportedto be two battle groups,eachof roughly a battalion

strength,under the commandof anotherbattle group carrying the title
10 SS Div FRUNDSBERG.They are unlikely to haveany heavytanks
with them, certainlyno appreciablenumber.'85

Dempsey'sG-2 further assessedthat the bulk of the replacementsof quality

had gone to meet Patton's thrust, and secondarilyto the Aachen sector during the

previous fortnight. Noting that parrying the Holland thrust by SecondArmy would

in
requirerisk other sectors,he stated:

[I]t is consideredunlikely that any large scale reinforcementscan be

made available, and the battle now joined will be fought out by the

7"
Ibid., 240-242.
78
.5SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 105,up to 2400 hrs. 17 Sep44,1.

435
 sometroops south
troops on the ground,with the uncertainaddition of786
of the River Scheldt.They will not amountto much.

That "uncertain addition, " the unknown factor, had been the crux of the

intelligence problem in predicting German capabilities. A new pattern of German

replacement, reinforcement, rehabilitation, and almost "spontaneous regeneration" of

combat power would emerge to tip the scales significantly. Intelligence had for weeks

located headquarters and enumerated rapidly growing numbers of stragglers pouring

into Germany. That these could be made into combat-effective formations in a matter

of weeks or sometimes days, challenged the entire belief system of the Allied

generals. These "new" units now began to appear throughout Holland and indeed the

Western Front. 787

entire

While Dempseynoted,consistently,"dull, rain" in his daily diary, the weather

had more ominous meaning for MARKET. Brereton had delayed the morning

operation on D+I due to predicted fog, reschedulingair operationsto arrive over

Holland in mid-aftemoon.This lift, comprising 1,360troop carriersand 1,203gliders,

brought in the glider supportunits for the 101", the glider regimentof the 82d, the 4

ParachuteBrigade, and the remainder of the Airlanding Brigade for I Airborne.

116Ibid., 2.
'8' In his interview
with the authorat Fort Leavenworth,Sir John Hackettdescribedthe remarkable
efficiency of the Germansoldier. He notedthat given a largebody of Germanstragglersinsertedbelow
a headquarterselement,thesetroopscould begin to function like a trainedunit in a short amountof
time. While obviously not equalto picked, highly trainedtroops,they fought extremelywell and
aggressively.One commentthat was telling was,"You havenever fought in a [real) war, until you
have fought Germans." It wasthe disbelief of professionalsin both the Americanand British Army,
that units could literally be -reborn" so rapidly after battlethat madetheir estimatesof German
strengthand capabilitiesso erroneous.The fact that someGermanunits had membersdrawn from the
shellsof as many severaldozenformationsalsoperplexedG-2s who trackedprisonersfrom thesenew
kampfgruppenby their paybooks.The reality they refusedto acceptwasthat many times the Allies
were meetingnot -stragglers"but new rehabilitatedunits.

436
 788
Supplieswere also dropped. While the delayprovedindecisiveto eitherthe 101" or

the 82d, it severelyhamperedthe now encircled I Airborne Division and slowed its

move toward Arnhem while the enemy simultaneously massed against it.

Additionally, Brereton's decision stopped83 Group from flying close support, the

decisionhaving beenmadeto keep only one air mission,resupplyor tactical, aloft at

one time. While the transportswaited for the fog to lift, the tactical air forces on the

found 789
themselvesgroundedby orders.
continent

Moreover, communicationsbetweenthe air missions proved disastrous.Air

requestsfrom the MARKET areawere sentvia Londonto 2 TAF in Brusselsand then

on to 83 Group;thereapparentlywas no direct link. The impendingbreakupof AEAF,

the move forward of the Air C-in-C, Leigh Mallory, to Granville to be near

Eisenhower,the lack of interest of the Deputy SupremeCommander,Tedder, in the

largest airborne operation in history, and the remarkably

poor communicationsthat

plaguedSecondArmy's air links, seemedto divorce the "air weapon" of the Tactical

Air Forcesfrom the ground battle. First Allied Airborne Army gave the air delivery

788FAAA, Allied Airborne Operationsin Holland, 8; Warren,Airborne Operations.EuropeanTheater,

117-118;
789RAF Narrative, IV, 151; PROWO 171/208,SecondArmy "G" Ops-OpnsLog, SecondArmy Air
SupportNotesNo. 85,85,87, Sept 17-19;PROCAB 101/316,Air OperationsAllied Expeditionary
Air Forces,17'-30 September1944/includingCloseAir Supportto 30 Corps; SecondArmy notesof
sortiesfor the first threedaysare:230 in supportof 2 Army and 86 asarmedrcccc; on 18 September,
173of 263 flown were over MARKET area;73 sortieswere flown but resultswere nil due to weather.
Only two armedrcccemissionswere flown north of Arnhem.The air supportfor MARKET GARDEN
was poorly coordinatedby the numerousairmeninvolved. Brereton'sinsistenceon being the "air space
manager"[in modemterms] often left the GARDEN forcesand indeedthe MARKET forceswithout
closeair support.Breretoninsistedthat no tactical missionscould be flown while air transportswere in
the sky-essentially eliminating many of the benefitsof air superiorityover the battlefield. Apparently,
changesin air reschedulingwere sentto 2 TAF without time to react,evenwhen decisionswere made
the eveningbefore by Brereton.83 Group flew 550 sortieson D-Day [seeChapterII for discussion].

437
role top priority-, they saw little immediacyin the problemsof the GARDEN force in

790
competitionwith their own transportschedule.

Indeed,the airborne's ground battle beganchangingrapidly, and air support

would havebeenwelcome.The 101" clearedEindhovenof a battalion of Germansby

noon on D+I, reachingthe group of bridges south of the town. A link- with Guards

Armoured was madebeforedark, and a bailey bridge built during the night to replace

the blown structure.Passingthe division forward, GuardsArmoured reachedGrave.

30 miles away, by 0820. (See figure 55.) Damageto bridge 10 (Hotinghue) caused

Club Route to be directedvia the HeumanBridge, bridge 7, then via Groesbeekto

Nijmegen. The Nijmegen bridge had not been captured,and Browning, Adair, and

Gavin met at noon to coordinatea combinedattack to clear Nijmegen and seize the

bridge over the Waal. While the corridor from Zon to Grave remainedclear, enemy

activity on both the 101" northwestflank and the 82d eastflank portendedthe grave

operationalproblem now facing MARKET GARDEN.

The presenceof Model at Army Group B, Studentat First ParachuteArmy,

and Bittrich at II SS PanzerCorpsprovided a clear, concertedview and plan for how

to squeeze,cut off, and eradicateboth the airborne and ground elementspiecemeal.

Theseactions,thoughput in train early in the operation(in late afternoonon the 17,h)

were clear by 19 September.While probably benefitting from the capture of a

completeMARKET plan from a downedUS glider during the first lift-presented to

790CAB 101/332,Notesfor Air Chief MarshalSir RalphCochranefrom Air Chief MarshalSir Harry
Broadhurston the Tactical Air ForceOperationsin Normandy,3,4, Coningham,OperationsofSecond
TacticalAir Force, 28; Leigh Mallory, Despatch,77-79; CharlesCarrington,Soldier at Bomber
Command(London: Leo Cooper, 1987), 177-181.

438
Studentwithin hours of the landing-the Germanresponsewas more than likely the
791
doctrinal responseof threelike-thinking, seasoned,
combatcommanders.

As GuardsArmouredlinked with Gavin's men on the road betweenGraveand

Heuman,regimentsfrom the 59thDivision pressedthe 101" at Best, at the Zonche

forest, and along the Zuid Willems Canal between Schindel and Veghel. East of

Grosbeek,elementsof the 406thDivision coming from the ReichswaldForestpressed

the GroesbeekRidge and drop-zoneareas,as well as attackingfrom the southeastat

Mook. Meanwhile,reinforcementsfrom 10 SS"Frundsberg"rafted acrossthe river to

bypassLt. Col. John Frost's block at Arnhem, and then proceededsouth acrossthe

NijmegenBridge to reinforcethe town.792

While GARDEN had the benefit of two corps beginning their attacks to

provide the threat to the enemy'ssouth flank-and neither the 101'"nor the 82d were

in dangerof being overrun as British armoredregimentssoon were to be attachedto

each to bolster their threatenedflanks-I Airborne was effectively boxed and the

elementat the Arnhem bridge isolatedfrom any relief by the division. Building on the

effective temporary block laid by SS Battalion Kraft near Wolfheze, 9 SS

791NARA, RG 319, "R-Manuscripts," MS R-5, Lucian Hechlcr,Invasionfrom the Shy,Research

Section,Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953,2742; MacDonald,SiegfriedLine Campaign,
141-143.The "W' Serieswere researchstudiesof the campaignusingGermandocumentsto
supplementthe researchand narrativesof the US Official Historians.
792Kershaw,It NeverSnows,Situationmap: Situationwithin the Airborne Corridor 18-19September
1944,VIII, IX, X, passim;Warren,Airborne Operations.EuropeanTheater,130;21 Armv Group
MARKETGARDEN,44-47; FAAA, AlliedAirborne Operationsin Holland, 9-11. Gavin indicatedto
the authorthat he had worried aboutarmor in the Reichswaldforestand had sentpatrolslooking for it.
His G-3, Major (later Lt. Gen.) JohnNorton, told the authorduring an interview that Browning, who
spentmost of his time at the 82d commandpost, was likewise concernedaboutthe division's east
(right) flank, and had cautionedGavin not to pressthe attackin Nijmegenon the 18that the expenseof
losing the high ground.This, of course,wasreversedwhen GuardsArmouredarrived. Both men were
reactingto unconfirmed"reports" of a tank depotin the vicinity of Cleve. Browning had told Gavin on
the eveningof the 18' that Nijmegenbridge shouldbe takenby dark on the 19' or latestearly on the
20'. This wasbasedon GuardsArmoured arriving on the 19'.

439
Hohenstaufen had effectively built a "sperrlinie" (literally, obstacle line). which had

held I Parachute Brigade at Arnhem's town limits. (See figure 56.) Meanwhile,

division of kampfgruppen, Division von Tettau, formed west of I

another ersatz

Airborne's drop zones. At the time of the second lift on 18 September, they had begun

to move eastward across Drop Zone "Y, " while additional kampfgruppen to the south

compressed the I Airborne area both from the river and off the original drop zones.

While 4 Parachute Brigade's drop had been taken under fire, many of the Dutch SS

were routed by Hackett's troops, and the Von Tettau attack was halted until 19

793
September.

This did not alleviate I Airborne's peril. While the division commanderwas

temporarily isolated during I ParachuteBrigade's unsuccessfulattempt to enter

Arnhem, the arrival of Hackett'sbrigadedid not signal a neededfresh estimateof the

airborne's mission. Believing the full three brigadescould still move to the river, the

division's acting commandermoved Hackett's brigadetoward its original objectives

north of Arnhem, while the Airlanding Brigade attemptedto hold back Von Tettau

while somehow reinforcing I ParachuteBrigade's move to the bridge. Failing

immediately, this resultedin the compressionof I Airborne Division into a "kessel"

(cauldronor pocket)centeringon Osterbeek,with I Airborne's new headquarterssited

a few minutes' walk from where Model had beenoustedon 17 Septemberwhen the

parachutedrops began. Returning to his division, Urquhart found two disastrous

occurrenceshad happened.First, the high groundof Westerbouwinghad not beenheld

as "vital ground" due to the intendedmove of the division eastward,and second,the

'" Kershaw,/I NeverSnows,Situation

maps,Formationof Kampfgruppevon Tettau,and Arrival of

440
ferry at Heavedorp, below Westerbouwing, had drifted away. Both the division and 2

Para were now isolated, both from each other and from any help coming from south of

Neder Rijn. 794

the

Weather continuedto plague MARKET, as did routing shifts. Brereton had

his
compressed air missionsinto following
a single stream, the northernroute on D+1

due to enemyaction, and now shifted all missionsto the southernroute on D+2 for

While
simile.r reasons. this causedplanning confusion, it also lengthenedthe arrival

times-times that werealso later in the day.Both lifts arrived too late to be committed

to battle on arrival day. Weather,however, cancelledmany air missions,with only

half for the 101" being flown, most of the 82d's being canceled,and somegliders of

the Polish Brigade arriving north of the river with heavy losses on arrival in the

ongoing battle. Two of the cancellationswere noteworthy:The 82d was to receivea

second glider battalion on 19 September,and the Polish Airborne Brigade was

planned to land on Drop Zone "K7 south of Arnhem bridge. Given the critical

shortageof infantry at Nijmegen and the disastrousisolation of 2 Paraat Arnhem, the

now teeteringtactical situation north of the Neder Rijn was not to receive even the
795
problematic"help" of thesetwo landings.

SecondLift at Ginkel Heath.

7" Interview with Sir John Hackett, 1983.Hackettnotedthat Urquhart'sabsencewas critical in that the
importanceof Westerbouwing-would never" haveescapedUrquhart.In retrospect,Hackettfelt the
failure to retain this grounddoomedthe division, though it was not apparentto him or the other
brigadicrsat the time. The original plan did makeprovision to secureferries and barges.The daily
situationoverlaysreproducedfrom the I Airborne Reportin Urquhart'sbook show the compressionof
the division into a perimeterfrom its attackstance.SeeUrquhart,Arnhem,44,78,94,102,118.
... Warren,Airborne Operations,European Theater,127-133.Warrennotesthat the original drop
plannedfor the Polishbrigadewould havearrived at 1000hours,severalhoursbeforeGermanarmor
beganreducing Frost's positionsnorth of the bridge. However,droppingthe Poleson the original Drop
Zone "K" might haveled to the slaughterof the paras,asthe southernend of the bridge was held by
elementsof 10 SS.

441
 Dempseyand Montgomery met on 19 Septenberto discussthe operational

situation, but Montgomery was ft*g to managemultiple problems-, dealing with

Crerar by phone in an attempt to speedup the ongoing attack on Boulogne and to

develop a thrust to open Antwerp, and communicatingwith Eisenhower,who now

for Monty's future Tý6 Still, throughout

suddenlywrote asking views on operations

their meeting,neither Monty nor Dempseypredicteddisaster.The Nijmegen bridge.

not takenby 19 September,

was the key to both I Airborne's survival and the viability

of the original plan. Dempsey's flank corps were slowly developing momentum.

Williams, at 21 Army Group, repeated his theme that preventing Allied use of

Antwerp was the Germans' most effective defense for the homeland, but

Montgomery's G-2 offered little on the developingtactical situation.He did note:

Hohenstaufendivision is located along the Yssel, with units from

Arnhem to Zupthen, and along the road Zutphen-Apeldornand Hq.
Possibly at Eede. 9SS Division has been missing for some time. A
mixed battle group Frundsberg of 9 and 10 SS was identified yesterday
South of Eindhoven:so theremay be sometruth in this report; but the
division cannotbe in a very formidablestate.797

Dempsey's intelligence section did not add gloom, stating in their 18 September

report:

There is no reasonto supposethat he [the enemy] has anything worse

in storefor us than we havemet so far, andnothing of divisional size is
798
likely to appearjust yet.

"'* MontgomeryLog, 19 September.Eisenhower'scommentswill be coveredin Chapter10.

71721 Army Group IntelligenceReviewNo. 160,18 Sep44,2. This array was generallyaccurateprior
to 17 September;sincethe airbornedrop 9 SShad formedto fight I Airborne; Hinsley, British
Intelligence,3, Part2, doesnot discussthis intelligenceasit underscoresthat the first actualusable
dispositionsproducedby ULTRA were after the operationbegan,and in fact, were not accurateon the
day delivered.Had they beendeliveredin this detail two daysbefore,no one could have ignoredthem.
'98SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 106,up to 2400 hrs. 18 Sep44,2. Noteworthy is the
assessment in Order of Battle locationsof the 9 SSand 10 SSlisted asbattalionstrength,11.

442
 The followin, day's appreciationbeganalmostasa cheer:
..

Right, left and centrethe enemyhas had the worst of the day, and on
799
all sectorsof [the] SecondArmy front thereare successes
to record.

While casually mentioning that the Arnhem bridge could "not be held," the

assessmentof the corridor leading from the original bridgeheadto Nijmegen was

remarkablysanguine,noting that though the enemyno doubt would try to break the

link, the effort to mount a large counterattackhad been spent instead to keep the

airborne groups separated.Citing the presenceof the boundariesbetweenthe First

ParachuteArmy and C-in-C Netherlands,the G-2 wrongly assessedthat it would be

800
difficult to coordinatebattle armngements.

As this summarywas being distributed,the situationbelied its content.From

the Germanperspective,threeSchwerpunktexisted:one north of the NederRijn at the

OsterbeekPerimeter,one at Nijmegen, wherethe defense the Nijmegen bridge

of and
the blocking of the road north was critical; and one southof the Waal, which might be

seenas the entire length of 30 Corps' corridor northward.Major efforts were mounted

againstthe Allies in all threesectors.

On 19 and 20 September,the 107thPanzerBrigade at Zon

and elementsof Il
FalschirmjaegerCorps,basedat Cleve, launchedattacks.Coming out of the eastwith

a tank raid, the enemywas driven off at dark on the I 9that Zon. This early raid was

developedinto a larger attack at the samespot at dawn on 20 September,when the

107th reappearedto attack and temporarily control by fire the area around the Zon

bailey bridge.The 107thwas driven off by tanksfrom GuardsArmouredDivision; this

SecondArmy IntelligenceSummaryNo. 107,up to 2400 hrs. 19 Sep44,1.

443
 posed the only southernthreat to the corridor on the 20th.H FalschirmjaegerCorps

planneda three-prongedattack at dawn, but the attack startedin late morning. While

the two northem attacks see-sawed,the southem thrust; which took Mook

temporarily,reachedwithin two kilometersof the Heumanbridge beforebeing driven

801
off in the afternoon by airborne infantry and Guards Armoured tanks. Guards

Armoured Division, by this time, had beensegmentedto bolster "Club Route- in the

airborne sectors,now about to be renamed"Hell's Highway" by the paratroops.The

15/19 Hussarswere attachedto the 101", the first of a series of detachmentsthat

would stretch Adair's division over two-thirds the length of Club Route while

diminishing its own strengthto push forward. The ColdstreamGroup would soon be

linked with the 82d to defendits easternflank from armoredincursionand to form an

802
armored reserve in the center of Club Route.

The hasty attack proposedagainstthe railroad and road bridgesby Gavin for

19 Septemberfailed, as three columnsof paratroopsand tanksmovedon both bridges

and toward the post office allegedly holding the demolition controls for the main

bridge. Neither bridge column succeeded,though the paratroopsreachedthe post

office and found nothing there.Anotherattackwasplannedfor 20 September.

The combinedattack by the GuardsArmoured Division and the 82d Airborne

on the Nijmegen bridge was a two-part assaultinvolving a tank-infantryattack on the

bridge from the south and a river assaultcrossingdesignedboth to flank the

enemy

8'0Ibid., 2.
801Kershaw,It NeverSnows,Situation
map,The Situationon Hell's Highway, 20-26 September,145-
147; 190-192.

444
and seizethe northern to
approaches the bridge. (See figure 57.
) Two kampfgruppen

held the twin bridges:a rail bridge in the west,backedon the north shoreby additional

troops in the fort nearLent, and the road bridge outpostedby defensesat the outlying

traffic circles. Both bridges were set for demolition. The attack plan agreedupon by

Adair, Browning, Gavin, and Horrockswas a strongerversionof the plan usedon 19

September.One column would attack the rail bridge, essentiallyto cover the rear of

the secondcolumn attemptingto clear HunnerPark and the Valkof, west of the road

bridge, while a third column worked from the east toward the traffic circle and

approachesto the road bridge. Eachcolumn was a mix of Guardstanksand American

paratroopers.Simultaneously,part of a battalion would crossthe river under the fire

supportof tanks, to seizethe north shoreand flank the north end of the bridge from

the west. Each group would be exposed,the men in the river crossingthe worst, the

entire attack relied upon pressure built on the defense from every quarter and

incrediblebraveryon the part of everyman taking part.803

While the bridge attack was being prepared, I Airborne received a radio

messageat 0140 hours from I Airborne Corps (Rear)requestingthe designationof a

new drop zone for the Polish brigade. New coordinateswere flashed to the rear

designatinga drop zone near the town of Driel, acrossfrom the Heavedorpferry and

802FAAA, Allied Airborne Operations,9; Verney, TheGuardsArmouredDivision, 112.In

addition to
the 15/19Hussars,the 44 Royal Tank Regiment,two squadronsof the Royals,and two batteriesof
artillery were attachedto the 101"by SecondArmy.
803
Adair, A Guards'General, 165-167;Lt. Gen.JamesM. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battlesofan Airborne
Commander,1943-1946(New York: Viking Press,1978) 169-175,178-181;21 Army Group
MARKET GARDEN,Section8, Operationsof 30 Corps,48-51; A Short History of 30 Corps,33-35,
Map 19; CaptainNigel Nicholsonand Patrick Forbes,History ofthe GrenadierGuardsin the War of
1939-1945[hereafterreferredto asNicholsonand Forbes,Ae GrenadierGuards], I (n.p., n.d.), 129-
140;82d Division Narrative, Opn Market; section"Crossingthe Waal River," 1-20.This section,based
on field interviews,indicatesthat the battalionpicked for crossing,3d Battalion,504" Parachute
Infantry, had no previousknowledge,plan, or preparationfor the river crossing.

445
closer to the perimeter. I Airborne Corps had known from a messageon 19 September

that the south end of the bridge was held by the Germans, thus threatening the Polish

drop. Sosabowski hastily planned and briefed his commanders, though weather would

intervene to prevent the planned drop that morning. The fight in Nijmegen, however,

intensified. 804

While fighting increasedon the 82d's eastflank, the attack toward the bridge

beganat first light with house-to-housefighting, as direct assaultsproved suicidal. By

mid-afternoon,Hunner Park and the Valkof were cleared,and the Americans began

their river crossingunder withering fire, eventuallyestablishinga shallow perimeter

on the dike overlooking the river. The first tank by

assault the GrenadierGuardswas

driven off, but a second,beginningabout 1800hours,was madewhen the Americans

were seenmoving toward the bridge from the west. This assaultcrossedthe bridge

under fire and linked with the American paratroopers.A shallow bridgehead,about a

mile deep,was as
established darkness
fell, and clearingthe bridge areaof snipersand
805
demolitionsproceeded. At dark, the situationat the Arnhem bridge was critical.

Dempsey'smajor concernswent beyond relieving I Airborne Division. The

landing of the airbornehad given him commandof the three airbornedivisions, but

his entire responsibility lay with impelling successwithin all four corps involved.

Montgomery,who had no fiinher reservesto commit, was forcedto acceptthe role of

bystander;it was, after all, an army-levelbattle. From this perspective,the operation

'04First Airborne Report,Annexure"M, " War Diary, Sheet5,

entry, 20 Sep0140; it is unclearwhen I
Airborne Corpsreceivedthe original message;Golden,EchoesfromArnhem, 164,165, GeorgeF.
Cholewcynski,PolesApart: ThePolish Airborne at the Battle ofArnhem (New York: Sarpedon,
1993), 118-119;Sosabowski,Freely I Served,156-158.

446
 teetered.O'Connor's 8 Corps wasjust coming into action, with 3 Division widening

its bridgeheadon the Escaut, II Armoured moving on Heeze, and 50 Division

clearing pockets of resistancebehind Club Route. Ritchie's 12 Corps met firm

resistance.53 Division had crossedbut two brigadesin its sector,and the Highlanders

of 15 Division were blocked by a strong enemy defense.The crisis for GARDEN,

however, was along Club Route. Dempsey'sonly solution for the southernend of

Club Route was to transfer the 101" Division to Ritchie's control, now making the

south end of the route an affair to be guardedby both Ritchie on the west and

O'Connor on the east. Dempsey went forward on 21 September,meeting with

Browning, Horrocks,and later Ritchie.806

HorTocksreceivedlittle help from the slow movementon his flanks, and each

of the two "airborne carpets"was pressedfrom the flanks. The 101", alreadydrawing

forces from Horrocks' "linking force," Guards Armoured,

was pressedfrom both
flanks, by both a brigade of armor and a division kampfgruppen.Likewise, the 82d,

now straddlingthe Waal with two bridgesin hand,were also pressedfrom the eastern

flank by a division kampfgruppen.Ahead of Horrocks, lay a building force on the

"island," the patch of land betweenthe NijmegenBridge and the troopsclinging to the

end of the Arnhem bridge, II miles away. While virtually pennedin by theseforces

along nearly 50 miles of road, each sector was in crisis, with the southern-most

alreadypenetratedand the road cut at St. Oderode.This momentarycut would soon

turn into a running battle along the road from Veghel to Uden. From an operational

905Nicholson and Forbes,TheGrenadierGuards, 134-140;82d Narrative,"Crossingthe Waal,"

passim.
806
DempseyDiaty, 20 September.

447
 the relief of I Airborne and a bridgehead on the Neder Rijn were
perspective, while

loss in the 82d area, or more important, on Hell's Highway in the

critical, tactical

101" area, could cause the destruction of the entire corps. In good weather, airpower

have been decisive. Between 20 September and the end of the battle, weather,
might

Brereton's hampered the only "hammer" that Dempsey might have

and restrictions,

807
used.

At Brereton's Brereton
headquarters, and his staff viewed the operation in

terms of air transportmissions.Breretonhad overflown the drop on D-Day in a B- 17

link with I Airborne

with Matthew Ridgway, and a wireless was established

Headquartersby 1700. Ridgway was told the next day that upon the fly-in of 52

Division, XVIH Corps would assumecommandof the two US airbornedivisions and

Browning would take commandof I Airborne, 52 (L), and the Polish Brigade.Parks.

who initiated this idea, immediatelyreceivedapprovalfrom Brereton.While Brereton

he
madeweatherand route changes, also informed Ridgwaythat he would preparehis

corps for another drop after I October, "regardlessof whether we have received

replacementsof men and "

material. While Breretonand Ridgway visited 2 Army on

the continent on 20 and 21 September,

the only additional aid offered to I Airborne

Corps by the headquarterswas to fly in two battalionsof the 52 Division in gliders

808
intendedfor the airborneengineers.

80'SecondArmyHistoiy, 229-233,NARA. RG 407, ML-93 1, Positionsand Activities of 8 and 12

Corpsduring Market Garden;21 Army Group MARKET GARDEN.48-52; Horrocks,Corps
Commander,117,118.
" Parks Diary, 17-21September.Of someinterestshouldbe the fact that Browning did not know his
headquarterswould be downgradedand an additionalcorpsheadquartersflown in with the 52
(Lowland) Division. Browning turneddown the offer of the two battalionsof the 52 (Lowland)
Division, though it had neverbeenmadeclear to him how much of the division would be sent.

448
 Brereton's information at Sunninghill Park revolved around the air situation.

His own G-2 did not identify elementsof the 9 SSand 10 SSPanzersas engageduntil

their 19 Septemberreport,and the sameday reported:

I PARA ARMY front pierced by Allied thrust into EINDHOVEN.

809
Light oppositionofferedagainstAllied airbornelanding.

While Breretonhad boastedto Eisenhower,while still commanderof Ninth Air Force,

that he could control the air supportthat would make an airheadunassailable,he did

not use his own authority or, more important,fly to seeConingham,who still smarted

from not having the final say over air support. Leigh Mallory and the moribund

Headquarters,AEAF remainedeven farther in the shadows.As 30 Corps waited for

dawn on 21 September,the questionno doubt in every mind from the Waal to the

perimeternorth of the NederRijn was would help comefrom the air?

Gavin's men were incensed that Guards Armoured had not gone forward

during the night. Yet those on the dikes north of the Waal knew nothing of what

transpiredsouth of them. Nijmegen had yet to be cleared,and the corps commander

had orderedforward 43 (Wessex)Division to clear the island.The carpethad run out.

Horrocks saw a battle aheadthough he still pushed the point element of Guards

Armoured forward on 21 Septemberto maintainpressure.The night had grantedcover

for the Germansto move up additional forcesto block the road. By dawn, there were

fewer than 150 men fit to fight at the Arnhem bridge; by 0900 theseremnantshad

been overrun. Tactical reconnaissance

reportedthat 20 enemytanks came south and

Considering terrainin thispointof thebattle,it isquestionable

therewaslittlesecure wheretheycould
havebeenlanded.

449
begandeploying south of Elst, about one third of the distancebetweenthe Nijmegen

and Arnhem bridges.At midday, the 82d withdrew south of the Waal as 130 Brigade

took over the bridgeheadand two of its battalions clearedwest Nijmegen. Finally.

Irish Guards the lead troop was annihilated in

about 1230, as the pressedahead,

ambush.Overhead,
the "cab rank" of Typhoons,which had broken them out of a trap

in identical circumstancesonly five days before, circled aimlessly as wireless

communicationbroke down. Artillery supportlikewise failed. While the Irish Guards

were held, a flanking by

attempt the Welsh Guardsalso failed. and then the light was

gone. They had gainedbut two of the II miles; the actual "advance" of the Guards

810
had lasted20 minutes. (Seefigure 58.)

The Polish Brigade droppednearDriel at 1714hours. Suffering casualtiesdue

to the closenessof the enemy, darkness and the lack of the operating ferry.

Sosaboski's men were unable to cross the river. Their mission had been to

immediatelyreinforcethe I Airborne,which wasknownto be heavilypressed.Wireless

link with 30 Corps had permitted the 64 Medium Regiment to fire close support

throughoutthe 811
day.
missions

Horrocks' plan had been to fan out to the west of the main road if it was

blocked, first with the GuardsArmoured,which had failed, and then with 43 Division

as it assumedthe assaultwhile the Guardsgroupsheld the flank againstthe panzer

8'9NARA, RG 33 1, FAAA, G-2 SummaryNumber 16.191630Sept. 1. On 19 September,FAAA's G-

2 reportedthe presenceof 9 SSon 14 September,apparentlyfrom 2 Army Reportor ULTRA of 18
September.
8'0 21 Arnty Group MARKET GARDEN,53-55; Major D.J.L. Fitzgerald,Histoly
ofthe Irish Guardsin
the SecondWorld War (Aldershot:Gale and Polden,1949),508-511;L. F. Ellis, WelshGuardvat War
(Aldershot: Gale and Poldcn, 1946),227,228; Gooderson,Air Powerat the Battlefront, 9 1.
"' 21 ArnýyGroup MARKETGARDEN,ibid., 55-58.

450
 block south of Elst. (Seefigure 59.) While 214 Brigade lost time due to mishapsand

mistakentracks taken,the HouseholdCavalrywas able to link with the Polesat Driel,

followed by two battalions of the Wessex in column. While some DUKWs were

brought forward, they were found unsuitabledue to the dikes, and few rafts were

available.About 50 Polish paratrooperscrossedthe river into the airborneperimeter

during the night. The 129 Brigade had pressedup the road directly toward Elst to

break9Aeblock holding the Guards,but madelittle headway.(Seefigure 60.)812

The 43 Division commander,Maj. Gen. G.I. Thomas,ordered an attack to

clear the Elst area on 23 September as it was apparent that a race was on between the

Germans to build up an inpenetrable line, and the 43d Division to break hold
a on the

road to Arnhem while preparing a crossing to relieve the beleagured I Airborne

Division. 30 Corps had meanwhile placed 32 Guards Brigade in

the Veghel-Uden area

to maintain a mobile reserve against attacks, while 5 Guards

remained with 129
Brigade facing the German blocking positions
south of Elst. The 214 Brigade

launched a fading-light attack at day's end and gained the

outskirts of the village of

Elst in heavy fighting that lasted until 2200. Some 250 Polish
paratroopers were
ferried into the airborne perimeter north of the river,
much of the time under shell and

mortar fire. Many of the assault boats were dedicated to ferrying ammunition that had

not been able to be supplied by air to the I Airborne position. Food and ammunition

within the airborne perimeter had reached crisis proportions. While Montgomery

began to doubt the ability to hold the perimeter, Dempsey remained unconvinced that

disaster was at hand. Both Horrocks and Thomas considered that the failure to
mount

912
21ArntvGroupMARKETGARDEN,
ibid.,58-61;FAAA, Ibid., 14,15;Maj.Gcn.H. Essame,
The

451
a large crossing the night of the 23d had spelled an end to hope for holding a

bridgehead.813

83 Group made an appearanceover the airborneperimeteron 23 September

for the first time, with 22 sorties flown the next day and 81 sorties on the 25'h.

Broadhurst complained that he could hear I Airborne calling for help on their

Phantomlink, but the Breretonrestrictionsconcerningair supportkept his Typhoons

sitting on runways waiting for permission to help. While aircraft could attack

identifiable targetsin open areas,close supportwas impossible.Urquhart's positions

were in heavy woods, and no direct radio links existed between the division and

814
aircraft flying overhead.

Dempsey's plan was to ferry another battalion over during the night of 24

Septemberand, dependingupon the rest of 30 Corps' situation,decidethen either to

withdraw the division under the cover of darkness

on the night of 25/26 September,
or

mount a large assaultcrossingto relieve them. (Seefigures 61 and 62.) On the 20, a

meetingwith Horrocks, Browning, Thomas,and Sosabowski

was held to plan another

crossing.Thomas,who would control the had

crossing, decidedto passthe 4thDorsets

and a Polish Battalion against the ferry site, and simultaneouslypassthe remaining

Poles directly into the perimeter. Sosabowskiarguedagainstthe plan, emphatically

calling for a larger crossingdownstreamto ferry the majority of Thomas's division

43"' WessexDivision at War 1944-1945(London: William Clowesand Sons,1952), 123-128.

"' 21 ArmýyGroup MARKET GARDEN,ibid., 62-64; FAAA, ibid.. 15,16; MontgomeryLog, 23
September;DempseyDiary, 23 September;Essame,43"' WessexDivision. 128-132.
114RAF Narrative, IV, 152-154;Gooderson,Air Power
at the Battlefront, 97,98.

452
 and the remainderof his brigadeto the west. His plan was disapproved.
The resulting

in 815
disastrous.
crossing the early hoursof 25 Septemberproved

The late arrival of assaultboatshad delayedthe crossing,and while about 350

of the Dorsets crossed,as well as several tons of stores that were passedinto the

airborneperimeter,the late start and a lack of boatskept the Polesfrom crossinginto

the perimeter.The Dorsets,landing at the baseof what was obviously vital ground,

met immediateresistanceand were soon fragmentedby the ten-ain,darknessand the

enemy. Most of the troops were lost. The failure of the Dorset crossingconvinced

Thomasthat a withdrawal of Urquhart'sdivision-not anotherreinforcing crossing-

was the 816

soleoption remaining.

It was the crisis in 30 Corps, however,

-that sparked the withdrawal order.

Dempsey was clear when he said that 30 Corps' operations

would determine how

much effort was put into crossing the Neder Rijn; I Airborne, at least from the 23d,

had been a victim awaiting the decision. The period of 24 hours

on the 24'h, during

which the road was cut in the 101" Division area, had signaled the futility of

attempting to press northward, as the flank situation had not been alleviated. (See

figure 63.) Both Montgomery and Dempsey agreed that I Airborne had to be

withdrawn. (See figure 64.) With the sending of the predetermined code word

"Berlin, " Urquhart was told to prepare his division to withdraw. That withdrawal

came during the night of 25/26 September. Urquhart wrote, "At the back of my mind

was Gallipoli, " and his withdrawal plan on keeping the appearanceof defending-the

8" Sosabowski,
FreelyI Served,182-184,198;
Middlebrook,
Arnhem1944,414417;Essame, 43d
WessexDivision,133-136;Choleswczynski,
PolesApart,220-224;A ShortHistoryof30 Corps,36-38.
316Middlebrook,Arnhem1944,418422;Essame, 43d WessexDivision,ibid.

453
result of his of
remembrance studyingthe problem for a promotion exam.43 Division

provided a program of both artillery and machinegun fire, with the remainderof the

4thDorsetsassisting.Assaultboatsferried some2,163men from I Airborne, 160from

the Polish Brigade, and 75 from the Dorsets.Approximately 180 men comprised a

detachmentleft in contact, sacrificing themselvesto hold the perimeter while the

817
thoseable to leavewithdrew.

While MARKET had failed to gain its final objective,GARDEN had to fight

to retain its 63-mile gain. Neither Dempseyor Montgomerywas defeated.and both

adjustedto the situation at hand. Other operationsin Normandy,and before in Italy,

Sicily, and Africa, had come up short of planned objectives.The reality of battle

always was that campaignswere composedof many half-failures and half-successes.

Despitehis reputationfor caution,Montgomeryknew battle was alwaysa gambleand

that preparation and concentrationwere attempts to weight the odds in favor of

victory, but they could neverguaranteeit.

The day Urquhart's sergeantsmajor held formations to account for those

presentand thoseleft behind,Montgomeryand Dempseymet to plan the next stageof

their drive to the Ruhr. Both expectedthat Hodgeswould come forward with a drive

to the south of Dusseldorf.While DempseyfinishedclearingHorrocks' flanks4Crcrar

would also presseastwardwith someforcesto clear the terrain toward Hertogenbosch

while using his remainingforcesto move toward Antwerp. Nijmegenand the "island"

s'721 ArnývGroup MARKETGARDEN,69,70; MontgomeryLog, 25 September;

DempseyDiary. 25
September;Urquhart,Arnhem, 167.

454
 remained to be defended. Both could be developed as later springboardsto the
818
Ruhr.

On 27 September, Montgomery issued M. 527. As if to explain the

disappointmentof MARKET GARDEN, he began:

The enemy has re-actedviolently since we launchedthe operations

outlined in M 525 dated 14 September.He has had to give serious
considerationto the threatsto turn the Siegfiied Line, to nullify the
defensivevalueof the Rhine,andto outflank the RUHR.

Continuing,he repeatedhis plan:

Intention
(a) To openup the port of ANTWERP
(b) In conjunction with First US Army on the right, to destroy all
enemy forces that arepreventingus from capturingthe RUHR.819

Getting to the Ruhr, the object of his argumentsand actions since the 17

August meetingwith Bradley,still remainedforemostin Montgomery'smind. Getting

there rapidly, he believed, would be the only operational decision neededon the

battlefield to endthe NorthwestEuropecampaignrapidly.

8'8MontgomeryLog, 26 September;DempseyDiar 26,27 September.

y,
$19M 527,27-9-44.

455
BLANK IN ORIGINAL
 CHAPTER TEN

Denouement

On 15 September,prior to the launchingof MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower

raised the question of the future phasesin his Broad Front campaign. That day,

Devers' Sixth Army Group was activated,giving Eisenhoweroperationalcontrol of

all Allied armies in Northwest Europe. It was also the day of the "flap" over the

presen(.
(- of "German PanzerDivsions" in Holland. Ike obviously was nonplussedby

the prospect, as he %xTote

Monty:

We shall soon,I hope,haveachievedthe objectivesset forth in my last

directive (FWD 13765)and shall then be in possessionof the RUHR,
the SAAR and the FRANKFURT area. I have been consideringour
next move.

Noting that theseobjectiveswould havedrainedGermany'sreserves,and that

the direct attack on the remaining important objectives left within Germanywould

yield great opportunities, Eisenhower offered his own assessment:

Clearly, BERLIN is the main prize, and the prize in defenseof which
the enemyis likely to concentratethe bulk of his forces. There is no
doubt, whatsoever,in my mind, that we should concentrateall our
energiesandresourceson a rapid thrust to BERLIN.

In outlining the objectives,he noted, it was too early to designatethrust lines,

but the Allied forcesmust be preparedto do the following:

a. To direct forces of both Army Groups on Berlin astride the axes

Ruhr-Hanover-Berlinor Frankfurt-Leipzig-Berlin,or both.

b. Should the Russiansbeat us to Berlin, the Northern Group of

Armies would seize the Hanover areaand the Hamburg group of
ports. The CentralGroup of Armies would seizepart, or the whole,
of Leipzig-Dresden,dependingupon the progressof the Russian
advance.

457
 c. In any event,the SouthernGroup of Armies would seizeAugsburg-
Munich. The area Numberg-Regensburgwould be seized by
Centralor SouthernGroup of Armies, dependingon the situationat
the time.
Simply stated, it is my desire to move on Berlin by the most direct and
expeditious route, with combined U. S.-British forces supported by
other available forces moving through key centers and occupying
strategic areas on the flanks, all in one coordinated, concerted
820
operation.

Three days before, Bradley had written emphasizing his views, and

Eisenhowermollified him, sayingif he [Bradley] could

keep Hodges fully supplied up to the moment of his attaining his first
principal objectives, then there is no reason why Patton should not
keep acting offensively if the conditions for offensive action are
821
right.

Montgomery's reaction to Eisenhower's letter was to reiterate his case for a

single concentratedthrust. Stating that Eisenhower'sobjectiveswere attainablewith

the forces in hand, eliminating the necessityof moving on CentralGermanywith the

centralarmy group. Montgomery'skey argument,

as he it,
summarized was:

5.1 considerthe best objective the Ruhr, and thenceon to Berlin by

the northernroute. On that route are the ports, and on that route we
can use our seapowerto the best advantage.On other routes we
would merely containasmany forcesaswe could.
6. If you agree with para. 5, then I would consider that 21 Army
Group, plus First Army of nine divisions, would be adequate.Such
a force must have everything it neededin the maintenanceline;
other Armies would do the best they could with what was left over.
7. If you considerthat para. 5 is not right, and that the proper axis of
advanceis by Frankfurt and centralGermany,then I would suggest
that 12 Army Group of three Armies would be used and would
have all the maintenance.21 Army Group would do the best it
could with what was left over; or possiblythe SecondBritish Army
"0 EL, Correspondence, GCT 370-3I/Plans, 15 September,1944;EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2148-2149.
He sent Bradley an identical letter.
921EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2146-2147.

458
 would be wanted in a secondaryrole on the left flank- of the
movement. *

He stressedfurther, in a later paragraph:

8.1 considerthat our plan, and objectives,should be decidedNOW,

and everythingarrangedaccordingly.I would not myself agreethat
822
we canwait until nearerthe time, assuggestedin your letter.

Eisenhowerhad meanwhilebeeninformed by his staff that in examiningthe relative

priority of capturing Rotterdam or Antwerp as a port, they had determined that

Antwerp should be given priority since it had been captured intact, and that the

its 823
clearanceof channelwould yield the quickestandsurestdividend.

MARKET's initiation on 17 Septemberdid nothing but intensify feelings

concerningboth viewpoints, given that Eisenhowerhad in fact committed SHAEF's

strategicreserve,the Airborne Army, in an attemptto jump the Rhine. But, contrarily,

Eisenhowertrefusedto shift forces to maintain operationsas a single movementon

the decisive axis to complementthis reserve,despitethe effect of hamperingboth

advancesby assigninga potentially larger force a thrust on a secondaryavenue.Nor

did Eisenhowerseecommandas an issue.As long as priority was given to a northern

advance, he felt Montgomery and Bradley could continue to coordinate their

operationsunderhis command.

Given the daily worseningweather,the increasein the strengthof resistance,

and the strain on logistics that would not be alleviateduntil Crerar was able to shake

free of the Channelports and put his full strengthinto the Scheldt,Montgomery felt

922Montgomery,Memoirs,250-251.This letter
appearsto be missingfrom the Eisenhower
CorrespondenceFile at the EisenhowerLibrary. It is listed as M.526 in the MontgomeryLog.

459
 ST COPY

AVAILA L

Variable print quality

 thal -a Nvait and see to decide attitude" was tantamount to bringing on a front-wide

halt in operations without obtaining an operational decision on the battlefield. This

was the essence of the difference between Eisenhower's and Montgomery's

opci-ational philosophies, neither a reemergence of "ego over strategy" as held by

SHAEF's detractors of the Field Marshal, nor a direct attack on Eisenhower's right to
I
he "Allied Ground Forces Commander."

Montoomery, meanwhile, attempted to push Crerar into moving on Antwerp

C,

with his left-hand corps while using his right-hand corps, I (British) Corps to stretch to
Cý

support Dempsey's left, which was in tactical crisis. He also continued to press

Brereton for an airborne operation designated for Walcheren Island to open the

Scheldt. ' ,' Despite Eisenhower's backing for an airborne operation to open the

Scheidt, Brereton and Williams refused, citing the unsuitability of Walcheren as a

target, though the airmen made no attempt to investigate alternative schemes to

reinforce Crerar's Scheldt operation. Brereton, in fact, still wanted to use the Airborne
I
Army within 12"' Anny Group's sector, regardless of the lack of strategic effect such

an operation might have. This feeling grew stronger after the beginning of

ý25
MARKET.

Post Ot-criord, Vol. 1. G-3. PS-SHAEF (44) 43, "Relative Priority of Operations for the Capture of
Rotterdam and Antwerp, " 16 September 1944.
"-1.1Wontgonicri, Log, 20 Septemberý EL Correspondence File, M-2 18,20 September 44. This message
,
ýisks, foi ciarification on Walcheren Operation.
', Post Ovcrlord, Vol 1, Msg, FWD- 15386, Eisenhower to WAS. USSTAF for Spaatz, 21 Sep 44;
MSG. FWD- 15385. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 21 Sep 44ý G-3 GCT 370-91 Plans, Sept 44, nA
,
Rapid Capture of the Antwerp Area study. 1-4. See also Brcreton Diaries, 349: Parl, Diarý-, 18,19
-ý
September. Note that the SYIAEF planners had likewise ruled Rotterdam a
poor airborne objective,
though it had at one time been favored by Tedder and Brereton. See, Post Overlord, ibid., SHAEF
GUI 370-9 1,18 September 1944, Capture of Rotterdam, 1-4. Eisenhower's
solution was to order
maxinium air assistance for operations against Walcheren, an order made meaningless by Tedder's
dcccntralization ofair in support of Montgomery.

460
 While weather had kept Montgomery from flying, to the battlefield earlier, lic

moved his tactical headquarters to Bourg Leopold on 21 September to be closc to

Second Amy. His receipt of Eisenhower's rcpiN, to his M-526 raised the issue ol

command ofthe Northem Thrust in Montgonicry's mind. Fccling that both 12'11

(froup*s insistence on shorting Hodges on supplies, and Eisenhower's belief that his

and Montgomery's operational views were in accord. Montgomery now believed that

only his control of' ground operations north of' the Ardennes could set the Allied

straten, toward what he desperately belleved to be the nght course of' action.

Eisenho,xer had written:

Generally speaking I find myself so completely in agreement with your

letter of 18 September (M-526) that I cannot believe there is any grcat
difference in our concepts.
Never at any time have I implied that I was consider-ingan advance into
Germany with all armies moving abreast.

Fie continued. negating the first parag-Taphs

of his letter:

There is one point. however. on which -we do not agree, it' I interpret
your idea correctly. As I read your letter you imply that all the divisions
Nve have. except those of the 2 1" Anny Group and approxinialek, ninc
of the 12 th Army Group, can stop in place where thc are and that we
'v
can strip all these additional divisions from their transpon and
everý,,thing else to support one single knife-like dnve toward Berlin.
This may not be exactly \vhat you meant but it is certamb, not possible.

What I do belleve is that we must marshal our stren, th up along the

-,
Western borders ot'Germany. to the Rhine if possible. insure adequate
maintenance by getting Antwerp working at full blast at the earliest
possible moment and they [sic] carry out the dnve you suggest. All of
Bradley's Group, except his left army, which makes his main effort.
will move forward sufficiently so as always to be in supporting
position of the main drive and to prevent concentration of German
forces against it front and flanks.

In fUrtheranceof his points. Eisenhower added:

461
 I merely want to make sure that when you start leading your Army
Group in its thrust onto Berlin and Bradley startsdriving with his left
to supportyou, our other forces are in position to assurethe successof
that drive. Otherwise the main thrust itself would have to drop off so
much of its to
strength protect its rear and its flanks that very soon the
drive would peterout.
As you know I have been giving preference my to left all the way
through this campaign including attaching First Allied Airborne Army
to you and adopting every possible expedient to assure your
maintenance. All other forces have been fighting with a halter around
their necks....
When we get on the Rhine the next concernof Bradley's will be to put
his left Berlin.826
a strong fully equipped Army on to accompany you to

HumphreyGale's personaldelivery of this letter and his briefing on Bradley's

logistical situation changedMontgomery's views concerningthe "help" he was to be

getting from Hodges or Bradley. He immediately asked that Eisenhower shift the

inter-Army Group boundary farther north to permit him to send 8 Corps against

Emmerich-Cleve,noting that failure to do so would causeSecondArmy's operationto

'4graduallypeter out." Just as Bradley and his generalsrailed at Lee for failing to

supply them, Montgomery told Eisenhower that Gale had brought on the mess,

Bradley had to 827

Patton.
without specifically stating that shifted supply priorities

Monty's failure to fly to Versailles on 22 September,so as not to leave the critical

MARKET-GARDEN battlefield, was viewed at SHAEF as a slap to Eisenhower,

828
thoughEisenhowerapparentlyneveracceptedthat astrue.

826EL, CorrespondenceFile, Letter, Eisenhowerto Montgomery,September20,1944; Eisenhower

Papers,IV, 2164-2165.
82'EL, CorrespondenceFile, Messages,M.221, M.222,21 September1944.
823MHI, PoguePapers,Interview Eisenhowerwith S.L.A. Marshall,ibid.

462
 Hoping to salvagewhat he now realizedwasa teeteringoperationalsituation,a

situation made more critical by the slownessof SecondArmy to reach Arnhem.

Monty senta last message:

Thank you very much for your letter of 20 Septembersent via Gale. I
can not agreethat our conceptsare the sameand I am sure you would
wish me to be quite frank and open in the matter. I have always said
stop the right and go on with the left but the right has beenallowed to
go on so far that it has out-strippedits maintenanceand we have lost
ilexibility. In your letter you still want to go on further with your right
and state in your Para.6 that all of Bradley's Army Group will move
forward sufficiently etc. I would say that the right flank of 12 Army
Group shouldbe given a very direct orderto halt and if this order is not
obeyedwe shall get into greaterdifficulties. The net result of the matter
in my opinion is that if you want to get the Ruhr you will have to put
every single thing into the left hook and stop everything else. It is my
opinion that if this is not donethenyou will not get the Ruhr.
Your very greatfiiend MONTY 829

The 22d of Septemberproved to be a critical day, both for MARKET

GARDEN, and for the direction of the ongoing campaign.The fresh appearanceof

Germanarmor on 30 Corps' front and the time lost in shifting assaultforceson Club

Route doomednot just Frost's battalionat the bridge,but GARDEN itself, thoughthat

appreciationhad not been admitted either at SecondArmy or at 30 Corps. Brereton

had signaled that the fight for the corridor demonstratedthat the enemy had not

decided to relinquish SouthernHolland, would attempt to confine I Airborne, and

Fifteenth
would continueto evacuate Army from harm's 830
way.

At Versailles, Eisenhowerfaced his generals,minus Montgomery, to assess

the campaign.Twenty-threegenerals,air marshals,and admirals were in attendance.

829EL, CorrespondenceFile, Msg. M 123,21 September1944.

830
poSt Overlord, 1,msg. VX-25396, Personalfor Marshall,from Brereton
signedEisenhower,22
September1944.

463
 The list of decisions provided with the minutes of the conferenceclearly outline

Eisenhower'sintentions:

a. That all concerned differentiate clearly between the logistical

requirementsfor attaining objectivescoveredby presentdirectives,
including seizingthe RUHR and breachingthe SIEGFRIEDLINE,
andthe requirementsfor the final drive on BERLIN.
b. That the fact will be generallyacceptedthat the possessionof an
additional major deep-water port on our north flank was an
indespensable prerequisite for the final drive deep into
GERMANY.
C. The envelopmentof the RUHR from the north by 21" Army Group,
supported by 0 Army, is the main effort of the presentphaseof
operations.
d. The boundarybetween21" and 121hArmy Groups [was to be
...
changedto reflect 21 Army Group'srequestto concentrate].
e. The 12'hArmy Group to take over as quickly as possiblethe sector
now held by 8 th British Corps.
f (1) 12th Army Group to continue its thrust, so far as its current
resourcespermitý towards COLOGNE and BONN. 12th Army
Group will also be preparedto seizeany favorableopportunity of
crossingthe RHINE and attackingthe RUHR from the southwhen
the maintenancesituationpermits.
(2) The remainderof 12thArmy Group to take no more aggressive
action than is permitted by the maintenancesituationafter the full
requirementsof the main effort havebeenmet.
h. 20 Army Group to open the port of ANTWERP
as a matter of
urgencyand to developoperationsculminatingin a strongattackon
the RUHR from the north.831

Bradleywould shift two divisions in ten days' time to assume8 Corps' sector,

and XV Corps would be shifted with its two divisions to Sixth Army Group to ease

832
the maintenancesituation. Eisenhowersent a messageconfirming his intention to

83'PostOverlord. 1, Memorandumfor Chief Staff, SupremeCommanders,

of Conference,24
September,Minutes of Meeting Held in the War Roomof SHAEF Forward 1430hrs., 22'
at
September1944.
$32Ibid., 3.

464
 supportthe immediatecaptureof the Ruhr, and that he would give any necessaryhelp

to assurethe immediate 833

captureof Antwerp.

Both De Guingand, who had attendedthe conference,and the Director of

Military Operations,Lt. Gen. Simpson,who had visited SHAEF at that time, felt that

the VersaillesConferencehad cementeda coherentcampaignplan favoring a northern

priority for operations.Importantly, Simpsonnoted that Bedell Smith knew Bradley

and Patton had violated both the spirit and the letter of Eisenhower's directives.

Simpson told Alanbrooke that getting the Americansto obey Ike's orders would be

key, a problem Smith told Simpson he would make clear and which would be

834
alleviatedin the future.

An immediate messagewas sent to Bradley, with a copy to Montgomery

directing Hodges to support Montgomery's efforts. In a handwritten note on 24

September to Monty, Eisenhower stated his views from the conference at Versailles:

Me have obtained complete understandings that should hold all the

way from here to the completion of our present bid for the capture of
the Ruhr. 835

While the positive will offered by Eisenhower seemed to foretell an

accommodation,which, if it didn't follow Montgomery'sprescriptionfor a continous

manueverto drive to the Ruhr and beyond,would lead to more closely harmonized

operationsamong the three Army Groups.But the past had proven to be prologue;

therewas ill will too strongto overcomein the Americancamp.MARKET GARDEN

833EL, CorrespondenceFile, Msg, FWD 15407,22 Sept44; Eisenhower

Papers.IV, 2175,2176.
134LHC, AlanbrookePapers,Memorandumfor CIGS from VCIGS,
23 September1944.
". EL, CorrespondenceFile, Letter, Eisenhower Montgomery,
to 24 September,1944;typed copy in
Post Overlord, 1; EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2185,2186.

465
 that had widenedbetweenthe Americansand British
continuedan unhealablechasm

Normandy. In Montgomery's mind, the decisionto supporta drive to the Ruhr

since

had come one month too late, but in Bradley's mind, the decisionnevershould have

Bradley had, after all, been working to physically separatethe Army

come at all.

Groups and to elimate any complementarybenefit that closely harmonized or

concentratedoperationswould have on 2d Army. Bradley's ego, not the specterof

deadmen resulting from failed opemtionsthat were inadequatelysupported,was the

overriding factor in keeping the Army Groups from opening the key gateway into

Germany in the fall of 1944. So it had been in August, and so it would continue

throughout 1944.

Bradley's sabotage was clearly visible to everyone, it seems, except

Eisenhower. In early September, Bradley had transferred 79'h Division, leaving XIX

Corps short of an infantry division throughout September, despite the larger open

coastal flank to be cleared by the British and the northeastward orientation of Second

Army that should have brought support from its southern neighbor. Given that

Montgomery lackeda corps in early September,and with ULTRA warning both that

the Fifteenth Army was escapingand that panzerdivisions were initially locatednear

Maastricht and were perhaps set for rehabilitation in Holland, the choice of

diminishing the left flank corps and depriving it of both transportation and fuel

appearedto be carelessif not deliberate.Moreover, the encirclementat the Mons

pocket in Septemberopened a gap acrosswhat was the greatestsingle maneuver

avenueinto the Reich, the areanorth of Aachen.XIX Corps' armoreddivision, the 2d,

was starved of fuel, and anotherarmoreddivision, the 5'h, was shifted southwardto

466
enter Gennany through the the constrictedArdennes-Eifelregion as V Corps was

to
angled south support Third Army at the end of the first week of The
September.

corps enteredGermany to
only withdraw for lack of flank support.

As COMET was preparedand Hodges assignedcorps objectives acrossthe

Rhine, the priority given to the two southerncorps was designedto maintain the

original design under Bradley's NORMANDY TO THE RHINE plan of August.

When Brereton had recast LINNET into LINNET H, the airborne landing in the

Maastricht-Aachenarea (the mouth of the maneuvercorridor to the Ruhr) Bradley

turned it down, passing the airborne baton back to Monty while clamoring for

Montgomery's planesto be taken away for fuel runs. LDWET 11,and a concentrated

drive by XIX Corps, might have openedthe Aachencorridor during the critical first

week of September,when little enemy opposition would have been met save

antiaircraft fire. At the sameinstant,much time and preciousfuel was lost in shifting

forces on an axis south of Aachen during the height of the fuel crisis for no

operational gain.

in force of 12 Septemberhad failed and despite his

Hodges' reconnaissance

and Patton's oathsthat enoughfuel and ammunitionexistedfor a run to the Rhine, the

advancesoon halted for a logistical pause.Moreover, the long-sufferingCorlett had

not been advisedof the changeof boundaryagreedto by the Army Groups prior to

GARDEN, and he soon found British columns headingnorth, leaving his northern

neighborhoodemptyof allies. Had Bradleyeveninformed Hodges?

Hodges' thrust south of Aachen in the StolbergCorridor fizzled from lack of

strength,as did a wide deploymentto clear the Hurtgenandto capturethe Roer Dams.

467
Both attackswere uncoordinatedand fearing
Hodges, Aachen
German-occupied to his

droppedoff infantry to it
clear rather than to envelopthe city and keep the Roer
rear,

fluid. The Germansbuilt up Yet,

defenses. First Army's G-2 had
plain approach

extolled the opportunitieswaiting, and on 15 had

September, stated:

The strategicopportunityoffered at the momentto the First U.S. Army

is enormous.A breakthroughin the sectorof the V and VH Corps of
the West Wall offers the possibility of a swift advance to the RHINE.
This would force the enemyto evacuatethe RHINE-LAND becausehe
would then occupy a compromised line with an obstacleat his back.
The cutting of strategic roads and bridges and the prevention of
withdrawal across the RHINE could effect the destruction of the
field 836
forces.
remaining western

Bradley's split of resourcesbetween his armies forfeited the concentration

to
needed maintain The
momentum. battlesfor the Stolbergcorridor, Hurtgen,and the

Roer Dams would stalemateinto one of the bloodiest campaignsin U.S. Army

history, all preventablehad the Americans concentratedin their northern corridor

when the enemy was still weak. Patton's own thrusts, head-on into concentrating

Germandefenses,addedtens of thousandsof casualtiesto the West Wall campaign

837
that stretchedon for threemonths.

While Montgomeryhad repeatedlypined over this openingand Bradley's lack

of interestin developinga side-by-sideoffensive,Corlett had pressedHodges,evenas

MARKET GARDEN was faltering. On 21 September,he hadwritten:

816
NARA, RG 407,101-2.15 to 101-3.0,Box 1956,First Army IntelligenceEstimateNo. 28,15
September1944.
837Hugh Cole, TheLorraine Campaign(Washington:Chief of Military History, 1950,1981),passim;
Anthony Kemp, TheUnknownBattle: Metz, 1944(New York: Steinand Day, 1980),passim;John
Nelson Rickard,Patton at Bay: TheLorraine Campaign,Septemberto December1944(Westport,
Conn.: Praeger,1999),passim; EdwardG. Miller, A Dark and Bloody Ground. TheHuertgenForest
and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945(CollegeStation:TexasA&M Press,1995),passim.

468
 [T]he whole XIX Corpszoneup to the Rhine is almost an ideal battle-
field and a naturalgatewayin Germanyproper,acrossthe Rhine....
It is believed that if the 301hInfantry Division and the 2ndArmored
Division were relieved of the responsibility of guarding the flank, of
First U.S. Army west of the Siegfried Line, they could with adequate
artillery and air supportgo through all of this oppositionto the Rhine
in the vicinity of COLOGNE.838

On 26 September,Corlett, assessinghis new mission of protecting the right

flank of Second Army with the addition of 7'h Annored and 29'h Divisions, added:

The terrain east of the MAAS River, with the exception of the
SIEGFRIED LINE, is especially favorable for both armored and
infantry action. A splendid road net exists. The ground is low and
rolling from our fi-ont line positions to the RHINE in the vicinity of
either COLOGNE or DUSSELDORF. The distance to the Rhine is
about60 kilometers.
It is believed that the SIEGFRIEDLINE can be breachedon the front
of the XIX Corpswithout unduelosses.Sucha breachwould complete
the encirclementof AACHEN and it is estimatedwould enablea force
of sufficient size to advance quickly to the RHINE to secure a
bridgeheadacrossthe RHINE, providing the left flank of the advance
were properly securedby sufficient troops. Every day of delay will
increasethe difficulties of this task.839

The sameday, Montgomeryassessinghis front and that of the Americansto his south,

sent his intentions to Alanbrooke and published M. 527. He stated his intentions

clearly-

(a) To openup the port of ANTWERP.

(b) In conjunction with First US Army on the right, to destroy all
enemy forces that arepreventingus from capturingthe RUHR.840

$38NARA, RG 407, Box 24117,"Combat Interviews," XIX Corps,InvasionThrough

the Siegfried
Line, Junc-Novembcr1944,Headquarters,XIX Corps,Memorandumfor CommandingGeneral,First
US Army, 21 September1944,1.
"9 Ibid. "Combat Interviews," Headquarters,XIX Corps,
Memorandumto LieutentantGeneral
Courtney Hodges,26 September1944,1.
to M-527,27-9-44.

469
 Assessingthe enemybuildup north of the NederRijn and in the areaeastand

Nijmegen, Montgomery noted the benefits accrued from MARKET

southeast of

GARDEN:

[W]e are favourablysituatedin that we hold main road crossingsover

the MEUSE and the RHINE on the EINDHOVEN-NIJMEGEN axis,
and thus have the ability to operatesouth-eastwardsbetween these two
rivers. Such a thrust, in conjunctionwith a strong advanceeastwards
on KOLN and DUSSELDORF by First US Army on our right, would
be difficult for the enemyto hold.

(See figure 65.) The Nijmegen bridgehead,he noted ftirther, poseda "threat" to the

enemy of a further assault northward and a possible river crossing.The upcoming

"killing match" at the door of Germany, demandedmore closely harmonized

opemtions:

[I]t is clear that the armieswhich are to capturethe RUHR should not
now operateon divergentaxes.
They must operateon convergentthrust lines, and thus becomesucha
powerful force that the enemy will not be able to stand against the
combinedmight of the two armies.
The objective, and the prize, is the RUHR; its capturewill mean the
beginningof the end for Germany.

His armieswould continueto clearup the coast,with Crerar'sCanadianArmy

masking Dunkirk, completing operationsagainstCalais and Boulogne,and "at once"

developingoperationsto open Antwerp. A strong thrust to clear Dempsey'sleft was

also ordered.Dempsey'smaintenanceof the corridor and a strongposturefacing north

had to continue,but his new tasks,dependingupon logistics,would be

to operate strongly with all available strength from the general area
NIJMEGEN-GENNEPagainstthe N.W. comer of the RUHR.
The right flank of the movementwill be directedon KREFELD.

470
 On the left flank, the RHINE will be crossed as and where opportunity
offers, and in particular every crideavour will be made to get a
bridgehead at WESEL. 841

Having met with Bradley and Hodgesand "coordinated"their plans, he noted

that the 7th(US) Armored Division would clearthe areasouthof the PeelMarshesand

act as a link betweenthe Secondand First Armies. More importantly, he noted as his

understandingof the agreed-uponplan that:

The [First] Army is to developas early as possiblea strong offensive

movementeastwardsup to the RHINE.
The main weight of the movementwill be directedon COLOGNE.The
left flank of the movement will be directed on DUSSELDORF.
Bridgeheadsover the RHINE will be securedasopportunityoffers.

He notedunder"SubsequentOperations"that:

The convergingmovementof the SecondBritish Army and First US

Army against the N.W. and S.W. comers of the RUHR area
respectively will be developedin each case as early as is possible.
Closetouch and liaison will be necessarybetweenthe two armies.842

Eisenhower'slettersof 23 Septemberto Bradley, copied to Montgomery,had

made it clear that Bradley

should direct Hodges to exert his main effort to meet the Field
Marshal's developing requirements. To save time, particularly in such
emergencies as immediately needed adjustments of inter-army group
boundaries or in suddenly arising tactical situations, the Field Marshal
should communicate directly with Hodges. Each Army Group
...
Commander will report to me any development that, in his
...
judgement, prejudices the accomplishment of tasks assigned to his
Amy Group. 843

"'Ibid., 2.
842
Ibid., 3.
943
EisenhowerPapers,IV, 283.

471
 "on
Ike's letter of 24 September,clarifying his agreement the presentbid for

Montgomery's deeply and fervently

the capture of the Ruhr," strengthened wished

held belief that SecondArmy would assaultthe Ruhr and that the Americanswould

by it from the southwith First Army. Without stating it as such,

cooperate assaulting

22 Septemberconferencehad granted Monty a strong position in bringing on that

decisive battle, and Hodgeswas told to "exert his to

main efforts meet" 21 Army

844
Group's requirements. Also, importantly, Eisenhowerhad respondedto Monty's

M. 527 with a note approvingof the changesbrought about by the Arnhem setback,

noting kindly that:

Theseslight changesare to be expectedin all battles,and I must say I

am delightedto have you so closeto that critical spot and I hope to
845 ...
be ableto run up to seeyou very quickly.

Sinceearly September,Montgomeryhadbeenfighting two military campaigns

and one very political one. He had, of been

necessity, using half his force to clear the

ChannelCoast,not simply to reduceenemygarrisonsleft in his rear but to open ports

for
needed the sustenance
of his army. Le Havre,the first of the major ports, was to be

given to the Americansto replaceport facilities they themselveshad failed to capture

in Brittany. It had taken two divisions, thousandsof bombersorties,and a significant

$44EisenhowerPapers,IV, 2183,2185.
945EL, Correspondence File, Letter to Montgomery,27 September1944.The sameday, Montgomery
submittedto Eisenhowerhis recommendationto the King for a showerof awards,to include a Knight
Commanderof the Bath for Bradley,five Companionsof the Bath, 10 awardsfor US staff officers who
had servedalongside21 Army Group in Normandy,and valor awardsfor the MARKET operationto
include DistinguishedServiceOrders,Military Crosses,DistinguishedConductMedalsand Military
Medals.Monty askedfor Eisenhower'srecommendationsfor theseawards.SeeCorrespondenceFile.

472
 portion of the specializedarmor from the 79" ArmouredDivision to reduceLe Havre.

The remainingports containedthe rest of Crerar'ssix divisions.846

As MARKET GARDEN began,2 CanadianCorps' "front" rangedfrom west

of Antwerp, west about 70 miles to Zeebruggeon the coast,southwestwardfor about

an equal distanceto CapeGriz, and then about 30 miles southwardpast Boulogne.

While Simonds' two infantry divisions invested Boulogne and the area west of

Antwerp, the remainderof the front was screenedby armoureddivisions, and Dunkirk-

by a SpecialServiceBrigade.847

The escapeof the Fifteenth Army and the decision not to move northward

immediately into Holland had resulted from an eagernessto continue the pursuit

eastwardwith SecondArmy while retaining Crerar's Canadiansfor a separateset of

battles on the left. The decisionto launch COMET, the operationat issuehere, was

decidedupon, evenasAntwerp's dockswere being takenby Roberts'sarmor. In some

measure, these decisions were also the result of a lack of timely operational

intelligence plus the fact that no intelligenceofficer or agencyhad yet to assessnot

only that the Germanability to rehabilitatewhat was believedto be a destroyedarmy

exceededany commonlyheld beliefs in the matter,but that virtually all the enemyloss

estimatesthat had fed the "victory disease"had beeninflated.

ULTRA had trumpetedthe beginningsof the FifteenthArmy move northward

on 6 September.It announcedthe Fuhrer's policy of defending"fortresses"designed

'46NARA, ML-2250, Historical Section,CanadianMilitary Headquarters,

ReportNo. 146,Operations
of the CanadianArmy in NorthwestEurope,31 July 1944-1October 1944,passim.
"7 Ibid., Situation Map, 2 CanadianCorps, 19 Sep
44; pages34-58, passim.The shortageof infantry
divisions in both Crerar's and Dempsey'sarmies
was a major operationaldeficiencyduring this phase

473
to prevent the expedientuse of ChannelCoast ports by the Allies. Both were key

decisionpoints for the Germans,and as suchshouldhavereceivedprominentreview

in the Allied camp. Eisenhower,however, as the custodian of the entire front,

registeredno commentover theseeventsnor did Montgomery,

whoseown operational

designhad beencast,seeany reasonto reevaluatehis plansfor either21 Army Group

or the employmentof First Allied Airborne Army.

From Montgomery'sperspective,the clearingof his rear,or the shift of forces

due northward,would havestoppedall eastwardmovement,a factorwhich also would

havecausedmajor reevaluationof First US Army's objectivesin relationto Eisenhower's

4 Septemberdirective. If the Ruhr and the Saarwere still objectives,Montgomery

could do no less than he was to maintain his plans, as well as his bold, creative

decisionto launch COMET both to outflank the Ruhr and to trap Fifteenth Army and

maintainthe separationof the two northernGermanarmiesin Army Group B.

Consideringthe strengthof enemyforcesavailableand the great frontagethat

in Montgomery's casewas semicircular (ranging fi-orn south of Boulogne, to Antwerp,

east to the Albert Canal, and then southward to Maastricht) he could have unilaterally

stopped one of his three operations-at the coast, at Antwerp, or in maintaining a

thrust to gain a bridgehead on the Rhine before logistics and weather closed the

possibility. As all these missions were within his directive from Eisenhower, he could

demand more resources or a shift in strategy from Eisenhower. While

minimal

logistical help was provided for the enlarged COMET-now MARKET-operation,

the most effective help available, a concerted thrust by First Army to relieve pressure,

Whilethearmorcouldrapidlypegoutterritorialclaims,it wasuseless
of thecampaign. to clearthe

474
 draw reserves,and widen Model's operationaldilemnawas not forthcoming.This was

never offered due to the continuingattemptby Bradleyto developan alreadyfaltering.

and alwaysoperationallyquestionable,drive on the Saar.

Eisenhowerdid promise force relief, frequently stating in messages,letters,

and at conferencethat "Bradley's left is striking hard to support you," both to

848
complement Montgomery's operations and to weaken the enemy on his front. This

fantasy was either deliberatelie meant for tidying Eisenhower's"record" of Allied

solidarity, or a reflection of Eisenhower's personal weakness and SHAEF's

operational irrelevancein shapingthe ground campaign.Unfortunately, it played to

Montgomery's theme,raisedasrecentlyas21 September,that he neededto coordinate

operationsnorth of the Ardennes,a military consideration;the unfolding eventsdid

show that Montgomery was correct concerning the orchestration of coordinated

849Eisenhower
operations. at no time attemptedthe planning, timing, coordinationor

execution of such complementaryoperations, leaving the "coordination" of such

matters to Montgomery, who obtained what he thought was agreement from

Bradley-whose Trojan Horse tactic was to agree,then ignore and, if need be, lie

about suchoperations,stymieingthem andoverturningEisenhower's"decisions."

This was the situation that obtained after 27 September,when MARKET

GARDEN's final objectivehadbeenabandoned.Not only could Montgomerynot stop

operationsto consolidatearoundNijmegen, SecondArmy fought off heavyattacksall

along the corridor. In early October, the enemy panzer concentrationsagainst

ports or to operatenorth of the Scheidt.

"' EL, Correspondence File, 16 September
1944, ibid.

475
 850
Dempsey near Nijmegen would eventually reach elements of four divisions.

Montgomery'sattemptto coordinateattacksfrom XIX Corpssouthof 8 Corps' wide-

open flank toward Venlo also obtained minimal assistancefrom Bradley, who

simultaneously hampered his own encirclement of Aachen in the process by

continuing to favor Pattonboth with fuel andwith the southeastward

push of V Corps

into the Eifel.region.

Montgomery's failure to stop operationstoward the Ruhr stemmedfrom his

belief that he shouldnot let the enemydig in on the SiegfriedLine, especiallysince he

was going to have to operatebetweenthe Maas and Rhine rivers. Foolishly believing

that Bradley would seethe Venlo areaas an encirclementopportunity,he continuedto

attempt to simultaneously open ports while maintaining some move on the Ruhr. He

would wait for the Canadians to finish their concentrationfollowing their port
851
operationson the coast.

Bradley's own directive at this time permitted clearing the Maas area; it did

on Dusseldorfor 852
The in
not order any move any coordinatedoperations. opposite,

fact, was true. Bradley's intent, if First Anny reachedthe Rhine, was that First Army

849LHC, AlanbrookePapers,Memorandumfor Lt-Gen Bedel[sic]Smith, 21-9-44.

'" MontgomeryLog, I October.He identified these 116Panzer,9 Panzer,
as and 10 SS Panzer,while
noting that 9 SS Panzerremainedin sector.
MontgomeryLog, 28 September.Montgomerynotesthe time for
shifting fully to the north to be
approximatelythreeweeks.Crerarlater returnedto Canadafor medicaltreatmentfor recurring
dysenteryduring the actualoperations.Montgomeryhad hopedthat Simonds
would remain in
command.
'5212" Arm Group Report Operations,V, G-3,
of Letter of Instructions,Number Nine, 25 Sep44;
'v
Letter of Instructions,
NumberTen, 28 Sep44, pp. 93-96.

476
would turn southwardto gain crossingpositionsfor Third and Ninth Army. First and

Third Army would crossthe Rhinetogether.853

Enemy action, supply,ammunitionshortageswithin the American armies,bad

weather, and a suddenly rehabilitated German army ended Montgomery's hope of a

single, seamless drive to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's acceptance that the Ruhr was a
on

priority, given on 24 September, had reverted to the need to move all the armies up

against the Rhine. Eisenhower's statement that he had never intended all the armies to

move forward simultaneously, a lie when stated, had become policy by the campaign's

own results. The MARKET GARDEN campaign, now over, could not change this.

Montgomery's refusal to accept Ike's strategy tied his belief in a concentrated thrust to

the command issue, and would soon reappear to cloud and corrupt any analysis of the

Broad Front design.854

On 7 October Montgomery sent Eisenhowerhis own appreciation of the

in increased
situation the north, statingthat enemyresistance, enemy and
strength, the

to
necessity concentrateon Antwerp had him
caused to decidethe following:

I therefore consider that I cannot launch SecondArmy towards the

RUHR until I haveeliminatedthe following commitments:
Finished the operationsopeningANTWERP.
Pushedthe enemyback over the MEUSE.

He continued:

853NARA, RG 407, Box 24143,12' Army Group Plans Studies,OperationsEast of the Rhine, 5
and
October 1944,p. 1.
8' MontgomervLog, 5 October.In this Montgomery his at an Eisenhower
entry, records attendance
conferencewherethe entire campaignplan againwasrevisited.Montgomery,clinging to Eisenhower's
notesregarding the 22 September
Versailles for
conference,argued priority in the north, which he had
understoodto be Eisenhower'sdecision.SeemessagesM-260,6 October;Eisenhowerto Monty, 7
October; M-264; M-266; 7 October;M-268,9 October.

477
 I have therefore ordered that the attack of Second Anny towards
KREFELD and the RUHR be postponed. 855

The MARKET GARDEN CAMPAIGN wasover.

The fact that Montgomery'sAugust plan had not beenacceptedand could not

be revisited even by gaining a Rhine bridgeheadhad not sunk in, though neither

reasonwas the causeof the fall stalemate.Those reasonslay in the nature of the

campaign and the complexity of the commandrelations that led to the failure of

MARKET GARDEN.

The campaignwas not simply the result of an operationaldesign.It reflected

tactical realities that shapedwhat was operationallypossible;it was distorted by the

philosophies and doctrines of the separateservicesthat made compromise,not a

single solution, a requirementfor every problem; and it reflected the differences in

displayed
generalship, by the senior commanders,differencesdistorted by their own

personalities,their ambitions,and their portrayalin the press.

... EL, Correspondence

File, Untitled Memorandum,7 October1944,
sgnd, B.L. Montgomery,7-10-
44.

478
 CHAPTERELEVEN

The MARKET GARDEN Campaign:

An Appreciation of the Factors and Controversies
Surrounding Allied Operations in the Late Summer
and Early Fall of 1944 in Northwest Europe

The 1944campaignthatculminatedin the launchingof OperationMARKET

GARDEN is enlightening for its richness in diverse factors that influenced the

conduct of operations,and for the insights it offers into the problems of conducting

joint military operationsas part of a coalition. While a detailed discussionof the

political factors that influenced the campaignwould be instructive, it is beyond the

scopeof the military natureof this study,and it is to the dominantmilitary factorsthat

we now turn.

Central to any campaigndiscussionmust be an understandingof the relative

combat power issuesthat dominatedthe In

campaign. NorthwestEurope,the basisfor

thinking on the relative combatstrengthsof the opposingarmieswas a key elementin

planning from the beginning. COSSAC's planners set an unrealistic standard for

successin the OVERLORD campaign,that being the belief that anything but the

broadest,subjectivecomparisonof "combatpower" was irrelevant in planning for the

operation. This assessmentwas seen in a specific number of enemy divisions that

were "acceptable" in theater to permit the NEPTUNE landings to be considereda

"'sound operation of war." Later, as intelligence was produced for the NEPTUNE

beaches,the addition of beachobstaclesand larger minefields was not given heavier

weight. Most important,ULTRA failed to confirm in a timely mannerthe locationsof

two divisions, one an infantry division on the coast,and the second,the 21s' Panzer

479
 Division, located near Caen and literally on the D-Day objective line for Second

Army. 856T119 further skewed the during-battle analysis of operationsconcerning

successand failure of the early landings,and hasbeenthe foundationfor much of the

misunderstandingconcerning the relative "worth" of the forces involved. That

SHAEF was apparentlyunawareof the subtletiesof suchdifferencesdemonstratedthe

lack of battle "experience"possessedby many of the staff, to include the Supreme

Commander, for whom war never progressedbeyond the theoreticals of a map

exercise.

The existenceof the heavierGermandefensewas never acceptedby SHAEF,

or by Montgomery's critics as a contributor to the loudly proclaimed "failure" of

Montgomery at Caen. More important, the remarkablyunsophisticatedanalysis of

Germandefensestrengththat followed the landingslikewise limited a clear vision of

Germancapabilities.Among many possiblefactors,two casesin point are instructive.

These revolved around tank strengths/capabilities,and the numerical assessmentof

antitank guns available to the defense. Both equated to a tremendous antitank

capability. Given the armor-heavy nature of Second Army, the inability of British

Shermans or Cromwells to compete at even odds with German tanks or guns negated

the "divisional" comparisons used at SHAEF for a correlation of forces estimate.

German tanks killed Allied tanks at far higher ratios, and German
antitank guns also

achieved very favorable ratios. While Montgomery's critics claimed that he and his

commanders did not understand how to use armor, Allied armor was-in any attack,

856Hinsley, British Intelligence,3, Part

2, Chapters43-44; Appendix 10. Hinsley that
ULTRA had "failed." SeeSHAEF Weekly SummaryNo. 11,3 never admits
June 1944;SHAEF Weekly Summary
No. 12, Orderof Battle Map Entitled,"Enemy Order Battle in
of WestNormandyas at 5 June 1944."

480
 deliberate or hasty-highly disadvantaged by their own vulnerabilities. That armor

men failed to commit suicide in larger numbers by pressing attacks such as EPSOM,

GOODWOOD, TOTALIZE, or TRACTABLE should have been seen as part of the

tactical equation, not necessarily a failure in generalship or nerve on the part of

Montgomery or Dempsey. The ability to neutralize enemy reserves and antitank

screens in depth was beyond the capability of the artillery of the day, and the use of

airpowf; r to make up these deficiencies was at that time both marginally effective and

857
controversial.

VAiile the closedefensivebattlesof Normandyshowedshortcomingsin armor,

the pursuit that followed the breakout on both the American and British fronts

demonstratedthat Montgomery did understandthe role of armor in the pursuit. He

concentratedhis armored divisions and used them to lead slower-moving and less

mobile infantry divisions whose organic transportationprevented their own self-

movement. Given that when Montgomery surfaqedhis concentratednorthern thrust

plan, there were 13 armoreddivisions, plus sevenindependentarmoredbrigadeswith

the British and Canadians,plus numerous independenttank and tank destroyer

battalions in the US forces, this gave SHAEF a tank superiority far in excessof

Hitler's 1940blitzkrieg.858

857Gooderson,Air Power the Battlefront, Chapter5,

at passim;ShelfordBidwell and Dominick
Graham,Fire-Power. British Army Weaponsand Theoriesof War 1904-1945(London: GeorgeAllen
and Unwin, 1982),Part4, passim.
858EL, SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary,23 August 1944.Independentbrigade
numbersfrom Ellis,
Victory in the West.1, Appendix 4. Allied tank strengthsper division averaged250, for tank brigades,
220 tanks.The author estimatesthat the tank vs. tank ratio of Allied tanksversus-running" German
tanks on I Septemberwould havebeenin excessof 20: 1. Ellis containsa useful comparisonof
Germanand Allied organizationsand weapons.

481
 Unlike the 1940Germancampaignin the west,wherethe armorwasusedboth

to createa hole in the front and then to exploit it, thesedivisions could have been

concentratedagainsta strategicobject and easilymaintaineda frontageof 100 to 150

miles. Eisenhower,like the French in 1940,choseto spreadhis armor, which while

carrying his general advance, achieved no operational decision. With the front

congealedin September,the advantageof mobility was lost, and the true calculus of

tank vs. tank and tank vs. antitank again obtained,with the samebloody results seen

as in Normandy.Though the use of armor is a subsetof the larger-scaleoperational

plan, SHAEF considered neither these factors nor, apparently,any other tactical

factors in designing their overall campaignplan, though lip servicewas paid to the

idea of using avenuesthat enhancedarmorandair powercapabilities.

The "phase line" comparisons made at SHAEF to "prove" that Montgomery's

operations had moved too slowly in Normandy were never adequate measures of

battlefield success. By September, though, they underscored the impending logistical

collapse possible due to distance from ports, and they posed false positive results

concerning operations. Distance and phase lines as depicted in SHAEF's forecasts did

not equate to enemy force destruction, nor did they focus the weight of Allied efforts

to key operational and strategic objectives. More deceptively, the rapid transit of

phase lines beyond SHAEF's original forecasts did not guarantee that further

successeswould be gained as rapidly, nor did they provide adquate measuresof future

sustainment. Rather, they provided the information that was not acted upon at

SHAEF-the priority that needed to be established for capturing the original ports

planned for as part of the NEPTUNE campaign.

482
 The entire logistical crisis was createdby two factors: a lack of operating

ports, and the distancefrom ports to the front lines due to the lack of intermediate

supply dumps, hencea transportationproblem.Montgomeryhad recastthe weight of

the Allied attack in NEPTUNE to favor a westerly attack,not simply to gain the key

port of Cherbourgbut to launch early attacksto gain the key Brittany ports. Airborne

plans cast early in the Normandy campaignat both SHAEF and 21 Army Group

favored early captureof theseports. The key "CHASTrM' plan, designedto solve

both the port and rail distance problems for deploying US divisions in Brittany

likewise was a key considerationaddedby the planners.

With the pursuit on in August and early September,and Bradley tending to go

more his own way, Eisenhower

neither insistedupon nor questionedBradley's lack of

in
success opening the Quiberon Bay area for CHASTITY, or in capturing Brest,

despitethe priority given to theseobjectives, both in Montgomery'sdirectivesand, as

he assumed command, in Eisenhower's. With the decreasedability to sustain

divisions farther from the ports; the desirefor momentumto be maintained;the large

number of self-mobile armoreddivisions available; and the failure to favor armored

and some motorized divisions while infantry was left to open the ports centeredon

one consideration alone-Eisenhower's strategy to have a "broad front," a pre-

OVERLORD conceptof operationswhose basic assumptionshad been nullified by

the operationalsituationin August.

An additional factor, as dominantas logistics, that affectedboth the battlefield

and the overall campaign design was "the air weapon." While this originally

comprised the use of the strategicand tactical air forces for the theater,it grew to

483
 include the Allied Airborne Army, dominatedanddesignedby airmen.It was intended

by Arnold and Breretonas the ultimate symbol and "proof' that the air and ground

were equalportions of any operationalsituation,portions that could and in the caseof

the Airborne Army, should,be commandedby airmen.

in everysituation," as
The philosophyor doctrineof "equality or independence

espousedby the airmen, was used by them as a constantsourceof variance in any

operationin which air forces' participated.As a result,the control of aircraft prompted

some of the war's bitterest controversies.While the "Combined Bomber Offensive"

known as POINTBLANK remained in the hands of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

through their executive agent, Air Chief Marshal Portal, the ainnen resentedand

resistedany attemptto maketheir "strategic" weapona theatercommander'sweapon.

The control of the strategic bombersfor OVERLORD not only prompted a three-

month controversy,its acceptancewas intertwinedby personalambition and air force

politics in attemptingto destroythe tactical "Air Commander-in-Chief,

" Sir Trafford

Leigh Mallory. It is nearly impossibleto escapethe conclusionthat Leigh Mallory, as

a former "Army Cooperation Command" commander, was not the "right kind of

chap" for the disciples of Douhet, 859

Trenchard,and Mitchell. While the RAF had

successfullykilled the Army's requestsfor its own dedicatedaircraft to match the

Nazis' capability, those such as Tedder saw to it that they would ensurethat their

American Air counterparts,whom he suspectedas "Brown Jobs," understoodthe

"" EL, Correspondence, Letter to PortalconcerningLeigh Mallory, 22 July 1944.Eisenhowerchanged

his mind about Leigh Mallory and was unsuccessfulin keepinghim in theater.Tedder
and Spaatz
engineeredhis departure.

484
 860
doctrine of an IndependentAir Force. The "AAF, " acceptinga truce in the their

own quest for for

independence the duration of the war, had beengiven carte blanche

by US Army Chief of Staff Marshall, but many American airmen rememberedtheir

roots and were far less prone to turn down pleas for help than their azure-uniformed

RAF counterparts.

The basicphilosophicaldifferenceadvancedby the RAF and then publishedin

the US Army Air Forces' manual,"Command and Employmentof Air "

Power, was

that:

LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND

INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF
THE OTHER. 861

While no ground soldier would arguethat this did not apply to the Strategic

Air Offensive againstGermany,it did not matchthe reality of the battlefield, nor did it

offer a synchronized use of air-ground forces unless someone,and some plan,

dominated the other. In the case of the US Army Air Forces, whose huge size

permitted large tactical and strategicair forcesthat did not jeapordize fielding a large

army, philosophical issuesreignedless as large numbersof aircraft were assignedto

supportBradley's forces.

For the British Army, whose size had been slashedproportionally from its

Great War force of 3,759,000 men that included 1.6 million infantrymen and 66

divisions, to a 2,920,000-manforce of only 24 divisions worldwide (with only eight

860The United StatesArmy Air Forces,a componentof the Army, wore "brown" Army uniforms. See
Owen, Tedder,passim.
861War DepartmentField Manual FM 100-20,Commandand Employment Power. 21 July 1943,
ofAir
1. This entire sectionis both bold-facedand capitalizedin the original, a first in US manuals.

485
divisions in SecondArmy in September1944),the issueswent beyondthe philosophy

of force employmentand doctrine.Royal Air Forcestrengthexceeded1,000,000men

in 1944and was about 950,000at war's end, comparedto the 291,000total of 1918.

Combinedwith a navy that had also doubledin size from World War I, the manpower

issue restricted combat options for the British and required the Army to look for

increased firepower and flexibility from the concerted use of airplanes in a

harmonizedair-groundbattle.862Despitethe fact that the million-man RAF had been

"bought" with personnel,monies, and technologythat would have made the British

Army a world-classforce, the airmen resistedaiding the army at every turn. Tedder

and Coningham viewed the increased ineffectivenessof their air-ground team

comparedto their American and Germancounterpartsas indicative of British Army

in
incompetence, a favorite topic of Coningham every venue possible.863

Eliminating the ability of the Air C-in-C to call on bomberswas a success

claimed by Tedder and Spaatzuntil Eisenhower,realizing that his ground campaign

was in dire straits, accededto ideasproposedby his fallen airman,Leigh Mallory, to

use bombersin close support.This enragedboth Tedderand Coningham,whoseown

personal hatred of Montgomery significantly hamperedoperations.Coningham had

told his American understudy,GeneralE.R. "Pete" Quesada,that he made it a firm

rule never to do anything he was told to do by the army. He didn't expect to see a

plan, and then be askedhow the air would support.He wantedto be presentwhen the

862Perry, CommonwealthArmies, 56,74,75; Bidwell

and Graham,Fire-Power, 260-275.
863Interview
with Lt. Gen. Quesada,who told authorthat Coningham'sstatementsin conferencesand
at every opportunity"to run down the British Army" went beyondvicious, and would havebeencause
for his immediaterelief in the US forces.

486
 problem was announcedand be part of the basic planning for the operation. He

864
strongly recommendedthat the Americansalwaysdo the same.

There was never any doubt, particularly after the Germanblitz of 1940, that

the British Army saw a definite role for airpower in the ground battle. In

Montgomery's view, airpower should first "win the air battle" and then provide

the
assistanzeas agreedupon to support groundbattle, both in close supportand deep

interdiction operations. Montgomery, in fact, acceptedand sought to practice a

doctrine later acceptedby the world's air forces, but which Tedder and Coningham

had discardedafter its successin the desertfor a more bureaucraticapproachrequiring

multiple levels of approvalfor target requests,air mission requests,and allocation of

effort that time

slowed response to make the intervention in
of airpower an opportune

fashion almost impossible.

The Cab-Ranksystemof on-call aircraft, favoredby Broadhurstand the Army,

was unpopular with Coningham, though adopted with great enthusiasmby the

865
Americans,who called it "Column Cover." The issue,asviewed by the airmen,was

one of effective use of aircraft, mainly to preventlosses,as opposedto most effective

use of airpowerto influencethe groundbattle.While the calculusof machine-gunning

trucks 100miles behindthe front might eventuallyyield somedimensionof battlefield

effect over time, the vagariesof battle often requiredimmediateinterventionto attack

the enemy reservesand subsequentgun-lines out of the range of artillery, to attack

enemy reservesas they deployed,to stop movementon the battlefield, or to attack

864Interview, Lt. Gen. E.R. Quesada

with author, 1984.
"'; Gooderson,Air Powerat the Battlefront; ETO Air Board, ThirdPhaseAirpower,
passim.

487
known defensive Given the superiorityof the Germanarmy in armor.
concentrations.

large divisions, this addedcombat power was a

antitank guns, and their number of

for inferior tanksand a lack To

replacements.
of personnel the
necessity an army with

host of fighter-bombersand medium bombers dedicatedfor 2 Tactical Air Force,

Leigh Mallory had addedheavybombersas an emergencystopgap.Their use,though

of mixed results,provedcrucial in the July and early August battlesin Normandy,and

in
was critical speedingthe captureof the Channel
ports. The set-piecebattlesusedto

the ports all used extensivebomber programslaid on by Leigh Mallory and

capture

Harris to support Crerar, whose own assets,particularly in anununition, were of

866
necessitylimited by Dempsey'soperations,which alsoneededsupport.

As Coningharn failed to achieve Montgomery's relief by claiming the "Army

plan had failed, " he went after Montgomery's air supporters, both the 2 TAF group

commanders. He succeeded in relieving the 84 Group Commander, Brown, while

failing to sack the efficient and popular Broadhurst.867 Thus, at a time when

operations became more dynamic, Coningharn sought to go his own way, loudly

complaining that the ground force's unit boundaries-needed to confine and control

operations- hampered the air effort, and damning the army for their refusal to have

his desires for "air sectors." 868

ground boundaries conform to

One of the tenetsthat Montgomeryhad preachedhad beenthat air and ground

headquartershad to be together.Monty hadmovedhis headquarters

rearwardto match

866RAF Narrative, IV, passim;Leigh Mallory Despatch,100-109.

16'NAC, Churchill Mann Papers,"Lecture Air Support"; Crerar Papers,RG 24, Volume 10636,
on
Letter Montgomeryto Crerar, 13-9-44.This letter begins,"Dear Harry, Coninghamhastold the Air
Ministry that your A. O.C. (Brown) is no good,that you do not like him, and you want him changed."

488
 the location behind the lines to which the RAF headquartershad fled during the First

Alamein battles. In Europe, Monty had considered Leigh Mallory his opposite

number, and Coningham,who did not leave England until late in the Normandy

campaign, never moved alongside 21 Army Group. As the campaign developed,

neither would move rearward or forward to collocate. This further separatedthe

concept of a harmonized"air-ground battle,

" though Monty had hoped the two group

commanders,who after all did the targeting and allocation of squadrons,would

cooperate.They did, earningConingham'seternalhatred.

Coningham posed a significantly difficult problem during MARKET

GARDEN. Here, air coordinationreachedits nadir. Leigh Mallory, alreadyalertedto

leave for SoutheastAsia as a result of the machinationsof Tedder,still should have

maintainedstrongcontrol of air operations,asAEAF remainedthe executiveagentfor

coordinating air missions to support airborne operations,though Eisenhower and

Brereton never permitted him authority to override plans despitepromisesmade to

that effect in late August during the formation 869

of the airbornearmy.

Air coordination for MARKET was spotty. While Leigh Mallory received

cooperation from Spaatz and Vandenburg, 2 TAF failed to send representation to a

key planning meeting on 15 September, and only six days before, the air commanders

had decided in conference that AEAF's control of tactical air forces was no longer

"practicable" from either Stanmore or Granville and that the AEAF should restrict

itself to strategic operations. On 14 September, the CCS removed control of the

... MHI, PoguePapers,Pogueinterview 14February1947;Coningharn,

with Air MarshalConingham,
Operations of 2 TAF,71-73.
269Seediscussionin ChapterFour.

489
strategic bombers from the theatercommander,and Tedder,though still considered

Eisenhower'sseniorairman,had no brief for the control of boffibers,which now had

870
beendelegatedto the direct control of Spaatzand Harris. DespiteTedder'sattitude,

Harris supportedCrerar's Army throughoutSeptember,launchinglarge air programs

871
to assistthe captureof Le Havre,Boulogne,andCalais.

While this perilous attitude of noncooperationpervadedthe air commandsat

the beginningof the MARKET GARDEN campaign,the statusof the Airborne Army

further muddled operationaleffectiveness.The RAF had opposedthe formation of

airborne divisions due to the requirementfor transport, tugs, and gliders, but the

American air chief, Hap Arnold, embracedthe idea enthusiastically,creatinga huge

air transport capability. While Eisenhower had sought to centralize the training and

support of the airborne under a unified command, Brereton, following on Arnold's

lead, had manipulated the command into an "Airborne Army, " another variant of the

air weapon that Arnold sought to use to gain Air Force independenceand a force that

he had hoped to absorb into a postwar independent air force.872

Brereton's ignoranceof the requirementsof ground battle, and his reftisal to

learn, had beenamply demonstratedduring the freneticplanning of August and early

Septemberand had resultedin a seriousbreachin personaland professionalrespect

betweenhimself and his Deputy Army Commander,"Boy" Browning. Perhapsit was

Browning's desireto heal this breachthat causedhim to be less forthright during the

planning for MARKET. Certainly Brereton's quick dismissalof Browning's outline

370RAF Narrative, IV,

pp. 125,148; Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,273-275.
$71Ibid., RAF Narrative, IV.

490
 plan to favor Taylor's demandsshouldhavebeencausefor a deepoperationalanalysis

of the commander's intent rather than a quick compromise solution affected by

placing Taylor under 30 Corps for planning. Moreover, the substitution of Williams

for Hollinghurst, who had beenthe principal transportcommanderdesignateduring

the planning period, substituteda far less bold, doctrinaire commanderin place of

someonewho was more willing to assistin the groundbattle.The confluenceof these

873
eventsaddedfatal flaws to the MARKET plan.

Likewise, Brereton's attitude toward the British posed a problem in a

multiservice, multinational operation.While he spokedaily with Smith at SHAEF and

turned somersaultsto pleaseIke, Spaatz,and Arnold in Washington,he never once

ventured forward prior to the operationto speakwith Montgomeryor Dempsey,the

men whom he would support in most of the plans hatchedby First Allied Airborne
874He did
Headquarters. visit Bradleyon a numberof occasions,and spenthourswith

Ridgway attempting to create opportunities for airborne drops that Bradley would

accept.Parks's HeadquartersDiary showsthat Breretonspentmore time planning for

his move to Paris, and more time away from the headquartersduring the MARKET

mounting period, than he did consideringoperationalconsiderationsfor what would

be the largestairborneoperationin history. With air supportallegedlycoordinatedby

AEAF and Leigh Mallory, with Williams and Hollinghurst picking drop zones,

timings, and routes, and with the Army commandersattempting to fit a ground

scheme of maneuver to match a procrusteanbed of aerial delivery requirements,

872
SeeChapterFour.
'" Davis, Spaatz
and the Air War,219. Williams had beenan aggressiveAir CommandCommander
in Tunisia. Spaatzpunishedhis supportof the Army by banishinghim to transports.

491
Brereton's real influence in shaping MARKET was marginalized, and his actual

in it times nonexistent.GARDEN and its relationship to

conduct running was at

MARKET's objectivesheld interestfor him; as "Airborne Army Commander"he

no

by Browning on 16 September
never evenattendedthe commanders'meetingchaired
875
to discussthe groundplan and final requirementfor the operation.

Yet Brereton'srole as "Army" commanderwas predicatedon the fact that he,

as an experiencedtactical airman, could combine close air support and ground

he himself had strenuouslyto Eisenhowerin July when he

a
operations, claim made

to within his own Ninth Air Force. This was

attempted create an airborne army

the inherent of
weaknesses the airborne; their lack of
especiallycrucial considering

firepower, heavyweapons,antitank capability, and self-mobility on the groundmeant

that their status as a surprise threat to the enemy could rapidly shift to that of an

immobile force imperiled. Until ground forcesclosedwith and relieved the airborne,

the tactical air forceswere their only methodof combatsupport,not simply an agency

for resupply as seenat First Allied Airborne Army. That Breretonwas not operating

closely and personally with both Leigh Mallory and Coningham, in whose sector

MARKET would occur, demonstrated negligence on his part. That Tedder,

Eisenhower's"senior air officer" for the theater,was also absentfrom key conferences

and did to
nothing assuresmooth and maximum support for MARKET GARDEN,

particularly when weather snagsand communicationsdifficulties plaguedthe entire

814He did visit Dempsey

after the operationbegan.
' '*-5Brereton'signorance Army
of operationswas a matterof attitude,not training. He had graduated
from the Army Commandand GeneralStaff Schooland had servedthereas an instructor. In World
War 1,he commandedan observationsquadronsupportingthe Army and had beenGeneralWilliam
"Billy" Mitchell's G-3 during the Meuse-Argonneoffensive.

492
 nine days of operations, demonstrateshis true "worth" as Deputy Supreme

Commander.

While biographersand this authorhaveattemptedto provide someinsight into

the personalities involved, it should be rememberedthat senior corrunandersare

genuinely strong personalities,and reachthe top of their professionby performance.

not personality. The chemistry of Eisenhower'sconunand had been forced by the

variabl.-s of the coalition, with multiple servicesnominatingindividuals and countries

accepting "champions" who, in the circumstances,often seemedill-suited to the

problems of coalition cooperation. For Northwest Europe, however, the great

influence was the campaignplan. Once initiated, it locked servicesand personalities

into a courseof action which, while seeminglyuncoordinatedor often diverged from,

kept a general line of operations,however inefficient, until the situation required a

major coursechange.

Neither Eisenhowernor Montgomery selectedNormandy, and though both

men can claim authorshipof parts of the NEPTUNE plan, the first "original plan" in

either man's term of commandwas the post-OVERLORDcampaignthat beganin late

August when the lodgementarea had been filled out. Two componentsdominated

both men's thinking; it was their diverging priorities over these issuesthat
sparked
debateover the campaignplan and the subsequentconductof the war.

The first componentwas the ground,seenfrom both operationaland strategic

perspectives.Both men recognizedthe role of avenuesof approachand the value of

what Jornini had describedas "strategic coup d'oeil." While any serious studentof

Europe's military geographywould have immediatelyseenthe

value of the northern

493
 only
approach, thosethiriking in termsof past,horsedarmieswould haveacceptedthe

southern gateway through Metz as a viable alternative. That SHAEFS planners

stretchedtheir estimate,and downplayedthe value of a campaignwithin Germany,

had to have been politically inspired, not merely based on a military estimate.

Moreover, two significant differences existed in Montgomery's and Eisenhower's

thinking. Montgomerycorrectly ascribedhis northernconcentrationas a "Schlieffen

Plan in reverse," a completeone-movementoperationdesignedto carry until victory,

whereas had
Eisenhower his
assumed operationwould pause,
possibly for a month or

two. Montgomery's strategywas totally offensive and reliant upon concentrationof

forces, supplies, and effort, with forces that were unsupportablefalling into flank

guard or reservestatus.Eisenhower'sidea of stretchingthe enemyassumedthat the

Allies would not have the initiative, nor would they achievea superiorityof forces at

the critical point, insteadproviding a defensivestanceas they moved and fighting the

enemyon near-eventerms. Montgomery's plan was for a deathblow; Eisenhower's

was an attrition strategydesignedto kill the Germanarmy oneunit at a time.

Montgomery believed in operationalconcentnation,as did the Red Army, the

German Army, indeed every major Western military force of the time; only the

Americans eschewedit at the operationallevel. Eisenhower'sstrategywas, at face

value, designed to split the Allies into the "Channels" that he described in his

appreciation on SupremeCommand,but it ignored the great fact that the second

smallestarmy group was on the key avenueof approachand had, with the Channel

Coast, the largest open flank to clear. Tom by the politics of keeping Marshall,

Stimson, and Bradley happy, Eisenhower had to react to the fact that the key

494
 objectives-the Channel ports, Antwerp, and the Ruhr-were in Montgomery's

sector. The mythology that Americans do not serve under foreigners,played up by

976
Patton and Bradley,was constantlyusedat his back to force bad military decisions.

Instead of a good campaignsomewhere,he had two bad campaigns,precisely as

Montgomery chargedin his postwarcomments,a fact that transpiredwith the failure

of MARKET GARDEN, in
the stalemate the Aachen Corridor, and the bitter fall

campaignin Metz and Lorraine.

At the operationallevel, the most essentialelementafter concentrationthat had

characterizedMontgomery's campaignssince Alarn Halfa in 1942 was careful and

'ý--the necessaryplanning,
thoughtful planning. British respectfor "battle procedure,

organization, reconnaissanceand staging of men, equipment,ammunition, and the

detailed briefing and rehearsalthat precededbattle-had causedMonty to be called

"cautious" by his enemies,but had beeninstrumentalin diminishing casualtiesas well

as maximizing the possibility for success.It also had encouragedthe use of "limited

objectives" to minimize risk, a less fluid approachthat unfortunately favored an

enemy keen at rapid shifting of reservesand the seizureof local opportunities.Late

August 1944had shownthat British forces,mainly 30 Corps, could pursueand harry

an enemywell astheir Americancousins.

MARKET GARDEN, however, was a significant departure from the form

previously seenby SecondArmy. NEPTUNE had permitted four months of detailed

8'6During World War 1,the US If Corps

was formed and neverserveda day under US command.It
servedunder British command.Separatedivisions also servedwith the Frenchuntil a largeenough
force to constitutean Americanarmy was formed.As if to follow their unwantedheritage,If Corps
servedin the British First Army in Tunisia under Frcdcndall,and then in Alexander's 18" Army
Group, under Patton,and then Bradley.

495
 its had beenunder study from the beginning
planning and rehearsal, airborneportion

the COSSAC period, though Gale's division was not formally given orders until
of

February 1944. The crucial coup de main at the Orne River bridge
(Pegasus) had

benefited from months of planning, training, and rehearsal,and the actual objective

before D-Day. MARKET had

was known to the commandermore than a month

benefitedfrom the practiceandplanningof a numberof operations,and SecondArmy

and 30 Corps had been in constantcombat since June and were well practiced at

cobbling together under

sometimes
operations, fire. MARKET GARDEN, therefore,

was not the product of inexperience,

though First Allied Airborne Army, I Airborne

Corps and I Airborne Division had yet to be testedunderfire in 1944.Given the time

from COMET's alert, 1 Airborne had 13 days of preparationand the two American

divisions, seven.

Montgomery'sorders,asalways,hadbeenverbal.DempseyandBrowning had

spoken to the Army Group commander,and were certain of his intentions and

conversantwith the "assumptions"that underlayhis It

plan. was their job to assure

that their detailed plans accomplishedhis intention, and if the assumptionsthat

underlay the plan had changedsuch that mission was

accomplishment jeopardized,

that they adapttheir plansfor successor cancelthem andrequestnew orders.

COMET had implied severalbasic assumptionsreflecting the enemysituation

as it was understoodon 3 September:that the enemywould not be able to form a

coherent front and strong defensiveblocks en route to the Rhine bridges, that 30

Corpswould be able to rush the small bridgesrangingfrom Eindhovento Veghel, and

that the airbornewould seizethe large and irreplaceablebridgesat Grave,Nijmegen,

496
 and Arnhem in rapidly
coup-de-mainoperations reinforcedby brigade-sizedelements.

The plan itself accommodatedthese assumptions.By beginning at Eindhoven, the

quick linkup neededto reach the first bridge would be a dash of roughly 30 miles

" a feat that had beendone recently by the Household

through "negligible resistance,

Cavalry and all the fighting elementsof the GuardsArmoured Division. Flak. it was

felt, would be negligible in the target areas;weatherwould be sufficient for close air

support and the delivery of four lifts in two days; and within severaldays, the air-

portable 52d (Lowland) division would be flown in to Deelen airfield, north of

877
Amhem.

Stiffening resistancesouth of Eindhoven,the spectreof tens of thousandsof

escapingGermansmoving north of the Scheldt,and henceavailablefor counterattack

north of the Neder Rijn, and the increaseddangerfrom V-missile sites to the United

Kingdom, causeda major restructuringof COMET. The new plan substitutednew

assumptions:that increasedforce would push through or break the enemy "crust"

forming, and that it would be ableto provide adequateflank protection.The increased

airborne strengthwould permit a virtual "passage"of the attacking force for most of

the depth of the attack and would permit control of divisional sectorsand the vital

ground along the route; surpriseparachutedrops or glider assaultsnext to the key

bridges would permit the surprise capture of and total

control over every bridged

water coursein the division sector;and the last major bridge along the route would be

reachedin two to five days.Enemyreserves,absentthe far objective area,would not

arrive prior to the groundelementsof 30 Corps.

$77
A detailed
discussion
of theairandgroundplanforCOMETis in Chapter
Eight.

497
 The new plan, as approved,was supposedto reflect theseassumptions.The

new tasks, as approvedby Dempseyand as outlined for MARKET, accommodated

these. Thus, in Browning's briefing, MARKET, the airborne phase, would be

increasedby adding two additional airborne divisions, and what had been seenas a

30-mile rush to link up would be replacedby a seven-mile-deepattack with heavy

artillery and air support.The groundattackwould be three divisions wide, with a full

corps in column. The "linking force" amongthe assaultingairbornedivisions would

be passedover roads controlled by the airborne for 46 miles of the route. Most

important, the airborne lift would take place in double lifts per day over two days,

surpriseat the bridges would be by coup de main, and weatherand flak would not

pose problems. In addition to tactical surprise, both COMET and MARKET

GARDEN assumednot simply air superiority,but that the US First Army's thrust to

Cologne and Bonn would have drawn enemyreserves,most particularly the armored

reservesknown to be southof Aachen.

Most significant in both cases,it was assumedthat the operation could be

executedin a short amount of time-36-48 hours after adoption of COMET and

within 48-120 hours of adoption of MARKET-to preclude substantial enemy

reinforcement. Also implied was the assumptionthat significant enemy reserves

would not be positionedin depththroughoutthe route,or nearthe major bridges.

Montgomerywas said to have first seenthe final plan on 15 September.If this

is true, he would havediscoveredtwo key items weremissingfrom his "intentions" as

describedto Dempsey:that the coup-de-mainmissionsfor the large bridgeshad been

abandonedin eachdivision area;that the "stair carpets"that would provide 30 Corps a

498
 quick passageover most of the route had been abandonedsouth of Zon, in the area

where enemyreservesfor the crust would be most likely to be located,and that the

corridor through the island would have its bridges open for enemy movementuntil

both the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridgeswere captured.While the three-division-wide

attack was still scheduled,it began to look as if logistics might force it to be

staggered,with 8 Corpsbeing the last to put in their attack.Moreover, the increasing

flak rings around the target areaswould require a daylight preparation,putting back

the time of the drop and hence cutting the available daylight for 30 Corps' drive,

which would be a daylight-onlyattack.Moreover,with one lift per day, and not two as

in COMET, the full airborne force would not be in their areasuntil D+3. From an

operationalperspective,the flank supportby the First US Army grew more tenuous

daily in the Aachen-Stolbergcorridors,and few enemyreserveswere being drawn off

from Holland.

Given the change in both the plan and its acceptableassumptions,did

intelligence justify its execution? While much has been said about ULTRA's

warnings, the Dutch Resistance, and aerial photography, what exactly did

Montgomery know on the eve of battle?After the war, his intelligenceofficer stated

after the war the key to this dilemma in an interview. The historian's notes are

reproducedbelow:

We knew that the 10 SS Pz was in the rest areaaround Arnhem. But

we knew their statehad beenbad. Didn't know how much they picked
up. They had crawled across the Seine. We didn't know they had
recuperated.SHAEF, V Army and [he] thinks that 30 Corpsknew (30
Corps not on ULTRA, but thinks that the stuff was given to Bill
Knowland anyway). However, the commander was not indoctrinated
so he didn't know. Tony Tasker [FAAA] sent me a chasersaying he

499
 had told A/B commanderhe didn't think 10 SSwasthere.My personal
in identification,but 878
error was not oneof strength.

In correspondencewith Pogue,Williams added scatteredcommentson the

draft of TheSupremeCommand,noting cryptically:

We agreed9 and 10 SS were there and Airborne Army knew (I asked

Tony Taskertheir G-2). What we didn't know was to what extentthey
hadbeenreplenishedwith tankssincecrossingthe Seine.

He notedfurther in the document,

The strength, not the presence of H SS PZ K[orps] was the nasty

879
surprise.

ConcerningMontgomery'suseof G-2 estimates,Williams said:

G2 estimates were not things M[onty] relied on, but rather oral
testimony and the occasional special paper one wrote for his personal
I
eye. shouldn't think he read my Intelligence Reviews, for he had them
summed up to him either by Joe Ewart (my representative at Tac. Hq. )
880
or myself

Given that it is probable that only the G-2 at Monty's tactical headquarters

would have briefed Montgomery, would he have stressedthe possible location of

"shelle' or building divisions? Moreover, would Dutch information been passedto

Montgomery?Monty appearedto have no love for the Dutch, or for Prince Bernhard

(who was German),but would Williams havepassedraw datafrom the resistance?

"s MHI, PoguePapers,Brig. E.T. Williams interview

with ForrestC. Pogue,May 30-31,1947,7.
Note that Williams mentionsULTRA, which Poguewasnot clearedto know about.
87'NARA, RG 319. SupremeCommand,Letter Williams to Pogue,12-viii-51 [background
papersof
official historian].
"0 Ibid.; Letter Williams to Pogue,10-viii-51. Of
somenote is that Strong,who allegedlywarnedabout
Arnhem, saysnothing in correspondence to Poguebut is persistentin trying to establishthat he had
warnedBradley concerningthe surpriseattackin Ardennes.Moreover,Pogueis not much interestedin
intelligence-failure" at Arnhem, but is persistentin askingmany questionsaboutStrong's "warning"
aboutArdennes.

Soo
 The official historian of the S.O.E. (Special Operations.Executive) suggests

that any information would haveheld little credibility. Earlier in the war, the Germans

had penetratedthe Dutch Resistanceturning a number of agents and wiping out

E.
S.O. teamsthat were dropped.
The operationswas called "North "
Pole. The official

historian states:

Chickens hatched during 'North Pole' came home to roost during

'Market Garden. ' Such news about secret service affairs as filtered
to
through allied airborne forces' intelligence staff indicated that Dutch
had been penetrated by the enemy to a hopeless degree; so
resistance
that any approach by men claiming to be Dutch resisters was liable to
be treated with reserve, even suspicion. It was the task of the
'Jedburgh' teams to dispel suspicion and replace it with confidence-if
881
they could.

Certainly, no evidenceof photo intelligence was passedhigher to 21 Army

Group by Browning's headquarters,and the fact remainsthat deep in the rear, some

vehicles would have been expectedto be found, and those seenby Urquhart were

most probably half-tracks of Harzer's Group, not tanks, which did not appear for

severaldaysinto the battle.

Besidesa level of sophisticationthat failed to account for combat elements

other than tanks, intelligence especially failed in two key elementsof information:

strengthsand None
dispositions. of thesewere offered. Montgomerysummedhis own

beliefs:

The 2ndS.S. PanzerCorps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having

limped there. But we were wrong in supposing it could not fight

88'M. R.D. Foot, SOEin the Low Countries(London: St. Ermin's Press,2001), 391-392.The
"Jedburgh" teamswere deployedduring MARKET; therewere nonein Holland to report prior to the
operation.

501
 effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation.It was
quickly brought into action againstthe V Airborne Division.882

Given the imponderables,was the risk justified consideringthe information at

hand?Montgomeryhadmadesimilar risks both with I Airborne in Sicily and with the

entireairborneeffort in Normandy.It was known that the 91" Airlanding Division had

moved into the Cotentin on top of 82d Airborne Division's drop zones, and he

supportedthe drop slightly to the easton D-Day's eve.Moreover,with knowledgethat

21 PanzerDivision was within rapid motor-marchdistanceof 6 Airborne's drop zones

in Normandy,he likewise authorizedtheir drop and later plannedto drop I Airborne

during WILD OATS in a more risky schemethat was overruledby Leigh Mallory.

More telling perhapsthan his assessmentof enemy strengthpossibilities is

Montgomery'spostmortemon the airborneplan.

The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away from the
vital objective-the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I
take blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and I
Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one complete Parachute Brigade
was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have been
captured in a few minutes and its defence soundly organised with time
do 883
to do so. I did not so.

Accepting that units were reforming in the battle area, with no strengths,

organizational information, or dispositions perhaps justified taking a risk, but

acceptingthe "no coup-de-main"plan demandedby the RAF and IX Troop Carrier

and, in particular,Taylor's compactdrop that eliminatedthe first "carpet" and bridge,

increasedthe "risk" to the statusof a "gamble."

882
Montgomery,kfemoirs.266.
883
Ibid.

502
 Certainly, the "drop zone geometry!--where the airborne landed-redefined

the essenceof the plan. In every case,the primary gift of an airborne operation-

surprise-was lost due to the failure to land near or on objectivesregardlessof cost.

Refusing to pay the price up front, the airbornepaid a larger price later as the odds

were turned againstthem by quick-reactingdefenders,by weatherthat crippled both

their reinforcementand air support,and by the fact that Club Route becamea battle

zone, not a short battle and a rapid exploitation mute as conceptualized by

Montgomeryand Dempsey.

A German analysis, captured and quickly distributed among MARKET's

numerousinternal lessonssponsoredby the variousheadquarters,

notedthe following:

The enemy's chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First
Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a
second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of
Arnhem. 884

The airmen themselvesshowed far less daring and even less imagination.

Brereton and Williams should have been aware that the introduction of napalm,

alreadyusedin somequantitiesin theater,would have beenan ideal area"clearance"

weaponand that parties of paratroopsor the original glider parties should have been

usedto seizethe bridge and freezethe combatareafollowing suchan attack.The fact

that the airmen refusedto countenancethis showedtheir lack of understandingfor,

885
and concern about, the ground battle. While Montgomery might be damnedas a

gambler,they proved unimaginativeand more deadlyto the plan. Nor was theremuch

884
NARA, R0331, IAAA, GcnnanAnalysis of ARNHEM, 18 December1944.
88'ETO Air Board,Effectiveness Third PhaseTacticalAir Operations,
of 138-156,314-319;NARA,
RG 18,373.2b Supportof GroundOperations,Headquarters,USSTAF, I ODcccmber1944,Eighth Air
Force,SpecialReportof Operationsin Supportof First Allied Airborne Army Operations.

503
initiative shown as the battle failed. One wonders why bomberswere not used !o

carpet-bombthe areaimmediatelyto the eastof the Elst block. Leigh Mallory, already

skeweredby Tedder and Spaatz,might have proposedthis, but both the tactical air

forcesand the strategicbomberswere out of his hands.Tedder,the self-appointedAir

Supremo,might haveacted,but he was nowherenearthe combatarea.Concerningthe

tacticalplanningof air operations,Broadhurstcommented:

In the Normandy campaign, this was normally [done at] the

Army/Tactical Group H.Q., although for small specialistoperationsit
was often delegatedto Corps H.Q. when a small team from the main
H.Q. would be designatedto sit in for the planning.Why Arnhem was
treatedso differently has neverbeenexposed,but I imaginetherewere
886
very strongpolitical reasonsfor the decision.

Broadhurst'sfiustration went beyondpoor planning coordination.He related

to the author,

I also receivedthis signal [relating to presenceof PanzersnearArnhem

at beginning of operation]. I immediately got on to my superior
[Coningham, 2 TAF] headquartersasking permission to attack the
Panzers with my rocket-firing Typhoons as they advancedtoward
Arnhem. I was virtually told to mind my own businessand keepout of
the areaas the operationwas being handledfrom England,and if Lhey
for it! 887
requiredassistanceLheywould ask

Broadhurst's comments extend further, to the realm of basic communications

capabilities:

I was completely flabbergastedat the time to find that an operationof

that magnitude was laid on without any proper communications
888
betweenthe Airborne drop andthe local Amy/Air Headquarters.

886CAB 101/332,Harry BroadhurstNotesfor Sir Ralph Cochrane,

ibid., 6.
887Letter, Broadhurstto the
author,28 March 1991.
$88Letter, Broadhurstto the
author,23 June 1991.

504
 " citing the large
Brereton, declaredthe operation an "outstanding success,

delivery figures and the low loss rates of aircraft and pilots. The ground battle, of

course,was lost by SecondAnny's failure to expeditiouslylink up with I Airborne, a

fact that he neverconsideredaspart of the drop plan itself. Complainingto Arnold, he

madethe following comments:

J would like to presenta few of the conditionswhich must be fulfilled

to increase the chances of success of a large airborne operation. The
first "don't send a boy to do a man's job, " "concentratethe
... but
maximum force on the principal objective. " This sounds trite, the
ground force planners persistin presenting a multiple of objectives. An
all-out effort with everything that can fly must take advantageof the
initial surprise by dropping the maximum of supplies and
reinforcements before the enemy can muster his air, flak, and ground
defenses.All troop drops and landings from the outset must be in
how 889
combat teams, no matter small the combatteamis.

Amold, fi=Uy, thoughtthat Brereton'sAirbome Army had missedthe major

point of their existence:

From the limited data availablehere, I would offer one conclusionon

your initial operation which may bear on future plans. It appearsthat
the successof the Air Commandooperationsin Burma and to some
extent, the inability of your British First Airborne Division to achieve
its objective, indicate that the key to successof large-scaleairborne
operationslies in the seizing of airfields or landing strips in the initial
phasesof such an operation.From this distant viewpoint, and at this
time, I feel quite strongly that future airborne operations must be
focussedabout airbasesif the air transportedforce is to remain active
and effective. It seems clear that an airborne force cannot rely
890
completelyon the advanceof any GroundForce.

Horrocks;and Browning havebeendamnedfor mistakes,but it is hard to fault

either for decisionsmade with little information. Nor was Browning's insistenceon

$89LC, Papers
ofHenry H. Arnold, Narrativeof OperationMarket, Dec 1944,4,6. Interestingly,it was
Breretonwho complainedaboutthe multiple combatteamsfor the Browning-planned101' drop that
would haveplacedthe units on their objectives.

505
clearing the Groesbeek
areaand holding it incorrect.It savedthe 82d and Club Route

during the counterattacksand, given the rumors of tanks in Cleves,was probably a

correct action. Browning's acceptanceof the cancellation of the coup-de-main

missions in the American sector may have been due to Taylor's protests and

Brereton's failure to support him. He was not going to specify such tactics to the

Americans.The 82d's commanderwas adamantin his claim that his men could have

takenthe Nijmegenbridge if permitted.This is a claim I do not accept.His force was

too small to take the town from the south and still accomplishall his objectives.A

battalion-sizeddrop north of the bridge might have worked, but a battalion was too

small a force to take the town and the bridge from the south.More than size, it was a

factor of timing. The 82d having failed to take the bridge at the outset, the very troops

and vehicles that opposed the Allied assault on the twin bridges had been permitted to

cross and fortify the town. The failure to pass the Guards Armoured expeditiously on

19 September, along with the failure to block both bridges from southern movement

by the 10 SS in the first hours of the operation, doomed the I Airborne. Adair's

statement concerning this is fair:

My orders had said that the Nijmegen bridge would be in airborne

hands by the time we reached it, and we would simply sweep on
891
through.

While the airborne criticized 30 Corps, its commandernoted for the official

historian his own views:

I cannot seewhat I as a Corps Commandercould have done more in

order to speedup the advance.This criticism suggeststhat I sat all day

890NARA, RG 18,312.1-k OperationsLetters,

entry 294, Letter Arnold to Brereton,October 13,1944.
891Adair, A Guards'General, 164.

506
 in my Headquarters,when in point of fact I was out with the leading
troops all day and every day, so I don't think you are being fair when
you saythis, but I blamemyself very much for the mistakein tactics-I
should have carried out a wide outflanking movement. Even so, 43
Division did not do so badly....
We might have beenable to relieve the V Airborne more quickly.
but if we had reachedthe final objectiveallotted to us, the result might
well have been disastrous,because we should not have been able to
keepopenour narrow L. of C. 892

13rowning's views concerning the Coup de main originally planned for

COMET but not usedin MARKET, werethese:

The chief reasonwhy coup de main were not put in was becauseit was
daylight. Coup de main by nightý if carefully planned, did not give
away the impending but major operation,whilst in daylight coup de
893
main would almostcertainlydoneso.

He also expanded on this theme:

The airborne objectives lay more or less in a strong belt of the flak
defencesof the Ruhr and the thickest part of this flak was at Arnhem
andNijmegen.
The fighter cover available was sufficient to protect the fly in of the
forces on the lines chosen, which would avoid flak as much as
possible; but not sufficient for subsidiary lines for coup de main in
addition.
Normal sizedcoup de main partieswould not havebeenstrongenough
to seizeandhold the major bridges. 894

While Montgomeryand Horrocksare most connectedwith MARKET

GARDEN's failure in someeyes,Dempsey'sown commentsto the official historian

are telling:

892CAB 1011332,Letter B. G. Horrocksto L. F. Ellis, 20 May 1966.

$13CAB 106/1133,Letter F.A. M. Browning, 12 October 1954.
894CAB 106/1133,Letter F.A. M. Browning, 27 September1954.

507
 The plan was mine. It was not perfect-few plans are-and in several
ways a calculated-risk was taken. We secured a good bridge-head at
Nijmegen, and we failed to get the final objective, which was a good
bridge-head at Arnhem.... The cutting of the road did have quite an
effect on the development of our operations, and was a very good move
by the Germans. 895

MARKET GARDEN, while one of the most dramatic battles of the war,

reflected the problems of conductingbattle within a coalition. While Dempseyhad

made a 60-mile thrust into enemy territory, the operation failed either to gain the

bridgeheaddesired,or to changeEisenhower'smind concerningconcentratingon one

main avenue.While MARKET GARDEN offered no proof that the war could have

been won in 1944, it did underscorethat the time to concentratehad long since

passed,and that Eisenhower'sdecision,regardlessof how he waveredin September,

had been irrevocable. The plan for a concentrated thrust on the main avenue of

approach,when offered in August, had alreadyreachedits "now or never" stage,and

Eisenhower having failed to accept one avenue, the Broad Front became reality.

Eisenhowerhad converted an operational opportunity into a tactical solution that

failed. The Northwest Europecampaignwould be an attrition campaignand it would

be prolonged. Montgomeryand Eisenhowerwould never agreeon this decision,nor,

in old age, eventreat the issuerationally. The failure to accepthis plan, Montgomery

felt, had permittedthe Germansto reform, rebuild, and launchthe Ardennesoffensive,

and to eventuallyprolong the war at the cost of countlessthousandsof lives. While

reachingBerlin was probably not possible,taking the Ruhr most certainly was, and I

agreewith Montgomerythat Eisenhower'sfailure to try was a costly mistake.

CAB 101/332,Letter M. C. Dempseyto L. F. Ellis, 18June 1962.

508
 Montgomery had describedthe events as he saw them, in the Wellington

Memorial Lecture given to celebratethe 2001hAnniversary of the birth of the first

Duke of Wellington. During this lecturehe said:

Therearethreetypesof commandersin the highergrades:

I. Thosewho havefaith and inspiration,but who lack the capacityfor
taking pains and preparingfor every forsecablecontingencywhich
is the foundationof all successin war. Thesefail.
2. Thosewho possessthe last namedquality to a degreeamountingto
genius. Of this type I would name Wellington as the perfect
example.
3. Those who possessingthis quality, are inspired by a faith and
conviction which enablesthem, when they have done everything
possiblein the way of preparation,and when the situation favours
boldness,to throw their bonnetover the moon. There are moments
in war when to win all, onehasto do this.
I believe such a moment occurredin August 1944 after the battle of
Normandyhadbeenwon, and it was missed.896

Montgomery,as an operationalcommander,may havehad a more clever plan,

faith, inspiration and, indeed, conviction, but Eisenhower, as the Supreme

Commander,possessed
the only bonnetthat could haveflown over the moon.

896Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery

of Alamein, Wellington Memorial Lecture, Journal of the
Royal United Services Institution, Vol. CXIV, No. 656,13.

509
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534
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AND ANTWERP
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629
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DISPOSITIONS
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LAYOUT OF XXX CORPS

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NTH 55 PANZER
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DISPOSITIONS
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