CASES (Equal Protection) DOCTRINE
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
People v. Vera where the inferior court or
tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of
prohibition from enforcing that
statute
for the purpose of executing the
statute, elements of consideration
which would be otherwise beyond
the scope of judicial authority
Justice Carson, in his illuminating
concurring opinion in the case
of Director of Prisons vs. Judge
of First Instance of Cavite (29
Phil., 265), decided by this court
in 1915, also reached the
conclusion that the power to
suspend the execution of
sentences pronounced in criminal
cases is not inherent in the
judicial function. "All are agreed",
he said, "that in the absence of
statutory authority, it does not lie
BASIS
violative of section 1, subsection
(1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands
undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of
several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution)
True, the statute does not
expressly state that the provincial
boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces but,
considering that, in being vested
with the authority to appropriate
or not the necessary funds for the
salaries of probation officers, they
thereby are given absolute
discretion to determine whether
or not the law should take effect
or operate in their respective
provinces, the provincial boards
FACTS
application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office
The constitutionality of Act No.
4221 is challenged on three
principal grounds:
(1) That said Act encroaches
upon the pardoning power of the
Executive; NO
(2) that its constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power
YES thus UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND VOID
(3) that it denies the equal
protection of the laws. YES it
permits and allows the violation
of the Equal Protection Clause
but surely result to a violation.
The challenged section of Act No.
4221 in section 11 which reads
within the power of the courts to
grant such suspensions."  legislature to suspend the
as a general rule, only those who
are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute
involved in a judicial decision, it
has been held that since the
decree pronounced by a court
without jurisdiction is void, where
the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the
statute in question, the issue of
the constitutionality will be
considered on its being brought
to the attention of the court by
persons interested in the effect to
be given the statute.(
are in reality empowered by the
as follows:
operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces, the Act to be
held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide
otherwise by appropriating the
necessary funds. The validity of a
law is not tested by what has
been done but by what may be
done under its provisions. (Walter
E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and
Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12
C. J., p. 786.)
This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in
which the respective
provincial boards have
provided for the salary of
a probation officer at
rates not lower than those
now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be
appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation
Office. (Emphasis ours.)

The unchallenged rule is that the

person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained,
or will sustained, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No.
4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the
present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it
set aside. Of grater import than
the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
Hence, the well-settled rule that
the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws

This court, by clear implication

from the provisions of section 2,
subsection 1, and section 10, of
Article VIII of the Constitution,
may declare an act of the
national legislature invalid
because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. 

" . . . where the pardoning power

is conferred on the executive
without express or implied
limitations, the grant is exclusive,
and the legislature can neither
exercise such power itself nor
delegate it elsewhere, nor
interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof, . . ."

under the common law the power

of the court was limited to
temporary suspension and that
the right to suspend sentenced
absolutely and permanently was
vested in the executive branch of
the government and not in the
judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation
by statute was conceded. 

We conclude that the Probation

Act does not conflict with the
pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power,
in respect to those serving their
probationary sentences, remains
as full and complete as if the
Probation Law had never been
enacted. The President may yet
pardon the probationer and thus
place it beyond the power of the
court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United
States [1926], 
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)

The power to make laws — the

legislative power — is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the
Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a
unicamiral National Assembly by
the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1,
Constitution of the Philippines).
The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not
escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate
the power is unconstitutional and
void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non
delegare potest.

Locke, namely: "The legislative

neither must nor can transfer the
power of making laws to anybody
else, or place it anywhere but
where the people have." 

Doubtless, also, legislative power

may be delegated by the
Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of article VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines
provides that "The National
Assembly may by law authorize
the President, subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import
or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues." And section
16 of the same article of the
Constitution provides that "In
times of war or other national
emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize
the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribed, to
promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national
policy." 
In testing whether a statute
constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any
other appointee or delegate of
the
legislature. COMPLETENESS
TEST AND SUFFICIENT
STANDARD TEST

Rationale revolves around the

presence or absence of a
standard or rule of action — or
the sufficiency thereof — in the
statute, to aid the delegate in
exercising the granted discretion.
In some cases, it is held that the
standard is sufficient; in others
that is insufficient; and in still
others that it is entirely lacking.
As a rule, an act of the legislature
is incomplete and hence invalid if
it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board
may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers
delegated to it.
What is granted, if we may use
the language of Justice Cardozo
in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a "roving
commission" which enables the
provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11
if the Act, the legislature does not
seemingly on its own authority
extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial
boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of
the various provinces are to
determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands
of the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain
language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds,
is a virtual surrender of legislative
power to the provincial boards.

But, in the case at bar, the

legislature has not made the
operation of the Prohibition Act
contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by
the provincial board. It leaves, as
we have already said, the entire
operation or non-operation of the
law upon the provincial board. the
discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board
need not investigate conditions or
find any fact, or await the
happening of any specified
contingency. It is bound by no
rule, — limited by no principle of
expendiency announced by the
legislature. It may take into
consideration certain facts or
conditions; and, again, it may not.
It may have any purpose or no
purpose at all. It need not give
any reason whatsoever for
refusing or failing to appropriate
any funds for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a matter
which rest entirely at its pleasure.
The fact that at some future time
— we cannot say when — the
provincial boards may
appropriate funds for the salaries
of probation officers and thus put
the law into operation in the
various provinces will not save
the statute. The time of its taking
into effect, we reiterate, would yet
be based solely upon the will of
the provincial boards and not
upon the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon
the ascertainment of certain facts
or conditions by a person or body
other than legislature itself.

While it may be undoubted that

the legislature may suspend a
law, or the execution or operation
of a law, a law may not be
suspended as to certain
individuals only, leaving the law
to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and
cannot be made for individual
cases or for particular localities. 

It is manifestly contrary to
the first principles of civil
liberty and natural justice,
and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that
any one citizen should
enjoy privileges and
advantages which are
denied to all others under
 like circumstances; or
that ant one should be
subject to losses,
damages, suits, or
actions from which all
others under like
circumstances are
exempted.

it should be borne in mind that a

constitution is both a grant and a
limitation of power and one of
these time-honored limitations is
that, subject to certain
exceptions, legislative power
shall not be delegated.

Class legislation discriminating

against some and favoring others
in prohibited. But classification on
a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. 

The classification, however, to be

reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of
the class. 
This is obnoxious discrimination. 

Inequality is not in all cases the

necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that in
section 11 of the Probation Act
creates a situation in which
discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. 

we are of the opinion that section

11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of
the law and is on that account
bad. We see no difference
between a law which permits of
such denial. A law may appear to
be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it
is within the constitutional
prohibitions.

If the law has the effect of

denying the equal protection of
the law it is unconstitutional. 

Under section 11 of the Probation

Act, not only may said Act be in
force in one or several provinces
and not be in force in other
provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of the
probation officer of a given year
— and have probation during that
year — and thereafter decline to
make further appropriation, and
have no probation is subsequent
years. While this situation goes
rather to the abuse of discretion
which delegation implies, it is
here indicated to show that the
Probation Act sanctions a
situation which is intolerable in a
government of laws, and to prove
how easy it is, under the Act, to
make the guaranty of the equality
clause but "a rope of sand".

where part of the a statute is

void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable
from the valid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this,
the valid portion must be in so far
independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presume that the
Legislative would have enacted it
by itself if they had supposed that
they could not constitutionally
enact the other. 
Ichong v. Hernandez

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Permit first before livelihood

Ceniza v. COMELEC Probation - unequal

Nuñ ez v. Sandigandbayan Sandiganbayan

PASEI v. Drilon Women workers

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy Monopoly by deregulating

ISAE v. Quisumbing Faculty; foreign hire and local
hire